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
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
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President ORELLO CONE of Buchtel College ;
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THE EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIANITY.

EVOLUTION is defined by Professor Le Conte as “continuous, progressive change according to certain laws and by means of resident forces.” Religion has been defined by an English divine as “The life of God in the soul of man.” It is my object to show that the Christian religion is itself an evolution ; that is, that this life of God in humanity is one of continuous progressive change, according to certain divine laws, and by means of forces, or a force, resident in humanity. The proposition is a very simple one ; my object is to illustrate and apply it, in a solution of some of the problems which are perplexing us concerning the Bible, the text-book of Christianity ; the Church, the institutions of Christianity ; theology, the philosophy of Christianity ; and social ethics and spiritual experiences, the social and personal life-fruit of Christianity.¹

All scientific men to-day are evolutionists. That is, they agree, substantially, in holding that all life proceeds, by a regular and orderly sequence, from simple to more complex forms, from lower to higher forms, and in accordance with laws which either now are, or may yet be understood ; these last are, at all events, a proper subject of hopeful investigation. The truth of this doctrine I assume ; I assume that all life, including the religious life, proceeds by a regular and orderly sequence from simple and lower forms to more complex and higher forms, in institutions, in thought, in practical conduct, and in spiritual experience. It is

¹ For the full development of this thought, see my forthcoming volume, *The Evolution of Christianity*. (Houghton, Mifflin & Co.)

not my purpose to demonstrate this proposition, but to state it, exemplify it, and apply it.

As "evolution" is the latest word of science, so "life" is the supreme word of religion. All religious men agree that there is a life of God in the soul of man. Max Müller may offer us a more scientific definition of religion, — one identical in sense, though different in form. He says that "Religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man" (*Natural Religion*, p. 188). The Christian religion then is, historically, the perception of that manifestation of God made in and through Jesus Christ which has produced the changes in the moral life of man whose aggregate result is seen in the complex phenomena of Christianity, past and present. As all scientific men believe in evolution, — the orderly development of life from lower to higher forms, — so all Christians believe that there has been a manifestation of God in Jesus Christ which has produced historical Christianity. As I assume the truth of evolution, so I assume the truth of this fundamental article of the Christian faith. With the scientific believer, I believe in the orderly and progressive development of all life; with the religious believer, I believe in the reality of a life of God in the soul of man. It is not my object to reconcile these two beliefs, but, assuming the truth of both, to show that this divine life is itself subject to this law of all life; that Christianity is itself an evolution. To restate the fundamental proposition once more, in a different form: assuming Max Müller's definition, so amended and limited as to define the Christian religion alone, it is my object to show that the manifestation of God in Jesus Christ has been a gradual and growing manifestation, and that the changes wrought thereby in the moral life of man have been gradual and growing changes wrought by spiritual forces, or a spiritual force, resident in man.

There are in Professor Le Conte's definition of evolution three terms. Evolution is first a continuous progressive change; second, according to certain laws; third, by means of resident forces. Each of these elements enters into and characterizes the development of Christianity. Christianity has been not a fixed and unchanging factor, but a life, subject to a continuous progressive change; this change has been not lawless, irregular, and unaccountable, but according to certain laws, fixed and inviolable and never violated, though by no means well understood; and the cause of this change, or these changes, has been a force, not

foreign to man himself, but residing in him. Thus Christianity, whether regarded as an institutional, an intellectual, a social, or a moral life, has exemplified the law of evolution.

I must beg indulgence for even a few more words of exact definition. For it cannot be doubted that in the discussion concerning the relation of Christianity to evolution, — or, in the larger and less exact phrase, concerning the relation of theology to science, — there has been much ignorance and more prejudice; ignorance respecting the true nature of evolution on the part of theological experts, and ignorance respecting the true nature of religion on the part of scientific experts. The theological discussions of our time grow out of an attempt, on the one hand, to restate the principles of the Christian life in terms of an evolutionary philosophy, or in terms consistent with that philosophy; and, on the other hand, out of resistance to this attempt, either by denying evolutionary philosophy altogether, or by maintaining that the Christian religion is an exception to the ordinary laws of life; that it is not and cannot be a continuous progression, but is and must be always unchanging; that it is not governed by certain laws, certainly not by laws which man can understand, but is dependent on the inscrutable if not capricious will of an unknown Person, and has its operating causes not in a force or forces resident in humanity, but in a force or forces outside humanity. As I have said, I do not propose to discuss this question, except as an attempt to restate the principles of the Christian life in the terms of an evolutionary philosophy is such a discussion; but it is evident, if such a restatement is to be made, that we must understand at the outset what we mean both by evolution and by the Christian life.

The doctrine of evolution, then, makes no attempt whatever to explain the nature or origin of life. It is concerned not with the origin but with the phenomena of life. It sees the forces resident in the phenomena, but it throws no light on the question how they came there. It traces the tree from the seed, the animal from the embryo, the planetary system from its nebulous condition; it investigates and ascertains the process of development; but it does not explain, or offer to explain, what is the difference between the seed, which is a living thing, and the grain of sand which is dead, or between the vitalized and the unvitalized egg, or what there is in the nebulae which produces out of chaos a beautiful evolution fitted for human habitation. One may with Haeckel believe in spontaneous generation, or with Tyndall disbelieve in

it, and in either case be an evolutionist. Only the processes of life does evolution trace; it does not offer to explain the nature or the origin of life. Life antedates all progress; and evolution only traces progress. The evolutionary theologian, then, must believe that the spiritual life shows itself in a continuous progress according to an orderly and regular sequence; but his belief in evolution will throw no light whatever on the question as to the secret of that life which antedates spiritual progress. He must believe that this spiritual force is resident in humanity; but how it came to be resident in humanity, evolution cannot tell him. This he must learn, if at all, elsewhere.

Making no attempt to explain the origin of life, the evolutionist insists that the processes of life are always from the simple to the complex; from the simple *nebulae* to the complicated world containing mineral substances and vegetable and animal life; from the germinant mollusk through every form of animate creation up to the vertebrate mammal, including man; from the family, through the tribe, to the nation; from the paternal form of government, through the oligarchic, and the aristocratic, to the democratic; from slavery, — the patriarchal capitalist owning his slave on terms hardly different from those on which he owns his wife, — to the complicated relationship of modern society between employer and employed. In this movement, notwithstanding apparent blunders, false types and arrested developments, the evolutionist sees a steady progress from lower to higher forms of life. The Christian evolutionist, then, will expect to find modern Christianity more complex than primitive Christianity. For the purpose of this comparison, I do not go back of Bethlehem: then, the confession "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God," — now, the Episcopal Thirty-nine Articles, the Methodist Episcopal Twenty-four Articles, or the Westminster Confession of Faith of Thirty-three Chapters, with their numerous sub-sections; then, the simple supper-talk with the twelve friends, met in a fellowship sanctified by prayer and love, — now an elaborate altar, jeweled vestments, pealing organ, kneeling and awe-stricken worshippers; then, meetings from house to house for prayer, Christian praise and instruction in the simpler facts of the Master's life and the fundamental principles of his kingdom, — now, churches, with preachers, elders, bishops, sessions, presbyteries, councils, associations, missionary boards; then, a brief prayer, breathing the common wants of universal humanity in a few simple petitions, — now, an elaborate ritual, appealing to ear and eye and imagina-

tion, by all the accessories which art, and music, and historic association combined can confer; then, a brotherhood in Jerusalem, with all things in common and a board of deacons to see that all were fed and none were surfeited, — now, a brotherly love making its way, in spite of selfishness, towards the realization of that brotherhood of humanity which is as yet only a dream of poets. Nevertheless, he will expect to find the Christianity of the nineteenth century, despite its failures and defects, better intellectually, organically, morally, and spiritually, than the Christianity of the first century.

The doctrine of evolution is not a doctrine of harmonious and uninterrupted progress. The most common, if not the most accurate, formula of evolution is “struggle for existence, survival of the fittest.” The doctrine of evolution assumes that there are forces in the world seemingly hostile to progress, that life is a perpetual battle and progress a perpetual victory. The Christian evolutionist will then expect to find Christianity a warfare — in church, in society, in the individual. He will expect Christianity to be a Centaur, — half horse, half man; a Laocoön struggling with the serpents from the sea; a seed fighting its way against frost and darkness towards the light and the life. He will recur continually to his definition that evolution is a continuous progressive change by means of resident forces. He will remember that the divine life is resident in undivine humanity. He will not be surprised to find the waters of the stream disturbed; for he will reflect that the divine purity has come into a turbid stream, and that it can purify only by being itself indistinguishably combined with the impure. When he is told that modern Christianity is only a “Civilized Paganism,” he will reply, “That is exactly what I supposed it to be; and it will continue to be a civilized paganism until the civilization has entirely eliminated the paganism.” He will not be surprised to find pagan ceremonies in the ritual, pagan superstitions in the creed, and pagan selfishness in the life. He will not even be surprised to find limitations of knowledge in Christ himself (Mark xiii. 32); errors and partialisms in the Bible, and ignorance and superstition in the Church. For he will remember that the divine life which is bringing all life into harmony with itself is a life resident in man, so far as is possible in a human life, God interpreted in the terms of a finite human experience. He will remember that the Bible does not claim to be the absolute Word of God; that, on the contrary, it declares that the Word of God was with God and was God, and existed before the world was;

that it claims to be the Word of God, *as perceived and understood by holy men of old*, the Word as spoken to men, and understood and interpreted by men, who saw it in part as we still see it, and reflected it as from a mirror in enigmas. He will remember that the Church is not yet the bride of Christ, but the daughter of the ashes whom Christ is educating to be his bride. He will remember that Christianity is not the absolute divine, but the divine in humanity, the divine force resident in man and transforming man into the likeness of the divine. Christianity is the light struggling with the darkness, life battling with death, the spiritual overcoming the animal. The end is not yet. We judge Christianity as the scientist judges the embryo, as the gardener the bud, as the teacher the pupil, — not by what it is, but by what it promises to be when the struggle is over, and the victory is won, and the fittest is presented perfect and complete, the sole survivor.

The doctrine of evolution is not inconsistent with the existence of types of arrested development or deterioration and decay. The progress is continuous but not unbroken. Nature halts. She shows specimens of unfinished work. Evolution is not all onward and upward. There are incomplete types, stereotyped and left unchanged and unchanging; there are no-movements, lateral movements, downward movements; there is inertia, death, decay. The Christian evolutionist is not then surprised to find all these phenomena in the evolution of Christianity. His finding them there does not shake his faith in the divine life which struggles toward victory against obstacles, and sometimes seems to suffer defeat. He expects to find faith hardened at certain epochs into cast-iron creeds; thought arrested in its development, men struggling to prevent all growth, imagining that death is life and life is death, that evolution is dangerous and that arrested development alone is safe. He expects to find pagan superstitions sometimes triumphing over Christian faith, even in church creeds; pagan ceremonies sometimes masquerading in Christian robes, even in church services; and pagan selfishness poisoning the life blood of Christian love, even in communities which think themselves wholly Christian.

“A growing tree,” says Professor Le Conte, “branches and again branches in all directions, some branches going upward, some sidewise, and some downward — anywhere, everywhere, for light and air; but the whole tree grows ever taller in its higher branches, larger in the circumference of its outstretching arms,

and more diversified in structure. Even so the tree of life, by the law of differentiation, branches and rebranches continually in all directions, — some branches going upward to higher planes (progress), some pushing horizontally, neither rising nor sinking, but only going further from the generalized origin (specialization); some going downward (degeneration); anywhere, everywhere, for an unoccupied place in the economy of Nature; but the whole tree grows ever higher in its highest parts, grander in its proportions and more complexly diversified in its structure." Consciously or unconsciously, Professor Le Conte has borrowed his figure from Christ. The mustard seed is growing to be the greatest of all herbs; but it grows in all directions: some branches pushing upward to higher planes; some growing only further and further away from the original stock, different therefrom in apparent direction, yet the same in nature and in fruit; some growing downward and earthward; some with fresh wood and fresh leaves; some halting in their growth and standing stunted and dwarfed, yet living; some dead and only waiting the sharp pruning knife of the gardener, or nature's slower knife of decay: yet the whole "higher in its highest parts, grander in its proportions, and more complexly diversified in its structure" than when the Nazarene cast the seed into the ground by the shores of Gennesaret. Then, a solitary physician, healing a few score of lame and halt and blind and lepers by a touch or a word, — now, throughout all lands which his presence has made holy, hospitals for every form of disease known among mankind; then, a single feeding of five thousand men, beside women and children, seated in serried ranks upon the ground, — now, an organized benefaction, which, through the consecrated channels of commerce, so distributes to the needs of man, that in a truly Christian community a famine is well-nigh impossible; then, a single teacher speaking to a single congregation on the hillside, and illustrating the simplest principles of the moral life, — now, unnumbered followers, so instructing men concerning God, duty, love, life, that not only does every nation hear the truth in a dialect which it can understand, but every temperament also in a language of intellect and emotion, unconsciously adapted to its special need. Does any Christian think that such a view is lacking in reverence for the Master? He may settle the question with the Master himself, who said, "Greater works than these shall ye do; because I go to my Father."

It may, perhaps, be assumed that the scientist, if he accepts religion in any sense, will not object to this view of Christianity.

If he believes that man is a spiritual being, and possesses a spiritual life, he will welcome the attempt to trace the development of this life according to the now generally accepted principles of evolution. But certain religious minds will at once interpose an objection. The religious life will seem to them to be an exception to the general law of evolution. They may hesitate to formulate an objection which their feeling really interposes. They may even be startled if they attempt to formulate such an objection, by discovering that, in so doing, they are denying the unity of life, and thus in fact, though not in form, throwing doubt upon the unity of God. But they will easily find this objection formulated for them. They will find it stated by Lord Macaulay in the interest of rationalism. "All divine truth," he says, "is, according to the doctrine of all Protestant churches, revealed in certain books. It is equally open to all who, in any age, can read these books; nor can all the discoveries of all the philosophies of the world add a single verse to any of those books. It is plain, therefore, that in divinity there cannot be a progress analogous to that which is constantly taking place in pharmacy, geology, and navigation. A Christian of the fifth century with a Bible is neither better nor worse situated than a Christian of the nineteenth century with a Bible, candor and natural acuteness being of course supposed equal."¹ They will find the same objection to progress in religion stated with equal vigor by Dean Burgon, but in the interest of theological conservatism. "The essential difference between Theology and every other Science which can be named is this, — that whereas the others are progressive, Theology does not admit of progress, and that for the reason already assigned, viz.; because it came to Man, in the first instance, not as a partial discovery but as a complete Revelation. Whereas, therefore, in the investigation of natural phenomena, man's business is to discover something *new*, Theology bids its professors inquire for what is *old*."²

This objection cannot be met by analogical arguments from other departments of thought and life, for its gist lies in a supposed contrast between theology, the science of the divine life, and all other sciences. The Bible is interpreted alike by Lord Macaulay and by Dean Burgon, alike by the apostle of a cultivated agnosticism and by the representative of a conservative ecclesiasticism, as a bar to progress. It would be vain to point out that the Christianity of the nineteenth century is not the same

¹ Macaulay's *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 305; Ranke's *History of the Popes*.

² Dean Burgon in the *Fortnightly Review*, for April, 1887, p. 606.

as the Christianity of the first century. The reply will be that it is not the same because of the decadence which has fallen upon the Church. We turn then to the Bible itself, since the radical denial that progress may be predicated of religion is based upon the Bible, to ask whether it claims to prevent or to promote thought and life, whether its command is "halt" or "forward march," whether, in Dean Burgon's phrase, it forbids men to discover aught that is new and commands those who believe in it to inquire only for what is old.

To ask this question is to answer it. The most casual glance at the Bible discloses the fact that, from its opening to its closing utterance, it is the record of progress, a call to progress, an inspiration to progress. Its face is always set towards the future. The story of the Fall is in some respects similar in Genesis and in other ancient legends; but Genesis alone contains a promise of restoration, "He shall bruise thy heel, but thou shalt bruise his head." Poisoned shalt thou be by the spirit of evil, but the spirit of evil shall be ground to powder beneath thy feet at last. The story of the Deluge is common to Genesis and other traditions as ancient or more ancient; but it is in Genesis that the rainbow spans the retreating cloud, bidding man look forward with hope to a divinely ordered future. Abraham is led out of the land of his idolatry by a promise to be fulfilled, not in his time, but in the day of his children's children. Israel is summoned out of Egypt by the expectation of a future prosperity, for which his past and his present give no warrant. The Tabernacle in the Wilderness is a preparation for a Temple in the Holy Land. The Temple is destroyed forever, and with it the idolatrous idea that God's presence is confined to holy places, or his revelation of himself to particular forms; in its place, seventy years of exile give to the Jewish people the Synagogue and the Holy Scriptures. From Genesis to Malachi the faces of patriarch, prophet, and priest are turned to the future: the religion of Judaism is a religion of expectancy; the hope and faith of Israel are fixed upon a Coming One. The condition of the Jews is exactly the reverse of that which Dean Burgon recommends; their theology makes it their business to look for something new, not to inquire for and be content with what is old.

Three or four centuries pass by. The new dispensation opens with a prophecy and a promise. Its first word turns all thoughts to the future: Prepare ye the way of the Coming Lord, is the burden of John the Baptist's message. Jesus takes up the cry.

His preaching is also a summons to hope and expectancy: "The Kingdom of God is at hand." The people dwell in their past; he summons them continually to the future. They are content with Moses and the prophets; he not only proclaims another and a better law, but he also declares in unmistakable terms his relation to the old: it is unfinished, he comes to complete; it is undeveloped, he comes to ripen. The process will be gradual, the consummation requires time. His kingdom is not a completed kingdom, it is the seed cast in the ground; it is a wheat-field growing up for a future harvest. His teaching is new wine, it requires new bottles; it is a new life, it requires a new garment. The institutions of Christianity must be elastic, because Christianity itself is a growing religion, with a life greater in the future than in the present. As the end draws near, Christ gathers with his disciples inside the walls of Jerusalem, and as the setting sun gilds the spires and domes of the Holy City, he foretells the destruction of Jerusalem and bids his disciples take a long look ahead, through the gloom of that dreadful day, to a redemption to be perfected and a Redeemer yet to come. He meets them in the upper chamber; he repeats the message in tenderer words: he has many things to say to them which now they are not able to bear. They must wait for the best; it lies in the future. As he ascends out of their sight the angelic word to them is that they must look for his reappearing, and through patience, hope, and a blessed activity prepare for it. That which inspires the apostles, as they take up their work, is not the memory of a great past, but the hope of a great future. They are as those that seek a country. They are pilgrims and strangers, and their haven lies before them. They forget the things that are behind; they press forward for their prize. They count not themselves to have attained; they follow after, if they may apprehend that for which they are apprehended in Christ Jesus. They look for a new heaven and a new earth in which dwelleth righteousness. They exhort one another to grow in grace and in knowledge. And when at last the canon closes, the last vision which greets our eyes is not a completed city, but a city still descending out of heaven upon the earth; not a completed victory, but a Captain riding forth conquering and to conquer; not a kingdom accomplished, but an hour yet to come when the kingdoms of this earth shall have become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ. From the vague promises of redemption in the first chapter of Genesis to the clear vision of victory in the last chapter of Revelation, the

cry of patriarch, prophet, martyr, apostle, and seer is the cry of the Lord to Moses by the shore of the Red Sea : "Speak unto the children of Israel that they go forward." If Lord Macaulay and Dean Burgon were right, if "theology does not admit of progress," Moses could not have added to Abraham's call the clearer words of the Ten Commandments, nor David supplanted the Tabernacle with preparations for a Temple, nor the prophets of exile have encouraged the organization of the synagogues, nor the Master substituted the Sermon on the Mount for the Mosaic Law, nor Paul have completed the wisdom of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes with the diviner and profounder wisdom of the Epistles to the Romans and to the Ephesians.

This whole notion of revealed religion consisting in a revelation made once for all and therefore forbidding progress, or confining it within very narrow limits, — to the criticism and interpretation, for example, of a Book or a restatement of what the Book says, but in slightly different forms of speech, — grows out of a singular misapprehension of the nature of Revelation. The sun in the heavens is obscured by the clouds ; through a break in the clouds it appears for an instant ; the navigator catches its place, makes up his record, and by that record thenceforth steers his vessel. So the ancient prophets are conceived to have caught a glimpse of divine truth, entered it in their log, and given us the reckoning by which ever after the world is to be navigated. But this notion of revelation, as something external to man, is as inconsistent with Scripture as it is with the analogies of all education and the fundamental principles of psychology. Revelation is unveiling ; but the veil is over the mind of the pupil, not over the face of the truth. This veil is removed and can only be removed gradually, as the mind itself acquires a capacity to perceive and receive truth before incomprehensible. The figure is not original with me ; I borrow it from Paul : "Even unto this day when Moses is read, the veil is upon their heart. Nevertheless when one shall turn to the Lord, the veil shall be taken away." The heavens are not veiled from the pupil, but the pupil is veiled, so that he cannot comprehend the stellar spaces, magnitudes, movements, until education has removed the veil and so revealed the truth. As in physical, so in moral science, revealing is a psychological process. It is the creation of capacity, — moral and intellectual, or both. In the nature of the case it can be nothing else. Truth cannot be revealed to incapacity. That God is love is the simplest, as it is the most fundamental revelation, concerning God which his

Word contains. But it means and can mean no more than love means to the individual soul. The child in the infant class prattles it artlessly, scarcely knowing the meaning of the word. The maiden sees a new and deeper meaning in it, as love looks out of her eyes into the eyes of the bridegroom at the altar. The mother has a new revelation when the babe upon her bosom strikes a new note of love in her heart. The aged saint, through the joy and the sorrow of love, the hunger and the satisfaction of love, love at the marriage, love in the home, love at the open grave, has learned something more, though not all, of the height and depth, the length and breadth of love immeasurable; the text lightly dropped from her lips in childhood she cannot speak without bowed head and tearful eyes. As with the individual, so with the race; love means in the Nineteenth Century what it could not mean in the First; from the lips of a Henry Ward Beecher what it could not mean from the lips of an Augustine or a Calvin.

Thus the Bible is not so much a revelation as a means of revelation. It is a revelation, because beyond all other books it stimulates the moral and spiritual nature, stirs men to think, and feel, awakens their life, and so develops in them a capacity to perceive and receive the truths of the moral and the spiritual order. God is not veiled, but man is blind; and the Bible opens the eyes of the blind. The Church has indeed often adopted, consciously or unconsciously, the philosophy of Lord Macaulay and Dean Burgon; it has endeavored to crystallize truth into a formal and final state. For a creed is truth crystallized. But a crystal is a dead thing; and truth is living. It is not a crystal; it is a seed. It is to be planted; and what comes from the planting will depend as much on the soil in which it is planted as on the seed itself. The figure is Christ's. "A sower went forth to sow; some seed fell by the wayside, some upon stony places; some among thorns; some into good ground and brought forth fruit, some an hundred fold, some sixty fold, some thirty fold." Which way does the seed look: backward to the winter, or forward to the autumn? The fundamental difficulty about all attempts to define truth in a creed is that truth is infinite, and therefore transcends all definitions. As soon as humanity understands the creed, the creed ceases to be to humanity the whole truth; because there is truth yet beyond, not confined within the creed. The fundamental difficulty in all attempts to reduce truth to a dogma is that they are attempts to reveal truth without imparting life. But truth cannot be revealed except as life is imparted; for we can know

only as we live. Revelation is, of psychological necessity, progressive; for we know the truth only as we grow in life-capacity to know the truth. The Bible never falls into the error of the Church. It never attempts to reduce truth to a dogma, never crystallizes it in a creed. The value of the Bible is not that it furnishes men with thought, but that it stimulates them to think. The Bible is a revelation because it is a literature of power; it operates on humanity for cataract; it removes the veil from the readers' eyes; it stirs and stimulates them to see truth with their own eyes and to think it in their own thoughts.

In fact this has always been the effect of the Bible. Churches, creeds, and theological and ecclesiastical systems have often repressed thought, checked it, or at least, tethered it. The Bible has always stimulated thought. It has emancipated the mind, set men thinking, and created differences and divisions. Not without historical warrant does Kaulbach, in his cartoon of the Reformation, group all the intellectual activity of the Seventeenth Century around Luther with his open Bible in his hand. The Bible is not a substitute for thought, but a spur to thinking. It reveals truth not by making it so plain that men need not study, but by making it so fascinating that study they must. Lessing said that if one offered him Truth in the one hand and Search for Truth in the other, he would choose Search for Truth. Search for Truth the Bible has been in its history, ever since the Waldenses studied it in secret in their mountain fastnesses, and by it fed that independence and individuality which the ecclesiasticism of their age had almost extirpated everywhere else in Europe.

The belief then that the Christian religion is a divine life is not inconsistent with the belief that it is an evolution; for evolution offers no explanation of the nature or origin of life, it only explains life's process. The belief that the Bible is a revelation from God is not inconsistent with the belief that the Christian religion is an evolution; for revelation is not a final statement of truth, crystallized into dogma, but a gradual and progressive unveiling of the mind that it may see truth clearly and receive it vitally. The Bible is not fossilized truth in an amber Book; it is a seed which vitalizes the soil into which it is cast; a window through which the light of dawning day enters the quickened mind; a voice commanding humanity to look forward and to go forward; a prophet who bids men seek their golden age in the future, not in the past.

LYMAN ABBOTT.

THE HISTORIC AND THE IDEAL CHRIST.

It is interesting to follow the changes in men's thoughts in regard to the person of Jesus, to see how his humanity has been taken up into divinity, to watch the different methods by which men have striven in their thought to unite the two elements that have seemed to most so incongruous; and then to see how, by a fuller recognition of his humanity, he has been brought back to earth, while men have sought by various theories to preserve for him an exceptional position among men. It is not only interesting but important to consider what truth may underlie this idealizing process, and especially to ask in what sense, if in any, Jesus, standing in the full light of history, must continue to be regarded as the ideal man.

The doctrine of the deity of Christ is doubtless held by many to-day in the simple and literal manner in which it is represented by the historic creeds. It is not many years since Professor Shedd wrote: "The Logos, by his incarnation and exaltation, marvelous as it seems took a human nature with him into the depth of the Godhead. A finite glorified human nature is now eternally united with the second Trinitarian person, and a God-man is now the middle person of the Trinity."¹ I suppose that many would still accept these words as a statement of their own belief. But the history of modern thought shows that the doctrine is gradually losing its hold upon the world. This is seen in the origin and development of the Unitarian and other heretical bodies, and, not less clearly, in the changes which the doctrine is undergoing within churches that consider themselves and are generally considered to be orthodox.

It is not to be expected that a form of thought so long held as sacred would pass away at once, leaving no trace of its presence, and that Jesus after being regarded as God for centuries should quickly come to be looked upon as man. Great changes in human thought rarely take place suddenly. Both in the church considered orthodox, and in the bodies considered heretical, the change has been, and still is gradual. He who had been a God still bore about him something of the fragrance of the upper heavens. Men could not help seeing him in the light of his previous exaltation. Such influences have colored men's conception of Jesus of Nazareth in the past, and they color it in many minds to-day. Thus,

¹ Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology*, vol. ii. pp. 230 ff.

we find him regarded as the absolutely exceptional man; the supernatural man; the sinless man; the ideal man, in the sense that in him was all possible perfection; or the divine man, in the sense that in him, by nature and office, there was, in some special and supernatural manner, the revelation of God to men. These views, sometimes sharply defined, sometimes extremely vague, have marked and still mark the transition in men's thought of Jesus.

Perhaps as characteristic an example as we can find of this phase of modern thought is furnished by the German theologian Dorner. There is a special interest for us in his views, because his system has influenced, in a marked manner, certain forms of theologic thought in our own country. According to Dorner, the Logos was incarnated in Jesus. The Logos is the second person of the Trinity, if the term "person" can be used in relation to such a Trinity as Dorner recognizes. It is a Trinity which has nothing in common with that of the creeds. The Trinity, according to Dorner, is made up of the elements that enter into the various aspects of all complete spiritual consciousness.¹ Thus, in one of these aspects the Father stands for what we may call the "I" of the divine self-consciousness; the Son stands for what we may call the "me;" while the Holy Spirit stands for the unity of the two. Thus, according to this view, every one who believes that God is a spirit is thereby a Trinitarian.

Dorner illustrates the possibility of the mingling of the divine with the human in Jesus by certain elements of human experience.² One of these is the presence of the Holy Spirit in the Christian. This higher life is not present as anything foreign, that can be distinguished from the human life into which it enters. It has become one with this human life, while at the same time it imparts to it a power which the human life by itself could not have shared. Another example which Dorner gives to illustrate the same truth is found in the moral sense. The conscience is the very presence and power of God in the soul, yet the unity of the life is not broken up by it. These illustrations seem to place the relation of Jesus to the Higher Power upon a level with that of other men. We might even think that there was no difference of kind, but simply one of degree. So to conceive his thought, however, would be to misunderstand Dorner, though there is such vagueness in his statement that I am unable to say wherein the difference con-

¹ *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, vol. i. pp. 395 ff.

² *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 420.

sists. This vagueness arises in part from the fact that, according to his statement, the Word which in Jesus was made flesh has no separate personality or consciousness. It is simply the objective side of the divine consciousness.

While the view of Dorner may be taken as an illustration of the manner in which the doctrine of the deity of Christ may be retained in form while its substance has been lost, that of Schleiermacher may represent another type of thought which has been not uncommon since his day. According to him Christ was a new and higher creation, who was the introducer of a new life upon the earth. He was the supernatural man.¹

I notice these two forms of thought to illustrate the fact that the phases of belief which they represent are absolutely without Scriptural authority. If we assume, as the church has done, that the teaching of the New Testament is perfectly uniform in regard to this matter, we must take its highest and most definite statements to represent this teaching.

In the Epistles ascribed to Paul we have very clear and definite utterances. Christ was consciously preëxistent. He dwelt in the glory of God, exalted above all others save God. His subordination to God is often recognized, but except for this, there is no limit to his power and glory. A single example will suffice. In the Epistle to the Philippians we read of Christ: "Who, being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men."² Here we have something extremely definite. The passage declares a personal preëxistence in glory, and a conscious and voluntary surrender of this glory, in order to enter upon the earthly life. If the Bible is an infallible and divine authority its statements must be accepted just as they stand. It will not do to go beyond them, or to fall short of them. It will not do to say: "Because the Bible says he is exalted in one way, therefore we will say that he is exalted in another way." It will not do to say, "Because the New Testament places him so near to God, we will make him the equal of God; we will make him very God." Whether we go beyond the statements of the New Testament or fall short of them, we equally lose its authority; if there is any reason for accepting such statements as authoritative, they must be taken just as they stand. We have no right to pick and to choose; to say we will accept this, and reject that. We have

¹ *Christliche Glaube*, vol. ii. pp. 34 ff.

² Philippians ii. 6, 7.

no right to soften down a declaration that seems to us too strong ; or to reduce a clear statement of an individual fact to a hazy abstraction.

Vague notions in regard to the divinity of Christ, like that quoted from Dörner, which are more or less prevalent at the present day, and other notions in regard to his exceptional humanity, which reproduce something like the thought of Schleiermacher, have a certain air of real or semi-orthodoxy ; but they have no more Biblical authority behind them than the barest humanitarianism.

It may be said that beside the authority of the Bible there is the authority of the church ; that in the church we have a progressive development of doctrine. This may be and doubtless is true ; but obviously this assumption cannot be used to sustain any particular view that may be held at any one time by any portion of the church, or even by the whole church. The history of the church is not yet complete. Who can say what its final utterance will be ? It is an interesting and important fact, however, that in the deification of Jesus, and in the modifications which the dogma of his divinity has undergone in its gradual relaxation, we have simply an example of doctrinal development. The doctrine was developed as an organism grows, and it is disintegrating as an organism disintegrates when it has passed its prime. In other words, the minds of men pass from one form of thought, which has been held earnestly, to another and radically different form of thought, very gradually. They tend to cling to the old as long as possible, and often they do not realize how the substance of the thought has been so transformed that its significance has been thoroughly changed.

In the dogma that we are considering there is a special motive at work to retard the transformation of belief. Jesus has stood as the central figure in history. He has been the object of love and reverence, even of adoration. Men have feared to let go the idea of some special supernatural and superhuman element in his nature and personality, lest his preëminence and his influence should be lost, undistinguishable among the manifold factors that enter into our modern life and our civilization. They have feared to leave him to take his chances in what may be called the historical struggle for existence. Yet whatever supernatural elements may or may not be recognized in his life, to this we must come at last. The historical struggle for existence is as pitiless as that which has been going on in the natural world. Even

man, the favorite child of nature and of Providence, cast apparently defenseless among the rude forces, animate and inanimate, that rule the world, would not have endured, had he not possessed certain powers of advantage in the great struggle. The Providence that preserved him was shown, not in surrounding him with safeguards, but in equipping him with those finer weapons by using which he triumphed over the elemental and brute forces of his environment. If, then, Jesus is to be recognized as the leader of the higher life of the world, the recognition cannot rest upon any theories of his office or of his person. He must hold the leadership simply because he leads.

We must here look upon the work of Jesus from the hither side. We can raise no question as to the divine plan or the councils of eternity. If we recognize a divine plan at all, this recognition can only rest upon what we find in the divine accomplishment. When, with this purpose in our minds, we look at the actual life of Jesus, we are at first baffled and disappointed. The story of his life, save in certain salient points, appears confused, if not contradictory. The Gospels were written long enough after the events which they describe to admit of forgetfulness, and of the growth of myths that obscure and distort the original facts. More confusing still, the thought of this later time to some extent necessarily blends itself with the thought of Jesus or takes the place of it. The geologist can distinguish at a glance the vein of trap rock which cuts through the solid mass into which it has found its way; but who shall distinguish with equal accuracy the later thought that has become infiltrated into the discourses of Jesus?

As an example of the difficulty of reaching definite conclusions as to some of the fundamental facts in the history of Jesus, we may refer to a discussion that has recently interested many students of the New Testament. In his work entitled "The Seat of Authority in Religion," Dr. Martineau maintains that Jesus did not himself claim to be the Christ; but that this office was first ascribed to him after his death. He bases his argument chiefly upon a conversation of Jesus with his disciples that occurred during the journey to Jerusalem.¹ Jesus asked his disciples, "Who do men say that I am? And they told him, saying, John the Baptist; and others, Elijah; but others, One of the prophets. And he asked them, But who say ye that I am? Peter answereth and saith unto him, Thou art the Christ. And he charged

¹ *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, pp. 349 ff.

them that they should tell no man of him."¹ Dr. Martineau assumes that Jesus here denies that he is the Messiah. In this he seems to me to force the words. The passage does take for granted that the Messiahship had not before been claimed by Jesus; and it suggests a reason why his claim was not known afterwards during his life. It seems to imply that while he lived Jesus was not recognized as the Christ. If, however, we take this and other passages that might be associated with it as our starting-point, we are met by many others that describe him as taking openly upon himself the Messiah's office. I refer to this discussion, not to take one side or the other, but simply to illustrate the kind of difficulties that we meet when we try to form a clear picture of the life and work of Jesus. We have to adopt some principle according to which we shall emphasize one or another class of statements as most to be relied upon, or as most characteristic. Here is obviously much room for caprice; the most careful judgment and the keenest historic sense are needed.

When we turn from the attempt to construct the story of Jesus, and seek to comprehend something of his character and personality, we meet somewhat of the same difficulty, but in a far less degree. The personality of Jesus stands out with a distinctness that is not surpassed in the case of any of the heroes of antiquity. Despite the myths and the arbitrary reconstructions by which the narrative is marred, it is impossible to mistake the character of the central person. We find the same image stamped upon the work and the ideals of his followers. The church to-day, however imperfectly, reproduces the image of its founder. If criticism of the New Testament story should be far more destructive than it is; if the whole narrative should be resolved into the mist of a later mythology, even this would reflect, in glowing colors, the real image and the strong personality of Jesus.

We see in him a man in whom mysticism and practicality were united in a wonderful degree. His God-consciousness, from certain points of view, seems to be the one supreme factor in his life. It shows itself under all circumstances. Whatever may be the subject on which he speaks, this thought of the ever-present God mingles in the discourse. We do not need the stories of the nights of prayer and of lonely struggle to teach us how he lived in this divine companionship, though these confirm and complete the impression of this aspect of his life. Sometimes this consciousness of God takes form in the glad sense of fellowship.

¹ Mark viii. 27 ff.

Sometimes he finds in God the ideal of human living. Sometimes he bows before his unapproachable perfection. Under one form or another, the thought of God seems always present to him. When we turn to his life among men, his care and his loving sympathy for them seem in turn to be the supreme power that manifested itself in him. His days were passed in ministering to their needs. While he shrank from being known as a wonder worker, the strange healing power that he possessed was always at the service of those who needed his help. The spiritual needs of men moved him, however, more deeply than their physical sufferings. To him a blind and halting spirit was far more pitiful than a blind and halting body. He did not underrate, as his followers have sometimes done, the importance of ministering to the physical needs of those about him. These, as we have seen, he never failed to help, so far as in him lay. But his great enthusiasm went to the quickening of the spiritual life of men. He would take them up into that fair world of aspiration and peace, of purity and love, in which he perpetually dwelt. He would make them share that divine companionship which was the strength and the joy of his own life.

In Jesus we also find blended in a union no less rare the elements of conservatism and reform. His keen vision distinguished accurately between the abuses that had gathered about the fundamental principles of the national constitution, and these principles themselves; between the pettiness of observance that sank into triviality, and the service which the law itself demanded. Perhaps nothing is more marked in his character than his power of seeing things in their true perspective, of distinguishing between the great and the small. The saying, "This ought ye to have done and not to have left the other undone," illustrates the spirit which controlled his teaching and the habits of his life. Thus he reared within the Jewish law a moral and religious structure so complete that it stood undisturbed and fair when that law fell away.

Another of these harmoniously blended contrasts in the spirit of Jesus we find in the manner in which he looked upon different classes of sins. Nowhere does his sense of ethical perspective show itself more clearly. The sins that spring from impulse, and from human weakness, that have their roots in something not wholly bad, and are fostered by the needs of the individual and by the customs of society, the sins, at the same time, that the world most affects to despise, — to these he was unspeakably tender. He strove to uplift the fallen, to encourage those whose

hearts had failed, to lighten by the smile of sympathy the path of those who moved in the shadow of the world's scorn. At the same time, there was nothing weak in this sympathy. It held up the ideal of a purer and better life that was still in the power of the sinner. On the other hand, for spiritual pride, for the spirit of those who, unconscious of their own sins, looked down in scorn upon their fellows, he had no sympathy. He seemed to feel that their spirit of self-righteousness crushed out all faith in the true life and all power to attain it. While for the outcasts of the world he knew there was no hope save in encouragement, for those who were filled with spiritual exaltation, whose sins disturbed neither their satisfaction with themselves, nor the world's satisfaction with them, he saw that there was no hope save in humiliation. I have little sympathy with those who find something foreign to the spirit of Jesus in the denunciations which he hurled at the self-righteous oppressors of the lowly whom he would exalt. I am a little suspicious even of the sadly modulated tones in which, according to the familiar story, Channing rendered these words in order to remove the misgivings of a person who seems to have learned to know only one side of the completeness of the Master. The Christ whom the painters for the most part give us could not have uttered these words. They cannot give the whole; so they take the fairest and the gentlest part. But Jesus united the tenderness of the sweetest psalmist with the sternness of the prophet who fearlessly denounced the wickedness of his time. While he rebuked with righteous indignation those who oppressed the lowly whom he loved, he met insult and cruelty directed towards himself with sublime patience and divine forgiveness.

When the "ideal Christ" is spoken of in contrast with the "historic Christ," the thought sometimes suggested by the comparison is that the ideal Christ has been formed by gradual accretion; that the historic figure has been overlaid by the ideals of later generations. Thus it is assumed that Christ seems always in advance of the world simply because he is clothed upon by the unattained ideal of every age. I should not dare to affirm that this element has been wholly absent from the relation of Jesus to the world. The idealizing process, however, has been on the whole rather one of abstraction than of accretion. The personality of Jesus has first been abstracted from its special environment. This separation has been, for the reasons already indicated, comparatively easy. The fact that we know so little of his definite plans and of the special significance of his work, makes it

easy to leave these to a great extent out of account. Indeed, the fact that while the personality of Jesus is marked so distinctly, his more direct relation to the circumstances of his time is left so vague, seems to make the separation of the two unavoidable. Thus it has been possible for the life of Jesus to become an ideal fit to be applied to the circumstances of every life, however unlike these circumstances may be to those in which he moved.

The second step in the process of abstraction has been to separate the traits in the picture of Jesus which unite to form a harmonious whole from those which can with difficulty be associated with them. This, again, for the most part has not been done artificially, with a set purpose; it has been rather a process that accomplished itself. In a composite photograph only those elements that are more or less harmonious leave any impression upon the plate; that which is merely individual is unrecorded; so in the various representations of Jesus that are given in the gospels, only the great mass of harmonious traits have impressed themselves upon men's hearts and memories; the few scattered details that do not conform to these have been for the most part disregarded. Such foreign elements are found, for instance, in the story of the cursing of the fig-tree because it failed to produce fruit out of its season; this perhaps was a parable hardened into a myth. Such also are some of the harsh and paradoxical sayings reported in the Fourth Gospel.

It is by such a process of abstraction, I conceive, that the ideal Jesus has been formed. I am not aware that any element of character attributed to this ideal is without a suggestion in the actual story. But the next stage in the process has been the abstraction of the few lofty moments of his life that are pictured for us, from his life as a whole, in affirmation of his absolute sinlessness either as man or as God. This certainly adds something to his nature; it adds nothing to his character as it is represented to us. It throws a more intense light upon it; and this very light tends to blind us to some of its more delicate *nuances*. Thus it detracts from the perfection of the picture instead of completing it.

There is in the Mahabharata a beautiful story of the marriage of Nala and Damayantí. Damayantí was a beautiful maiden who had given her heart to Nala, by whom she was tenderly loved. According to a custom of the time there was a gathering of heroes from among whom Damayantí was to select a husband. She cast her eyes over the assembly in search of him whom her heart had

already chosen; but to her dismay there were five Nalas. Four divinities also loved her; and, knowing her love for Nala, each had assumed his form, hoping thus to be selected by the maiden. She prayed them sweetly to resume their proper form that she might distinguish the object of her love. They granted her request, and stood before her in their full divinity. "Their feet did not touch the earth, their eyes winked not, their garlands were as fresh as if newly gathered, and not a stain of dust lay on their raiment nor a drop of perspiration upon their brows." "And Damayantī saw also the true Nala, for he stood before her with shadow falling to the ground, and twinkling eyes, and drooping garland, and moisture was on his brow, and dust upon his raiment."¹ Such were the marks of his humanity, and with them he was dearer to her than the immaculate Gods. In like manner, may not a human Jesus be nearer to the hearts of men than one separated from them by a supernatural impeccability?

The theoretical question whether Jesus was or was not absolutely without sin does not much concern us. The important thing is to decide whether the spirit and the life of Jesus, as we know them, furnish an ideal which we may use for the shaping of our lives. When we take a rule by which to draw a line, we do not ask whether under a microscope it would still show an unbroken edge. We ask simply if it can be safely used. In the case of Jesus, we have no microscope that we could use, even if we would. We have only glimpses at certain grand moments of his life. If we must pronounce upon his sinlessness, we have to base our judgment upon *a priori* considerations, resting on theological or metaphysical theories. It is far better to forget the speculations and the strife of the schools, and receive what guidance and inspiration we may from the personality of Jesus as it stands in living reality before us.

Let it be admitted that Jesus may be an ideal after which we can shape our lives. Does it follow, it may be asked, that he is *the* ideal? What becomes of the central position that he has held? Why may not the world find others who shall as well, if not better, inspire men's lives? To these questions it may be answered that so long as the teachings of Jesus are recognized as embodying the loftiest truth, so long will his personality be regarded as the embodiment of this truth. This is the final stage in the process of idealization and generalization which we are contemplating. By this relation to the universal truth that was

¹ Wheeler's *History of India*, vol. i. p. 434.

manifested through it, the life of Jesus will be taken out of its individuality, and made also universal. So long as his teaching holds the central place in our higher thought, so long will his personality hold the central place as the ideal of life. It is necessary, then, to consider the teaching of Jesus, that we may judge in regard to the duration and extent of his personal influence.

In regard to this teaching, two questions suggest themselves. One is, what does the world owe to it? The other is, what do we owe to it? I believe that the answer to these questions is the same, that our indebtedness is also the world's indebtedness. To speak of the world's indebtedness would, however, demand a study of the utterances of the great leaders of the world's thought, and a comparison of them with the teaching of Jesus, for which we have here no space. I wish to present certain considerations in illustration of our indebtedness to him. After all, this is what chiefly concerns us. A boy's mother is, and will ever remain, his mother. Though he finds, as he goes out into the world, that there are other women as wise and good, they can never be to him what she is. Even if it should appear that other races owe to their teachers as much as we owe to Jesus, he will still remain the source of our best life.

When we sum up the teaching of Jesus in a formula, it seems, we must admit, somewhat commonplace. He spoke of God as the loving Father; of religion as an answering love, which strives to shape the life into conformity with the divine ideal; of duty as being fulfilled in love. In his teaching, religion and morality were so interfused, they had become so indissolubly blended into one, that they cannot be severed even in our thought. Men sometimes speak of the Sermon on the Mount as if it were merely a system of ethics. Every word is transfigured by religious faith; every word is luminous with the thought of God. These ideas seem commonplace, but it is partly because they are so often repeated; yet chiefly because this repetition has often so little meaning for the life. With Jesus himself these truths were not commonplace. They were as if fresh minted and unsullied by careless handling among men. They came into the world as powers both of destruction and of accomplishment. They were the most revolutionary thoughts uttered. The living of them brought Jesus to the cross. However imperfectly recognized, they have been slowly transforming the world ever since.

Yet when we look at them more closely, do not the teachings of Jesus seem thin and abstract beside the fullness and sweep of

modern thought and life? Has not the world developed a religion and a morality more complex and many-sided than those which Jesus taught? Take, for instance, the general matter of religion. He spoke, as we have seen, of the loving Father. Have we not learned to know God as something more vast than this? Have we not learned to know Him as manifested in the perfect order of the Universe, in the sublime and inflexible law which holds the dust of our streets and star-dust and human souls alike in its grasp? Does not religion demand a recognition of this truth also, and must it not shape itself to its demands? Does the thought of Jesus in truth furnish more than one factor in that greater and more complex whole which we call religion to-day? Have we any right to call this greater and more complex whole by his name?

Yet in this greater whole the thought of Jesus forms the only element that can be called religious. In a world of mere law, could there be anything like what we know as religion? There might be awe before the stupendous forces of Nature, and a deeper awe before the law by which each of these is kept within its appointed bounds. There might be submission to the inevitable. There might be peace in the thought that these laws are working out, on the whole, more good than evil; and one might be willing that his little bark should be wrecked by a wind that, in the end, brings good to man. But would all this be what we call religion? Does not religion imply the communion of spirit with spirit? Does it not demand to see love working in and through the law? What Jesus taught was, then, the essence of religion.

The revelations of our modern science open a world of which religion, if it would continue to exist, must take possession, and which it must transform into itself. So far as men can see or can believe that law is a manifestation of love, so far is religion possible. If the teaching of Jesus seems abstract, it is because it is the form into which the whole life and experience of the world were to be taken up. This conquering and transforming of the world of law by the power of religion was not left by Jesus for the future to accomplish. Men sometimes fancy that he saw in God only a weak tenderness that granted its request to every cry. But in his moment of fiercest agony he cried, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless not as I will, but as Thou wilt." "If it be possible." He felt the terrible might of some necessity, in the divine plan, or of it, that might make the granting of his prayer impossible; but he submitted his

will to it, because he knew that in it and through it a wise love was working.

Such was the relation of the spirit of filial trust in Jesus to the might of the law by which he felt himself encompassed. Such is the relation of religion to the laws of the universe now. Never did the world of material forces and inexorable law open to the thought of man in such vast complexity and order as to-day. This, however, furnishes no new element to religion. Submission to irresistible force is not in itself religious, even though this force be the manifestation of an order too sublime for our thought or our imagination wholly to grasp. Religion shows itself in a faith by which this world of law is transfigured; by which it is felt to be the expression of a presence and a power to which the spirit may trust itself and all things; to which it may trust farther than it can see or comprehend.

What is true of religion is true also of morality. Here, also, the world may seem to have advanced far beyond the simple teaching of Jesus. "Give to him that asketh thee," he said, "and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away." This sounds superficial and old-fashioned to many ears to-day. We have to-day the science of political economy, a science extremely imperfect as yet, indeed, but still developed enough to change many of the forms of helpfulness. This science was not studied in Judea, although Paul anticipated its fundamental principle when he explained, "If a man will not work, neither let him eat." We sometimes think that with this science of political economy there has originated a wholly new kind of charity; and we look back with a certain contempt on the charity that incited to promiscuous almsgiving.

But charity was always the same divine power that it is to-day. Charity has not changed its nature. It moves a little awkwardly, it is true, among the rules to which it has not become fully wonted; but it is the same divine power which showed itself in the life of Jesus, and the praises of which Paul uttered in words which have never been surpassed. Charity has grown wiser. It has had to adapt itself to new conditions; it has learned more of the real needs of men. All this has not changed its nature. Suppose a charitable man to be giving clothes to some poor people who need not clothes but bread. When he learns their real need and gives them bread, has his charity changed its nature? His charity was the love of helpfulness working through such channels as seemed best at the moment. Political economy

by itself is not charity. It has no moral worth. When it is animated by the power of love, then it becomes the means of charity.

Thus charity and religion, when once their highest truth has been uttered, remain simple and unchangeable. The world changes, and these elements have to penetrate new sets of facts and new conditions with their power. So religion stands in the presence of the laws of the universe that have revealed themselves in such stupendous majesty in these later years. So charity stands in the presence of the political economy which has become such a controlling element in our thought. Each retains its primitive simplicity in the presence of a world which it is to conquer.

When Columbus raised the cross on this western hemisphere it was not a new religion which he brought; it was a new world that the old religion claimed as its own. The two commandments in which Jesus summed up the teaching of the law, "Love to God and love to man," remain to-day the final utterances of religion and morality.

When we speak of a final word in regard to anything, do we seem to put a bar in the way of progress? Can the human mind see finality anywhere? We sometimes forget that without something that is regarded as fixed once for all there can be no progress. Progress requires not only that there should be successive stages won and held; it also requires that some principle should be reached upon which all future accomplishment can be based. If the law of gravitation were held in doubt, how would the progress of astronomy be checked! Newton, in stating the law of gravitation, uttered a principle within which the science of astronomy could develop indefinitely, beyond which it cannot pass. So the teaching of Jesus is the sphere within which religion and morality may develop indefinitely, but beyond which they cannot pass. Love, divine and human, is the highest word, a word which we are even now hardly beginning to comprehend.

If Jesus had merely uttered such teaching, we might have had another school of philosophy; or we might have had simply another great individual filling one of the niches of history. It is more probable, however, that his words, unwritten and unsystematic as they were, would have been forgotten, and that he would have been forgotten with them. We certainly should not have had in him the founder of a new religion. The teaching of Jesus, was, however, embodied in his life. On the other hand, his life would have been remembered simply as we remember the lives of

other heroes, or it would more probably have been forgotten, if it had not been the bearer of the teaching which we have just contemplated. Happily for the world, the two elements, the teaching and the life, were united in him. Whatever theories we may hold, whatever theories we may reject, in regard to the nature and person of Jesus, his life will have a position and a power unlike that of any other so long as his teaching retains its place as the inspiration of the best and truest living. The older theologians insisted that the blood of Jesus had infinite worth, which was derived from the presence of the indwelling God. So the outward life of Jesus gains sacredness and power from the teaching of which it was the incarnation.

We may illustrate the power that is won when the loftiest teaching and a noble life are harmoniously joined, by a reference to the leader of men who would most naturally be compared with Jesus. To a large portion of the inhabitants of the world, Buddha holds a place like that which Jesus holds in the regard of the Christian. He is believed to have uttered the words which alone can bring emancipation from the evils of existence. His teaching was also embodied in a life of tender and compassionate service. The words of Buddha, however bare they may seem to us of the highest spiritual truth, were to his followers words of salvation; and, being such, they added unfading glory to his beautiful life. His followers never dreamed of ascribing to him superhuman qualities. What he was, any human being might in time become. None the less, his life, because in it his teaching became incarnate, is to them the ideal life, and Buddha stands before them as the central figure in the world's history.

How, then, can it be possible that Jesus, from whom the nations that call themselves "Christian" have received the truth that seems to them the highest, should not have a place that is all his own; and that his life should not be set apart from other lives, not necessarily as in itself different from them, but as being, to those who accept his truth, the source of a common inspiration? Thus we see how the simple historic Christ may and must stand as the ideal for those who accept his teaching.

What is true of the life of Christ is true also of his death. By his crucifixion he became accursed before the Jewish law. His followers shared his pollution. They were outcasts from the Jewish sanctities. Being under the curse of the law, they were free of the law; and if they were accursed they were accursed with him who was to them the very Christ of God. Thus their

shame was their glory. Their condemnation was their liberty. Thus through the pain and ignominy of the cross, Jesus passed out from the limitations of his race, and became the leader of the best life of the world. Thus the cross must always stand as the symbol of the triumph that may spring from defeat, of the glory that may spring from shame. It will stand as the symbol of that self-sacrifice which is the portal of the truest life and the grandest victory.

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THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL RELIGION IN AMERICA.

WE may forecast the drift of contemporary religion if we can determine, first, what has been and is the process of religious development among mankind, and, secondly, what modifications, if any, this process is undergoing in the peculiar environment of the New World. Instead of predicting we have only to examine what is and has been. Foresight resolves itself into insight. One support the feeblest writer upon religious themes may always count upon with confidence. So be it he is sincere and speaks right out, he will have the sympathy and good will of his readers. Every now and then we hear, to be sure, the requiem of religion chanted alike by the spirits who mock and by the pious souls whose "only language is a cry." I suppose we shall always have professional mourners. But it is greatly to be desired that their services should not be prematurely given. If there is anything in the world that is alive and active, it is just this religious spirit for whose demise certain mourners go about the streets. The body of religion changes, the spirit and the life abide forever. To the assertion that religion is defunct I reply by pointing to the intense interest which men to-day everywhere feel in religion. It was recently stated by a Massachusetts judge—Burke observed truly that we Americans like to appeal to the law—that there is nothing in the world perennially interesting but religion. The ground of this *dictum* is to be found in the constitution of humanity; for the human soul which the things of sense fail to satisfy can attain its true home and its complete self-realization only in conscious communion with the Spirit behind the veil. What better evidence of the vitality of religion is needed than the fact that millions of our people go every Sunday to church, notwithstand-

ing the crudeness of so many ecclesiastical dogmas and the sonorous inanities of so many pulpits? Men are too strongly convinced of the reality and significance of religion to be driven out of the temple by a caricature of its heart-uplifting services and ordinances. Furthermore, I assert, as a matter of observation, that there is no topic — not even politics, and still less science, — on which men are so anxious to be instructed. Man feels himself akin to the all-Father, and he would fain know more of the conditions of his sonship.

There are, no doubt, religious changes. But change is a sign of life. What is dead is rigid and fixed. What lives grows, develops, and realizes its essence through differentiation. In this respect the development of religion is analogous to that of philosophy, science, art, or any other element of civilization. Compare the science of to-day with the science of the age of savagery. The investigation of nature's laws merely for the sake of knowing them would have seemed to primitive man an insane pursuit. The goal of his endeavor was to fill an empty stomach and so maintain a precarious existence. If he used his mental faculties, if he observed and made inferences, it was to procure food, to escape perils, and to overcome rivals. For fallacious reasoning, for imperfect observation, the penalty was death. In that universal struggle for existence, only those properly adapted to the environment could survive. This is the reason why there is so much truth and wisdom in what we call the vulgar, or common-sense, view of things. It is the deposit of the experience of the race tested by its adequacy for life. But this common knowledge kept all the time expanding. In ministering to their physical wants, men were unwittingly in the service of the ideal. They noticed their five fingers, and invented arithmetic. They measured land, and originated geometry. They used the lever, and discovered the first principles of physics. They watched their flocks under the kindly eyes of night, and, looking upward, they dreamed of the secrets of the heavens. Astronomy is *our* most perfect science. By it we regulate our watches, take our bearings at sea and on land, and predict solar and lunar eclipses. Think of the astronomer if you would realize vividly the growth of human knowledge from its beginnings with our rude progenitors, who could not count their fingers! The poor savage had no chronometer but his stomach. As a matter of fact, he measured the lapse of time by the recurrence of hunger. The word "meal" means originally "time." And the reduplication "meal-time,"

which is not merely a peculiarity of our language, shows that the sense of time in primitive man was pregnantly stomachic. Time! Time!! like the rising reverberation of a dinner-bell! The measurement of time amongst ourselves is *astronomical*; amongst our earliest ancestors it was *gastronomical*. Would you see at a glance the evolution of human science? Then note its rise in an empty stomach and its progress, often slow and always toilsome, to the mastery of the laws of the celestial universe.

Man has evolved, the arts have evolved, science has evolved. Evolution means growth and progress; there is nothing but has evolved anywhere in this universe of God. It would be strange, indeed, were there no evolution of religion. I care not how one defines religion, whether one fills it with superstition or empties it of everything but emotion; whatever it is, it has come to be what it is, it has had a history, and it is now in process of development.

Look first at the development of religion in the individual mind. The mind of the child is wax, on which parents and nurses and teachers set their seal. Our earliest education consists in appropriating the ideas and beliefs of those about us. Children get many of them, more or less consciously, with language; and their mimetic instinct, joined with their curiosity, keeps them constantly adding to the first stock. How much there is for any one mind to learn from the mind of the race! A lifetime would be insufficient for any one of us to acquire and assimilate the mental products which the previous generations have transmitted. The utility of such general information is also obvious enough. Yet I wish to point out that something else besides the absorption of preëxisting material is required to make a man. Unquestioning recipiency, however far you carry it, is only the infantile stage of education. Many persons, perhaps the majority, never go very much farther; they believe what they are told, and consider themselves learned when they have been told a great deal. I know an encyclopædic professor of theology who said to a doubting student: "Sir, I never had a doubt in my life." That man's mind was like the mind of a little child, not in its guilelessness, which is a Christian virtue, but in its absolute dependence upon others' thought.

The great Teacher bade men live each his own individual life, heedless of the rules and traditions of Scribes and Pharisees. This is the second stage in the development of the soul. The first stage is that of acquiescence and absorption in custom, tradition, inherited beliefs, and sacrosanct formulæ. These are our first

schoolmasters; and the discipline they give us is invaluable. The impression they make is so deep and lasting that many persons never pass to the higher stage of free and independent manhood. Yet there is probably in every mind a certain growth in this direction. In the best minds the tendency is so strong that it issues in what, considering its nature and its effects, we may designate a spiritual puberty. It is a coming of age of the master of the house, who has hitherto been kept in leading-strings. He is disposed to call everybody to account. He despises tradition, sneers at custom, doubts the certainties of the creeds, and finds that nothing is indubitable on earth or in heaven. The assimilating soul has become reactive; the unchained Titan flings himself against every restraining authority. This is the stage of doubt that follows in normal mental development, — if this development is carried along naturally — upon the stage of credulity and acquiescence.

In some form, though not perhaps in this violent degree, every thoughtful youth must be conscious of such an experience. It is, certainly, no uncommon thing to see the credulity and submission of youth give way to doubt, denial, and fire-eyed defiance. But this is an abnormal condition of the soul; from the nature of the case, it cannot endure. It is, in fact, the hurricane which precedes the settled calm; it is the darkness of chaos ere the spirit says, "Let there be light." The third stage of mental development — happy is he who attains thereunto! — consists in the readjustment of the old material to the new, in the discovery of a higher standpoint, in the attainment of an ultimate view of things broad enough to embrace all the facts we know of man and nature and God, in such harmonious relations as will satisfy the demands of the scientific intellect and the yearnings of that human heart whereby we live.

Credulity, doubt, reasoned belief, or faith: these are the three phases of mental development, and, therefore, they are the three stages of the evolution of religion in the individual soul. The child lives by faith as by his mother's milk; the youth, conscious of strength, revolts against the powers that have held him in tutelage; the man regains peace by a larger knowledge and a riper experience, through which the youth's doubt is overcome and the child's faith essentially vindicated. Skepticism is, we may say, only a halting-place, not a goal; it is the growing-pains of the spirit.

Agnosticism is the apotheosis of skepticism. It is skepticism

as a creed, as a system, as an ultimate resting-place. Those who proclaim it strangely misread the processes and the conditions of our spiritual life. They make the aimless gropings of the youthful intellect an ideal for the thinking of mature men. Only instead of the awful earnestness of the inquiring youth, they often affect an indifference to the great problems which oppress him. As though we could be indifferent to the highest interests of the human spirit! So long as life lasts, so long must we strive to grasp the ultimate truth of things. To shut our eyes to problems is an ostrich policy. Man is called by an inner voice to strive, and strive, and strive, and not to yield. Agnosticism would eradicate this noble endeavor. Its only justification, so far as I can see, is that men never attain the absolute truth, but only make successive approximations to it. But this very fact indicates with reasonable clearness that God meant our life to be one of constant and progressive endeavor. Such was, in the last century, the faith of Lessing, and, in this, of Browning. Our religious thought is to be on the growth. The complaint that no system is final rests upon a misapprehension of the nature of thought; for thought realizes itself only in continuous progression. The evolution of religious belief is necessitated alike by the constitution of the mind and by the inexhaustible character of the divine object of religion. Agnosticism is a passing fever of juvenile free-thinking.

So much, then, of evolution from the point of view of the individual soul. But religion has also an objective side. It is a system of doctrine and worship embodied in the creeds and rituals of the churches. When we speak of the evolution of religion, it is of this body of dogmas we think first. After the sketch I have given of the development of religion in the individual mind, it will not be so difficult to trace the development of 'religion' as an objective system and institution, that is, as an established doctrine and mode of worship. Hitherto we have regarded religion as a process in the mind of the single person; now we are to regard it as a product of the mind of humanity.

The first thing to be noted in the early history of religions is that dogma occupies a quite inconspicuous position. With the history of Christianity before our eyes, this statement seems paradoxical. But the fact is that Christianity differs from all earlier religions in its insistence on articles of faith. Yet this dogmatic spirit, as modern criticism shows, was a late development in the Christian church, and a foreign graft upon primitive Christianity. Not belief, but ritual, is the key-note of primitive reli-

gions. Their essence is a cult, not a creed. They prescribe modes in which God's anger may be averted or his favor enjoyed. It is true that all religion presupposes the existence of God. But I firmly believe that no rational being has ever permanently doubted, or will ever continuously doubt the existence of God, though men have called Him by different names, which best seemed to them to express the infinitude of his nature.

Certainly for the primitive races of men, God was an ever-present, a never-questioned reality. They conceived of Him in the two ways which all later thinking has followed, either as a Great Human Spirit or as a Great Natural Power, though never exclusively one or the other. Under the latter aspect God was terrible as the devastating storm or the rattling thunder; under the former He was the mild and kindly Father of the tribe. According to their experience and environment, primitive men inclined to the one or to the other of these conceptions of the Godhead. The tribes that personified the powers of nature dwelt in fear and trembling, with a haunting sense of alienation from the terrible ruler of the world, though with the conviction also that the God might be rendered friendly. The tribes that practiced ancestor-worship, making God their Father, enjoyed a sense of union and communion with the Divine Spirit, who deigned to join them at the common meal and sit with them round the common hearth. For either class of worshipers religion consisted in cult, and in cult only. There, religion meant the rites and ceremonies — many of them very absurd — by which the hostile nature-God was won over to friendship with man. Here, religion meant the pouring out of libations and the offering of food to the ancestor-God who guarded the homes of his children. In both cases religion consisted of practices, not of beliefs. There was room for *hetero-praxy*, or an error in ritual; but there was no room for *hetero-doxa*, or an error in belief. Hence among the Greeks, who are the authors of art, science, literature, and philosophy, who, in fact, originated all occidental civilization with the single exception of religion, — the notion of "heresy" was absolutely unknown. There could be no heretic in the primitive world. Cult was the first stage in the evolution of religion.

The second stage is that of creed or dogma. This is a step in advance of cult or ritual; for it presupposes considerable development of the intellect. I have already said that cults *imply* the elements of a creed — God's existence and man's power of influencing God; but this belief is implicit, latent, unconscious, and

overlaid by ritual. It becomes explicit and predominant with the growth of human experience and reflection. The creed may be the philosophy of a preëxisting ritual. If so, belief in the creed becomes as necessary as the performance of the ritual. But the creed may transcend national traditions; it may offer a new theory of God's will concerning man or of man's relation to God. Thus the Hebrew prophets of the eighth and following centuries endeavored to teach the nation, which had given itself up to forms, that God sought justice, mercy and truth, and could not away with their sacrifices and burnt offerings. The burden of the Gospels, again, is just the fatherliness of God and the revelation of his love to man.

But such simple, undeveloped creeds are not the most striking varieties of the species. For these we must have a body of doctrines, belief in which is necessary to salvation. The perfect dogmatist declares that we are saved by faith; and by faith he means acceptance of a number of propositions formulated by some council or synod. The believer wins Heaven; the doubter — let him be *anathema*! Among Mohammedans, the standards require acceptance of the Prophet as the messenger of God. It is not so easy to describe the creed of the Christian church. For, unlike the Mohammedan, the Christian nations have been characterized by progress, and progress is more vitality. That which lives changes and varies. The creed of Christendom is not fixed, but plastic; it is not one, but many. Only death gives the rigidity and uniformity which those good souls desire who are always seeking the living among the dead. A living religion is like an organic species; it never *is* but is always *becoming*; it is always passing into new varieties. What life there has been in Christianity to produce all the creeds of Christendom, — the creed of the Catholic, the creed of the Protestant, the creed of the Episcopalian, the creed of the Presbyterian, the creed of the Independent, the creed of the Quaker, and the creeds of all the forgotten denominations whom the church outlawed for heresy! But one thing is common to all these doctrinaires: they hold that dogma is the essence of religion, and each claims that his dogma is not merely truth but *the* truth. Religion is right belief, or orthodoxy; and orthodoxy is my “doxy,” while a “doxy” other than mine is heterodoxy.

The stage of creed is higher than the stage of cult. We must also observe that the lower is taken up in the higher, as an instrument for its expression. Thus in the historic church of Rome,

while dogma is the soul, ritual is the body of religion. The rites and ceremonies which constitute the religion of cult as well as the beliefs they imply are absorbed, and not only absorbed but transcended, by the religion of creed. But not only does this latter make dogma the primary and essential element of religion, it also multiplies indefinitely the articles of faith. I cannot here analyze the creeds of the churches. It will suffice to observe that, howsoever they may differ in details of doctrine, they all agree in furnishing a theory of the Divine existence and government, a theory of the origin and destination of man and a theory of the creation, course, and final purpose of the world.

These are all vast, nay, they are infinite subjects; and it is not surprising that the religious mind in grappling with them should have fallen short of the absolute truth. What else could have been expected? Certainly the natural understanding is prone to error; and even if we suppose God to have made a supernatural communication to chosen spirits, we can only apprehend as much of that message as our finite intellects can compass. In other words, given a revelation or given no revelation, our knowledge of the ultimate mystery of things is but partial, provisional, and true in a relative sense. *In the past the churches have all sinned through ignoring this consideration.* They have claimed to be in possession of the final and absolute truth about nearly everything. The Christian churches knew that the earth stands still, with heaven above and hell beneath. They knew that the world was created in six days, and so much of it each day. They knew exactly how the first man and the first woman came into existence. They knew how languages originated. They knew why men must toil and sweat, and why it is that boys kill snakes. Nor was it to these problems of nature alone that the religion of dogma furnished ready-made answers; these indeed were only episodes in its main theme. Its peculiar boast was that it furnished a revelation of the will of God and of God's doings in nature and in human history. In the books of the Old and New Testament it possessed the truth, final, complete, and absolute, about all things of any importance in the life of man and God. These infallible oracles came from God himself, who inspired the authors. The church was as sure of the actual authors as we are of the writers of current literature. Moses wrote the Pentateuch; Solomon wrote Ecclesiastes; David wrote the Psalms; Job and Isaiah composed the works that bear their names.

The arrogance of this dogmatism is hastening the close of the

second stage of religion. It is the pride of intellect that goes before confusion and discomfiture. Creedal religion has sown the wind; it is reaping the whirlwind. Dogma has conjured up the avenger, doubt. Men now begin, where they are thoughtful and serious, to ask whether religion has not had its day, whether the future generations will not be godless, whether the universe, which seems to us divine, will not turn out to be an atheistic machine. France well reflects the *Zeitgeist*; the youthful philosopher of the new generation, the late M. Guyau, has left us a brilliant work on "The Irreligion of the Future." Be the future what it may, there are few of the dogmas once held dear that now strike us as axiomatic. Astronomy has set the earth spinning, dislocated heaven and hell, and whirled man from the centre of the spatial universe. Biology and geology have revolutionized our views of the origin of our race and of the cosmos. History and criticism have made the Bible a new book, or rather a new collection of books, written, for the most part, we know not by what authors or at what dates, and put together, as a Bible, we know not on what principle. All the old landmarks, Moses, Solomon, Job, are gone; and a restless sea of criticism threatens to engulf religion with the records it adored. This is the so-called warfare of science and religion. For him who has eyes to see, the religion of dogma lies exhausted on the field.

Shall we then despair? Lift up thine eyes towards the eastern sky and see what light is breaking just beneath the horizon. It is the star which the wise men of yore beheld and followed. That mildly glowing radiance is the immortal genius of religion. Once eclipsed by nebulous ritual and dogma, it shines now, and will shine upon future generations, in its own ineffable beauty and purity. Itself the breath of God, its kindly light will cheer and gladden the hearts of all the children of God. Religion is life and spirit. It has long been buried beneath creeds and superstitions of men's device; it now bursts its cerements, and comes forth a glorified reality. The decay of dogma is the resurrection of spiritual religion.

Religion is life with God; dogma is a theory of that life. The mistake of the theologians has been in supposing that there could be no religious life without a correct theory of life. As though there could be no digestion without a knowledge of physiology, or no imagination without a knowledge of psychology! Dogma was intended to nourish and support religion; its kindness, alas, choked and suffocated her. The creeds were meant to be the

defensive fortifications of religion; alas, that they should have turned their artillery against the citadel itself! But spirit cannot be captured by mechanism. Life outlives the theories that would tear out the heart of its secret.

"Grau, theuer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
Und grün des Lebens gold'ner Baum."

The third and final stage of religion, which is now dawning upon us, cannot be so easily described as its predecessors. The religion of cult and the religion of dogma are things of the past: and it is a striking fact that we never know things thoroughly till we have gone beyond them in our experience. There is a sort of antinomy between living and knowing. "Has been," not "is," is the badge of all our knowledge, especially in the realm of human life. The religion of to-day, therefore, will be better understood by future inquirers than by us who experience it. But it seems to me that it may be described, not inaccurately and not too vaguely, as the religion of spirit. Dogmatic religion is retreating; spiritual religion is advancing. Henceforth we shall call that man religious who, be his belief and knowledge what they may, is possessed of a sense of union and fellowship with God. In the coming ages of perfected Christianity, religion will be defined as a man's permanent attitude and frame of mind towards the All-Father.

But, while it is true that we cannot describe very adequately the religion of to-day because it is a part of our life, of one thing we may be assured, that it has not broken with the past and will not be alien to the future development of religion. In the historical world there is no solution of continuity. The religion of dogma took up the religion of cult. The Roman Catholic Church, which holds belief in certain doctrines essential to salvation, at the same time uses ritual for the expression of its creed and worship. So in the religion of to-day, though spirit rises superior to dogma and to cult, it does not repudiate its convictions or wage a puritanic war against symbols. Spiritual religion will part with none of the elements which have entered constitutively into the development of the religious consciousness. We must be very careful to define accurately the mutual relations of the three stages of religion. They differ, not in elements, but in emphasis. In the religion of cult, the emphasis fell on actions of a certain kind, that is, on ritual observances. The worshipers performed the rites under the influence of certain beliefs indeed, and in a certain frame of mind; both of these, however, remained latent and unconscious.

The religion of creed lays stress on belief in dogma as essential to salvation; but it rejoices in the use of symbols, and it assumes, though not very consciously or explicitly, that a sound faith and a correct ritual will issue in a pious, God-fearing life. Now in the final development of religion, it will be explicitly recognized that its primary and constitutive element is neither cult nor creed, but what I may call the soul's entire attitude towards the Invisible, — an attitude which in its highest attainment embraces the creature's sense of dependence upon the Creator, the child's loving and reverent trust in the Father, and the man's fellowship with the Divine Companion who alone can satisfy the boundless and immortal yearnings of the human spirit.

To prevent misapprehension, it may be noted in passing that spiritual religion is something very different from ethical or humanitarian culture. The enthusiasm of humanity is, indeed, the certain outcome of deep fellowship with the Father of Spirits, as we may see in Paul and Luther and many a less distinguished preacher of the gospel. It is a blessed characteristic of our own age that religion has come to express itself so nobly in practical well-doing. But beneficence is not piety. To make the love of man the essence of religion is to misread the latter and to divest the former of its supreme spiritual dynamic. If the religious man is a benediction to earth, it is because his soul is bathed in the dews of Heaven.

We have now traced the growth of religion as a process in the individual consciousness and as a product of the objectifying reason of mankind. We have found that, as a process, religious life passes from credulity to doubt and from doubt to faith; and that, as a product, religion develops from cult to dogma and from dogma to spirit. These two lines of development are parallel. In the life of the mind doubt is higher than credulity, while faith carries us beyond both to those indubitable intuitions which are the constitutive factors of intelligence. Similarly, in the external sphere, doctrines are higher than ceremonies, though from the highest standpoint each gives us only the letter which kills while it is spirit alone that makes alive. Finally, credulity and doubt correspond to the religion of cult and dogma, while open-eyed faith and reasonable hope are the struggling soul's response to the religion of spirit. Indeed, spiritual religion, which we have described as the late fruit of the tree of objective institutions and creeds, cannot be distinguished from that highest phase of religious life which, in the mind of the individual, supervenes upon credulity and doubt.

At this point objective and subjective religion are one and the same. To the religion of spirit, therefore, — a religion which is in the soul and for the soul, — we may conceive historical progress and psychological development alike to be tending. When, from the least to the greatest, all shall in this way “know the Lord,” the millennium, in which all good men believe at least as an ideal, will actually have come upon us.

Towards this goal the race is slowly but steadily advancing. The religion of cult has vanished from the civilized world. Civilization is characterized by a subordination of the physical to the mental; it puts material things to spiritual uses. The civilized man has *come to himself*. He can no longer be satisfied with mere external rites and ceremonies. They must be informed by thoughts. The religion of dogma becomes a necessity. It will probably long remain a necessity even for a considerable portion of Christendom. It is the religion of elementary reflection, — the religion which asks and answers questions about the deep things of God with equal readiness and assurance. Its questions appall the critical, but its answers satisfy the multitude. Indeed, dogmatic religion owes its security to the fact that man yearns for definitive and exact information about his own origin and destiny. By a well known psychological law, the yearning predisposes him to accept any theory, but especially one claiming authority and finality. The religion of dogma has therefore always appealed to a supernatural revelation. Behind this intrenchment it is impregnable, even in the gross form of Mormonism, so long as the masses of mankind are swayed more by personal hopes and fears than by insight and love of truth. But the spirit of inquiry cannot be permanently repressed; and in recent times it has dared to investigate the nature and grounds of revelation. The answer of the Roman Catholic Church was the decree of Papal Infallibility. The effect of this decree was to reassert the identity of religion with belief in divinely revealed doctrine, and to furnish an infallible expounder and interpreter of this doctrine. It committed the larger portion of Christendom irrevocably to the religion of dogma, for which indeed it had always consistently stood in the past. The Roman Catholic Church, rich in the reassured inheritance of nineteen centuries, confronts the rising spirit of liberal religion with a serenity and confidence disturbed only by contempt.

The summary procedure adopted by the Roman Catholic Church was not available for Protestantism. The Reformers had ap-

pealed from ecclesiastical authority and tradition to reason, and especially to the Bible. They failed to observe that these new authorities could not withdraw themselves from investigation. The "all-destroying" Kant dissected the human mind, and proved the incapacity of reason to know anything of itself, or to demonstrate, even with the aid of other powers, the existence of God or the immortality of the soul. The image of the Bible, which Protestantism adored, fell to pieces in the hands of critics who wrenched from it the secret of its origin, structure, and diversified meaning and purpose. We have to-day, in fact, a nobler Bible than we lost and a diviner faculty than Kant denied. But in view of the revolutionary work of critical science, scholarship and philosophy, — a work demanded by the spirit of Protestantism, — it is no longer possible for any Protestant sect to wave the banner of final and infallible authority in matters of religion. Protestantism, in all its forms, originated in the assertion of creeds or polities; but the spirit of Protestantism has always carried it beyond its starting-points. Its history is the record of a growing disinclination to that dogmatic apprehension of religion which it owes to the Church of Rome.

This tendency can be illustrated by a glance at the history of American Christianity. At the beginning of the Revolution the whole number of religious organizations existing in the Colonies is estimated to have been about nineteen hundred and fifty, or one for every seventeen hundred souls. The creed of three fourths of these churches, Congregational, Baptist, Presbyterian, and other, was Calvinism; while of the remainder some three hundred churches professed the faith of the Church of England. Methodism had scarcely gained a footing in the country; and the Catholics had not more than twenty-six priests with twice as many congregations. If anything seemed probable in the future, it was the ascendancy of the Calvinistic creed.

Now what American history shows is the decay of this creed, and, with it, of all merely creedal religion. The Methodists, who had no existence here at the time of the Revolution, are to-day the largest religious body in the land. The growth of Methodism may be attributed in part to its effective organization and in part to the missionary zeal of its preachers; but there can be no doubt that its main source of success is to be found in its appeal to the feelings and in its disparagement of the intellect in which Calvinism lay intrenched. The Baptists, who are nominally Calvinists, are now, as they were at the beginning of the century, second in

numerical rank; but their fundamental principle — the Bible, the Bible only — taken in connection with their polity, has enabled them silently to drop the old theology and unconsciously to adjust themselves to the new spiritual environment. The Congregationalists, who, at the beginning of the Revolution, were by far the strongest and most numerous of all religious bodies, are now one of the minor denominations in point of numbers. With them the process of adaptation was more difficult, for the body had a deeply ingrained and inherited theological habit. But after producing Unitarianism and Transcendentalism, the sturdy mother also made her peace with the anti-dogmatic tendency of the age.

There remain of the larger denominations who made profession of the ancient creed only the Presbyterians. And they have more than held their own during the century. The steady growth of this religious body, which never, at least in form, abated one jot or tittle of its Confession, seems at first sight irreconcilable with the view we are advancing. But this growth is to be attributed, not to the distinctive creed, but to the wise, orderly, and admirably effective system of church government by which the Presbyterian body secured to itself a full share of the fruits of American Christianity. Indeed, the creed so long held with the resolute tenacity characteristic of the Scottish race that brought it to these shores has at last come to be felt as a burden too heavy to be borne. It is at the present time undergoing revision. The result bids fair to be, as it was in the like case with the Congregationalists, a "compromise document." But the right of a liberal party within the Presbyterian church will be established, and the last residuum of Protestant dogmatism will be officially opened to the leavening influences of the religion of spirit.

It may be objected that, while these facts do indeed show the decadence of the old theology, they fail to prove the decay of dogmatic religion in general. The objector, however, overlooks the all-important point that the religious movement which we have been examining was not so much a reaction against Calvinism as a protest against the interpretation of Christianity as a system of dogmas. Only half its meaning can be read from the modifications which have been made in the creeds. For those creeds, which are survivals of dogmatism, resist, like the Matter of Plato's cosmology, the transforming breath of the creative spirit. It is the penalty of the new that it must always settle with the old; and for this reason its true character is difficult to discern.

But whoever will compare the best preaching of the present day with the sermons of the earlier part of the century will be aware of an entirely different atmosphere and attitude. Of doctrine there is nowadays scarce a word. Fuller, larger life, is the ideal held before us. The potential communion of man with God being assumed, as it always has been in religion, the whole strain of the preacher's discourse is directed towards quickening that potency into activity, making man's sonship vital and spiritual. He finds the quintessence of the Gospel in the text: "I am come that ye might have life, and that ye might have it more abundantly."

Few persons, who have not the opportunity and the taste for verification, have any idea how sweeping has been the reaction against the religion of dogma. It has gone on gradually and, for the most part, silently, but with the force and efficacy of a process in Nature. The revolution with which the modern world has been in travail is now accomplished. Yet the sight of it is a surprise even to the actors themselves. The hand is subdued to what it works in, and many of the clergy find it hard to conceive that the creeds which formed so large a part of the material of their theological training are actually either obsolete or of minor consequence. But the laity, who have ceased to read them, are rallying to the support of practical and spiritual religion.

The goal of this religious movement is not uncertain. It is, as we have seen, not the religion of humanity, though humanitarianism is one of its manifestations. Neither is it simple ethical culture, though it leads to the full exploration and development of the moral nature of man. There can be no religion without God. And one great characteristic of the anti-dogmatic religion of the day is the conception of God, not as a capricious Power, not as an external Lawgiver and Judge, but as an Infinite Life and Spirit with whom the finite life and spirit that is ours may have fellowship and find everlasting joy. Personality in man moves out towards personality in God, and is met by it. The fuller our conception of personality, the truer and deeper will our religion be. It was a mistake of the older theologians, with their love of formulæ and finality, that they resolved the soul into a small number of definable faculties. It is one of the many boons we owe to recent psychology that it has taught us to recognize the Vague as well as the Definite in the life of the soul. Just in proportion as we see and reverence the mysterious depths of our own nature shall we rise in worship of the Eternal Spirit who is its source and ground. Spiritual religion is the conscious union of man and

God. It defines itself only in the process of coming to be, and then only to the subjects of this process.

If the result we have now reached, along different but converging lines, be correct, certain conclusions follow as corollaries. These will serve to characterize a little more fully what we have ventured to call the religion of the future.

First, spiritual religion will maintain a social organization. The church is rooted in the nature of things. It is the essence of spirit to express itself, to manifest itself to others and to form associations with them. Of all shallow speculations few are more absurd than the assumption that churches are the device of priests and parsons, the mere organs of dogmas whose decline they cannot outlive. The fact is that every good yields its goodness only when shared with others. Even gross material things, like food and drink, lose half their flavor when taken in solitude. The common meal is the first product of civilization. Art and science embody themselves in corporate institutions which nourish and diffuse them. The church, too, is essential to spiritual life, in which no man can live unto himself.

If this was recognized when religion meant belief in dogma, how much more emphatically should it be recognized of spiritual religion! Creeds and rituals split mankind into sects; in spiritual religion men are drawn together by community of experience and aspiration. The religious man will feel (if he will but think of it) that he is an organ of a common life, which is the spirit of the church universal. Few things seem to me of more practical consequence for the future of religion in America than the duty of all good men to become identified with the visible church. Liberal thinkers have, as a rule, underestimated the value of the church. Their standpoint is individualistic, "as though a man were author of himself and knew no other kin." "The old is for slaves," they declare. But it is also true that the old is for freedmen who know its true uses. It is the bane of the religion of dogma that it has driven many of the choicest religious souls out of the churches. In its purification of the temple, it has lost sight of the object of the temple. The church, as an institution, is an organism and embodiment such as the religion of spirit necessarily creates. Spiritual religion is not the enemy, it is the essence, of institutional religion.

Secondly, the religion of spirit does not need a unique or separate sect. Such a limitation would contradict the universality which, potentially at least, can even now be seen to characterize

it. It is a Pentecostal outpouring which every one receives "in his own tongue, wherein he was born." It is a leaven working in all the sects. It uses what it finds to hand, recognizing frankly that the churches have gone beyond their starting-points, and to-day move towards goals which would have been inconceivable to their various founders. It pays little heed to the questions of speculation and church government out of which the denominations have arisen. It intrenches itself in the citadel, living on the best of terms with ritual and dogma which occupy the outworks. The maintenance of this non-sectarian attitude, which is a present note of spiritual religion, may be predicted for the future, as it can certainly be asserted of the past. It is a well-known fact, though the meaning of it has not been apprehended, that the decline of dogmatic religion in modern times has given a check to the multiplication of sects. The development of spiritual religion in America has had for its concomitant the consolidation of the great existing types of ecclesiastical organization. Creedal religion makes sects; spiritual religion uses them, and in using unites them.

Thirdly, spiritual religion will make its home with any of the religious bodies which recognize it. It will more and more become the condition and the criterion of church membership. As at the present day, so presumably in the future, there will be in all the churches men who, according to their various characters and stages of development, stand preëminently for ritual, for dogma, or for spirit. But the latter class is likely to increase with considerable rapidity. And it will shape the church of the future. The first business of such men must be to understand and sympathize with their brethren who have not yet escaped the bondage of rites and formulæ. One thing they must not do: they must not part company with them. How is the divinely ordained education of the human race to be achieved, if the children of light mass their torches and leave their less favored brethren in absolute darkness? Humanity is a school of spiritual culture only when its members, who have a common nature but diversified attainments, group themselves into organizations of like and unlike, analogous to that of the family, which is the miniature type of every moral organism. Consequently if a true Christian discovers that the creed of his church is no longer tenable, his plain duty (other considerations apart) is not to leave the church, but to let his light so shine that others may come to a knowledge of the fact that the church is not the mere embodi-

ment of a creed, but the plastic organization of a life which is spiritual. His insight into the real situation of affairs forbids desertion, even though he is aware that fidelity may be rewarded by banishment or persecution.

Such a course is apt to be denounced both by the religious and by the secular press. It is held that the defense is sophistical and disingenuous; and that those who plead it are undermining morality as well as religion. Now I will not deny, though I will not aver, that, in the case of those holding clerical positions of honor and emolument, the course here recommended may be unwise, for the simple reason that their motives may be misinterpreted by those who are always ready to catch the "appearance of evil." But apart from this consideration of expediency, I see no reason why an honest man should withdraw from a communion in whose formularies he has ceased to believe. My reasons for this conclusion are, however, very different from those usually adduced. To read into the articles of faith propositions which they never contemplated, or were even expressly framed to deny, as John Henry Newman did in Tract XC., seems to me intellectual jugglery and moral paltering, of the most shameless sort. But this sophistry is the product of the religion of dogma; it is the deposit left by the corrosion of doubt. Protestant Christianity, speaking generally, has put away, as we have seen, the religion of dogma, and is even now rising to the heights of spiritual religion. To this religion no one can be true who makes the creed the condition or test of fellowship. Varieties of church government have perhaps originated more sects than varieties of doctrine; and in the near future it will be thought as absurd to leave a church because one disagrees with its formulation of doctrine as it would seem to-day to leave it because one thinks its system of government not altogether perfect.

Doctrine, worship, and polity will, doubtless, in the future, be brought into closer harmony with spiritual religion than we see to-day. But the change will be wrought silently and from within outwards. Agitations for the revision of doctrines and modes of worship are not desirable if they concentrate attention upon these subordinate elements of religion. If, as is frequently the case, they help many persons to see that there is something higher, they conduce to real progress. Plainly, the religious bodies best organized for development are those which have adopted the principle of local independency. Each church can differentiate itself according to the requirements of its inner life and its outer envi-

ronment. While the movement from dogmatic to spiritual religion is in progress, these various Independent denominations are likely to be the favorite homes of liberal Christianity. When, on the other hand, the movement is completed (if it ever is), the American preference for stable ecclesiastical order can scarcely fail to inure to the benefit of the Presbyterian and Episcopal bodies. The latter has, indeed, some advantages. For it has not, to the same extent, desiccated religion into dogma, and thus it cannot suffer so much from desquamation. The impressiveness of its liturgy and the grace and good sense of its forms—which in the seventeenth century filled Laud with a consuming sense of the “beauty of holiness,” and in the nineteenth drew from Emerson the comment, “By taste are ye saved”—give scope and satisfaction to the æsthetic sentiments which in recent times have gained a very prominent place in the worship of all religious bodies. It is conceivable that some such organization as the Episcopal Church might ultimately become the catholic organ for that spiritual religion which seeks to express itself in symbols and in creeds. But the experience of a century suggests that in the four or five favored and consolidated types of “strenuously competing sects,” we have a diversity founded upon ineradicable differences in the religious life of our people.

Fourthly, spiritual religion will lead to a modification, if not to an abandonment, of the conception of authority in religion. Authority is properly predicated of a sovereign. He has the right, or at any rate the power, of enforcing his commands. But if the ruler's will is law to his subjects, it is only on condition that it limit itself to prescribing or prohibiting certain kinds of actions. Not even a despot can command the thoughts and the spirit of a man. It is for conduct alone that the sovereign is an authority. Accordingly, we conclude that in so far as religion is conceived as consisting of acts or observances, — and these constitute the religion of cult, — it is proper to speak of an authority in religion. In the second place, the term “authority” is metaphorically predicated of specialists who have mastered the facts and laws of any particular field of investigation. Edison is thus an authority in applied electricity, Huxley in physiology, and Zeller in Greek philosophy. These masters tell me what I should believe in their specialties, and I accept their teachings. If in the same way I recognize a man or a council or a book as competent to lay down valid propositions in theology, the man or the council or the book is to me an authority. Those who identify religion with belief in

dogma are within the line of possibilities when they speak of authority in religion; that there *is* such an authority, however, is not a consequence of the inherent admissibility of the conception.

But if it is not impossible to think of an external authority—even a final and infallible one—for the religion of cult and the religion of creed, it is a contradiction in terms to suppose that there can be, ultimately at least, any authority for spiritual religion outside the soul which experiences it. Autonomy, not heteronomy, is the way of the spirit. But since we rise to spiritual life through successive stages of development, for the baby is only potentially a spirit, the agencies which stimulate and incite us to self-realization may, in a derivative sense, be designated the authorities for our religious culture. Without them we should not have reached the stature of perfect men, or acquired the freedom whereby the spirit becomes its own sole and absolute authority. This religious experience is paralleled by the moral. The source of moral obligation for the child and for the undeveloped adult is the will of the family, of society, of the state, and even of God. The virtuous man, on the other hand, knows that, while he is a fellow-worker with all the moral forces, human and divine, in the universe, duty would become mere legal or mechanical obligation could any one impose it upon the free spirit but itself. Yet if the good man is also a philosopher, he must recognize that that free spirit could never have come to itself, that the individual could never have developed into personality, but for his training in and through society and under law, to both of which he has nevertheless, in course of time, come to feel his own moral essence to be superior.

Just as law and society are authorities in morality, so the Bible and the church are authorities in religion. Through these disciplines we make our way—at least some do—to the higher altitudes of free and self-supporting moral and religious life. But many fail to reach this stage; and even those who succeed would surely fall if deprived of the guides and helps that led and aided their steps.

The function of the Bible and the church is, in this regard, educative. The noblest souls will feel most deeply their value, as they would be the last to belittle the function of law and society in the moralization of mankind. By its worship, even if it be merely formal, the church puts men in the mechanical attitude of piety; and, owing to the wonderful connection between our mind and our motor mechanism, the muscular exercise reacts upon con-

sciousness and quickens the germs of religious life. No doubt Pascal carried the matter to an extreme when he counseled men to take holy water and observe ceremonies as if the rest would come of itself. But the general principle is sound: it is the foundation of the histrionic art; and our most eminent psychologist has come to the conclusion that joy and sorrow are the effects, not the causes, of laughing and of crying. But besides its ritual, the church has its articles of faith. The memorizing of these stands in much the same relation to spiritual religion as the learning of the multiplication table to the reasonings of the original mathematician. Lastly, no description could well exaggerate the value of the Bible as an agency for the development of spiritual religion in the soul. This religion emerges when the human and the Divine spirit meet and embrace. Now the Bible is a record, on a large scale, of man's reaching out after God and of God's communication of himself to man. It reveals God as inflexible righteousness and as infinite love. What a glass it is through which to see the ever-living God! But how useless when you put your eyes out!

A scholar, who is the ornament of a great church, is on trial for heresy because of his contention that the Bible, the church, and the soul (or what he calls "reason") are the three sources of authority in religion. His accusers assert there is only one ultimate authority. If the foregoing analysis be correct, neither party has the whole truth and each has a portion. There is only one ultimate authority in religion, — we mean spiritual and not dogmatic religion, — and this is the free spirit of man which finds itself in life with God. The Bible and the church, it is true, are, in a certain sense, authorities: they have the authority of pedagogues who train us up to the religion of spirit. The terms "authority," "finality," "infallibility," and the like, are, however, all borrowed from the religion of dogma. They are all inapplicable to the highest stage of religion, which is not an objective fact, but a subjective attitude — an ever-tending, never-ending process of communion with God.

Fifthly, and lastly, the religion of spirit will be not only theistic, but Christian. Christianity affirms that God and man exist for one another; that human beings are children of the Divine Father who loves them with an exhaustless love, and that they find their blessedness in a correspondent love of Him. This was the gospel of Jesus of Nazareth, and it is the foundation of all spiritual religion. But there is another sense in which, as I be-

lieve, the religion of the future will be Christian. Some liberal thinkers, indeed, have come to the conclusion that the personality of the author of Christianity is a matter of indifference to our religious life, if we are not deprived of his noble and exalted teachings. Others would be satisfied with a good example. But this position I hold to be erroneous. Like the religion of dogma, it springs from an inadequate conception of the soul as mere intellect feeding upon truth. But the soul is living spirit. It grows and realizes itself by contact with spirit. I am moved more by my vision of the personality of Jesus than I am by my thought of his doctrines. Spiritual growth is brought about by the impact of nobler souls on ours. Consequently, I cannot understand the Voltaire-like petulance with which, in his Divinity School Address, Emerson banished "the person of Jesus" from genuine religion. He thinks that you cannot be a man if you "must subordinate your nature to Christ's nature." It seems to me, however, that you realize your capacities only by coming into contact with their realization in others. The objectified self reveals the subjective aptitude; and with the thrill of discovery begins the higher development. Spiritual growth is the attainment of those who constantly look up to higher personalities. Now if it is true of Jesus Christ (as Emerson says in the address) that "alone in all history, he estimated the greatness of man: one man was true to what is in you and me," then I should say that you and I are to find our own highest life by opening our souls to the influence of this perfect and absolute personality. Nay, as Jesus Christ was perfect man, so also, and for that very reason, was he the revelation and realization of the Eternal Godhead. In the new dispensation of spirit, as in the old of dogma, he must, therefore, continue to be our Mediator and Saviour.

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THE COMMON, THE COMMONPLACE AND THE ROMANTIC.

THE common is that which, like the ground, the sky and the sea, lies open for the perception and enjoyment of all, in distinction from those exceptional superiorities of splendor or luxury which are the monopoly of the privileged few. The average-reality of nature and life, which the experience of the multitude can easily appropriate by paying the price of attention, is what we mean by the common.

The common is deadened and sunk into the commonplace when the faculties which regard it are so diseased or wearied as no longer to see any fresh meaning, attractive value or charm in it. The commonplace is the common with the stimulating beauty and significance taken out of it by mechanical familiarity and spiritual torpor. It is whatever unheeding custom has worn into vapidness and triteness.

But the common can not only be sunk into the commonplace, and robbed of inspiring interest by the preoccupied or the stagnant-minded; it can also be discerned as filled with a deeper symbolism and clothed with a richer glory than nature gives it. This happens whenever it is contemplated through the idealizing faculties of faith, reason, and love, animated with kindling zeal. The simplest outward scenes and the humblest inward facts, thus penetrated by the principles of the intellectualized and religious imagination and conscience, are seen to be surcharged with the fixed purposes of the whole, and with the free messages of the creative Spirit. Then the common, grown unwontedly significant and beautiful, is exalted into the romantic.

There is no falsification or illusion in the process. It is but a more adequate unveiling and a keener appreciation of the truth. The splendor of sunset is romantic, compared with the common light of day; but is it not just as genuine? As personal dullness or heartless repetition deadens the startling into the tame and dwindles the momentous into the insignificant, so the penetrating eye, with a sharpened sensibility behind it, glorifies the panorama of ordinary things into an astonishing novelty and sprinkles the wearisome round of trifles with relishes and fascinations that electrify.

The romantic arises from the perception of some variety or greatness of good in contrast with the stated course of things.

An unusual experience of evil is tragic rather than romantic. The tragical elements in our life are much sharper and more exigent than the romantic. They therefore obtain undue attention and undergo mischievous exaggeration. Extraordinary good lies concealed from us and near at hand, much more often than extraordinary evil. A volcanic eruption is a rare occurrence, and locally limited; but rainbows are visible anywhere, at any time, if you will look through a prism. So imagination, in the hands of knowledge and affection, is a moral prism which enables its possessor to behold both the actualities and the possibilities of things, clothed in the divine resplendence rightly belonging to them.

Real life, both without and within, is as full of romance as fiction is. Let us consider a few cases. On the lowest level, when a day laborer, after long poverty and hardship, unexpectedly falls heir to a vast estate, his experience is romantic. When a student of science, who year after year has patiently accumulated stores of empirical knowledge, at length generalizes his perceptions all at once into a new law, and invents the perfect formula which the human race will henceforth acknowledge, thrills of reverential gratitude shoot through him which conquerors or kings might well envy. Still more romantic, in its way, is the fortune of a gifted and noble man, who, through adverse circumstances, has been plunged into desolation and is nigh to despair, when a great passion of love fills him for one every way worthy, who reciprocates it, and they are happily united. The change in his experience is as great as that which happens outwardly when the sun rises on a world hung with the dismal monotony of a dripping fog, and soon shows every detail of the landscape sharply defined in the universal illumination. A similar, still diviner result occurs when a man undergoes one of those revolutionizing religious conversions wherewith the history of the great spirits of all ages abounds. He hears the teaching voice of God within, and feels a divine bliss in every faculty. The universe is transfigured with the ineffable presence, and his life is turned to perpetual ravishment. This is the story which is variously illustrated in the biographies of the saints; it is magical as a fairy tale, but substantial as arithmetic or chemistry.

To breathe the air, with our average inattentive sense of life, is an ordinary experience of the common. To respire laboriously, in the yawning fatigue of satiated powers and a disenchanted spirit, is to know the revolting tedium of the commonplace. To inhale

a delicious perfume is a delight. But to be in such a condition of joyous vitality and accord with the deep heart of things that the ordinary atmosphere becomes fragrant and exhilarating, an aerial wine, is to enter the region of romance without leaving the region of truth. This is the invariable result of the combination of health in the body, freshness in the spirit, enthusiasm in the mind, and vigorous love and faith in the heart and imagination. And these traits are virtues obligatory on us all. If we have them not, we are guilty of the opposite vices. And then the humdrum poverty of our experience is the penalty we have ourselves invited. We cannot expect to grasp the prize the price of which we have neglected to pay. To find life inexpressibly rich and glorious, we must be alive with harmonious activity through all the dimensions of our being. The cynical pessimist, refused the prerogatives he has not earned, incompetently denies their existence: but each one has what he fits himself to have.

Romance is the seeing of the whole in the part, with the hierarchical ensphering of lesser wholes in greater ones. Its method is the associative insight whereby the clarified intellect, the surrendered will and the inspired heart perceive that nothing is isolated, but that everything is in and of the whole. And surely nothing else can be so sublimely romantic as the interpenetration of all nature, all spirits, all destinies, by the omnipresent God, working his will through just laws whose operation forever floods the experience of the moral universe with fresh marvels. The cosmic order, in which bodies dwell, is a bound system of related forces whose uniformity is never broken; the moral order, in which spirits dwell, is a domain of liberty where each one receives precisely according to his deserts, from the most abject wretchedness to the most inclusive transport.

He who faces the usual facts of the social world with no fresh exercise of a generous reason and faith and affection, finds his life degraded into a dull commonplaceness. Everything bores him. But in proportion as he brings intellectual insight, moral earnestness, æsthetic emotion and religious trust to bear, so as to realize the living drama and the divine presence therein, it is exalted through the various degrees of interest from the simply agreeable to the entrancingly beautiful, sublime and inspiring. The descent is caused by the narrowing, darkening, hardening and poisoning influence of our vices, which hide the glory of the universe from our eyes and defeat the workings of God in our souls. The ascent along the rising scale of romantic realiza-

tion is the unveiling of the potential wealth of nature and destiny by the coöperation of our proper virtues with divine grace. The more of harmonious intelligence we have in us, the more of precious treasure we see around us. A bitter cynic and a devout aspirant stand at the same moment amidst the same scenery of circumstances; the one growls with savage wretchedness; the other is gratefully exultant. Both have what they have earned.

Thus the ground of the romantic, subjectively considered, is faith and love and happy hope; its constituent elements are good fortune, contrast, beauty, grandeur, and surprise. If we are what we should be, these elements are possible everywhere, without a limit, for our inner life. This follows logically from the simple admission of the truth that God is in omnipresent relationship with his creatures, that his life is absolute perfection infinitely determined, and that He offers to share his life with us in exact proportion to our fitness to receive it. Our misfortune is that through sensual absorption, through frivolous distraction, or through unbelief and lethargy, we are unconscious of the transcendent glory of our opportunities, and therefore neglect to improve them, while we give ourselves up to the trivialities of the day, which soon become sickening and wearisome. Mechanized in our intelligence and materialized in our affection, we look listlessly out on a mechanical round of shows and details which have no value or interest for us.

Here the noble office of literary and dramatic art comes in. Its task is to supplement the defects of nature and neutralize the blindness and sloth of man by awakening him to a consciousness of his destiny and giving him glimpses of its romantic freshness, variety and grandeur. This art, in the highest form, depicts every detail of character or experience as inseparably bound up with the laws of the universe and all its symbolism. Thus common things are shown to be full of a meaning unspeakably momentous, an attraction eternally fresh, and an authority directly divine. The true artist is the man of genius extricated from the enslavement of the lower self on the material plane, and attaining, by the creative action of his higher nature, to a clear insight into the real ends of existence according to the plan of the Creator. He thus becomes an inspiring revelator and interpreter of life for others. This is the precise mission of the artist: to display what he sees for the benefit of those who see it not. To suppose that his business is merely to reflect facts is to take a most insufficient view of his mission. The facts themselves suffice, simply as barren facts.

The tautology of an empty restatement has no use. The real artist so presents facts as to *interpret them and show their rank as true or false, fair or foul, good or evil, right or wrong, blissful or baleful*. Hence comes artistic instruction, the illumination of things in the light of ideas. The artist will do this with the beautiful freedom or inspired spontaneity of art, not with the technical dryness and didactic obtrusion of the pedagogue. The man of genius differs from the mere observer of facts in seeing not only the facts, but likewise their presuppositions and their consequences. Literary art will not barely describe, with accurate minuteness, a given person in a given situation; it will so portray him and describe his actions as to reveal the level and quality of his character and conduct, and make them serve for guidance or warning.

It may be well, sometimes, in the performance of this office, to paint ignoble persons, or set forth an experience of the unmitigated common and commonplace in their lowest coarseness and vulgarity. Frivolous chatter, empty or malignant gossip, addledness, utter absorption in a grinding routine of petty material interests, are undoubtedly facts of extensive prevalence in our times. Beyond a question, there are many men and women so small and base, so fussily taken up with egotistic and superficial matters, so ignorant and hard and knowing and complacent, that in their atmosphere every kind of pure, heroic deed or aspiration, and every form of magnanimous sacrifice, sublime consecration or divine trust becomes impossible. But books which deal wholly with such persons and such facts, setting nothing more worthy in contrast with their meanness, — as if human experience were nothing but such an arid desert of vices and trifles, — do not deserve the name of literature. They make life seem loathsome to every generous and aspiring mind, that would fain believe experience commanding, man noble, God adorable, and eternity rich with imperishable good! They cater to the silly, the conceited, the selfish and the sensual, by reflecting these to themselves without rebuke.

Literature proper is the selected and artistic record of human experience. It should reflect that experience so as to interpret it in all its degrees, with the emphasis on the higher, an emphasis increasing with the ascent. To fix attention on low and vile experiences, as if these were all, or were as worthy of notice as the rest, is one of the worst offenses a writer can commit. It tends to degrade our estimate of human nature and to make life appear

worthless and hateful in the eyes of all who have any ideal nobleness. It spreads a dry rot of mediocrity, shallowness and insincerity.

The staple of life is the common, with a strong tendency, under automatic custom, toward the commonplace. But there is always present the possibility of raising life in the direction of the romantic. The two urgent desiderata, accordingly, are, first, to counteract the tendency of the crowd to sink into dead habit; second, to reinforce the tendency of genius to rise into living insight and fruition. Here lies the very essence of the mission of all pure art; to point out evil there, rebuke it, and destroy it; to point out good here, approve it, glorify it, and minister to it.

The opposite spirit treats the common as if it were necessarily commonplace, and as if there were nothing else. This most pernicious wrong is carried to its extreme by cynics and pessimists who consider all disinterested sentiment, all passionate devotion, all inspired eloquence as delusive folly, or sheer affectation. Such morbid misleaders are the sappers and miners in the army of the literary aliens. The persistent satirist who pours contempt on everything above his own vision and sympathy is engaged in a work of the deadliest omen to human welfare. Not scorn, distrust, selfishness, complacency, and apathy, but faith, expansion, enthusiasm, illuminated energy, are the great wants of the multitude. Through the force of custom and collective example they sag heavily from the common into the commonplace. They need to be stimulated, by the precepts of teachers and the exceptional examples of men of genius, to open their faculties to the perpetual inspirations of the ideal and the romantic.

The degradation of the common into the commonplace and its exaltation into the romantic have their precise parallels in that degeneration of truth into truism, which is the habit of careless mediocrity, and that regenerative glorification of truism into truth, which is the prerogative of genius and inspiration. A truism is a truth which by thoughtless and heartless repetition has been devitalized and stripped of the fascinating significance and authority it had when fresh in the mind where it has now grown trite and stale. But, inversely, the merest truism, when contemplated by an intellect full of assimilating power and glowing affection, reveals itself in new aspects, acquires unsuspected importance, yields richer applications, and thus undergoes a transfiguration. Bits of dead fact, embraced by the spirit of enthusiastic insight and love, are made organically alive and become fruit-

ful: they speak of the invisible omniscience in which they are imbedded.

Lifeless familiarity with truth, neglecting to obey its claims, deadens into indifference and weariness. But earnest interpretation of truism, seeking personal extraction of its uses, quickens it into wisdom and delight. To many a rigid formalist, who lives on the dry husks of ceremony and tradition, the most marvelous doctrines of religion are as barren of power and poetry as an algebraic equation. They never illumine a faculty or stir a throb in him. But in the ecstatic devotee is an operating power of associative insight, and obedience in conduct to what this reveals. For example, one man considers space as the abstract of all the relations of coexistence. Another conceives it as the perpetual entrancement with which the Logos contemplates his initial emergence from the Father, in the eternally generated distinction of the form from the substance of the Godhead. In the first case no more emotion is awakened than by the equation $A + B \times Y = C - D \times Z$. He who regards space in the second way will feel a wondering adoration as vast and mystic as the phenomenon his thought confronts. So, with most men, the law of gravitation has been familiarized into a truism which does not awaken the slightest interest. But in a spiritual nature responsive to every intellectual conviction, it will be exalted into a truth sovereign, pervasive, and sublime, and fill him with a religious rapture almost greater than he can bear. Thus will he think of it: Love is the unity of the substance of God. The law of gravitation is the reflex energy of this unity in the material order. The law of gravitation, therefore, is the incessant mirrored expression of the love of God binding the worlds into one. He whose character and attainments enable him to realize this will never feel that life is not worth living. How can he ever be wanting in gratitude, wonder, fear, or rapture, when every step he takes is a consentaneous interplay of his will and the living will of almighty God? *Deus operatur in omni operante*, said Saint Thomas: No work is done by a creature without the co-working of the Creator. Every ultimate thinker, from Plato and Aristotle to Suarez and Leibnitz, asserts that God is present in every being and in every motion, as the first cause and the immovable mover.

Surprise and awe, the highest elements of the romantic, are invariable concomitants of the recognition of God by man. Accompanied by harmony and trust, they constitute delight. Accompanied by discord and doubt, they constitute terror. In either

case, the experience, however often repeated, remains as fresh as though it were unprecedented ; and it moves the very foundations of our being. We can never become familiar with God or with his inward communications. We may be so shallow, self-occupied, reckless, or blunted as no longer to feel surprise and awe, with their ravishing promise or their tremendous misgiving. But whenever we do experience them, even to the last they are as novel, penetrating, and immeasurable as ever. Whoever has paid the price entitling him really to believe in God ; whoever has an experimental conviction of his presence within, whenever a signal of that presence is given, thrills with a sense of inexplicable and unfathomable surprise and awe. Is not this the very quintessence of the transcendently romantic ? Such a man feels intense interest in his own personality and experience, not as an egotist, but as one enveloped in God and subtending all beside. His conscious nature and its inner drama are so filled with mystery and unexpectedness, as well as with wonderful indications of a retributive order and an infinite future, that their appeal to his curiosity is equally irresistible and inexhaustible. To such a one life can never be commonplace, but must always be indescribably romantic. What will happen next ? What does this new thing mean ? There is no end to the divine marvels and no cloying to the human taste for them.

Actual experience consists of limited realities in consciousness. But the ultimate basis of experience is an unlimited possibility of new events and changes. The ground of all experience of the romantic is a richly colored expectation sustained in the region of the indeterminate unknown ; the romantic itself is the impressive breaking forth of actual examples of this latent possibility into definite realization. The romantic enhances feeling by means of ideal considerations, making the vapid, intense ; the vulgar, noble and sacred ; the familiar, strange ; and the trivial, sublime. A walk willingly taken, to enjoy the scenery, is common. A walk reluctantly taken for exercise is commonplace. A walk eagerly taken to meet a friend, whose voice will thrill the breast and whose smile will electrify the soul, is romantic. In the most comprehensive sense, romance is whatever heightens experience, with a dramatic effect, by enriching it with imaginative ingredients or associations. One man may have the external conditions productive of this result without the internal, another have the internal without the external, and a third enjoy both together. Two men may be occupied with the same inward experience, but one be in

a deep, narrow valley filled with dampness and gloom, the other be walking along a mountain ridge lighted with a gorgeous sunrise and commanding a vast landscape, fringed with the border of the dark-green sea and overhung by the boundless blue. When we contemplate a great scholar, outwardly poor, neglected, and forsaken, it gives us a mighty lift of the heart to think that inwardly he has for his most intimate companions Plato, Dante, Saint Thomas, Leibnitz, and Shakespeare, with their kindred. To such a one the laurels and public attention for which the crowd contend are unimportant. For he who wins the heroic insight of the master-aspirants of our race attains an eminence whence the career of the conqueror seems only a bloody gash across the historic landscape, while the road of glory, hedged with swords and flags, pales into an illusory streak.

Feeling, swollen in volume and lowered in tone, is tragic. But feeling, heightened in quality and degree, even though it be lessened in mass, is romantic. The drift and symbolism of Gothic architecture are upward, and speak of living aspiration: those of Egyptian architecture are downward, and speak of dead immobility. So the former is romantic; the latter, tragic. The central peculiarity of "Faust," the great romance of the Middle Age, is the supernatural enhancement of his powers and adventures through a compact with Satan. The whole character of Christendom as compared with that of ancient Greece is romantic; the glow and the glare of the supernal and the infernal worlds gleam in upon the earth, through rents in the fixed curtain of the natural order. In the classic school of art objective facts bear preponderant rule; in the romantic school, subjective feelings dominate. The fundamental condition of every style of romance is mystery or undetermined possibility; its form, picturesqueness or variety; its essence, contrast. But the distinction of classic representation is perfection of form, while the distinction of romantic representation is richness of content. The unity of the two is found by the insight which penetrates to the same substance and law in each. The desideratum is to fill the calm and simple finish of the classic with the crowded and heaving exuberance of the romantic; each will gain a mystic suggestiveness from the union. This result, taken out of abstract theory and professional art, and seen in concrete life, is destined, in some future and happier age, to glorify human nature and bless human experience as they have never yet been glorified and blessed.

No one has ever adequately stated the overwhelming magnifi-

cence and mystery of the conditions for romantic experience which are latent in human life. They are partially revealed in the records of the great saints, but not in a systematic and intelligible form. Emerson in many of his fragmentary utterances, especially in his matchless essay on the Over-Soul, has perhaps come nearer to a proportionate declaration of the truth than any other writer. Martineau, too, in some of his sermons, has most impressively indicated it. Without any attempt at a full elucidation, it may be here briefly hinted at.

Our life, as an actuality, is what we make it. But, as a possibility, instead of being what we make it, it is what God meant it should be, what God offers us. And does not God offer us himself, in addition to the contents of created being? This is the inexhaustible and omnipresent ground for an experience of infinite blessedness, forever perfect, and yet forever varying so as to remain forever new. Nothing better than this can be conceived.

Consciousness is an infinite possibility of forms of experience, just as space is an infinite possibility of forms of matter, time an infinite possibility of forms of mind, and force an infinite possibility of forms of motion. The determinations of consciousness are finite, but it is itself an infinity to be limited only by its own act. Now the objective realities to be experienced are as infinite as the subject experiencing them. Whatever is, or can be, awaits its receptive activity. The very definition of the divine humanity is *the power in consciousness to become all that is and to create all that is not*. This is the generic archetype of the race, which the church represents as historically realized in Christ alone. But the proper destiny of each individual is to exalt his personal experience into a complete realization of it somewhere in eternity; and it may be done as well here as anywhere else. So the profoundest reasoners and the most ardent aspirants who have ever lived affirm in one chorus, seeing that man is made in the divine image.

If we consider the nature of God, and his relation to created consciousness, some faint notion of the sublime truth herein implied will begin to dawn on us. The pure act of God is an absolute unity of essence with an infinite variety of determination, a purposive freedom without limit or obstacle or alloy. Such an experience must be an infinite perfection of bliss eternally new. This is the life of God. His disinterestedness causes him to bestow himself on his children and share his prerogatives with them in the degrees of their preparedness. The only limit to his

gifts is their lack of receptivity. He is indivisibly omnipresent, in pervasive union with all spirits. They may, therefore, participating in his life, expect, at any moment, in any place, the greatest experience for which they have made ready the conditions. Nothing else conceivable is so romantic as this omnipresent possibility of fresh revelations out of an infinite creativeness.

Poetry, philosophy, and religion speak here with one voice; Plato, Aurelius, Newton, and Goethe sink on their knees in common assent with Isaiah, David, Anselm, Fénelon, and Channing. He whose words were weighted with the greatest authority that ever spoke with a human tongue said, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect." The true destination of man is to repeat, in conscious reflection, the free bliss and glory of God. Consequently the miraculous marvels of the romance of the inner life, in its ideal possibility, surpass all that speech can ever express. The inspirations of genius and the ecstasies of sainthood afford broken hints of it. Kepler, grasping his three laws, breaks out in transports of apostrophe to God. Francis and Bonaventura and Catherine and Theresa, and a thousand others, declare that in their supernal visitations they feel almost annihilated by the insufferable excess of bliss.

Literary art should not be so exclusively occupied with the vulgar average of commonplace characters and experiences as to ignore those authoritative glories and charms of ideality and romance which come to their climax of solid substantiality in religion. Much less should it ever permit itself to insult them with denial or mock at them with ridicule—as if everything grandly virtuous or beautiful were mere hypocrisy and illusion. *Idealism is seeing things in the light of ideas.* It is truer than realism; for ideas, as the perfect models of things, are more direct and full expressions of the creative mind than the things which defectively represent them. Realism confines its attention to things, with the open or tacit omission of ideas. With the idealist the meaning of a thing is the essential; but the realist, at least in his coarser form, is satisfied with the description of its appearance.

A prominent author of our day has said, "Idealism in art is the truthful treatment of the materials." An admirer quotes this statement as a definition not to be improved. But, in the sense in which the writer seems to have used the words, they do not define idealism at all, only a naked realism. Mere observers appear to hold that everything stands by and for itself alone, with no further meaning. But penetrative thinkers perceive that

everything carries a meaning; and they try to grasp this and indicate what it is. The direct delineation of facts with their natural groupings and processes is the work of a mirror or a camera. The duty and the glory of an artist are to do far more than this. He must treat persons, things, and events, in the light of their ideas; he must interpret them as seen in relations with their antecedents and their results, set off between exemplars and foils. This alone is genuine idealism with its instructive and inspiring power. Art is not the heterogeneous and literal; it is selection and interpretation. Nature is confined to truth of fact; art reaches to truth of reason. Idealism must not only treat the materials of art truthfully; it must also *render their meanings transparent by handling them purposely under the illumination of ideas*. To set down the bare materials correctly is stark realism. It does not do us good, however just their statements may be, to read whole volumes filled with microscopic descriptions of superficial and hypocritical characters, shamelessly absorbed in contemptible rivalries and utterly unsuspecting of the existence of anything nobler. To justify such volumes some touch of ideal reality, some kindling vision of romantic virtue and achievement, is needed. If this make us turn with disgust from the life portrayed and lift our eyes to diviner standards, the vile is turned to service.

To unveil, in what passes for commonplace, an interest, value or grandeur undiscerned before is the highest triumph of genius and the noblest service it can render. If this be what the critic means, we altogether agree with him. But he who would divorce the transcendental from the actual, explain the quickening messages of faith and imagination as idle dreams, and invest the whole many colored spectacle of life with one common drab of selfishness, advocates the most injurious, disheartening and dishonoring falsehood ever broached. The word "romantic" seems, indeed, to act on some writers and critics like a red rag on a bull. They fly at it with a fury incapable of just distinctions. We all know that forms of romantic sentiment prevail which are unreasonable and consequently pernicious. But it is a fatal mistake to confound the wholesome and beautiful reality of its inspiring essence with affected, mawkish, silly or extravagant manifestations. Careful definition and rational examples are needed, not universal condemnation and indiscriminate onslaught, for this is as if one, seeing that flunkysism abounds, should sneer at reverence. Undoubtedly there is a great quantity of fustian in the world; but

shall we therefore deny that there are silks, velvets and satins? The error is akin to the sneer of the demagogue at the introduction of morals into politics, — as if the rule of right did not reach wherever human conduct is to be found. The melodramatic is often objectionable; but the dramatic is not therefore to be denounced and ridiculed. Let us try to keep our experiences of the romantic rational; but let us not bring the romantic itself into contempt or distrust, lest we thus destroy the very inspiration of existence. The creative writer and the discerning critic do wisely in expelling the false romantic from the field of experience and art; but they should also go on to the nobler office of revealing the true romantic present everywhere in the usual facts of healthy experience, — showing duty, loveliness and joy, coexistent and inherent in the common.

It is better to ascend than to descend. For the higher includes the lower, while the lower does not include the higher, though it may be raised into it through its own aspiration, aided by the higher. We can conceive of conscious spirit creating matter, but we cannot conceive of unconscious matter creating spirit. Since the cause must be before the effect, and the meaning precede the expression, idealism is older and truer than realism, includes it, transcends it, and will survive it. That which gives glory or sweetness to human nature and character, dignity or worth to society, attraction or authority to political struggle or personal ambition, is the detection in them of principles and purposes deeper than their shifting phenomena, — the perception that they are set in a dramatic symbolism which, through providential laws, unites them all with one another and with God. This is a view equally ideal and real. It reveals everywhere, in the union of every part with the whole, an infinite ground of romance. It enables us to trace the prophetic finger of experience always pointing, even through the tragedies of sin and pain, towards beatitude; since God is unlimited perfection, and the twofold universe, material and spiritual, is the theatre of his fulfilling purposes.

“Deep love lieth under
These pictures of time;
They fade in the light of
Their meaning sublime.”

Human beings here on earth are romantic in proportion to their wealth of endowments and their freedom of action. To this wealth and freedom there is no fixed limit; the magical horizon of self-determination is capable of contraction or expansion from the in-

infinitesimal to the infinite. In view of this truth, we hold that the literary rank of an author is shown by the consistency, beauty, richness and grandeur of the types of character and forms of life he creates; just as the moral rank of personalities and experiences themselves is decided by the quality and quantity of being they present in free consciousness, — the amount of good, truth, beauty, right, and joy, in them. The writer whose influence on his readers narrows their vision, chills their enthusiasm, overshadows their outlook, and pulverizes their hopes with belittling estimates and cynical theories, is unworthy to write and unfit to be read. True literature is enriching and redemptive. For the highest service man can render to men is to purify and aggrandize their ideal of existence, and give it new power to enchant and command, by showing greater treasures in heaven and earth than they have suspected.

WILLIAM ROUNSEVILLE ALGER.

ABRAHAM KUENEN.

OF the details of Kuenen's youth little has been published.¹ He was born September 16, 1828, in Haarlem, and attended the schools of that city up to his fifteenth year. His father's death then made it necessary for him to leave school for a time and do what he could for the support of the family. After a while it became possible for him to reënter the Gymnasium, whence he went in 1846 to Leiden as a student in the Faculty of Theology; he took his Doctor's degree in 1851. He is described as having been a brilliant student both at school and at the university, and it may be assumed that high hopes were entertained of his future — hopes destined to be nobly fulfilled.

The place of his academic training was fortunately chosen. When he came to Leiden, the university had had a distinguished career of two centuries and a half, standing most of the time in the van of advancing thought. From the first days of its establishment in the heroic year 1575, it seemed to be animated by fresh and vigorous life. One of the earliest members of its pro-

¹ The facts here mentioned concerning Kuenen's private life are taken mainly from an article in *The Inquirer* (of London) for December 26, 1891, by Rev. Philip H. Wicksteed. Professor C. P. Tiele, of Leiden University, is preparing a biography of his colleague.

fessorial staff was Joseph Justus Scaliger, whose vast learning and penetrating genius made it for a time the resort of all the ambitious scholars of western Europe. Through the labors of Hemsterhuis, Ruhnken, and their eminent associates, it gave a new direction to classical study. It was adorned by the distinguished Arabic scholarship of Erpenius, who went thither as professor in 1613, and for whom, later, a special chair of Hebrew was founded. To it belongs the honor of introducing a broader linguistic conception of Old Testament exegesis; Albert Schultens headed the revolt against the rabbinical school of Buxtorf, and insisted on the utility of the Aramaic and the Arabic, especially the latter, for the explanation of Hebrew words. Though Schultens exaggerated somewhat the value of Arabic in this regard, his general position remains unshaken. Since his day the discovery of the Assyrian language has added greatly to the resources of Semitic lexicography, and some scholars, carried away by a natural enthusiasm, have denied that Arabic is of any use for the Old Testament lexicon; but the majority, recognizing the close affinity of the Semitic tongues, accept the testimony of all of them, under the rigid supervision of scientific philology. Down to our own time Leiden has continued to be a centre of Arabic study: the splendid work of Dozy and De Goeje, and it may be added, the enterprise of the Brill publishing house, are widely known.

In theology proper the university has numbered among its teachers a host of distinguished men. Two years after its foundation Drusius accepted its invitation to occupy a chair of theology, and fifteen years later Junius was called and remained as teacher up to 1602. The next year Leiden became the centre of the most important theological movement of the seventeenth century. In 1603 Arminius became professor, and in the six years of his work there as teacher placed the revolt against Calvinism on a solid foundation. By his side stood John van Oldenbarnevelt and Hugo Grotius, who, though not teachers in the university, were its faithful sons, and proved themselves powerful allies of the new movement. The theological contention of Arminius was ably continued by his pupil and successor, Simon Episcopius. Though Arminianism was for a time crushed by the Synod of Dort and its adherents banished, out of their dispersion arose the important Theological School of Amsterdam. In the middle of the seventeenth century another professor of the university, Cocceius, created an exegetical school which called forth discussion all over Europe

and has not yet ceased to affect theological thought.¹ Among other men, famous and important in their day, who adorned the halls of the university, were Ludovicus de Dieu, whose "*Critica Sacra*" is still consulted; Salmasius, whose "*Defence of Charles I.*" called forth Milton's "*Defence of the People of England*;" Hermann Witsius, the expounder of the Covenants; and John Marck, whose "*Medulla*" is still an admirable compendium of the old theology. After the close of the Napoleonic wars and the rise of the Dutch Reformed Church, the university entered on the task of reconstructing the church dogmas under the influence of modern thought, and among the leaders of the new tendency one of the most distinguished was Scholten, the teacher and friend of Kuenen.

Amid such scholarly traditions and in such an atmosphere of serious and free investigation, Kuenen pursued his university studies and began his career as an independent thinker. He was, however, not attracted to the field of theology proper. His Doctor's thesis was an edition of part of the Arabic version of the Samaritan Genesis, and he seems to have gone immediately into critical research. So high was the opinion of his ability, that immediately after he received his degree he was given a temporary appointment in the university, and the next year, on the recommendation of Thorbecke, was appointed Extraordinary Professor of Theology. He was now permanently connected with the university, and in 1855 was promoted to a full professorship. The same year he married the daughter of Professor Muurling of Groningen. Those who knew Mrs. Kuenen describe her as a woman of great intellectual and social powers, for a time her husband's constant companion in his work, and always, until her death in 1883, entering with keen sympathy into all his occupations. The marriage was not without theological significance; the Groningen School was the leader in the liberal theological movement in Holland, and with this movement Kuenen seems to have been connected from the beginning of his career. But it was, as we have said, to the critical rather than the dogmatic side that he turned. After six years of preparation he began the publication of his elaborate treatise on the Old Testament literature — the "*Historisch-Kritisch Onderzoek*," or "*Historical-Critical Inquiry into the Origin and the Collection of the Books of the Old*

¹ Over against him stood the many-sided Grotius; the opposition between the two was expressed in the well-known saying that Cocceius found Christ in the Old Testament everywhere, and Grotius found him nowhere.

Testament" (1861-65). This work attracted wide attention, and the first part was immediately translated into French with a highly commendatory preface by M. Ernest Renan. Its general position was that which had been reached by the advanced critics of the time. But before speaking further of it, it will be well to pause and glance at the preceding history of Old Testament criticism.

The serious critical study of the Old Testament began in the first half of the seventeenth century. Before this time there had been scattered observations from Jerome to Aben Ezra and Elias Levita, but there was no connected and permanent investigation. The Christian world had been occupied with other things. In the early centuries the majesty and the practical power of Christian thought and life absorbed the attention of religious leaders. The struggle against paganism was continued when the newly-founded kingdoms of western Europe embraced Christianity. Out of the social chaos the church, representing both social unity and the idealizing ethical principle, gradually rose to a dominant position. Society was occupied with the organization of social and political life. The church, in enforcing the necessary unity, naturally took its stand on the historical documents of Christianity, and forbade inquiry into the source of its authority. By the end of the fifteenth century something like order had been established in Europe: the political power was firmly organized, the serious study of the old classic literatures was begun, and the discovery of Copernicus opened the way to scientific investigation. At the same time sprang up the revolt against the authority of the church; Protestantism took possession of half of Europe, and a new period of dogmatic strife and construction set in. Then came a breathing time; Catholics and Protestants rested side by side in England, France, Holland, Germany, and Switzerland, each party fiercely denouncing, indeed, the errors of the other, but each compelled, and in a sort content, to accept the other as an established fact. It was in this period of comparative repose, when the two branches of the church had settled down, each to its own work, that attention began to be turned to critical questions connected with the Old Testament.

France was the centre of the new movement. Whether from her geographical position in the middle of western Europe, the influence of her ancient institutions of learning, her distaste for dogmatics, or these and other causes combined, France was for one hundred and fifty years the source and inspiration of Old Testament critical literary study; Catholics and Protestants alike

took part in these investigations. The beginning was made by the Protestant Ludovicus Cappellus, professor at Saumur, who attacked and demolished the current opinion on the antiquity of the Hebrew vowel-points. His book gave rise to a lively and effective discussion. Against him was arrayed the tremendous rabbinical learning of the Buxtorf family at Basle, who ransacked the Talmud and other Jewish works to prove that the points were affixed to the texts by Ezra. But the position of Cappellus was supported by the lately recovered copy of the Samaritan Pentateuch, and solidly based on many other facts which gradually carried conviction to the more open-minded of his contemporaries, Catholic and Protestant. The excitement was great. To many it seemed that this new theory meant the subversion of religion; for, said they, if the vowel-points were not given by divine revelation, but were added by Jewish scribes many hundred years after the last Old Testament book was written, what warrant have we that our reading of the Scripture-text is correct? For a century the question was discussed and then sank to rest. Cappellus further made a sharp examination of the ancient versions, and indeed his "*Arcanum Punctuationis Revelatum*" (1624) is throughout marked by noteworthy scholarly caution and precision. At this time, also, the authority of the Hebrew text as compared with that of the Septuagint and the Vulgate was widely and keenly debated.

The next epoch-making book came from a French Catholic, Richard Simon, Priest of the Congregation of the Oratory (1678).¹ Spinoza² and Hobbes³ have acute remarks about the Pentateuch, pointing out passages which are inconsistent with a Mosaic authorship. Spinoza, indeed, is in accord with the most modern results in bringing the final publication of the Pentateuch down to the time of Ezra; but these opinions came from the insight of genius, and were not based on a connected study of the documents. Father Simon proceeds in a more systematic way. The three books of his "*Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament*" treat successively of "The Hebrew Text of the Bible from Moses to our

¹ In 1655, the worthy Peyrerius, in deep concern over those who "had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression" (Rom. v. 12-14), fell on the explanation that they were pre-Adamites. Doubts on this point, he said, had occurred to him when as a boy he read the history in Genesis, for example, the story of Cain. But his interest was chiefly dogmatic, and his speculations were unfruitful.

² In the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.

³ In the *Leviathan*.

time; *The Principal Versions of the Bible and The Manner of properly translating the Bible.*" In the first book he discusses the origin of the present form of the Old Testament. Here he displays a free and scientific spirit in his manner of dealing with the material, and indeed, points out several things (such as archaeological remarks, references to later times, repetitions, lack of orderly arrangement, and diversity of style) which have ever since formed the staple of Pentateuchal criticism. Strange to say, the book was taken up chiefly by Protestants. Bossuet all but destroyed the first edition. The only reliable later edition, that of 1685, was printed at Rotterdam. Simon's principal antagonist was the accomplished Clericus, professor in the Remonstrant School at Amsterdam. The publisher's preface to the Rotterdam edition gives a lively picture of the tone of the controversies of that day. There was no lack of sharp words, and there was a profusion of learned books, most of which have passed out of sight.

Simon's work lived in its results, and no doubt had much to do with calling forth the next book which marks decided critical progress, the famous work of Astruc, the "*Conjectures on the Original Memoirs which Moses seems to have used in composing the book of Genesis*" (1753). Here we have for the first time the recognition of Elohist and Jehovist documents, a division that has played a chief part in Old Testament criticism ever since. Exactly how Astruc came upon his famous theory we have no information. He was a physician greatly esteemed at the court of Louis XIV., not particularly a Hebraist, but obviously a keen-sighted student of the Bible. He was aware of the difficulties in the way of regarding Moses as the author of Genesis cited by Simon and Clericus, Fleury and Le François, and undertook to remove them. Whether he was in all simple-mindedness and sincerity defending the traditional claim of Moses, or adopted the apologetic tone in part to ward off unfriendly criticism of his novel theory, may be a question.¹ In any case, he was in one important point the founder of Old Testament criticism. He found in the authors above-mentioned the suggestion of the employment by Moses of written documents; but the happy recognition of the distinctive use of the divine names seems to have been wholly his own. His explanations of difficulties (like Simon's liberal employment of the prophets as the editors and changers of

¹ Renan expresses a similar doubt in his preface to the French translation of Kuenen's *Critical History of the Old Testament*.

the Hebrew text) have proved to be of little service; but his hypothesis of documents has stood the test of time.

With the appearance of Astruc's book France retired from the field of Old Testament criticism, to which she has returned only in these last years. The work of research passed to Germany, and for a century was carried on by Germany alone. The real successor of Astruc was J. G. Eichhorn, the first edition of whose "Introduction to the Old Testament" appeared in 1780-83 and the fifth in 1823-24. Following in the footsteps of Simon and Astruc, though in an independent spirit, he undertakes to show that the greater part of Genesis is composed of fragments of two historical works, the Elohistic and the Jehovistic, and that the first of these works appears in the early part of Exodus. He deserves credit for composing the first critical history of the Old Testament, and subjecting each book to an orderly examination. He simplified somewhat Astruc's scheme of "memoirs," but in other respects added little of importance for the solution of the Pentateuchal question. Up to the last he held substantially to the full Mosaic authorship, though between his first and fifth editions a number of important works had appeared in which the opposite view was fairly made out.

In 1798, Ilgen found in Genesis two Elohistes and a Jehovist, thus coming very near the present view. But the greatest stride forward was made by Vater, professor at Halle, who in his commentary on the Pentateuch, published in 1805, analyzed the evidence with remarkable sagacity and clearness, holding that Moses did not compose Genesis from preëxisting memoirs, that the history of Israel shows no consciousness of the Pentateuch till after David's time, that Deuteronomy is the earliest of the five books and is to be referred to the period of Jehoshaphat, and that the other books were probably put into shape in the early part of the exile. It happened, curiously enough, that just about this time the young Dr. De Wette had prepared a work on the Pentateuch, the manuscript of which he had shown to Dr. Griesbach, of Jena, who advised him to print it. But while he was putting the last touches to the manuscript, Vater's work appeared, and De Wette, to his delight and dismay, found the publication of his results anticipated in the book of the renowned professor. He hastened to pour his griefs into the sympathizing ear of Griesbach, who pointed out to him that there was still much in his manuscript that he might profitably publish. Vater, also, encouraged his young colaborer, and promised to aid him in bringing out his work.

This accordingly appeared the next year under the title, "Critical Examination of the Credibility of Chronicles, with reference to the history of the Mosaic books of legislation. An appendix to Vater's investigations in the Pentateuch,"—an attempt to prove the untrustworthiness of Chronicles. The next year his investigation of the Pentateuch as a reliable source of history was printed, his conclusion being that the work was chiefly legendary.

We need not follow the further history of Old Testament criticism in detail. The foundation was now laid, the conception of the Pentateuch as the result of accretions, as the product of the growth of Israelitish religious life, was established, and the critical examination of other Old Testament books had been begun. Succeeding writers devoted themselves to the elaboration of the principles laid down by Vater and De Wette and to other critical work. The opinion that the second part of Isaiah belonged to the Babylonian Exile was already current when Gesenius published his Commentary on Isaiah in 1821, and a preëxilic date for the second part of Zechariah had long been held. Pentateuchal investigation continued to be carried on by De Wette, Bleek, Ewald, Vatke, Knobel, and others. In 1853, Hupfeld reaffirmed and elaborated the view of Ilgen, that in addition to the two generally recognized Elohistic and Jehovistic writers a second Elohist must be assumed allied in tone and spirit to the Jehovist—a view that has since maintained itself.

Kuenen thus entered the field at a time when the literary questions connected with the Old Testament had assumed a serious shape. The historical-critical spirit was fully aroused. A similar earnestness showed itself in the classical world, where the origin of the Homeric poems had been the subject of lively discussion ever since Wolf published his famous *Prolegomena to Homer* in 1795. The Pentateuch and the *Iliad* were not unlike in the reverence which they called forth; to assail the unity of either was felt by a large part of the learned world to be a profane procedure, though this feeling was, of course, far more pronounced in the case of the former. De Wette in 1807 takes pains to say clearly and eloquently that in denying the historical validity of the Pentateuch he is not attacking the foundations of the Christian religion. Nothing could be farther from the writings of the critical scholars of this period than a spirit of irreverence. Nevertheless, the taint of heterodoxy clung to all such inquiries, and so late as 1875, the English translator of Bleek's *Introduction* found it necessary to affirm and defend the orthodoxy of the pious and

devoted author. On the other hand it is true that by the middle of our century Old Testament critical study had gained the haven of calmness, could dispense with violent emotion, and content itself with the quiet search after truth. In this respect, also, Kuenen was fortunate in the moment at which he began his work.

The "Historical-Critical Inquiry" appeared in 1861-65. M. Renan, in his preface to the French translation of the first part, gives noteworthy testimony to the position which the author then occupied in the world of scholarship. "The work of M. Kuenen," he says, "needs no other recommendation than the name of the author. M. Kuenen is Professor of Sacred Scripture in the Theological Faculty of the University of Leiden. He is one of the glories of that great school, equally distinguished for its learning and for its Christian spirit, at the head of which stands the profound theologian Scholten. His publication of the Arabic version of the Samaritan Pentateuch, and his essays in sacred criticism and hermeneutics, had placed him among the most skillful critics of the Old Testament. His work entitled '*Historisch-Kritisch Onderzoek*' . . . is certainly the completest, the most methodical and the most judicious of all the attempts to give a full view of the results of research into the ancient Hebrew literature. A solid and precise thinker, M. Kuenen seeks not so much to develop original hypotheses as to state exactly what can be affirmed. He knows the limits of knowledge; he accepts with resignation the fact that he cannot hear the grass sprout or seize the unseizable. In the present state of Biblical-exegetical study, this is perhaps the most important thing. . . . He states all opinions, weighs them with admirable sagacity, and marks out with a sure hand the limits of the probable, the doubtful, the certain, and the unknowable. That notably solid quality of the Dutch mind, to which these studies owed so much in the eighteenth century, reappears in him, now that they have reached maturity, to sum them up, judge of their results, and state the conclusions to be drawn from them."

Kuenen's book richly deserves this praise.¹ It is marked by fullness of material, careful examination of facts and coolness and prudence of judgment. Well versed in the literature of the subject, the author patiently considers the views of all the critics

¹ The French translation seems to have stopped with the second volume (thus including the Historical Books and the Prophets). The first volume of the *Onderzoek* has been accessible to me only in the French rendering. M. Renan declares that the translator has faithfully reproduced the original.

from Ilgen and Vater down, seeking to examine their conclusions in the light of his own knowledge, and to combine all well attested facts in a rational though not inflexible theory. It is unnecessary to give his arguments and results in details, especially as on some important points he soon after changed his opinion. M. Renan is right in saying that he was not addicted to novel hypotheses; in this book, certainly, he shows himself notably cautious. On the other hand he was far from being inhospitable to new ideas; his plan is to prove all things. His critical feeling, uneasy in the presence of unsolved difficulties, was constantly reaching forth after new points of view.

One of the pressing questions of the time was that of the mutual relations of the component parts of the Pentateuch. The earlier writers had held that the work received its present form from an editor who combined the various documents into a whole. A second generation of critics, feeling that this hypothesis did not duly recognize the unity of the book, supposed that an original work (the so-called "Book of Origins"), an Elohistic production, was supplemented by the Jehovist, who added material either composed by himself or drawn from other sources. But it had lately been suggested that the Jehovistic element was by no means a mass of fragmentary additions, but itself represented a separate and connected work. Kuenen declares for this last view (which is now the generally adopted one), and supports his opinion with characteristically just remarks, his arguments being substantially those now relied on.

A still more interesting illustration of Kuenen's power of feeling his way is found in his treatment of the Levitical legislation. The question was as to its date compared with that of the Deuteronomical legislation. The majority of critics held that Deuteronomy presupposed all the sacerdotal legislation of the "Book of Origins" (Leviticus, Numbers, and part of Exodus); but some regarded the latter as posterior in date. In discussing this point, Kuenen cites the opinion of M. Orth, who maintained in the "*Revue de Théologie*" that the legislation of Ezekiel stood midway in ritual development, and therefore in date, between that of Deuteronomy and that of Leviticus. Kuenen sees difficulties in this reasoning, but he also feels its force, and he sums up as follows: "So much of it as is true supports our opinion as to the successive redactions of the Book of Origins. That the whole of this book was written after the prophecies of Ezekiel we cannot admit, for reasons already given. But on the other hand it is

perfectly clear (as M. Orth's argument also goes to prove) that in the time of Ezekiel some parts of this book were still unknown. It follows that the final redaction of the Book of Origins is later than Ezekiel, and consequently later than the Deuteronomic legislation, which that prophet was evidently acquainted with." Here both Orth and Kuenen come very near the position which has since been so generally adopted. Kuenen's treatment of the historical and prophetic books is hardly less interesting than his criticism of the Pentateuch, though in these books the literary questions were less involved, and the conclusions less liable to change. The critical account of Chronicles, for example, remains substantially as De Wette gave it in 1806.

In his "Onderzoek," Kuenen fairly summed up the reigning critical feeling of the time. In spite of the conclusion suggested by Spinoza, Vater, and Vatke, the general opinion was that the mass of the Levitical legislation was earlier than Deuteronomy. But a great change was now to take place in the attitude of the critical world toward this question. In the year in which the last volume of the "Onderzoek" appeared (1865), K. H. Graf wrote the preface to his treatise on the Pentateuch. This work (the title-page of which is dated 1866) consisted of two parts, the first dealing with the elements of the historical books from Genesis to the end of Kings, the second investigating the value of Chronicles as an historical authority. The second part owed its special value to the first; by reason of his novel view of the date of the Levitical legislation he was able to go far beyond the results reached by De Wette, Ewald, and Bertheau. The first part is a keen and luminous comparison between the ritual laws of Leviticus, Numbers, and the second half of Exodus on the one hand, and those of the Book of the Covenant (Exodus xx.-xxiii.), Deuteronomy, and Ezekiel on the other hand. Graf reaches the conclusion that the former are more elaborate, and therefore later than the latter, and that this relation of dates is fully borne out by the history. The Levitical legislation, he says, was possible only for a small and united community, such as we find at Jerusalem after the exile. This conclusion was undoubtedly novel and surprising to the critical world when it was uttered. But, as we have seen, something like it had already been affirmed by Orth, and Graf cites a perfectly definite and clear expression of this view from an article by Edouard Reuss (in Ersch und Gruber's Encyclopädie, II. 27, 337). It afterwards appeared that Reuss had announced this view many years before in his lectures to his classes, though he

had never undertaken to make an orderly exposition of it. It is not unlikely that he was its originator; but it had somehow got into the air, and to Graf is due the credit of having recognized its great critical value, and given it such shape as made it an effective principle.

The effect of Graf's revolutionary work on Kuenen was great. It supplied the solution of difficulties with which he himself had been laboring before Graf's book appeared. He gave the new theory a cordial reception, and proceeded at once to develop it. He very soon saw that the Grafian hypothesis, as it then stood, was defective.¹ While affirming the post-exilian date of the ritual legislation, it still held to the early pre-Jehovistic origin of the historical narratives therewith connected. Kuenen perceived that the legislative and the narrative sections could not be separated one from the other; and he came to the conclusion that, as the post-exilian date for the ritual was satisfactorily established, a similar late date must be claimed for the history. This conclusion he made known by letter to Graf, who in his reply recognizes the justice of the criticism and accepts the suggested modification. He had himself, he says, felt the difficulty referred to, and he adds: "You suggest a solution of this enigma which has struck me the more forcibly because it was quite new to me, and yet I felt immediately that it was the true one, namely, that the Elohist parts of Genesis are posterior to the Jehovistic parts."

I have taken these words of Graf from Kuenen's critical autobiography in the introduction to the English translation of his "*Hexateuch*," to which I must refer the reader for a fuller history of recent Pentateuchal criticism. Kuenen's narrative is not only scientifically precise; it breathes also a delightfully genial spirit, an unaffected judicial calm, and a hearty recognition of the work of his collaborators. The paths of philological and Biblical research, sad to say, are not always free from unseemly contentions, and it is therefore all the more pleasant to find a scholar standing in the forefront of the battle and fighting with all his might, yet keeping justness in judgment and courtesy and sweetness in tone and demeanor.

In 1866, Kuenen had reached his final critical position respecting the Pentateuch; he held that the prophetic narratives and laws stood first in order of time; that Deuteronomy came next, and the full Levitical legislation and the priestly narratives last. We have seen that he had been working up to this point; Graf's

¹ This was pointed out by Riehm also.

essay had given shape and consistency to his view. His general position was fixed, but there were many details to be worked out, and with these he occupied himself during the rest of his life. He was a constant contributor to the "Theologisch Tijdschrift," which was founded in 1867 (Amsterdam and Leiden), under the editorial supervision of Van Bell, Hoekstra, Kuenen, Loman, Rauwenhoff, and Tiele. The magazine at once took a high scientific stand, and has maintained its position to the present time. Kuenen began in it a series of Critical Contributions to the History of the Israelitish Religion, besides writing a number of articles on Old Testament literary questions. It would require too much space to describe the contents of all these articles. They range over the whole domain of Old Testament study, and are all marked by his characteristic fullness and clearness of presentation. Most of his main results are found in his later books, but in the articles they are worked out in greater detail. His contributions were not confined to the "Tijdschrift;" one of his most important dissertations, that on "The Men of the Great Synagogue" appeared in the "Journal of the Royal Academy of Sciences," of Holland.¹ His activity was indeed prodigious; he found time in the midst of all his other occupations to write many book-reviews, and these are among the freshest and most interesting of his productions. One noteworthy result of his writings deserves special mention. The first edition of Dr. Hermann Schultz's excellent "Alttestamentliche Theologie" (1869), was based on the pre-Graffian view of the literature. Led, largely through Kuenen's influence, to examine the facts anew, Schultz rewrote his work for the second edition (1878), and gave it the improved shape which it now has.² The two works of Schultz and Kuenen on the Old Testament religion deserve to stand side by side as admirable expositions, each supplying certain things that the other omits, both being animated by the same spirit of scientific reverence and justness. Even where one cannot accept their positions, one must acknowledge the excellence of their method and aim.

As early as 1864, Kuenen had begun to lecture on the religion of the Old Testament, this subject connecting itself closely with his critical studies. An important part of his contributions to

¹ Second Series, Vol. VI. (1877), Literary Section. This was written as an addition to what he says on the subject in his *Religion of Israel*, and is supplemented by some remarks in the *Tijdschrift*, 1877.

² Kuenen was not satisfied with Schultz's second edition, objecting that he treated the Levitical period as a part of the Prophetic development, whereas it should be regarded as a new stadium.

the early numbers of the "*Theologisch Tijdschrift*" bore on the same theme. He now collected his material and worked it up into the form of an historical survey of the Israelitish religion, which was published in Dutch in 1869-70, and appeared in English translation in 1874-5, under the title, "*The Religion of Israel to the Fall of the Jewish State.*" This work was noteworthy, one might almost say epoch-making, not only in respect of its critical point of view, but also in the manner in which it dealt with the subject. Christian writers had from the beginning occupied themselves with the religious ideas of the Old Testament. The New Testament itself is full of interpretations of the words of the old Hebrew books, and church-fathers and later theologians continued to expound their teaching. But up to the end of the eighteenth century the Old Testament was looked on chiefly as the fore-court of the temple of Christianity, as an adumbration of Christian truth, as a collection of texts which were to be interpreted not simply by the New Testament, but by the later results of Christian development. Christian belief was regarded as established, and the proofs of it were therefore to be got from Old Testament as well as from New Testament. There was little or no conception of organic religious growth; the Bible was looked on as a unit, and there was only a single step from Malachi to Matthew. From such a point of view there could be a systematic statement of doctrines, but there could not be a history of religion.

The change from this way of looking at the subject proceeded naturally from the outburst of interest in historical and literary critical investigations in the latter part of the last century. The first important advance was made in 1816, when De Wette published his work on the religious conceptions of the Old Testament, in which he recognized the Hebrew religion as a distinct phenomenon, to be kept apart from Christianity. There was, of course, danger of exaggeration in such a position, but De Wette did the service of pointing out that the Old Testament represents a circle of ideas which are to be studied in and by themselves. So soon as the conception was grasped that Ezekiel was an independent thinker whose intellectual-religious *milieu* was very different from that of the Apostle Paul and not to be understood in the light of the Apostle's ideas, then the essential principle was established, and something like a history became possible. The historical conception in the treatment of the Old Testament religion was further emphasized by Vatke (1835) and Bruno Bauer

(1838), both, however, accepting and carrying out the view of Hegel, that the various religions of antiquity represented different conceptions of the relation of God to the world. Here again, in spite of the speculative element, the effect was to fix attention on Israelitism as a specific religious form which had its own idea, its own development, and a definable relation to other religious forms. Hermann Schultz's work is far more judicious than the attempts of his predecessors; he undertakes to give a clear and connected view of the religious ideas of the Old Testament, allowing each Hebrew writer to speak for himself, and interpreting and judging each writer in the light of his historical surroundings. He is, however, still under the influence of the Hegelian method; he feels it necessary to give a precise definition of the Old Testament religion; his differentia is soteriological and supernaturalistic. After describing and rejecting the religious-philosophical conceptions of Hebraism held by Kant, Hegel, Schelling, and others, he defines it as the divine revelation of the Kingdom of God on earth, differing from Christianity in that it is still growing, and therefore imperfect, while Christianity is the religion of the perfect Kingdom of God. We need not stop to examine this definition, which, as Schultz understands it, may be regarded, with some modification, as expressing a substantially correct conception of the Israelitish religion. I mention it in order to point out in how different a way Kuenen approached the subject.¹

Kuenen's treatment, while throughout argumentative on the critical side, is above all characterized by its historical-biographical form. So far as regards its fullness of critical discussion, this was perfectly natural at the time the work was published. In 1869, Pentateuchal criticism and Old Testament criticism in general was in the midst of a great revolution. Certain points, which in such a work would now, probably, be assumed (such as the relation of Deuteronomy to the Levitical legislation) had to be emphasized and supported by argument. In addition to this, however, Kuenen's habit of thought was critical, and he was attracted by critical questions; and indeed in the composition of such a book, involving the reconstruction of a great history, there would necessarily be a thousand points to be cleared up, offering unlimited occasions for notes and excursus. These supplements form not the least interesting part of the book, partly because of

¹ Schultz says in the preface to his second edition that in his presentation of the religious material he has held himself more aloof from the dogmatic scheme, — a result of the influence of Kuenen and Tiele.

their critical value, partly because they are sometimes of autobiographical worth, since in certain points he afterward changed his opinions. In the preface to the English edition (which appeared five years after the original work) he says that if it had been possible he would have changed some details; and modifications of earlier views will be found in his later books. Such changes of opinion are sometimes regarded as a proof of the instability of a science; but they are really, when they show organic progress, signs of vitality of research. As no scholar of our time has been readier than Kuenen to admit and correct his own errors, so no one has given better proof than he of a firm basis of critical thought by orderly advance in conclusions. He had given most attention to the prophetic, historical, and legal books of the Old Testament; it is the later books, Job, Psalms, Proverbs, the treatment of which in the "Religion of Israel" is least satisfactory. But in the main his critical positions are well supported, and his book is a treasury of keen and stimulating remark on the whole literary history of the Old Testament and the Apocrypha.

It is not too much to say that Kuenen's description of the Israelitish religion is the most attractive that has ever been written. Instead of setting forth the religious dogmas one by one, he treats the religious thought as part of the national life, tracing it from period to period in connection with all the conditions of the nation's history. The description is necessarily largely biographical, because the advances in Hebrew thought are represented to a great extent in the labors and writings of known persons. The narrative form gives freshness and life to the description; religious ideas appear not as isolated abstractions, but as concrete realities taking shape naturally out of the conditions of the times, the occasions of hot social-religious conflicts, crushed or established only after generations of struggle. It is easy to see how, in the hands of a master of exposition like Kuenen, prophets and priests and people can thus be made to live and breathe and act before us. The whole book is filled with this high vitality; from Amos to Malachi the epoch-making thinkers of the Old Testament stand out in free relief as real men animated by a distinct purpose, and living and working in the common paths of humanity. Kuenen of course recognizes the genetic side of the religious history; he sees the natural connection between the prophetic and the legal periods, and he seeks to show how each of these naturally arose out of the social-historical fortunes of the people. He does justice

to that ritual stage, established by Ezra and Nehemiah, which has often been represented as a retrogression; it is only the great poetical books that, as it seems to me, he does not succeed in placing satisfactorily in the history of the national-religious thought. But he gives the picture of the organic growth in a very impressive way. He recognizes the unity of the religious life of Israel; for him it is a great connected movement, advancing uninterruptedly from beginning to end, and demonstrating the wonderful religious power of the Israelitish people. He describes the conflicts of opinion, the oppositions and the compromises, the defeats and the victories through which the final results were attained; in this way he gives intense human interest to the Old Testament history.

To such a sketch of the religion as a life Schultz's book forms an excellent companion-volume. The systematic description of a people's religious dogma is a different thing from the history of its religion; each is complementary to the other, and both are necessary for the best understanding of religious thought. Schultz has given us the best sketch of Old Testament doctrine; he has had many predecessors, but none equals him in fullness, fairness, and faithfulness to facts; the defects of his book arise from his failure to apply his own principles consistently.¹ Kuenen may almost be said to have created the history of the religion of Israel; though the subject had been before treated in a general way, no one had grasped, as he did, the conception of the religion as an unfolding of the national life. We may go farther and say that his "Religion of Israel" contributed in no small degree to the foundation of the science of the history of religions; he lays down the lines along which every religion must be studied.²

Kuenen continued his study of Hebrew religion in his next work, "The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel." This book has special interest for us from the fact that it was suggested by an Englishman and written with particular regard to the needs of the English public. Dr. John Muir of Edinburgh, struck by A.

¹ Kuenen's criticism (*Theol. Tijdschr.* 1872, 1873, 1875, 1876) on Ewald's *Lehre der Bibel von Gott*, namely, that it does not distinguish between dogma and religion, and that it is in the bonds of supernaturalism, applies to some extent to Schultz, in whose book, however, the fault is partly relieved by his exact exegetical-historical method.

² He had a share also in the composition of *The Bible for Learners*, a work which, though all its positions are not to be commended, gives the Biblical history and literature, in general accordance with modern critical results, in a very striking and attractive way.

Réville's articles in the "*Revue des Deux Mondes*" on the second volume of the "*Historical-Critical Inquiry*," consulted the author respecting a translation of the first chapter (which treated of the prophets and of the prophetic literature in general) into English. Correspondence on the subject led to the conviction that it would be better for Kuenen to give an independent discussion of Israelitish prophecy, and this book was the result. It appeared in Dutch in 1875, and in English, with an introduction by Dr. Muir, in 1877. Its object is not to examine the particular religious ideas of the prophets, but to determine the function of the prophetic thought in the religious development of Israel and of mankind. Its specific purpose is to demonstrate that the value of Hebrew prophecy does not lie in its predictive element, but in its creation of the conception of ethical monotheism. In order to establish this point Kuenen takes the predictions one by one, and undertakes to show that the most of them were not fulfilled, and that those that were fulfilled do not demand any supposition of supernatural insight to account for them. The form of the argument gives a polemical and seemingly ruthless tone to the book. To those persons who held the religious validity of the prophets to be inseparably connected with a supernatural revelation of historical facts, Kuenen appeared to be laying an irreverent hand on the most sacred of all beliefs. He does indeed treat the prophets as living men enveloped in the atmosphere of their own times, acting on the instincts of their own souls, and he finds no need of the supernatural in order to explain their work. But it is a great misconception of his spirit to call him irreverent. He seeks to clear away the mists of supernaturalism in order that the prophets may appear in their full proportions as grand, moral-religious thinkers. He feels that, strictly speaking, the man into whose mind thoughts are mechanically poured by God is no more to be considered great than the warrior who slays his enemy with an enchanted sword. In his hands the prophets cease to be machines, and become thinkers. He ascribes to them an enormous moral power. What more could he say, indeed, than that they were the creators of ethical monotheism? He thus puts them on a level with the greatest creative minds of the world; he represents them as the authors of the central idea of human-religious development. His discussion may even give an exaggerated idea of their importance. In the first place the word "prophet" must not be supposed to include only the men thus styled whose writings have come down to us, but must embrace the whole body

of sound Israelitish theistic thinkers; and the conviction of the aloneness of the supreme God must be regarded as having issued out of the whole national life, and as having taken shape through the concurrence of many conditions. And, in the second place, other nations had a share in the establishment of monotheism; the idea was not the birthright of any one people. It strove to find expression everywhere; only it was Israel that, through a happy combination of circumstances, succeeded in giving it organic form. But these points it did not lie in Kuenen's way to treat;¹ he was dealing with the Hebrew prophets, and he has defined their character and function with admirable justness. His book contains a large mass of exegetical matter, and he has two valuable chapters on the treatment of the Old Testament prophecy in the New Testament.²

The opportunity to handle this subject in a larger way was afforded him in 1882, when he was invited to deliver a course of Hibbert Lectures. He chose as his theme "National Religions and Universal Religions," the purpose of the lectures being to show how the latter have risen historically out of the former. The religions he treats are Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam;³ in considering them he reverses the chronological order, that he may begin with the one of whose origin we know most. His central thesis is that each of the universal or international religions has been developed out of a national system by the power of a human personality. He undertakes to show that Islam was potentially existent in pre-Islamic thought, Christianity in Palestinian Judaism, and Buddhism in the older Brahmanism, and that, nevertheless, the emergence of the new religion cannot be understood without taking into account the person of the founder. He thus, in fact, comes to define a universal religion as one which receives its form from a single man.⁴

In the development of this thesis Kuenen examines the circle of religious ideas in the midst of which Mohammed was born; the conceptions of Israelitish prophetism and of the later Judaism;

¹ He touches on the first of them in his *Hibbert Lectures*.

² On some critical points, like the date of Joel, he afterwards changed his opinion.

³ As to Islam, he denies, improperly, as it seems to me, that it is entitled to the name of "universal." He shows, however, that it arose under conditions similar to those that attended the genesis of Buddhism and Christianity.

⁴ On this point see Professor Tiele's article "History of Religions" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Manual of the Science of Religion*, chapter vii.

and the Brahmanistic teachings and practices of the period to which the rise of Buddhism is referred. He has made this examination very attractive by his broad and mature learning, his historical insight, and his skill in presentation; he moves through the great mass of literature with a firm step, generally recognizing with a sure instinct what is trustworthy, and using the material in a masterly way. This is of course what we should expect in his treatment of Israelitism. Here he brings out clearly the relations of the prominent thinkers, priests and prophets to the mass of the people; he shows that the prophets, especially, while of the people, were yet above them; he points out that the ethical element of their thought forced them toward universality; and he insists that the later Judaism, though it may seem to be characterized by narrow nationalism, really contained universal elements. In support of these positions he adduces a convincing mass of testimony from the literature. If there is anything that one misses in reading his exposition it is a statement of the relation of Judaism to the religious thought of neighboring communities, especially the Persian and the Greek. Kuenen is right, it seems to me, in concluding that we have no proof of a Buddhistic influence on Christianity. On the other hand, he does not appear to give sufficient prominence to the foreign atmosphere in which Judaism grew up. In estimating the ethical broadness of the scribes, for example, shall we look on them as a purely Jewish product? Must we not rather regard them as shaped in part by ideas that came into Judea from without? The internal contradiction in the scribal system arose, Kuenen thinks, out of the lack of harmony between its prophetic and its legal elements; perhaps it would be better to substitute "universal-ethical" for "prophetic."

Kuenen's exposition of the influence of the founder in the rise of an international religion is admirable. He shows that Islam is unintelligible without Mohammed; he declares that Christianity cannot be derived from Essenism, and that Christian universalism must not be regarded as the creation of Paul; and he thinks that some one man must stand at the beginning of Buddhism. His treatment of this last position is instructive as showing how one who is not a specialist may, from the point of view of wider studies, feel himself able to control, in a sort, the conclusions of scholars whose preëminence in learning in their own departments he fully recognizes. Kuenen modestly disclaims the right to speak with authority on the literature of Buddhism, but so deeply does he feel the necessity of the personal element in its origin that he is

not convinced by Oldenberg's statement that of the multitudinous saviours of the world in India about B. C. 500, one came to transcend the rest by a chain of purely accidental circumstances. Though he cannot decide whether or not Buddha is a mythical sun-hero, as Senart and Kern maintain, he feels sure that, in any case, some one man gave the decisive turn out of which Buddhism arose.

Kuenen's main position in these lectures is not likely to be shaken, and it forms a valuable contribution to the general history of religion. Without committing himself unreservedly to any theory of evolution, he recognizes the fact of orderly and continuous advance in the communities of which he treats; he holds that national life is the source of all religious construction and at the same time he insists on the powerful influence of individual genius. He has, in fact, suggested the principles which lie at the basis of all organic religious growth, and he has marked out a path for future investigations. He shows here the same sort of constructive power visible in his "Religion of Israel;" and he well maintains the reputation of his university and of his country in the field of general religious history. Holland has occupied a foremost place in the scientific construction of this new department of research; its work has been characterized by soundness of thought as well as by breadth of learning, and Kuenen's book is every way worthy of the standard thus set up. Mention should be made of the valuable critical material contained in the notes at the end of the volume, such as the examination of Sprenger's conjectures as to written documents known to Mohammed, the remarks on the word "hanyf," the criticism of Friedrich Delitzsch's view of the origin of the divine name "Yahweh," the treatment of Bruno Bauer's denial of the Jewish origin of Christianity, and a number of observations on Old Testament passages.¹

¹ Kuenen favored the introduction of the history of religions into the school-programmes. In his preface to the Dutch translation (1855) of Professor C. C. Everett's *Religions before Christianity*, he remarks on the discussions to which this question had given rise, and commends the book, among other reasons, because it offers a practical solution of the problem. "The question of which I have just been speaking," says he, "is not here touched on. But from beginning to end the book is designed to solve it. The text of the chapters and especially the appended questions prove that the history of religions can be made clear to the simplest minds, and particularly that remarks and suggestions may therefrom be derived for the proper understanding of *our* religion which would not present themselves so easily and so naturally in the treatment of another sort of material."

From this time to the end of his life Kuenen continued to work on the lines laid down in his books. The death of his wife in 1883 was a blow from which, Mr. Wicksteed says, he never recovered. Yet he maintained his courage and cheerfulness, and wrote with unflagging industry. He was President of the International Congress of Orientalists which met at Leiden in 1884. He continued his Old Testament and general religious investigations in the "*Theologisch Tijdschrift*," to which also he contributed a large number of book-reviews. He was in fact preparing for a new edition of his "*Onderzoek*," the necessity for which was apparent; since 1865 he had almost completely changed his critical point of view. The first and second volumes of the new edition appeared in 1885-9, — the first comprising the Hexateuch and the historical books; the second comprising the prophetic books; the third volume he did not live to complete. That portion of the first volume which deals with the Hexateuch has been translated into English,¹ and widely read. Prefixed to the English translation is the valuable Introduction, already referred to (compiled by the translator with the author's assistance from the "*Theologisch Tijdschrift*"), which gives a sketch of recent Hexateuchal research. While this sketch does not pretend to be a complete history of the subject, it has the very great advantage for the general student that it points out clearly the milestones in the path of critical advance; it contains Kuenen's mature estimate of the work of Reuss, Graf, Colenso, Wellhausen, and others; and it is, besides, in the nature of a critical autobiography. It includes all but the very latest phases of Hexateuchal criticism, and will be an important aid to future historians of the subject.

The body of the work gives a satisfactorily full view of the literature and methods of recent Hexateuchal science. Naturally, little is said of pre-Grafian writers, their methods and results having been either passed over by the advance of the science, or else absorbed in later books. But in the literature of the twenty years between 1865 and 1885 the volume is an admirable guide.² Kuenen is an excellent instructor in method; he makes the reader the sharer of his mental processes, detailing the considerations on this side and on that, and giving a glimpse of the workings of his mind which have issued in his decision; herein he differs

¹ By Mr. Wicksteed (1886) to whom we are so greatly indebted for the introduction of Kuenen to the English and American public.

² The hypotheses of Maurice Vernes and others, not here treated, are referred to by Kuenen in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift*.

from his eminent co-worker, Renan, whose critical results appear rather to have been reached by divination. The "Hexateuch" will no doubt be a manual of study for a long time to come; in such an investigation, indeed, the last word is never said, but the book is an adequate record of the position of the critical world in 1885. It is fair in tone and attractive in form, a monument of critical learning and insight.

Of the remaining parts of the second edition of the "Onderzoek" it need only be said that they are critically full and exact. They take account of the large mass of new material which has been provided, since the first edition was published, by the Assyrian inscriptions, by the work of Wellhausen, Stade, and others on the historical books, by researches in the Greek text of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, and by other sources. On some points, as the date of Joel, the work shows an important change in the author's opinion, and the whole treatment of the post-exilic literature is colored by his new view of the Levitical legislation; but in general the divergencies from the first edition are less striking here than in the "Hexateuch."

It is a great loss to us that Kuenen did not live to finish the third volume. After the natural absorption of scholars in the Hexateuch, interest in the poetical literature is now reviving; with the more thorough study of the Persian and Greek periods exacter critical methods are being applied to Job, Proverbs, and the Psalter, and we should prize Kuenen's judgment on the new results. Whether we shall ever have it is doubtful.¹ He was cut off in the midst of many labors. In addition to his "Onderzoek" he was engaged on an Old Testament translation and commentary in connection with Drs. Hooykaas, Oort, Kosters, Matthes, and others, and he had in mind the recasting of his "Religion of Israel."² He died December 10, 1891, after a long-continued and painful illness. He was mourned by the university, the city, and by many in all lands who had never seen him. His oldest son, described as a scientific man of great promise, had recently received an appointment at Leiden.³

The debt which Old Testament criticism owes to Kuenen is

¹ Occasional discussions of these books are found in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift*; he gives his view as to the possibility of Maccabean psalms (1871), and touches on some points in Job (1873, etc.); but we have no full treatment of the larger critical questions.

² P. H. Wicksteed in the *London Inquirer*, Dec. 26, 1891.

³ Mr. Wicksteed in the *Academy*, Dec. 26, 1891.

large and varied. To it he gave his whole life. Beginning his career with a presentation of the science as it then existed, he kept pace with its progress step by step, year by year, up to the last. His outlook covered the entire field; scarcely a book on Old Testament criticism appeared in the world but he noted its contents and passed judgment on it. By a happy combination of circumstances this position as watchman over the fortunes of his science seemed to fall naturally to him: his faithful studies, his judicial calmness, the breadth of his interests, his power of expression — all these things made him, in a sort, a centre of Old Testament scientific thought. We know his opinions more fully than those of any of his colaborers; he has written out his estimates of many books and of many of his contemporaries, and always with passionless simplicity and clearness. This is especially true respecting the Hexateuch, a field that he had made particularly his own; the history of his life would be the history of the Hexateuchal criticism of his time.

Dr. Kuenen was above all a critic. Throughout his works the disposition is prominent to weigh, compare and estimate. His habit was to collect the available material, including the researches of all known writers, and subject it to a piercing scrutiny; only after such a process did he feel justified in making up his mind. Examples of this method of work have been given in the preceding sketch; thus he dealt with the earlier theories of the Hexateuch, and with those of Colenso, Graf, Wellhausen, and Vernes. He was singularly open-minded in the sense that he was willing to consider everything; he had his fairly well-fixed opinions, but this did not prevent his giving honest attention to opposing views. This critical demand of his mind extended to all matters, small and great; he was not satisfied without going to the bottom; and he has left on record a large number of investigations of questions ranging from the minute to the broad and universal, in all of which the carefulness and thoroughness of his thought are visible.

Kuenen was scarcely less eminent as an organizer than as a critic. His first large work was a systematic exhibition of the literary history of the Old Testament. No sooner had he accepted the Grafian point of view than he proceeded to make a practical application of it in the form of a history of the Israelitish religion. His latest production was a revision of his critical history of the Old Testament writings, and he had in contemplation a new edition of his book on the Hebrew religion. Such connected and

orderly presentation of the material is of immense value; the facts being exhibited in their mutual relations enable us to estimate fitly the particular phenomena and to judge of the correctness of particular conclusions.

Kuenen's services in the field of the general history of religion have already been referred to. He was, it is true, a specialist, — his main contributions were to the history of one religion; we owe to him the completest exhibition of the function of the prophets in the rise of Israelitish monotheism, and the true significance of the legal period in the development of the Hebrew religion. But in working out these points he reaches more general principles, such as those with which he deals in his Hibbert Lectures. All studies in the ritual and theistic aspects of the great religions of the world have been furthered by what he has done in the field of Hebraism.

On the historical side Kuenen was a consistent adherent of the principle of natural development. All that he has written is meant to show that the facts of the Old Testament religion, no less than those of Buddhism and Islam, may be satisfactorily understood as the products of human thought. His effort was not to dispense with the divine element in the world, but to rid science of that false supernaturalism (so he regarded it) which obscures the truth of history and the advance of science by interposing unverifiable agencies and closing the way against the recognition of real relations. In this way he made his great contribution to religion — he set it forth as the outcome of the moral forces of human society. Such must be regarded as the actual influence of his books. If he helped to shatter the traditional framework of the religious ideas of the Old Testament, he also did much to vindicate for them a noble and permanent ethical energy. Religion, in the Bible and elsewhere, was for him the communion of the human soul with God. He has reconstructed the outward history of one great episode in man's struggle toward the divine. In so doing he helped to demonstrate anew the nature and the significance of religion as an abiding element of human life.

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THE THEISTIC EVOLUTION OF BUDDHISM.

THE subject which I here endeavor to present is exceedingly intricate and complex, and it is a bold undertaking to attempt to condense into a few pages the development of ten centuries of thought. Were its stages all clear, the task must be encompassed by difficulty; but the obscurity of many of the steps shrouds much of the process in darkness where conjecture is at best an unsafe guide. Nevertheless, I hope to show that the problem is at least worth study. It may perhaps be stated thus: What were the causes which converted Buddhism from a scheme of practical ethics into a religion? I shall not embarrass myself or my readers with any initial inquiries as to what is religion. I shall use the term in its commonly accepted meaning as equivalent to some form of theism, implying the reality of worship as a communion between two living minds; and I shall endeavor to show how a system of ethical culture, summed up in what were known as the Four Truths,¹ which resolutely shut the door on all metaphysical inquiry, was driven by degrees into the realms of ontological speculation, and, having begun with a singularly firm grasp of the moral life of man, was led to find the source and the goal of that life in God.

I.

The outlines of the teachings of Gotama the Buddha are now well known. Starting from the belief in the doctrine of transmigration, or the succession of existences, current in the Brahmanical schools in the sixth and fifth centuries B. C., he sought to deliver his brethren from the weary round of birth and death, and set them free from the sufferings of mortality. Criticising without reserve the doctrines of God and of the soul, he clung firmly to the central conception that the world is ruled by a moral order, that each man's life here is conditioned by his merit or demerit in a former birth, and that the existence which follows this will be determined in the same manner by the joint result of past and present action. All other popular beliefs, rites, and usages came within the scope of his solvent dialectic; this principle remained untouched. It was questioned neither by himself nor by his dis-

¹ Namely, of Suffering, of the Origin of Suffering, of the Cessation of Suffering, and of the Noble Eightfold Path which leads to the Cessation of Suffering, consisting of Right Views, Right Feelings, Right Words, Right Behavior, Right Mode of Livelihood, Right Exertion, Right Memory, Right Meditation.

ciples. In repeated discussions he assumes it without attempt at proof as the common ground between himself and his opponents. It is the foundation of his whole view of life; it rules the ages from the birth to the destruction of the world; it is the guarantee that the believer's efforts will not be in vain.

If it were thought necessary to vindicate for primitive Buddhism a place among religions, it must be through this idea that it would gain admission within their ranks. In *Karma* is a power-not-ourselves that makes for righteousness, and enforces on every one without exception the stern law, "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." From this power there is no escape save by the attainment of a condition of holiness that lies above the worldly range of guilt and goodness, in which the law of recompense and retribution has nothing more on which to feed, and the saint, transcending every form of personal desire, passes out beyond its scope and ceases to be. The whole energy of mind and heart was accordingly concentrated on this end, and every effort to divert the believer's interest to other aims was at once suppressed. Discussion was checked on the ground that it was not profitable for character, and the disciple was warned off the field of pure reason because it did not directly help the practical life. Again and again do the early texts record such incidents as this. A wandering ascetic, one of the roving teachers with whom the Ganges valley teemed, comes with his three hundred followers to the Buddha to question him on the topics commonly debated in the Schools. "Is the self identical with the sense-perceptions?" he asks. "Is the world limited in time, or is it eternal? Is it bounded in space, or is it infinite? Are the life (*i. e.* the soul) and the body the same thing, or different? Does the Buddha exist after death, or does he not exist? Or does he both exist and not exist, or does he neither exist nor not exist?" But Gotama refuses to answer one query after another. Why? "Because," he says, "these inquiries have nothing to do with things as they are, with the realities we know; they are not concerned with the Law of Life; they do not make for religious conduct; they do not conduce to the absence of lust, to freedom from passion, to right effort, to the higher insight, to inward peace."¹

Now the teachings of Gotama were very early combined with a theory of his office and function from which all future development took its rise. How far this theory was in existence in his

¹ See, for instance, the *Paṭṭhapāda Sutta*, in *Dīgha Nikāya*, ix. 21 ff., edited by T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, vol. i. p. 185 ff.

own time, how far he applied it to himself, and how far it was worked out afterwards by his disciples, it is now impossible to tell. It rested on the belief which had descended from ancient days through the Indian schools that knowledge depends upon character, and that spiritual vision is the fruit of purity of heart. Wisdom is gained by moral effort, and supreme insight belongs only to perfect holiness. It did not strike the Hindu mind that there was any incompatibility between omniscience and humanity; the doctrine of transmigration broke down the rigid limits with which we environ our conception of personality; and the same being who was now born as a man might have formerly ruled the topmost heaven as the great Brahmā. Accordingly the conception of the Buddha was the conception of a man who through age-long endeavor had at length attained; the ceaseless practice of moral resolve strung up to the intensest pitch of self-renunciation had at last achieved its end; the secret of existence was disclosed to him, and this knowledge raised him at once to the supremacy of the world, and made him the teacher both of men and gods. But despite his superhuman powers he remained a man. He could mount the skies and proclaim the truths of ultimate deliverance to the dwellers in the Deva-realms; but the time came when the worn-out frame could do no more, and he passed away into complete extinction, "leaving not a trace behind."

The order of Indian thought here so completely cuts athwart our own, that it is difficult to lay hold of the idea that the saint who has convinced himself of the vanity of earthly things is superior to the whole hierarchy of the gods; or to realize that it was deemed worth while to toil for unnumbered ages, to pass through the severest discipline, and to spend one's self in unremitting effort, in order to know aright the worthlessness of life, and open to all existing beings the path of virtue, along which lies the only escape into nonentity. Yet such is the paradox of primitive Buddhism. The way to the cessation of suffering is proclaimed by a man who has purchased his own omniscience (and the corresponding power to save others by his teaching) through the concentrated labor of countless lives all bent toward this one goal. In the mythical biography which Buddhist piety evolved, the vow to attain Buddhahood and deliver men and gods was carried back through a vast succession of previous existences to the days when Gotama had been a hermit named Sumedha, in the time of the Buddha Dīpaṅkara.¹ The whole of this mighty interval had

¹ *Birth Stories*, translated by T. W. Rhys Davids, vol. i. p. 9.

been devoted to the practice of the Ten Perfections, through which he might win supreme enlightenment, and become the Teacher, the great Physician, the healer of the world's sorrows by lifting it above its sins. Age after age, when he might at any moment have passed himself into his final rest, he had toiled on, giving life after life in self-abandonment to his great end; until at length the last birth has arrived, and under the fig-tree at Gayā, where the ancient temple (recently restored by Government) still stands, he fathoms the mystery, penetrates the open secret, and by the attainment of perfect insight becomes *devātideva*, "deva of devas," the guardian, protector, deliverer, of the world.

II.

The Buddha died, and was not reborn. Early Buddhism, therefore, permitted no communion between the disciple and his departed Lord. The passion of reverence and admiration could not, indeed, be repressed, and a cultus arose around the relics of his person and the places once hallowed by his presence, into which the believer poured the enthusiasm for him whom though he had not seen, he loved. It might not be without interest to describe how this cultus was justified in the Buddhist schools against the objections which were naturally brought against it;¹ but as it was purely commemorative in character it cannot properly be designated as worship, and the germs of the theistic evolution must be sought elsewhere.

It has been already implied that the Buddha was not a solitary phenomenon. Hindu thought dealt with everything in cycles, and pious imagination soon worked out a theory about Gotama's predecessors. His very title, the Tathāgata ("thus-come") designated him as "the one who came as others had come before him," and within the limits of the Pāli Scriptures he appears first of all as the last in a series of seven,² and then as the last in a series of twenty-four.³ Between these Buddhas, however, there is no personal connection. They are in no way related save in the order of time. Each one had felt the sacred impulse for the deliverance of conscious beings from the weary round of births and deaths, but each one had to traverse the path to saving knowledge independently, and each one in his turn passed away and ceased to be.

¹ See "The Questions of King Milinda," translated by T. W. Rhys Davida, *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxxv. p. 144.

² Mahā-Padhāna Sutta, *Dīgha Nikāya*, xiv.

³ In the *Buddha-vamsa*.

But when attention was turned from the past into the future, what then? In due time, when Gotama's religion has in its turn declined, another Buddha will appear, men said, to take up the holy work. *Where is that Buddha now?* Through what discipline is he passing, and when will his turn come to tread the earth, and bring the old truth into light and life once more?

The answers to these questions gave rise to the doctrine of the future Buddha, or Bodhisattva. There is a being now in the Tushita heaven, who has served the same great apprenticeship of holiness, and is approaching the full fruition of his labors. When his hour arrives, he will descend, like Gotama, to be reborn for the last time on earth; and by the same course of renunciation he will win the same conquest, and set forth upon the same career. His name, Metteyya,¹ derived from *mettā*, the Buddhist principle of brotherly love, good-will, or charity, already indicates that he is a kind of embodiment of the chief conception of Buddhist ethics. When piety declines, and love waxes cold, and heresy and division increase, it will be his function to appear as a sort of Buddhist Messiah and set all things right. It is doubtful if there are any allusions to this hope in the Pāli Scriptures; but the expectation is found in full force in the interesting work known as the "Questions of King Milinda," belonging to the first century B. C.; and he takes his place later on as a popular figure in both South and North.

To Maitreya, then, the believer who sought a personal sympathy turned in aspiration and endeavor. To him he looked in peril, not so much for deliverance as for strength and support. Gotama had taught that he who would tread the path of holiness must first break the fetter of doing good for the sake of avoiding future suffering in hell or securing future happiness in heaven. But the disciple now begins to pray for rebirth in that happy land where Metteyya dwells. When the famous Chinese pilgrim Hiouen Tsiang² was descending the Ganges with some of his disciples and a number of other travelers, their boat was boarded by pirates, who conveyed them to the shore and proceeded to select a victim for the unhallowed rites of the goddess Durgā. The noble stature and distinguished bearing of the "Master of the Law" at once pointed him out as the fittest offering. Though his fellow-passengers besought that he might be spared, and his followers even entreated to be allowed to die in his stead, an altar was erected, and two of

¹ In the Pāli form; the Sanskrit is Maitreya.

² His journey lasted from 629 to 645 A. D.

the robbers were ordered by the captain of the gang to bind him on it. To their surprise he showed no sign of fear, but only begged them not to crowd around him in distress. "Let me," he said, "with a joyous mind take my departure." Then fixing his thoughts on Maitreya and the Tushita heaven, he earnestly prayed that he might be born in that place, that he might pay reverence and religious offerings to the Bodhisattva, and listen to the sound of the most excellent law. Then, having perfected himself throughout in wisdom, "Let me return," he prayed, "and be reborn here below, that I may instruct and convert these men, and cause them to practice themselves in doing good, and to give up their evil deeds, and thus by diffusing far and wide the benefits of religion, give rest to all the world." The sequel of the story is hardly less characteristic. As the Master lay bound upon the altar, with his thoughts fixed on Maitreya, it seemed to him that he rose through worlds after worlds, tier upon tier, to the heavenly courts where the hearer of his prayer sat enthroned with the devas round him upon every side. Rapt into ecstasy, he knew nothing of the altar, and had no recollection of the pirates. Suddenly a typhoon arose. Branches were torn off the trees, clouds of sand were blown up from the shore, the river was lashed into waves, and the terrified robbers interpreted the hurricane as a warning against their intended sacrifice, and a call to repentance. As they bowed their heads, and made obeisance, one of the robbers touched Hiouen Tsiang with his hand and recalled him to consciousness. He opened his eyes; "Has the hour come?" he gently asked. "We dare not hurt the Master," was the reply, "we pray you to accept our repentance."¹

Here, it is plain, is something more than the cultus of a Catholic saint. Maitreya is not indeed God; hardly, perhaps, even a god; yet he is a hearer of prayer, and a revealer of the truth. Communion with him is the believers' supreme joy. When Hiouen Tsiang's end actually came, years after his return to his own land, he listened to the recital of the vast series of translations of Buddhist books from Sanskrit into Chinese which he had completed, and then sank to his rest with a hymn of praise to Maitreya on his lips.

III.

The Master of the Law, Hiouen Tsiang, in describing the Buddhist countries which he visited, classifies the brethren of the Order in two great divisions, as adherents of different, and in

¹ *Life of Hiouen Tsiang*, translated by the late Professor Beal, pp. 86-89.

some sense opposite schools, the systems of the Little Vehicle and of the Great. The Little Vehicle spread all the way from Ceylon to Persia, and represented undoubtedly the older tradition which still prevails in Ceylon, Burmah, and Siam. The Great Vehicle was found both North and South of the Himalayas, and flourished especially in Kashmir, the Punjab, and the Ganges valley. Its modern continuators are distributed through Nepal, China, Japan, and Thibet. It comprises a vast and complicated nexus of beliefs ranging from the most puerile superstitions to the higher theism. This theism has a moral and a metaphysical aspect. An attempt must be made to indicate as briefly as possible this two-fold character.

The first teachers of this system are commonly ascribed to the first and second centuries of our era: and the catalogues of Chinese translations show that the Sanskrit literature which it produced was supposed to have begun in the second and third. If we open one of these books, such as the *Lalita Vistara*, a life of the Prince up to the attainment of Buddhahood, and compare it with a similar life by Aṣvaghosha in the first century,¹ founded on the tradition now preserved in the South, we shall be struck immediately by one significant difference. Imagination is a thousandfold more extravagant, so that miracles and mythology tend to obscure the simplicity of the earlier ethical portraiture; but more than this, while the Southern School knows but one Bodhisattva, Maitreya (*Metteyya*), here they are "countless as the sands of nine Ganges." A mighty retinue of unnumbered myriads attends the prince at every crisis of his career; and they receive from him the sacred charge to preach the truth from world to world.

So remarkable an extension cannot be without significance; and it must be interpreted, I think, as the necessary evolution of the original moral impulse of Buddhism. Under this original impulse Gotama had sent forth the first disciples to declare the way of deliverance by the attainment of that type of personal holiness technically known as Arahatsip, which enabled a man to pass away into complete extinction. But this, after all, was a solitary, and in a certain sense a selfish, end. In that mythical biography of the Buddha's antecedents, when the hermit Sumedha is pondering on the great aspiration, he says to himself that he might, if he so pleased, then and there cut off the root of his life at once, and cease to be. "But why," he says, "should I attain deliverance

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xix.

alone? I will embark on the ocean of existence in a ship which will convey men and Devas."¹ The metaphor was not worked out in the older schools; but it became the distinction of the new. The Little Vehicle was the chariot that held the *arahat* alone: but as Buddhahood was open to all, the same missionary fervor which had sent out the first heralds of rescue East and West and South and North, now claimed that they should devote themselves to the service of man, and the enlightenment of the world, not in this life only but in the future also, and enter the Great Vehicle in which they could carry over with them all orders of beings. The disciple, then, was bidden to seek for something more than personal sanctity and individual salvation. He was summoned to take his share in the great drama of history, and labor for the future welfare of the race. The early Buddhism which had sought to create a people of saints who could do nothing more for the world when they died, now found this ideal too limited, too self-contained. It tended to settle into stagnation; it needed a fresh motive to kindle it once more into life. It regained its elasticity under the influence of the Buddha-legend: the same impulse which had animated the Master, must move the disciple too.

It is related by Hiouen Tsiang² that a certain distinguished Buddhist writer named Jina was converted from the method of the Great to that of the Little Vehicle, and conceived the desire to attain the "holy fruit of no further birth," i. e. the personal holiness of the *arahat*, which relieved him of the necessity of further existence. But the Bodhisattva Mañjuçrî, knowing his purpose, was moved with pity. Wishing to arouse him to the truth, and to awaken him in a moment, he came to him and said, "Alas, how have you given up your great purpose, and only fixed your mind on your own personal profit, *with narrow aims giving up the purpose of saving all!*"

This, then, was the new demand on the disciple, that he should assist in universal salvation; and this aim expressed itself in the presentation of the Buddha with unnumbered hosts of Bodhisattvas around him. Into this band, as into the ranks of the angels of the Christian Church, it was not difficult to incorporate figures, or at least traits and characteristics, that had a very different origin. Some of these became like Maitreya, the objects of a cult essentially theistic, though incomplete. Such above all was "The Lord who looks down" (from heaven), Avalokiteçvara,

¹ Davids, *Birth Stories*, vol. i. p. 13.

² *Buddhist Records*, translated by Beal, vol. ii. p. 220.

whose worship was so popular in India in the days of Hiouen Tsiang. He bears the Brahmanical title *Īvara*, the real equivalent for God, otherwise applied to *Brahmā* and *Vishnu*. He is "lord" and "guardian" of the world (*lokesvara*, *lokapāla*), and thus he is preëminently the Buddhist Providence. For he had taken a mighty vow that he would not enter Buddhahood until every living creature in all the realms were in possession of Bodhi knowledge.¹ Therefore his life was prolonged from Buddha to Buddha while he continued his holy toil, sometimes in heaven, and sometimes on earth, where not even the worms and insects were beneath his care. He reclaimed the sinful; he supplied food for the famine-stricken; he healed the diseased. But above all, his compassion spread to the sufferers in hell, among whom he labored incessantly, delivering the wicked from their guilt and pain. To him the first of the Chinese pilgrims, Fah Hian, in peril of shipwreck on his voyage home, prayed and was rescued. To him the young prince, *Sītaditya*, afterwards the patron of Hiouen Tsiang, went with fasting and with prayer, on his accession, like Solomon to the great high-place at Gibeon, and the Bodhisattva then appeared with advice and help. To him the deliverer poured forth his heart in impassioned hymns, in which he was addressed as the Father of mankind, all-good, all-pitiful, and almighty to save.

IV.

The instances which I have given show how the moral principles of Buddhism tended to expand into the ideas of religion. It is no less interesting to find that metaphysical speculation, rejected with so much determination, revenged itself by almost overwhelming the ethical elements in the ontological. The disciples of the Teacher lived, of course, in the midst of the Brahmanical schools in which the philosophical movement contrived to combine the utmost freedom of thought with the most rigid sacerdotal and ritual practice. They were confronted especially by a pair of theories, one of which represented the world as the product of a creative mind, the other as the result of a process of self-evolution from unconscious matter.

These ideas were combated from the point of view of what was called "moral causation," according to which the universe comes into being through the seeds of antecedent *karma*, and is the necessary scene for the working out of the self-acting moral order, to which it is entirely subordinate. Accordingly, *Açvaghosha*, a

¹ Mitra, *Nepalese Buddhist Literature*, p. 95.

representative of the Little Vehicle in the first century of our era, argues against the theistic doctrine on such grounds as these: If there is a God, it would be natural to expect that he would make his existence so clear that it should be impossible for any one to doubt or to mistake the fact; and he ought not to allow any other being to be worshiped. Again, the time-series of created things is inconsistent with their production by the Eternal and Self-Existent, for the totality of the Cause must produce a totality of Effect. And if it be alleged that the succession of events is due to successive acts of will, this is equivalent to ascribing to God a plurality of causes; for volitions are the issue of purposes. Either, then, it must be admitted that fresh motives have risen within the divine mind, implying change and consequent imperfection; or, if purpose be denied, the world's phenomena have no better origin than caprice. Moreover, a world produced by the Everlasting and Unconditioned ought not to be liable to variation and decay; this limits his beneficence. If he is the sole cause, and all things are one with him, humanity cannot be excluded; we share his self-existence; all moral distinctions are abolished; all acts are alike his, and character becomes indifferent. The doctrine of creation by God (Īṣvara), therefore, was rejected, on grounds both moral and metaphysical, by the Little Vehicle. Yet in the literature of the Great Vehicle, such as the "Lotus of the Good Law,"¹ the boldest identification is effected between the Buddha Çākya Muni (in these books he is never termed Gotama) and Īṣvara; the Buddha is himself the Eternal, the Self-Existent, the Absolute, the Unconditioned — he is God. The process has a twofold aspect, at once historical and transcendental.

It has already been observed that even in the Pāli Scriptures Gotama is not the only Buddha; he is the last of a series of seven, or afterwards of twenty-four. According to the Great Vehicle, however, just as the Bodhisattvas have become innumerable, so likewise are the Buddhas themselves infinite. The grandiosity of Indian imagination has here full play. The very universe with its series of worlds, each with its own heavens and hells, has been multiplied a million-fold, and for these new systems new Buddhas — past, present, and future — were required. As the Buddha Çākya Muni sits on the mountain of the Vulture's Peak at Rājagriha, surrounded by a mighty multitude of disciples, he darts a Buddha-ray from his divine eye which illumines the countless

¹ Or the "Good Creation;" Beal, *Catena of Buddhist Scriptures*, p. 12.

worlds in all directions, and myriads of Buddhas then make their appearance, and gather round the Çākya Sage in one vast throng of reverent adoration, circle within circle like the rose of paradise. A little later, there is a corresponding outburst of the Bodhisattvas, who salute the assembled Buddhas on their jeweled thrones, and chant hymns of praise, while Çākya Muni, who himself here bears the title *Īvara*, sits on high, silent and calm. Fifty æons roll by, and it seems to the countless host but one single afternoon. This is the imaginative expression of eternity. When Çākya Muni at length condescends to speak, he declares that the infinite Buddhas are all the creations of his own proper body, and that the Bodhisats are all his sons, brought to maturity since he himself attained enlightenment beneath the fig-tree at Gayā!

Hereupon the Bodhisattva Maitreya is filled with wondering doubt: How could the Lord have produced so many within forty years? These Bodhisattvas have long followed a spiritual course, and planted roots of goodness under many hundreds of thousands of Buddhas, needing hundreds of thousands of ages to become finally ripe. "It is as though a young man with black hair and in the prime of life were to present a number of centenarians and say, 'Here you see my boys;' how can we have faith," asks Maitreya, "in the Tathâgata's words when he says the Tathâgata is infallible?" The solution of the doubt, when it is extricated from the gigantic cloud of words in which it is enveloped, offers a singular parallel to early Christian Docetism. The world's notion is that the Buddha won supreme insight at Gayā; but in reality he gained it many hundred thousand myriads of *kotis* of æons ago.¹ From the infinite past he has been preaching in this world, and in hundred of myriads of *kotis* of other worlds, and the other Buddhas, Dīpaṅkara (the first of the Southern series) and the rest, have all been created by him out of himself, expressly to preach the holy Law. For in successive ages he satisfies the changing wants of different creatures in manifold ways by divers utterances of the truth; he is the author of various Scriptures and inspires them all. His earthly life and death, then, are not his real being, they are only an appearance. The declaration that he is young and that he has just left his father's home, is made for the sake of example, that it may rouse and quicken others: "Repeatedly am I born in the land of the living."

¹ A *koti* is ten millions. A very ingenious arithmetical illustration is here introduced, again designed as a figurative presentation of immensity.

The Buddha's historic career is thus a sort of phantasmal discipline, while he himself abides, seeing and knowing all things *sub specie eternitatis*. He is in truth everlasting: his life has neither beginning nor end. How, then, can he die, and pass into that extinction which leaves not a trace behind? But this, too, is an illusion. He himself affirms that he only makes a show of becoming extinct for the sake of the unconverted; as it is elsewhere phrased, "I show the place of extinction, I reveal to all beings a device to educate them, albeit I do not become extinct at the time, and in this very place continue preaching the law. In the opinion that my body is completely extinct, they pay worship in many ways to my relics, but me they see not. They feel, however, a certain aspiration by which their mind becomes right. When such pious creatures leave off their bodies, then I assemble the crowd of disciples and show myself here on the Vulture's Peak. And then I speak thus to them: 'I was not completely extinct at that time; it was but a device of mine.' Repeatedly am I born in the land of the living, for the duration of my life has no end. So I am the Father of the world, the Self-Born, the Healer, the Protector of all creatures. What reason should I have to manifest myself continually? When men become unbelieving, unwise, ignorant, careless, fond of sensual pleasures, then I, who know the course of the world in reality, declare 'I am so in reality,' and consider 'How can I incline them to enlightenment? How can they become partakers of the Buddha-nature?'"¹

V.

The doctrine of the eternity and the self-existence of the Buddha advances a step further than the providential government of the world by the Bodhisattva, and reaches a positive Theism. It rested on a twofold foundation, one element being historical, the other transcendental. Each one of the multitudinous Buddhas created out of the proper body of Çākya Buddha, and each one of the no less multitudinous Bodhisattvas, bears on his person the thirty-two marks of the *Mahā-Purusha*, or "Great Man." Now it was part of the oldest doctrine of the Buddha in the Pāli Scriptures that *Mahā-Purusha* (Pāli *Purisa*) would appear, that he would be distinguished by thirty-two signs, and that he would fulfill one of two functions. If he elected the life of a house-

¹ Saddharma Puṇḍarīka, in *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxi. p. 307 ff. (condensed). The term *Buddha-dharma*, translated by Kern "Buddha-laws," means rather, I have no doubt, the "Buddha-quality, character, or nature."

holder, he would become a universal monarch ruling in righteousness. If he quitted his home in the quest for truth, he would become a blessed Buddha, teacher of gods and men.

In the colloquies between Gotama and the Brahmins it is always assumed that this doctrine is part of the current Brahmanical teaching, and instruction in the way to recognize the marks is part of the regular lore, transmitted by the master to his pupil. When the report goes forth that a Buddha has appeared in the person of Gotama, a Brahmin teacher sends one of his followers to inquire if he can satisfy the claim, just as the disciples of John bring their master's question to Jesus, and ask, "Art thou he that should come, or do we look for another?" The connection of this conception of Mahā-Purusha with early Buddhist doctrine is very obscure. The mystic figure of the Great Man himself mounts back to the days of the Vedic canon. Here it is presented, in one of the later hymns, as a great cosmic symbol, out of whose mighty limbs the heavens and the earth are framed, from whose mouth come the Scriptures, and from whose members, in head, body, and feet, are derived the four great castes. This quaint anthropomorphic pantheism may be traced through the philosophy of the Upanishads, where Purusha is the spiritual essence at once of the universe and of the inmost heart, vast as the world, yet with no more dimensions than a point, *i. e.* transcending space relations altogether. It receives noble expression in parts of the later law-books, where Purusha and Vishnu are identified, as well as in some sections of the well-known epics, which are perhaps contemporaneous with the teachings of the Great Vehicle.

Here, then, is the historical link between the earlier Buddhism and its later development. The conception of Mahā-Purusha is common to both. For reasons now obscure, and never perhaps to be clearly traced, in the Pāli Scriptures it is divested of all theistic significance, and simply determines which of two careers were open to Gotama, — that of the imperial ruler, or that of the all-wise deliverer. But the constant contact of Buddhism with the metaphysics of the Brahmanical schools (like that of Christianity with the metaphysics of Hellenism) produces in course of time its natural results; the idea acquires more and more of its Brahmanical significance, and becomes thus a new measure for the nature and manifestation of the Buddha. A Buddha doctrine then arises, analogous to the Christology of the Church; and the human Gotama, who was born and died, is converted through his association with Mahā-Purusha into the Eternal and Self-Existent

Īvara, somewhat in the same way as the man Jesus under the form of the divine Word became at last to the Christian consciousness "very God of very God."

VI.

Apart from this historical link, the same result was attained along an independent line of metaphysical thought, to which allusion must be made, even in this brief sketch, because of its singular anticipation of some present-day modes of speculation. The Indian philosophical schools were rivaled only — some have doubted if they were surpassed — by the Greek. But the problems discussed in the Ganges valley were in truth far more modern than those of the Academy and the Porch. The fundamental antithesis of Greek thought lay between the phenomenal and the abiding; and the object of philosophy was to attain a knowledge of τὰ ὄντα, the real being which is the ground of all change. But the fundamental modern antithesis lies between subject and object; the question which it asks is, "How can you know anything outside yourself, how can you justify the existence of an external world?" This was one of the questions which started up in the Buddhist schools, and acted as an additional force of cleavage between the Little Vehicle and the Great.

Rejecting all metaphysical entities, declaring that consciousness passed away at death with the dissolution of the *skhandhas*, or supports out of which the body was built up, Gotama's psychology was materialistic, though his ethics bore no such taint. In refusing, however, to discuss the doctrines of the finite or infinite extension of the world in space and time, he never denied its positive existence. Early Buddhism, therefore, took its stand on what may be called a common-sense Realism, which gained for its adherents the name of *Sarvāstivādins*, "those who affirm that all things (past, present, or future) actually exist." But the repudiation of the belief in a permanent self could not stop here. If there is no self, but only bodily organs, what after all are the bodily organs? The eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, — can these feel or think? They do not themselves possess self-consciousness, they are inanimate by nature, insensible as the grass or a wall. They are therefore *void*; for it was laid down that where the object has no consciousness of itself, there is no real being.

This line of negation, once started, was easily carried further. The existence of the phenomenal world, assumed by the ignorant and uninstructed, was soon disproved; the successions of cause

and effect were dissolved ; the time-sequence of past, present, and future under which we represent phenomena to ourselves was declared to be an illusion ; and the whole of the outward scenery of life was cast into the Void. If there is neither anything outside the Self to be known, nor any Self within that knows, the entire doctrine of knowledge is a phantasm ; it is only the cloud of ignorance in which sin and passion envelop everything. Nay, the very enlightenment after which the disciple strives has itself no more reality than anything else. Accordingly the Buddha and his *Bodhi*, teacher and teachings, the Great Vehicle itself and the Nirvāṇa to which it leads, are all mere words. A universal nihilism swallows up the believer, his path, and his goal. Everything is doubted — except the doubt ; everything is denied — except the denial.

It is a remarkable proof of the vitality of the Buddhist ethics that the vast literature of the doctrine of the Void should still be penetrated with a vivid moral enthusiasm. That firm hold of the moral life which distinguished early Buddhism saved even its most negative speculations from absolute sterility. The reaction was not long in making itself felt. Even granting, it was argued, that we do not know the phenomena outside of us as they truly are, *we do know those within*, for if we do not know ourselves, the whole universe is unintelligible and blind. Our own states of mind are within our cognizance ; percipient and percept are identical ; intellect has no other *percipibile* but itself.¹

These propositions led at once to subjective Idealism. This mode of thought is expounded at great length in a dialogue of unknown authorship between the Buddha and his disciple Ānanda, which was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese at the end of the fourth century of our era, and has been made known through the Chinese version by the late Professor Beal.² Ānanda is represented as an ordinary unreflecting realist ; but he is driven from theory to theory by the remorseless dialectic of the Buddha, until he entreats that his doubts may be removed. Thereupon the Buddha, solemnly sitting on his lion-throne, lays his hand on Ānanda's head and declares, "Every phenomenon is but the manifestation of mind :³ the entire theory of the causes of production throughout the infinite world is simply the result of mind, which is the true substratum of all."

¹ See the *Sarva-darsana-samgraha*, tr. Cowell and Gough, p. 25.

² *Catena*, p. 284 ff.

³ Literally, "the Heart," i. e. the supreme self-consciousness.

This leads to a distinction between the conditioned mind and the ultimate ground of all thought, until the Buddha defines the relation between the two in these terms: "Illustrious disciple, my constant words are these, — All the thousand connections of mind and matter, and the offspring of mind, to wit, the various modifications of ideas, all these are but what the Heart originates. Your mind and your body themselves are but things made manifest in the midst of this mysteriously glorious and true essence called the perfect Heart." The objection raised by Ānanda that this is like the heretical doctrine that there is a true personal "I" diffused throughout the whole universe, is met by the doctrine of the unreality of the world as we know it: the veil of phenomena is produced (in accordance with ancient Buddhist teaching) by *Karma*, which limits the action of the unconditioned in relation to us, and gives it a semblance of duration which does not properly belong to it.

At last the Buddha's efforts succeed, and Ānanda and all the congregation perceive that "each one's 'heart' is coextensive with the universe, seeing clearly the empty character of the universe as plainly as a leaf in the hand, and that all things in the universe are all alike merely the excellently bright and primeval Heart of *bodhi*, and that this Heart is universally diffused, and comprehends all things within itself." So, standing before the Tathāgata, they burst into this song of praise: "Oh that we now might obtain the fruit, and perfect the royal treasure of Nirvāṇa and be the means of converting endless worlds of beings, and causing them to experience this same deep heart of gratitude through endless worlds. Thus would we return the boundless love of the Buddha, and so humbly seek the illuminating energy of the World-Honored. Passing through the various worlds we would rescue the countless beings yet immersed in sin, and in the end with them ourselves find rest."

VII.

Here Philosophy passes once more into Religion, and this religion is saved from the barrenness of a vague pantheism by the altruistic impulse stamped so deeply upon Buddhist thought by the original genius of Gotama. The same broad conception which led him to break down the barriers of caste and bid his followers carry forth the truth from land to land in active interest for the welfare of man now requires that the believer shall himself aim to become a Buddha, and carry on the work of deliverance from

world to world. This is the goal to which the *Lotus* constantly summons the disciple. Tathâgata manifests himself that his true hearers may become "partakers of the Buddha-nature."¹ Again and again is the promise made, "Ye shall become Buddhas benevolent and compassionate." And if this seem to some too great a call, they hear the word couched in another form, "Ye are my sons."

The wise man, therefore, is always thinking, "How can I and these beings become Buddhas? I will preach this true law upon which the happiness of all beings depends, for the benefit of the world." As he preaches, the Buddha, even though he be in a distant sphere, will make the minds of his whole congregation well-disposed towards him. Should he forget the Scripture which he had studied, "I," says the Buddha, "though staying in another world, will show him my face, and the words which he has forgotten will I suggest to him." Nay, so close is the communion between the believer and his Lord, so real the spiritual presence of the Buddha in the sages and the sacred writ, that wherever the sage has walked or sat, reciting even one holy verse, "That spot of earth has been enjoyed by myself, there have I walked myself, and there have I been sitting. Where that son of the Buddha has stayed, there I am." "He that receiveth you," said Jesus, "receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me." "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of you."

The last words addressed by Gotama to his disciples summed up his fundamental principle of escape from the round of transmigration by personal moral discipline; "Work out your own deliverance with diligence."² The later Buddhism might quite well have added the correlate of the second part of the paradox of Paul and said, "For it is the Buddha that worketh in you to will and to do." Hindu devotion, therefore, readily moved along lines that have many parallels in the West. When the Brahman Râmachandra was converted to Buddhism in the eleventh century, he seems to have been driven by persecution from his native land in the Ganges valley, and to have found shelter in Ceylon. There he poured out his trust in a little garland of verse, published a year or two since at Colombo,³ which might have been

¹ Compare the Christian phrase, "That ye may become partakers of the divine nature." 2 Pet. i. 4.

² "Buddhist Suttas," in *S. B. E.*, vol. xi. p. 174.

³ See *Proceedings of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Feb. 1890, p. 125.

written by a mystic of mediæval Christendom. "Whether I live in heaven or in hell, whether in the city of ghosts or of men, let my mind remain fixed on thee, for there is no other happiness for me. Thou art my father, mother, brother, sister; thou art my fast friend in danger, O dear one, thou art my lord, my teacher who imparts to me knowledge sweet as nectar. Thou art my wealth, my enjoyment, my pleasure, my affluence, my greatness, my reputation, my knowledge, and my life. Thou art my all, O all-knowing Buddha!"

Thus, from a system of ethical culture, Buddhism has become a religion.

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"BETWEEN THE TESTAMENTS."¹

THE appearance of Ezra on the scene of the reconstruction of the life of Israel marks the beginning of the Jewish Church, as distinguished from the Hebrew nation. The national life from the time of Ezra now runs in channels ecclesiastic. The elaboration and announcement of the law by Ezra was accompanied by a purification of Israel, as a church, which went so far as to divorce all those who by mixed marriages had made the possibility of a hybrid worship a thing to be feared and prevented, even at the cost of the breaking up of family life. This, as Farrar remarks, was a proceeding "in strong contrast with the marriage of Moses to an Egyptian, and of Solomon to a princess of the same land, and the descent of the national hero David from Ruth and Boaz." The estimation in which Ezra as a lawgiver was held may be gathered from the later Jewish saying that God would have originally given the law by Ezra had not Moses anticipated

¹ In preparing this sketch of the historical period which lies in a certain sense between Malachi and Matthew, the writer has had in view the readers who find it difficult to realize the conditions which confronted Jesus of Nazareth, when he appeared to deliver to his people his message of spiritual truth, and who, through lack either of time or of opportunity, cannot make such systematic and thorough study as has been made possible, for even those who read only English, by the labors of experts in this field. The omission from this article of any more extended reference to the Roman rule in Palestine is due in part to the limits of space, and in part to the fact that there cannot be claimed for the Roman any intellectual influence on Judean life.

him. In view of the recent conclusions of scholars this eulogy needs only slight modification, leaving to Ezra the credit to which Judaism thought he was very nearly entitled. The Talmud even declares that Ezra and the men of the Great Synagogue wrote the Old Testament. His appearance at Jerusalem dates from about 457 B. C. Nearly a century before his coming had occurred the return of the Exiles from Babylon and the rebuilding of the Temple at Jerusalem by them under the lead of Zerubbabel and stimulated by the prophets Haggai and Zechariah. The work had been slow; their numbers were insufficient; and their courage was dampened by the fact that whatever they might accomplish would appear to the old men far inferior to the state of things before the Exile. Even after the Temple had been dedicated, the elders wept at the remembrance of the former glory; while the younger men rejoiced at the recovery of any privilege of life in the land of their fathers. The offended Samaritans, too, had been continually misrepresenting the colony, at the Persian court.

It was upon such a scene of disorder that Ezra entered. Ten or twelve years later, the sturdy governor Nehemiah appeared, to second his work vigorously and build the walls of Jerusalem. The account of this period given in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah shows an administrative ability at work in fine contrast with the uncertain movement of national life preceding it. But few if any Levites had accompanied the forty-two thousand upon their return from the Captivity. The reason for this is probably to be found in the discrimination which had arisen between the sons of Aaron and the other members of the tribe of Levi. It was natural that the other Levites should not care to return from Babylon, where all went well with them under the Persian rule, and take up menial service under priests of their own tribe. Doubtless many of them, like their brethren, the priests, added the service of the pen to that of the altar, and became "scribes." Upon the arrival of Ezra an effort had been made to organize the nation, mainly upon the legal basis afforded by Deuteronomy; but with the new life and activity which Nehemiah's more vigorous rule proclaimed, a further and more intricate scheme of legal-religious method was announced, and the whole Torah (which came to be called the Pentateuch) became the basis of national life.

This change would not have satisfied the preëxilic Prophets, who regarded ethics, not ceremonial, as of prime importance. It was not, indeed, a movement in advance, so far as the spirit of religion was concerned; but it was probably a necessary stage in

the preservation of the material for the religious inspiration of a later age. The legalism of this time was, doubtless, a shell which formed around the kernel of truth to preserve it from loss. Although this point of view was not conducive to strong prophetic inspiration, it brought to pass certain necessary conditions, for it put an end to the tendency of the ruling priests to let down the bars between Judaism and the Heathenism which closely surrounded it. This tendency had been evident between the return and the arrival of Ezra and Nehemiah. The high priests had given evidence of a desire to play the ruler after the manner of the Ethnarchs of the contiguous provinces. When, however, under the guidance of Ezra, the "just man" became the legally clean and the exact observer of the Law, this too liberal interpretation of priestly rule was at an end.

Furthermore, a new interpretation of the true Israel now appeared. The Israelite was no longer simply the dweller in the land who could prove his continuous presence there. This the Samaritan, mongrel though he was, could claim, and go far to prove. Sanballat had built about the year 420 B. C. that rival temple on Mount Gerizim, which vaunted its prior claim to possession of the true worship. But under the new observances inaugurated in the time of Ezra the true Israelite was the man who had returned from the Captivity, had kept himself clean from all heathen alliances, had helped to reëstablish religion in the land of his fathers, and belonged beyond a suspicion to the renaissance of religion. As a result of this feeling, Judaism ceased to be a national or tribal name; from this time on it represented a settled religious conviction which distinguished the true Hebrew from "that abandoned people who lived in Shechem." May not the phrase "Congregation of the Captivity" be intended to point out the blue blood of a class distinction? Slavery, also, at this time disappeared. No Judæan would buy a Judæan. The year of emancipation ceased to have any significance, as an obligation. Almsgiving became a prime virtue: almoners were appointed in every town, and the command went forth that there be no poor in the land. For once, an effective anti-poverty society was inaugurated, and practically, it continues among the Jews to this day; the same term is used now as then for the Hebrew almoner. From this same time must be dated the regulation of the houses of prayer; the order of public services in the synagogue; the establishment of schools and the journeyings of the scribes through the land as interpreters of the law. Another significant change came

somewhat later, the substitution of the Aramæan for the older Phœnician character in writing the Hebrew language; along with this came the "New Hebrew," the adoption of the Aramæan dialect, and the relegation of the classic language to the schools and the learned as practically a "dead tongue."

No prophet of the older type appeared in Israel during this time of the hardening of the shell about the religious life, unless we must except the Second Isaiah — the Great Unknown — a prophet of the time of the Exile and the Restoration. There was, however, one fervent soul whose word has come down to us. He did not belong to the spiritual order of Amos, Micah, and Joel; he had not Ezekiel's imagination, or the political sagacity of Jeremiah. Manifestly, he has joined those who are shifting the centre of gravity from inspiration to strict obedience, and he is intent upon preventing any decline from the strictest observance of the newly imposed regulations of daily life, according to the law of Moses. It is significant that we have the same date assigned for the building of the Samaritan temple on Mount Gerizim and the message of Malachi in the "Book of the Angel," — 420 B. C. All deliverances were now an "Echo of the Voice." The connection of this prophet with the new order of the worship of the Law, rather than with the older ethical inspiration, appears in the fact that he alone among all the prophetic writers mentions the Law of Moses. Nowhere in the Prophets is Sinai named: this indicates either a supreme indifference on the part of the prophets to the giving of the law by Moses or else that the law, as Ezra and his successors understood it, was not really given until after the return from the Captivity.

But now a new and potent influence appears, in the intellectual life of Israel. With the Persian conquest the dogmatic and speculative dualism of the Zarathustrian cult made itself felt in Western Asia. There was a consequent heightening of the power of imagination, due to this more abstract way of dealing with the unseen world. A result of this relation of the Persian to the Babylonian on the one side and the Jew on the other is the significant claim soon to be put forth by the Jew to a more fully developed theory of the future life. Up to this time he had not expressed a speculative interest in the world of spirits other than that conveyed in the picture of the shadowy and uncertain Sheol. This "Underworld" was the dwelling of righteous and unrighteous alike: it was "rather a negation of life than a declaration of immortality." But the Zarathustrian influence penetrated even

the singularly incurious mind of the Jew: the Garden of Eden of Genesis was elaborated into a Paradise of delight awaiting the righteous dead: the disgusting Valley of Hinnom outside the walls of Jerusalem became the symbol of a Gehenna, to which the unrighteous would be hurried after death: the old conception of long life to the righteous and of a sudden cutting off of the wicked gave place to a "fearful looking-for of judgment" and a graduated scheme of retribution.¹ The Royal Counselors, the "Seven Amshaspands," of the Persian throne were represented by the Seven Holy Watchers who stood ready to do the will of the Eternal.²

This was not a speedy development, nor did it come by any copying of Persian doctrine. The Jew might be infected by a subtle influence and show its results in the fronting of his thought in a new direction; but he would indignantly have repudiated any intentional modification of his thought under the persuasion of any outside cult, which at best could only afford him a background against which to emblazon his motto, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord, the Eternal is One!" As Professor Cheyne says: "The influence exerted upon Israel by Babylon and Persia was not that of a master upon a slave, but of one disciple of the true God upon another." However little this speculative change may seem to us an advance upon the simple severity of the monotheism now firmly established in Israel, it has to recommend it the quickening of imagination and the increase of the power of the ideal over the rather commonplace ethics of Israel. It is noteworthy that the ever tightening ritual strictness of the Judæans adds innumerable tests of ceremonial purity, as though in emulation of the ritual of the Persians.

When, in the latter half of the fourth century before Christ, the Persian rule in Palestine was broken by the Greek conquest of the East, and Oriental despotism yielded to the less personal rule of the West, the monotheism of the Judæan was found to be penetrated by a speculative infusion which, far from being disturbed by the Greeks, was fostered and deepened by their intellectual enterprise and unbounded curiosity. The Greek mind itself had

¹ See Cheyne's *Origin of the Psalter* on Pss. xvi., xvii., xxxvi., xlix., lxiii., lxviii., which, he holds, contain a vague, untheological expression of the hope of a future life.

² Zech. iii. 9; iv. 10. "The seven eyes of the Lord, which run to and fro through the whole earth." "The seven spirits which are before his throne," Rev. i. 4.

passed beyond the crude materialism of its earlier thought concerning the world, and had been led by the Socratic philosophy to an idealism, of which we shall see the exaggerated development in the century before the Christian era, in the almost universal adoption of the allegorical method of interpretation and the search for "hidden wisdom" wherever the slightest impediment lay in the path of common-sense. We must bear constantly in mind, therefore, that in the period in which the Jew changed from a Babylonian to a Persian and from a Persian to a Greek master, the Greek people had passed through a struggle, political, theological, and philosophical. Politically, the separate life of states had resulted in placing now this and now that state in supremacy; the petty monarchies had been extended into oligarchies, and through all the changes the necessity of political unity made itself felt more and more. Theologically, the poets of the fifth century, Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, had been striving to express worthier conceptions of deity. Zeus had urged his way to the place of honor among the gods, as the One who "had clothed the earth with its many colored garments."¹ Greek literature offers little that resembles the sublime and religious poetry of creation which the Hebrew had uttered in entire disregard of scientific speculation. But philosophically the Hebrew and the Greek ethics were approaching the same plane. This fact is well brought out by Zeller: "Among the Greeks as nowhere else the universally recognized moral laws are referred to the will of the gods, and their inviolability is founded on the belief of divine retributive justice. This belief gained considerably in power from the time that the ideas concerning a future state entered its service, and the shadowy existence in Hades, beyond which the belief in immortality of the Homeric period never went, was filled with greater life and meaning through the doctrine of a future retribution." To the spread of such a doctrine the Pythagoreans mightily contributed by their teaching of transmigration and re-incarnation, which appealed strongly to the moral sense.

It was at this time, as Professor Cheyne tells us, that "Immortality among the Greeks passed from being an aristocratic privilege and was thrown open to the common people." The saints were no longer the *aristoi*, they might also be drawn from the sweating rank of *oi polloi*. That the Palestinian Jew did not reach this conception of the right of man as man to all religious

¹ See Evelyn Abbott's *Theology and Ethics of Sophocles*, and Professor Wenley's *Socrates and Christ*.

privileges may be inferred from the contemptuous reference to the common people in John vii. 49, where the Pharisees say: "This mob which knoweth not the Law are accursed." The unhistorical but significant legend of the Seven Wise Men of Greece is a sign of a deeper sense for morals in the people. The ethical dream had been expressed in moral precepts, and these had been given a historical setting, and an authoritative name.

The interval between the Testaments has been called "The Centuries of Silence." The phrase is most untrue; for, as a whole, this time was vocal with the cry of a battle in which empire contended with empire, and philosophy with philosophy: it was an age of earnest and angry contention. But the hundred years succeeding the death of Nehemiah are for us, so far as any record remains of that Judæan history, a century of silence. For some reason which does not appear, the period from the death of this sturdy old captain at Jerusalem to the time of the Greek conquest of Persia has no Jewish history. That it was a period of growth and development with the Judæans — especially in their theological and ecclesiastical life — is evident from the changes which the close of the century shows. The stress of external events made it a time of heavy taxation and distress, — a time of struggle with Samaria, and of internal conflict for the control of the high priest's office. The strong and wise sway of Macedonia over all the region from the Mediterranean to India came to an end with the death of Alexander the Great. The prowess of the united Greek armies was made ineffectual by the lust and greed of their leaders. There was no successor fit to take the crown now fallen from the youthful brow of the master of the world: there were left only pigmies contending over the spoils. To the gentlest of all the captains of Alexander, Ptolemy Soter, Egypt fell in the division of the empire. Lower Syria was soon acquired by conquest, and thus Judæa became once more subject to Egypt. This relation was maintained in the war which now began between Ptolemy and the other Macedonian captains, and it brought with it great advantages. During the rule of Alexander, settlements of Jews had begun to form in Egypt, where they were well received and prospered. When the struggle of Ptolemy with Demetrius and Antigonus, B. C. 312–301, had closed, emigration to Egypt from the cities of Palestine, scorred by the ravages of war, became popular, as the Jews were thus nearer to the protecting throne of the king. So began that Egyptian-Judæan life, which powerfully influenced the later thinking of the Jew, and penetrated

the Christian thought of four centuries. Many Jews too of northern Palestine found their way to the court of Seleucus at Antioch, destined to become the source of influences as evil as the influence of Alexandria was benign.

We have come to the opening of the third century before Christ, and the first great name since the death of Nehemiah, the high priest, Simon the Just.¹ Here the words of Graetz may well be quoted:—

“For more than a century after the death of Nehemiah, the Judæan nation might have been represented in its inner life under the form of a caterpillar, which covers itself with a web in order to weave thread from the juices of its own body: and, in its outer life, under the form of a martyr, bearing humiliation and insult alike in silence. Until that date it had not produced any one man who by his one strong individuality could be regarded as the great author of a new movement: no one had arisen capable of giving the Judæans direction and enthusiasm. The stimulus for development and improvement had always come from without,—from the principal men of Persia or Babylon. But now the people were separated from their co-religionists of these lands in consequence of new political circumstances. The Judæans of the Euphrates and the Tigris could no longer carry on an active intercourse with their brethren in the mother-country. For the reigning dynasties, the Seleucidæ and the Ptolemies, looked upon one another with suspicion, and frequent visits of the Judæans of the provinces of the Seleucidæ to the Judæans of Jerusalem would have been unfavorably regarded at Alexandria. Had the nation not been able to rouse itself in its own country without extraneous help it would have been lost: a people which cannot exist or improve of itself must sooner or later fall into insignificance. But the right man arose at the right time. He saved the Judæan community from its fall. This man was Simon the Just. In an age deficient in great men he appears like a lofty and luxuriant tree in the midst of a barren country.”

But confusion reigned after his death. His son Onias was too young to assume the office of high priest, and the other child was a daughter, married to one Tobiah, a man of priestly rank. A son of Tobiah, named Joseph, appointed by Ptolemy Euergetes tax-gatherer of Lower Syria, became the head of a party known in the

¹ The saying attributed to Simon the Just indicates the fundamental idea in the Judaism of this time,—“On three things the world rests: on the Law, on Divine Service, and on good works.”

disgraceful struggles for the high priest's office as the Tobiadæ. He maintained his lucrative holding from the Egyptian court for twenty-two years, for so closely had he identified himself with the interests of Egypt, that upon the death of Ptolemy Euergetes in 223 B. C. Ptolemy Philopater continued the tax-gatherer in his hateful office. In 218 B. C. Antiochus the Great began the encroachments from Upper Syria, which in the century following precipitated the War of Independence, a struggle of singular heroism, and military success in the face of overwhelming numbers, — the one period between the kings of Judah and the Christian era when the Jews could claim an independent existence as a nation. But Antiochus the Great could get no permanent footing in Judæa. Egypt was still too strong; and the Jew remained loyal to the southern kingdom. Meantime Joseph the tax-gatherer, not satisfied with pillaging his countrymen, proved his devotion to his Egyptian master by introducing into the Holy City the rude and boisterous Dionysian festival lately imported into Alexandria by the luxurious court. Greek learning and Greek license had taken possession of the capital, and all the provinces felt the consequent demoralization. This was the influence which in the century before the Christian era made Cæsarea a Roman city, and Tiberias almost entirely un-Jewish, — a centre for the Roman games where the Jew, the Roman, and the Greek contended on equal terms in the palæstra and the stadium. Jerusalem itself was to become the home of a parasitic party, the Herodians, who took their manners and their morals from the court of the Idumæan kings, "the Herodian lords of the land." But before this depth was reached the high priest's office became the gift of the court of Syria, and citizenship in Antioch was coveted and bought by the Jew of Jerusalem.

Graetz places in this time, about 200 B. C., the composition of the "Song of Songs," which he thinks was written by a Grecian Jew, or Hellenist, to celebrate sacred as contrasted with profane love. If this be so, then the book is in strong contrast with another work, referred to this same time, the Koheleth, or Ecclesiastes. It is not surprising that in the first century of our era a vigorous debate was going on as to the right which these works have to a place in the sacred canon. If the two belong to the same time, say B. C. 250–130, they represent two distinct phases of literary activity of the Jew. To modern Jews the "Song of Songs" is more than the amorous drama which M. Renan would put seven centuries earlier: to some of them at least it represents

in the story of the chastity and faithful love of the Shunammite the struggle of the uncorrupted Jew amid the seductions of Greek life and thought.

Already the Palestinian Jew and the more serious among his brethren in Greek lands had entered the reflective period of literary activity. The proverbial philosophy which is preserved in the Book of Proverbs, and penetrates the "Wisdom of Solomon" and the "Wisdom of the Son of Sirach," sets forth with great acuteness and much beauty a working-theory of ethics—a late expression of the slowly accumulating philosophy of life. The Book of Tobit extols the duty of almsgiving, implying that it is an earthly virtue which enlists the interested regard of Heaven. So far, at least, the beautiful story is Jewish; but the part assigned to the angel Raphael, attending young Tobias on his journey and instructing him how to bring to naught the devices of the demon Asmodeus, is certainly a Zarathustrian scene introduced into the plot of the Jewish drama. This reflective period must be credited with those two widely divergent dramatic pieces, the Book of Jonah and the Book of Esther. The Book of Jonah is so catholic in its interpretation of the divine care for a heathen city as to seem scarcely at all Jewish: the Book of Esther, on the contrary, is so patriotic in its solicitude for the Jew as a Jew and for Jewish ritual and observance, that the author forgets to mention the name of God,—an error corrected in the Greek recensions, in which prayers are put into the mouth of Mordecai and Esther.

In all these works we see the freer handling of history by Jewish writers in the interest of a literary and philosophic purpose: in the Book of Esther we have an intimation of the national feeling, which in the second century was to find its most ardent expression, when the trumpet call of the Book of Daniel should match the sword-stroke of the Maccabean heroes. The thrilling story of Judith should not be passed over, "full indeed of contradictions, geographical, theological, and strategical," but unmistakably patriotic, a drama of Providence. The part played by the woman is Jewish rather than Persian or Greek. But the reflective tendency is seen in its finest development in the "Wisdom of Solomon," and in the "Wisdom of Jesus, the Son of Sirach." Contrast the pessimism of Ecclesiastes, declaring, "that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth also the beasts . . . as the one dieth so dieth the other" with the confidence in God, beautifully expressed in the Wisdom of Solomon:—

"Thou canst show thy great strength at all times when thou wilt: and who may withstand the power of thy arm? For the whole world before thee is as a little grain of the balance, yea, as a drop of the morning dew that falleth down upon the earth. But thou hast mercy upon all: for thou canst do all things, and winkest at the sins of men, because they should amend. For thou lovest all the things that are and abhorrest nothing that thou hast made: for never wouldest thou have made anything, if thou hadst hated it. And how could anything have endured, if it had not been thy will? or been preserved, if it had not been called by thee? But thou sparest all, for they are thine, O Lord, thou lover of souls." "This," says Professor Toy, "is Platonism and Stoicism interpreted by Jewish theology." The Book of Ecclesiastes is saturated by a pessimism which must be derived from the later school of the Greek cynics. "The writer still believes in God, and is so far a Jew; but his belief in God gives him no comfort" (Toy). The sharp and contemptuous attack upon the idols of the heathen in the Epistle of Jeremiah should not fail of mention. "They are surely no gods," since their priests must wipe the dust from their eyes, protect their garments from moths and guard them from harm in every way; it is a strange and attractive mingling of wit and indignation, much in the style of the later Prophets.

This was a period of great literary activity; but many works are known to us only by name, or through brief quotation in the books which remain. These include apocryphal writings admitted by the Roman Church into its canon, and many others more distinctly apocalyptic in their purpose,—among them the Book of Enoch, the Sibylline Oracles, and the Assumption of Moses. This mass of literature represents, on one side, a struggle of Palestinian Judaism against the infusion of foreign thought, and on the other the obvious surrender to this influence in lands more remote from the altars of Israel. For the most part, however, these apocalyptic writings are prophetic in form and intensely national and poetic in their temper. Many a great name of the past is invoked to aid in the delivery of the message of courage and inspiration, appealing to Israel by its memories to insure the fulfilling of its hopes. "The quick succession of empire to empire in the midst of which the Jew stood fast gave to the Jew the conception of Israel's destiny as certain amid all fluctuations, and his philosophy of history became a dogmatic declaration of purpose of Jehovah as the God of the Hebrew people."

Especially interesting and important in this period is the development of the Messianic hope and ideal. Beginning in the vision of a personal ruler of a glorious realm, going on to picture Israel itself as the embodiment of the ideal, a Messianic Nation, it ends as a requiem for a suffering Messiah. The personal Messiah, as judge and arbiter, more and more comes into view in the century before the birth of Jesus of Nazareth. The catastrophic and dramatic heralding of "the coming" appears in Enoch as in Matthew and Mark, and, later, in the Epistle of Barnabas. One point is not to be lost sight of in reading these visions of mingled patriotism and religion. The Messiah, however glorious, regal, and strong, is nowhere pictured as other than human. It is ideal humanity, but it is still unmistakably humanity. The Messiah is always the Servant of Jehovah, waiting upon the will of the Most High. Paul might be quoting from any of these apocalyptic visions, when in the First Epistle to the Corinthians he sets forth the constant statement of the New Testament, that Christ is not the end, but a means to an end. "Then cometh the end, when he shall deliver up the kingdom unto God the Father, that God may be All and in all; . . . the Son also himself shall be subjected unto him that did put all things under him."

But while these patriotic and idealistic influences have been at work, two most important events have occurred. The first of these is the appearance of the Torah in its Greek version under the fostering oversight of Ptolemy Philadelphus. The Pentateuch, and later the Prophets, now appealed to the Greek in his own tongue. This was another influence which the Jew of Palestine resisted, but happily without success. The depth of his hatred for this incursion of Greek learning may be judged by the fact that in the second century of our era a rival Greek version appeared bearing the name of Aquila, and put forth in Palestine as a proof of the control of the Scripture by a triumphant rabbinism on Palestinian soil. But in the mean time the genius of Philo of Alexandria has given Jewish exegesis its first systematic form for the Hellenic Jew. The other event is political. The hearty jealousy of the Seleucidæ in the north and the responsive hatred of the Ptolemies in the south brought about the crisis so long postponed. The Greek learning of the mild Ptolemaic dynasty diverted the energies of the Egyptian from the field of battle to the field of letters; even the coins of the later age show a loss of virile strength in the faces of the kings. With the death of Ptolemy IV., B. C. 205, Palestine passed under the con-

trol of Syria; the Jews, foreseeing the sure decline of the Alexandrian power, had indeed already transferred their allegiance to the northern kingdom. The Syrian kings looked with greedy eyes on the temple treasures, and Jew vied with Jew to rob the temple and win the favor of the court at Antioch. These contentions resulted in the overthrow of Jerusalem in B. C. 168 by Antiochus Epiphanes, and the placing of a Syrian garrison in the fortress of Acra, preparatory to the extermination of the Jews. This extermination Antiochus now ordered; his general, Apollonius, was appointed to execute the decree. The observance of the Sabbath and circumcision were prohibited; a systematic search was made for all copies of the Law, and the possession of such a copy was made a capital offense; in the desecrated temple heathen altars were erected to the Olympian deities; and on an altar which surmounted that of the burnt offering sacrifices to Zeus were offered before the eyes of the scandalized Jews. The persecution was not confined to Jerusalem, for the war of extermination (or conversion) was meant to be final and unrelenting. In the country towns the same exactions were made, and everywhere the local officers were ordered to compel the Jews to offer sacrifice and eat the flesh of swine. Like nearly every other persecution of the Jews, this had no moral motive.

But now there appeared two unexpected means of salvation for the Law and the religion of Israel. The Septuagint Version, which the Jew of Palestine had despised, was far beyond the power of Antiochus or the cruelty of his agents. In all the Greek lands, the religion of Israel was now known, and the Scriptures of the Jew had taken their place among the classics of the world. Alexandria swarmed with Jews, intellectually alert and prosperous; the Dispersion had become a means of national preservation. The feeling, again, had long been growing more intense which led the Jews to turn to those "waters of Babylon," where they had wept when they remembered Zion. As in the return from the Captivity a new aristocracy of the true Israel had been formed, so now, in the eyes of the oppressed people in Judæa, a new sanctity attached to their devout and prosperous brethren in the East. This feeling found its full expression later in the sacredness attached to the Talmud, produced among these Eastern devotees, and made the region of the Euphrates and the Tigris the chosen home of Jewish learning until the eleventh century of our era. Under Syrian oppression the Palestinian Jew turned with affection and hope to the land from which four hundred years be-

fore Ezra had come with the Law of God in his hand. This tender feeling for Babylonian Judaism may be seen in the way in which Babylon was included in any mention of Judaism, while Western and Egyptian Judaism were jealously excluded. A curious rabbinical comment on Isaiah xliii. 6, explains the words "my sons from afar," to mean exiles to Babylon, who have remained men; and "my daughters from the end of the earth" to mean exiles in other lands, who have become as women.

The full tide of hatred and persecution crept slowly and surely up the hill-country of Judæa. It reached at length the little town of Modin, northwest of Jerusalem, among the hills overlooking the Mediterranean. Here its flood of cruelty was broken against the altar of sacrifice, erected by the representative of Syria to try the faith of the inhabitants of this hamlet among the hills. The scene has a fine dramatic interest. The record of it in the first Book of Maccabees is familiar and thrilling. Old Mattathias, surrounded by his five sons, stands among his neighbors in the place of his birth, whither he has fled from the sad scenes in Jerusalem. He is an agonized spectator of the ordeal enacted in the name of Antiochus the King of Syria on the one hand, and to be resisted in the name of Jehovah, God of Israel, on the other. A recreant Jew approaches the altar and conforms to the heathen requirement, timidly offering a sacrifice to the Olympian gods. The wrath of Mattathias leaps into flame; he slays the traitor to Israel, and overthrows the altar of sacrifice. Followed by his heroic sons he proclaims the War of Independence, which is to become a struggle for national existence, a miracle of courage and zeal, and which swept before it the armies of Syria like stubble before the flame. The nation continued independent, though beleaguered, until the Pharisees invited the protection of Rome in B. C. 63.

Throughout the whole period under review, and despite all political changes and personal sufferings, one uninterrupted influence made itself felt. The scribes became a power in the land. In the time of Ezra, priest and scribe were not clearly distinguished. From the time of the Greek rule, however, they became unmistakably separate. "The best activity of the nation during the Greek rule appears in the legal schools" (Toy). In the Maccabean era, two sharply defined parties may be discovered. The names so familiar in the New Testament — Pharisee and Sadducee — now arise, and continue their unabated intellectual and social antagonism into the Christian era. The Pharisee was a legalist, a scribe, and a bigot; the Sadducee was a rationalist, a

priest, and an aristocrat. In the synagogue was found the natural stage on which to display the learning which the scribe regarded it as his special function to impart, and in the supreme importance of which he profoundly believed. At the corners of the streets, also, in the gates of the cities, and in the courts held on market days in the towns, the wise men of the Law set themselves "to make many disciples and to build a fence about the Torah." They fulfilled the praise given them in the Song of Deborah: "I have been sent to praise the scribe of Israel, who so long as persecution endured did not cease to expound the Law. Lovely was it as they sat in the synagogue and taught the people the words of the Law, when they pronounced the blessing and professed the truth before God. Their own business did they make of less account, and rode upon asses through the whole land" (Wisdom of the Son of Sirach).

The course of development followed by this teaching of the oral law and the commentary upon the written Law may be briefly indicated. The class of students called "Sopherim" had arisen in response to a demand for the interpretation and application of the Law: the name is given to Ezra. (Ezra vii. 6.) Doubtless, from his day on, there was a succession of men who devoted themselves to the elaboration of legal science. But the study seems not to have been definitely organized until the second century before Christ. The complete development of the branches of sacred learning cultivated in the guild of the scribes is thus divided by Dr. Edersheim: The basis was of course the Mosaic Law, including the elaborated ritual observance, which had been brought into unimpeachable authority by Ezra. On this was formed the second law, or Mishnah, which was intended to explain and supplement the Mosaic Law. In the study of this second law rabbi, sage, scribe, and *darshan* were absorbed. From their search grew up commentaries, theologies, and dogmatics: these constitute the Midrash. Theology was again subdivided into two branches, the Halachah, and the Haggadah. The Halachah (the Going) was the "spiritual rule of the Road;" it grew to have an authority greater than Scripture because it explained Scripture. The Haggadah (the Telling) was the commentary of the teachers; it had no authority, and was meant to have none, except that derived from the personal piety and learning of the teacher himself. But as teachers would arise especially gifted or personally popular, their sayings would, sooner or later, constitute a body of doctrine. One of the most famous of the Fathers of "The Way" (Halachah)

was Hillel the Babylonian, belonging to the first century B. C.; the most popular of the Haggadists was Eleazar the Median, living in the first century A. D.

There were various ways of studying the text: there was the study of the words of the text as words; the study of the possible application of texts; then came the finding out of the hidden meaning — the supernatural beauty of the words. This finally “went to seed” in the allegorical method of the Hellenist schools, which survived in the Christian era. It appears again in the Christian Theophilus of Antioch; and in the saying of Origen, “Whatever in the Old Testament seems discreditable to the character of God must be understood as having some ‘hidden meaning.’” How far in the search for the hidden meaning this ingenious study of words went may be seen from the discussion as to which is the great commandment of the Law. The question was answered in the Gospel by the Master of the art of living, in a way to set it at rest forever. But this answer was far too simple and spiritual for the acumen of the scribes. To one of the greatest of their number is attributed the declaration that the “law of the fringes” is the greatest commandment of all. This view was proved to be correct by one of the commentators of a later time through his discovery that the word “fringes” in Hebrew, together with the number of knots and ends proper to this ornamental decoration of the robe, corresponded in its numerical equivalence to the whole number of the written precepts, six hundred and thirteen; thus the “law of the fringes” must be the greatest of all, for it includes all. So impressed was one of the scribes with this view that having torn the fringe of his robe in going up a ladder, he remained standing on the ladder until the rent could be mended.

All this trifling was in marked contrast to a saying attributed to that great scribe of the second century B. C., Antigonus of Socho, probably a Greek both in name and training. “Be as servants, who serve the Master without view to reward.” This finds its parallel in the New Testament in the saying of Jesus, “When ye have done all, say we are unprofitable servants; we have done that which it was our duty to do” (Luke xvii.). This fine unselfish precept of Antigonus was the exception. The common thought was fast becoming “the letter that killeth;” more and more the Jews were “making the law of God of no effect through their traditions.” The view was everywhere accepted that the words of the rabbi were more binding than the com-

mandments of the father of the family. All the words of the scribes, they said, are weighty ; the words of the Law are weighty and light. The denunciation by Jesus of those who " bind heavy burdens on men's shoulders and will not lift them with a finger " is emphasized in the saying of Simon Peter, that the " law was a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear."

In the two centuries preceding the advent of Jesus this hardening and deadening process was going forward : the Maccabean triumph gave it emphasis, and the support of the Pharisaic party by Roman intervention procured it new vantage. The latter enriched the services of religion and elaborated the law of the Sabbath, but they impoverished the spirit of true worship, and even seemed to have made independent thought impossible on the simplest themes. Thus when, in the synagogue, Jesus puts to them the question : " Is it right to do good on the Sabbath or to do evil, to save life or to destroy it ? " they held their peace. Even such a simple generalization was beyond them ; they had no quotation from the scribes ready as an answer ; the man with the withered hand stands up and points with the shrunken member to where they sit bewildered at the simplicity of truth. When one surveys this dearth of originality in the Jewish mind of the time, he is reminded of the saying of Hegel : " The soul that has been immersed in a Dead Sea of moral platitudes comes up out of it invulnerable as Achilles, but with all the moral force washed out of it."

It is difficult to understand the absorbing interest of the Jew in the trivialities of the questions so ardently discussed by him. But it must be remembered that religion had become stereotyped. The tendency of these conventional processes — educational and social — in their bewildering recurrence and unrelenting exaction may be easily imagined. Those who studied to make them binding were equaled in adroitness by those who studied how to avoid them. Think for one moment of the effect upon the direct action of the moral sense of such a device as the following : A man died on the Sabbath ; it was not lawful to remove a corpse on the Sabbath ; but he may have died of a contagious disease, and he must be buried. What, then, may be done ? This was the solution of the difficulty : A dead body may not be removed, but bread may be carried on the Sabbath. Let us therefore lay a loaf of bread upon the corpse, and then we may draw the corpse along, for we are removing the bread ; the dead man is but the vehicle which supports the bread. In such subtleties as these the moral force

of the people was evaporating. It could then have but one end when a prophet of the old ethical kind arose, declaring as Jesus of Nazareth did: "Ye have heard it said" thus and thus . . . "but I say unto you: 'Ye tithe mint and anise and cummin, and neglect the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and faith . . . ye cleanse the outside of the cup and platter, but within they are full of extortion and excess.'" Such arraignments must have left the scribes blinking like night-birds suddenly confronted by the sun.

The fate of such a prophet as John the Baptist or Jesus is sealed by such words spoken to such a society. The Pharisees resented his love of humanity which put to shame their assumed democracy. It was hard for them to hear that "the sinner that repenteth" is more to Heaven than "the ninety and nine" ceremonially righteous. The Sadducees discovered in the new prophet a spiritual insight which was a rebuke to their materialism and their affectation of liberalism; they encountered in this simple peasant a free conscience which did not contradict the Law by wresting its letter, and saw deeper than the scribes into its spirit and meaning. The Zealots heard his sayings on the destruction of the temple and "the Sabbath made for man, and not man for the Sabbath;" and they sought revenge in memory of those who had perished in the War of Independence, because they would not even draw the sword on the Sabbath. Annas, the father-in-law of Caiaphas the high priest, must have been enraged with this champion of the poor; for he owned dovecotes on Mount Olivet, where he had a monopoly of the offerings of the poor on the temple altars. "As it is written, a pair of turtle-doves or two young pigeons" shall be given to redeem the first-born son of the poor. He had raised the price so as to equal the difference between a penny and a guinea.

The Roman procurator saw in Jesus only an anarchist and a malecontent, and exhibited him to Herod as a curiosity. The rabbis declare that he is a failure: "He saved others, himself he cannot save," not knowing that "he who would save others can never save himself." The last of the prophets of Israel was broken upon the wheel of custom, charged with treason. A seer whose vision could not be expressed in the terms of the scribes, and whose communion with the Eternal had transcended the range of a groveling ritual, he witnesses this good confession: "For this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I might bear witness unto the truth."

The student of this period described as "Between the Testaments" turns from its contemplation saying with Hausrath: "The history of the Ideal is never the history of the Individual, and has a yet deeper signification than that contained within the efforts and currents of the passing day, an eternal signification and an absolute purport, which belong not to the history of a period, but to humanity, and in which every individual has to reverence a mystery of mercy he also shares."

THOMAS R. SLICER.

THE NEW ORTHODOXY.

THE titles which we have placed below¹ represent an important movement among our "evangelical" churches toward a larger interpretation of their faith. While it does not profess to be an organized departure, and calls itself still by various names, it claims to be doing a valuable work in counteracting the negations and the restless questionings of the hour. It may well interest us as the sincerest attempt yet made to reconcile Orthodoxy with modern thought. The frankness with which the inadequacies of the old faith are recognized, the spirit of freedom which animates all these pages alike, and their ready acceptance, up to a certain point, of the results of Biblical criticism, are refreshing indeed. The generous tone and candid temper of these writers are as marked as their distinguished scholarship and ability within the lines which they have arbitrarily marked out for themselves.

But all these admirable qualities only make us regret the more that it was thought necessary to mark out any lines at all. As contributions to denominational literature, such works are of inestimable value; but whoever is seeking the fullest light on the great religious questions of the hour, or that unfettered discussion of spiritual problems to which the general student of religion is nowadays accustomed, becomes aware at once that these pages are not for him. There is a point in his inquiries beyond which he is not expected to go. No doubt there is a large denominational constituency within the various churches to which it is worth

¹ *The Freedom of Faith.* By Theodore T. Munger. 1883.

Progressive Orthodoxy. By the Editors of the *Andover Review*. 1886.

The New Theology. By John Bascom. 1891.

Who Wrote the Bible? By Washington Gladden. 1891.

while to appeal ; but as there is a still larger constituency without, to which denominational affairs are nothing, while the universal themes of religion are of vast moment, we cannot but wish that their needs also had been taken into account. The single protest which we are inclined to enter against the New Orthodoxy is that it needlessly limits its own influence and scope.

To come at once to details, let us take, for instance, its dealings with the Scriptures. On no one point do these representatives of the new faith seem more perfectly agreed than in accepting the methods and many of the results of modern Biblical criticism. They assume, as frankly as could be asked, that we must get our knowledge of the Bible, not from ancient traditions, but from the Bible itself ; and they assure us that in acquiring this knowledge scientific criticism has been of incalculable value, and has still much to do. Yet no sooner is this position taken, as if with complete cordiality, than certain restrictions begin at once to appear. We hear immediately of "destructive criticism," as something to be greatly deplored, and to be by no means confounded with the true criticism which has done so much good. The name sounds formidable indeed ; but exactly what has it to do with critical science ? Is Biblical criticism never to deny, but always to affirm ? If it sees itself about to destroy anything must it stop ? If so, then it differs essentially from all other critical inquiry, and can afford no positive results whatever. And after all, what is meant by "destructive" ? Fifty years ago it would have seemed in the highest degree destructive to deny the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, or to pronounce the deluge a Chaldaic legend. Shall we give the same meaning to the word to-day ? Is Baur destructive when he denies the genuineness of Second Thessalonians and Colossians, and Luther not destructive when he denies the genuineness of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Epistle of James ? Is modern criticism destructive in placing the Fourth Gospel in the second century, and not destructive in placing the best half of Isaiah at the end of the exile ? We must either accept scientific criticism or reject it ; we may not accept whatever we like or cannot possibly escape, and denounce or weep over the rest. To deny any of its authenticated results is to deny the validity of the whole. To decry "destructive criticism" is to misconceive the whole character of scientific criticism, or, rather, of modern scholarship. A Bible critic is good or bad according to the soundness of his scholarship and the honesty with which he uses it, not according to the results he reaches. To apply any other

test is to rule Biblical criticism, once for all, out of the circle of the sciences, and forego any of the help it renders in interpreting the Scriptures. To try to secure for ourselves all its advantages, while skillfully eluding its inconveniences, is a game worthy of sectarian disputants, but not of scholars. Is it not time for theology, whether new or old, to give up its black-list of "destructive critics"?

The same judgment must be pronounced on the attempt made by the New Orthodoxy to open the Scriptures to modern investigation, and yet assume that their place in the world's literature is altogether exceptional, and that some other than purely natural forces have been at work in producing them. For denominational purposes, of course, such a position is entirely fair; but what claim has it to the name of Biblical science? Science accepts none of its conclusions in advance, even the most fundamental. The uniqueness of the Christian Scriptures, the presence or absence of a supernatural quality, the indications of a divine or of a strictly human origin, are questions of supreme interest to the Christian world. They are far too important to be decided by any off-hand judgment. If critical science is of any validity, it would seem to be of especial value just here. To listen to its voice when its decisions are comparatively trivial, and silence it precisely when it has something to say, is the work of the partisan, not of the real seeker after truth. If it is thought necessary, in order to retain the Christian name, to warn criticism off the field entirely, well and good; only the Christian position becomes then, as the Catholic Church maintains, a matter not of reason, but of unquestioning faith. Nor does it help matters to insist upon *inspiration* as an essential fact, yet give the term so loose a construction that it may mean anything and everything. To announce that the Scriptures, though not infallible, are yet inspired; or that, though the books themselves cannot be considered inspired, yet the writers were certainly inspired men, is only pushing the dreaded question a little further back. If inspiration is assumed on *a priori* grounds, why not infallibility as well? On the other hand, if the claim of infallibility has been investigated and disproved on purely critical grounds, why shall not the claim of inspiration be investigated in the same way? If one is a question of historic fact, so is the other. If inspiration is a vague quality which no one can define, then it makes little difference whether we affirm or deny it; if it has a definite meaning, then historic criticism would seem to be precisely the tribunal to decide upon the facts. Indeed, if

infallibility be once surrendered, it may well be asked what place still remains for inspiration. An inspiration which is liable to error, which utters personal convictions rather than positive truths, which is full of the divine spirit yet not itself divine, is quite intelligible, but how does this differ from the religious faculty as possessed by every spiritual nature? If it does not differ at all, or differs only in degree, why keep up the solemn fiction of a special name? If we may call all religious men inspired, or all spiritual or mental processes supernatural, as these writings seem generously to allow, we shall undoubtedly save many theological prejudices, but how do we serve the cause of truth, or of clear and honest thought? To clamor loudly for the ancient names, after the reality has been virtually abandoned, is not treating seriously the doubts and questionings of earnest thinkers. In point of fact it is quite too late to reserve any Biblical questions as too sacred or occult to be inquired into. Whether permitted or not, critical science, once admitted into the sacred realm, will claim all these questions as its own; and theology can do no wiser thing than to grant it, once for all, absolute entrance into its entire domain.

Another singular phase of the situation, as revealed in the four books named, is the apparent cordiality with which the results of Old Testament criticism are welcomed, and the grave distrust shown towards the criticism of the New. That the Pentateuch, in its present form, was written many centuries after Moses; that the whole priestly legislation, or, in other words, all that we have hitherto considered characteristic of Judaism, belongs to the period after the exile, and was the very human product of Ezra and the scribes; that the monotheistic conception of Deity is found only on the latest pages of the Hebrew Scriptures, and grew out of a primitive polytheistic faith, — all this, if not yet fully accepted, is at least recognized as a legitimate result of historic research. But when the same process of inquiry brings the authorship of New Testament books into doubt; when the book of Acts is shown to give a strangely different picture of historic events from that derived from the Epistles of Paul; when the Fourth Gospel is proved to create an ideal Christ, in place of the human Messiah of Matthew, Mark, and Luke; when the whole Logos idea is traced to extra-Christian sources; and when the miraculous narratives of the Gospels are made to appear as the far-off impressions of events the fresh records or recollections of which had been irretrievably lost, — then serious exceptions are taken to the sufficiency of historical criticism! At once we hear of

certain barriers which no one on any account is to overleap ; and are given to understand that what might be decided on historic evidence, if it happened in the ages before Christ, must be settled on *a priori* grounds if it happened in the time of Christ or after. Yet facts are facts, it is superfluous to say, whether in Jewish history or in Christian. Critical science, if allowed any voice at all, must judge the Gospels exactly as it judges the books of Moses, or the Apocryphal writings. It is not to pronounce "snap" judgments, by any means, or rule steadily against existing beliefs, rather than in their favor ; for this is not the way of science. Critical science will treat every possible question as open until it is closed, and will vent no theological odium on one set of conclusions more than on another. It will not pretend that there are sacred archives which no criticism is to touch, or holy regions of New Testament research where only the elect may enter, or only the spiritually-minded be allowed an opinion. The questions to be answered in New Testament criticism are precisely the same as in Old Testament criticism. "When was this book written, and by whom?" "Is this the writer's idea, or a divine revelation?" "Can these two statements be reconciled, or are they plainly at war with each other?" If it be true, as it certainly is, that on these decisions hang far more momentous results in one case than in the other ; if the authorship of Genesis involves only the primitive character or growth of Judaism, while the authorship of the four Gospels involves the whole fabric of Christian theology, or even the claim of Christianity to be the final and universal religion, then all the more important is it that we get the unprejudiced verdict on all these points of the only impartial tribunal, the tribunal of historic research. All the more important is it that we call the full resources of critical science to our aid, and give that science full and unfettered sweep.

Again it is interesting to note the attitude of the New Orthodoxy towards the ancient creeds. We are so accustomed to see all doctrinal questions withdrawn from general discussion as matters which have been settled once for all, that it is refreshing indeed to find modern methods of inquiry recognized here so cheerfully. Theology, it is freely admitted, is a science, and as such, if it is to take its place beside its sister sciences, is bound like them by scientific methods. This position is so frankly taken in almost all these treatises, and so plainly assumed in all, that we are surprised on coming to close quarters with their doctrinal statements to find the limits so sharply drawn beyond which our

investigations must not go. Theology, it would seem, is a science quite by itself, accepting historical evidence for its subordinate data, but holding its fundamental premises to be altogether above and beyond historical proof. Its unimportant conclusions may be open to scientific investigation; its important assumptions no scientific reasoning must approach. The more sacred the truth, the less carefully must we scrutinize its pretensions. So at least the New Orthodoxy seems to declare.

To be more explicit, while the entire Calvinistic system is calmly thrown overboard as altogether antiquated, the older, so-called œcumenical, creeds are not to be given up, or even recast. But why this distinction, we ask. If Christian theology is to be treated as simply an "evangelical" system, we understand the position, of course; but not if it is in any known sense a science. No doubt the Nicæan and Apostles' Creeds are far simpler and more comprehensive than the Westminster Confession. No doubt Greek theology has a more spiritual tone than the Augustinian, and because of its earlier date avoids many dogmas formulated by later councils, which are offensive to modern thought. It is easy to see why the earlier creeds are preferred nowadays to the later; but why is modern scholarship bound to accept either? If the confessions of the sixteenth or seventeenth century are open to critical tests, why not those of the fifth or fourth? If the Calvinistic or Augustinian dogmas are to be adjudged in the courts of human reason or of historic research, why not the dogma of the Trinity or the Incarnation? What gives Athanasius a higher title to speak for the Christian world than Augustine, or Nicæa than Westminster or Heidelberg or Cambridge? The Catholic Church has its answer ready, of course; but how is it with the Protestant Church, or, what is quite as much to the purpose, how is it with the inquirer after religious truth? Is it supposable that theological scholars, once trained to the habits of modern research, will long continue to accept any limits short of the primitive facts? That these ancient creeds are more than twelve centuries further back than the Calvinism which is so coolly rejected does not alter the fact that they were themselves three hundred or four hundred years distant from the birth of Christianity, and entitled therefore to speak of its teachings only as distant events. Is this belated interpretation of original truths better than the original truths themselves?

No one will deny that these nineteenth century versions of the Atonement, the Incarnation and the Resurrection, are far more

alluring than the mediæval dogmas. Even when they are presented to us, as here, in their most mystic or metaphysical garb, we are quite willing to admit that what is wholly lost upon our prosaic souls may be profoundly significant to more finely organized natures. But granting all this, it cannot be denied that Christianity, whatever it may or may not mean, does imply a certain cycle of literal human events, — the birth, ministry, and life of a certain living being a certain number of years ago. Scientific criticism may have nothing to do with the interpretation of the great doctrinal verities in question, or with their religious significance; but with the primitive facts, which alone give Christian doctrines any meaning, it has everything to do, inasmuch as it is the only instrumentality yet known to the world by which historic truth can be determined. What room is there for the poetic or philosophic imagination, for Greek idealism or Roman dogmatism, or for vague abstractions as to the indwelling God, in the presence of the simple questions: "Was this being naturally or miraculously born?" "Is a supernatural origin ascribed to him by all the New Testament records, or by only two?" "Are these two among the older or the later Christian documents?" "Was the notion, in other words, of the immaculate birth of Jesus of Nazareth a primitive belief when facts were fresh, or only a later addition when memories were dim, and legends already rife?" "Did his own household and those who were nearest him share in it, or only those who had never seen him in the flesh?" "Are his alleged miracles and other evidences of a superhuman career so uniformly attested and based on proofs so positive as to allow of no doubt, or do they show the same mingling of imagination with fact which is to be found in all narratives belonging to an uncritical age?" Before Christianity or its founder can be assigned an exceptional place in history, these questions and similar ones must be answered. What place is there here, I ask, for mysticism or idealism? It is precisely the place where they are not wanted, unless we wish the plain facts to be dimmed or distorted. What we all want is the reality. If this kill poetry, let poetry die; if it starve out sentiment and feeling, let them disappear; if it leave no room for metaphysics, let metaphysics go. But nothing of the kind, as we all know, can happen. Nothing will suffer that really belongs to man's spiritual life. On the contrary, unless man's imagination is greater than God's creative thought, the more true to reality our view of facts, the profounder will be the religious emotion they must needs evoke, and the higher the

spiritual ideals they will awaken. It is a dangerous hour for Christian theology, when it teaches the world to sever its doctrines from historic facts, and leaves its faith at the mercy of human imagination and fancy alone.

The same is to be said substantially of all the ancient doctrines which the New Theology reclothes so skillfully, and presents to us in these volumes in such wealth of mystic or scholastic imagery. Wrap the Atonement, the Incarnation, the Resurrection, Eschatology, in whatever haze of poetic glory one may choose, the final question in each case, to a generation schooled in scientific thought, must needs be one of bare historic fact. "Does the idea of the Atonement, in any form which the church has ever given it, lie in the realities of Jesus' life and words, or only in Paul's rabbinical version of them? If in the latter, what authority for the nineteenth century has this idea more than Paul's notion of the immediate coming of the Lord, or indeed any other figment of first-century theology? Why go beyond the record in the matter of the Atonement, or the Incarnation, any more than in the matter of Biblical infallibility?" The same question must be asked of the New Theology as to Eternal Punishment, or as to any of the doctrines of "Last Things," which are causing such strange distress in our American churches to-day. These are momentous questions, indeed, — whether the soul's destiny is irrevocably determined at death; whether there is a future period of probation; whether immortality is conditional or unconditional; whether those who have never known Christ have any chance of eternal happiness. But on what does all this discussion rest? "Eschatology" is a high-sounding term, indeed, redolent of all sorts of Greek speculation, mediæval scholasticism, and ecclesiastical dogmatism. But stripped of its foreign terminology and reduced to honest English, what has it to tell us, but of certain allusions in the New Testament to a Messianic kingdom, and the coming of its Prince to judge the world? What did the writers mean? Were they speaking of a spiritual kingdom and of a far-off and invisible future, or of an event immediately to occur on earth? Has the Last Judgment any meaning whatever in the New Testament, save as a feature of the Messiah's coming, before "that generation should pass away"? If not, and if that generation passed away eighteen hundred years ago, and if what was then the future is no longer so, what Biblical basis can be claimed for any existing doctrines concerning the future, whether of the Old theology or of the New, however ingenious or edifying they may be

in themselves? These are plain and simple questions, easily answered one way or the other. Theology, in its fury of debate and its hot contentions over the fate of the heathen or the unrepentant sinner, has found little time to answer, if even to ask, them; but there they are, and "eschatology" has but slight meaning until they are answered. If these are anything but pure historical questions, or if they come under any jurisdiction but that of historical criticism, then historical criticism, it seems to us (or historical study, for that matter), has no function at all, and the whole sphere of religion becomes a realm of fads and fancies.

We have alluded once or twice, somewhat disparagingly perhaps, to the mystical tendencies of the New Theology. We are quite aware of the protests that this will arouse. Mysticism, we shall be at once reminded, is an essential element in all religious truth, whether of the nineteenth century or of the first. The deeper the soul's needs, the more mystic will be its cry, or the more mystical at least it will sound to prosaic natures, or to the formal and technical theologian. To all this we fully assent, and trust that this has already been made clear in what we have just said. The higher criticism, when fully understood, will not rule mysticism out of theological discussion; it will simply assign it, very strictly, to its proper place. Religious truth is unquestionably something more and deeper than the bare historic facts from which it starts. It lies in the interpretation of these facts; and for purposes of interpretation all the resources of spiritual insight, of imagination, of poetic sentiment, of philosophical speculation will always come into play. If Christianity has any one claim higher than another upon the world's gratitude, it is in having stirred these nobler faculties so profoundly, and set the race to thinking and dreaming so magnificently. That it should continue to make "old men dream dreams, and young men see visions," and that the latest theology should be as misty and fantastic in its way as any before it, is not strange in itself, and calls for no rebuke. At the same time, if the ages bring any wisdom at all, they should surely have taught us by this time to distinguish the realm of fact from the realm of fancy, and to employ sentiment, not for dimming our vision or mystifying our thought, but for deepening our insight. The New Theology, with its splendid inheritance of ordered thought and trained habits of reasoning and historical discovery, may fairly be called upon to assign to reason and sentiment, to knowledge and hypothesis, their distinct functions, and suffer them no longer to confuse

and demoralize each other. The old theologies, before historical science was born, could not understand this, but no new theology is excusable for not recognizing it. In these days, while poetry must have full rights in its own large domain, it commits a capital offense when it befogs the clear results of scholarly inquiry, or embarrasses by any sentimentality the honest processes of Scripture criticism. There will always be ignorant objectors to critical inquiry, enough and to spare; but it is time that scholars of every name should be banded in its behalf in solid phalanx. *Noblesse oblige*. What is theology for, if not to help religious people to think intelligently on religious themes? What greater wrong can possibly be inflicted on the unlearned multitudes than to persuade them that the higher themes of thought are hazy and unfathomable things, belonging wholly to the realm of vagueness and uncertainty, or that historical criticism can approach established beliefs only as a profane intruder? What excuse is there for still blurring the lines where verifiable facts end and speculation begins?

To no one point do these questions apply so forcibly as to the doctrine which holds the central place in all recent theological discussions, — the nature of Jesus, and his actual relation to humanity. On no theme are these writers more eloquent, nowhere do they seem at first to concede more to modern thought. The reality of the earthly life of Jesus, in its purely human aspects, is brought out with great distinctness. We approach this, the most important question which the Christian believer has to face, with the feeling that it is to be at last fairly and frankly met. Every one knows how easy it is to becloud this matter, how many meanings may be given to the terms "supernatural," "miraculous," "inspired," "divine"; how easy it is to say one thing and seem to say just the opposite. Every one knows the fine points of spiritual truth involved in this decision. Yet every scholar knows how much has been done towards clearing these points, and putting the inquiry on a solid historic basis. Let theologians say what they will, the hour has unquestionably come when the question of the pure and absolute humanity of Jesus can be plainly put, for a definite and unequivocal answer. The world, the Protestant world at least, is prepared to view it in its true light, if only allowed to do so. Nowhere is it more necessary to show the exact position of the question, or to use words in their precise meaning. Nowhere could the New Theology be of nobler service to thinking and truth-loving men than by telling just how much

historical research has established, and how much remains to be determined. At first, as we have said, the writings before us seem ready to do all that we could ask; but what is our disappointment, after the preliminary facts have been handled with impressive freedom, and we are approaching the supreme question itself, to find it suddenly withdrawn from our grasp. Everything else may be asked, but this question of questions, whether Jesus held an exceptional place in the world's history, must not be challenged. But this is the very question which we wish to ask. It is the question which the studies and researches of the hour have prepared the world to ask, and up to which science and philosophy are distinctly leading us. If the New Testament narratives can be explained on natural grounds, by all means let us know it. If humanity can of itself evolve so holy a life, let humanity have the full credit of it. If the birth and growth of Christianity testify, not to a heavenly interposition in man's behalf, but to moral and spiritual capacities belonging to man himself, let this be clearly shown. If a truth at all, this is the most important truth, as it is the most profoundly suggestive, which Christian theology has ever advanced. No key to the mysteries of Christianity is so helpful as the pure and simple humanity of Jesus. It is interesting to see what fascination this thought has for all exponents of our New Theology; how perpetually they recur to it and play about it; how boldly they claim all the advantages of the humanitarian doctrine without avowing the doctrine itself; how constantly they seem just on the point of uttering the last definite and positive word, only to take refuge again in poetry or metaphysics. Meantime the question itself remains a simple one; a question not of metaphysics but of history. The truth, once frankly and plainly stated, proves to involve no dangerous consequences, but rather to simplify and enrich the whole domain of religious thought.

We would not seem to imply that when the humanitarian position has been taken, all enigmas disappear and the whole meaning of Christianity becomes at once clear. Far from it. Once granting that the life of Jesus was wholly human, it remains to bring out its great spiritual significance. It is one thing to show that it was a genuine earthly career, it is quite another to show what quality of humanity it is which could produce so beneficent and lasting an effect upon the world's history. That there was much in the life of Jesus, as in every holy life, which transcends our common thought, and that it affords a unique illustration of the process by which the divine is forever incarnating itself in the

human, we are quite willing to believe. Here is a field for the deepest philosophical insight, and for the loftiest idealism. We are not surprised that the New Theology delights in dwelling upon these truths, and loses itself in mystic exaltation. But how does it help us, just as we begin to comprehend these truths, to have the whole vocabulary of the old theology, or worse, brought in to explain them? How does it help us to dismiss the old-time dogmas of tri-personality, and the like, only to thrust into their place an equally inscrutable something called "Christocentric theology"? How is one inscrutable better than another inscrutable? How is the second-hand scholasticism of the nineteenth century better than the brave and outright scholasticism of the thirteenth? This propensity of all modern theology to invent abstruse or resounding names for its new thoughts is one of the striking features of the situation. Our common phraseology does not satisfy its needs. When too pronounced a literalism or too gross a realism seems to threaten, it takes refuge in a stately terminology. When accused of naturalism, it recovers its grasp of the supernatural by means of ponderous phrases or conspicuous capital letters. As soon as the time lost in evading the consequences of our own conclusions is devoted to an uncompromising following out of those conclusions, the era of clear religious thought will at last be in sight.

Another disappointment awaits us, we have to confess, in the attitude which the New Theology assumes towards science. Apparently accepting the methods and results of scientific inquiry, and even taking account of the doctrine of evolution, it yet betrays great anxiety lest science should approach too near to the ultimate truths of religion. Science is a good thing in its place, we are told, but it must not go too far, and must not loosen our hold upon spiritual phenomena. Naturalism, though excellent to a certain extent, must not go beyond its beat; it must not be too naturalistic. Supernaturalism may be given as wide and vague a meaning as modern thought requires, may even be made to include man's ordinary mental and spiritual operations; but the supernatural itself science must not be permitted to touch. Unfortunately, however, it is not for us to determine, or for any school of theology to determine, how far the natural interpretation of phenomena shall go. It will go as far as its explanations will carry it. Whether man's religious or intellectual nature is subject to regular laws or apart from all laws is one of the questions to be scientifically decided; it is not to be predetermined as an

a priori postulate. The only safe thing for religion to do, if it objects to the full application of scientific criticism, is not to allow it entrance at all, but to reserve the whole field of religion for dogmatic formulæ or transcendental speculation. If religion is to make terms with science and its supreme doctrine of evolution, it must accept all the conclusions of science or none. An evolution which takes no account of the most noteworthy phenomena of human history is no evolution at all. An evolution which confines itself to what happened after Jesus came into the world, and after the Christian religion was born, may be an edifying pulpit hypothesis, but it has no more to do with the scientific theory of evolution than with the Buddhist theory of Nirvana. However gingerly theologians may apply this doctrine for their own purposes, the intelligent believer in it will refuse to recognize it at all, if not in its full scope. The time is quite past when theology can be natural and supernatural, evolutionary and dogmatic, both at once; or when transcendentalism can slip unobserved into the chair of science.

The Transcendental Movement of half a century ago, of which we hear so many familiar echoes in the New Theology of to-day, did a great work for religion. It released many a soul from its bondage to the letter; it restored reason and feeling to their rights; it shattered the old mechanical theory of faith; it gave the spiritual sense once for all its due place in religious experience. The idea of the indwelling God became from that hour too familiar and helpful ever to be wholly lost. But transcendentalism was not the last word in religion, and it is too late now to make it appear so. In its paramount reliance upon intuitive perceptions it created the peremptory demand for verifiable truth which the scientific method has arisen to supply. The exact processes of Biblical criticism and historical science offered themselves at the right time, and found their work waiting to be done. It is plainly impossible to-day to pass off the transcendentalism of our fathers as a new gospel, or to endow it with its old authority over religious thought. Its hour has passed. As a way-station towards the regions of unfettered inquiry, it had its use; as a message to the thinking world, it now sounds strangely antiquated. It serves chiefly to indicate how rapidly theology has advanced in two generations. As we listen again to the words which our fathers found so conclusive, an entire epoch of discovery and experiment seems to thrust itself in between ourselves and them. The old mysticism has not wholly lost its charm;

but it is poetry and symbol now, no longer argument. For better or for worse, the race has entered another spiritual phase, and craves other methods of proof.

It must be confessed that one rises from these theological treatises with a sense of vagueness and indecision, in marked contrast with the assured tone which characterizes other branches of research to-day. Full of earnestness and suggestiveness as they are, they can hardly be accepted as answering the serious doubts and questionings of the day. Too often they seem to take back on one page what is so generously offered on another. From this irresoluteness and inconsequence we can see but one escape; to accept modern methods, if accepted at all, in their full intent; above all, to resign resolutely the term "orthodoxy" in its application to theology, and replace it with the nobler name of "truth."

If there is any one point on which the modern world is agreed, it is in dismissing from all researches in which scholars are engaged the term or the idea of "orthodoxy." So long as any pursuit is avowedly carried on within a certain inclosure, or for a distinct ulterior purpose, the words "heresy" and "orthodoxy" have a rightful use. The Catholic Church, for instance, has an undisputed privilege, if it chooses, to teach history in its colleges and seminaries from Catholic text-books alone, through Catholic instructors, and from the Roman standpoint, taking no account of the various persecutions in which the church has been from time to time engaged, or of the several schisms which have rent its unity. In this case we have orthodox histories, and orthodox historians. A State college in Pennsylvania or Iowa may ordain that Political Economy shall be taught solely in the interest of protection or of free trade; in this case the term orthodox Political Economy would be altogether legitimate. It is not long since a Southern college, if the accounts were correct, decided that science should be taught within its walls in unconsciousness of the Darwinian hypothesis of evolution; and for that latitude "orthodox science" becomes, of course, an appropriate designation. We can imagine a university, or a summer-school of philosophy announcing that by philosophy or ethics must be understood, not utilitarianism or positivism, but an exclusively spiritual or intuitionist system; in which case there would be a truly orthodox philosophy. Under similar circumstances, we might easily have an orthodox botany, physiology, chemistry or anatomy. It will be readily acknowledged, however, that this is not the way in which either of these branches is taught nowadays in any institution of

learning worthy of the name, and it is not likely to be again. Why should there be a difference as we pass from colleges to theological schools, or from science or philosophy into theology? Are we to confess that theology cannot be taught, discussed, or preached on its absolute basis, as a department of the truth universal?

We shall be reminded, perhaps, that the New Theology holds avowedly to the Christian basis, and works within Christian lines. Very good. It is perfectly legitimate for any religious body, whether Christian, Mohammedan or Buddhist, to teach its own doctrines exclusively, and study religion from its own standpoint. We do not contest this for a moment. Yet if either Buddhist or Mohammedan should assume the premises of his faith without proving them, or should invite learned research into his religion while yet assigning limits beyond which no inquirer must go, we should hardly rank such study among scholarly or scientific pursuits. If Christian theology is to cover the great problems which interest the human mind or concern the human soul, it must view them in the full light which modern investigation throws upon them. It may be very interesting to the evangelical student to conceive of God as presented in the earlier creeds, or as revealed exclusively through Christ; but will it be claimed that the idea of God cannot be treated in wider or more absolute relations? To limit religious truth to the œcumenical creeds may be orthodox, but is it, in any large sense, theology? Do orthodoxy and truth go together any better here than in the chemist's laboratory? Or if they do, which is holier, the theological school or the chemist's laboratory? We ask these questions not merely for purposes of criticism, or to say, "If so far, why no farther?" but only in the cause of theological science.

Whoever invokes the name of Science, invokes a great name. He calls to his aid a master, not a servant. Science has its own domain, and in that domain its own laws and its own rights. It cannot be dictated to; it dictates. It suffers no one to assign its limits, but goes wherever there is work for it to do. Wherever there is question of evidence, argument, testimony, or proof, there the scientific method belongs; and once admitted, it must be given full play. For purposes of sectarian controversy, or to defend as long as possible a position in danger of being carried, it may well enough be called in one moment, to be dismissed as an intruder at the next; but not in the large discussion of problems which concern the world of thought. Meantime, let us welcome these half-

way recognitions of the higher criticism as harbingers of the day when theology shall be placed frankly where it belongs, side by side with its sister sciences whose sole interest is the pursuit of truth. Until that time comes, and the name of orthodoxy is heard no more in connection with religious discussions, theology must remain an affair provincial and relatively unimportant. In dogmatic and denominational matters there may still be such a thing as orthodoxy; in theology proper there can be none.

EDWARD H. HALL.

THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN. .

THE Hegelian mode of reading the riddle of the universe, which at present colors much of the general literature on both sides of the Atlantic, and is diffused by professorial lectures at some influential seats of learning, has probably its most important centre of influence in the University of Oxford. Not even in Germany is any university to be found in which the teaching of absolute idealism is at all so predominant as in the schools on the bank of the Isar. There would seem to be some little ground for the saying that when German systems of philosophy die, their ghosts take up their abode at Oxford. Just at the time when the young theologians of Germany began to grow weary of Hegelian idealism, and to turn, by preference, to the spiritual realism of Lotze and to the libertarian views of sin and moral responsibility set forth in the writings of Albrecht Ritschl, Hegelian ideas on ethics and theology were introduced into Oxford by Professor T. H. Green and Mr. F. H. Bradley. A little later Principal John Caird, in his "Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion," presented to English readers the pith of Hegel's treatise on that subject in a very fascinating form. About the same time, or perhaps a little earlier, the definite application of Hegelian ideas to theology passed over to America, mainly through the self-sacrificing efforts of that devoted lover of truth the editor of "The Journal of Speculative Philosophy;" and within the last few years Professor Royce's attractive volume on "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy" has, no doubt, helped to bring American theological thought into fuller contact with what are substantially Hegelian ideas.

In saying that Hegelianism, as a philosophical system, has almost wholly ceased to command the respect and allegiance of the younger German divines and theologians, I do not, of course, mean that the present generation of theological students in Germany is unaffected by Hegelian ideas. On the contrary, there can be little doubt that the narrow individualism of the eighteenth century, which even the Kantian philosophy, profound as it was, proved inadequate to wholly correct, has been effectually banished from the higher thought of our time by that grander and truer conception of the rational unity of the cosmos which we owe to the inspiring thoughts of the great German idealists and preëminently to Hegel. Had it not been for these idealistic speculations Lotze would never have succeeded in his attempt to do full justice at once to the real and to the ideal, to the universal and to the particular, by showing that the Eternal Thought and Will, which differentiates itself in infinite variety in the psychical monads of nature and in the souls of men, ever remains in vital union with each and every individual, and thus interrelates and unifies the whole. The theologians of Germany now see that Hegelian idealism, in its needful but excessive reaction against materialism and individualism, overshot the mark; in asserting that things are but groups of thought-relations, it emptied nature of all that dynamic energy which is at once as necessary for scientific explanation as it is for the play of poetic imagination; and in its doctrine "that the real is the rational and the rational the real" it comes into fatal collision with that indestructible deliverance of the moral consciousness which distinctly declares that willful sin, alike in the view of God and in the view of man, is at once essentially real and essentially irrational.

In Germany the promulgation of the Hegelian philosophy was rapidly followed by the application of these views to theology, and several treatises were written to show that Hegel's views are wholly in accord with the profound theological truths which find expression in the teachings of Paul and of the author of the fourth Gospel, and give these philosophic clearness and unity. So at Oxford Professor Green added to his lectures on ethical and political philosophy other lectures in which he expounded the Pauline and Johannine writings in the light of Hegelian ideas, and he also delivered, on two occasions at least, lay sermons in which he sought to harmonize absolute idealism with religious faith. But notwithstanding Green's vigorous efforts, and the similar attempt of Mr. F. H. Bradley in his "Ethical Studies" to

introduce into Oxford Wilhelm Vatke's views of God and human freedom, this development of Hegelian thought in the theological direction has practically led to nothing. Rather, we should say, it has led to a confession, by those disciples of Green who have entered the ministry of the Anglican Church, that the conclusions of philosophy and the truths of religion are fundamentally at variance, so that the same mind cannot consistently retain both. There is a certain degree of truth in the statement, which one often hears, that the higher mental activity at Oxford at present runs mainly in two directions, toward High Churchism or Ritualism on the one hand, and toward Agnosticism on the other. It must be borne in mind, however, that neither the Ritualism nor the Agnosticism wholly corresponds with the articles vulgarly known under these names. Both Ritualists and Agnostics here are much influenced by Hegelian ideas; and it is evident that Professor Green's strong and noble personality and his great philosophical genius have deeply impressed themselves upon many forms of Oxford thought and life. The negative or indifferent attitude toward definite theological ideas, which appears to widely prevail among the lay tutors and fellows at Oxford, is a very different thing from the agnosticism of the followers of Professor Huxley or Mr. Herbert Spencer. The Hegelian idea of the indivisible unity of subject and object, of thought and reality, underlies most of the speculative discussions which not unfrequently enliven the common rooms of the Oxford colleges; and, therefore, it may with some reason be urged that theories which tacitly recognize the fundamental rationality of the universe have, in strictness, more right to be called "gnostic" than "agnostic."

Still, as I shall presently endeavor to show, the eternal subject or rational principle, which is presupposed in Hegelian accounts of the evolution of the universe, performs merely the function of giving logical unity to the infinite variety of phenomena. Green, it is true, was accustomed to refer to this subjective side of the cosmos as an "eternal consciousness;" but the majority of his followers decline to speak of it as a personal thinker, and are content to regard it as absolute self-evolving thought. It is to be carefully noted, however, that Green and his present disciples are quite at one in insisting that the principle which gives unity to the universe must not be described as in any sense *a causal Will*, and that its causality or activity must on no account be appealed to in explanation of the origin or order of phenomena. In their view, the only possible explanation of the as yet unsolved myste-

ries of the universe is to be sought, not in any assumed volitional energizing of the eternal subject, but exclusively in the more careful study of the perceived relations among phenomena. Hence the eternal subject becomes of no more practical interest to the student of nature or to the student of mind than the gods of Epicurus were to the Epicurean expositors of the cosmos. To the consistent Hegelian, God is simply an inseparable aspect or factor common alike to all physical and mental phenomena, and hence, as is truly and wittily remarked in a recent work by a late student of Balliol, He may, whether in the sphere of science or in that of religion, be safely treated as "*une quantité négligeable*." Though the mental attitude towards religion, which the teaching of Green and of other Hegelians has encouraged at Oxford, is thus very far, in many cases, from being identical with what is usually called theological nescience or agnosticism, yet in regard to vital interest in theology, this is almost as effectually quenched by the Neo-Hegelianism of Oxford as it is by the coarser extinguisher which Mr. Spencer's agnosticism supplies. In the direction of ethics and political philosophy, the disciples of Green have been very active, but in the direction of theology the work remains in the same incomplete and unsatisfactory condition in which the hand of the master left it. Green himself appears to have hoped and believed that his teaching would stimulate not only philosophical but also theological thought; the present activity of his leading followers is far from realizing this anticipation.

The actual barrenness of Hegelian thought in the sphere of religious philosophy is as clearly indicated by the parallel phenomenon which constitutes the other noticeable feature in the mental life of Oxford. Many of the young men who have studied philosophy under Oxford tutors are now prominent High Church clergymen, and are full of zeal in their vocation. Let us see what has been the effect upon them of the mode of philosophizing here dominant. On the one hand it has apparently been successful in convincing them that the philosophy of Green is the only philosophy which can finally justify itself at the bar of reason; but, on the other hand, it has signally failed to satisfy them that such philosophy can adequately account for and effectually meet the moral and spiritual beliefs and aspirations which constitute the essence of religion.

Two years ago a few of the ablest of these Anglican clergymen published, as a kind of manifesto of their position, a volume of essays entitled "*Lux Mundi*," the main object of which was to

show that, though science and philosophy in the course of their developments point, by analogy, to a higher and special revelation, they are of themselves wholly incompetent to furnish a true and satisfying idea of God and his relation to humanity, and require to be supplemented by that special Incarnation of God which is supposed to have been given in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Thus the late Canon Aubrey Moore, by far the most powerful thinker among these essayists, writes in his essay on "The Christian Doctrine of God : " —

" We find ourselves, in the present day, face to face with two different views of God, which though they constantly, perhaps generally, overlap, and even sometimes coincide, yet imply different points of view, and by a process of abstraction can be held apart and contrasted with one another. Many devout Christians are philosophers and men of science ; many men of science and philosophers are devout Christians. But the God of religion is not the God of science and philosophy. Ideally, every one will allow that the religious idea of God and the scientific and philosophical idea of God must be identical ; but in actual fact it is not so, and in the earlier stages of the development of both, there is a real antagonism. To accept this antagonism as absolute is, by a necessary consequence, to compel one to give way to the other. We cannot long hold two contradictory truths. We find ourselves compelled to choose. We may have Religion or Philosophy, but not both. . . . The religious idea of God may, of course, become philosophical without ceasing to be religious. If there is to be a religion for man as a rational being, it must become so. But there is a point beyond which, in its desire to include philosophy, religion cannot go. It cannot afford to give up its primary assumption of a moral relationship between God and man. When that point is surrendered or obscured the old religious terms become increasingly inapplicable, and we find ourselves falling back more and more on their supposed philosophical equivalents, the 'Infinite' or the 'Absolute,' or the Universal Substance, or the Eternal Consciousness, or the First Cause, or the Omnipresent Energy. But these terms, which metaphysicians rightly claim, have no meaning for the religious consciousness ; while in metaphysics proper 'God' is as much a borrowed term as 'sin' is in non-religious ethics. Moral evil is 'sin' only to those who believe in God ; and the Infinite is only 'God' to those to whom it suggests a superhuman personality with whom they are in conscious relation. Even when religion and philosophy both

agree to speak of God as 'the Infinite,' for the one it is an adjective, for the other a substantive. The moment we abandon the idea of God as personal, religion becomes merged in philosophy, and all that properly constitutes religion disappears. God may exist for us still as the keystone in the arch of knowledge, but He is no longer, except as a metaphor, 'our Father, which is in heaven.'"¹

In several sentences of these extracts we might almost fancy that it is the voice of Dr. Martineau to which we are listening, were it not for the important difference that this distinguished thinker would not dream of setting up such an antithesis between philosophy and religion. With Dr. Martineau, a philosophy which deserves the name must not ignore or violate, but rather accept and seek to interpret, the fundamental facts of man's moral and spiritual experience. Aubrey Moore himself admits that "ideally" philosophy and religion must accord; surely, then, his proper course was not to disparage and condemn philosophy in general, but simply to indicate the points in which the dominant Oxford philosophy falls short of the philosophical ideal. It is clear, too, from an admirable volume of philosophical criticism from Aubrey Moore's sole hand, that he knew perfectly well that at least two eminent recent thinkers, Professor Lotze and Dr. Martineau, had given to the world systems of philosophy wholly free from the anti-religious character which he inconsiderately imputes to all philosophy. Nor can it be doubted that Professor Green was essentially at one with Dr. Martineau in repudiating all attempts to call in a special and exceptional revolution as a kind of *Deus ex machina* to extricate humanity from the awkward dilemma in which reason and philosophy have left it. If Canon Moore is correct (as I am inclined to think he is) in his contention that Green's modified Hegelianism is not capable of being harmonized with generally accepted facts of consciousness, then the course which all consistent disciples of Green are bound to take is perfectly clear. Either they must maintain that the ordinary views of Christians concerning "sin" and the immediate personal action of God on the human spirit turn out, on close examination, to be mere illusions, or they must so revise and reconstruct their master's philosophy as to make it capable of entertaining and interpreting these most important features in human experience. The prevailing tendency in non-ecclesiastical circles in Oxford appears to be in favor of accepting the former

¹ *Luz Mundi*, pp. 59 ff.

of these alternatives. But there are not wanting indications that the tide is on the turn, and that the weighty reasons adduced by Professor Andrew Seth, in his "*Hegelianism and Personality*," for seceding from the Hegelian school of thought are meeting with a response in many minds. Fascinating as absolute idealism is when we first make its acquaintance, it does not often succeed in retaining an abiding hold on the convictions. It is in connection with the *moral* consciousness that the most serious doubts of its validity force themselves on the attention. As Dr. Fraser says, at the close of his treatise on Berkeley, "*The Hegelian seems to claim, as attainable philosophy, an intuition of the rational articulation of the universe of things and persons in the unity of the creative thought. This, if really attained, would eliminate mystery from our physical and moral experience, and convert philosophy into absolute science. If it has fulfilled its promise, it has translated all faith into rationalized thought. But I cannot find that this all-comprehensive system really tallies with the experience which it is bound to formulate adequately, and also to explain; or that it has yet got so far as to solve even so clamant a difficulty as the existence within the universe of immoral agents and moral evil. We ask for intellectual relief for moral difficulties, and we are offered the 'organization of thought.' We look for bread and we find a stone.*"

If it be the fact that both our own ethical consciousness and the existence of so much moral evil in society present a problem which the Hegelian, with his dictum that "*the real is the rational and the rational is the real*," seeks in vain to satisfactorily solve, a most interesting and important question arises: Did Professor Green himself at all realize this most serious difficulty? It would seem from his statements in his "*Prolegomena to Ethics*" that he considered that his philosophy could be harmonized with the existence of genuine moral responsibility and with the consequent existence of individual merit or demerit. There is, however, some reason to think that — at all events in the last few years of his life — he was not altogether satisfied with the extreme idealist philosophy. We find him at times, for instance, using Kantian phraseology, such as in calling the spirit of man "*a free Cause*," — a mode of expression which appears to be quite foreign to consistent idealism. The great interest, too, which he showed in introducing Lotze's views to English readers is also significant. Some of his disciples say that this was because he regarded an acquaintance with Lotze's ideas as a valuable preparation for the

study of Hegel. This, however, can hardly have been the case, for Lotze, both in his moral and in his religious philosophy, puts his finger with admirable precision on the weak points of the Hegelian system, and shows that in these points it comes into vital antagonism with the moral and spiritual consciousness of mankind. The probability that Green in his later years was not wholly at ease as to the feasibility of reconciling his idealism with ethical facts is increased by a statement I recently heard made by a distinguished philosopher, whose writings are well known and highly esteemed in England and in America. This gentleman, who enjoyed personal intimacy with Green, said that it was evident from Green's language in private conversation that he was by no means completely satisfied with the account which his philosophy gave of the mode of development of human character; it seemed to him likely that, had Green lived longer, he would have come to much the same estimate of Hegelianism as that now reached by Professors Andrew and James Seth.

Whether Green was or was not fully convinced that his philosophical system dealt successfully with ethical and spiritual facts, there appears to be no room for doubt that, while his views have stimulated his disciples to much activity of thought in the direction of ethics and social reform, they have at the same time, in some degree, weakened or destroyed the preëxisting interest in theology. To the religious mind, then, it is a question of the highest moment whether the idealist philosophy of Green, or the much more definitely theistic teaching of such thinkers as Dr. Martineau and the late Professor Lotze has the stronger claim upon the convictions of reflective minds. If the former win the general assent of society, it may, so far as I am able to see, be reasonably expected that what is now called Christian theism will not much longer retain any strong hold upon the cultured classes, and that the present assemblages for prayer and devotion will gradually give place to societies for the purpose of ethical culture. The importance of this subject makes it desirable that I should dwell somewhat more fully on those factors of Green's philosophy which I have already indicated as being, in my view, fatal to its permanent acceptance. But before entering upon the ungracious task of hostile criticism, I must express my earnest assurance that, though absolute idealism does not make good its claim to be the "ideal" philosophy, Green's writings are so aglow with warm and noble human sympathies, so plentifully besprinkled with gems of good sense and of ethical and political wisdom, that it

is impossible to read them without feeling admiration for the writer, and gaining inspiration and benefit from mental companionship with a spirit so pure and so wholly devoted to truth and to humanity.

In dealing with absolute idealism, the first question which logically presents itself is the mode in which this philosophy regards Nature. Here I can only glance at the doctrine that the reality of the objective world entirely depends on its being thought by some self-consciousness. To the *monism* of Green's philosophy — the doctrine, that is, that the only ultimate reality is spirit, and that matter as a substance distinct from spirit has no existence — for my own part I have no objection to offer. Nay, I hold that there are respectable grounds for maintaining, with Lotze, that not only human spirits but also the countless centres of energy which constitute the cosmos are best described as infinitely varied differentiations of the eternal self-subsisting Spirit, which take their origin from his voluntary self-restraint and self-limitation, but which are of the same essential nature as the source whence they proceed, and in whom they have their being and their mutual relations. But when idealists go further, and say that all the objects of the external world have no other reality than that which is conferred by their being thought about by some self-consciousness, I cannot but think that they come into hopeless collision with indubitable facts. Not only do they by this mode of exposition empty nature of that *dynamic* character which is as indispensable for science as it is for art and poetry, but they necessarily exclude from the sphere of reality a class of facts, namely, the feelings of animals, which every one but the idealist regards as equally real with the sensations of the self-conscious man. Green himself admits that in all probability animals low down in the biological scale possess nothing corresponding to what we call thinking; are, then, their pains and pleasures only real as they become objects of cognition by God or man? Simply as felt by the animals themselves, says Green, these feelings are not real in any intelligible sense. Surely, Green's definition of reality would find little favor with societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, and it has little chance of being indorsed by the calm reflection of mankind.

But not only does the absolute idealist empty nature of all force or energy, it is a matter of far more consequence that he virtually deprives both the spirit of man and the spirit of God of every other activity or function except that of cognition. It is

true that in his view the Eternal Spirit is indivisibly united with that infinite tissue of changing sensations and ideas which are supposed to constitute the reality of the external world ; but in this system of philosophy it is not conceivable that the subject which has the ideas, and by having gives them an intelligible unity, should, as subject, act upon and control the ideas which he has. The vital difference between this idealist view of the activity of the subject and the view of mankind in general may, perhaps, be made clearer by a concrete example. We are every day aware of the fact that successions of ideas — good, bad and indifferent — are passing through our consciousness, and we are also aware of another fact, namely, that by a mental act of our own true self, which we call *an act of attention*, we can, to a large extent, control the character of the ideas and emotions of which we are successively conscious. For instance, by omitting to attend to some ignoble or selfish idea, or by attending to some nobler accompanying one, we can, to a large extent, cause the former idea to die away without bringing any similar unworthy visitors in its train ; and, in like manner, by attending to such an evil state of our consciousness we may insure the entrance of a troop of kindred imaginations, and thus by our free act degrade and debase our character. By virtue of this grand faculty of attention, which the subject possesses, the development of our character is, in large measure, left at our own disposal, and we thus become responsible for the moral beauty or ugliness which it gradually assumes. Accordingly, the ordinary consciousness of mankind, I venture to say, distinctly declares that this all-important act, or function, of attention really belongs to the subject, or self, which has the ideas, and not to the objects of the subject's thought, — not, that is, to the succession of ideas which the subject is conscious of having.

Now it is characteristic of the idealist thinker that he exactly inverts this explanation. In his view what is called attention to an idea is not to be referred to any active function of the self, or subject, which has the idea, but simply means that the idea to which we are said to attend happens to be more vivid or interesting than any one of the immediately-preceding or attendant ideas.¹ Accordingly, the prominence and consequent influence of any particular idea does not, in the Hegelian view, at all depend upon the activity or inactivity of the thinking subject, but solely upon the

¹ See, for a full exposition of the idealist's view of Attention, an article by Mr. F. H. Bradley, entitled "Is there any Special Faculty of Attention ?" in *Mind* for July, 1886.

relations between the idea in question and the rest of the mind's mental furniture. It would be difficult to overestimate the ethical and religious consequences which are necessarily involved in this inversion of the ordinary reading of the act of attention. If a man's true self possess no function of attending, but simply takes intellectual cognizance of the successive processes which go on in his inner life, what conceivable responsibility can we lie under for the development of character? A man certainly *knows*, on this theory, what direction his character is taking; but as to any power of controlling the flow of his ideas and emotions, this is, from the Hegelian point of view, wholly out of the question, for the causal activity of the self, which is indispensable for such control, is declared by Green to be an unmeaning fiction. The subject knows, and by knowing unifies his successive and simultaneous ideas; but the active changes, which go on in the groups of ideas, are determined wholly, not by the will of the subject, but by the principles of association and succession among the ideas themselves.

In thus denying to the subject the function of attention, the idealist, I believe, strikes a fatal blow at sound theology as well as at sound anthropology. For as the active function of the human self is thus limited to knowing what changes proceed in consciousness, so, in like manner, the function of the Eternal Self, or God, is equally limited. Hence it is that, in Green's view, the ascription of causal activity to God becomes an unintelligible statement. It is in God's ideas, and not in God's power of directing and giving practical effect to ideas, — in a word, it is in the relations of *thought* and not in the act of the *thinker*, — that the idealist makes the activity of God to lie. Thus to the true self of God as to the true self of man practically nothing more is left than the mere capacity of being passively aware of the mental processes which take place in consciousness. This logical result of absolute idealism reminds us of similar speculative extravagances in the more extreme German mystics. Thus Angelius Silesius writes: —

Wir beten "Es gescheh', mein Herr und Gott, dein Wille,"
Und sieh, Er hat nicht Will'; Er ist ein' ew'ge Stille,

which Professor Max Müller translates as follows, —

We pray, "O Lord our God, do Thou thine Holy Will,"
And see, God has no Will; He is at peace and still.¹

This insistence on God's *thought* to the utter exclusion of any real recognition of God's *will* lands Green, as it does every other

¹ *Deutsche Liebe*, edited by Professor Max Müller.

absolute idealist, in most serious difficulties when he comes to deal with the reality of the human consciousness and its relation to the consciousness of God. If the ultimate reality be the indivisible unity of the eternal self-consciousness and the sum-total of ideas which that self-consciousness embraces and knows, it becomes wholly inconceivable that this Eternal Being should originate other self-conscious beings in some way distinct from himself. The activity of thought may give rise to other *thoughts*, but it is, from the nature of the case, impossible that it should give rise to other *thinkers*. Hence one naturally looks with the greatest interest at what Green has to say concerning the genesis of individual souls. We learn from the "Prolegomena to Ethics" that the origin of the individual is as follows. When, in the course of the development of God's ideas, — which stand for what in realistic parlance is called the evolution of nature, — that particular physical organism, which we name the human body, appears, then God's eternal self-consciousness *reproduces* itself in connection with this body. He says: "Our consciousness may mean either of two things; either a function of the animal organism, which is being made gradually and with interruptions, a vehicle of the eternal consciousness; or that eternal consciousness itself, as making the animal organism its vehicle and subject to certain limitations in so doing, but retaining its essential characteristic as independent of time, as the determinant of becoming, which has not and does not itself become" (p. 72).

How, I ask, is this to be distinguished from the most thorough-going pantheism? Is this eternal self-consciousness, which in union with a physical organism constitutes an individual soul, a consciousness in any way distinct from God's consciousness? If it is, then God has called into existence another thinker whose inner life is to some extent, at least, other than that of the original thinker. We have seen, however, that Green's fundamental conception of God and reality renders such a creation entirely inconceivable and absurd. Accordingly, we learn from many passages in Green's writings that, though he often speaks of God's act of reproducing himself in connection with physical organisms, he really does not mean that the so-called "reproduction" is anything else than a phase of God's own eternal consciousness under the limiting conditions of a particular organic structure. In other words, while God's consciousness, in one aspect, embraces the whole range of ideas which constitute the objects of His thought, — in another aspect, it breaks up into a variety of limited phases,

owing to the peculiar nature of those various groups of ideas, which science is accustomed to call physical organisms. But the reader may perhaps say, What does it really matter to us, if what seems to us to be our separate self-consciousness is, after all, only a mode of the consciousness of God limited by certain so-called organic conditions? To this I should reply, Perhaps it would be of no great consequence, if we had nothing but an intellectual nature and were not aware that we are also moral beings, conscious at times of being in more or less complete antagonism to the eternal consciousness; conscious, in short, of a state of alienation from God, in which we cherish desires and put forth acts of will, which we at the same time know to be neither lovable nor admirable when seen from the rational or universal point of view. Once let it be understood that my individuality simply means that the eternal consciousness is using my physical frame as its vehicle and its limitation, and it necessarily follows that "sin" can have no ontological reality. Man is no longer a child of God, capable through moral freedom of obeying or resisting the will of the Father within him; he becomes in reality a mere phase of that Father's life. As a being with a certain psychological history, he may seem to fall short of his ideals and so to be guilty of sin; but idealism teaches us that this is an imperfect and abstract view of him; it is treating his psychological history as if this were something apart from the eternal consciousness. Looked at truly and philosophically, man, alike in his nobleness and in his baseness, is simply an inevitable and indispensable mode of the eternal life of God.

Hegelianism and Christian theism recognize in common the fact that man, though in one sense a finite being, is yet able, by virtue of the immanence in his nature of the Infinite and Eternal One, to rise above himself, and to pass more and more into sympathetic union with the indwelling Spirit of the Universe. But it makes a momentous difference in the whole tone and character of our religious philosophy, whether we regard God's self-revealing presence in the soul, in the form of our higher reason and our moral ideals, as the presence of a supreme Personality in a certain sense distinct from our personality, or whether, on the other hand, we conceive of ourselves as, in one aspect, human and finite, but, in another aspect, identical with God, the self-existing, self-evolving thought. The distinction between these two views makes all the difference between the pantheistic speculations which abound in Indian thought and have their finest intellectual expression in the

Upanishads, — speculations which regard sin as having no absolute reality, but merely a relative meaning due to the imperfection of our human standpoint, — and the Hebraic and Christian consciousness that regards sin as an essential reality, which, while it remains, excludes the sinner from spiritual union with God.

The essentially pantheistic character of Green's theology still further reveals itself in the account which he gives of the "Will and its freedom." Let me here request my readers to look into their own consciousness and ask themselves what are the facts of which we are aware, when in a crisis of temptation we come to a decision which ennobles or degrades our character. We are conscious, I think, in the first place, that what our character at the time is determines what our temptations are. That which is a temptation to one man is no temptation to another man in a different stage of ethical development. But while our character determines the nature of our temptations, we are, I believe, clearly conscious that it is not the character, but *the self which has the character* to which the ultimate moral decision is due. In every moral crisis of a man's life he rises in the act of moral choice above his own character, envisages it, and passes moral judgment on the springs of action or desires which he feels present within him; and it is because a man's true self can thus transcend and judge his own character, that genuine moral freedom and moral responsibility become possible and actual. As Dr. Martineau in his "Study of Religion" pertinently says, "Besides the motives felt and besides our formed habits or past self, there is also a *present self* that has a part to perform in reference to both." "Is there not," he asks, "a *causal self* over and above the *caused self*, or rather the *caused state and contents* of the self left as a deposit from previous behavior? Is there not a *judging self*, that knows and weighs the competing motives, over and above the *agitated self that feels them*? The *impulses* are but phenomena of your experience; the *formed habits* are but a condition and attitude of your consciousness, in virtue of which you feel this more and that less: both are *predicates* of yourself as subject, but are not yourself, and cannot be identified with your personal agency. On the contrary, they are *objects of your contemplation*; they lie before you to be known, compared, estimated; they are your data; and you have not to let them alone to work together as they may, but to deal with them, as arbiter among their tendencies" (Vol. ii. p. 227, first edition).

This powerful passage appears to me to give a perfectly ac-

accurate reading of our moral consciousness; and it involves the activity of a metaphysical or noumenal self which *has*, and not *is*, the various ideas and habits which make up its character. Now in Green's refusal to recognize the existence of this *true causal self*, which has the character, we find the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* which vitiates, more or less, the whole of his ethical and religious philosophy. Such a self, on the existence of which Kant emphatically insists (but for an accurate and consistent account of which we must look to Dr. Martineau), the Hegelian will have none of. But apart from the activity of such a causal self, no exposition of our moral consciousness can be other than a perversion of the facts. Let us see, then, how Green explains man's freedom of moral choice when the reality and causality of this personal self are omitted. In Green's view, the character is the man, and the expression of the character is the will or moral decision. In his essay on "The Sense of Freedom in Morality," he says "Man being what he is, and the circumstances being what they are at any particular conjuncture, the determination of the will is already given just as an effect is given in the sum of its conditions. The determination of the will might be different, but only through the man's being different." This, I submit, seems about as thorough-going determinism as could well be found in philosophical literature, and yet Hegelians are fond of asserting that the very essence of their ethical teaching is the doctrine of man's moral freedom. What, then, is the Hegelian method of reply, when the unsophisticated reader asks, whether, on this theory, he could have decided, in any moment of temptation, otherwise than he actually did; and if he could not, whether he is a fitting subject for praise or blame? To this very natural question Green's reply is, "Put in that shape, your question cannot be answered;" and he proceeds to point out to the inquirer that in what is called the physical world, the causation, as he terms it, is mechanical; that bodies move because other bodies necessitate their movement; and this kind of causation, he says, is properly called *determinism*. But, he continues, if you look into your inner consciousness you will find that your character does not express itself in a certain way because it is extrinsically forced so to do; the choice is the spontaneous outcome of your own nature, and therefore in that act of choice you have escaped altogether from the fetters of necessity; and it is this mode of action which is properly called *moral freedom*. The libertarian inquirer will naturally reply, "I see clearly enough the distinction you draw, but still I do not see

that in this moral freedom, as you depict it, there is involved any conceivable *alternative*." Green's answer to this is, that to ask for an alternative in such choices is to forget that an unmotivated determination is inconceivable, and to recur to the exploded error that the self is something more than the unity of the states of consciousness.

For myself, I cannot understand how a doctrine of moral freedom *which allows of no alternative*, which declares that it is inconceivable that a man in a moment of temptation should be able to decide otherwise than he actually does, can with any propriety be regarded as a doctrine of moral freedom at all. If there is no alternative; if the actual course taken is under the circumstances the only possible course, then all ground for the ascription of praise or blame is taken away, and Hegelian moral freedom turns out to be only our old friend Necessity in a somewhat new-fashioned guise. It appears, then, that in Green's moral theory there is not the slightest possibility or conceivability of any man's character developing in any other direction than that in which it really develops. It is *conscious* growth it is true, and therefore in that respect unlike *unconscious* growth; but in so far as this question of moral freedom is concerned, the reproduction of God under organic conditions passes through an inevitable process of development just as completely as does the physical organism which forms its corporeal vehicle. If Green's philosophical system is compatible with the reality of moral freedom at all, — which appears to me exceedingly doubtful, — such freedom has certainly no application to the separate groupings of ideas, emotions, and desires by which one human individual is distinguished from another; it must be the sole privilege of that eternal principle of thought which finds its various modes of limited expression in our individual lives.

Space permits but a glance at two other features in Green's philosophy which have a bearing on theological ideas. First; There is no room in his theory of God and man for the direct causal action of the Spirit of God on the human spirit. In the remarkable lay sermon on "Faith," in which Green's intense ethical and religious consciousness most earnestly, but, it seems to me, ineffectually strives to adequately express itself through the intellectual medium of the Hegelian philosophy, he writes: "Though it is a mistake to identify the causation of any phenomenon with its antecedent in time, yet it is vain to seek for it elsewhere than in conditions, of which each is itself conditioned and,

as related to sense, sensibly verifiable. A proposition which asserts divine causation for any phenomenon is not exactly false, but turns out on analysis to be unmeaning." But surely the spiritual intuitions which issue from the mouth of the prophet, and the consciousness of divine response which arises in the moments of truest devotion, are all psychological phenomena. Did Green, then, mean to maintain that it is in vain to seek the cause of these phenomena elsewhere than in their relations to other psychological phenomena? He certainly did *not* so mean; for he tells us a little later that what he has been saying does not touch that "relation of the inner man to a higher form of itself of which the expression is to be found, not in the propositions of theology, but in prayer and praise." Yet certainly this relation between the soul and the Father within it implies the causal action of God in the spirit of man, and hence we have clearest internal evidence that God is something more than the principle of thought which cognizes and unifies all phenomena; and I venture to think that the doctrine which assigns phenomenal effects to immediate divine causation may turn out, on strict analysis, to be so far from unmeaning as to be rather the fundamental tenet of a sound religious philosophy.¹

A word or two must be devoted to the bearing of Green's doctrine on the question of Immortality. In the third volume of his works there is a curious little fragment on this subject which only covers about a page, but which indicates the substance of what he has to say in this connection. There is nothing in this fragment at all novel to those who have any familiarity with Hegelian ways of thinking. By virtue of that indivisible union of the finite and the infinite — of the human and the divine — which is present in our consciousness, man in the act of knowledge transcends the succession of phenomena of which he takes cognizance. As the knowing subject, he shares the timeless being of God. As the whole succession of phenomena — past, present, and to come — forms the indivisible eternal object to the eternal subject, God, it follows that everything, as being a determination of thought, is eternal. The living agent man, says Green, is therefore eternal as a factor in the objects of divine thought. But it is to be noticed that Green has before assured us that the indi-

¹ Consult, on this all-important subject of Causation, which Professor Royce truly says holds "a very subordinate position" in his school of thought, the exceedingly weighty chapter on "God as Cause" in Dr. Martineau's *Study of Religion*, vol. i.

vidual soul is a reproduction of the eternal consciousness under the limiting conditions of a physical organism. When, then, this physical organism which is only a phase in the objective of God's eternal thought gives place to other phases, what becomes of the individual man? So far as I can see, he ceases to exist as an individuality: the eternal self-consciousness ceases in his case to limit itself by this particular organic vehicle; and so all that constitutes the special consciousness of the individual is lost and merged in the eternal and infinite consciousness. He still exists, no doubt, in the eternal objective of God's thinking, but, as an individual consciousness, he is a transient phenomenon, which has passed away. In denying to the individual man a distinct metaphysical self which thinks and acts, Hegelianism implicitly denies to him, likewise, a personal immortality.

I contend, then, that it is impossible to harmonize the absolute idealism of Green, first, with the sense of sin and of personal merit and demerit; second, with the spiritual experience of the action of the Spirit of God on the inner life of man; and, lastly, with the rational hope of a continued individual existence after physical death. The alternative between Hegelianism and Christian theism appears to finally resolve itself into the question, Do the facts of man's ethical and spiritual consciousness support that doctrine which represents the human soul as having a real self to which is delegated such a degree of independent causality and freedom of choice as enables it, in the great crises of life, either to coöperate with, or to resist the injunctions and invitations of the indwelling Father, and thus to voluntarily advance or retard the moral and spiritual end for which the universe exists? Or, on the other hand, does calm reflection on the facts of our inner life warrant the conclusion that our individual consciousness is but a transient phase of the eternal consciousness of God, and that, therefore, in the words of Professor Royce: "For the Infinite, then, the question, 'Is there anything better than what exists?' must be nonsense. For Him the actual and the possible fall together in one truth; and this one truth cannot be evil"?¹

There is in our intellectual nature an instinctive impulse and craving to unify all the phenomena of nature and of human life, to try to show that they are so logically interrelated that the existence of any one phenomenon implies and, therefore, explains and necessitates all the rest. But it may well be questioned whether in the case of the Absolute Idealist this appetite for logical unity

¹ *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 445.

has not been indulged till it has overborne the equal or higher claims of our ethical and spiritual insight. The characteristic doctrines of this philosophical school are, it seems to me, of a kind only to be enjoyed as speculative luxuries in academic seclusion or the quiet of the study. There, for a brief season, the student may persuade himself that Nature has no reality save in the thought that thinks it, but this "metaphysic dream" can hardly fail to vanish away when we find ourselves actually breasting the winds and the waves, or toiling up the mountain steep, and with the blows of our geologic hammer disinterring the skeletons of our predecessors on the globe. So, too, in the case of the far more momentous ethical question: in quiet intellectual moods, we may, perchance, fondly imagine that we and all things are but phases of manifestation in the inevitable evolution of self-existent, eternal thought. But no sooner do we find ourselves in living contact with practical life and its moral problems, than we wake from this "metaphysic dream" also, and the conviction forces itself upon us that there exists much, both in our own character and in the character of many around us, which need not have been; and in respect to which we feel that it would have been both better for society and more acceptable to God if it had never been.

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OXFORD.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

IN presenting to the public the first number of a new review, devoted to Religion, Ethics and Theology, the members of the Editorial Board believe that they are occupying a field that has thus far been vacant. There are, indeed, in America and England many theological reviews, some of them of great merit. So far as we are aware, however, they are either limited in their range of theological topics, or conducted in the interest of some special form of belief. Articles not within this prescribed range or out of harmony with this form of belief are naturally excluded from these reviews. Many periodicals, chiefly devoted to secular matters, also admit occasionally articles of a religious or theological character, and here greater diversity of utterance is allowed. As a general rule, the serious writer on theology finds these periodicals closed to him. This is especially true in the case of important topics which demand generous space for their proper treatment, and which have no immediate bearing upon the events of the hour. We believe, therefore, that there is a place for a periodical that shall be hospitable to progressive, scientific thought in religion, theology, and ethics considered in relation to religion.

While we trust that the contributions to "The New World" will show that the authors are animated by a common spirit, we are not solicitous to avoid differences of thought. One of the fundamental ideas upon which this review is based is that persons whose theological positions are unlike may freely state what from their respective standpoints appears to them to be the truth. In the present number, for instance, we have two articles, the first and the third, which present, from within, certain aspects of what has been loosely called "the new orthodoxy," while the eighth article criticises it from without.

We encourage such diverse presentations, not from indifference to the truth, but from the love of it. We are not distrustful of the power of truth to win the victory in a free and candid comparison of convictions by those who, with faces turned toward the light, are seeking by different ways a sound theology, an inspiring religious faith, and a rational groundwork for ethics.

While freedom of speech will be encouraged here, and each of our contributors will be responsible for his own utterances, and for these only, "The New World" will, necessarily, have a plan and limits of its own. We believe in liberty, but we believe also in a "law of liberty." We do not contemplate a periodical in which matters that concern religion shall be debated by the able and the unable, the reverent and the irreverent, the rational and the irrational. Our object is to obtain from strong and clear-sighted writers the expression of their ripe scholarship and their mature convictions. This review will thus be devoted to what may be called, or to what may at least some time become, the science of religion; and we trust that its discussions will be characterized by the scientific spirit.

We have no distrust of the scientific temper which in many spheres of investigation has accomplished such great results; or of the critical spirit which has led the way to a better understanding of every literature to which it has been applied. In the new world of modern thought the application of scientific and critical methods to the study of the Bible and of theology is not only inevitable, it is in the highest degree desirable in the interest of religion itself. Here as elsewhere "The thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns."

The comparative study of all the faiths of the world has already proved one of the most effectual means to a just understanding of Christianity. "The New World" will give special attention to the history of religions; and we hope to print in every number one article at least dealing with some aspect of this great subject.

We have included ethics among the topics to which this review will be devoted. In this direction it will not attempt to cover the field occupied by the recently established "International Journal of Ethics." It will treat ethical subjects, for the most part, from the point of view of religion; and discussions of pure ethical theory will not occupy much of its space. The new "Philosophical Review," in like manner, opens its pages freely to competent writers on metaphysics; and in this province we shall need to deal with philosophy chiefly as it is related to religion. The great social problems of our time we cannot neglect. We shall leave, however, to the "Political Science Quarterly," the "Quarterly Journal of Economics," and similar reviews the detailed discussion of such questions from the political and economic point of view. "The New World" will emphasize their ethical and religious aspects.

In conclusion, we will state that the time for the preparation of the present number has been short; accordingly, it does not present any articles from the scholars of Continental Europe of whose sympathy we are assured, and the survey of current periodical literature in our field is necessarily omitted. But we have already been greatly encouraged in our undertaking by the expressions of interest and promises of coöperation that we have received from able and distinguished writers, at home and abroad, representing various denominations, or unconnected with any religious organization. Our June issue is expected to contain articles by E. Benjamin Andrews, Julius Wellhausen, Mrs. Humphry Ward, Francis Tiffany, P. S. Moxom, Josiah Royce, and Minot J. Savage. In addition to the writers in our first two numbers, we have reason to expect early contributions, among others, from James Martineau, T. K. Cheyne, C. R. Lanman, James Bryce, C. P. Tiele, A. V. G. Allen, John W. Chadwick, R. Heber Newton, E. C. Smyth, Francis E. Abbot, Charles A. Briggs, J. P. Peters, and E. E. Hale.

CHARLES CARROLL EVERETT.

CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY.

ORELLO CONE.

NICHOLAS PAINE GILMAN.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Essays, Reviews, and Addresses. By JAMES MARTINEAU, LL. D. Selected and revised by the Author. Four volumes. London and New York : Longmans, Green & Co. Each, \$2.50.

In his essay on Sir William Hamilton, Dr. Martineau speaks of the "most dignified and significant act of a professor's career, the gathering together of his scattered stores, and the transference of them from the class-room to the world." This most dignified and significant act Dr. Martineau performed when he brought out his "Types of Ethical Theory" and "Study of Religion;" which were, in the main, the rich courses of thought he had traversed with his pupils. But he had other stores scattered more widely, in the form of essays, reviews, and addresses, and these, too, he has now gathered in four goodly volumes. There are yet other sheaves heavy with wheat, which, for some reason, he has discarded in the final harvest; these essays and addresses, ample in learning, weighty in thought, clothed with his wondrous diction, and equal to the scope of another volume, are hidden mainly in the *English Quarterlies*, where we hope they will be left, since the author so decrees. There is also the volume of "Studies of Christianity," edited by Rev. W. R. Alger thirty-four years ago, which we wish Dr. Martineau would see fit to republish in a volume uniform with these. The fairest conditions of life should surely be given to a book that ought on no account to die.

The row of volumes which these four very perceptibly lengthen, viewed in connection with the life out of which they have come, are a marvel. It has been given to Dr. Martineau to sustain himself in three long and successful careers running parallel with one another, any one of which would seem a reasonable achievement for a man of uncommon powers. For forty-two years he was a metropolitan clergyman, conforming to the severest standard of pastoral duty, and bringing to his pulpit sermons which, in wealth of thought, felicity of diction, and nobleness of tone, have not been surpassed by any preacher of our century. For forty-five years he was a very active and laborious college professor in the most exacting of departments. As an author, the scope of Dr. Martineau's production is nearly, if not quite, equal to the twenty volumes it taxed the great powers of Carlyle to bring forth. Some of his volumes, indeed, are the direct outcome of his pulpit and professorial labors; but others, sufficient it should seem, for an industrious literary career, have been brought forth independently of both, and among them are these four.

It will thus be seen that they are the product of what might fairly have been the breathing moments of a very busy life, after the weekly sermons had been prepared, the pastoral duties performed, the college lectures given, the incidental calls brought him by his twofold office responded to, and the scanty time allowed him, in the longest day his health

would permit, devoted to the studies of which these papers are the outcome. Yet we might suppose from reading them that they were the productions of one whose sole business it was to produce them. In the beginning they show no weariness, at the close no exhaustion ; and all the way through they are fresh and strong. Another feature one is likely to mark who reads these volumes chronologically. In the reckonings of a human life these papers cover a very long period. The earliest was first published in 1833, when Dr. Martineau was twenty-eight ; the latest, so far as dates show, in 1886, when he was eighty-one. Yet, were the dates reversed, — the earlier affixed to the later production, and the later to the earlier, and all the other dates correspondingly rearranged, — the sharpest eye for internal evidence would hardly detect the error, save for possible anachronisms in their substance. The earliest papers do not betray the young man, — certainly not one immature, — nor the latest the old man. Here, then, we meet one of the phenomenal men, whom the heaviest burdens do not bend, and who have carried the tropic warmth of youth far into the polar zone of age.

The matter of these volumes is classified according to the nature of the subject treated. The first volume is entitled, "Personal and Political ;" the second, "Ecclesiastical and Historical ;" the third, "Theological and Philosophical ;" the fourth, "Academical and Religious." The "personal" papers are a most instructive series of portraits, embracing Priestley, Dr. Arnold, Channing, Parker, Lessing, Schleiermacher, and Comte. Here is the very elaborate discussion of Personal Influences on Our Present Theology, embracing a highly suggestive review of Newman, Coleridge, and Carlyle. Two minor essays treat of Dr. Martineau's old teacher, John Kenrick, and of his beloved friend and fellow-laborer, J. J. Tayler. The imaginative people who have lately been grieved, or otherwise, by recent changes imputed to Dr. Martineau may well read the paper on "Theodore Parker," written in 1846, just after the publication of the very troublesome "Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion." If one would see an example of the most unflinching moral criticism, combined with the highest personal appreciation, he should read the paper on "Thomas Arnold." Possibly Dr. Martineau dwells somewhat too long on the senile weaknesses of Comte ; but here is by far the most interesting account we have yet met of the founder of the Positive Philosophy.

Of the political articles, one is of especial interest to Americans, "The Slave Power of the West," treating our country as she was in 1857, and as, by the grace of God and the outpoured blood of patriots, she is not now. As we look back from this distance, it is plain that few Americans had clearer insight into our condition than Dr. Martineau had ; and surely few Americans could have painted it with such force. One thing this paper makes very clear, that whatever was the cause of his sympathy with the South during our war, it was not any sympathy with slavery.

The series entitled "Ecclesiastical : Historical," deals largely with

grave problems of ecclesiastical life, some of which are a little foreign to Americans. Of these are the papers on "Church and State," "The Church of England," and a large portion of the very elaborate and incisive essay on "The Battle of the Churches." These are great papers; and one at all interested in ecclesiastical studies may well give them a careful reading. Other papers speaking more directly to the American mind, and of scarcely less worth, are "Europe since the Reformation," for instance, in which the author tries a fall with John Henry Newman, and "Professional Religion," which every minister might ponder long to his profit.

The "Theological: Philosophical" series is, for the student, perhaps the richest of the four. Here are most of the papers with which Mr. W. V. Spencer made us acquainted in the volumes of "Essays Philosophical and Theological," published twenty-six years ago, — the searching reviews of Whewell, Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer; the papers on Mill and Bain, on "Unity of Mind in Nature," and "Nature and God." Here, also, are Dr. Martineau's dissection of F. W. Newman's "Phases of Faith and New Phases;" his critique of Renan's "Life of Jesus," and two learned papers on "The Early History of Messianic Ideas."

The fourth volume, "Academical: Religious," is devoted mainly to addresses at the opening of Manchester New College, and occasional sermons. Midway the volume, however, comes "Modern Materialism: its Attitude towards Theology," the crushing rejoinder to Professor Tyndall. In the long controversy provoked by modern scientific theories there is, perhaps, no abler polemic than this.

Detailed discussion of these papers is not called for here and now. They are Dr. Martineau's, and his revered name is sufficient guarantee of rare excellences. The style is of the kingly order, and never forgets the Tyrian purple. Here are the balanced and rhythmic period, so long familiar; the possibly over-exuberant, but always brilliant metaphor; the occasional satire, a physician's lance, and humor that provokes a smile, dying away ere it reaches laughter. Here are the strong, poetic aphorisms; criticism that searches to the heart of an error, and lifts a truth into new meaning; learning drawn from the amplest store; and thought that in height and depth and amplitude reveals always an intellect of Olympian mould.

Taken for all in all, we know no other series of volumes of like character to be preferred before these. Though they contain Dr. Martineau's most popular work, they are not for the indolent hour, or a substitute for a siesta or an opera. The student may find rest in them, and any attentive mind may appropriate easily from their rich store of wisdom. The clergyman, of whatsoever creed, should find in them a stimulus to his intellect and a friend to his spirit.

A. W. JACKSON.

Sermons. By FREDERIC HENRY HEDGE, D. D., LL. D. Pp. vi, 334. Boston : Roberts Brothers. \$1.50.

In the death of Dr. Hedge two years ago, American letters lost one of its most fruitful workers and profoundest scholars. As a ripe and philosophic thinker on the deepest subjects, he occupied in the world of American thought the same preëminent place that James Martineau holds in English thought. He had given us a series of noble volumes in which the chief modern problems were discussed with admirable perspicacity, comprehensiveness, and thoroughness. His "Reason and Religion," "Ways of the Spirit" and "Atheism in Philosophy" are books that every student of religion and philosophy should know. But we cannot have too much from such a master hand, and we gladly welcome this volume of parish sermons, mainly his own selection, from the large number composed in his long service as a preacher.

To those who knew Dr. Hedge only in his published writings, he will here appear in a new garb. He does not wear in this volume that richly embroidered court-dress of opulent and stately diction which gave to his more elaborate essays and addresses such a distinction of style. He is not speaking here to scholars, but to the people ; so he drops the grand, sonorous, Miltonic style of which he had full command on fitting occasions. He comes before us in every-day attire, delivering his message in an earnest and straightforward manner, and so simply that no one need fail to understand him. There is no avoidance of the difficult problems of life, but the handling of them is always clear and practical ; the style is terse, direct, and impressive. A level-headed common sense, an intense moral earnestness, a cosmopolitan largeness of view, a firm grasp of the fundamental truth hidden under distorted intellectual growths and a steady, uplifting spirit of hope and good cheer are the dominant characteristics of the book.

Dr. Hedge's faith was as healthful as it was rational ; emancipated from the trammels of old superstition, he was not soured by modern skepticism or pessimism. True piety, to him, is spiritual sanity, maintained in its serenity by its consciousness of God's unchanging goodness and perpetual presence. He likes to find some high lesson in all the daily incidents and the common routine of life, and to point out the unsatisfactoriness of mere sense enjoyment or outward possession compared with the true blessedness of existence. Only in unselfish love does wisdom find its higher end ; only then are the fetters of obligation unloosed. Dr. Hedge was a scholar from his earliest youth, and it is therefore especially instructive to find him in the sermon on "The Gospel of Manual Labor"—written some twenty-five years ago—anticipating the present great reform in education, urging manual training as one of the best remedies for social troubles, and looking forward to the time when all the children of the rich shall be trained in manual labor and the children of the poor in mental culture.

For the cowardly conventionalities and weak compromises with error and injustice so prevalent to-day Dr. Hedge shows just and thorough scorn. "Our business," he forcibly says, "is not to be all things to all men, but something to somebody; to stand for some definite idea or principle, so that men may count upon you in that one thing." He regards the law of right as sacred, and enthusiasm for duty as the key that unlocks the kingdom of heaven; and he has no sympathy with those who would resolve duty into mere prudence or some transformed survival of ancient utilities. The moral alone, to him, gives meaning to life; conscience is the safeguard of both individual and social well-being, and "the material universe, take conscience out of it, is a film, nothing more."

But with all his sturdy loyalty to truth and righteousness, Dr. Hedge exhibits a breadth of view and an inclusive sympathy that are equally noteworthy. He seeks to do justice to all sides of human nature; to all elements of the universal church, both those that insure forward movement and ideality, and those that insure stability, organization, and æsthetic charm. The noble sermon on the Broad Church represents no passing caprice, but the settled aspiration and tendency of his mind, which always sought to round out his thought on all sides, and to make the Christian Church both large enough and well balanced enough to meet the wants of every part of our many-sided human nature. To this Holy Catholic church which puts its trust in faith and progress, devotion and love, Dr. Hedge was ever loyal. Among the most edifying of its documents his reverent and comprehensive statements of spiritual truth will always hold a high place.

JAMES T. BIXBY.

An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament. By S. R. DRIVER, D. D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Pp. xxix, 522. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50.

This is the first volume published of "The International Theological Library," edited by Charles A. Briggs, D. D., and Stewart D. F. Salmond, D. D. It is matter for sincere congratulation that the series begins with a work of so much excellence as Professor Driver's. Within five hundred and twenty-two pages, neatly printed, it contains just that presentation of the results of Old Testament criticism for which English readers in this department have been waiting. It is not, however, simply an exposition of the conclusions of others; it is the work of an independent scholar altogether at home in Biblical criticism.

The author understood his task to include "an account of the contents and structure of the several books, together with such an indication of their *general* character and aim" as he could find room for in the space at his disposal. A distinctive indication of Professor Driver's high scholarly tone in executing this task appears in his making it no part of

his "object to represent conclusions as more certain than is authorized by the facts upon which they depend. . . . In the critical study of the Old Testament there is an important distinction, which should be kept in mind. It is that of *degrees of probability*. . . . It may not be superfluous to observe that, from allusions to the subject in contemporary literature, no accurate opinion can commonly be formed as to either the principles or the results of the critical study of the Old Testament."

The book begins in the usual way with a criticism of the Hexateuch. The theory that it was composed primarily of a prophetic narrative, of Deuteronomic legislation, and of a priests' code is accepted. On the prophetic narrative, J E, Professor Driver remarks: "If, however, minuter, more problematical details be not unduly insisted on, there does not seem to be any inherent improbability in the conclusion, stated thus generally, that 'J E' is of the nature of a compilation, and that in some parts, even if not so frequently as some critics have supposed, the independent sources used by the compiler are still more or less clearly discernible." These two sources are held to have worked into literary form current traditions respecting the beginnings of the nation "approximately (as it would seem) in the early centuries of the monarchy." With respect to the homes of J and E, the author considers it "at least *relatively* probable that E and J belonged to the northern and southern kingdoms respectively." After discussing various dates for J and E, he concludes that "all things considered, a date in the early centuries of the monarchy would seem not to be unsuitable both for J and for E; but it must remain an open question whether both may not, in reality, be earlier." These two narratives are supposed to have been combined, approximately, in the eighth century B. C.

Of Deuteronomy, chapters v.-xxvi. are held by Professor Driver to comprise the legislation proper, with chapter iv. 44-49 as superscription and chapter xxviii. as conclusion. While allowing that there are incongruities between i. 1-4: 40 and chapters v.-xxvi., Professor Driver inclines to the view that the former section with chapter iv. 41-43 was prefixed by the author of the body of the book as an introduction. The song in chapter xxxii. is placed about 800 B. C., while in chapter xxxiii. the style suggests a higher antiquity than that of chapter xxxii. In his discussion of the relation between the opening chapters and the body of Deuteronomy the author might well have emphasized a little more the points in favor of a difference of authorship.

Turning to the priestly code, we find a very careful and interesting comparison of it with J E, D, and Ezekiel; and the conclusion is that it is later than any of these in its completed form, having been based, however, in its main stock, upon preëxisting temple usage, and it was not, therefore, manufactured by the priests during the exile. In the discussion of the priestly narrative there are some very valuable pages on the mutual relations of D, P, and H, H being the Law of Holiness imbedded in

Lev. xvii.-xxvi. The author concludes that Lev. xxvi. 3 ff. is probably earlier than Ezekiel. "The paranetic framework of H, while it may thus be earlier than Ezekiel, is not, perhaps, much earlier; for though isolated passages in Lev. xxvi. resemble, for instance, passages of Amos or Micah, the tone of the whole is unlike that of any earlier prophet; on the other hand, its tone is akin to that of Jeremiah, and still more (even apart from the phrases common to both) to that of Ezekiel. The language and style are compatible with the same age, even if they do not actually favor it. The *laws* of H date in the main from a considerably earlier time; but it seems that they were arranged in their present paranetic framework, by an author who was at once a priest and a prophet, probably towards the closing years of the monarchy." The reader wishes here for a closer defining of the "considerably earlier time," in the sentence just quoted, and something more in the way of detail of the editorial processes under which the Hexateuch reached its final form. But how much soever the author might have liked to enlarge in these directions, ample reason for not doing so is given in his preface.

One leaves these pages with the impression that English scholarship has in recent years made no other contribution to the study of the Hexateuch so valuable as this by Professor Driver. There is an attractive modesty about the author's expression of opinion through all this difficult work; and an example of the gentleness characteristic of Professor Driver in estimating the historical trustworthiness of some of the Hexateuchal narratives is found in the following sentence respecting P's view of the conquest of Canaan: "The limits of the different tribes and the cities belonging to them are no doubt described as they existed in a later day; but the partition of the land being conceived as *ideally* effected by Joshua, its complete distribution and occupation by the tribes are treated as his work, and as accomplished in his lifetime." And again: "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the representation of P includes elements, not, in the ordinary sense of the term, historical." One might ask in what *extraordinary* sense such elements are historical.

The author's view of the relation between the opening section of Judges and the account of the conquest in Joshua is that usually held by later critics; and his conclusion respecting the body of the book is that it is very possible "that there was a *pre-Deuteronomic* collection of histories of Judges, which the Deuteronomic compiler set in a new framework, embodying his theory of the history of the period." The section in chapters xvii.-xxi. "consists of two continuous narratives, not describing the exploits of any judge, but relating two incidents belonging to the same period of history." Chapters xvii., xviii. are taken as expressing "an archaic state of Israelitish life," and are not supposed to be a combination of parallel narratives. "The narrative of the outrage in chapter xix. is old in style and representation; it has affinities with chapters xvii., xviii., and in all probability has come down to us with very little, if any, altera-

tion of form." The author apparently concludes that chapters xx. and xxi. "are *not homogeneous*:" parts are decidedly later than chapter xix., and "exhibit the tradition respecting the action of the Israelites against Benjamin in the shape which it has assumed in a long period of oral transmission." "In the first and third divisions of the book, chapters i. 1-ii. 5, and chapters xvii.-xxi., "no traces are to be found of the hand of the Deuteronomic redactor of the middle division; there are no marks either of his distinctive phraseology or of his view of the history, as set forth in ii. 11-19. Hence it is probable that these divisions did not pass through his hand, but were added by a later hand (or hands) after ii. 6-xvi. had reached its present shape." In chapter xx. "the account, as we have it, can hardly be historical."

In the criticism of the Books of Samuel there is continued the same clear perception of the work to be done that has been so evident all along. 1 Sam. i. 1-iv. 1a "appears to have been written as an introduction to iv. 1b-vii. 1 (stating particulars of the previous history of Eli and his sons, and accounting for the prophetic importance of Samuel) by a somewhat later hand. The Song of Hannah (ii. 1-10) is not early in style, and seems unsuited to Hannah's position; . . . vii. 2-17 is a section of later origin than either" of the two standing before it. Chapters viii.-xii. "are formed by the combination of two *independent* narratives of the manner in which Saul became king, differing in their representation both of Samuel and of his relation to Saul." The later narrative with its disfavor to the kingdom the author considers to be "by no means so pronounced" in Deuteronomic style as is "the framework of Judges and Kings." Budde, he says, "has made it probable that it is a *pre-Deuteronomic* work, which in parts has been expanded by a subsequent editor." Because of a want of continuity and of a different style and representation, chapter xv. "does not appear to have been written originally in continuation of chapter xiv." The differences in the two accounts of the introduction of David are noted, and the author says, "It is remarkable that in II. Sam. xxi. 19, Goliath is stated to have been slain by *Elhanan* of Bethlehem (otherwise I. Chron. xx. 5)." With respect to getting rid of the conflicting elements in the accounts introducing David, Professor Driver thinks it doubtful "whether the text of LXX. is here really to be preferred to the Hebrew." "Looking at I.-II. Sam. as a whole, relatively the latest passages will be Hannah's song, and I. ii. 27-36; vii. 2-c. 8; x. 17-27a.; xi. 14; c. xii, xv.; II. vii., all of which, in their present form, have *some* affinities in thought and expression with Dt., though decidedly less marked than those observable in the redaction of Kings, so that they will hardly be later than c. 700 B. C. The rest, it is plain, is not throughout the work of one hand, or written *uno tenore*." II. Sam. ix.-xx. is taken to be in all probability "nearly contemporary with the events recorded," and it "appears plainly to be the work of a single author."

The make-up of the two Books of Kings comprises "materials derived from older sources . . . and sometimes expanded at the same time, in a framework supplied by the compiler. . . . Both in point of view and in phraseology the compiler shows himself to be strongly influenced by Deuteronomy." Though not probably Jeremiah himself, this compiler "was nevertheless a man like-minded with Jeremiah, and almost certainly a contemporary, who lived and wrote under the same influences." Following his criticism of Kings the author gives a long list of phrases characteristic of the compiler of the books.

Reaching the Prophets, Professor Driver says of Is. xl.-lxvi., "These chapters form a continuous prophecy, dealing throughout with a common theme, viz., Israel's restoration from exile in Babylon." Chapters i.-xxxix. are rearranged largely in agreement with modern criticism. The position of ch. xlii. 2-xiv. 23 is said to be "not that of Isaiah's age." "To base a promise upon a condition of things *not yet existent*, and without any point of contact with the circumstances or situation of those to whom it is addressed, is alien to the genius of prophecy. And upon grounds of analogy the prophecy xlii. 2-xiv. 23 can only be attributed to an author living towards the close of the exile." The words concerning Moab in chapters xv., xvi. the author says may have been written by Isaiah "in anticipation of the foray made by Tiglath-pileser upon the districts east of the Jordan in 734 B. C." But "the terms of xvi. 13 (which in no way connect the preceding prophecy with Isaiah himself) rather support" the view that it was uttered by some earlier prophet and "adopted and reinforced by Isaiah." Respecting the words on Babylon in ch. xxi. 1-10 the author differs with Kuenen and Dillmann, and assigns them, agreeing with Kleinert, to Isaiah's own time, "perhaps in 710." Chapters xxiv.-xxvii. are taken as a "single prophecy," which "may be referred most plausibly to the early post-exilic period." Chapters xxxiv., xxxv. are also referred to the period of the exile.

Of Jeremiah ch. i. 1-li. 58, Professor Driver says, "It does not seem that this prophecy is Jeremiah's." The reason for this conclusion is found in "the *manner* in which the announcement is made" of the end of the Babylonian power, "and especially in the contradiction which it evinces with the position which Jeremiah is known to have taken in the year to which it is assigned by li. 59." "The standpoint of the prophecy is later than Zedekiah's fourth year." The rest of the Book seems to be assigned to Jeremiah.

The internal evidence in the Book of Joel is taken to be in favor of "a date *after* the captivity." With regard to the Book of Jonah Professor Driver says: "A date in the fifth century B. C. will probably be not far wide of the truth." Verses 7-20 of the seventh chapter of Micah are supposed by Wellhausen to have been added by a prophet writing during the Babylonian captivity. Professor Driver accepts Wellhausen's characterization and exposition as eminently just, but concludes that it is not

clear that the expressions which seem to imply that a state of exile is in the prophet's mind "are more than parts of the imaginative picture drawn by him of the calamity which he sees to be impending." Zechariah ix.-xi. together with xiii. 7-9, is clearly discussed in the light both of a pre-exilic and of a post-exilic date, with the conclusion that "the *predominant* character of the allusions" appears to be pre-exilic. For ch. xii. 1-xiii. 6 and ch. xiv. a post-exilic date is apparently preferred. Of the Psalms some, *e. g.* Ps. ii., xx., xxi., xxviii., lxi., lxiii., lxxvi., lxxxix., are presumed to be pre-exilic; some, *e. g.* "Ps. lxxiv., lxxix, and perhaps lxxxiii., belong (as it seems) to the period of the Maccabees." With respect to the "I" of the Psalms, the author, while unwilling to agree with Smend, concludes that "doubtless in more Psalms than is commonly perceived to be the case the speaker is the nation, as Ps. xlv. 4, 6, 15; lx. 9; lxxiv. 12; xciv. 16 ff.; cii.; cxviii."

Professor Driver concludes that Job "belongs most probably to the period of the Babylonian captivity." The Elihu speeches are taken not to be a part of the original plan of the Book, but "a valuable supplement to it. . . And precisely the same inspiration attaches to them which attaches to the poem generally." It occurs to one that some readers might like to have a little more precisely defined this inspiration which attaches to the poem generally.

This whole book is excellent; it will be found helpful, characterized as it is all through by that scholarly poise of mind which when it does not know is not ashamed to present degrees of probability.

G. R. FREEMAN.

Einleitung in das Alte Testament. Von CARL HEINRICH CORNILL, Professor der Theologie an der Universität Königsberg. Pp. xii, 325. Freiburg i. B.: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1891. 5 Mks.

This is the first volume of a series of "Outlines of the Theological Sciences" projected by the intelligent and enterprising publisher of the "Sammlung theologischer Lehrbücher," the recently completed "Hand-Commentar zum Neuen Testament," and other works by which he has deserved well of theology. The new series is designed primarily for the use of students of theology, and is to include not only the chief theological disciplines, but subsidiary branches, such as Patristics, Christian Archaeology, and the History of Missions. Its aim, as indicated in the title, is to give the learner, in moderate compass and at a moderate price, a clear, concise, yet comprehensive "outline" of the sciences, avoiding on the one hand the exhaustive completeness which confuses and discourages the beginner, and, on the other, the barrenness of a mere compend. The names of the scholars who have promised their coöperation is an assurance that the volumes will not be compilations and abridge-

ments at second hand, but works of independent value in their own field. The plan is a very happy one; and we heartily wish that it may be fully and speedily carried out.

There is hardly any branch of theological study in which the difficulty of making such a book is as great as in Old Testament Introduction. The immediate results of criticism are a bewildering accumulation of details which obstruct the vision; in the present divided state of opinion upon the greater part of the questions with which Introduction has to do, it is impossible to set forth results without being drawn by mere fairness into controversy. To these difficulties are added perplexing questions of method and disposition, on the right solution of which in such a volume everything depends. Professor Cornill has succeeded in this task to a degree which was hardly to be anticipated. In a volume of less than three hundred and fifty pages he has given a remarkably clear and intelligible introduction to the subject; and as he has accomplished this by judicious selection and arrangement rather than by excessive compression, he has at the same time made a book that can be read with interest and pleasure.

In the treatment of the various parts of the subject, a just proportion has, in the main, been observed. It will, perhaps, appear to some, however, that the Psalms receive less attention than their importance and the difficulty of the critical questions involved require. In a second edition, which is sure to be necessary before long, the views of Professor Cheyne in his latest volume may demand consideration. The paragraphs on the history of Old Testament Introduction and on the history of Pentateuchal criticism are on a larger scale than the rest of the volume; but in this, also, the sound judgment of the author is manifested, as well as his predilection for such historical surveys. The sketch in particular of the progress of criticism, which is extremely well done, will not only interest students, but will also make clear to them at the outset that the history of criticism in this field has not been, as appears to a superficial observer, a confusing succession of hypotheses adopted without reason and abandoned for no better reason, but a scientific testing of truth and error on a large scale, the nature of which assures us of a gradual and, on the whole, steady approximation to the truth. As the result of almost a century and a half of investigation and controversy, it may be regarded as established that the Pentateuch is made up of four distinct narratives woven together. The main features also of the analysis which attempts to assign to each of the older histories its part in the composite whole, are fairly agreed upon. Having by this historical sketch shown what has already been achieved, Professor Cornill deems it unnecessary to enter at length into the proof of the composite character or constituent elements of the Pentateuch, or into the criteria and methods of the analysis, but proceeds at once to the points which are still *sub lite*, the relative and absolute age of the several sources, and the origin of the Pentateuch as we have it. Pro-

fessor Cornill's position, in general, is that of the modern school; but he has worked the field over thoroughly for himself, and in more than one point, as in the paragraphs on the original Deuteronomy of 621 B. C., he has carried the investigation a step nearer to the end. The treatment of the historical books, Judges, Samuel, and Kings, is especially full and satisfactory. It is here that the "Quellenkritik" is now most busily at work, and with the best promise. Following in the main in the track of Budde's "Richter und Samuel," in the light of which Professor Cornill has materially modified his earlier views about the composition of Samuel, he has set forth the present state of critical research, and the direction of its advance.

The departure from the prevailing opinion of scholars which is likely to provoke the most dissent is the defense of the genuineness of the Elihu chapters in Job. I doubt whether the argument will convince many. It seems to me to rest chiefly on a feeling of the inadequacy of the theodicy of the book without Elihu, which it is unsafe to assume that the author or his first readers felt as we do. On another point where Professor Cornill has gone back to Herder, however, I am in full agreement with him; this is the rejection of all dramatic reconstructions of the Song of Songs. The book is, in fact, a string of wedding songs, variations on a given theme, without plot or progress. I may call attention further to the very satisfactory paragraphs on Daniel; I should, however, lay more stress than is done on the relation of the moral of all the stories in the first chapters to the Antiochian persecution as the strongest argument against a division of the book such as is proposed by Strack and others.

The General Introduction, dealing with the history of the Canon, and the transmission of the text and the versions, is one of the best parts of a work which throughout is deserving of high praise. A tabular survey of the development of the Old Testament literature, in which the results of the Special Introduction are brought together in chronological order, is so useful that it has already been two or three times reprinted in this country. Unusually full indexes facilitate reference both to subjects and to passages of Scripture.

GEORGE F. MOORE.

The Genesis of Genesis. A study of the documentary sources of the first book of Moses in accordance with the results of critical science, illustrating the presence of Bibles within the Bible. By BENJAMIN WISNER BACON. With an Introduction by GEORGE F. MOORE, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Hartford: The Student Publishing Co., 1892. Pp. xxx, 352.

This helpful book is divided into three parts. Part I. gives a general explanation of the science of documentary analysis and historical criti-

cism ; Part II. gives the text of Genesis in varieties of type, in order to exhibit the sources and method of the compilation ; in Part III. the three documents which go to make up Genesis (J, E, P,) are conjecturally restored. Mr. Bacon gives an excellent view of the present condition of Pentateuchal criticism, and his book will be full of interest to those who wish to have a clear sketch of what has been done, and a good statement of the methods of modern critics. The different kinds of type are used in an excellent manner to set the different documents before the eye of the reader. The conjectural restoration at the end deserves attention, for Mr. Bacon has shown that he can do good critical work in articles in "*Hebraica*" and the "*Journal of Biblical Literature*." Professor Moore, in his "Introduction," gives a lucid and interesting sketch of the history of Old Testament criticism, and warmly commends the book to Biblical students.

C. H. Toy.

History of the People of Israel from the Time of Hezekiah till the Return from Babylon. By ERNEST RENAN. Boston : Roberts Bros. 1891. Pp. xiii, 429. \$2.50.

The third volume of M. Renan's "*History of Israel*" deals with the period which is the most picturesque in the old Israelitish annals, because its details have been most fully preserved. It includes the relations of Israel with the Assyrians and Babylonians ; the careers of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the great anonymous prophet of the Captivity, and the rise of the first elaborate law book ; it reaches down to the great turning-point in the national fortunes, when the nation became a church. Here is material enough for M. Renan's genius in description, and he has made good use of his opportunity. The personages and events of the drama stand out before us in living reality ; the questions of the time seem, under his hand, to be no less human than those with which we now have to deal. In this regard his exposition of the history is masterly. Every word of the text supplies him with a hint from which to reconstruct the inner life of the time, bring out its motives, define its aims, and invest the skeleton with flesh. This stimulating insight is M. Renan's finest quality. He is a great Semitic scholar, but his scholarship is not always controlled by historical-critical soundness of thought. In this volume he introduces a great many critical opinions, and to a large number of these exception must be taken. In this pre-exilian period he puts much that is considered by the majority of critics to belong to the priestly document of the Pentateuch. Into the age of Hezekiah he crowds a great number of important works. To it he assigns not only all the latter part of the Proverbs, but also the Book of Job, the Song of Songs, and a number of the poems of the Book of Psalms. This is not the place to enter into an argument on this point, but it may be said that M. Renan's own

portraiture of the seventh century is a strong reason against his location of these works; their tone is so different from that of the prophets as to take us into another atmosphere of thought.

The controlling idea of the prophets, according to M. Renan, was social reform. They were the friends and advocates of the poor against the rich. In their writings he finds the key-note of all later socialism, and this, he thinks, was the source of their enduring greatness. As politicians, he declares, they were fatal; they gave the nation into the hands of its enemies; yet had they not failed, Jerusalem might have remained the capital of a small nation, it would never have become the religious capital of the world. There is, no doubt, an element of truth in this view; but the statement is greatly exaggerated. Israel was what it was to the world, not simply, or chiefly, because the prophets pitied the poor, but because the nation grasped the idea of religion as the central fact of society with extraordinary firmness, and developed it with wonderful genius. We must recognize the exaggerations in M. Renan's critical, historical-religious positions, but his book gleams with bright and fruitful remarks, and may be read to great advantage in connection with the more staid and labored works of the great German historians.

Of the English translation, it is, unfortunately, impossible to speak with any respect. It bristles with errors of all sorts. Typographical errors are not infrequent in the English; the Hebrew is wrongly printed almost without exception; in many cases the meaning of the French is not understood; in other cases the author's finer shades of thought are not brought out; the spelling of proper names is very bad; instead of the author's own version of the Old Testament, the English King James' Version is used, sometimes with dire effect; the passages cited in the French from the Old Testament are mostly omitted, to the no small detriment of the exposition; and, in general, the translator is not sufficiently acquainted with the literature of the subject to give a fair representation of the book. It is a great pity that so notable a work as this should be offered to the English and American public in so unworthy a dress.

C. H. Toy.

Gospel-Criticism and Historical Christianity: A Study of the Gospels and of the History of the Gospel-Canon during the Second Century, with a Consideration of the Results of Modern Criticism. By ORELLO CONE, D. D. Pp. ix., 365. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. \$1.75.

Rev. Dr. Cone's work on the canonical Gospels is calculated to interest two classes of readers — those who, already familiar with the problems discussed, take pleasure in going over familiar ground with an intelligent companion, and those who are glad to have a competent guide in a region by them hitherto untrodden. The brief survey of the field of Text-

Criticism, with which the book opens, will be of service to the latter class, although it is, in parts, too technical in expression to be fully comprehended by any but scholars. It would seem to have been worth while to mention, among the meanings assigned to the term *Peschito*, the one so ably defended by Professor Nestle, of Ulm, who makes it appear quite probable that, as applied to the old Syriac Version of the Bible, the name signifies only *Common* or *Vulgate*.

At the very outset of his treatment of the canon the author commits himself unreservedly to the historico-critical method of procedure. To him the question of canonicity is simply a question as to what books were, in the second century, considered "classical," that is, distinguished from others by their supposed possession of some special excellences. He marshals the authorities in a clear and effective manner, and draws his conclusions with that soberness of judgment which is one of the most pervasive characteristics of the whole work. Some will consider him unnecessarily conservative in speaking of Tatian's Diatessaron as altogether lost and of a character quite unknown, considering Professor Zahn's presumably approximate reproduction of the text (1881) chiefly from the commentary of Ephraem, which, though formerly accessible only in an Armenian and a secondary Latin version, is now better known through an Arabic translation made direct from the Syriac and recently published (1888). This partial discovery of the Diatessaron (if, indeed, it is a real discovery, which is not beyond doubt) has, however, added little or nothing to our knowledge with regard to the formation of the Gospel canon.

With regard to the mutual relations of the Synoptics, Dr. Cone is persuaded of the priority of Mark and of the dependence of the other synoptists upon the second Gospel and a logia-document derived from the logia ascribed by Papias to Matthew the Apostle. As to authorship, he finds in the second Gospel more than the crude notes which Papias says that Mark took down from the preaching of Peter; yet he seems to think of no other than Mark as its author. Since history knows nothing of a working-over and rearrangement of his memoranda by Mark, it would seem to be quite as likely that some one else made use of his material, and that the Gospel now ascribed to him fitly bears his name for a reason like that which justifies the application of Matthew's name to the first Gospel, — because most of the material was derived from him. The sources of the first Gospel are held to have been the logia of Matthew, the Gospel according to Mark, and oral tradition. To the last-mentioned source are attributed the birth-stories of the opening chapter and the marvels in the account of Passion-week. The date of Matthew is fixed at about 70; that of Mark, between 65 and 70. The relation of Luke's Gospel to that of Matthew is held to be indirect, the logia-document being a common source; yet it is conceded that Matthew's Gospel may have been and probably was known to Luke, though seldom if ever used

by him. It is also maintained that Luke, even more frequently than Matthew, borrowed from Mark's Gospel, though freely working over what he took, and often blending with it material from other sources. The date of the Gospel is fixed at about 90. Dr. Cone argues that the unknown author of the fourth Gospel, writing, probably, in the second quarter of the second century, possibly had at his command true logia of Jesus, which, by their sententious and gnomic style, can often be distinguished from the less authentic material in which the work abounds. The lofty spiritual tone which is maintained throughout and the evident sincerity of the author forbid our thinking of the Gospel as a forgery.

A chapter is devoted to the eschatology of the Gospels, the view taken being, in the main, not unlike that of Dr. Samuel Davidson — that the language of Jesus concerning "the last things" has not been preserved to us in its purity, but has seriously suffered from admixture with current apocalyptic phraseology.

While the extravagances of the more pronounced advocates of the "tendency" hypothesis of the Tübingen school receive just criticism, it is clearly pointed out that Matthew and John, at least, wrote under the influence of strong doctrinal prepossessions, and that in Luke's Gospel some not very pronounced traces of the Pauline spirit and doctrine are discoverable.

The subject of Old Testament quotations in the Gospels is approached from the point of view of the best modern criticism, which demands that the inductive method be pursued in the investigation of all such questions, and that the intent of the original author be determined independently of any use which the later New Testament writer may have chosen to make of his words. The incidental remark that "the exegesis of the Apostle Paul, too, shows the influence of his rabbinical training" — a remark which almost any one would hitherto have thought it quite safe to make, — may now, in the light of a well-considered article in the January number of the "Andover Review" need such modification as to prevent any one from getting the impression that Paul is actually known to have studied in the schools of the rabbis. "Typologizing," whether of the sort of which the New Testament writers made use, or of that innocent kind to which Dr. Immer seems to have no objection, has no place in Dr. Cone's system of hermeneutics, which is altogether unclouded by any prepossession as to the absolute harmony of the Old Testament and the New.

The last two chapters make the application of the results of the previous studies to the great problem suggested by the title of the book — the bearing of modern criticism upon our estimate of the historical value of the Gospels. After a most admirable summary of the facts and arguments already presented, the conclusion is confidently drawn, that while the Gospels "contain unhistorical elements of various kinds," "the historical ground of the beginnings of Christianity is securely established

in the common tradition of the synoptics." Throughout the book the views of most of the leading critics, especially those of Germany, are briefly, but clearly and impartially stated.

GEORGE L. CARY.

The Pauline Theology. A Study of the Origin and Correlation of the Doctrinal Teachings of the Apostle Paul. By GEORGE B. STEVENS, Ph. D., D. D., Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in Yale University. Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. xi, 383. \$2.00.

The object of this work, as stated in the preface, is "to inquire into the genesis of Paul's leading thoughts, so far as their origin may be the subject of historical inquiry, to define critically their content and relation to one another, and thus to present a systematic account of his teaching upon the great themes which he considers." The author, who has evidently read widely and deeply upon the subject, expresses himself as most largely indebted to four writers, — Neander, Weiss, Pfleiderer, and Lipsius. He treats of Paul's conversion, his style, the shaping forces of his teaching, the sources of his doctrine, his teaching regarding God, sin, the Law, Christ, redemption, justification, the Christian life, the church, and eschatology.

In treating Paul's conversion, Dr. Stevens accepts the accounts of it in the Acts as a part of the "documentary evidence" in the case, but thinks it necessary to find "that point of inner connection between the revelation made to him [Paul] and his own inner spiritual life, which it seems necessary to find in order to relieve the change of its otherwise magical appearance (p. 12). The conclusion reached is that two causes contributed to his conversion — "an inner conflict" described in Rom. vii. 7-25, and a supernatural opportune appearance of Christ "on the scene." In the discussion of the shaping forces of Paul's teaching the author rejects the opinion of Pfleiderer and others, that the apostle was influenced by the Hellenistic thought represented in the Book of Wisdom, and regards the Old Testament, the later developments of Jewish thought, and his own reflection "under the guidance of the Holy Spirit" as the chief forces which moulded his opinions (p. 58). He concedes that Paul adopted the allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament which prevailed in the rabbinical schools of his time, and sometimes followed uncritically the erroneous Septuagint translation; and thus from two causes often fell into error as to the true sense of the Scriptures.

As to the sources of the Pauline doctrine, Dr. Stevens decides for the acceptance of all the Epistles ascribed to Paul, while not having "the same degree of confidence" respecting the Pastoral Epistles "which may be felt regarding the others" (p. 86). It may be questioned whether this conclusion does not put an insuperable difficulty in the way of the construction of a consistent view of the Pauline theology. In discussing

the Pauline doctrine of Sin he accepts the conclusion of all the great exegetes, that the apostle believed in the fall of Adam and regarded physical death as the consequence of sin, but he defends the very questionable view that the words "in that all sinned" [ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον] mean that all men sinned when Adam sinned (p. 129). The discussion of this question, together with that of the Pauline meaning of the term "flesh," shows very effectively the author's exegetical skill. In treating of the Person of Christ the difficulty previously referred to, arising from the acceptance of all the Epistles as genuine, becomes especially apparent in the predominance given to the Christology of the later [spurious] Epistles, and in the disappearance of some of the most characteristic features of the genuine Pauline doctrine of Christ, — those of "the second Adam" and "the man from heaven." Rom. ix. 5 is interpreted in opposition to Tischendorf, Ezra Abbot, Baur, Beytschlag, Meyer, and many other eminent scholars, as extolling Christ as "the One 'who is over all, God blessed forever,'" and support for this un-Pauline view is found in the deutero-Pauline Epistles to the Colossians and the Ephesians.

In the chapter on Redemption, Dr. Stevens regards Paul as teaching that in being "made sin for us," "Christ so far took the sinner's place as to suffer in his stead. He was made in some sense the bearer of the sinner's guilt and penalty in order that the sinner himself might not bear it, but be accounted righteous upon believing in Christ" (p. 241). The discriminating remarks in this connection on "the just use of Paul's expressions in theology" are worthy of special attention (p. 254). The doctrine of Justification is expounded in consistency with that of Redemption (ch. x.). The apostle's eschatology is treated with great freedom and penetration, and the conclusion reached is that Paul's teaching includes the personal second coming of Christ, the *parousia* which he expected to survive, the resurrection of believers and the judgment of the world at the *parousia*, and the abandonment of unbelievers in *sheol*. As to some Pauline words which appear to indicate the apostle's belief in the restoration of all men, the author thinks that "this interpretation of them cannot be adjusted either to Paul's doctrine of man, of salvation, or of the judgment" (p. 366). It must be regarded as a mild and cautious statement of the facts in the case when the author says that "the impression made by an impartial examination of the salient points in Paul's eschatological teaching is that he has expressed the content of Christian hope without close reflection upon the relation of the various elements of his doctrine to one another."

Dr. Stevens's book should receive a cordial welcome as the work of a scholar who has made a thorough study of the subject, and presented his conclusions with clearness, candor, and force. Its strictly exegetical character is a great merit. The author does not attempt to "rationalize" the great apostle's thought in order to bring it into accord with theological preconceptions, and shrinks from no conclusion to which his exegesis

leads him. The Pauline theology will be better understood than formerly among us by means of this book, which is significant, in that it attains along with a few other recent works by American scholars a scientific treatment of theological questions, and indicates a tendency toward the subordination of the dogmatic interest to that of critical and historical investigation.

OURELLO CONE.

BUCHTEL COLLEGE.

Natural Theology : The Gifford Lectures, delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1891. By Prof. Sir G. G. STOKES, Bart., M. P. Pp. viii, 272. London and Edinburgh : Adam and Charles Black. New York : Macmillan & Co. \$1.50.

The wise generosity which endowed the Gifford foundation in the four Scottish universities and the reputation of Professor Stokes in the departments of Physics and of Mathematics lead the reader of this volume of the Gifford Lectures to expect a valuable contribution to natural theology, but he is doomed to disappointment. The terms of the foundation provided by the sagacity of Lord Gifford (which Professor Max Müller regards with such evident appreciation, and which enable him to deliver lectures upon the Science of Religion, summing up the work of a lifetime in that field of study) were singularly burdensome to Professor Stokes. This is evident from the repeated assurance that, in touching upon this or that subject, he thinks he is not transcending the intention of the Founder of the Lectureship. Finally, he can no longer refrain from an open avowal of his discomfort, and declares that, though he has felt at liberty to suggest certain lines of thought in the related field of revealed religion, he has "done so with reserve;" and he adds, "I could not help feeling oftentimes as if I were called on to work in a strait waistcoat." Evidently the conditions imposed by Lord Gifford were too liberal for a mind not able to maintain a truly scientific attitude upon a subject which appealed to it in the terms of traditional education. One need only quote the statement, which the author allows himself to make in closing, to estimate the value of these lectures aright: "In concluding . . . I may perhaps be permitted to make a personal explanation by way of apology for the very imperfect way in which I feel that I have discharged the duties of the office. I knew nothing of it till I was informed that the Senatus of the university had done me the honor of electing me Gifford Lecturer. . . . What I have previously written has been mainly scientific memoirs: as to theology, I have merely written a few short articles, and in those, though I did not scruple to employ natural reason, I have gone on the basis of accepting a supernatural revelation, more especially on that of accepting the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth as a supernatural, historical fact." The result is that Pro-

fessor Stokes has added nothing to the subject discussed except a few illustrations from recent scientific investigation, mainly in the field of optics, with which he is most familiar and to which he has made valuable contributions. We seem to be, in all other regards, back in the atmosphere of the Bridgewater treatises, — an atmosphere not quite so clear as that which surrounds Butler's "Analogy."

Throughout the discussion, Professor Stokes seems to be trying to answer three questions. First, how far may evolution be accepted, even as a working theory in science, consistently with the determination to have man brought on by an act of special creation, and in view of the other fact that anthropomorphism must be dismissed from our thought of the Creator as far as possible. Second, how far can the argument from design be carried, without straining it until it breaks, broken — by the old objection that nothing gives so much evidence of design as a Mind, — preëminently, therefore, the Universal Mind. Third, how can everything be made in scientific research to agree with that haunting demand for Revelation, outside all nature, from a Being who is outside nature. The shadow of this demand is on every page. As a result of these conditions in the mind of the lecturer, Darwin's *Origin of Species* is treated as though it had been leveled at the argument from design, and therefore at theism; and as though it had not been before the scientific mind for more than thirty years, and had not long ago its place in the field of such inquiry assigned it. This fear of the influence of the doctrine of the *Origin of Species* is due in part to the feeling, in the mind of the Gifford Lecturer, that it necessarily carries with it the truth of spontaneous generation. If these lectures were a strong putting of the case against evolution one might treat them in detail. But they are much impaired for conservative use by a certain amount of scientific knowledge, and are ineffectual for all scientific use on account of the double action of the lecturer's mind, as it oscillates between tradition and apology. Nothing more need be said respecting so unfortunate a reversal of the design of the noble foundation on which the lectures were delivered. If a contrast is needed to assure the reader interested in Lord Gifford's purpose, he has only to turn to the two courses of lectures delivered by Professor Max Müller on the same foundation at Glasgow, on "Physical Religion and Anthropological Religion," which are, in their field, models of what the noble founder intended his bequest of £80,000 to accomplish, when he said in his will: —

"The lecturers shall be subjected to no test of any kind, and shall not be required to take any oath, or to emit or subscribe any declaration of belief, or to make any promise of any kind; they may be of any denomination whatever, or of no denomination at all (and many earnest and high-minded men prefer to belong to no ecclesiastical denomination); they may be of any religion or way of thinking, or they may be so-called skeptics or agnostics or free-thinkers; provided only that the patrons will

use diligence to secure that they be able, reverent men, true thinkers, sincere lovers of and earnest inquirers after truth. I wish the lecturers to treat their subject as a strictly natural science, the greatest of all sciences, indeed, in one sense the only science, that of Infinite Being, without reference to, or reliance upon any supposed exceptional and so-called miraculous revelation. I wish it considered just as astronomy or chemistry is."

The work done by Professor Stokes not only falls far short of this standard, but the literary presentation is incredibly defective. It seems beyond belief, for instance, that a learned man, who for five years was President of the British Association, could send out such a sentence in print as the following, or should have uttered it before the University of Edinburgh: "We think of the initial state, as presenting postulates, outside alone of which design is capable of being exercised" (p. 39). A scientific temper is a natural endowment, and it is questionable whether it can be acquired when naturally absent from the mind; but literary exactness is a necessity to the conveyance of ideas, even when commonplace.

THOMAS R. SLICER.

What is Reality? By FRANCIS HOWE JOHNSON. Pp. xxvii, 510. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. \$2.00.

The ability and originality of this work establish its author high on the list of our strongest thinkers. It is weighty with profound reflection, lucidly and forcibly expressed. The candor, breadth of view, and boldness of speculation which are found in combination in this book with a serene faith and wise reverence for spiritual verities make it a notable contribution to theological and philosophical literature. But taken as a representative of "Progressive Orthodoxy," as we suppose it may fairly be taken, it is doubly remarkable. Mr. Johnson has not hesitated to give a hospitable hearing to the most advanced theories of modern science; much more than this, he has courageously adopted many of these theories as his own, and with astonishing ingenuity has enlisted them in the service of Christian Theism.

The aim of the book is to furnish a scientific basis for the fundamental truths of religion. The author accepts frankly the great truths that modern investigations of Nature have established. He recognizes the fact that reason, not feeling, is the test of truth, and that if Theism is to retain its hold over thinking men of to-day, it must base itself on experience and the realities of life, not on mere assumptions, traditions, or unverifiable speculations.

Mr. Johnson has fully outgrown the idea which has made such mischief in theology, that the exceptional, the irregular, and the marvelous are to be regarded as the seal of truth rather than the orderly and nat-

ural. In sympathy with the new order of thought, he does not look upon God as dwelling apart from his world which at a given time He had called into existence in a finished form; but God is held to be working in the world constantly by new combinations and re-combinations, bringing forth new and wonderful products.

The test of reality is not isolation from other facts, but connection with them. That proposition expresses reality, the affirmation of which is necessary to life. Faith is the will to trust in, and to act upon, probabilities that have been rationally constructed from experience. Mr. Johnson cogently shows the baselessness of the two great assumptions of physical realism: that the mechanical realities of the world are a contradiction of its spiritual realities, and that the former, as genuine, are able to suppress the other as spurious. He traces these false assumptions to the deeper misconception, that the human mind occupies such a central position in the universe that all its facts can be organized into one harmonious and logical whole. He points out with great force that the domain of accepted science is full of contradictions and mysteries in its most fundamental conceptions, such as those of gravity and elasticity.

The best illumination upon the character of the Divine Spirit and its relations with physical and human nature is found, according to Mr. Johnson, in the analogy supplied by the human soul in its relations to the organism in which it lives; and many exceedingly curious and instructive similarities between the Microcosm and the Macrocosm are developed. The Universe exhibits a hierarchy of principles with recurrent similarities. As analogy, rising from lower to higher groups of organized phenomena, has been the great instrument of discovery in physical science, so progressive thought is led to infer that the elementary realities of the world are atomic souls, and that an all-embracing Spirit at the centre of the Universe is the efficient reality of all things. The Universe is the manifestation of this Divine Being, and every part of it bears relations to this being similar to those which the organs, the cells, and the subordinate consciousnesses in a human body bear to the central consciousness that they serve and represent.

This is Mr. Johnson's central thought, and it is worked out with great power, skill, and amplitude of view. By it he unites the conceptions of the immanent and the transcendent God in a living and abiding Divine Reality. He would enrich Christian Theism with a pantheistic element which does not swamp either the individuality of the soul or the personality of the Divine. Religious devotion is shown to be something which can only realize itself by faithfulness to organic relations. Evolution is accepted as the method of divine creation, proceeding under the intelligent guidance of the Divine Mind. Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious, Mr. Johnson well shows to be self-contradictory; he keenly characterizes it as in truth "an unconscious philosophy of the conscious."

Revelation Mr. Johnson regards as natural but superhuman, — a creative personal guidance by the Indwelling Spirit. Revelation helps reason and conscience, but is not a substitute for them. The Bible is not infallible but a collection of writings, especially superintended by the Holy Spirit, and coördinated to meet the spiritual requirements of men in all ages. Evolution accredits miracles as divine specializations of force, transcending the limits of our knowledge; but in a rational theology they should be given only a subordinate and provisional place.

Men are saved, not by being snatched out of the process of the world, but by being raised into a higher state by the progressive development of spiritual life in them. It is a process of moral illumination and training. What is called the Fall was rather a rise, by its opening of the eyes of humanity to the nature of moral distinctions, — the first upward step toward the spiritual rescue which is to save not only man, but also the whole antecedent evolutionary process, from miscarriage and failure. The work of the Christian dispensation is to make the individual soul a conscious co-worker with God, and more fully receptive of the inflow of the Holy Spirit.

Such is the general line of thought of this notable book. The first half is so courageous and rational and brilliant that we feel a certain disappointment in the relics of traditional theories that, here and there, incongruously strew the pages of the concluding chapters. I refer especially to Mr. Johnson's half-hearted handling of the questions of miracles, Biblical infallibility, and the teachings of Jesus. If he had pursued here a bolder course, he would have given us conclusions, not only more reasonable, but also more reverent. If it be true, for example, that the Fourth Gospel represents Jesus as an habitual dealer in dark riddles, what is the reasonable and reverent deduction from this? Is it that Jesus had not the sweet reasonableness that Matthew Arnold claims, and the Synoptic Gospels present in their portraits, or, rather, that we have here a further argument in favor of the conclusion reached by the best modern scholarship, that the discourses of the Fourth Gospel are not faithful reports of the words of Jesus, but in more or less measure, imaginative compositions colored by philosophical preconceptions? If we were in a very critical mood, we might also urge that Mr. Johnson has hardly treated Mr. Herbert Spencer with entire justice, and that his course of reasoning is in some places too condensed, failing to present with sufficient clearness the successive steps and the coherence of his argument. Nevertheless, the merits of the book so greatly predominate that these matters should blind no one to the unusual freshness, power, and fertile suggestiveness of a noteworthy treatise.

JAMES T. BIXBY.

West Roxbury Sermons. By THEODORE PARKER. Roberts Bros. \$1.00.

This volume of the early sermons of Theodore Parker, preached to his small congregation at West Roxbury, before a few determined people had declared that "Theodore Parker should be heard in Boston," has something of the same interest as the volume of Rev. Dr. Hedge's sermons noticed on another page, for here Parker writes simply for his own parish, and he does not handle the great questions of the day in theology or social reform. These are distinctively practical sermons relating to the moral and spiritual life of the individual, as the mention of a few of their subjects will show, — "spiritual indifference, tranquillity, application of religion to life, fact of life and ideal of life, the crucifix, low aims and lofty, and God's income to man." Rev. Samuel J. Barrows, the editor of this volume, has well remarked that the Theodore Parker that we thus far know is the Theodore Parker of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society of Boston; but he had preached between three and four hundred sermons to his West Roxbury congregation before he came to Boston, and some of his parishioners in West Roxbury have given their testimony to the effect that some of his noblest discourses were preached in that little country church. Mr. Barrows has accordingly done wisely to omit such doctrinal sermons as Parker preached in those days, and has included only sermons of the religious life.

The effect produced by this collection upon those who have known Parker only as a great theological controversialist and ardent social reformer is likely to be one of distinct surprise. But we count it a most happy event that in this time when Theodore Parker as a reformer has long since ceased to need excuse or apology, and Theodore Parker the heretic is almost orthodox in comparison with many widely read scientists and even preachers of the day, this volume devoted to subjects of abiding interest to the thoughtful of every sect and church has made its appearance. It is true that, as Parker's theological system has needed much revision, so there are utterances in these sermons which call for modification from a more scientific and philosophical view of human life than Parker entertained in the early years of his ministry, at least. One could hardly say to-day, as he does in the first sermon on "The Parable of the Talents," that all men "may attain the same measure of morality, and have the same eminence in every virtue." But all who read will feel the directness and power of Parker's simple address to the soul and conscience in this discourse as well as in its successors. In his insistence that character is its own recompense, and that "all the outward universe is too poor a return for godliness," we note the plain influence of Emerson. "If one with all the wisdom of truth, all the eloquence of persuasion, should attempt to lead us, his preaching were cold and profitless in comparison with that silent sermon which every good man delivers to him who will attend;" these are Parker's words, but how easily might they be mistaken for Emerson's!

If there be any at this late day who need to be told that Theodore Parker was a religious genius ; if any be yet so far blinded by prejudice and ignorance as to shut themselves out from the help and inspiration to a devout and noble life which they might gain from the record of his work and his life, they should by all means read these early sermons. They have reminded us more than once of that incident of a later year in Boston, when a lady, who knew Parker only as the great infidel of the day, once heard a stranger preach a most helpful sermon of practical religion, full of earnestness and devoutness, in James Freeman Clarke's pulpit. At the close of the service she could not forbear saying to the preacher, "If only Theodore Parker could hear such a sermon as that!" "Madam," replied the stranger, "*I am Theodore Parker.*" It is the same Parker who speaks in these words on personal experience of religion :—

Men think they must examine every curious thing they can find. Men go thousands of miles to look at Niagara. We laugh at the stupidity of men who have lived a half century within a score of miles of this wonder, and have never seen it. We are amused at the folly of the traveller who sent a servant by torch-light to examine a cataract of the Nile, while he slept in indolence. But does not every irreligious man do something infinitely more foolish every day ? He knows nothing of the darkness of his soul, the wonders therein far more wonderful than all the Niagaras and cataracts of the Nile. He does not work himself, seeks not to learn the true beauty of religion by looking with his own eyes, but takes the account of the foolish man, who happens to have been there and found nothing, or that wise man who could only see for himself, not for you or me. Without religion man is but a worm on the face of the earth, striving with ineffectual and painful, because disappointed, efforts, to raise itself to happiness. He turns upward and onward, but finds no support. Religion bursts its shroud and prison-house, and the winged spirit flies to God free and unconfined.

NICHOLAS P. GILMAN.

The Crisis in Morals. An Examination of Rational Ethics in the Light of Modern Science. By JAMES THOMPSON BIXBY, Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Leipzig. Pp. viii, 315. Roberts Bros. \$1.00.

Dr. Bixby here makes his second contribution to the list of small books on great subjects which already numbered his treatment of the relations of Science and Religion, published some years ago, that has taken permanent rank as one of the ablest discussions of its theme. The crisis in morals that he would here consider has come about through "the immense success of the theory of evolution," which "has thoroughly unsettled the views of the younger generation, and made them suspect the old foundations." Dr. Bixby therefore sets out to examine carefully the views of ethics which have recently proceeded from the school of evolutionary philosophy ; and, to make his task more specific, he concentrates his criticism upon Mr. Herbert Spencer. The "*Data of Ethics*" had pre-

visually received careful attention from numerous writers of the most opposite tendencies. But many readers of this book will doubtless agree with us that it has scarcely ever before been subjected to a discussion of its chief points more candid, penetrating, and conclusive than this by Dr. Bixby. The larger part of the work is devoted to a critique of Mr. Spencer's volume, and the second part to "the positive reconstruction of ethics," rendered necessary by the adverse judgment on the Spencerian doctrine. The author wrote before the appearance of Mr. Spencer's "Justice" last summer; but his argument is scarcely affected even in small details by this latest addition to Mr. Spencer's philosophy.

Dr. Bixby is an evolutionist, and he writes with cordial recognition of the great services which Mr. Spencer has rendered to modern thought. He recognizes, especially, the excellence of the "Data of Ethics" in its insistence upon the historical element, on the influence of heredity, and the indisputable agency of pleasure and pain in the moral development of mankind. But he finds the fatal defect in the new ethics of the Spencerian school in its elevation "of incidental concomitants to the supreme place, while the higher essential features it would degrade to the subordinate rôles." He means by this that pleasure and pain are shown by the experience of humanity, past and present, *not* to be the one standard by which the ethical quality of actions is to be judged; that happiness is a most shifting and unreliable test of such quality, even if we distinguish kinds of happiness, as Mr. Spencer does not; and that the true end of the evolution of humanity is the perfection of total human nature. He contends that Mr. Spencer insists altogether too much on the objective action, and pays far too little attention to the inward motive, the specifically moral quality being in the conscience of the agent, and not in the act which he performs. He reproaches Mr. Spencer with inconsistency as an evolutionist; when the latter says that "evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life, in self, in offspring and fellow-men," he should, naturally, have gone on to indicate "as the supreme end of all moral agents . . . the highest perfection of the highest class of beings that we have to deal with." Instead of this, he positively neglects "elevation of life," as a measure of conduct, and falls back upon the Benthamism which he had previously disavowed. But, as Dr. Bixby well brings out, the process of evolution in the animal world is not altogether a pleasurable process by any means; it is accompanied at least as much by pain as by pleasure. Whether painful or pleasurable, the process must go on, and the consistent evolutionist will fix his eye upon the supreme end, the development of mankind into higher life rather than upon the happiness which may or may not be incidental to the evolution, but which, in any case, is not to be directly pursued as the end and aim of conduct, according to Mr. Spencer himself. Dr. Bixby contends that there must always have been a moral *germ* in human nature; while the countless expe-

riences of utility in the history of our race "may have preceded moral ideas and led up to them, it by no means follows that these experiences of the useful have *produced* the moral ideas. Antecedents are not necessary causes, nor are conditions to be confounded with sources. While the moral faculty, as I maintain, is original and independent and moral ideas undecomposable, it is, nevertheless, quite natural that a long process of mental development should be required before man could apprehend fully these moral ideas."

In this very acute and entirely candid critique of the "Data of Ethics," we hold the author fully justified in accusing Mr. Spencer's theory of superficiality. No careful thinker, we believe, can read Mr. Spencer's chapters on morality and feel that the subject has been adequately treated, or even that the most important facts of the moral order have really been considered at all. The reaction may be natural according to which certain writers on ethics emphasize to-day the objective act rather than the subjective feeling which was formerly the chief subject of consideration. But an ethical scheme which goes to the other extreme is no less unfaithful to our complete human nature than a purely ideal ethics. Dr. Bixby is, to our mind, entirely correct in declaring Mr. Spencer unfaithful to the complete notion of evolution itself; he should have been one of the first to admit the fact that the morality of mankind is almost infinitely above that of the so-called morality of the animal world, and that this almost immeasurable difference is due to the development of a nature which, as Dr. Bixby says, feels itself "bound to resist his hereditary impulses and social pressure about him and remake both his inner and outer world as far as he can in accordance with his vision of better things." In his constructive work, therefore, Dr. Bixby seems to us to be more consistently an evolutionist than Mr. Spencer, so far as regards the present outlook of humanity upon its actual life. He holds that our common life in the social organism gives rise "to the common rights and duties that constitute the moral life of humanity. Our moral obligations are no illusive or merely subjective phenomena, but a part of the very nature of things, — the necessary conditions of social health, growth, and permanence." The social whole lays upon each and every person certain inevitable duties which cannot be avoided, if society is not only to persist but to advance. Our end as moral beings is to be according to the "amplest, loftiest development" of which we are capable, life being an expansive power, and the chief agent of human expansion being the consciousness which looks to an ideal aim, — "the fullest, noblest, and highest life possible." This life, however, cannot be attained by the individual alone; society, giving so much to the individual, demands much in return, whether the giving of this by the individual be pleasurable or painful to him. Social coöperation is now the chief factor in human evolution; and, as altruism is just as natural to man as egoism, the demand of society upon the individual is usually obeyed spontaneously and

cheerfully. As the race advances in its intellectual development, morality becomes more rational, as M. Fouillée, quoted by Dr. Bixby, well declares. It is not, then, upon such shifting matters as the individual's feelings of pleasure or pain that his moral conduct is to be grounded, but upon his deepest and most comprehensive thought concerning his relations to society. Such consideration will usually issue, in the mind of a thinker who does not for some special reason bar out theology, in a reference to the "Power-not-ourselves that makes for righteousness." So Dr. Bixby declares: "Our conscience is rightly understood only when it is recognized as the voice of the spiritual nature inwoven with our whole personality. And that personality must be looked upon as a part of a grander spiritual whole. . . . We may look upon the moral laws, therefore, as the vital reactions of the plastic organization of humanity to the constantly repeated impressions of the righteous Cosmic Life in which man is environed, emerging at length in human consciousness in the forms of intuition of duty and the rightful supremacy of the higher motives over the lower; and the enlightened conscience we may regard as an expression in the human soul of the Divine Consciousness."

Substantially, and also in most points of detail, we regard Dr. Bixby's criticism of Mr. Spencer and his own positive construction as unimpeachable. The great service which Mr. Spencer has rendered to the thought of this generation should not blind even his strongest admirers to the fact that no man can be equally effective in all parts of such a universal scheme as Mr. Spencer has projected. In the direction of ethics Mr. Spencer's shortcomings have been pointed out by thinkers of more authority and more cautious in their statements in a field which they have made especially their own. If any one should wish even a more striking instance of Mr. Spencer's inconsistency as an evolutionist it may be found in his disposition toward the social discussions of the present time; he virtually denies the propriety of the modern State developing into something more complex and widely efficient than a State which simply keeps the peace between man and man and performs a few other comparatively simple functions. This view we hold to be entirely incompatible with the system of evolution in the political field, and it seems to us due to Mr. Spencer's prejudices rather than to his philosophy. So in his ethical scheme, he has really retained the comparatively rude standard of pleasure and pain erected by Bentham, and has coolly put aside the phenomena of morals, inward and outward, which represent in fact the highest development of the moral nature in humanity.

Mr. Spencer appears to us, however, to be more consistent than his critic in respect to the probable prehistoric origin of the moral nature of man. Dr. Bixby holds that the moral sense is incapable of analysis. It may, indeed, defy analysis at the present time, so many are the elements entering into it; yet a consistent evolutionist, holding to the de-

velopment of mankind from a lower grade of life, must inevitably seek to trace the origin of the moral nature backward from stage to stage until, apparently, everything which we should now call distinctively moral has disappeared. Yet even here Dr. Bixby could more easily mend his position than Mr. Spencer, by withdrawing his expressions concerning the incapacity of the moral sense of decomposition into simpler elements, and maintaining that the moral evolution depends upon constant accessions of life in man from the Universal Spirit of all life. How, in fact, the higher ever comes into, or is evolved from, or accompanies the lower, is the constant puzzle of all evolution. The lower does not include the higher, as Mr. Spencer would so often seem to imply. But whence does the higher element come? This is a question we cannot answer; but we are fully justified in saying that, however it comes and however it works, it enters into the steadfast process of natural development, and is just as natural as the lower to which it joins itself, and which henceforth must ever be held subordinate to the higher.

It is from the standpoint of those who seek to be rigidly consistent with the idea of evolution, then, that we accept Dr. Bixby's chief criticisms upon Mr. Spencer for his inconsistency, and in turn make something of the same complaint against Dr. Bixby himself! But we cannot close without commending this little volume, full of sound thought vigorously expressed, to every student of the moral evolution of mankind.

NICHOLAS P. GILMAN.

The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri. Translated by CHARLES ELIOT NORTON. Vols. I., Hell; and II., Purgatory. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. \$1.25 each.

In the endeavor to unite the nations divided by the ancient Nimrod,

By whose evil thought

One language in the world is not still used,

many great minds have employed themselves with the translation into diverse tongues of the poetic masterpieces of the world. Among such labors in the cause of universal letters an important place belongs to adequate prose versions. Until now, such a rendering has been lacking to the "*Divina Commedia*." It has been reserved for Professor Norton to supply the want; and these volumes prove how fortunately the occasion and the artist are met. The task could hardly have been better performed, whether we have in mind faithful accuracy, beauty of diction, or felicity of style, always restrained within the limits of pure prose.

We by no means believe, however, with Professor Norton, that in all previous versions "substance is sacrificed for form's sake." Our belief is continually confirmed that Longfellow's translation is, and will remain, the definitive English text, in which all the claims of substance, form, and spirit are balanced, and, as far as possible, equitably satisfied by means

of the rare sympathy and sense of beauty that distinguished the most widely known of American poets. Of poetry one may say in the words of Tasso,

Thou art only by thyself expressed,

for its atmosphere and its technical resources are special prerogatives. For example, the constructions of the original Italian of the "*Commedia*," differing by frequent inversions, or by other peculiarities from the manner of prose, could, in most cases, be imitated in Longfellow's verse. Professor Norton in his translation has rightly maintained the mode of natural and unforced English speech. At the same time it appears to us arbitrary and unjust to compare these two renderings, in prose and in poetry, as if the arts were in all things parallel. Better and truer is the judgment that assigns to the versions of Longfellow and of Professor Norton the first rank, each in its own department.

The opportunity tempts us to define somewhat the privileges and the duties of prose and verse as means of translation. The two main principles, moral and artistic, are in both cases the same: Fidelity and Beauty. But their application must vary according as the language used is rhythmic or non-rhythmic. The translator should — and this is especially true if his task be the "*Commedia*" — accept as his motto: "*Thou shalt renounce.*" First of all, he must efface himself, becoming only a transparent, colorless medium for the original work. Great artists as they are, it is not probable that Mr. Swinburne or Mr. William Morris would succeed in a version of the "*Commedia*." The first writer would be likely to impede, with magnificent caparison of purple and gold alliteration and rhyme, the pace of Dante's verb and noun that run together like a pair of superb horses. The latter, who has, indeed, declared that of heaven and hell he has no power to sing, would probably chant in Northern idiom a new Edda which would bring the divine poem too close to the visions of St. Brandan and Drithelm, and other mediæval imaginings, which certain commentators like to raise from the shades in order to account for the genius of Dante. If in prose, instead of Dr. John Carlyle with his warm and sincere idiom, it had been his famous brother who had set himself to translate the *Inferno*, what acrid whiffs of peat-reek would have flavored the smoke of the City of Dis!

The fidelity of the poet in translation is one thing, and that of the prosaist is another. Yet no one is bound to attempt the impossible; and in this category, for all practical purposes, may be reckoned the importation of the *terza rima*. For the sake of this, indeed, substance would need to be slain on the altar of form. The Italian language, singularly rich in rhymes and plastic in construction, is always ready to rise into song; in English the rhymes are few and hard, and the idiom is inflexible and resistant. The delightful assonances of the Italian vocabulary — terse in significance while their accents delay upon the ear — can be braided smoothly as Tuscan straw in the intricate texture of the

terza rima ; the monosyllables of the Anglo-Saxon hold themselves apart with true English insularity. Rhythm, not rhyme, is the presiding genius of English versification ; therefore we may conclude that blank verse, as adopted by Longfellow, is the form which is most intimately and elastically the representative of the original poem, as it retains the metre and remits the rhyme, while it follows sensitively the Dantean word and construction. To us Longfellow's version stands in its grace and simplicity as the supreme and perdurable rendering in English poetry ; it leaves to the ambition of versifiers only competitive experiments in *terza rima*, — agile attempts to reach the unattainable apple that hangs on the topmost bough of the tree of translation.

Two errors, in especial, vitiate the popular judgment on translations of the "Commedia." One of these is ignorance of the genius and the times of Dante, that would have him different from what he really was, and that formerly took pleasure in the frigid ornament of Cary's inexact and feeble version. But this is already in quick process of correction through the study and researches of modern criticism. The other mistake is the inartistic tendency to make an easy show of knowledge in comparisons which, in themselves illogical, prove nothing, as when one sets side by side the verse and the prose translations of some famous passage — usually the episode of Francesca or Count Ugolino, since the ordinary reader of Dante rarely traverses the entire *Inferno*, or comes out "to re-behold the stars." Such lyric moments are indeed a perfect test of poetry ; but in prose they can do little more than show the good-will of the translator, and his fine recognition at once of the spirit of the original and of the limitation of his own literary instrument.

This, in a few words, is the whole duty of the prose translator ; and here is the reason for admiring Professor Norton's work, unsurpassable in its own line. The more we read it, the more profound is the satisfaction we feel in the large quality of its devotion to Dante, in the pure and sustained beauty of its idiom, its careful attention to details, and the direct and persuasive manner in which it carries onward the story of the pilgrimage of the Florentine spokesman of humanity. The continually occurring felicities of Professor Norton's work delightfully surprise the reader, however great may have been the expectation founded upon a knowledge of the exact learning and the subtly finished style of the foremost Dante scholar in America. His effects are so legitimate, and are made with such apparent ease, that the work seems less a formal translation than a voice affectionately taking the words from the lips of Dante and reporting them, yet warm with the prophet's breath, to people speaking another tongue. Among the advantages of prose, this cordial directness is one of the chief. Another is the continuity of appeal, unbroken by the divisions and the capitalization of verse, which it makes to the eye ; the story may be read without attention to the artistic form.

Professor Norton modestly says that, if Dr. Carlyle's prose version of

the "*Commedia*" had been completed, he would not himself have undertaken the task. We may then thank the previous translator, not only for that which he did, but also for that which he left undone. Excellent as his work was and especially creditable for his day, — less critical and less devoted to research for the truth concerning Dante than our own, — a comparison of a fragment of Dr. Carlyle's version with the parallel rendering by Professor Norton will prove how well repaid is the long waiting for this entire prose translation of the "*Commedia*." We will take as an example the *Apology of Fortune* (*Inferno*, vii. 67-96) : —

CARLYLE.

"Master," I said to him, "now tell me also : this Fortune, of which thou hintest to me ; what is she that has the good things of the world thus within her claws ?"

And he to me : "O foolish creatures, how great is this ignorance that falls upon ye ! Now I wish thee to receive my judgment of her. He whose wisdom is transcendent over all, made the heavens and gave them guides ; so that every part may shine to every part, equally distributing the light. In like manner, for worldly splendors, he ordained a general minister and guide ; to change betimes the vain possessions, from people to people and from one kindred to another, beyond the hindrance of human wisdom. Hence one people commands, another languishes ; obeying her sentence, which is hidden like the serpent in the grass. Your knowledge cannot withstand her. She provides, judges, and maintains her kingdom, as the other gods do theirs. Her permutations have no truce. Necessity makes her be swift, so oft come things requiring change. This is she who is so much reviled, even by those who ought to praise her, when blaming her wrongly and with evil words. But she is in bliss, and hears it not. With the other Primal Creatures joyful, she wheels her sphere and tastes her blessedness."

NORTON.

"Master," said I to him, "now tell me further ; this Fortune, on which thou touchest for me, what is it, that hath the goods of the world so in its clutches ?"

And he to me : "O creatures foolish, how great is that ignorance that harms you ! I would have thee now take in my judgment of her. He whose wisdom transcendeth all made the heavens, and gave them their guides, so that every part on every part doth shine, equally distributing the light. In like wise for the splendors of the world, He ordained a general mistress and guide, who should ever and anon transfer the vain goods from race to race, and from one blood to another, beyond the resistance of human wit. Wherefore one race rules, and the other languishes, pursuant to her judgment, which is occult as the snake in the grass. Your wisdom hath no withstanding of her : she provides, judges and maintains her realm, as theirs the other gods. Her permutations have no truce ; necessity compels her to be swift, so often cometh he who obtains a turn. This is she who is so set upon the cross, even by those who ought to give her praise, giving her blame amiss and ill report. But she is blessed and hears this not. With the other Primal Creatures glad she turns her sphere, and blessed she rejoices."

In the swiftly revolving harmony of this version, with its apt instinct for choosing either a Latin or a Saxon word, and its singular purity of

idiom, we recognize the distinction of Professor Norton's manner. Other passages might be cited to show the translator's power, such as the view of the City of Dis, the coming of the Messo, and the narrative of Ulysses, from the Hell; or from the Purgatory, the speech of Sordello, the incisions of the first ledge, the appearance of Matilda, or the mystical triumph of the Griffin. The appreciation of the range and quality of Professor Norton's work may however be safely left to the general reader, with these mere indications. In the Purgatory, it appears to us that the translator's hand is even firmer and surer than in the first canticle, and his play of thought still more free and sympathetic. We await with high anticipation his handling of the extreme difficulties of the Paradise.

While admiring the general and the particular beauties of this version, we have marked a few questionable points, mostly in the first book. *Ombrare* (Inf. ii. 48) means, instead of "to grow dusk," to shy, as a horse. In the inscription over the infernal gate (iii. 11) it may be hypercriticism to observe the equivocal of the adjective and verb "last" as a translation of *duro*, "remain or endure" — an effect heightened by the previous words "before me." The next *duro* (iii. 12), "hard," contains, indeed, one of Dante's own Janus-faced intentions, which could have been preserved by literal translation. If we read that Achilles fought *with* love (v. 65), the flash of association which pictures him sulking in his tent is lost to us. *Pluto*, the great enemy (vi. 115), is to be identified with Plutus, god of riches, and, perhaps, in this sense the source of all evil; while *Plutone*, Pluto, Dis, or, in his character of Antichrist, Lucifer, is stationed at the very bottom of the pit (Inf. xxxiv.). By a literal version of "new," instead of "strange" roots (xiii. 73), more historic clearness would be given to the image of Pier delle Vigne's punishment. One would like to hear the sweet repetition (xix. 30-31) literally rendered, when Virgil tenderly lays down the burden tenderly borne. *Spola* (xx. 122) is not the "spool" which gives thread to the needle, but the shuttle of the weaver; so that in the original three various images appear of the first industries of the sibyls. Vapors, rather than flames, inhabit low lands; and a vapor it was that should be drawn from Val di Magra (xxiv. 145). In the nervous and brilliant rendering of the horrible duality of man and serpent (xxv. 50-75) a distinction by the use of the pronouns "he" and "it" would have made the passage still clearer to the understanding.

In the Purgatory, we notice that Professor Norton follows the reading *sposandomi* in the speech of Pia. He has good reason for this, no doubt; yet it seems to us characteristic of Dante that the whole history of the poor woman should be compressed in those few lines (v. 133-136). Of Santaflora he reads "how dark it is" *com' è scura*, instead of *si cura* or *sicura*, the literal or the ironical reference to its government; for this reading also he probably has cause. *Pregio* (xxvi. 125) is less the "prize" than the merit which procures the award.

It is very much easier to count the interrogation points than the admiration marks which have punctuated our reading of Professor Norton's work. Compact and admirably lucid is the brief exposition of the design of the "*Commedia*" which he makes in his preface; and his annotations, more numerous to the Purgatory than to the Hell, are always valuable and free from finespun theories. America can now congratulate itself upon having produced the best translations, in prose and in poetry, which have been or are likely to be made of the "*Divina Commedia*." As a result of this new version by Professor Norton in an idiom not too remote from the every-day usages of language, and telling a plain story divested of the poetic garb, we look for an immediate and evident increase of popular interest in the life and work of Dante Alighieri. In such an effect the devotion of the translator will have its most appropriate and acceptable reward.

E. CAVAZZA.

The History of David Grieve. By Mrs. HUMPHRY WARD. New York : Macmillan & Co. \$1.00.

Mrs. Ward's second important novel has naturally been received not only with great curiosity, but with a critical spirit justified by the great expectations aroused by "*Robert Elsmere*." Those who declared three years ago that this last book announced the arrival of a novelist of the highest rank, capable of greater things, have had their prophecy fulfilled in this strong, artistic and profound story, which is in reality the history of the education of a human soul. They, indeed, who read fiction simply for entertainment, as a diversion from the serious work of life or from themselves, will say at once that "*David Grieve*" is far too long, and certainly a shortening of the book by one third or one fourth would have added to its effect. The minute detail of the first part and of such later chapters as those which describe the visit of David Grieve and Lucy to Lord Duffield's country seat are not wholly defensible, even when one makes allowance for the large canvas which Mrs. Ward had a perfect right to choose, and every inch of which she has painted with the utmost care. There is, indeed, not a single loose or slipshod sentence in the book. The whole novel stands high above even the majority of the best novels of the day in its distinction of style.

It is true, again, that after the natural charm of the first part describing the "*Childhood*" of David and Lucy in Derbyshire; the more intellectual and emotional interest of the second part devoted to David's sanguine "*Youth*" in Manchester; and the strong presentation of the "*Storm and Stress*" period in Paris, the fourth book, "*Maturity*," which shows David Grieve married and doing his comparatively unambitious work of life as a manufacturer and quiet social reformer, and his wife's sickness and death, will seem to some an anti-climax. But Mrs. Ward

may almost be said to have addressed in these four books four audiences ; at least, there are four distinct sets of people who will find each book of " David Grieve " especially appealing to them. Her justification is to be found, however, in the fact that this is the history of a human life as it may actually have befallen, and more than one human life has its storms of passion in its early years, which subside into a deep, quiet and sympathetic manhood like that of David Grieve, the manufacturer and the student. From beginning to end this book has an air of actuality ; nowhere is there a tone of unreality heard, and we read it as if it were a strict biography. We must, of course, grant to the author the right to show Louie Grieve what she was meant to be — an exceptional and almost abnormal being, a moral idiot, in short, compact of selfishness and wild animal instincts. The one point where we find the air of reality most absent from the work is where Mrs. Ward makes Lucy Grieve die of a disease almost as exceptional as the character of Louie. It is not an offense against the truth of things that Louie Grieve should slay herself as her mother had done before ; the terrible force of heredity, or, in other words, the tyranny of temperament, is one of the three or four *motifs* of the book, and Louie Grieve is supposed to have inherited, almost without any admixture of her father's good qualities, the purely selfish and sensual temperament of her mother. But the novelist should not accumulate exceptional events or characters ; and, for our part, while not asking for a purely conventional end to any novel, we think that David Grieve might well have been left in the enjoyment of that happiness with Lucy his wife which came for a short time after years of marriage, when at length they really knew and deeply loved each other. Mrs. Ward should beware of a stereotyped close to her novels, in which accounts of long sickness and death-bed scenes, however faithfully and powerfully she may describe these, are a prominent feature. Evidently she desired to bring her hero into the way of faith and trust through the deep waters of affliction ; but was it not, perhaps, an injustice to such a noble character to make him suffer so deeply in his own personal experience that he might attain to fundamental peace ? His other experiences, apart from his wife's death, were surely tragical enough, and his soul was sufficiently sympathetic to draw from other lives the blessings of a healing and lasting inspiration to a noble life. If Lucy had been allowed to live, and the novel had closed with David in a happy home, the book would have struck a more natural balance between joy and sorrow than it now holds. Certainly, as it stands, it is not pessimistic, but it is sombre, and the mingling in our human lot of happiness with woe, of brightness with gloom, is not here in its usual measure. In Mrs. Ward's next novel one may hope that she will dwell more upon the happier aspects of life. We do not mean that she should represent the deep and thoughtful characters in whom she delights as altogether content, leaving them superficially happy ; but such persons, as well as the great

crowd of the mediocre and the commonplace, have some rights in the hands of the novelist, and they should not be dismissed with very short ration of felicity!

If one were to characterize "The History of David Grieve" in a few words, one might almost say that it is the teachings of Matthew Arnold in the form of a novel. Mrs. Ward has, of course, been deeply influenced by her great uncle's writings on Christianity and the Bible, and David Grieve's utterances on these subjects are such as one would expect from the writer of "Robert Elsmere." But just as much in her handling of the marriage question, a central topic in the book, Mrs. Ward is true to the Arnold doctrine. David Grieve going to Paris with that strong but hitherto latent impulse to have his fling, which his Celtic blood gave him, felt there "a goading and intoxicating *freedom*. His country lay in the background of his mind as the symbol of all dull convention and respectability. He was in a land of intelligence, where nothing is prejudged and all experiments are open." With no sense of sin in his heart and not a shred of theology in his thought, and fired with the eloquence of the French Romantics, he plunges into the sea of passion, thinking only of his own personal happiness, regardless of the burden laid upon him by his sister, and giving full swing and play to the sensuous and purely intellectual powers of his young manhood. He tries *l'union libre*, the doctrine preached to-day by many shallow sentimentalists in England and these United States. But the workman's wife, whom he meets in his distress in Paris after Elise Delaunay has deserted him, knows better. "Le mariage, c'est la justice! it is nothing but that. It is not what the priests say — oh! not at all. But it strikes me like that — c'est la justice; it is nothing but that!" Mr. Ancrum, despite his own sorrowful experience, urges upon David "the pathetic unalterable claim of marriage" in these words, which David's Anglo-Saxon conscience cannot deny:

David, that is the question of a fool. Were you and she the first man and woman in the world that ever loved? That's always the way; each man imagines the matter is still for his deciding, and he can no more decide it than he can tamper with the fact that fire burns or water drowns. All these centuries the human animal has fought with the human soul. And step by step the soul has registered her victories. She has won them only by feeling for the law and finding it — marriage, the family, the State, the Church. Neglect them, and you sink into the quagmire from which the soul of the race has been for generations struggling to save you. Dispute them! overthrow them — yes, if you can! You have about as much chance with them as you have with the other facts and laws amid which you live — physical or chemical or biological.

In later years David comes to recognize the fundamental justification of monogamy, which Goethe well called the greatest victory that human nature has won over the sensual man.

Mrs. Ward has traced in a masterly way the long history of David Grieve's religion — the actual faith and unfaith of his central being. True

to the saying she quotes : "To dissent no longer with the heat of a narrow antipathy, but with the quiet of a large sympathy" — she describes him with equal justice under the influence of the revivalist, and under the fascination of Voltaire or Bishop Berkeley, listening to Mr. Ancrum's searching gospel or docile to his own sad experience. The living voice of religion spoke to David for the first time in that interview with Mr. Ancrum after his return from Paris ; and a few years later, he writes, after attending the Christmas Eve service at St. Damian's : "The legend of Bethlehem and the mythology of the Trinity are no longer matters of particular interest or debate with me. . . . After a period of three fourths assent, followed by one lasting over years of critical analysis and controversial reading, I have passed of late into a conception of Christianity far more positive, fruitful and human than I have yet held. I would fain believe it the Christianity of the future. But the individual must beware lest he wrap his personal thinking in phrases too large for it." David Grieve often expresses that deep interest in critical questions relating to the New Testament and early Christian history which Mrs. Ward herself feels, and to which she has given so thoroughly elevated and intellectual expression in her previous writings. This is the faith to which he attains : "That the spiritual principle in nature and man exists and governs ; that the mind cannot be explained out of anything but itself ; that the human consciousness derives from a universal consciousness, and is thereby capable both of knowledge and of goodness ; that the phenomena and history of conscience are the highest revelation of God ; that we are called to coöperation in a divine work, and in spite of pain and sin may find ground for an infinite trust, covering the riddle of the individual lot, in the history and character of that work in man, so far as it has gone — these things are deeper and deeper realities to me. They govern my life ; they give me peace ; they breathe to me hope." But the religion of sorrow will not allow David Grieve to "see God" before the night of Lucy's death. "His whole life and hers passed before him ; and in his mind there hovered perpetually the image of the potter and the wheel. He and she — the Hand so unfaltering, so divine had bound them there, through resistance and anguish unspeakable. And now for him there was only a sense of absolute surrender and submission, which in this hour of agony and exaltation rose steadily into the ecstasy — ay, the *vision* of faith ! In the pitying love which had absorbed his being he had known that 'best' at last whereat his craving youth had grasped ; and losing himself wholly had found his God."

The distinction of Mrs. Humphry Ward's mind appears not only in her treatment of marriage and of religion, dogmatic or personal, but also in her treatment of such a question as socialism. She is quite free from that irrational and almost purely sentimental surrender to socialism which has characterized so many men and women of letters in recent years. She has too much respect for the private character to seek the regeneration

of the world in any other direction than the elevation of persons. Thus David Grieve says after he has been explaining to his wife the system of division of profits with the employees which he practices in his manufactory : —

Socialism, as a system, seems to me, at any rate, to strike down and weaken the most precious thing in the world, that on which the whole of civilized life and progress rests — the spring of will and conscience in the individual. Socialism as a spirit, as an influence, is as old as organized thought — and from the beginning it has forced us to think of the many when otherwise we should have sunk in thinking of the one. But, as a modern dogmatism, it is like other dogmatisms. The new truth of the future will emerge from it as a bud from its sheath, taking here and leaving there.

In a review like "The New World" one need make no apology for devoting so much space to a great work of fiction of this serious strain. "David Grieve" will excite far less religious discussion than its predecessor ; but, beyond a doubt, "Robert Elsmere" has had an immense effect upon the mind of the English-speaking public to modify their views of the nature of the New Testament, the office and influence of Jesus, and the real weight of the prevailing creeds. This effect will be enlarged and deepened by "The History of David Grieve ;" much less theological, it is true throughout to the faith which Robert Elsmere himself attained. David Grieve comes to it by a far different road, and his religious movement is one of general progress and deepening of faith after an unbelieving youth. The greatest obstacle to the spread of thoroughly rational and truly edifying views of religion, and of Christianity in particular, is the altogether natural distrust of their effect upon life. When a great novelist like Mrs. Ward sets before us, with every token of reality, a noble personality like David Grieve, who has lived for years in the acceptance of convictions supposed to be immoral and faith-destroying, her influence will be even greater than she can exert by the strongest account of change of mind in a clergyman, who must always remain to the great world, in some sense, a "professional." Few, we believe, can resist such ethical intensity as speaks in this passage from David Grieve's journal : —

A world athirst for preaching, and nothing simple or clear to preach — when once the miracle-child of Bethlehem had been dispossessed. And now it is daylight-plain to me that in the simplest act of loving self-surrender there is the germ of all faith, the essence of all lasting religion. Quicken human service, purify and strengthen human love, and have no fear but that the conscience will find its God ! For all the time this quickening and this purification are His work in thee. Around thee are the institutions, the ideals, the knowledge and beliefs, ethical or intellectual, in which that work, that life, have been so far fragmentarily and partially realized. Submit thyself and press forward. Thou knowest well what it means to be *better* — more pure, more loving, more self-denying. And in thy struggle to be all these, God cometh to thee and abides. . . . *But the greatest of these is love !*

NICHOLAS P. GILMAN.

Recollections and Letters of Ernest Renan. Translated from the French by Isabel F. Hapgood. New York : Cassell Publishing Company. \$1.50.

M. Renan seems to have determined to make as light as possible in his case the labors of those literary scavengers

Who rake the sweepings of the artist's room
And pile them on his tomb.

He has swept his own study, and we have here a basketful of scraps. He makes no disguises, but describes with perfect frankness the genesis of his book. His publisher wanted a volume in the style of his "*Souvenirs*," interesting for everybody, simple and personal. Moreover, his friend Jules Sandeau had said to him, when he protested that the public might tire of his confidences, "No, Renan, the public will always be glad when you talk about yourself." The volume collected in response to these suggestions is the most trivial that M. Renan has ever offered to an indulgent world. Several of the letters and speeches add less to the value than to the bulk of the volume, and, though they have touches of his characteristic quality, they exhibit him in a new light, — as straining after those amusing things which generally seem as easy for him as his natural breath. But the book justifies itself by what remains when these matters are thrown aside — a few judgments of persons, Hugo, About, George Sand, Cousin; the preface of the volumes and the two concluding papers, one a review of Amiel, the other called (though the reason does not appear) "A Philosophical Examination of Conscience." These have all the delicacy, wit, and charm which we expect from M. Renan, in a style so perfect even in the translation that it seems as if it could not be better in the original, while yet it is.

Only in the pages of Heine and Voltaire does one find such wicked paltering as there is here, such dainty blasphemies, and never in them is there such fundamental levity. The innuendoes of Gibbon compared with M. Renan's are clumsy and sedate. The judgments of particular persons are marvels of felicity, and have the merit of sincerity. Even when M. Renan is writing directly to Gustave Flaubert in praise of his "*Temptation of Saint Anthony*" we have this candid phrase: "Place a flower on these manure-heaps, as you did in '*Madame Bovary*.'"¹ Speaking of Hugo and Voltaire together, in the article on Hugo, M. Renan concludes, "They took pleasure in the words which you employ: they avoided the mistake of many subtle minds which, in order not to speak like the credulous centuries, wear themselves out in seeking synonyms for God." M. Renan does not do this. He talks of God and of the Heavenly Father, as if he believed in them as real existences, which he does not do at all. This fact relieves his page of a good deal that would be blasphemy if he had any real belief. A pious person writes him every three months "There is a hell." He would like to be sure of that, preferring hell to

nothingness. But he imagines, that if the Eternal were to send him to that bad place he would succeed in escaping it. "I would send up to my Creator a supplication that would make Him smile. The course of reasoning by which I would prove to Him that it was through his fault that I was damned would be so subtle that He would find difficulty in replying to it." For a believer this kind of talk would be remarkable, but M. Renan's God is but the plaything of his Epicurean imagination. He says the prettiest things about Him; he has some pages of prayers to Him of men and women in parallel columns, the women promising Him that they will talk nonsense to the men when they need it.

In the final essay M. Renan gives the most complete disclosure of his thought concerning God that he has ever made, and it is "that in the universe which is accessible to our experience we do not observe and never have observed any passing fact that proceeds from a will, or from wills, superior to man." Nevertheless "Everything is possible — even God." Only, if there is one, He is the God of some other universe — not ours. M. Renan's speculations upon "other universes" would be amusing in their agility but for the abyss upon the edge of which they dance and sing. Generally the atheist and agnostic in our time takes his revenge in an ethical intensity which shames the common ethics of the Christian world. But M. Renan's ethics are as skeptical as his theology. "On this matter one makes bets; one draws lots; in reality one knows nothing. . . . We must listen to the higher voices, but in such a manner that, in case the second hypothesis prove the true one, we may not be too thoroughly duped." A writer must be very bright, very witty, very amusing, to infect us with his own genial optimism on such a basis of unreality and make-believe as this. As we go on, the superficial gayety only makes the general impression more completely depressing. We look upon a smiling, laughing mask, and know that it conceals a countenance that is wholly sick and sad. We recognize that the optimism of the writer is merely a matter of temperament; that it has no justification in the process of his thought. Thoreau thought that atheism might be comparatively popular with God. Yes, certainly it must be in comparison with a sentimentalism which takes his name upon its lips while mind and heart are far from Him.

JOHN W. CHADWICK.

Der Prophet Iesaja, für die fünfte Auflage erklärt von Dr. AUGUST DILLMANN, ord. Professor der Theologie zu Berlin. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel.

Just after completing his commentary on the Hexateuch, Professor Dillmann, urged by repeated requests from the publisher and by his own interest in the subject itself, undertook this edition of Knobel's "Iesaja." It is only, however, in a few archæological details that he retains Knobel's

words. This is in reality, then, a new book, marked by the same painstaking accuracy and marvelous oriental and theological learning that make Professor Dillmann's *Hexateuch* by far the greatest commentary on the subject.

In the introduction Professor Dillmann gives first a critical survey of the chronological and historical setting of Isaiah's life and activity; and then follows a detailed characterization of the prophet's work. To the full discussion of the critical problems we can only refer here. The commentator takes chapters i.-xxxv. and xl.-lxvi. to be the two main divisions of the book, separated by the historical section xxxvi.-xxxix. The second main division, a book by itself, is referred to an unknown author at the end of the Babylonian exile. The historical section is not by Isaiah; it was written long after his time. That the writer of this section was not contemporary with the events he narrates, Professor Dillmann holds to be fully established by what is said of the destruction of Sennacherib's army, and of the sun-dial, together with the definiteness of the predictions in xxxvii. 7, and xxxviii. 5, which shows them to be "oracula post eventum." The announcement, too, of the assassination of Sennacherib in the year 681 B. C. is far removed from the time of Isaiah, and in connection with xxxvii. 7 it points to a time when the years that elapsed between the king's home-coming and his murder were no longer remembered.

It is, then, only in the first section of the book that writings by Isaiah are to be found. And of course not all of this section is ascribed to the prophet. Chapter xii., for example, Professor Dillmann takes to be a post-exilic addition to the chapters preceding. Verses 15-18 of chapter xxiii. are assigned to the same post-exilic date. In his discussion of the section xxiv.-xxvii., the critic, after showing that the style and the language are unlike Isaiah, goes on to determine the question of date, concluding that in accordance with the eschatological expectations expressed in the passage, one might assign it to the fourth century, "aber die Andeutungen xxvi., 13-19 passen nur in die 6-7 ersten Decennien des neuen Jerusalems; auch xxvii., 9 u. 1 zeigen dass die Verhältnisse der vorexilischen Zeit noch nicht zu weit im Hintergrund liegen. Möglicherweise können xxiv., 4-13 die Kriege u. Unruhen unter Cambyse u. Darius im Auge haben." To the period of the exile are assigned, among other passages, xiii. 1-xiv. 23; xxi. 1-10; xxxiv.-xxxv.

A particularly helpful feature of this commentary is its careful tracing of the content and development of the thought through the various prophecies. The book is a marvel of compactness; and in its amplitude of theological, linguistic, historical, critical, and archaeological learning, and its exact references to the sources in all these directions, it is such a book as scholars expect from Professor Dillmann: to say this is eulogy enough.

G. R. FREEMAN.

THE NEW WORLD

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THE SOCIAL PLAINT.

Is the social body, economically speaking, well or ill? It is certainly complaining, and suffers painful attacks. Some tell us that these are purely superficial, and that the subject is, after all, in the best of health. Others will have it that the case is truly serious, so that naught but blood-letting will restore normal tone and strength. Still others declare the patient hopelessly gone. Not taking sides, at least with this or that extreme, and not presuming to suggest either diagnosis or treatment, we will in this paper attempt an examination and registry of symptoms.

Let it be distinctly understood that the criticism to follow is not of this or that man, or of particular men at all. Individuals are only in the rarest instances to blame for any ills from which society may suffer. They, the good as well as the bad, are the creatures of the system in which they are bound up; and in general, so long as this is unchanged, they cannot be censured for proceeding as they do. Wrongs that individual action might conceivably cure are often due to ignorance, which, in economic matters, is still terribly dense. To represent employers as so many heartless Shylocks, each bent upon getting from the poor his pound of flesh, betrays slight preparation for discussing the relations of labor and capital. What is commonly said against the existing economic order needs sifting, of course. The fact of poverty is not necessarily a just impeachment of this order. Many of the poor are poor because of indolence or thriftlessness, for which they deserve to suffer. Even if laziness is sometimes constitutional, unless it can be shown that the constitution has

derived its perverse bent from social maladjustments, suffering through such laziness may be, sociologically considered, not an evil at all, but of remedial tendency, and therefore a good instead.

Nor is it a proper complaint that some are better off than others. They may have wrought or economized better. We feel as by a sort of intuition that gain gotten by the honest, open use of one's own powers, without artificial or accidental advantage of any kind, is earned, — that it belongs to the possessor, so that no other has any right to view his possession as a hardship. That the gain has arisen through superior native endowment no unprejudiced mind would regard as impairing the title, unless this has worked its victory through craft and cunning. It is only accidental or artificial advantages to which our moral sense objects.

We should, however, not abate sharp criticism of our economic doings, if the evil attaching to them seem inevitable. Though it seem so, it may not really be so, and in troubles thus perilous to humanity's advance, we have no right to remit efforts at reform so long as a ray of hope remains. Conveyance of one's thought across this continent in an hour, and of one's body in a week, was formerly deemed impossible. Poverty may yet disappear.

Nor does one at all bar out or weaken an indictment of society's ways by inquiring for the complainant's theory of remedy. He may state grievances truly, though neither a theorist nor a practitioner. Perhaps no help whatever is in store. Very many have hope on this point rather than confidence. Shall we, therefore, call evil good? Nay, not even were an oracle from heaven to declare all hope vain. That unrighteousness can never be banished from the earth does not turn it into righteousness. If the exploiting of the weak by the strong, and of the honest by the cunning, the unwilling beggar, the starving babe, the gaunt woman sewing twenty continuous hours at the machine for the wage of a shilling, and the agricultural laborer, who just manages, by agonizing toil, year in and year out, to keep death's clutch soft upon his throat, — if these are perpetual phenomena, so surely are they perpetual wrongs, and with our living and our dying breath they ought to be proclaimed as such.

Evaporating, then, the agitator's plaint, we find solid matter about as follows: In the first place, many men are rich, either altogether without economic merit, or wholly out of proportion to their economic merit. This will have to be admitted, however loosely and largely one interprets economic merit; or however great allowance we make for intellectual labor in its various kinds.

By economic merit is meant the quality which attaches to any human action, or line of action, in virtue of its advantageousness, on the whole, and in the long run, to the material weal of the community. It assumes three forms. A man may claim economic merit, when and so far as he is a wage-earner in any useful calling; when and so far as he earns economic profits, that is, secures profits by effort and agency of a genuinely economic kind, without trick, theft, monopoly, or any artificial advantage; and when and so far as he owns capital as distinguished from unproductive wealth. Capital is productive wealth. Hence a holder of capital must be, indirectly at any rate, a wealth-user. Such a functionary is called economically meritorious at this point, not as a final judgment, or to beg the question against Socialists, but provisionally, for the sake of argument. One could doubtless grant that this is a lower form of merit than would be realized were the holder also a worker; yet in society as at present organized, the mere holder of capital must be regarded as deserving well. We see this instantly if we suppose owners of capital to consume it instead of retaining it. We waive for the moment the question whether private capital is, on the whole, administered as well, as truly for society's good, as if society owned and administered it all, although the difference is certainly smaller than Socialists contend.

These, then, — wages-earning, profits-earning, and interest-earning, — are the three forms of economic merit; but it goes almost without saying that wealth comes to many who are not meritorious in any one of these ways, and to many others out of all proportion to their merit. Some flourish by gambling; whether this takes place at the faro table or on the stock exchange, makes no difference. The gambler produces nothing, yet he lives, and often thrives. This means that he is a leech, the rest of us having to share our blood with him. The immeasurable evils which have fastened upon stock operations all honest people bewail, and with justice. It is, of course, difficult to lay down a fair and tenable definition of legitimate speculation. The best one, perhaps, tests legitimacy by genuine intention to transfer the goods. It is pleasing to know that a professed intention to transfer is insisted upon in all the regular exchanges, whenever "futures" are trafficked in, and is implied in the printed forms of contract provided for such transactions. The precise difference between an exchange and a "bucket-shop" is usually declared to be, that in the latter the "puts," "calls," "straddles," and the rest, are nothing but

bets on the market prices. Bucket-shops are doubtless the more exclusively given up to this practice, but, in spite of rules, it is dreadfully prevalent in the exchanges as well.¹

We can see that proper speculation is advantageous. It acts like a governor to a steam-engine, preventing prices from rising so high or falling so low as they otherwise must. Shocks in the market that but for it would be terrible, are so distributed by it as to render them least harmful. The effect of absolutely wise speculation would be to annihilate speculation. Honest speculation is, therefore, negatively productive, like the work of judges, army, and police; it is not creative of wealth, but preventive of loss. Gambling manifestly lacks this saving character. It does not steady prices, but the reverse. At best it but transfers property from pocket to pocket.

Other economic parasites fatten on the produce of cheating, stealing, and robbery. Such, of course, earn nothing: as little when they proceed by "freezing out" small stockholders, or by forming sub-corporations to secure all the profits of main corporations under forms of law, or by creating artificial "corners" or artificial fluctuations in prices, as when they deftly pick your pockets or bravely throttle you upon the road. Individuals often secure great fortunes by mere chance, happening to be so circumstanced at some felicitous phase of business meteorology as to fill their buckets from the golden shower. Such beneficiaries are, of course, not thieves; on the other hand, they are not creators, but only receivers of social wealth.

Multitudes more prey upon society through monopoly. This may be created consciously and artificially, as in some of the great trusts now so numerous, or it may arise *bonâ fide*, in a natural way, without self-seeking on the part of any one, through well-meant but unwise legislation. The mere existence of monopoly in any quarter is no sign of wrong. Many monopoly concerns actually earn a large part of their profits, and some earn all. So far, they are not to be condemned. But the gains of others are clearly inequitable; they are not, like genuine wages or profits, a blessing to all society, but are simply so much subtracted from the social store, impoverishing society for the monopolists' behoof. Many mistakenly suppose monopoly to exist only where every sort of competition is absent. It is not necessary, in order that an establishment, or a banded group of establishments, may put an undue price upon its goods, that it should directly control the

¹ Compare, on this general subject, More's *Utopia*, chapter xii.

entire production. Immediate mastery of a majority is practically the mastery of all. This is demonstrable at once *a priori* and from experience. One can maintain a monopoly until his competitors, offering at a lower price, produce enough to supply the market. Up to that limit their competition is formal only ; they in fact participate in the extraordinary gains. Albert Schaeffle,¹ with many others, has pointed out that Ricardo's law of rent applies in a sense, under established industrial habits, to all business. The goods of any given kind, sold at a given hour, in any given market, bring not the cost of their production plus a fair profit, but the cost of the part of them, be it never so small, which cost the most. On all the cheaper portions some one has a bonanza. If such cheapness was begotten of skill, careful oversight, or any other form of strictly economic activity, the abnormal profit was earned. In any event we must regard it as legitimate, existing conditions being presupposed ; but in ninety-nine per cent. of such cases the bonanza can be traced more or less completely to mere luck.

The case is nearly the same if riches are acquired by simple shrewdness, even though this falls short of criminality, provided the shrewdness is not an element in economic merit. During our war, for instance, telegraph lines being then not extensive in the East, a certain sharp cotton speculator used to cause every steamer approaching Calcutta from Europe to be boarded far out, and the tendency of cotton ascertained and signaled to him long before the ship touched. A fleet vessel of his own, with steam up, would be waiting at the outer anchorage, which, on receiving word from the proprietor by another signal to "buy" or "sell," sped to carry this command to all his agents in the Pacific cotton ports, where its execution swelled his gold pile by millions every time. Such gains may be technically legitimate, and in international trade perhaps unavoidable ; but, so far as the internal economic system of any country offers facilities for such gold-winning extraordinary, as in great land speculations, all will feel that it is still imperfect.

If he who is unduly enriched by a monopoly has himself created the monopoly, we are quite sure to condemn the man ; but we often do this without observing that just such evils as he has effected befall us each day, in ways for which not men but the economic system is at fault. The unfair gain which accrues to multitudes from protective and other laws, hurts society only in the same way

¹ *Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers*, iii. 431, 435.

as the unearned increment of land values does. In a vast majority of cases the taker of pure economic rent earns nothing, however honestly or truly he may have earned the capital with which he bought the privilege of rent-taking. The main difference is, that protective laws, so-called, are young, while land laws are so old that most people, and, with regret be it added, some economists, take them as ordinances of nature or of God.

One of the worst evils of the sort now under survey, making some men rich at others' expense, and wholly apart from economic merit, is fluctuation in the purchasing power of money. It is peculiarly bad, because it is sweeping in its operation, and also because it works so silently and subtly that only the trained mind can see what is doing. If general prices fall, holders of money and of titles calling for money grow rich by cutting coupons, taking to themselves so much of society's pile for no equivalent whatever, of course making the rest in like degree poorer. If general prices rise, the reverse infelicity occurs. Special attention is called to the fact that it is quite immaterial whether the fatal change in the value of money arises from new plenty or new scarcity of money itself, or because of extra dearness or cheapness on the part of general commodities. It is as truly a source of robbery in the one case as in the other. In addition to the cheat which all general price fluctuations entail, falling prices have the additional baneful effect of painfully discouraging industry and production,—an effect which has had as much to do as any one thing with the hard times of recent years. Through rise and fall in money values, then, as well as through mere luck, through monopoly, through theft, and through gambling, it actually does come to pass that, under our present economic practice, one section of society eats, drinks, and is merry, in whole or in part, at the expense of the rest, very much as if the latter were slaves.

On the other hand, — the counterpart of this proposition, — a great many men are poor without the slightest economic demerit. They are people who do the best they can, and always have done so; they are not dissipated, indolent, thriftless, or prodigal of children, but quite free from these vices, being in every way exemplary citizens and worthy members of the community. Yet they are poor, often very poor, never free from fear of want, doomed for life to the alternative of hard labor or starvation, and as thoroughly cut off from all means of culture proper, as completely precluded from the rational living of life, as were the Helots of old Sparta. Such human beings are to be found in

every city of the world. They are less numerous in America than in Europe, but America has them, too. Let him who doubts read Mrs. Helen Campbell's "Prisoners of Poverty," or better, go among these poor people, converse with them, and judge for himself.¹

It has been carefully computed that in representative districts of East London no less than 55 per cent. of the very poor, and fully 68 per cent. of the other poor, are so because of deficiency of employment,² while only four per cent. of the very poor, and none of the other poor, are loafers. It is estimated that 53 per cent. of the needy in New York city suffer for work instead of aid, and the willing idlers among those are certainly no more numerous proportionally than in London. According to the "Massachusetts Labor Statistics" for 1887, almost a third of the people in that State returned as usually engaged in remunerative toil, were unemployed during nearly a third of the census year, 1885; the working people of the State, as a whole, averaged to be employed at their main occupations less than eleven months of the year. These results are not far from normal for this country, while for most others they are much too good to be normal. It must be admitted that the extreme division of labor has wrought its curse as well as its blessing. According to the Massachusetts statistics only about one in eighteen of those deprived of their usual employments turned to another.

Most well-to-do people, whether millionaires or ordinary *bourgeois*, know, in effect, absolutely nothing about the truly poor. Mr. H. M. Hyndman does: "I have watched friends of mine who have had to go round week after week, month after month, maybe, seeking for a job. Such men do not parade their griefs, never, or very rarely, ask a middle-class man for help, and would utterly scorn to beg. Yet, as a highly skilled artisan said to me only a few days ago, 'I would almost as soon go begging bread as begging work; they treat you as if it were a favor you asked.' I have watched such men, I say, skilled and unskilled, too, and the mental effect upon them of these long periods or short periods of

¹ For the poverty of East London, see Mr. Charles Booth's *Labour and Life of the People*, vol. i. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1889.

² *Ibid*, p. 147. These are invaluable statistics. Of the four thousand cases on which they are based, among the very poor, 14 per cent. are so from drink or thriftlessness in the family, 27 per cent. from illness, infirmity, size of family, or from one of these causes combined with irregular work. Among the other poor, 13 per cent. of the families suffered from drink or lack of thrift, 19 per cent. from illness, size of family, etc.

worklessness is more depressing than I can describe. Let a man have been never so thrifty, if he has a wife and children, a few weeks of idleness sweep away his savings; then he begins to pawn what little things he has; later he gets behind with his rent. His more fortunate comrades help him, — this is invariable, so far as I have seen, among all classes of laborers; and then, if he is lucky, he gets into work again; if not, his furniture goes, and he falls into dire poverty. All the time not only has the man himself been suffering and losing heart, but his wife has been fretting herself to death and the children have been half-fed. In the winter-time, when the uncertainty of getting work becomes, in most of our great industrial cities, the certainty of not getting it for a large percentage of the laboring men and women, things are, of course, at their worst. After having vainly trudged from workshop to workshop, from factory to factory, from wharf to wharf, after having, perhaps, fought fiercely, but unsuccessfully, for a few hours' work at the dock gates, the man returns home, weary, hungry, half dead, and ashamed of his growing raggedness, to see his home without firing or food, perhaps to go to bed, in order to try and forget the misery around him."

But is not the condition of the poor continually improving? Yes, and no. Undoubtedly the average wage-worker can earn more pounds of wheat, meat, and coal, and more yards of cloth, by twelve hours' work to-day than fifty years ago, and probably enough more to make up for the greater unsteadiness of labor now. Mr. Giffen's statistics for England are well known. In the industries figured upon by him, wages have advanced since 1820-25 between 10 and 160 per cent. The average may be about 50 per cent. The English income-tax, *per capita*, has increased as follows: in 1865-69 it was £14; in 1870-74, £15 6s.; in 1875-79, £17 4s.; and in 1880-84, £17 2s. There are endless figures of the same tenor, which we need not cite. Mr. Giffen says that the wealth of Great Britain advances at the rate of three per cent. yearly; population, only 1.3 per cent. How speedily, at this pace, may we not expect poverty to be extinguished! For this country the improvement is at least no less; we doubt if it is greater. Mr. Edward Atkinson's roseate pictures of laborers' progress are familiar to all. The French *savant*, M. Chevallier, has surveyed, as best he could, the whole industrial world, and is very sure that the laborer has advanced everywhere.

In all probability the figures usually presented upon this subject, taken literally and for the time to which they relate, are not false.

Materially, the workingman is gaining a little. Well may we rejoice that his wage is no longer the scanty four shillings a week, fixed for Warwickshire hands in 1588, under Queen Elizabeth's Statute of Labourers. His very discontent, by a well-known law of human nature, proves that he is profiting. Yet many representations, as commonly pressed and understood, mislead. Thus when Mr. Goschen, a few years ago, following Mr. Giffen's line of argument,¹ showed that the number of small fortunes and incomes in England was increasing faster than large, faster than fortunes in general, faster than population, he did not touch the really poor at all. He dealt with incomes from \$750 a year upwards, estates under \$5,000 in value, house rents of \$100 and on, small shareholdings, small insurance policies, and the like. But what is all this to the caravans of poor fellows with starvation incomes, or none at all? Is it not almost mockery to argue hope from a more felicitous distribution of "estates," "rents," "policies," and "shares," in Britain, when English villages, unable to give employment, are emptying their impoverished sons and daughters into the cities at the rate of sixty thousand or seventy thousand yearly, only to make their situation, if possible, worse yet; when, as a report of Mr. Burnett, labor correspondent of the Board of Trade, assures us, the sweating system is forcing men and women to work sometimes for thirty-three, and even thirty-six, consecutive hours to avoid starvation, and when the hungry hordes of East London poor, but for the Christian work done among them, or for fear of the police, would speedily march to the sack of the West End!²

In our own country one hears equally inconclusive utterances regarding the masses' welfare. On reading them, we sometimes really pity the mill-owners, and wonder why they do not take work as hands in the mills. The common statement about wages as increasing faster than income from invested wealth, neither has, nor can have, statistical proof, because we have no public or even private registry of profits.³ So, too, the apparent fact that a greater and greater proportion of the nation's product goes year by year as wages, does not necessarily imply a rising rate of wages, but may accompany falling wages, and it will do so if population increases faster than wages fund. And when wages

¹ *London Times*, weekly, October 9, 1887.

² The Earl of Meath, *Nineteenth Century*, January, 1889.

³ The recent statistics of the Massachusetts Bureau, 1891, appear to be excellent, so far as they go.

statistics are adduced to show improvement, nothing can exceed the recklessness with which they are sometimes made and handled. Wages of superintendence frequently swell the apparent average. Account is rarely taken of shut-downs and slack work, or of those unable to find work at all. The system of fines, often as vicious as it is common, is also ignored.¹

In many respects, indeed, the toiling masses are no whit better off to-day than in England four centuries ago. The late Thorold Rogers, describing the Plantagenet and Tudor age, declares that then "there were none of those extremes of poverty and wealth which have excited the astonishment of philanthropists, and are now exciting the indignation of workmen. . . . Of poverty which perishes unheeded, of a willingness to do honest work and a lack of opportunity, there was little or none. The essence of life was that every one knew his neighbor, and that every one was his brother's keeper." The fact is, that while the poor man has been getting on, he has not retained his old-time closeness to the average weal. Let us take a rubber strap, fasten one end, and extend the other till the length is doubled. If, now, we note the changes in the relative positions of points between the middle and the fixed extremity, we shall find that each, though farther from the end than before, is also farther from the middle; that, besides, the points nearest the end have moved least, those nearest the middle, most. Of those between the middle and the free end, all are now further beyond the middle than before, while each has gained the more the remoter it was at first. Much in this way has society stretched out in the matter of economic welfare. There, at the fixed point of dire poverty, stand the mighty masses, as they have always stood. Our heaping up of wealth, Pelion upon Ossa, elevates them no iota. Their neighbors have removed from the dead point a little, but the centre has gone away from them still more. Those nearer the average at first, and yet beneath it, have drifted further from the fixed extreme, but not one among them is so close to the middle as he began. Only when you pass beyond the average do you come to men who have gained upon the average, and these have accomplished this in proportion to the advantage which they had at the start.²

¹ These errors, which, of course, he could not correct, must be allowed for in M. E. Chevallier's *Les Salaires au XIX^e Siècle*, a very instructive work on the whole: the author is, however, too hostile to coöperation and profit-sharing.

² We do not forget the difficulty of laying a solid *ωὸν ἐνὸς* for this analysis. The *personnel* of "the rich" and of "the poor" of course changes incessantly.

While the poor man should be very glad that his toil brings him more and better food, raiment, and shelter than once, the fact that it does so is no sign that his condition is "improved" in the sense in which this expression is usually understood. Richer supply for one's mere bodily wants does not signify that one is getting forward, or even holding one's own, in humanity's general advance. Let man, as a race, remove further and further from the condition of brutes, and let me, in the mean time, keep as near to the average of human weal as ever, — that is what I want. So long as I am falling behind the average comfort, welfare, culture, intelligence, and power, it insults my manhood to remind me that my sweat commands per drop a little more bread. "It is written, man shall not live by bread alone." And in this higher life, the only one in respect to which it is really worth while to discuss the question at length, hosts of men in civilized countries are making no progress whatever, but are relatively losing ground.

To be sure, "the workman is now a freeman, and, compared with his progenitors, an educated man. If not taught in the schools, he has learned from the increasing progress which he beholds everywhere around him. In the railway carriage he visits the great towns; the newspaper gives him intelligence of all that is going on from day to day in the most distant portions of the earth; he hears discussed, with more or less accuracy and information, the leading topics of the age. So, life itself for him is a great public school. But when he beholds the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of the higher classes, which affords to them luxury, the ease, the social distinction, and the means of enjoyment denied to him, and when he reflects that this wealth is mainly created by the toil of himself and his fellow-laborers, he is naturally filled with discontent and envy, wherein may yet, perhaps, be found the seeds of anarchy. Amid such circumstances he is exposed, on the one hand, to the teachings of socialistic advocates; and, on the other hand, to the inculcation of the doctrine of passive obedience, and to that blasphemous as well as puerile philosophy which would enjoin him to submit meekly, in the name of reason or religion, to a condition of things which is abhorrent to every sentiment of justice and to every feeling of humanity."¹

A penniless fellow strikes "pay gravel," and is a millionaire; another man just as suddenly falls from opulence to rags. Still a *weū orō* is attainable. The economic fortune of many an identical man, family, or community, which for the last fifty years shows no break, paroxysm, or absolute change of any kind, can be seen to have altered greatly in relation to the material welfare of the country as a whole.

¹ Rees. *From Poverty to Plenty*, pp. 65 seq. London, Wyman & Sons, 1888.

From this point of view, the wages-system itself, inevitable as it after all seems to be, is yet an evil, at least in comparison with the older one of masters, associates and apprentices. It has become the order of things for human beings to work on a gigantic scale for other human beings as servants, menials, serfs, being granted access to the means of production not in their own right as men, but by the gracious favor of their more lordly fellows. The effect is to put a stain upon toil as dishonorable. If you are verdant enough still to speak of the "dignity of labor," people smile at you. That old aphorism has gone to the rubbish-pile. Witness the pride of many *bourgeois* aristocrats, who boast of it as a special claim to consideration, that neither they nor their ancestors ever got a living by work. Equally significant is the assumption, both haughty and common, of capitalists, that they are the "guardians" of labor. But every one notices that wage-workship is widely regarded less humbling in proportion as it ceases to involve subjection to individuals. As a rule, work for a private corporation even, is more desired than work for A or B; work for a great public corporation, responsible to society, is still more desired; work for churches and educational institutions is yet more sought after; while work for the state is so enticing that even at the most moderate wages, and in spite of an all too insecure *ténure*, a hundred applicants scramble for every post.

How slight is even the economic betterment usually alleged, compared with what, from foreknowledge of the character of the age, one would have been justified in anticipating. Such progress in all the industrial arts, such cheapening of wares, such opening of new continents in North and South America and in Africa and Australia, the richest in bread-yield and beef-yield of any beneath the sun, should, it would seem, have annihilated poverty. Yet the amelioration is only well perceptible for wage-workers as a class, and for the unskilled it is hardly this. Still less can any general law of economic progress, covering the centuries, be established. On the contrary, the passing of this age of industrial advance and of world-wide land utilization with so slight gain in the ordinary comforts of life on the part of the laboring man, goes far to preclude all hope of great improvement for him under present economic conditions.

Thorold Rogers noticed that the trades correctly cited by Mr. Giffen as showing an advance of wages since 1833 have each had the advantage of a trade-union, and Rogers apparently cherished strong hope that unions were to introduce the laborers' millennium.

I am unable to share this pleasing view. Each trade-union will benefit its own members, not unmixedly, indeed, because it always levels downward more or less in quality of work and in wages; but trade-unions often operate against one another, and they continually keep down instead of elevating the unskilled masses. Even an industrial trust, like the Knights of Labor, cannot exert its central power without forcing the abler and better workmen to make common cause with the poorer, so as greatly to impede production; nor will such an organization ever be in condition to enforce a general strike, because of the "scab" laborers constantly ready and competent for so many kinds of work. To exclude foreigners, which, so long as our protective laws continue, would be just, would not rid us of "scab" help. The increase of home population would soon furnish this. It is hard to see any likelihood under the present economic system, unless a good deal modified, of any such continence on the part of the laboring masses in our cities as will deliver them for any length of time from the grip of Ricardo's iron law. Self-interest will never do it. This is a point where the *laissez-faire* theory of society most visibly breaks down. Morality and higher intelligence would do it, but we fear that these can never be engendered in sufficient degree amidst the existing poverty and strife of classes.

One has a right to complain touching the idle wealth which the present order of things heaps up, and the still greater quantities of wealth which are wasted out and out. If any one of our numberless millionaires wishes to turn some millions of capital into non-capital wealth in the form of needlessly large houses and grounds, gorgeous equipage and clothing, fancy wines and viands, or works of art never to be seen but in his own house, there is nothing to hinder him and much in the way of example to tempt him. Yet his act abstracts these millions from the wage-fund as permanently and effectually as if they were sunk in the mid-Atlantic, leaving many a work-seeker to hunger or starvation, who, had the man built factories or railways with his pelf, might have been well off.

It is amazing in view of this process, continually going on, to hear some of our brightest thinkers arguing as if poverty were always due to the fault of the people who suffer from it, as if there were some providence or natural law which would make it impossible for one man ever to smart for the misdeeds of another. Not seldom the exact reverse occurs. This, in fact, is one of the very worst vices of present industry, that it not seldom visits

curse upon men for results which they had not the slightest hand in originating. It is said that profits are justifiable because the employer takes risks,—a position entirely just so long as the present system prevails. But it is not the profit-maker alone who is involved in the risks he takes. His help are bound up with him, and if he is proved to be rash, while he himself will only have to surrender this or that luxury, they may starve or freeze. When over-production, again, either alone or aided by over-speculation or by those changes in the value of money already referred to, has evoked a commercial crisis, the poor, who have had nothing whatever to do with causing it, are its most pitiable and helpless victims.

Socialists have said none too much about the cross purposes which, of necessity, prevail in our unregulated production. Let the business man be as careful as he may, under the prevalent business methods he cannot but take most dangerous risks. There are now only the roughest means for ascertaining what the next season's demand for this or that line of goods is to be, and still poorer chance for learning what the output by competitors is to be. Notwithstanding all that trusts have so excellently done to forecast and regulate output,¹ every year's operation of many a manufactory is to a great extent a game of hazard. Lines of business are over-wrought, begetting glut and necessitating sales below cost; needless plant is set out, which must decay or burn. Losses in these ways are crushing, and are so much the more sad in that they are intrinsically needless. Through such waste of capital, interest rises, and wage-yielding businesses which might have flourished are prevented from starting. Prices fluctuate abnormally, deranging and discouraging industry. Mills that were in operation close, the operatives, who had absolutely no part in the errors which brought the crisis, being the chief sufferers. One earnest writer refers to such dislocations of industry all the economic troubles of the time.² We see here, again, that poverty does not always befall men by their own fault, but very often through the crime or stupidity of others.

We have space merely to name a few unfortunate features not so strictly of an economic nature, which attach to the prevalent industrial course of things. Wealth is for man, not man for

¹ A merit of the trust-system usually not recognized. Compare the author's article on "Economic Reform Short of Socialism," in the *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1892.

² W. Smart, *Contemporary Review*, 1888.

wealth. It is conceivable that a given line of production should favor the amassing of wealth in a most eminent degree, and yet be so baneful ethically, for instance, as not to deserve toleration. To be laid to the account of the existing economic dispensation is most of the fraud and villainy in industrial life. If you are a grocer, and other grocers send their sugar, you must, or, unless you have immense capital, leave the business. If you manufacture clothing, and the fashion in that line of production is to beat sewing-women down to starvation wages, you must do thus, or you are lost. You may wince or protest, but your position is such that you cannot obey conscience without becoming a martyr. This is why the best men in a trade do not fix its maxims and practices, but the worst.

It is a fact that our present plan of industry presses men with indescribably strong motives to gamble, to depress wages to the utmost, and to cheat in the quality of wares. Many resist nobly. Many others yield, but with a stout inward protest which would do honor to them were it known. People dislike to do wrong; but in hundreds of cases, if not as a rule, they must do wrong or fail in business. The meanest man undersells the noblest and, either financially or morally, drives him to the wall.¹ Honesty is often as uneconomical in face of the customer as in face of the tax-assessor. Out of this murderous competition there is a survival not of the fittest but of the unfittest, the sharpest, the basest.

When great wealth has been amassed, even honestly, another fearful pressure is brought to bear upon its possessor to regard it too much as an end, and to bend all his energy to the further swelling of the pile, how inordinate soever it may be. He overworks himself; he takes colossal risks; he frets; he passes sleepless nights. He forgets his obligations to family, society and God. He reads naught but market-reports. Think, he does not; he only reckons. Such a life is not rational, and its general prevalence through generations cannot but make us more a race of Babbage calculators than of moral beings.

Lastly, much of the wealth itself, invested in idle or positively harmful luxuries, is lost to society as truly as if sunk in the Pacific Ocean. Any one who will reflect can easily make himself heart-sick by computing what a large proportion of existing wealth has been put into forms that not only do not afford wages to labor, but are a moral if not an economic disadvantage to the owners

¹ Read, in Mrs. Helen Campbell's *Prisoners of Poverty*, the chapter entitled "Two Hospital Beds."

themselves. This is not condemning luxury, but only useless and damaging luxury, which, of course, no economist can approve ; nor can any one else do so, without repudiating altruism and going over to the baldest egoism in ethics.

I do not believe that socialism is coming ; but I expect a moral growth of society which will bring with it many changes, some of them radical, in the economic structure and methods of society. Workingmen's complaints are not all wanton and they cannot be dismissed with a puff. That pleasing optimism which views all increase of wealth as inevitably, under natural law, a blessing to wage-workers, is very shallow. Both the socialist on the one hand and the *laissez-faire* theorist on the other are in too great haste to generalize. At present our business is the analysis of social conditions, — deep, patient and undogmatic.

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RELIGIOUS EVOLUTION.

ONLY a few years ago the general opinion of Christendom was that all the religions of the world are divisible into two classes, the true and the false. In one class the Jewish and the Christian faiths stood alone. These were hardly to be regarded as two, for one was only a preparatory stage of the other. Indeed, since the Christ was read back into all the Jewish records and discovered, where he had been carefully hidden, everywhere, it is perhaps better to say that in this first class Christianity stood alone. This class had been supernaturally revealed and authenticated ; it was therefore stamped as eternally "true" and as unchanging as its Author. In the other class were all the other religions of the world, all labeled "false." Milton ingeniously imagined that they were devices by which the devils — the fallen angels — managed to get themselves worshiped in place of the one only and true God. Others spoke and wrote of them as impostures, consciously and purposely foisted upon the various peoples by their fraudulent inventors. Until within a few years Mohammed, for example, was generally spoken of as having "gotten up" his religion, just as some wily schemer "promotes" a swindling scheme on Wall or State Street. I distinctly remember that this was the impression I got of him from whatever reading was accessible to me on the subject during my boyhood.

As the result, however, of the discovery of gunpowder, together with the uses of steam and electricity, the world has been thrown open to investigation. The past has been resurrected. The origins and growths of ideas and systems have been studied. There is beginning to be a science of comparative religions. The opinions of all competent thinkers are changing or have already changed. The outcome of all this is that there are no longer any "false" religions, any more than there are "false" flora or fauna, or "false" arts or inventions or governments. Watt's steam-engine was not a "false" one, as compared with any supposed "true" steam-engine in use to-day. The first tree-like forms were not "false" compared with the oak or the pine. Nor is the gorilla "false," compared with Homer or Shakespeare. Each period in the history of our planet has had its own appropriate vegetable and animal forms. Each period in the history of man has had its own appropriate out-blossoming of thoughts and theories, of discoveries and inventions. So the religion of any age or people has been the natural expression of the religious life of that time or race. There are no "false" religions; and there is no "true" religion in the sense that a finality has been reached. There are only grades of religious thought and feeling and life, beginning in the lowest and crudest savagery, rising step by step to where we are to-day; but the stairway still rises, and "slopes through darkness up to God." Like Jacob's ladder, this religious progress rises from earth to heaven. But the top is still far away and out of sight.

As one studies the various and manifold manifestation of the religious life of man, one great fact becomes clear in the midst of the apparent confusion. This fact is so important and so full of inspiration and hope that I wonder that no more has been made of it. It runs, like a line of light, through them all, from lowest to highest, and binds them together like beads on one golden string. As biology now recognizes but *one life* on earth, from protoplasm to man, so this fact shows that there is and can be but *one religion*, from the feeblest beginnings of human feeling and thought up and on to that "far-off, divine event to which the whole creation moves." I have tried myself to bring out on several occasions the fact in question; but I am not aware that anybody else has dwelt upon it. It seems important enough to be here treated at sufficient length to make it perfectly clear.

For the purpose in hand there is no need of settling the question as to what was the first and lowest manifestation of man's

religious life. Whether this was ancestor worship or fetish worship, or both combined, or neither, we can wait for science to settle. But whatever it was, we can see plainly what the attitude and purpose of the worshiper must have been.

Take, as an illustration, the case of some North American Indian who, for whatever reason, has come to believe that a spirit, an invisible power, a god, is associated with or resides in the stump of a tree. This becomes his altar. He brings to it an offering, perhaps some tobacco leaves, and laying these upon the stump offers up his prayer. He asks the spirit that dwells in the place to hear him and accept his gift. Then he prays that he may be successful in the hunt; or that, from the warlike expedition on which he is setting out, he may return to his village safe and victorious.

Let us analyze this act of religion, and see of what elements it is composed. The savage has in mind certain theories clearly outlined or dimly perceived that underlie his action, and he is animated by a certain purpose. His action represents elements common to all the religions of the world. He is not yet troubled with any thoughts of natural or supernatural, possible or impossible. He has, however, a set of theories, ideas or notions: (1) as to the nature and character of his god; (2) as to himself; and (3) as to the relation in which he stands to his god. He feels sure that this god can either help him or hurt him, as he may be inclined, or according to the relation in which the two stand to each other. He is thus dependent upon his deity. He thinks (4) that the present, existing relation between himself and his god is not the best or most favorable possible. Otherwise he would not do anything to better it. He thinks (5) that it is possible for him to improve this relation, and get on better terms with his god, by doing something which he has come to believe his god desires.

The one purpose then, the one aim of the Indian's religious endeavor, is to get into more favorable relations with his god,—this power, which is not himself, which is outside of and above him, which can help or hurt, and on which his life and prosperity depend. Here is the common type which, in the midst of all variations, is apparent in the many forms which religion has assumed in the past, and which must appear in any form which it may assume in the future.

To see the naturalness and necessity of this, let us glance at some of the more developed forms of religion. Let us attend one

of the feasts of the Hebrews in the days of the First Temple as the Old Testament describes it. Representatives of the people have come up from every part of Palestine. The priests have marched in procession; the psalms have been chanted by the temple choir; the bullock has been slain, and the blood has flowed over and about the altar; the High Priest has gone into the Holy Place and sprinkled with blood the Mercy Seat; he has returned from the Holy of Holies and has pronounced the absolution of the people; and they have started on the return journey to their homes with the sense in their hearts of being at peace with Yahveh.

What now have these Jews of Solomon's day been doing? They had their thought about their God. They had their ideas as to their own nature and character. They had their thoughts as to the actual relation in which they stood to their God. They believed that this relation could be improved. This whole religious service was their attempt to comply with the supposed conditions in accordance with which they might secure these better relations. They were trying to do precisely what the savage was trying to do — get on better terms with their deity. The essential impulse and aim, in both cases, are precisely similar.

When, in later days, the prophets tell the people that Yahveh does not desire the blood of bulls and of goats, that he is weary of their burnt offerings, and that what he really does want is that they should do justly, love mercy and walk humbly with him, the type of religion is not changed. The prophets have gained a higher and nobler thought of Yahveh, and so a more worthy conception as to the best way of getting into right relations with Him. The problem to be solved is the same. The impulse is the same. The aim is the same.

When, later still, Jesus teaches that not in any special place and not by means of any special rites is God to be worshiped; when he declares that what God desires is the true heart and the life of loving service, and that all else is of no avail without these, still the problem, the impulse, the aim remain unchanged. It is still man's attempt to find out the way by which he may come into right relation with God.

To turn aside, and go back for a moment to the classic days of Rome and Greece, let us call up some scene of religious service in the Eternal City and in Athens. It is not necessary to stay for description. No matter what god or goddess was approached, the worshiper was engaged in the one same age-long effort. Having

his thoughts of his god, of himself, of the actual relations existing between them, and of certain possible better relations, he was trying to attain these better relations.

In papal Rome it was the same. When Luther brought on the Protestant revolution, it was because he became persuaded that he had found a truer thought of God, of man, of the ideal relations between them, and of the means by which the ideal was to be attained. He was engaged in the one perennial pursuit. Precisely the same thing is true of all the many sects into which Protestantism has been divided. The liberal religionists of to-day — Unitarians, Universalists, Independents, or whatever other name they bear — are what they are because they believe that by free study and inquiry, in the light of all attainable knowledge, they can better find out the truth about God, about themselves, about the relations in which they actually stand to each other, and about the way by which to establish better relations, than they can while hindered and hampered by the bonds and traditions of the ages of the world's ignorance and childhood. But the search is ever the same.

This marvelous and impressive unity will appear still more clearly and forcibly if we raise the question as to whether, under any other name, this religious search is likely to be outgrown. One of the great thoughts of this age is that of the adjustment of the various forms of life to their environment. That which cannot, or does not become so adjusted, perishes; for this adjustment is the condition of its life. The degree of man's adjustment to his environment is the measure of his welfare and prosperity. To the theistic evolutionist, God is his environment; for the universe is only the changing manifestation of that "eternal energy from which all things proceed." Being "reconciled to God" then — in the phrase of Paul — and being "adjusted to his environment" — in the phrase of Spencer — mean practically the same. For the religion of the intelligent and free man of to-day is not a thing of Sundays or of books, — it is a life.

Professor Huxley is the inventor of the term "agnostic"; so let us take him as the example of a school. I intend no carping or criticism. Professor Huxley may hesitate to affirm or deny God. But he recognizes a power without imaginable beginning or end. This power is not himself, and it is manifested in the universe about him. It was here before he was born, and will be here when he is dead. On this power he depends, for life and breath and all things, every moment. He has his thought about

this power, at least so far as it is manifested and so concerns him. He has his thought of himself. He has his theory as to the relation in which he stands to this power. He knows that on his right relationship to this power depend his life and welfare. To know the laws of this power then, and obey them, he is sure is the secret of human well-being. The agnostic then is and must be engaged in the same search which has impelled the human race from the beginning, — the search for the secret of life. If a man is a dogmatic atheist even, the problem is not changed. He still stands in vital relation to this power that is not himself, and still it is through knowledge and obedience that he is to attain life and welfare.

From that far-off day, then, when man first stood upon his feet and looked, with questioning eyes, upon the heavens, to that other far-off day when, lord of himself and of his conditions, he shall be a member of a world-wide kingdom of God, this one thing has been, is and must be true: Man is essentially a religious animal, and this religious search is the search of the ages. Man always has been and always must be "feeling after God, if haply he may find Him who is not far from every one of us." By so much as he finds God, by so much does he find life and happiness. His thinking has been affected by conditions of race, climate, country, inheritance, tradition and culture; but each religion, at its best, has been an earnest attempt to get into right relations with God.

No argument is needed to make apparent at once the fact that all this chimes, in perfect harmony, with the teaching of evolution. On this theory, we find the religious history of the world has been precisely what we should have expected. It accords with the thought of a universe — the unity of the race and the unity of the power by whose impulsion it has been lifted to its present level of civilization. It reveals also the fact that only intelligence is necessary to guide this one age-long search to such a religious unity as shall culminate in a completely realized brotherhood of humanity.

If this theory be true, then Christianity is no exception to the universal law of religious growth. It is not a supernatural religion, let down out of heaven from God, like the vision-city of the Apocalypse. It is so far the largest and finest development of the God-consciousness and the God-search of the human heart and mind. Growth must be expected in the future as fast and as far as man is able to attain truer conceptions of God, of himself, and of all that is needed to bring about higher, better and closer relations between the human and the divine. Having in mind

these facts of the past that seem to find their key in theistic evolution, let us turn to this theory that has proved the solvent of so many problems, and see if we can find in it an explanation of the religious changes that are going on all about us and of which we are all a part.

That form of religion called Christianity — the popular, “orthodox” theory which has dominated Christendom for a thousand years, — is formed after the same general type which has already been made clear. It is made what it is by its peculiar thought about God, about man, about the relations existing between them, about the ideal of these relations, and by its proposed method for securing more desirable or “right” relations. At the risk of repetition, let us analyze the popular Christianity. We shall thus see its entire conformity to the universal religious type.

1. There is its theory of God. He existed as a threefold personality from eternity. At some point, decided on by himself, He created the world and time began. Until recently, this was generally held to have been about six thousand years ago.

2. Immediately after the creation of the world man was created. He was a perfect being, made in the image of God. But, by voluntary transgression, he fell into a state of sin, misery, and death. A rebel against God, he had forfeited all claim to love or mercy. This condition so infected the race that all human beings were born corrupt, and worthy of endless punishment.

3. By supernatural revelation, through prophets and inspired writers, God condescended to tell men the condition they were in, — *i. e.*, the relation in which they stood to himself.

4. This revelation also pictured the relation between man and God as it ought to be. Man dreams of the divine forgiveness here and of heavenly felicity, as the result of it, forever.

5. This revelation is supposed to set forth the terms and conditions of God’s pardon and of human deliverance. The second person in the Trinity has volunteered to be a sacrifice. By accepting this divine provision, man succeeds in getting once more into right relations with God. The one purpose, then, the aim of all Christian endeavor, is just this. All the churches, the preaching, the hymns, the prayers, the rituals, the services, have this for their one motive-power and objective point.

The value of Christianity has been, of course, in the amount of truth it has held and taught, and the amount of service it has rendered in helping men into right relations with God. But should anything happen radically to change the convictions of

men as to the actual relations in which they stand towards God, or as to the validity of the methods by which it is proposed to better these relations, it would of necessity result that radical changes would take place in the Christian system itself. Should these changed convictions lead the world farther away from the truth, it would of course be a serious calamity. But, on the other hand, should they prove to be a step forward and upward, so bringing the world nearer to the truth, then equally of course it would be an unspeakable blessing. It behooves, therefore, all students, teachers, writers, and preachers to handle these matters with a free, open, serious, and earnest mind.

As a matter of fact, these fundamental postulates of the great, historic "orthodox" system are now challenged and called seriously in question. Let us, therefore, note carefully what has occurred, and what it is that constitutes the seriousness of this challenge.

In the first place, it is worth while to note, in passing, that the demonstration of the Copernican theory of the universe gave a most disquieting shock to the settled convictions of Christendom. The world of Ptolemy was admirably adapted to be an appropriate stage on which to play the drama of redemption. It seemed lost and out of place in the Copernican world. Then, unfortunately, the church had committed herself to the old theory as infallibly revealed. Undoubtedly a great impulse was given to the belief in the righteousness and safety of free thinking by the discovery that, in such an important matter, the "infallible" church had mistaken. But, though Catholic and Protestant alike declared the new ideas to be irreligious and atheistic, a compromise was patched up and things settled down to comparative quiet.

But a new and more threatening source of disturbance arose in the form of the very modern science of geology. This discredited the so-called Mosaic account of creation, and the supposed biblical chronology. It changed the accepted order of the creative acts, and turned the six days into uncounted periods of time. All this was not human doubt or speculation, but only a reading of the demonstrated word of God recorded in the rock volume of the earth itself. Along with this belief in the antiquity of the earth came a belief in the antiquity of man as well.

As the result, again, of the opening up of the whole earth to scholarly investigation, there has arisen the science of Comparative Religions. The mythologies, legends, traditions, folk-lore, and fairy tales of the world have been studied. How wonder stories

spring up, and how religions grow, and on what evidence (?) miraculous tales are accepted, — all these have been brought to light. The result of these things has been a criticism that sifts and weighs, and separates the true from the false.

Of more importance than either of these, while accepting and including them all, is what I shall venture to call the demonstrated science of Evolution and Darwinism. Here is the crowning glory of the nineteenth century. For the sake of giving honor to whom honor is due, it is well to recognize the fact that Herbert Spencer had begun his work, and had published hints of what was coming, before the appearance of the "Origin of Species." I mark this because it seems to be the general impression that Mr. Spencer is only a gleaner in the field of Darwin's discoveries. It is obvious, however, that Darwinism is only a subordinate province in the universal kingdom of Evolution. Great discoveries do not come all at once. Darwin had been preceded by the guesses and speculations of such men as Lamarck, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, and his own grandfather, to say nothing of some of the early Greek philosophers. It is enough glory for Darwin that he discovered at least one *vera causa*, and so turned speculation into science.

As to the status of Darwinism at the present time, I will simply quote the opinions of two authorities. In a private letter to myself, dated October 29, 1890, Mr. John Fiske writes: "I do not know of any living scientific man, of any account, opposed to Darwinism as a whole, though of course there is (as there ought to be) much diversity as to *subsidiary* questions." In September, 1876, Professor Huxley gave three lectures on Evolution in Chickering Hall in New York. In closing his second lecture he said, "In my next lecture I will take up what I venture to call the *demonstrative* evidence of evolution." Towards the close of this third lecture he declared: "The doctrine of evolution at the present time rests upon *exactly as secure* a foundation as the Copernican theory of the motions of the heavenly bodies. Its basis is *precisely of the same character*."

For myself, I venture to think that the matter can be put in such a way as to rationally compel at least provisional acceptance by all intelligent and free minds. First, as to the earth itself, one of three things must be true: Either the earth was always as it is now; or it was suddenly created in the precise condition in which we now find it; or else it has grown into its present condition through a long course of progressive changes. No one advances the claim that it has always been as it is to-day; so we

need not consider this notion. That it was suddenly created in the condition in which we now find it, there exists not one slightest particle of proof. That it has come into its present condition through a process of continuous and progressive changes, there is a large body of evidence. This is backed up by the fact that worlds and systems can now be observed in process of growth in the skies over our heads.

Of these three theories, then, it is apparent that two have absolutely no proof whatsoever in their favor; while the third (which is Evolution) not only has an almost overwhelming body of evidence, but it has all the evidence there is. As between three theories, two of which have no proof whatever, and the other of which even has only *some* proof (to say nothing of its quantity), no reasonable man can for one moment hesitate after he clearly sees the situation. Does not this simple line of thought amount to a demonstration of the evolutionary theory, at least so far as our earth is concerned?

Let us now pursue a similar line of reasoning concerning Darwinism, or that part of it which covers the origin of man. Here, also, there are three theories, all of which as a matter of courtesy I will call thinkable. We know that there was a time when man was not on this planet. By what process then did he get here? Either he was suddenly created, or he was born of parents very much unlike himself (as, for example, as if a dog were born of a horse), or else he has appeared as the result of slow and progressive changes in animal forms, and was born at last of parents only slightly unlike himself. One of these three theories must be accepted by all persons who arrive at the dignity of thinking. Here again (let it be carefully noted) in favor of either of the first two theories there exists not one slightest particle of proof. All the proof there is, and the amount is very large and constantly accumulating, is in favor of the last theory, which is Darwinism. Whatever "missing links" or breaks there may be, then, however scientists may still differ as to minor matters, this much is clear: there is no proof in favor of anything but Darwinism, and in its favor there is a vast amount of evidence.

Are we not rationally compelled then, as in the case of the earth, to say that all reasonable and free thinkers must be Darwinians? There is no reasonable choice. The man who is not familiar with the facts has no right even to an opinion, while he who is familiar with them and is not a Darwinian declares one of two things, either that he is the slave of a bias that will not let him be

rational, or else that there is some defect in his mental mechanism itself. In the light of all that is known at present there is simply no other alternative.

Before we go on to consider impending changes of belief, it is worth our while to note the mental attitude of those who claim to represent the historic "orthodoxy" of the church. At one extreme we find Brother Jasper, who still clings firmly to his version of the Old Testament teaching and declares that "The sun do move!" He shares with no one else, probably, the proud distinction of being the last of the followers of Ptolemy. Then comes a class represented by no less distinguished a man than Rev. Dr. William G. T. Shedd. These are not troubled by modern thought because they pay no attention to it. A distinguished college president in the West (now dead) told me once that Professor Shedd said to him that he did not regard as worth reading any of the books written since the sixteenth century. It is quite natural, I suppose, that the inhabitants of the sixteenth century should not be disturbed by the controversies of the nineteenth. Then there are those who cannot be false to the instincts and duties of scholarship, but who cling to the old beliefs as long as they can reason out what seems to them any sort of solid ground on which to stand. I have no fault to find with this, provided there is no paltering with facts, and there is a loyal allegiance to truth so far as it is seen. Then there is another large class, made up of those who have thought they heard a divine voice, like Abraham, and who have gone out at its bidding, without a too prudent inquiry as to whither it would lead them. At the other extreme to Brother Jasper are the ignorant and shallow echoers of what they suppose to be Darwinism, who consider it a matter of pride to declare that the humbug of the universe is found out at last, and that it is only "dirt."

Now, what is the secret of this tremendous upheaval of modern thought? It seems to me plain that the age is in labor, and is giving birth to a new and unspeakably grander revelation of truth. It is a flood of light that drives the weak-eyed to the antique dimness of the cloister and leaves many others in the condition of him who saw men only "as trees walking." When the Copernican theory displaced the Ptolemaic, no one of the stars was put out. So to-day religion itself is in no danger. But there is going on an "irrepressible conflict" between the old theories that constitute "historic" Christianity and what I believe to be the grander religion that is to be the next step of humanity towards God.

Let us recall now the religious type-form, and ask careful attention to the fact that a radical change of belief in any one part of the type compels a reconstruction of the whole. A theory about God (or the "power not ourselves"), a theory about man, a theory as to the actual relation existing between these two, a theory as to what the relation ought to be, a theory as to what is necessary to attain this right relation — here is the type. It is obvious that if any one of these be changed it will result in a change of them all. If, for example, God is not what we thought Him, then, no matter what we are, the relation between us cannot be what it was supposed to be. So our idea of the relation that ought to exist is changed, and, of course, the method to be employed also. A religion is a vertebrate, and we cannot change the structure of one limb without reconstituting the whole.

We are now ready to note the effect of that new revelation of truth that is called Evolution or Darwinism. At one stroke it abolishes the supernatural creation of man, the Garden of Eden, primeval human perfection, and the fall of man. It also abolishes the old idea of God, as a being outside the universe, creating by fiat, governing from without, and related to man as a king to his subjects. Religion and morals are no longer laws imposed by the arbitrary will of a governor and hedged about by arbitrary rewards and penalties. Sin is not something to be arbitrarily "forgiven," in the old sense; prayer is not a power to interfere in the working of the universe; and miracle is not so much disproved as rendered unthinkable, since we cannot imagine God as interfering with himself, and there is no longer any external "nature" with which He can interfere. Evolution does not dethrone God, but enthrones Him more securely than ever. For the universe, from the grandest star down through dust grain to the unimaginable minuteness of the dreamed-of "atom," is only the manifestation of the eternal and tireless energy and working of the Infinite God. God, then, was never so near and never so accessible. Materialism as a universe-theory has been slain by science itself. Already we are on the eve of such physical discoveries as seem to bring us face to face with the ineffable glory of God himself. Those who still claim to be materialists have been compelled, in order to account for this fact, to invent "mind-stuff" and "atom souls," and so to change their definition of "dead" matter as to recognize the magnificent truth that it is pulsing and thrilling with an infinite life.

The old conception of God then, as well as the old conception

of man, is hopelessly gone. There has never been any fall, but only ascent. Humanity is not in rebellion against God, and so not under his condemnation. It of course necessarily follows that Man is not in need of any "salvation" in the theological sense of that word. The whole dogmatic and practical machinery of the old church is therefore adapted only to "delivering" him from a condition which, in reality, does not exist. It is undoubtedly true that the story of Eden and the Fall grew up as, perhaps, the best attempt then possible to account for the observed facts of moral and physical evil, suffering and death. But Evolution accounts for these things not only as naturally and fully, but in a way far more consistent with the honor of God and with hope for man.

The old historic theory of "orthodox" Christianity is thus hopelessly discredited. It is dead, no matter how long it may seem to have life. However strongly entrenched in popular belief the Ptolemaic theory of the universe may have been, when Galileo first caught a glimpse of the moons of Jupiter it was dead. He had discovered a truth of God which made it impossible that the old conception should survive. Henceforth it was only a question of intelligence and of time. So to-day the demonstrated truths of evolution make it impossible for the old notions of Christianity to survive. Again, it is only a question of intelligence and time. The thought about God is proved to be incorrect. The thought about man has been proved to be incorrect. The thought as to the actual relations existing between God and man is proved to be incorrect. So, however fine the dream of relations such as ought to exist, it is of course apparent that the means of bringing about ideal relations, having been based on misconception as to the real conditions, must also be beside the point.

Intellectual houses, not being amenable to the law of gravity, can be the scene of curious happenings. If from beneath a house of wood or stone the entire foundation be suddenly removed, it visibly and audibly tumbles about the ears of its inhabitants. But the basis of an intellectual establishment may be suddenly taken away and the owner appear to be quite unconscious that anything has happened. The doctrine of the fall of man is unquestionably the foundation on which rests the whole superstructure of "orthodox" Christianity. Yet hundreds of preachers who freely admit that the advances of modern knowledge have removed it clean away, do not seem to see any reason why they should not go right on with their ecclesiastical housekeeping just the same.

Still the world does actually get on, though after its own somewhat curious and lumbering fashion. As an illustration of its methods of progress, let us note the progressive changes of belief concerning the nature of the Bible. When it is first established as the infallible source of authority for all Protestants as over against the infallibility of the church, the belief is that it is verbally inspired, as literally as though written by the very finger of God. But this position proves untenable. Then the doctrine of plenary inspiration is held, to the effect that the Bible teaches no error of any kind, and does teach all truths that man needs to know in order to salvation. But this theory also proves untenable. It is settled that the writers made mistakes in history and in science, for example. So a new doctrine arises, that the Bible was not intended to teach history and science; yet it is infallible concerning all spiritual matters, that is, in religion and morals. When this position, too, has to be given up, the Scriptures are still specially set apart from all other books as being those into which God has been peculiarly written.

A process like this has been going on concerning the historic Christian scheme as a whole. The fall of man is given up, or it shrinks to the proportions of a parable of the personal experience of the individual soul as it first becomes conscious of moral distinctions. The miraculous mission of the prophets, and, indeed, the entire supernaturalism of the Old Testament, is waved to one side. Even in the New Testament, miracle ceases to be a proof of the nature and the mission of the Christ, and is only mildly accepted on the supposition that a wonderful being may reasonably be expected to do wonderful works. So Constantine said it was only fitting that such a being should "invent a new way of being born." The supernatural claims of the church are gradually abandoned. "Unbaptized infants" are taken out of even "the easiest room in hell," and admitted to paradise. The number of the hopelessly lost is reduced until only those are left whom God himself is not able to save, because He bestowed on them the fatal gift of free-will, so that they are able permanently to defy the Almighty. But why even these few should wish to do so is not made very clear.

To such a pass, then, has the old system come. The "irrepressible conflict," however, still goes on. A leading Congregationalist ("orthodox") minister has recently written me, "Evolution is the law of the relation of all things in time, including Jesus;" again he says, "The doctrine of evolution is all-comprehensive, or it is

nothing." This has long been my own belief. In carrying this discussion, then, to its fitting conclusion, it will be necessary for us to carefully examine the question whether there is anything in the history, character or teaching of Jesus that compels us to consider him an exception to the great law of religious growth.

One striking fact meets us at the very outset. We can start with a time when Jesus was viewed as simply a man, and we can trace every step of the natural evolution of the idea which, it is said, a supernatural theory is needed to account for. But when we can see the idea of the supernatural in the very process of natural development, is it not apparent that, all the while, we are in the realm of the natural?

It seems strange to us to-day that anybody should ever think of a man as being also a god. So far is it from our ordinary methods of thought that the very strangeness of it influences us. We are apt to think that there must have been some extraordinary reason for so extraordinary a thought. But we need to remember that the apotheosis of Jesus took place in an age and a country where the process was common and familiar. The deification of man might almost be spoken of as characteristic of the age. It was a regular custom to deify the Roman emperors as they died. But Augustus became a god even in his lifetime. He was worshiped and treated as the source of the peace and prosperity then universal in almost every peasant's cottage throughout the empire. It is most significant that this process of seating Jesus on the divine throne should take place at a period in the world's history when such deifications were considered natural. It took about three hundred years for the growing dogma to become complete in the finished form of the Trinity, and every step of the advance can be easily followed. It is not necessary now and here to trace all these steps in detail. I wish only to note some curious indications of a double story in the Gospels themselves. These plainly show the earlier tradition already beginning to be overlaid by the later thought.

If Jesus be correctly reported, he taught in the plainest possible words that he should return in the clouds of heaven to change the old order and set up his supernatural kingdom before the generation to which he was speaking should have passed away. Even if he be not correctly reported, the fact that he was believed to have thus spoken reveals plainly the popular expectation. This conception is apparent throughout the New Testament. Paul teaches it; and the Apocalypse is all on tiptoe in anticipation of

the astounding event to come. In the face of such a general belief, of course, it would not occur to any one to write a biography or record of Jesus. The story simply passed from mouth to mouth, or was taught by the catechists. When, however, he did not come, the early Christians not only began to revise their opinions, but also to feel the need of some more permanent account of the great life and the wondrous sayings. Thus, in the most natural way in the world, the gospel narratives came into shape. Who their editors were, no one now can tell with any certainty.

Let us now notice a few of the indications of the double story referred to. The genealogical table in Matthew is evidently a part of the earlier tradition current before the miraculous conception was heard of. It traces the ancestry of Joseph; and it is evident that, if Joseph was not the father of Jesus, the table has no more to do with Jesus than it has with anybody else. Intended to prove the descent of Jesus from David, it does not prove his descent from anybody, on the theory of the supernatural birth. In the face of this tremendous oversight on the part of the Holy Spirit (on the "orthodox" theory) it is of only secondary importance to point out that this table does not at all agree with the tables in the Old Testament.

Turn now to the stories of the birth of Jesus. As recorded in Matthew and in Luke, they are full of confusion and contradiction. But, important as this fact is, I do not wish to dwell on it now. I desire rather to call attention to the naïve and unconscious indications of a theory of the proper humanity of Jesus utterly irreconcilable with these stories. In this wonder world, an angel visits Elizabeth and foretells the birth of John. Another angel visits Mary and prophesies the birth of Jesus. Another still visits Joseph and lets him into the marvelous secret. When, at the age of eight days, the child is brought for presentation in the temple, the prophet Simeon and the prophetess Anna recognize his miraculous origin and nature. If these stories are true, Joseph and Mary, Zacharias and Elizabeth, Simeon and Anna and a whole circle of relatives at least knew who Jesus was,—the supernatural Son of God. Yet when, at the age of twelve, he goes up to the Temple with Joseph and Mary, they are astonished beyond measure that he should show a precocity that attracts the attention of the doctors. When on the day of their return they find he is not in their company, they are as anxious and troubled as though they supposed a supernatural being was not capable of

taking care of himself overnight. When he says "Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?" they have not the slightest idea what he is talking about. At a later time, when the much more modest claim is put forth that he is the Messiah, his own brothers (who must have heard something about the supernatural birth) scout the whole notion, and will have nothing to do with him. The story of the visit to the Temple evidently belongs to the period before Jesus was viewed in any other light than as an ordinary human child.

This untangling of the different, confusing and contradictory traditions might be carried much farther. This much is here set down only to indicate the undoubted fact of their existence. But two or three other points are worth noting as bearing on the natural growth of the belief in the supernatural nature and origin of Jesus. In a preserved fragment of one of the lost gospels is a hint of a tradition once current that Joseph was the father of Jesus, and that the Holy Ghost was his mother. The notion gives us a glimpse of the fluctuating condition of thought and fancy in that far-away time.

The church fathers make curious unconscious confessions. One of them condescends to argue with a heathen on the basis of his own mythology, and pleads that it is no more strange that the Christian God should have a son by a mortal mother than that similar things should occur among the Olympian deities. St. Chrysostom acknowledges that it was not known at first that Jesus was anything more than a man, and that Joseph was supposed to be his father. He even thinks that, under divine guidance, Joseph and Mary were married on purpose to conceal the fact that Jesus was virgin-born. Conceal from whom? From the Devil; for the Devil, being able to understand prophecy, was on the lookout for virgins likely to become mothers, in order that he might frustrate the plans of the Almighty. Others said that it was necessary to keep from the Devil the fact that Jesus was really the second person in the divine and eternal Trinity, for unless the Evil One supposed Jesus to be a man, he would not think he could compass his death. In this case, the whole scheme of salvation would have come to naught. God was represented as having made a bargain with the Devil, by virtue of which Satan was to have Jesus in exchange for souls purchased by his death. Had the Devil known that Jesus was God, and so could not be kept in hell, he would not have agreed to this contract. So, by a master-stroke of guile on the part of God, the Devil was cheated of his prey.

These facts are important for two reasons. They show us what sort of stuff was regarded as reasoning, evidence and proof, in the days when the dogma of the Deity of Christ grew up. They also show very clearly that the belief was an afterthought, not at all a belief held from the beginning. One of the plainest of all plain facts then is that the belief in the Trinity is only an illustration of the natural evolution of religious ideas and dogmas. It grew as naturally out of the mental soil of the age as the story of Hercules or King Arthur grew up in other times. There is nothing in the known origin and nature of Jesus that requires us to think of him as outside the order of natural evolution.

Is there anything in his teaching that compels us to think of him as more than human? Fine and high as it confessedly is, it seems only the natural outflowering of the thought of his age. Indeed much that seems most characteristic and noble was original with him only in the clearness and freshness of its utterance. The thought itself was older. The Golden Rule was taught by Confucius and Gautama; and Hillel was before Jesus in declaring it even among the Jews. Did Jesus do anything that lifts him out of the range of humanity? The miracles attributed to him are no more wonderful than those of the Old Testament, or those said to have been performed by his disciples.

Does Jesus seem to be more than a man? The reply to this question seems to me to depend entirely upon our own subjective ideas as to what is possible to humanity. If we start out with a poor and mean theory of man, of course we can easily lift Jesus, in our thought, above it. When some one asked Father Taylor if he thought there had ever been anybody as good as Jesus, he (a Methodist Perfectionist) on the contrary, replied, "Millions!" If we should arbitrarily set the limit of poetic achievement at what Marlowe and Dryden and Milton attained, it would be easy then to exalt Shakespeare, and declare that he could be accounted for only on the theory that he was greater than man. But who has authority to set the level of the humanly possible so low as to leave out the towering stature of the Nazarene? Until some one can authoritatively set the limit between the human and the divine, the saying that Jesus was more than a man must be, in the nature of things, only an arbitrary act of human and so presumably fallible judgment.

How, again, are we to know, in the light of only fallible records, whether the historic Jesus of Nazareth and the ideal Christ of to-day are one? Twice in my life have I asked clergymen if, when

they spoke of "Christ" so often, they always meant the historic Jesus, and in both cases the answer was "No." Each of them told me he had in mind the great ideal of human perfection. One of these clergymen was a Unitarian, and the other was Orthodox. So practically it has come to pass that the person of Jesus has been clothed upon with all the higher and finer dreams of the ages. But, should we grant that he was the perfect and ideal man, this does not prove him to have been more. Even though he were God, it is not easy to see how that fact could have been manifested within the limits of humanity. A god in human form could be no more than a perfect man, without ceasing to be man. When he becomes a man he limits himself to the scope of humanity. He thinks through a man's brain, he loves with a man's heart, he aspires with a man's soul, he veils himself with a man's body. He could then manifest no more of the god than the man could hold. If Hercules casts aside his club, and arms himself with a reed from the brook, his giant strength thenceforth must be measured by the reed. He can strike no heavier blow than the reed can bear. So, if God in very deed should come into a man, He could appear no more than ideal manhood. Whether, then, God came down from above and took possession of a man, or God evolved the divine in man from beneath until it blossomed out into humanity's ideal, I do not see why the results would not be precisely the same. How, from the outside, at least, would any one be able to tell the difference?

To the theistic evolutionist there thus appears to be no reason for making Jesus an exception to God's ordinary method of working. The supposed necessity is only a survival (perhaps unconscious on the part of the thinker) of the old ideas of God's methods. If Evolution be the divine method of galaxy-and-world-making, the method of the development of life on earth, why should we try to "help out" God in our thinking, as though certain things were too much for Him unless He resorted to extraordinary methods? Instead of piety, this looks very much like the perversity and pride of personal opinion.

The historic "orthodoxy" of Christianity, I repeat, is hopelessly discredited by modern knowledge. The thought of God as an external, arbitrary governor is gone. The thought of man as a fallen being, and so a willful rebel, is also gone. The old conception of the relations between God and man is gone. So the old methods of reconciliation are demonstrably uncalled for. They are the work of human imagination dealing with the raw material of miscon-

ception. A clearer light of knowledge shines on our pathway. It is a most striking fact (almost more striking, considering the age in which he lived, than the claims that have been made on his behalf) that Jesus himself never taught the "essential points" that have made up the "Christian" scheme. Free therefore from those entanglements of demonstrated error, his great teachings and his spiritual attitude, God-ward and man-ward, still shine before us a star of leadership. So, as the dogmatic system falls away from him, the real Jesus is given back to us, dearer than ever before.

Religion remains, to grow to more and more. As it ceases to be a "scheme" for "soul-saving," it becomes a life. It breaks over the bounds of days and rituals and abolishes the distinction between "secular" and "sacred." All life becomes sacred, for in all daily work and play, as well as in services called religious, man is face to face with God. He is our environment; and to become adjusted to Him is the condition of all life, prosperity and happiness. All truth is his word. Every effort to better the world is service of Him. All admiration of that which is above us is worship of Him. All aspiration, all outreaching of our life towards Him, is prayer. The universe is his temple and the stars are his altar-lights.

In the days to come, as we recognize that each new truth is a new word of God, religious progress will be a duty and not a crime. To find out more and more of the vital laws of God, in nature, in government, in society, in industry, in the body, heart, mind and soul, — this will be the one great endeavor. To know and obey will be found the one good. So it will be seen ever more and more clearly that the religious search is the search for the secret of life. As they discover this secret, men shall have life, and have it more abundantly.

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THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF THE STORY OF SODOM.

It is now many years since the late Professor Diestel, of Tübingen, pointed out to me that in Gen. xviii.—xix. 22 we have a fusion of two versions of a popular Israelitish story, in one of which Yahvè (Jehovah) was said to have appeared in a single human form, in the other in a group of men. If this view were correct, the case would be similar to that of the description of a divine appearance to Jacob in Gen. xxviii. 10–22, where two narratives have evidently been united by an editor. It cannot, however, be shown that there is a combination of narratives in Gen. xviii.—xix.; putting Gen. xix. 29 aside (the solitary passage from the late Priestly Narrative), we have no linguistic grounds for analyzing these two chapters into heterogeneous elements. Two courses are open to us. We may suppose with Mr. Fripp¹ that in the story as it was penned by the narrator whom we call the Yahvist, the divine Visitor was related to have appeared alone, and that a later editor (or later editors) not only inserted vv. 17–19 and 22a–33a (as Wellhausen suggests), but consistently throughout altered “the man” into “the men” (once into “three men,” and once into “the two angels”), “him” into “them” (I speak English-wise), “thy” into “your,” “he” into “they,” and so on. Or we may hold with Wellhausen² that the Yahvist himself imagined Yahvè to be represented by three men, and that the distinction between Yahvè (who remained to talk with Abraham) and the “two angels” who went to Sodom was due to the same later writer who (as Wellhausen rightly thinks) introduced vv. 17–19 and 22a–33a,—a passage which reveals the existence, in the writer’s time, of doubts as to the divine justice such as we know to have been expressed by Jeremiah (xii. 1) and the author of the book of Job. For my own part, I prefer Wellhausen’s solution of the problem. Mr. Fripp’s theory compels him to suppose a strange piece of carelessness in the later editor at Gen. xix. 19–21, where (according to his theory) an original “he” has once been altered into “they,” but has twice been left standing. It seems to me that the “three men” are an apt symbol of the *elôhîm*, or divine

¹ *Genesis* (1892), pp. 48–53.

² *Die Composition des Hexateuchs*, pp. 27, 28. Mr. Bacon, in his excellent work, *The Genesis of Genesis*, p. 133, note †, seems to me to misapprehend somewhat Wellhausen’s view.

powers, whom collectively the early Semites worshiped at each of their sanctuaries,¹ but whom Yahvè-worshippers had long since begun to view as summed up in an individual god. The indeterminateness of the relation of "the men" to Yahvè is just what we should expect in an age which had not had the courage to take a new start in religious thinking.

It is necessary to prefix these remarks, my primary object being to trace the origin and explain the significance of the original Sodom-story, though I shall not willingly close without briefly setting forth the permanent religious significance both of the original Yahvistic story and of the very noble inserted passages.

What is, it then, that the original Yahvistic story related? We have seen in chap. xviii. how, at the sacred grove of Mamre, Yahvè visited his faithful servant Abraham and accepted his hospitality. This statement conflicts with a prejudice of recent origin. It has often been said that while the Aryan races bring the gods down to earth (witness the *Iliad* and the *Edda*²), the Semites find their gods in divinized natural objects, thereby revealing an innate tendency to supernaturalism. This view, however, is not altogether supported by the evidence. The Assyrio-Babylonian and the Israelitish people, equally with the Lycaonians, could have said, "The gods have come down to us in the likeness of men" (*Acts* xiv. 11). Of the local Babylonian myths we know but little, but considering that "the deities of the popular faith were all represented in human shape,"³ we can hardly doubt that visits of the gods in human form to favored mortals were commonly reported in the olden time. Indeed, the dream of Assurbanipal's seer,⁴ in which a visit of Istar is described somewhat as Homer might describe a visit of Athênê, enables us to reconstruct imaginative Babylonian narratives differing only in their spirit from that which is preserved in *Gen.* xviii. Of the local Israelitish myths, enshrined in the book of *Genesis*, we have a real though scanty knowledge.

It is in chap. xix., however, that the mythical and legendary element is strongest. We there learn that as a punishment for

¹ Cf. Professor Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 426 ("the *elôhim* of a place . . . viewed collectively as an indeterminate sum of indistinguishable beings").

² *Hom. Odys.* xvii. 485, καὶ τε θεοὶ χεῖροισιν δουκότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι κ. τ. λ.; Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, pp. xxxiv.-xxxviii.; cf. pp. 312, 313.

³ Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 483.

⁴ *Records of the Past*, ix. 52; cf. Sayce, *l. c.*

their violation of the sacred law of hospitality, and for a deadly sin committed at least in intention, "Yahvè rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire from Yahvè out of heaven, and overthrew those cities, and all the Region, and all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew upon the ground" (Gen. xix. 24, 25). Can we throw any light upon this story? In order to do so, we must inquire (*a*) whether there are any other traces of its existence in Israelitish tradition. The answer is, that it is referred to in numerous passages of the Old Testament. In some of these Sodom alone is mentioned as the guilty and the punished city (Isa. iii. 9; Lam. iv. 6; Ezek. xvi. 48-57); in others Sodom and Gomorrah are both referred to (Isa. i. 9, 10, xiii. 19; Jer. xxiii. 14, xlix. 18, l. 40; Amos iv. 11; Zeph. ii. 9), while in others the names of Adma and Zeboim are added or even mentioned alone (Deut. xxix. 23; Hos. xi. 8). There is also one passage with but a vague reference to the destroyed "cities" (Jer. xx. 16). We may also possibly find allusions to the tale in certain descriptions of divine judgments (Ps. xi. 6, cxl. 10; Ezek. xxxviii. 22; Isa. xxx. 33, xxxiv. 9, 10), though a better explanation will be given later on. Now, if we look at the passages quoted first, we shall be struck by the use of technical Hebrew terms for the divine judgment, viz., *hāfak* "to overturn," *māhpēka* "(the) overturning." From these terms it has been inferred by Nöldeke¹ that the original Sodom-story represented the cities to have been destroyed by an earthquake. The conjecture is obvious, but by no means necessary. A fully adequate reason for the use of these terms will be given presently. Suffice it to mention here that the very same verb *hāfak* is used (in Nifal) in Job xxviii. with reference to the shapeless masses produced upon the earth by the action of fire.

We have also to ask (*b*) whether there are any parallel versions of the story of the destruction of Sodom. In reply let us note that Bunsen found a survival of one of the forms of the Sodom-story in the statement of Trogus (Justin, xviii. 3, 3) that the Phœnicians were forced to leave their home by the *Assyrium stagnum* by an earthquake. But, as Gutschmid points out,² the *Assyrium stagnum* is certainly not the Dead Sea, but the lake of Bambyke (Mābūg or Hierapolis). The chief extra-Biblical passage, however, in which distinct reference is made to the destroyed cities is in Strabo (xvi. 2, 44), where, after describing the rugged and burnt-up rocks, exuding pitch, round about *Mouaráda*

¹ *Untersuchungen*, pp. 21, 22.

² *Beiträge zur Gesch. des Orients*, p. 26.

(i. e., the stupendous rock-fortress Masada, near the southwest shore of the Dead Sea), the geographer mentions the native tradition that here thirteen cities once flourished. The ample circuit of Sodom their capital can, he says, still be traced. In consequence of an earthquake, and of an eruption of hot springs, charged with bitumen and sulphur, the lake advanced suddenly (*ἡ λίμνη προπέσσει*); some of the cities were swallowed up, and others were deserted by as many of the inhabitants as could flee.¹ How much value can be attached to these stories? Little enough on the score of proved antiquity, but we cannot afford to disregard even secondary evidence. It is remarkable, too, that the Korán constantly refers to Sodom and Gomorrah by the title *al mutafikât*, "the overturned" (Sur. ix. 71, liii. 54, lxix. 9). This title, however, probably comes from Mohammed's Jewish teachers.

We can now proceed a step further, and inquire what analogous stories are in existence in the Eastern or Western world; but not, of course, with the view of tracing all such stories to a common local origin. Comparative ethnic psychology has taught us that the deepest roots of folk-tales are in the nature of the human mind. Even when tales do migrate from one people to another they assume a new local coloring, which makes it possible to dispute their historical connection. But at any rate, the comparison of analogous tales will give us some help in tracing out the origin and significance of the story of Sodom. Now the number of stories concerning ruined cities is very great;² and, quite unconsciously to ourselves, they seem to have long since influenced our conception of what happened to Sodom according to Gen. xix. For I cannot help doubting whether the idea that the cities of the Pentapolis are covered over by the Dead Sea would have taken such a hold on the popular mind, but for the existence of so many folk-tales of the submerging of cities by water. Let us now consider these folk-tales. Even in our own time, says Professor Rhys, each Welsh mere (Bala lake in particular) is supposed to have been formed by the subsidence of a city, whose bells may even now at times be heard merrily pealing.³ On the shores of the Baltic and of the North Sea similar tales are told, one of which has formed the

¹ Cf. Josephus, *B. J.* iv. 8. 4, *ἔστι γὰρ ἐπὶ λείψανα τοῦ θαλάου πυρὸς, καὶ πέτρε μὲν πάλαιον ἰδεῖν σκιδεῖν*; also Tac. *Hist.* v. 37, Solin. c. 36.

² See Tobler's art. in *Im neuen Reich*, 1873. L. Pinaud's art. "Les villes disparues," in *Revue des traditions populaires*, v. 8, I have not seen.

³ Rhys, *The Arthurian Legend*, pp. 360, 361. One notion appears to be that the departed spirits and the fairies have their home in the submerged tracts.

subject of a beautiful poem by Wilhelm Müller. Elsewhere, as in Switzerland and the Tyrol, falling rocks are the instruments of sudden ruin; a mountain valley strewn with boulders naturally suggests the thought of smiling plenty suddenly exchanged for desolation. But the story is not always an inference of the imagination from the natural peculiarities of a district. Near Brecknock, we are told, "there is a large lake known as Llyn Llangors. Local tradition has long declared that under this lake lies a drowned city. . . . But the curious thing is that within the last few years numerous traces have been found of a large lake-city in Llangors Lake, showing clearly that it has certainly been the site of one of those [well-known] lake towns." ¹ Often, but not always, these legends have received a moral meaning. Thus a place on the Lake of Thun is said to have been destroyed because a dwarf was refused hospitality during a storm by all the inhabitants except an aged couple who dwelt in a miserable cottage. ² It is hardly necessary to point out the similarity of this story to the Biblical narrative. It is a cheap explanation to say that the Swiss story was modeled on the Biblical one. No; it is one of the many Teutonic dwarf-stories. It was not invented by an individual, but by the unconscious action of the popular imagination.

A still greater profusion of analogous stories meets us in the East. The story of Philemon and Baucis is well known from Ovid's beautiful narrative (*Met.* viii. 626, etc.), but I must not pause long upon it. There may possibly have been an earlier form which would have been helpful for purposes of comparison. But as the tale stands, we can only regard it as a secondary version of the story of Sodom and Gomorrah, especially when we remember that the Syrian king Antiochus the Great (B. C. 223-187) removed two thousand families of Jews out of Mesopotamia into Phrygia, ³ and that in the third century A. D. the authorities of the Phrygian city of Apamea adopted the Biblical narrative of the Deluge, and struck coins, with the legend ΝΩ and a representation of the swimming ark. ⁴ It is in Arabia that we find the most naïve and, therefore, the most primary expressions of the root-idea of the Sodom-story. The late Professor E. H. Palmer

¹ *Westminster Review*, 1875, p. 262.

² Tobler, *Im neuen Reich*, 1873, p. 167.

³ *Jos. Ant.* xii. 3, 4.

⁴ Lenormant, *Les origines de l'histoire*, i. 441.

tells us how the Arabs of the neighborhood account for the blocks of stone at the base and on the summit of Jebel Mâdara (in the Desert of the Wanderings). Except that stones take the place of brimstone and fire, it reminds us strongly of the Sodom-story, of which, however, only the most uncritical orthodoxy can regard it (as Professor Palmer does) as a "transplanted reminiscence."¹ Nor is it only in et-Tih that stories of ruined cities are handed down among the Arabs, and that the desolation is accounted for by the infidelity and the abominable deeds of the former inhabitants.² The best known of these stories is that connected with the Hijr of the Korán, now called Medáin Sâlih, on which the reader may consult Mr. Doughty's remarkable "Travels in Arabia Deserta" (vol. i. chap. v.). In Ptolemy and Pliny we meet with Hegra as an important commercial town on the caravan road. Quite naturally the city became deserted through the disuse of this route to the north, and only five hundred years later we find an unhistorical legend to account for the "solemn ranges" of desolate rock-sepulchres of the ancient people of Thamûd,³ to which Mohammed refers in more than twenty of the suras of the Korán. Evidently the Arabian prophet thought of el-Hijr much as the Hebrew writers thought of Sodom; indeed, he expressly compares the fate of the two cities. And may we not venture to suppose that similar stories existed in the desert in the time of the author of Job (see Job xv. 28, xviii. 15, 21, and cf. Korán xxviii. 58)? But let it not be imagined that these stories are a monopoly of the desert. The well-known Birket er-Râm, about two hours distance from Bâniâs, which is evidently the crater of an extinct volcano, has this story attached to it by the natives. Once, they say, a flourishing village stood here, whose people refused hospitality, under aggravating circumstances, to a poor traveler; the next morning after he had asked it in vain, the site of the village was covered by a lake.⁴ The ruined cities, however, are more numerous, at least in Arab legend, than the submerged ones, and it should be noticed that there is a technical term for them which exactly corresponds to that used in the Old Testament for the judgment upon Sodom.

¹ Palmer, *Desert of the Exodus*, p. 416.

² See Korán, vii. 100, and for the folk-tales Wetzstein's account in Delitzsch's *Job*, p. 197.

³ On the people of Thamûd, see Glaser, *Geschichte und Geographie Arabiens*, ii. 98, etc.

⁴ Wetzstein, ap. Delitzsch, *Job*, p. 418.

They are called *maqlābāt*, "overturned ones," which certainly does not necessarily imply an earthquake, but simply a sudden and violent destruction, the traces of which are still visible.

We can at last safely venture to inquire into the basis of the story of the destruction of Sodom. It would be no proof of critical sobriety to insist on its substantially historical character. No sober critic, uninfluenced by dogmatic considerations, holds the Flood-story to be substantially historical, and why should we be expected to come to a different conclusion with regard to the story of Sodom? The first thing to be noticed is the constant custom in the Old Testament of referring to the judgment upon Sodom as a *mahpēka*, or "overturning." This expression is probably older than the Sodom-story itself, and reaches back to a remote antiquity. The Sodom and Gomorrah of the story were in fact representatives, and not the oldest representatives, of the class of "overturned" cities (the Arabic *maqlābāt*) inhabited of old by ungodly men, or, as Eliphaz in Job calls them, "destroyed cities, . . . which were destined to become heaps" (Job xv. 28). We must observe next that the Sodom-story presupposes an acquaintance with the phenomena of a bitumen or petroleum eruption, such as have been so strikingly described by Sir J. W. Dawson.¹ Such phenomena may often be witnessed on a miniature scale. Of the bitumen pits which he found near the Tigris Sir A. H. Layard tells us² that "before leaving them, the Arabs, as is their habit, set fire to the bitumen, which sent forth a dense smoke, obscuring the sky, and being visible for many miles." Similar phenomena, together with those of volcanic eruptions, may have led to that striking epithet of the Assyrian war-god Adar,³ "Thou who rainest fire and stones upon the enemy," as well as to those phrases in the Hebrew psalms and prophecies (Ps. xi. 6, etc.) referred to already. Can it be now that the tradition of Sodom and Gomorrah is more than an imaginative crystallization of such expressions, based upon the natural phenomena of the Dead Sea region? I need not say that the popular fancy is quite capable of inventing names. The Yahvist knows nothing of Adma and Zeboim; the contemporaries of Strabo possibly had other names to mention besides the four mentioned in the Old Testament. All that we can venture to infer from the

¹ *Modern Science in Bible Lands*, p. 486.

² *Nineveh and Babylon*, ii. 47.

³ Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 483.

local coloring of the narrative is that, when the Sodom-story first arose, there was a much greater abundance of bitumen than now exists about the Dead Sea, and consequently that destructive eruptions were of frequent occurrence. The story is in short a commemoration of this fact, and of the great moral principle that God hates and will punish the violation of his fundamental moral laws. It is in itself neither better nor worse than any of our own stories of ruined cities which have received an infusion of moral sentiment, and if it has reached a place in the respect of Christians far above that which the Welsh or Swiss stories occupy, this is due solely to the high gifts of the narrators, and to its incorporation into the history of that noblest of the heroes of traditional Jewish story — Abraham, the "father of the faithful."

Some of the details of the Sodom-story, however, are of comparatively late origin. The passage respecting Zoar (Gen. xix. 18–22) must be a recent etymological myth. The "pillar of salt," moreover, is plainly an imaginative accretion. From the time of Josephus (*Ant.* i. 11, 4) and the book of Wisdom (*Wisd.* x. 7) the columnar salt-fragments at the side of Jebel Usdum and elsewhere have suggested the idea of a shrouded human form.¹ "Suddenly," says Captain Warren, "we saw before us among the pinnacles of salt a gigantic 'Lot,' with a daughter on each arm, hurrying off in a southwesterly direction, with their bodies bent forward, as though they were in great haste, and their flowing garments trailing behind."² The proof of this is completed by several current Arab legends.³ Wetzstein saw at the source of the Raqqâd (a river in the Jôlân) a number of erect and singularly perforated jasper formations, called "the bridal procession" (*el-fârîda*). Near them is its village, *Ufûna*, which, in spite of repeated attempts, can no more be inhabited (cf. Job xv. 28). It remains forsaken, according to the tradition, as an eternal witness that ingratitude, especially towards God, does not escape punishment. So, again, the caution addressed to Lot, "Look not behind thee" (Gen. xix. 17, cf. 26), is mythical, though in another sense.

¹ On the mediæval site, see Conder, *Quarterly Statement of Pal. Exploration Fund*, 1875, p. 94.

² *Quarterly Statement*, etc., 1870, p. 150.

³ One is mentioned by Palmer in the *Desert of the Exodus*. It is attached to a black rock or boulder (*el Yehûdiyek*), said to be a woman turned into stone for denying the certainty of death. Palmer adds that it is something like the "Lot's Wife" (*bint shêch Lût*) of the Arabs, which is a tall isolated needle of rock on high ground.

Orpheus is said to have lost Eurydice for such ill-timed curiosity (Ovid, *Met.* x. 51); Hagar, too, was surprised to have "looked after him that had seen her," and remained alive (Gen. xvi. 13, according to the received text).

It only remains to determine the permanent-religious value of the group of stories in Gen. xviii.-xix. This, after all, is the chief point for Biblical students. Let us, first of all, consider what I may call the original Sodom-story. The original mythic motive is, no doubt, to us a very unattractive one. And it is noteworthy that the greatest of the Hebrew sages (who lived after rather than before or during the Exile) puts the notion that "desolate cities" must once have been inhabited by an ungodly people into the mouth of the narrow-minded Eliphaz (Job xv. 29-35). Nor are the details invariably such as commend themselves to our modern taste; in this respect, too, one is sure that the poet of Job would have sympathized with us. All that one can say is that there are terrible moral secrets in the life of early races, and that if we knew them, we might fully justify the Hebrew narrator. No one, of course, will desire to defend the appendix in Gen. xix. 30-38 (which reveals but too clearly a fierce national hatred in the narrator), but it is impossible not to feel the deep moral earnestness which breathes in Gen. xix. 1-11. And greatly as one admires the inserted dialogue between Abraham and Yahvè, designed (as we have seen) to limit the doctrine of the solidarity of all the members of a people, one must admit that there is still something to be said for the primitive doctrine. It is not Eliphaz, but that modern-minded thinker who speaks to us as Job, who complains (Job ix. 22):—

It is all one ; therefore I say,
He destroyeth the perfect and the wicked.

As a matter of fact, the righteous often do suffer with the wicked. However true, profoundly true, the words, "I will not destroy it for ten's sake" (Gen. xviii. 32) may be, the truth which they contain belongs to the moral rather than to the material sphere. Since our moral history is affected in many ways by our material circumstances, we cannot, even in our thoughts about religion, disregard the facts of experience which the original Sodom-story expresses. But how much more attractive are the portions which were added to the original narrative (Gen. xix. 17-19*d* and 22*b*-33*a*)! In its form Abraham's prayer may not be a model for a Christian's, but how worthy of cultivation is its spirit! What

a loving reverence breathes in it! Surely the birth of true prayer need not be brought down, as it is by M. Renan,¹ to the time of Isaiah and Micah. The disciple of still earlier prophets to whom we owe this fine passage knows what it is not merely "to walk humbly," but also to talk reverently, "with his God." Abraham's philanthropy, too, as this writer represents it, — how pure and disinterested it is! Not for Lot alone, but for all the righteous men in Sodom, his prayer is uttered, and it is based upon a fine sense of justice: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" And what is right? Not the mere prescription of a legal code; justice must be softened by compassion. Each of the supposed ten righteous men of Sodom has links innumerable binding him to his fellow-citizens. Is he to be sent abroad without any of those to whom nature or custom has attached him? No; a single righteous man can at least (as in the case of Noah²) save his family, and "for ten's sake I will not destroy the city." Surely this is a far-off anticipation of that great prophecy which is so justly dear to Christians — the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. Surely the somewhat poor and earthly substratum of the narrative does but heighten the divine beauty of the superadded ideas.

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¹ *Histoire d'Israel*, ii. 504.

² Note that the Babylonian Noah (Šit-napištim) is saved with his wife, but with none besides.

THE FOUNDATION OF BUDDHISM.

HE who is led, by taste or profession, to inquire into the manner in which religions grow and develop is sure to find India, on the whole, one of the most profitable territories for his search. We are accustomed to think of India as a great, sad peninsula, full of Oriental luxury on the one hand, and Oriental mysticism and quietism on the other; a land of heat beyond all description, alternating with rainy seasons even less endurable; a land of bizarre images for gods, many-headed, many-armed — the heads set with quaint eyes, the outer corners elongated, fixed and expressionless; a land of cruel religious practices, for every one has heard of the institution of caste, the practice of widow-burning (suttee), and the car of Juggernaut. A chaos of names greets the ear of the casual inquirer: Brahma, Vishnu, and Çiva, creator, preserver, and destroyer — every one has heard of the Hindu trinity. Every one has heard of the Vedas, of the religion of the Jains, of Buddha and Buddhism. The word *nirvāna* has fairly gained a place in the literatures of the Occident. Hindu pantheism is as familiar a catchword as is Hindu pessimism. Then there clamor for recognition a host of other names: Agni and Indra, Varuna and Mitra, Krishna and Rama, Mahadeva and Durga, and scores of others. We have idolatry and symbolatry; nature worship and liturgy; worship of trees and serpents; philosophy and mysticism. Then, as for the effect of his religions upon the character of the Hindu, one may hear or read on the same day that he is cruel and gentle; that he is treacherous and truthful; that he grovels in ignorance, and that his thought is the most subtle and hair-splitting in the entire domain of the history of mind.

All this, naturally, is very discouraging to persons of general culture who desire to increase their knowledge with a moderate expenditure of labor. In the hands of the specialist this exuberant variety assumes an orderly aspect; long, clear lines of thought and form manifest themselves in the troubled mass. In truth, the investigator finds soon enough that India is a veritable cosmos all by itself. The peninsula of India is a continent upon which the life of two hundred millions or more of people throbs to-day, and it has throbbed there for more than a hundred generations within the ken of history. This is the very point which makes the study of religion in India so very instructive and suggestive. We have a continuous record of at least three thousand years of essentially

undisturbed religious thought and practice. The inroads of foreign peoples with foreign religions have never seriously influenced the indigenous development of Hindu thought, since the Aryans first occupied the Panjab, the land of the seven streams, or since, as is claimed with some show of truth, they first came through the passes of the Himalayas in the northwest. The same passes afterwards admitted Mohammedan peoples and Mohammedan religion, but these never succeeded in crowding out, or seriously influencing, the native development. The most modern, infinitely subdivided form of sectarian Hindu idolatry is still the offspring, in direct succession, of the nature-worship of the Vedic Aryans; and the morbid vagaries of "Esoteric Buddhism" in the hands of Occidentals are easily recognized as the pantheistic, pessimistic thought of the Vedic Upanishads, the earliest theosophic texts, dressed up with crumbs from the table of modern science, notably the doctrine of evolution.

Nor is this all. The study of Indian religion does not end with the religion of the Vedic Aryans. Beyond this lies a range of facts, fading out at the farthest horizon, and seen not with the eyes of ordinary history, but with those of pre-history, if we may be allowed to coin such a word. The Vedas present the earliest directly historical records of Hindu life and religion, but the language of the Vedas carries us back still farther. By its means we are enabled to study the history of Aryan religion before it became specialized on Indian soil; we may, to put the case somewhat paradoxically, study Indian religion before its arrival in India. The subtle processes of comparative philology have taught us to connect the language and the thought of the Vedas with those of other peoples. The early Aryan tribes in the northwest of India were part of a large family of peoples, the Aryans, or Indo-Europeans, a prehistoric group which included the ancestors of the Persian, Armenian, Greek, Latin, Celtic, German and Slavic peoples, along with not a few others who have played minor parts in history. The early religious history of these peoples forms frequently an organic part of the history of religion in India. It would, for instance, be well-nigh useless to attempt to understand the rôle which the worship of the drink Soma, personified as a god, plays in the Vedic hymns, without considering the same feature, the worship of the Haoma in the Zend-Avesta, the Zoroastrian books. Recent Vedic studies tend to show that the great mass of the hymns of the Rig-Veda, the so-called family books ii.-viii., as well as book ix., the Soma-book proper, were devoted to

the service of the Soma. It seems to me, in fact that, the earliest liturgy, the earliest great Hindu sacrifices were devoted to this apotheosized intoxicating liquor, so that we may, in a certain sense, speak of the Vedic religion as a Soma-religion.

Before the discovery of the Vedas, scarcely a hundred years ago, the relation of the Greek Zeus and the Latin Jupiter was doubtless understood in some measure; but we can imagine the keen pleasure of him who first encountered the name Dyaush pitar in the Veda. This word is in form identical with Greek Zeus pater and Latin Jupiter down to certain fine details of the accentuation of the words. The true naturalistic value of this imposing divinity, the Olympian Zeus who delights in lightning, is so obvious in the Vedas that a child may understand it. Dyaush pitar is "father sky," contrasted constantly with Prithivī mātār, "mother earth," and we can understand why Latin poets say *sub Jove frigido*, "under a cold sky," "in a cold climate," as well as we can see why the Homeric Zeus is called *terpikéraunos*, "rejoicing in lightning."

We cannot within the limits of a single article enter upon a discussion of prehistoric Aryan mythology, or even a complete sketch of the naturalistic beliefs of the Veda, although both of these form the proper background from which Buddhism stands out in true relief. A knowledge of the earliest religious conditions in India is valuable, above all, because it teaches us to appreciate the change which has come over the innermost life of its people. At any rate, it is futile to attempt to understand Buddhism without a knowledge of those lines of thought which are spun out singly from the nature-worship and the liturgy of the Veda, until in the hands of Buddha they were woven into a texture comparatively firm and durable. Buddha died, or his *nirvāna* took place, between 482 and 472 B. C., and we have very perfect records of Hindu religion and speculation, dating back perhaps nearly a thousand years before that time. One might as well attempt to understand the gospel of Matthew without a knowledge of Isaiah, or, more broadly, the New Testament without the Old, as to try to understand Buddhism without some knowledge of the Upanishads, the earliest theosophic treatises of the Brahmins. When we attempt to reconstruct the primitive doctrine of Buddhism, when we observe the early influence of Buddha's teaching upon the life of his disciples, we come upon something so closely akin to the Vedic Upanishads, that it becomes a most delicate task to determine what features belong peculiarly to Buddhism. The Upanishads

are, in fact, in a large measure Buddhism before Buddha. The very fact that Buddhism is a nomistic religion, that is, a religion upon which the mighty personality of an individual founder has left an indelible impression, shows, according to a fundamental principle of the science of religion, that we are dealing with an advanced stage of religious thought. A religion is never fabricated by a single man out of whole cloth. The founder of a religion criticises, diverts, modifies, rejuvenates, fructifies, or even negates the beliefs of his own time, but he never ignores them. A fabricated religion would resemble closely the abortive attempts to construct artificial "world-languages" like Volapük, and would be doomed to death for lack of an organic historical nexus with the past, and for lack of a soil upon which it may root, and from which it may derive nourishment.

The religion which we find in India in earliest times is a natural religion in which the sacrifice forms the means of communication between men and gods. Nature manifests itself to simple yet poetical minds. Agni, the fire, is the heavenly messenger, the heavenly guest, the central feature of the home; then, again, the carrier of the sacrifice (oblation-bearer), the middle-man between men and the gods. Indra is the Hercules, the demiurge; he is inspired by the drink *soma* to give fight and to slay the cloud-demons who are stretched across the sky, withholding from the earth, according to the primitive view, the precious rain which is desired during the hot season with a longing which we cannot understand. So Dyaus and Prithivi, the shining sky and the earth; Surya and Ushas, the sun and the dawn, the divine maiden, the rosy-fingered dawn of Homer; Rudra and the Maruts, the storm-god and his companions; Varuna, the encompassing, all-seeing sky, he who has his spies everywhere to ferret out the wrongs done by men, and punishes such wrong by inflicting the dropsy, the disease of Varuna, — these and many others are worshiped with sacrifice and rhythmic song. The economic relations, so to speak, between men and gods are of the simplest sort; *dehi me dadāmi te*, "I give in order that you may give," is palpably the burden of every song, and the expressed or implied reason of every sacrifice.

In accordance with this conception the early notions of a future life are simple, poetic, and of a character such as to appeal thoroughly to the natural instincts of man. The bodies of the dead are burned and their ashes consigned to earth. But this is viewed merely as a symbolic act of preparation — cooking, it is called

outright—for another life of joy. The righteous forefathers of olden times who died before,—they have found another good place. Especially Yama, the first man, has gone to the distant heights in the skies, and has searched out a way for all his descendants. “He went before and found a dwelling which no power can debar us from. Our fathers of old have traveled it and this path leads every earth-born mortal thither. There in the midst of the highest heaven beams unfading light and eternal waters flow; there every wish is fulfilled on the rich meadows of Yama.” Day by day the two dogs of Yama, the sun and the moon,¹ are sent forth as messengers to search out among men those who are to join the fathers enjoying themselves in company with Yama.

The very freshness and lustiness, the thorough physical healthfulness of early Vedic life, was a guarantee that the Hindus would in time do what every strong race must do sooner or later,—think. The Homeric Greeks, rejoicing in their redundant physical life, in due time, elevate their thought to the level of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The tawny-haired barbarians whom Tacitus describes produce the leaders of modern science. The Vedic people, whose healthy nature may be guessed, even from the faint outline presented above, are the originators of the pessimistic philosophy which rules all India, and has inspired Schopenhauer to transplant the system to Europe. The world of these old gods in strong flesh-tints does not satisfy the thinkers among the people forever. They begin to ask questions reaching beyond them and their assumed powers. Even the earliest Vedic collection, the Rig-Veda, contains a highly interesting skeptical inquiry of this sort. I quote from the famous cosmogonic hymn, Rig-Veda x. 129:

“There was neither being nor non-being, there was no atmosphere and no sky above it. What covered all, and where, by what protected? Was there the fathomless abyss of the waters?

“Neither death was there nor immortality, day was not separated from night. Only one thing breathed, without breath, by inner power; than it truly nothing whatever else existed besides.

“Who truly knoweth, who can here proclaim it, whence hither born cometh this creation? The gods are later than its creation; who knoweth then whence it came to being?

“Whence this creation came, whether it made itself, or whether not, he who is the overseer in the highest heaven surely knows—or does he even not know it?”

¹ So according to a recent investigation of the writer in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. xv., pp. 163 ff.

The desire grows apace to understand and call by their right names the powers which rule the world and individual human life. The conception of space, or, as the Hindus conceive it, "the directions," springs up: not only the directions east, west, south, and north, but also the "upright" space, the zenith; the "firm" space, that is, the direction upon which earthly objects stand and rest; "the oblique space," and others. Time begins to play an independent rôle in their thought, although they speak of it somewhat crudely as "the year" or "the days and nights." Past, present, and future are abstractions which are handled eagerly, compared with one another, and made the basis of mystical speculation. The "thought" and the "word" which are one and yet different appear upon the scene. Words, syllables, numbers, metres, all of them begin to be conceived as powers which are not only what they seem to be superficially to the eye and ear, as always carrying some second value, deep beneath the surface. Everything is not only what it *is* but also that which it *signifies*. The boundary line between the two grows more and more evanescent. By the zealous watch over the details of the sacrifices which have now grown to a portentous multiplicity and subtlety, only the external side of the religious act is satisfied; the knowledge of the meaning of each detail is the true force which fulfills the desire of the sacrificer. The phrase *ya evam veda*, "he who thus knows (the sense of the sacrifice)," occurs numberless times. A strange system of crude psycho-physics, or rather physiological psychology, grows up. Every part of the human body, understood through rough anatomical knowledge, is associated with some psychical function. All the parts and functions of the human body again have their counterpart in the external universe. When a man dies, his voice goes to the (roaring) fire, his breath to the wind, his eye to the sun, his mind to the moon, his hearing to space, his body to the earth, his hair to the plants and trees, and his blood to the waters; as even Plato says: "Most like to the sun, methinks, is the eye, of all the organs of sense."

With untiring persistence the question is asked, What is the life-giving essence in things? and when this is found, the inquiry is pushed forward in the search after the essence of the essence. The final entity (Sanskrit *sat*, Greek *τὸ ὄν*), the truth which is at the bottom of all manifestations or phenomena, and then again the truer kernel of the truth, are chased through this fantastic domain of conceptions. Very soon this search after a final element, or substance, points all thought to the assumption of a final unity

in everything that manifests itself, for the visible differences are not essential. And again, by a quick reversal, this final unity is itself the pantheistic all. We are now face to face with what may conveniently be called the second period of Vedic thought, the period of the Brahmanas and Upanishads.

Of paramount importance is the following crystallization in the seething caldron of the speculation of this period. It is the composite conception of the *âtman*, "the all-soul," and the *brahma*, "the essence of spiritual thought." In the view of the speculations of this time the human body is pervaded by breaths, *âtman* (Greek *ἀνρμήν*); these vivify the body, and are the essential part, the *ego*, of the individual existence. Several of the old Upanishads contain a fable of the contest of the vital powers, which resembles the Latin fable of "the belly and the members." In this the vital powers appear striving among themselves for supremacy. They bring their case before Prajapati, "the lord of the creatures," and he advises them to leave the body one by one and to observe which loss affects it most unfavorably. The voice, the eye, the ear, the mind departed, exposing by their absence the body to no little inconvenience. But when the breath was on the point of departing, "just as the proud steed from the Indus would pull and tear the pegs of his tether, so it pulled and tore the other vital powers." And they yielded the palm to the *âtman*.

The *âtmans*, or breaths, are conceived as flowing from a single *âtman*, the universal *ego*. One of the Brahmanas says: "Ten (kinds of) breath dwell in man; the universal *âtman* is the eleventh; all the breaths are contained in him." Again: "From the *âtman* all the members (of the human body) spring into existence. Of all things that spring into existence the *âtman* is the first." This *âtman*, after it has been adjusted to the own *ego*, is transferred to the great universe outside of man. The *âtman*, the lord of the breaths, is at the same time the lord of the gods, the creator of all beings: all the worlds are merely an emanation of his great universal *ego*; the *âtman* is the all.

At the same time a second power, coming from a totally different sphere of conceptions, presses to the front to be recognized as a cosmic force of the first rank. The sacred word, the constant companion of the sacrifice, contains a kind of spiritual essence which elevates itself and its representative, the priest, above the profane word and the profane world. This is the *brahma*, used in the neuter gender, not as yet the personified god Brahma who stands at the head of the late Hindu trinity, Brahma, Vishnu, and

Īva. "The *brahma* is the word, the truth in the word is the *brahma*." "Through *brahma* heaven and earth are held together." Nothing characterizes so sharply the peculiar speculations of this period as the pressing of such an idea to the very first place: it has not sprung, as is usual in such developments, from the contemplation of the forces of visible nature, but from pondering and refining a conception whose very beginning is transcendental.

Nor was the polytheism of the hymnal period entirely without participation in the development of this monotheistic pantheism. In the hymns themselves one after another of the prominent gods steps out of the pantheon, and assumes on occasion the attributes of an all-powerful god. Agni and Indra are frequently so regarded. Glimpses of the nobler vision of an ethical divinity appear in the person of Varuna, the all-encompassing, all-seeing god who rewards and punishes, and it has been surmised that we have here the nearest approach to a primitive Aryan monotheism. Varuna has much in common with Ahura Mazda of the Zoroastrian writings. The statement occurs that "the gods are only a single being under different names." After monotheistic ideas had been attached in turn to personalities which figured in the earlier myths and the earlier cult, these ideas were finally transferred more permanently to a divinity who is known most familiarly by the name of Prajapati, "the lord of creatures." Various earlier divinities, especially Savitar, the inspiring, enlivening principle of the sun, and Tvashtar, the divine artificer, were blended in this product, which went as far to realize a personal monotheism as was ever possible in India. This "lord of the gods" is then known by names and attributes which imply a close approach to the idea of the *ātman* and the *brahma*. He is designated as Viçvakarman, "the fabricator of the universe," Parameshthin, "he who occupies the highest summit," Svayambhu, "the self-existing being;" these and various other epithets mark, at any rate, the trend of all thought in the direction of an abstract uncreated force.

In the *ātman* and the *brahma* we have two manifestations of the final all-power, the former representing the physical side, the latter the spiritual side of universal life. As might be expected, the two ideas are merged in time into the conception of a great eternal single power, in which all the differences of physical phenomena vanish. The universe with all its physical, mental, and spiritual manifestations lives and moves in it. This product of thought was never again abandoned; all the philosophies, Buddhism included, stand upon this ground, and they all accept the

consequences which were deduced from this fundamental thought with modifications of comparatively secondary importance. The Buddhist *nirvāna* rests directly upon this conception. It runs the entire gamut of values, from something like a blissful, half-conscious state of repose — in the mind of the vulgar, very nearly a personal repose — through the old Upanishad idea of union with the *âtman-brahma*, to absolute annihilation. The *nirvāna* is based upon faded and decayed pantheistic ideas. In the Upanishads the *samsāra*, the round of existences, is terminated by fusion with the all-soul; in Buddhism the converse of *samsāra* is *nirvāna*.

The chief consequence which followed upon the development of the pantheistic conceptions claims our attention in an especial measure. The conception of this pervasive all-force, out of which all visible things flow, might have been a hearth of joy and the head-spring of hope for the Hindus. A palpably possible consequence of their thought would be that all men have the divine or Brahmic spark, that all are microcosms flung off by that superb macrocosm the *âtman-brahma*, and that the phenomenal existence of this force, just like its universal existence, must be based upon truth and right. Not so did the Hindus proceed. Having lavished upon the Brahma all attributes of perfection, the attribute of absolute unity and absolute fulness, they proceeded to apply this standard to the world, and find it the place of division, conflict, limitation, and pain. The light of Brahma, the all-powerful, has a shadow — the bitter pessimistic criticism of this world. The world ceases to be a desirable home in which one may live with naïve satisfaction, as soon as it is measured by the standard of Brahma, and is found wanting. When the Brahma is praised, that Brahma which is above hunger and thirst, above grief and tribulation, above age, decay, and death, the prominent personal application is, that this world of creatures is full of hunger, thirst, grief, tribulation, decay, and death.

Now we cannot help asking why such pessimistic inklings, doubtless to be found wherever men have given expression to their moods of "Weltschmerz," should have fastened themselves permanently upon Hindu thought. The question has frequently been put point-blank, Whence did Hindu pessimism originate? I believe that the answer, or at least a partial answer, may be given with a great degree of security. Our earliest acquaintance with the Aryan Hindus exhibits them as a sturdy life-loving people on the banks of the Indus, the land of the seven streams, the modern Panjab in northwestern India. They advanced eastward by suc-

cessive conquests, hinted at in very interesting chapters of certain Brahmana-texts, until they had overrun the plains of the Ganges — the hottest civilized land on the face of the earth. This is the hearth of Hindu theosophy, the land of the Upanishads, the land where Buddha preached, many centuries after the earliest Upanishads. Buddha's most famous sermon was delivered at Benares, in the very centre of the plain of the Ganges. The Aryans did not succumb to the change, but it left an indelible impression upon their character. The intellectual strength of the race did not perish, but their bodies suffered: hypochondria, melancholia, dyspepsia — call it what we may — conquered the conquering Aryan, who was no doubt ethnically the product of a more northerly and more vigorous climate. Any Aryan of to-day who should undertake to pass a year or so, including the hot and rainy seasons, in Benares, the city in which Buddha delivered his first great sermon, that sermon which has been likened to the Sermon on the Mount, is very likely to experience anew the unabated effect of this climate with very similar results.

Very much at the same time when Hindu speculation had finally developed the conception of the Brahma and its pessimistic consequences, there came to the latter a reinforcement from a totally different channel, the speculations on life after death. These, as is generally known, took the turn which landed all thought on this subject in the bizarre, but highly interesting, doctrine of transmigration of souls, or metempsychosis. Like a will-o'-the-wisp, we see this belief flare up at many points on the globe totally unconnected with one another; the precise nature of its origin is still obscure. The early Vedic times of the joyous gods in strong flesh-tints knew nothing of the wandering of the soul after death, of repeated death and birth. We have touched briefly upon the happy character of the earliest beliefs on this subject. These correspond in general with the views of many other primitive races — the belief in a happy life beyond the grave, a beatified reproduction of life on earth. Arms and utensils, especially sacrificial utensils, are buried with the corpse, for the employments of "those who have gone forth" (*preta*) are the same as upon earth. The manes, or fathers (*pitar*), as they are called in the Vedas, prepare sacrifices, as is distinctly stated in the texts; they also eat and drink and "enjoy life." Hence the offerings to the fathers, the so-called *çrâddhas*, which are one of the most salient features of the Hindu ritual, and continue obligatory throughout the history of religion in India. It is stated

explicitly that they are necessary for the support of the fathers, and therefore it is the leading object of a man's life to beget a son who shall take care that his needs are supplied.

Whence came the first germ of the doctrine of metempsychosis it is difficult to say. It is possible that this doctrine filtered into the Aryan Hindu religion from the beliefs of the aboriginal non-Aryan tribes of India. But the first records of its existence in Hindu religion exhibit it rather as a product of the philosophic schools; the more popular musings are silent on the subject. No allusion to any such belief has hitherto been found in the Vedic hymns. It is, too, like the *Brahma*, a conception which feels its way through misty, hesitating, sometimes conflicting beginnings to rigid doctrinal conclusions. The first mention of metempsychosis occurs in one of the oldest Upanishads, the *Katha*, where the discussion of it is undertaken within the frame of a curious story. A young Brahman, *Naciketas* by name, is, in an angry moment, consigned by his father to Death. He takes it literally and goes. Death happens to be away when *Naciketas* arrives, so that the latter has to wait three days at Death's gate without receiving any hospitable attention. *Naciketas* being a Brahman guest, Death's delinquency is very serious, and he apologizes with humility, and offers *Naciketas* three boons, that is, the fulfillment of three requests. After having asked two which do not directly concern the subject of the treatise, he asks as the third boon "that question that there is respecting a man who is departed: 'he is,' say some; and 'he is not,' say some; that let me know, instructed by thee. Of the boons this is the third boon." Death endeavors to beg off, but *Naciketas* holds him to his promise until he yields. Here then we find the first expressions in Hindu literature which depict metempsychosis, and the release therefrom, that is, the doctrine which appears in Buddhism under the name of *nirvâna*. Thus he says: "One who possesses the necessary knowledge gets beyond old age and death, and goes to the endless. Pushing away before him the bonds of death, getting beyond pain, he enjoys himself in the heaven-world." Then again there are such expressions as the following: "When all desires are let go, then a mortal becomes immortal; when all the knots of the heart here are severed, then a mortal becomes immortal." Further the converse of this is stated with perfect clearness. Death says of the careless youth, fooled with the snare of wealth, and thinking "this is the world — there is no other," that he again and again falls into his power; which, of course, implies being born again

and again. Even more clearly : " But he that is not possessed of discrimination, that is mindless, ever impure, does not obtain that place and enters upon *samsâra*." This is the first occurrence of a word which later becomes so important as the converse of *nirvâna* ; it evidently means " round of births." Again, it is stated that " he obtains death from death (that is, one death after another) who here sees things as it were in separateness," that is, does not recognize the identity or unity of all things, and hence the non-essential character of all worldly phenomena. Finally, " Some souls come to the womb in order to obtain a body ; others go after the immovable, according to their deeds."

We can observe how vague and flitting the first statements of transmigration are ; but when all this has finally assumed a definite shape we find the doctrine, soon threadbare from use, that every creature is again and again the prey of death, until in some life all desire and all activity as the outcome of desire have been laid aside. This is the Hindu means of salvation, namely, absolute resignation. " When the mortal has freed himself from every desire of his heart, then does he enter immortal into Brahma." These thoughts fitted perfectly into the speculations on the Brahma. The notion of the Brahma is dualistic : on the one side the eternal all-force, the foundation of all being ; contrasted on the other with the world of suffering and perdition. Similarly, the doctrine of metempsychosis involves a dualism ; the unreleased soul in the bonds of death, and the released soul which has conquered death, and found the end of its wanderings. The two conceptions were certain to blend, and they did blend. The result was that final doctrine without which ancient India would not be India, that doctrine which is shared alike in some form by the Upanishads, the later orthodox philosophical systems, Buddhism and Jainism : the wandering of the soul through the realms of death is the consequence of its separation from the Brahma ; the escape from the chain of successive deaths, the Hindu salvation, can be attained only by union with the true ultimate being, the Brahma.

We must dwell a moment longer on the supposed cause of metempsychosis. This is one of the most important and interesting links in the chain of the philosophy of the Hindus. Their scriptures say : " When the mortal has freed himself from every desire of his heart, then does he enter immortal into Brahma." Why does absence of desire produce this stupendous effect ? Because desire produces deeds or action, answer the Hindu philosophers.

The Sanskrit word for deed or action is *karma* (Pâli *kamma*); the entire doctrine is that of the *karma*, well known by that name in all Western writings on Buddhism. Desire and deed are essentially the same thing. On desire man's nature is founded; as his desire so are his endeavors, as his endeavors so are his deeds. By his deeds the character of his next birth in the round of births is regulated. If his *karma* in a given life has accumulated for him a good balance, as it were, the next life will prove a high and delightful one; conversely, if his life is evil, the consequent birth will be as a low and degraded being. But no deed leads the way to release, to union with Brahma. Even the best deed is something which, from its very nature, is limited and vitiated by the finite. It is rewarded, to be sure; but the reward of the finite can itself be only finite. Brahma, on the other hand, is above reward and punishment, above good and bad; things done as well as things left undone cause him no pain; his empire suffers from no deed. Thus the highest Hindu ideal does not consist in taking a part in the amelioration of the world: it is ever absolute separation from the world.

There is a last link still wanting in this chain. The question is asked, as it must be: "What is the cure for desire, the thirst for life and its contents?" The answer is—knowledge. Knowledge, or perhaps it would be better to say, recognition of the unity of the *ego* with the great Brahmic principle, and the recognition, ever present, of the divided condition of everything finite. "When a mortal has recognized Brahma, feeling 'he is myself,' how can he then desire and cling to bodily life?" Thus the ultimate attainment for man is this recognition; it is the "works" of the Jew, and the "faith" of the Christian—salvation through pessimistic knowledge. When this knowledge has been attained, all desire vanishes, of its own accord. Conversely, the root of all perishable conditions is to be sought in the failure to acquire this perception. Such perception is called *buddhi*; the person imbued with this knowledge is called *buddha*. There are many Buddhas. But Gautama Çakyamuni turned out to be the Buddha, the enlightened one *par excellence*.

We say "knowledge is power." Doubtless we feel that it adds strength to one's activity to know the circumstances which environ each and every factor with which we operate, and that it enables us to bring into operation factors unknown to others. This is most distinctly *not* the Hindu view. The very passiveness which is the ideal of Hindu emancipation renders such a construction

untenable. I believe that we may look for the origin of this titanic dogma, which controls Hindu philosophy, in certain earlier, cruder conceptions, imbedded within the early polytheism and demonology of the hymns of the Rig-Veda and Atharva-Veda. The belief seems to appear in earliest times that the knowledge of conditions, circumstances, and designs is, in itself, a force which endows the owner with mystical power. The god Agni is thus frequently extolled as "he who knows all beings," "he who knows the origins of the gods." The charms and incantations of the Atharva-Veda are full of statements of this sort. In a charm against lightning it is said: "We know the hidden seat of the lightning on high," and this knowledge alone implies control over it. In a charm against serpents it is said: "We know your father and your mother and your entire kith and kin; why will you therefore act, being without strength?" Again, he who desires influence in the assembly-room addresses it as follows: "We know your very name and hence we are powerful in you." Later on, as the details of the sacrificial ritual grow to portentous dimensions and most intricate complications, the statement is made innumerable times that the knowledge of the meaning, or the knowledge of the history of each sacrificial act, is perforce the agency which endows the sacrificer with the fruit of the sacrifice. We stand here before a singular bit of psychology — folk-psychology we must call it — which it would be futile to endeavor to reproduce in full in our minds. It is an ethnic peculiarity of mind analogous in its bizarrerie to the many institutional peculiarities in which India is singular and foreign to our taste and understanding. I cannot doubt that the philosophic doctrine of knowledge has grown up on the rock-bed of this kind of popular conceptions.

The system which has thus been briefly sketched is the universal Hindu philosophy, and it is the foundation of Buddhism. It becomes clear at once that such thought as this could not exist for any length of time by the side of the fantastic sacerdotalism without at least necessitating a conscious adjustment of the two. Thus, right here, we have the first reformatory step, anticipating, as it were, Buddha's reformation, which freed men from the thralldom of priestly practice and domination. Buddha derides the Brahmins and their practices. The Brahmins themselves establish a compromise between their philosophic insight and their daily practices. The adjustment was accomplished very gently, not without a touch of diplomatic shrewdness. To begin with, this speculative side of early Brahmanism does not in any sense repre-

sent an abrupt break. Although the Upanishads are undoubtedly the most noteworthy attempts at a final philosophy, which, in India, ever presupposes by its very terms the futility of all worldly activity, these texts themselves are distinctly parts of the Brahmanas, the sacerdotal texts *par excellence*. As far as the philosophers of the Upanishads are concerned, they disregard distinctly all ordinary terrestrial conditions, not excluding the earlier religion, with its anthropomorphism, its liturgies, and the technical arrangement of every-day life which followed. But they disregard this only in their character as thinkers, not as individual members of this world of phenomena. An orthodox Brahmanical life was necessary in order to attain the fruits of life which the ordinary man desires, including the heaven of Yama. But heaven and all else were conceived as finite and transient; the philosophy of the time had boldly elevated itself above individual life and individual aims and desires. It is of especial interest to observe that the Hindus recognized, themselves, at the very outset the duplex character of their religious development with its ultimately irreconcilable conflict. They make frequent attempts to adjust the later thought to the earlier practice, that is, to reconcile the older ritualism, their religion of performance, with their later religion, which is, as we have shown, a religion of knowledge, or insight. Some such argumentation as the following is employed:—

The Vedas with their four books contain many ceremonies, morning and evening oblations, which produce higher or lower fruit, as the case may be. Still these do not result in the attainment of man's highest object; for they all aim at fruit which is to be *produced*, and whatever can be produced is transient. But according to the scriptures, whosoever in this world, without the knowledge of the imperishable, makes oblations, gives alms and practices austerities, even for many thousand years — for him all comes to an end. Now the Upanishad aims to show the way to an object which is by its very nature eternal. One whose internal organs are filled with the impressions of countless objects is led by his subjection to these impressions to continued activity. The ritual, therefore, at first teaches him outward ceremonies only as a means of preparation for the struggle towards a loftier aim. These ceremonies, performed without any desire for selfish results, are intended to distract the mind from worldly pursuits, to develop passionlessness and self-restraint, and extinguish all desire save that for final emancipation; to effect a clear discrimination between things temporal and things eternal; to prepare a man for

the knowledge of the real nature of the individual soul, and so lead him to a knowledge of the supreme soul, in which knowledge there is perfect peace.

This is an interesting special plea made by a thinker before the enlightened, the chosen few. But all this, the theosophy as well as its adjustment to daily practice, remained the property of learned schools solely, until the appearance of Buddha. To the people, the Brahman philosophers gave nothing but a polytheistic worship which kept on changing the attractive early Vedic beliefs into an idolatry, growing more and more grotesque at every stage of its development. The Brahmanic priests, holding in their hands the knowledge of the sacrifice, grew into a hierarchy whose power has never been exceeded. They kept on strengthening the system of castes which even to-day rules native Indian life more than ever since Buddhism has disappeared from the continent of India. The Buddhist reformation consisted in breaking away from the Brahmanical polytheism by simply ignoring it, in the neglect of caste, restrictions, and, most of all, in bringing down to the people the philosophical beliefs described above. The importance of these modifications lies chiefly in the fact that they opened the door for the gentle ethical system which rendered Buddhism a great world-religion, and has always elicited the profound interest of Western minds.

But the real philosophical foundation of Buddhism is the thought of the Upanishads. The conception of the *Brahma* fades out into the Buddhistic *nirvâna*; the term *samsâra*, "round of births," is common to Brahmanism and Buddhism; the *karma*, the conduct during a given life which regulates the next existence, is the Buddhist *kamma*; the desire for life is designated in the Buddhistical writings by *tanha*, which is the Pâli form of Sanskrit *tr̥ṣṇā*, a word obviously connected with English "thirst," and so on. Even the institutions and moral dictates of Buddhism are not so entirely exempt from this law of continuity, are not so entirely original, as is popularly supposed. The outer form of the Buddhistic Church, with its prevailingly monastic character, was prepared by that Brahmanical practice which led the Brahmans to become ascetics and wandering beggars after they had passed through the preliminary stages of student, householder, and forest-hermit. Alexander the Great and his Greek invaders were profoundly impressed by this feature of Hindu life. The Greeks speak of these people as *ἰσόβιοι*, "forest-dwellers." Doubtless, celebrated ascetics before Buddha's time attracted large follow-

ings of those religiously inspired, and thus the aggregations of large numbers of monks into Buddhist communities was a continuation of habits widely prevalent before Buddha's time. One of the most characteristic ethical laws of Buddhism is the *ahimsâ*, "the doctrine of inviolability," that law which forbids injury to any living being whatever. Buddha once asks "In what manner must the ascetic participate in righteousness?" He himself answers touchingly: "The ascetic ceases to slay living things. He lays down his staff; he lays down his weapon. He is compassionate and merciful; with kindness does he plan the welfare of all beings." This doctrine, which frequently leads to ludicrous exaggerations, is but the reflex of features that appear quite markedly in the period of the Vedic sacrifices. Among these the sacrifice of cattle plays a not inconsiderable part; and it dates doubtless from ruder early times prior to the systematization of the sacrifice. In the Brahmana-texts cattle are still sacrificed. But it is done in a gingerly fashion. The animal is asked for permission; this is so habitual that "to ask permission" has become the regular technical term for "slaying the sacrificial beast." Before the knife is used the formula, "O knife, do not injure him," is pronounced. Very frequently a sham ceremony of slaughter is substituted for the reality. Very likely the growth of this feeling in India is also to be ascribed to the change in the climatic conditions alluded to previously. Aversion to animal food in a very hot climate is natural, as well as a certain faint-heartedness, dreading the sight of blood and suffering. Buddhism, with all its reactionary and reformatory features, remains throughout a true Hindu product; its roots are in the great past of India. It is the new dispensation, but step by step it presupposes the old.

We are thus led on to a few final remarks of a different kind. Ever since Buddhism has been known in the West, it has exercised an irresistible charm. There is a set of Buddhistical writings called *Jātakas*, "birth-stories." They contain fables, stories in which Buddha is the central figure, and they are employed as the framework within which the wisdom and morality of Buddhism are presented in an attractive popular manner. These stories gradually penetrated westward through Syrian, Hebrew, Latin and Greek channels. Upon the basis of these materials a monk, well known by the name of St. John of Damascus, composed a romance entitled "*Barlaam and Joasaph*," narrating the history of an Indian prince who was converted by Barlaam, and became a hermit. "*Joasaph*" is St. John's rendering of the Arabic "*Yudasaf*;"

and this, owing to a confusion in unpunctuated Arabic between the characters *y* and *b*, is the Buddhist word *bodhisattva*, "whose nature is enlightened," a standing epithet of Buddha. When Pope Sixtus V. (1585-90) authorized the compilation of a systematic martyrology the names of "the holy saints Barlaam and Josaphat of India, on the borders of Persia, whose wonderful acts St. John of Damascus has described," appear in the list, and thus Gautama, the Buddha, under the name of St. Josaphat, is now officially recognized and worshiped throughout the whole of Catholic Christianity as a Christian saint. Who will rise and say that he was not well chosen? The charm of the Buddhist teachings is permanent, despite one-sided criticisms of its weaknesses and excrescences. Accordingly its philosophy and its ethical system have not failed to impress themselves again and again upon Western thought and conduct. They who are now tempted to lay aside their own mental habits and substitute those of the Buddhist writings will remember with profit that they are not adopting the doctrines of a single inspired teacher, but the common thoughts of Hinduism, with the background of its mythology, its sacrifices, and its local color. The modern Hindu pandit derides as illogical the fundamental tenets of Christianity, and first and foremost, the belief that Christ took upon himself the sins of mankind. The fundamental principle that every one must suffer the consequences of his every deed at some time or other, even if it be in his thousandth rebirth, unless his saving insight emancipates him from further existence, is as much an axiom with him as the equation "twice two are four." Now the belief in metempsychosis, the exact anthropological basis of which has not yet been made clear, is a local Hinduism, and it does equal violence to all Western habits of thought. Without it, the philosophical structures of the Hindus fall to the ground in hopeless ruin. All the consequences of this axiom are but interesting phantasms, originating with a people whose history and destiny no one would care to see repeated in the cold, strong North, among peoples who carry on their shoulders a civilization infinitely superior, and whose possibilities are immeasurably great.

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IMAGINATION IN RELIGION.

The lunatic, the lover and the poet
Are of imagination all compact :
One sees more devils than vast hell can hold,
That is, the madman : the lover, all as frantic,
Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt :
The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven ;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.

HERE, at a wave of the magic wand of the real Prospero of the Enchanted Isle, we have a series of pictures of imagination in its most characteristic shapes of action ; first, the madman, in whom visions of an inner world so overpower every impression from sense-contact with the outer world that, to escape the self-evoked devils in full cry after him, he will leap headlong from a precipice ; second, the infatuated lover, in whom certain genuine sense-impressions from the actual object of his adoration are yet so overlain and glorified by images from within as to transfigure her into a likeness she could suggest to no one else ; third, in the sane, self-regulated poetic mind, into which entrancing ideas and emotions stream from earth and sky, and yet ideas and emotions he prizes solely as vital material — what colors are to the painter, or tones to the musician — for a world of original creation. It is a world none the less conceived in entire harmony with the law and spirit of the visible universe, only lifting its tendencies to higher reaches.

The first thing to claim attention in this famous passage is the sense it evokes of the dynamic power of imaginative activity. Here evidently is no airy, metaphysical entity, but a vital energy potent enough on the one hand to take shape as an anarchic mob of destructive hallucinations mastering every nerve and muscle of the body, or, on the other, to fling itself as dictator into the wildest hurly-burly of sensation and emotion, there to enforce law and order. Positive effects such as these can proceed only from that which is positive power. Imagination, then, must substantially consist of essential energy, as real an incarnation of the physical, rational, and emotional forces of the universe as a block of granite is of gravitation or a steel-spring of resiliency. No headway

is possible in the study of the commanding part played by imagination in religion, or, indeed, in any other domain of human life, until the delusive idea is dismissed that imaginations are bodiless, insubstantial ghosts, floating vaguely in the air. The first question then demanding answer is this: Of what is imagination — considered as an action or as a product of mind — actually made? Its essential constituents, its working forces, what and whence are they? The man who is “all compact” of it, of what is he all compact? Precisely here modern science, so often irrationally pronounced the annihilator of imagination, steps to the front with a proffer of help, summoning the mind at the very outset to a splendid feat of imagination, through the successful performance of which alone the reverberation can be felt in consciousness that reveals the ever-active sources in nature, man and God, out of which imagination rises. To essay this feat!

Man, as seen by the advanced thought of to-day, is a sensitive, responsive organism set in an environment of inconceivably varied and ceaselessly active external agencies, stimulating it from every side. Far from being passive, awaiting man's first salute of recognition, everything around him is on the spring to attract his attention. The sun, a hundred million miles away, is ceaselessly pelting his retina with sunbeams; the flowers at his feet are pelting his nerves of smell with jets of perfume; and throughout the whole diapason of the sound-world, from the highest treble of the gnat sighing in the air to the deepest bass of the thunder rolling among mountain-peaks, every motion of the stirred atmosphere is an outright summons, “Behold and hear!” There is a universal conspiracy, terrestrial and celestial, that the dullest, most apathetic man shall know something of what is going on around about him. The universe means this with a will. To effect its purpose it is eternally pouring out from exhaustless fountain heads that which alone has validity, — power under the irresistible action of which no one, unless a congenital idiot, can remain totally unconscious of his great surroundings. So, in response to this unintermitting wave-play of energy, something marvelous — no plummet of thought can sound its nature or mode of action — wakes within, revealing itself as the seeing eye, the hearing ear, the feeling heart, the discriminating reason.

All this, to a mind capable of wonder and reverence, seems marvelous enough. But the next stage of man's development brings us face to face with a second marvel, more amazing still. Now there first reveals itself a magic power in the strength of

which conscious mind rises into a realm of partial independence at least of the world of stimulus outside the body. The external macrocosm has reproduced itself in an inward microcosm. The long-exercised body has become a developed organism capable, in and of itself, of repeating from its own resources the infinitely varied and delicate vibrations which were the former media of communication between itself and flower, lake, mountain, child or lover. Now the birds can sing, the planets can revolve in a new realm of seemingly pure mind. To the very sun which once said, "I make myself visible to you!" the joint body and mind can at last respond, "I make you visible to myself!" For lo! in the depths of the night, in darkness palpable, suddenly the happy soul sees flash before the inward eye a transcendent sunset, first beheld twenty years before, from the Wengern Alp in Switzerland. There rises again in stainless purity the Jungfrau, while over its virgin peak, relieved against a background of ash-colored cloud, arches a resplendent rainbow, all inclosed within its magic dome pulsating with prismatic reflexes. This ideal vision, this pure product of reminiscent imagination, of what substance is it composed? Of airy nothing? of ghostly phantasms of dead experiences? No! but as much of the stored-up and now re-liberated active forces of the universe, as much of the stored-up and now re-liberated emotional response to these in a sensitive subject, as was the original spectacle beheld twenty years before from the Wengern Alp. Say then profoundly with Shakespeare, "We are such stuff as dreams are made on;" and it will hold true of all man's conscious life. But then put one further question, What is the stuff such dreams are made on? There is but one answer: It is the stuff that sun, moon and stars, forests and oceans, thews and sinews, loves, admirations, despairs, triumphs are made of; the stuff of things — all nature, man and God.

Thus far attention has been called to but one phase of imaginative action, to that which ordinarily goes by the name of "reminiscent imagination." It is the power, in other words, of mind and body in union to reproduce from within a more or less distinct revival of a mountain scene, a statue, a flowing melody, once enjoyed through the outward eye or ear. But now as the attempt is made to pass from the realm of simply reminiscent to the higher realm of creative imagination, — the supreme act of supreme minds, — the loins must be girded for the ascent of a yet more commanding peak. Here first we encounter an initiative power inherent in the most highly evolved organisms. It is a

power not simply of reviving, in their former colligation, visual, auditory or emotional experiences ; but of selecting out of them living material for the original creation of a new world as literally never before seen by the bodily eye, as the West Indies by the European before Columbus raised his thrilling cry, "Land ! Land !" Yet here is an ideal-real world which, later on, acts upon and modifies the minds of millions as palpably as the sights and sounds of their every-day native soil.

In actual sense-perception, blended with reminiscent imagination, your prophetically dreaming Watt boy watches the steam lifting the lid of the tea-kettle on the crane in his mother's kitchen. A pretty little feat, indeed, but what to the titanic revelation that now suddenly startles him ! "It lifts ! it lifts ! I say steam lifts ! if one thing, then why not everything ? Aha ! old Proteus, I have caught you napping now, and will hold you fast. Visibly, I see you transforming yourself into horse, sail, quarryman, carder, spinner, and in each shape you thus assume will I enslave you to weave the cloth and grind the corn and shoulder the burdens of the world." This, in the purely physical realm, is an instance of creative imagination projecting upon what is yet "airy nothing" the compelling image of a new positive order to come. In countless other realms it likewise steps forward in the demonstration of kindred power. Thus the mind of a Turner weaves his reminiscences of lake, grove, sunset, ocean, into a permanent enduring landscape, ideally more beautiful than any ever existing in unaided nature ; thus a Mozart weaves his sound-reminiscences and their emotional correspondences into enduring melodies such as no sighing of the wind through the pine needles or lapse of waters on the shore ever approached. Thenceforth the minds of men are cast in new moulds, reshaped by the working of art as before by the working of nature, incapable henceforth of seeing, feeling or thinking as previously they did.

The thing to note in these examples of creative imagination of the highest order is the stamp of authority with which they leap forth in the mind, — the authority of incarnate truth, beauty, law. "When the conception of a piece of music comes to me," said Mozart, "it does not come as afterwards it will be heard played by the orchestra, part succeeding part in the order of time, but all together. I hear beginning, end and middle, as it were, at once." In other words, the conception starts up as, at the bugle-call, an organized regiment, but now asleep on the battle-field, each soldier in place ; the reason of each one's position preëxisting in

the military structure of the whole. No wonder that the old — yes, and even to this day the profoundest — explanation of it all was: "It is the muse, it is the breath of a power more essentially informed with beauty, love and reason than man in his isolation feels himself to be!" Thus inevitably succeeds to the question of creative potentiality in man, the deeper question of the witness thus borne to prior creative forces behind him, incarnating in his impulse and aim their own harmonious activities.

Sooner or later in life there comes to every one the experience of a great hour in the presence of Nature, in which there flashes home upon the consciousness, as never before, the irresistible sense of a vast external organizing power; its prenatal workings evidenced by its later manifestation in responding creatures. In company with three or four friends, who have sailed with him from the mainland, one finds himself whiling away a morning on a rocky island, miles out at sea. It is the breeding-place of thousands of gulls and Mother Carey's chickens. Overhead, the air is strident with the creaking wings and wild with the cries of the parent birds, while below, so thickly on the slabs of granite have the gulls laid their eggs that one has to step with extreme care not to tread on them. With the nests, however, of the Mother Carey's chickens it is another story. These are constructed so far below the surface, in the accumulations, two or three feet deep, of the withered needles fallen from the spruce trees, that, to reach them, the arm must be run into the ground nearly to the shoulder. One of the party brings up in his hand a little downy, coal-black, blinking-eyed chickling, so feeble, so appealingly helpless, as to call out all the caressing love one feels for helpless things. How eagerly the group gathers round that temporary hand-nest, now looking lovingly at this little bit of trembling sentiency, now off at the stormy ocean which, under a rising southeasterly gale, breaks in thunder tones on the rocks. Yet, marvel of marvels, these two stark contradictories, chick and ocean, are born mates. More imperially than ever Venice wedded the Adriatic, this tiny birdling is to wed the stormy Atlantic. A month or two more, and any one of the group, fearful perhaps for his very life in his fortress-like steamship, might meet this tiny creature a thousand miles out at sea, absolute master of the situation. Inevitable the thought, along what infinitely converging lines must there have worked hitherto, must there still be working, an unseen organizing power, to assemble the harmonious elements needed to evolve from the egg this splendid piece of

adaptation, this little magazine of power, with its unerring eye, its sweep of wing, its nervous batteries, its swell of pectoral muscle, its storehouse of nutrition for such immense expenditure! As fire kindles fire, so it seems but one further flash of a universal creative imagination darting upward from flight of bird to flight of the soul of man, when Bryant breaks forth in devout ascription:—

He who, from zone to zone,
Guides through the boundless sky thy certain flight,
In the long way that I must tread alone,
Will lead my steps aright.

Enough, however, of this preliminary sketch of the prenatal organization, vital constituents, and reshaping power of imagination. Now for the question of the specific manner in which this faculty has throughout the ages displayed its forces in the realm of religion.

All the great founders and heralds of religion have been men of preëminent imaginative endowment,—“of imagination all compact.” They must be so. Spiritual imagination is the reason of their being, the fulcrum and lever of their power. For what is the actual mission, in a world like this, of such inspirers? It is the same in one special realm of human experience as in other realms,—that of scientific, mechanical or artistic imagination. This mission is to confront and overlay a world of sense, multiplicity and bewildering confusion with the order, beauty and hope of a world of prophetic vision—a world dynamic in its very elements, and so realizing itself in “the demonstration of the spirit and of power” as to project itself from within the soul upon external phenomena, compelling them into new groups, and endowing them with new spiritual meanings. At once

The light that never was on sea or land,
The consecration and the poet’s dream,

and yet a light transfiguring in its magic effect as the sunset rays flung on a naked cliff, and dissolving it into a dream-world of purple, gold and amethyst!

The world of sense and instability without, of doubt, fear and distress within,—has it not, indeed, through all the ages, been the primal mission of religion to seek to overlay and interpenetrate this with an overpowering mental world of security, friendliness and refuge? Bacon declared the supreme end of poetry to be “to subject the shows [the prosaic, commonplace appearances] of things to the desires of the mind;” in other words, so to trans-

figure them to the spiritual eye as to make them wear the look which man at his neediest and highest yearns to have them wear. All shrinking — as from something purely arbitrary and willful — from the expression “*subjecting the shows of things to the desires of the mind*” must be abandoned here. As well think to pronounce it derogatory to science to declare its root-impulse to be the desire of subjecting blind chaos to coveted rational order, or to the art of sculpture to declare its root-impulse to be the desire to subject human deformity to the yearning for faultless beauty! To every barren Philistine who contemptuously objects, “Here you are talking poetry,” must the answer be made: “In this realm prose is ruled out. Reduce religion to prose, and in such an atmosphere it will gasp and die. As wide apart are Isaiah and Gradgrind as the eagle in the sky and the mole underground.” For what are these unquenchable “desires of the mind” that voice the human cry for the prophet of religion, and secure him his hushed and expectant audience? And who are they thus appealing to him, bearing in his bosom the burden of their woes, yearnings and triumphs? They are beings who, from the very constitution of human nature, must see the often appalling shows of things subjected to the higher desires of the mind, or abandon as mockeries these desires, and so sink into despair. They are the Rachels weeping for their children; they are men and women plunged in an abyss of inscrutable mystery; those writhing at injustice, hag-ridden with loneliness and care, orphaned and hungry for cheer and companionship, or heart-sick over the long struggle between duty and passion, faith and doubt. Yet all these have shared blessed experiences so different, such revelations of higher possible realities, that an undying yearning has set in for a hold on a Power enthroned above the world or incarnate in its every experience, who has it at his central heart to rescue from destruction what seem his highest revelations to his dependent creatures.

In different terms, the first word and the last word of religion, in prophet and hearer alike, has ever been *salvation*, the salvation of man's most precious treasures, outward or inward, as objects with which all possibility of satisfying life is consciously bound up. Primarily, and to the final end, this is what man demands God for, as instinctively as the lungs gasp for air and the eye turns to the light. Be the man the lowest fetiche-worshiper, craving a magic charm with which to paralyze his enemy, or be he a Thomas à Kempis yearning after peace in the

beatific vision of God, ever and always in the human want is rooted the longing for power to lay hold of the attributes of the coveted want-supplier, — the faith in some form or other, “I know that my Redeemer liveth.” Nor does this inevitable attitude imply mere self-seeking in any invidious sense, but is as fraught with prophetic meaning as the instinctive craving of the new-born babe for its mother’s breast. Blind instinct of self and prophecy of life to be are here one. Granted that the babe will take hold with equal vigor of a finger applied to its lips; laugh, too, if you will, at his blind ecclesiastical faith. To the more reflective mind, the misjudging act proves nothing more than that the little undeveloped mite of sentiency is builded “wiser than he *knows*.”

Too early in life, then, can no man rid himself of the abysmal silliness with which the word “self-seeking” is so often made a word of reproach. True, in this whole attitude of religion, from the outset to the end, there is encountered one startling phenomenon, the absolute, passionate insistence on subjecting to self and the desires of self, the whole objective world of pain and blight till “death is swallowed up in victory.” Just in so far as this goes, the attitude of the religious instinct, alike in the individual and in the race, is egoistic to the highest pitch. Indomitable refusal to submit, as to finality, to that which is as now it is; such is religion’s rallying cry. Yet, strange paradox! in all its nobler forms this highest egoistic pitch is but the inevitable individual shape taken on, in finite mind, by the indwelling sense which partakes most of universality in its nature, and so furnishes present witness and foundation of trust in an infinitely superior-to-self. “I” indeed, but “I” identical with the highest and purest brought to consciousness in me, — its voice, its revelation, — and not “I” identical with self-seeking after the merely private and self-prompted. Yes, an Abt Vogler yearning for the permanence of the soul’s richest music, but because such music is felt to be a snatch of the eternal harmony, a strain of viol, harp or organ in creation’s full symphony!

Such, then, is the “Here I stand, I cannot otherwise!” of the loftiest prophet, as equally it is the stand of the lowest idolater dimly reaching after a higher that he yet surmises. Just here, under the press of this undying impulse, begins imagination’s mighty rôle. For in every case, low or high, the answer to the passionate quest must come, if it come at all, in some incarnating vision of cheer, created out of the same life-elements that inform the feeling prompting the quest. Never by any possibility can

man escape the law that through *sense-attestation* he sees and believes. Thus is there, can there be, but one sole power through which the witness of material sense can ever be effectually triumphed over,—the witness, namely, of the *second-sense of the spirit*? Such *second-sense*, prophetic imagination is, in all its visible, palpable creations, “substance of things hoped for, evidence of things not seen.” So when the shuddering peasant women whispered, awe-struck, to one another, as Dante’s sorrow-scarred form swept by, “That is the man that went down into hell!” it was but instinctive recognition of the indelible stamp the *second-sense* of visionary imagination sets on the very lineaments of the prophets of the race.

The desires in human nature which impel man to seek at the hands of superior power the salvation of his dearest interests—the ground of the sense of the only living unity that can subsist between himself and such power—range, of course, through the whole scale, from the lowest depths of materiality to the highest reaches of the spiritual. But the action, as food and stimulant to imagination of these desires and their objects, is ever one and the same. A Mohammed, for example, proclaims himself to the freebooting tribes of Arabia as the prophet of Allah. What unquenchable desires of these fierce and hungry sons of the desert can Allah satisfy? Those deepest-lying in their immediate stage of development. First of all must the prophet inflame his followers to see vividly a freebooter God, absolute lord of the rich cities and fertile plains of the earth, and holding them all in fee for his naked and outcast, yet ever faithful, servants in the holy crusade against idolatry. Full well they know from stern sense-experience the fiery heat and suffocating simooms of the desert; and flesh and blood shrink from the march through them. Equally, in blessed contrast, they know the refuge of the springs and verdure of the oases, and fain would they lie at rest in them. But now it is to become palpable reality to them that under the inexorable will of Allah they will have to deal with still more dreadful, still more entrancing experiences, and that, on the one hand, to escape a wrath shriveling with an infinitely fiercer heat than the desert’s him who disobeys, or, on the other, to dwell through eternity in Paradise with the rewarding houris,—one day of whose smiles outweighs an eternity in the greenest earthly oasis,—they must rise to a far intenser pitch of life. What power, short of imagination at its highest potency, can work this feat! Duly inflame this vision-flasher, and then first will the wild

son of the desert lift the cry, "The houris are beckoning me; I see them bend with welcoming arms from Paradise!" and into the glare of the quivering sands will he plunge, just as, on an infinitely higher level of conception, Dante, in his passage through Purgatory, leaps at the sight of Beatrice into the fire hotter than molten glass, and mastering the torture, struggles through to taste the rapture of standing by her side.

All this, however, it may be objected, is but the type of a low and materialistic form of religion, of the earth earthy. Take, then, an instance from the highest form, and ask whether, in impulse or method, it differs one whit. Jesus, in Palestine, sees a peasant boy go by, a string of dead sparrows in his hand, and shouting, "Two for a farthing, two for a farthing!" How cheap the market estimate of sparrow life! But here is a heart pitiful as a little girl's over her dead canary, a heart craving a world of protecting love for the very birds and flowers; a heart, moreover, so profound in its reach as to feel that the whole issue of Love Divine lies as much at stake in the fall of a sparrow as in the fall of an empire. A shock of pain, a sense of world-orphanage, comes over him, till, the indestructible love and trust in love of his own breast surging on high in protest, his whole being gathers itself together in one supreme act of religious imagination. He rises out of the realm of death into the realm of life as he communes with a plenitude of omnipotent love, in the sight of which not one of these tiny creatures can fall unheeded to the ground. Here, as always, relief comes through the passionate leap of the soul into a higher and richer world, overpowering the painful spectacle of the lower world. Yet the material out of which spiritual imagination builds that other and only satisfying world is, in every item, vital material furnished by the love, beauty, yearning and blessing of this, only raised to prophetic heights.

Religion, thus, never arose out of mere intellectual speculation; it never did and it never will so arise, though on its onward march it perpetually takes up and glorifies in its imaginative creations the results of speculation, as well as of all other activities that widen and enrich experience. What religion did grow out of, what it ever survives through the might of, is, as Wilhelm Bender in his "*Wesen der Religion*" has so powerfully argued, something far more fundamental in human nature; nothing short, in fact, of the ineradicable instinct of self-preservation inherent in every fibre of man's being. Are his own forces spent, then swift

the question arises, Are there no other forces to summon to the rescue? No matter what persuades him, there *are*, — instinct or reason in the sage, or superstition in the savage, — for their help will he Jephtha-like sacrifice his virgin daughter; or St. Anthony-like macerate his body in the desert; or Jesus-like surrender in Gethsemane the hope of the earthly kingdom of God, be it only that in the “Thy will, not mine, be done!” there lie somehow, somewhere, a fullness of divine content to insure ultimate security of the heavenly kingdom of God. But surrender, even to God, the essence of the desire of the mind — however the outward shape of its victory may change — that man will not, that he cannot, do so long as the religious instinct survives. With such surrender, the religious instinct would die, the passionate instinct to live and to see the best and dearest the heart knows live also in the purpose of the Eternal Will. Thus ever, “just at the point at which consciousness of human power *ends* religion *begins*; the impulse to self-reliant action at once changing shape into the impulse of yearning, sacrifice, prayer, trust.”

Only, however, through the contemplation of a vast and complex system of religious faith, like that of the church of the Middle Ages, a system gathering under its ample folds the most widely varying nationalities and stages of culture, is it possible to form an adequate conception of the Protean shapes taken by spiritual imagination. In Palestine, for example, is Jesus born. Weary, heartsick to the core over the cruelty and brutal materialism of the actual world, his sublime spirit seeks refuge in the prophetic vision of a coming ideal kingdom, whose indestructible foundation to him is laid in the infinite resources of the divine Fatherhood, interpreted through the sense of his own God-begotten Sonship, — the vision of a kingdom of heaven on earth which shall reverse the whole theory and practice of the brutal Roman world, and crown as greatest of all him who is the servant of all. Tender, loving natures are instinctively drawn to his side as sharers in his beautiful anticipation, and all, for an hour, is radiant hope. But the cruel “shows of things” refuse to “submit themselves to the desires of the mind.” The brutality of fact asserts itself, and the Master is crucified and buried. Has the blessed vision gone forever? a brief sunrise glory fading into a day of gloom and chill? All turns on which of two powers in the human breast shall prove mightier, material sense of bleak actuality, or prophetic sense of a glory beyond. “Faith, substance of things hoped for, evidence of things not seen,” triumphs. In the insur-

rection of the spirit of his impassioned disciples, who cannot, will not, allow that such a one could be the spoil of the grave, Jesus rises in the resurrection and ascends on high, seated thenceforth at the right hand of God, King of the new spiritual world soon to descend and swallow up the material.

To sustain and keep radiant this faith in the face of brute contradictory realities, what a world of defiant imaginative creation forthwith sets in! Soon shall this gospel be carried into Asia Minor, where Hebrew, Syrian, Greek, Persian forms of belief mingle and interchange ideas and yearnings. Thence shall it spread to Europe, to Greek, Latin, Gothic, Teutonic, Gallic races. How, throughout these vast realms, shall Jesus, "the desire of all nations," be conceived? As the desire of these varied nations is. And lo! a power to effect it, creative imagination, dowered with a world of richest material to work on from Hebrew prophecy, Greek philosophy and art, Persian conceptions of the elemental conflict of good and evil, home-bred polytheistic faiths. This will bear on the crucified one from Logos to Godhead, to sate the yearning of the Aryan mind for incarnate God in man. This will translate the Galilean peasant mother into the all-prevailing Queen of Heaven, to comfort the heart finding in infinite maternal love the only bosom tender enough to take refuge in. This, to meet the polytheistic needs of millions, will glorify the humble fishermen-apostles till, in due season, St. Peter shall stand holding the keys of heaven and hell, or St. Mark, emblazoned on the banners of the Venetian Republic, shall flame in the van of the frantic charge over the walls of Zara or Constantinople. In these and countless kindred forms shall shaping imagination have free range to summon up a supernatural world answering to every desire, debasing or exalting, cruel or redeeming, in the mind of man. The theologic madman shall see more devils than vast hell can hold. To the remorseful penitent the stone-crushed form of the repentant toiling up the mountain of Purgatory shall become as visible in the mind's eye as the every-day peasant laboring up a steep with his burden on his back. To the mystic saint shall be thrown wide the golden gates of Paradise, where, in the beatific vision of God, St. Francis and St. Dominic are seen lost in the contemplation of the hidden mysteries the angels desire to look into. Architects shall rear temples alive with the hierarchies of the angels and the glorious company of the apostles and martyrs; painters shall call down from on high the cherubim and seraphim, — till, finally, a world of vision so overwhelming as to assert itself

lord and master of the every-day world of blight and sorrow and wreck. Death itself shall be abolished by the vitality of continuous life, life diabolical, life celestial. Such, then, in outline was the triumphant march of what may be regarded as the crowning illustration in human history of the might of spiritual imagination, although the close parallel to the same stupendous process is familiar to every student of the religious story of Assyria, Persia, Greece, or Scandinavia.

Meanwhile, underneath this ceaseless activity of religious imagination there has perpetually been going on in human history, and generally in fiercest struggle with it, the steady progress of the world's intellectual enlightenment. A giant antagonist here steps into the arena, whose name is Legion. Now is he Abelard, confronting St. Bernard; now Copernicus or Galileo, confronting the intrenched traditions of the church universal. Each side is in deadly earnest; each is warring with weapons that have an indestructible validity. Therefore, in this internecine warfare, unless a principle of reconciliation satisfactory to the dearest interests of each can be established, all in vain were it to hope that the essential function of imagination in religion, as of a king never to be dethroned, can ever think to command universal consent. For the first procedure of critical science always has worn, and always must wear, to trustful hearts the guise of a baleful spectre, — frost to the flower, incendiary fire in the temple. The affirmation is lost sight of in the denial. From cherished haunt after haunt of visible, radiant faiths does man see himself driven, like Adam and Eve out of Paradise, and but a world of briers and thistles without. Thence the inevitable outcry, "Were all these blessed hiding-places of the soul but airy nothings, which, like an insubstantial pageant faded, leave not a rack behind?"

This pathetic collapse into despair at the initial shock of cold reason, on what is it based? On the temporary wreck of trust in the validity of imagination, inevitably setting in when the literal objective results of the enormous rôle it has played throughout human history begin to be critically tested. All life seems impoverished. The eagle's wings, once commanding the empyrean, — thousands now superciliously proclaim, — are at last closely clipped; the royal bird, brought down from its lofty soarings, may now be disciplined to hop soberly about on the ground, a useful, domestic barn-yard fowl, "a creature not too bright or good for human nature's daily food." Happily thus, these disdainful pinions kept renewedly shorn, the instinct of flight may die out in them, as they become purely rudimentary.

It is the pardonable juvenile folly of every fresh movement that, after the manner of some new dietetic Graham system, with its categorical imperative that henceforth man shall live by coarse-ground cereals alone, it ignores everything short of the clumsy flights of its own as yet infantile imagination. Profound truths, no doubt, are often overlooked. Still it is a far cry to the demonstration that this barren husk contains the sole nutritious elements in this amazingly complex universe. Yet, on the other hand, too gratefully can it never be acknowledged that to the disintegrating analysis of scientific criticism is solely due the recognition of the sharp line of demarcation between the divergent realms of imagination and material fact, of poetry and prose, of prophetic forecast and demonstrated knowledge. Too gratefully, again, we can never acknowledge the immense gain of frankest admission that the essential function of imagination begins and ends in the *act of incarnation*; in the spiritual feat of transforming barren and impotent abstractions into concrete shapes instinct with the energies of a universe all alive. Thence arises of necessity the clearest recognition of the law that as mind grows wider, richer, diviner, an ever-ascending hierarchy of symbols is demanded fitly to incarnate and glorify its inner content. Such admissions, however, which all should gladly make, — do they so much as touch, still less dry up, the perennial springs in human nature out of which welled these vast creative forces, forever “decomposing but to recompose?” The Promethean wrestle, throughout the ages, of undying yearnings in the soul of man with the maiming Jacob’s angel of the universe, to wring a blessing and compel the revelation of his holiest name, — must this not evermore go on? Not in depression, but in exultation rather, will every enlightened mind that has got down to imagination’s perennial sources feel it an act of worship to declare, even of its highest creations: “They shall perish; but Thou remainest; they all shall wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture shalt Thou fold them up and they shall be changed; but Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail.” None the less, as from the beginning so to the end, shall there still sound out of the heart of a universe of self-revealing glory the eternal mandate:

Build thee more stately mansions, O my soul,
As the swift seasons roll!
Let each new temple, nobler than the last,
Shut thee from heaven with a dome more vast,
Till thou at length art free,
Leaving thine outgrown shell by life’s unresting sea.

In the dawning of a new era, fitly characterized as that of the "sympathy of religions," it is already becoming clear what an "angel in disguise" critical science has really turned out to be. So far from affecting their essence, such criticism has but killed the prose too long materializing the heart-poetry of the grand imaginative creations of the world-religions, thereby anew communicating the "one touch of nature that makes the whole world kin." How hidebound in literalism many a mind had been, such a book as Sir Edwin Arnold's "*Light of Asia*" at once revealed to thousands by making their hearts burn within them as they surrendered themselves to the spirit of the devout legends in which the grateful heart of the East had glorified its redeeming Buddha. Such liberation of spirit through sympathetic imagination will be quickened by yet other world-religions, till, even in this land of disenchanted literalism, it shall restore to thousands, as a priceless treasure of the heart, their own angel-song of the Nativity, the star of Bethlehem, the Magi bringing gold, frankincense, and myrrh, — their own Resurrection and Ascension, — triumphant outbursts of thanksgiving they have long hesitated to read even from the pulpit, lest, in the eyes of the "advanced," they might incur the ignominious suspicion of accepting them as sheer external phenomena. Happily, to the paralyzing dread of failure to approve themselves as "nothing if not critical" shall there succeed in a new generation the more salutary dread of writing themselves down bloodless and prosaic.

Entirely apart, however, from the enriching of human life that is sure to come through free heirship, once again, in the spiritual life of the higher imaginative creations of the past, imagination has still her old imperial rôle to play in the evolution of the faith and ritual of the future. Indeed, should the question be put, — at least among English-speaking people, — What has been the form inevitably taken by the profoundest and most inspiring religious utterances of the nineteenth century? there could be but one answer. It is the imaginative, witnessed to in such poems as Tennyson's "*In Memoriam*," and Browning's "*Abt Vogler*," "*Rabbi Ben Ezra*," and "*Saul*."

In Tennyson we encounter the thoroughly equipped modern man. No shred of superstition clings to him. His intellectual outlook is the outlook of the most advanced scientific thought. No one recognizes more distinctly that positive knowledge is the answer to the mind's curiosity as to phenomena now and here; no one more distinctly sees that the moral life is the necessary

outcome of the struggle after adjustment between the demands of human beings on earth. But neither of these is religion, whatever superb material each may furnish for its transforming power ; neither of these can satisfy the present, immediate yearning of religion for higher vision which shall transfigure the pain and bleakness of the actual.

We have but faith : we cannot know ;
 For knowledge is of things we see ;
 And yet we trust it comes from Thee,
 A beam in darkness : let it grow.

To Tennyson, however, triumphant faith stands for no mere passive thing. It is, on the contrary, the culminating prophetic act of the soul gathering up its intensest energies of yearning and love, dowering its consciousness with all its richest resources of experience and knowledge, and then, at the impulse of passionate aspiration, bravely launching itself on the eternal currents of tendency along which these sweep the devout mind.

If e'er when faith had fallen asleep,
 I heard a voice, " Believe no more,"
 And heard an ever-breaking shore
 That tumbled in the Godless deep ;

A warmth within the breast would melt
 The freezing reason's colder part,
 And like a man in wrath the heart
 Stood up and answered, " I have felt."

Here, as always in such instances, the deep peace which " In Memoriam " has breathed into many suffering lives has been born solely of the power of the poet's creative imagination to quicken in the receptive imagination of his fellows the same elemental trusts with his own, and then lifting their souls to freedom of flight with him through worlds made visible of cheer and hope.

Impossible, finally, is it to have been brought into vital contact with the exceptional class of men and women whom the poetry of Robert Browning has delivered of late years from the oppression of materialistic nightmare, and to whom it has imparted daring of imaginative flight, without being struck by the encounter in them of a sense of positive spiritual exultation, as over a new-discovered province in their being, — a genuine echo of the enthusiastic Abt Vogler cry :

Sorrow is hard to bear, and doubt is slow to clear,
 Each sufferer says his say, his scheme of the weal and woe,
 But God has a few of us whom he whispers in the ear,
 The rest may reason and welcome ; 't is we musicians know.

Short, indeed, has been the syllogism of faith worked by Browning, but it sums up the eternal logic of feeling :

See the King — I would help him but cannot, the wishes fall through,
 Could I wrestle to raise him from sorrow, grow poor to enrich,
 To fill up his life, starve my own out, I would — knowing which,
 I know that my service is perfect. Oh, speak *through* me now !
 Would I suffer for him that I love ? *So wouldst Thou — so wilt Thou !*

Nowhere else than in the buoyant faith with which the poet has incarnated in reacting characterization and imagery this authoritative syllogism of the heart is to be found the secret of his quickening power. Thence the grateful confession of so many of our day that, after working mind and soul into the deeps of such a poem as "Saul," its overpowering passion of faith made sight so shook them to the centre that the half-dazed, half-ecstatic outcry of the youthful David, staggering homeward under the spell of the new revelation, seemed but literal transcript of their own experience :

I know not too well how I found my way home in the night.
 There were witnesses, cohorts about me, to left and to right,
 Angels, powers, the unuttered, unseen, the alive, the aware.

And the stars of night beat with emotion, and tingled and shot
 Out in fire the strong pain of pent knowledge ; but I fainted not,
 For the Hand still impelled me at once and supported, suppressed
 All the tumult, and quenched it with quiet, and holy behest,
 Till the rapture was shut in itself, and the earth sank to rest.

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THE NEXT STEP IN CHRISTIANITY.

VERY different notions are entertained about the nature and person of Jesus Christ. It is generally agreed, however, that no one is likely to appear whose authority could be more trustworthy in the sphere of religion. What he did not know, in that department, is generally conceded to be either not worth the knowing, or not possible to be known. It is generally conceded, also, that he himself and his deliverances have never been more than partially comprehended. He declared more than once that his nearest and most sympathetic friends did not understand him. It is clear that they did not; and that, in some particulars, they strangely misconceived him. But, all the same, they were deeply impressed by him. The same has been true of "Christendom" for now these nearly twenty centuries. He has been one of the most considerable influences which have shaped and colored the movement of humanity. He continues to be so, as is evident to any one who simply looks about him. His name is in point of fact "exalted above every name."

Judging simply from the facts which are equally accessible to every one, it seems pretty plain, *first*, that men will not get on without a religion; and *second*, that there is no religion practically available except Christianity.

A few people, it is true, are experimenting with Swedenborgianism and Comtism and Buddhism and "Christian Science," but these may be dismissed as *une quantité négligeable*.

From all that one can see, Christianity, in some form, is likely to remain the religion of the enlightened world.

Christianity *in some form*; but in what form?

Viewed from the outside, no institution has undergone such startling transformations as Christianity has. One who looked at it casually in the first century, say at Antioch, and again in the fourth at Constantinople, in the fourteenth in Rome, and in the nineteenth in Philadelphia, would find great difficulty in identifying it. Will any of these forms be abiding? Or will the Christianity of the future take on an aspect as markedly different from any of these as they are from each other?

I venture to think that this last is true; and that it is a truth the importance of which can hardly be estimated.

The great metamorphoses which Christianity has experienced have not been very many, but they have been very marked, and

they have each and all been characterized by two features: they have been comparatively sudden, and they have not been recognized by the people who were living when they occurred. The phases through which Christianity has passed have been substantially these three, viz., the *dogmatic*, the *ecclesiastical*, and the *mystical* (or "evangelical"). What will the next one be? I venture to think that it is very near, if not already here, though unrecognized. This paper is an attempt to identify it in the midst of many phenomena which, without the clue, seem meaningless and hopeless. The importance of doing this, if it can be done, is obvious. But, to do so, it will be necessary briefly to review the past.

It was both inevitable and right that Christianity should at first put on a dogmatic dress. The little group of men who had been profoundly impressed by the person and words of their Judean Master proposed to themselves to be missionaries. But this fact made it necessary that they should cast, in some portable and transmissible form, their beliefs about the person and doctrine of their Principal. This was not easily nor readily done. It is clear, from their record, that their Master was one of the most perplexing characters imaginable. Beside that, the impression which he left upon them was the result of years of companionship. For them to state clearly just what the impression was, was not easy. It did not get itself done completely for several centuries. Much conferring with one another and much interchange of opinion by converts drawn from different provinces were needful to formulate a working creed. It was an absolutely necessary thing to do; but it was also natural that, when the Christian community had been engrossed for three or four centuries in formulating their belief, they should come into the habit of thinking that accurate belief and an accepted way of stating that belief were the most important of all possible things. Christianity came, in their minds, to be identified with *doctrine*. A large section of Christendom stopped at that point, and has ever since refused to move. The Eastern Church rests in orthodoxy. She takes that word for her official title. And so she sits a spectacle in her Basilica. Old she is, but not venerable. Her hair is hoary, but the fire of youth is gone from her leaden eyes. Wrapt in her embroidered vestments, she slumbers on, as powerless to touch or be touched by the life of the men and women of Russia and Greece as the mummy of Seti is by that of the Fellahin of Egypt.

But the Western Church, with its creed in its hand, passed on

into the next phase. It became a great *organization*. It inherited the constructive spirit of the Great Empire, and bettered its instruction. It identified Christianity with a church. For the first four centuries all revolved about doctrine. For the next ten, all revolved about organization. Slowly and powerfully the structure was builded. No institution, probably, has ever been formed of as intractable material, under as unfavorable circumstances, or has commanded the unqualified services of so many generations of astute and earnest men. Within its walls, and guarded by its ever watchful sentinels, the theological system-builders continued to elaborate their endless schemes of dogma. They overlaid the missionary creeds, and buried them out of sight under a grotesque mass of derivative doctrines. Yet it was the churchmen, and not the theologians, who guided the movement of Christianity during this period. But, long before the period ended, their task had also been completed. The simple missionary organization, which had been necessary to carry the simple missionary creed, was overlaid and buried out of sight in the mighty structure of the Roman Church.

Then came the third phase, known popularly as the *Reformation*. The phrase is misleading. It was not a reformation, but a new step. It was the successful issue of a long series of efforts, made by the most earnest, sagacious, virile and devout men in the Western Church, to carry their religion from the region of dogma and organization into the realm of personal experience. Jerome of Prague, Arnold of Brescia, Wyclif, Huss, Luther, Calvin, Colet, More, Cranmer, George Fox, Tauler, William Law, John Wesley, all sought the same end. In the modern cant they would all be called "Evangelicals." The secret spirit which they all held in common was the belief that Christianity is essentially the establishment by the individual of a conscious, personal relation with God. This idea of "conversion" is the differentia of Protestantism. In American Christianity it has held, until lately, the central place.

Now, it will be observed that each of these phases is an advance upon the one which preceded it. No one of them was possible until the one which went before had been measurably accomplished. Each one was entered upon unconsciously. Each was strenuously opposed at its beginning by the mass who fancied their own stage to be final. Each, when it became an accomplished fact, reacted upon and modified what had gone before.

At present there are unmistakable signs on every hand that a

farther step is about to be taken. What will it be? That it will still be Christianity no candid man can doubt. But it is equally plain that it will be as unlike any phase of it heretofore seen as these have been, and, in their survivals, are unlike each other.

It is clear, in the first place, that Christianity has already broken out of the bounds which have long contained it. It has broken out of the old bounds of doctrine; out of the church; and will no longer submit to conventional "experiences." There is not a single "confession of faith" which serves to express the actual belief of even the most conservative members of the ministry of any church which is supposed to accept such a confession. They are all in the same boat. The decrees of the Council of Trent, the Thirty-nine Articles, the Westminster Confession, that of Augsburg or Dort, while they all retain a place of quasi authority in the several churches, have become powerless to hold the real belief of even the clergy. That this convicts the clergy of insincerity will only be alleged by the shallow and the ignorant. A profound change has come about against which they are helpless. They are honestly trying to readjust the conditions with earnestness and singleness of heart. Some think to find relief by formally abolishing doctrinal formulas which have ceased to be credible. Some think to find it by "revising" so as to accommodate the doctrinal statements to the actual beliefs current. Both methods will fail, though it is not in my way, in this paper, to say why. I am only concerned to point out the fact that religious belief *has* broken out of the formulas which once contained it.

In the second place, functions which once belonged to organized Christianity have, one by one, been taken in hand by others. Notable among these are education and the administration of charity. Only one branch of the church now makes any serious claim of right to control the machinery of education. And, in the United States at any rate, a constantly increasing number of her adherents either make this claim half-heartedly under the pressure of their priesthood, or refuse to make it altogether. In the distribution of their alms rich men do not now, as once, make the church their almoner. Wise men bring gold, frankincense and myrrh to the King, but they appoint their own agents for its distribution. To speak of those near at hand and notable, I name the Girard College, the Williamson School, the Drexel Institute, and the secular societies for the organization of charity.

In the third place, good men are, in an increasing number of cases, unmoved by the conventional "experiences" of religion.

A century ago "the Great Awakening" swept over America like a spiritual cyclone. So sturdy a man as Benjamin Franklin could not keep his feet against it. The masses were swept by it into a religious frenzy. Fitful gusts, more local and less intense, have been present ever since. But men are less impressible by them. Twenty years ago Mr. Moody, the *evangelist*, could produce "conversions" almost at will. Now Mr. Moody has become the *educator*.

What do these changes mean?

What is to be done?

To these questions some can give a short and easy answer. "It means," say they, "that we are in a day of apostasy. It is all due to the hardness of men's hearts. We live in the midst of a stiff-necked and rebellious generation."

But when these are called upon to say what should be done, they give different answers. The *Theologian* says, "Let us restore to its old completeness our Confession, bating of it no word or phrase; and, if we must perish, let us fall like our fathers — with the old blue banner in our hands."

The *Ecclesiastic* says, "Let us restore the church of that period when it had the power to guide the steps and control the conduct of all men."

The *Evangelical* says, "Let us pray."

They all misread the situation. It has always been true, of course, that a large portion of the community have been indifferent or hostile to Christianity. They are "irreligious" men. They are, therefore, usually thought of as immoral men; for religion and morality are, in the common mind, so intimately associated that they are thought of as present or absent together. If this were the only class to be considered the case would be very simple. But a large, and increasingly larger, proportion of *good* men cannot be called Christian, *if* to be a Christian means any one or all of those things, which it has, thus far, been defined to mean. They are good men and women, tried by any test which may fairly be applied to goodness. They are sober, kindly, earnest, sympathetic, clean, charitable. But they are "unsound" in doctrine; they are not "church-members;" they are not aware of having undergone any subjective "experience." This class is increasing at a rate which few realize.

Says the Presbyterian Dr. Bruce, Professor of New Testament Exegesis, in the Free Church of Glasgow: "I am disposed to think that a great and steadily increasing portion of the moral

worth of society lies outside the church, separated from it, not by godlessness, but rather by exceptionally intense moral earnestness."

The leadership of science and art is already almost entirely in the hands of men who have broken with organized Christianity. They are the guides and pioneers in political and social reforms. They are a large minority—promising soon to be a majority—in the management of charitable and reformatory institutions. They are the professors in colleges and the teachers in normal schools. They are kind husbands, faithful wives, good sons, daughters, friends. What is their relation to Christianity?

The answer is, *They are Christians in fact ; but they are waiting for Christianity to pass into the new phase which will include them in form.*

Like every household, the church is compelled at times to the necessity of house-cleaning and rearrangement of furniture. During the disturbance of this process a considerable number of the family and relatives prefer to live out of doors. They will not do so permanently. They do not wish to do so. One may venture to say, also, that they would play a more honorable part if they remained in the house and lent a hand, and gave their opinions concerning the proper rearrangements, rather than to stand critically outside, waiting till the task be done. But things are as they are. And they can truthfully retort that their suggestions of change in doctrine or discipline were not well received when they did remain within. But will the Christian society of the future be such as will be able to embrace them? I think it will, and for this reason:—

The formal statement of Christian doctrine and the organization of the Christian church are always determined by the actual beliefs and practices which precede the formal action.

Laws in the religious sphere are analogous to laws in the political sphere; they are but the expression of antecedent habits. What, then, are the present habits of the religious world which will, by and by, find formal expression? Their general drift may be seen in two or three striking phenomena.

1. The altogether unprecedented interest now manifest in the person and teaching of Jesus Christ. Booksellers tell me that there are only one or two books in the English tongue of which so many copies are sold as of "Ben-Hur." Those who have read it know that this is not on account of its literary excellence, great as that is, but because of the way in which it introduces Jesus. Dr. Farrar's "Life of Christ" is one of the few books of which it pays

to produce cheap and popular editions. Now, hardly any "Life of Christ" can be found which dates back more than fifty years. They are all the product of the nineteenth century. They have all been written in response to the increasing desire of the community to know just who and what Jesus was, and just what he did and said.

2. The enormous popularity of what one may call the "Professor Drummond literature." This Scotch professor's "Natural Law in the Spiritual World," and "The Greatest Thing in the World," and such like, have been hailed by millions as the statement they earnestly desired. With all their shallowness, and forced analogies, they do answer the present desire to express Christianity in terms of actual life.

3. The strenuous attempt to apply the teaching of Jesus to the problems of conduct. John Fiske, Tolstoi, Henry George, Mr. Powderly, Leo XIII. and Mr. Bellamy have all formally essayed to point out how this can or ought to be done. Mr. Fiske, in his "Destiny of Man," says, in effect, that this is already within the possibility of practical life. Mr. George would describe himself as, above all things else, a Christian. "Christian socialism" has become a phrase to conjure by. The Christian churches all acknowledge, in a way, their obligation to ease the burden of human living. A conservative churchman of fifty years ago, who went regularly on Sunday to hear a doctrinal thesis in a church which was shut up and deserted all the rest of the week, would be dumfounded if he could re-visit the old holy place and find built on to it a dispensary, a kitchen, a social hall, a lyceum, and, mayhap, a stage.

The change which has come about in the actual thought about religion may be strikingly seen in the fact that the motive of the Order of the Knights of Malta, which existed for the "defense of the Faith," and the motive of the Order of the Jesuits, which existed for the "defense of the Church," have become unintelligible or offensive; whereas a Catholic Total Abstinence Society or a Young Men's Christian Association seems natural and fitting.

The machinery for "revivals," also, which even a generation ago could be set up and worked with *naïveté*, is now clearly in its decadence.

Facts, all pointing in the same direction, might be multiplied indefinitely. But to what do they point? To this: Christianity has passed through the phases of dogmatism, ecclesiasticism and experimentalism, and is about to show itself in the region of *conduct*.

"But," it will be protested, "Christianity always has affected men's conduct; this has been its glory, that it has made men good."

This protest is true, but it is not true in the sense in which it is made. The present Archbishop of Canterbury feels called upon to warn the Church of England that it has never "received a shadow of commission to set forth as doctrine and worship that religion which began as morals and social order." It is true that Christianity was at first set forth as a "life." The "faith" which it demanded was not an intellectual but a moral possession. But when theology began to dominate, the quality of the "life" deteriorated. So far as temper and character are concerned there could hardly be a more violent contrast than that between the men who formed the first Council at Jerusalem and those who discussed the refinements of theology in the fifth century or the sixteenth. Where the theological spirit has been in control, it has sharply drawn a dividing line across the area of thought, calling one portion "sacred" and another "profane."

Where ecclesiasticism has controlled, it has portioned out conduct into "religious" and "secular;" so that the Sicilian bandit, who pays punctiliously his duties to the church, is not conscious of any incongruity as he crosses himself and mutters an "Ave" while he goes to rob.

Where evangelicalism has prevailed it has drawn the sharpest possible distinction between "religion" and "morality," making everything of the one, and speaking contemptuously of the other. Luther did not hesitate to say that "a Christian cannot, if he will, lose his salvation by any multitude or magnitude of sins, unless he ceases to believe; for no sin can damn him, but unbelief alone."

So while it is true, in the main, that Christianity has always had its effect in improving the quality of men's lives, it is also true that it has not always set this before itself as its main purpose. It has been thought of as a device to secure "salvation." Now, the interest for "salvation" is surely receding behind the interest for "conduct." The appeal is about to be taken to life. Christianity will more and more concern itself with *living*.

But in doing so it will not revise nor formally abolish its previous methods. What is superfluous in them will be allowed to be quietly forgotten. It cannot subsist without a creed, an organization and an act of choice by the individual. It gained each one of these essentials, as we believe, under the guidance of that Spirit of wisdom with which its Founder imbued it. The reality of its

life in the past has been vindicated by the fact that it *has* passed on from phase to phase even though the mass of its adherents bade it rest upon each in turn as a finality. But the creed will be short, broadly marked, portable. The organization will be no more complex than is necessary to carry the creed abroad. The initial experience will be nothing beyond the sincere desire for right conduct. All will issue in, and be tried by their issue in right living.

For this purpose and by this means Jesus will become more and more available. In this way Christianity will be seen to be both far easier and far more difficult than it has appeared since the apostolic days; easier, because more intelligible by the moral nature to which it addresses itself, and more difficult, because that manner of life which Jesus taught and exemplified is only possible to supreme faith.

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THE IMPLICATIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. ' 1

THE present paper is an effort to set forth in brief some of the evidence for an idealistic interpretation of the nature of reality. My argument is in its essential features identical with the one presented in a chapter on "The Possibility of Error" in my book called "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy," published in 1885. Another statement of the same considerations is to be found, in a summary form, on pages 368-380 of my recently published study entitled "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy." In the latter book I have also given an extended account of the historical relations of this line of argument, — especially of its relations to Kant's "Deduction of the Categories," and to the philosophical development from Kant to Hegel. That these relations are intimate, needs here no further express declaration. The discussion in my chapter on "The Possibility of Error" was criticised in some detail by two French writers, — by M. Paulhan, in the "Revue Philosophique" for September, 1885; and by M. Renouvier, in "La Critique Philosophique," for 1888, pp. 85-120. To both these distinguished critics I owe a hearty acknowledgment, and I have tried to profit by their objections, though I cannot here consider them.

I.

What is it to be conscious? What does self-consciousness imply? Such are the questions with which philosophical idealism begins. It is by examining these questions that a philosophical idealist hopes to get a clearer notion of the world in which he finds himself, and of his relation to this world. A successful estimate of such a doctrine can never be made unless one comprehends how it has been reached. It is the road that here determines the result. In vain does one, as philosopher, try to pass the gates of this heaven of theory, and to get the beatific insight for which the idealist hopes, unless one has first followed the strait and narrow path of thorough-going self-critical reflection. Whoever has approached his idealism by this road will no longer imagine, like the critic cited by Professor C. B. Upton ("The New World" for March, p. 142), that the God of idealism "may be safely treated as 'une quantité négligeable.'" The careful student of the path will have learned, as he went, the worth of the goal. His own insight may be still very incomplete, but he will know that the truth with which he deals is not "négligeable" merely because, like the earth in Browning's poem, it "keeps up its terrible composure," and declines to have a market value, or to show itself in the precise guises which tradition had led us to expect it to wear. For the idealist whose mind is as I think it ought to be, the Infinite is unquestionably a Person, and this Person is as unquestionably a world-possessor. The finite does not vanish in him; but he appears to us, although very imperfectly, through and by means of the finite. Yet what it is and means to be a Person, and to be also infinite, and to be the world-possessor, only a successful philosophical analysis can hope to make in general terms clear. It is useless to approach such problems with only our accidental and traditional prejudices concerning what personality may mean.

It sometimes seems to me that to many minds the word "person" has come primarily to mean one who can and perhaps will on occasion strike back at you if you first hit him; and doubtless the notion in question does in fact reveal a certain aspect of the ultimate truth. The world is indeed a moral order, and the moral law is a hard master, and hard masters do strike down rebels; and to many, who would reject very scornfully the crude language that I have just used, the idea of God and of his personality is, in fact, based upon an unconscious elaboration of just such simple cate-

gories as these. I do not question the relative value of such categories. We have in childhood to get our theology in these terms, and we never ought altogether to forget our childhood, or to ignore the sinewy and healthy truths then impressed upon us by tradition. Only such truths should not pretend to be ultimate. Imagery of this kind does not reveal the inmost meaning of the word "personality." Ideas of this sort ought not to be treated as final tests of all philosophical definitions of God. It is perfectly true that in our immediate inner experience, in our uncriticised finite self-consciousness, fragmentary as it is, we mortals learn at the outset, in a first rude example, what personality means, and it is by reflection upon this rude example that we have to proceed. But we need not wonder to find that the deeper meaning of the word "personality" is only to be got at by a long study of the significance of the rude facts themselves. For, as a very little analysis shows, we are none of us at the outset able to answer sharp questions concerning the true extent, or the nature, or the limitations, or the significance, of this familiar reality which we call our self-consciousness. In other words, we are self-conscious, but very imperfectly so. The question, "Who am I?" is not easily answerable, yet no question is more obviously a fair one. The problem, "What is a person?" is, then, not to be solved by a mere glance within.

In seeking after God, there are many who do indeed begin by asking the question, "Who am I?" but who thence proceed by offering some facile answer, such as the well-known one, "I am a thinking substance," or the still more familiar one, "I am a being possessed of free choice and volition," and on such a basis a theology is quickly built up. This theology will therefore, indeed, take a comparatively naïve shape. I am a person. God, of course, is another. For I have free volition. That constitutes the essence of me, and so of any person you please; and this fact is obvious, and for reflection nearly if not quite ultimate. Now, in the exercise of my free volition, I meet resistance from without. This resistance indicates a world of outer objects. But obviously only a will can resist a will. Hence there is will, and so personality, outside of me. The unity of law in the world of my objects, the cleverness of the manifold contrivances of nature, or, better still, the extent and the wisdom of plan which I see exemplified in the facts of organic life and of evolution, — all these things assure me that, in knowing the physical world, I am dealing with the doings of one great Person, whose creation is this natural order. He is free, and so am I. He limits me; and,

so far as I am free, I limit him. We are two; and hence the world is a moral order. Any more monistic interpretation would be immoral, for I should not fear God unless he were another person; nor regard him as my Father unless I felt his resistance whenever, in the exercise of my free volition, I push against his reality. After all, it is the muscular sense that, from such a point of view, becomes the chief revealer of the divine personality to us finite beings; and hence those who insist upon these categories love to exalt their "dynamic" character.

All such brief sketches of the views of opponents have of course to be inadequate, and therefore in a measure unjust. It is only to show in what direction I myself should look for more light that I make this brief hint of the unreflective nature of all these notions of a good deal of current theology. They are derived from a very simple inspection, so I must insist, of the world of the inner life. They have their relative truth, but they need deeper criticism. "Conscious of free choice," "conscious of outer objects resisting my free choice," "conscious of dynamic principles beneath all reality," — how profoundly problematic are the categories contained in each one of these phrases! What is it to have free choice? What is it not only to have but also to know one's own free choice? What is it to know outer objects? What is it to know one's Self? Yes, what is it to be conscious at all? What is a Self? All these are just the questions of philosophy. Whoever says, "But I *do* know all these things, and there is the end of it, — no matter about the *how*," — such a person is perfectly welcome to his assurance, but he is not philosophizing. It is precisely the *how* that concerns one in philosophy.

So much, then, for an indication of the reason why the idealist, knowing at the outset something of his own bit of finite self-consciousness, but longing to know more, declines to state *à priori* his notion either of Personality, or of the world, or of free will, or of the nature of knowledge, but aims to get at the true ideas of these things by means of a better analysis of the implications of self-consciousness themselves.

II.

Our questions, then, are no doubt fundamental, and worthy of scrutiny. They promise rich fruit. Yet, in approaching them, we must, in the present paper, limit our undertaking pretty carefully. Amidst the wealth of these problems we must choose what most directly concerns us in getting a general notion of the nature of the idealistic doctrine. Let our choice be as follows.

Idealism of the post-Kantian type is distinguished by two especially noteworthy features. It first involves a criticism of the inner nature of finite self-consciousness. I, the finite thinker, it says, must be in far more organic and deep and wide relations to my own true selfhood than my ordinary consciousness easily makes clear to me. In essence, then, I am much more of a self than my immediate consciousness, as it exists under human limitations, ever lets me directly know. The true Self is at all events far more than the "empirical" self of ordinary consciousness. This is sure because, upon examination, one finds that the flickering and limited self-consciousness of any moment of my life logically implies far more than it directly contains. I am never fully aware of the content or of the meaning of my present self. Unless, then, I am in deeper truth far more of a self than I now know myself to be, I am not even as much of a self as I now suppose myself to be. In other words, it is of the essence of finite consciousness to be, in its logical implications, transcendent of the limited character of its momentary inner contents. This is the first assertion of idealism. Put negatively it runs: Finite self-consciousness never directly shows me how much of a self I am. Therefore finite self-consciousness never directly reveals to me the true nature, or extent, or limitations, or relations of my own personality.

The second feature of our idealistic doctrine appears in its theory of the relation of any finite self to what we call the "external world." The idealistic view here is, that if on the one hand the self of finite consciousness is in any case, by implication, far more than it can directly know itself to be, on the other hand this self, in order to be in true relation to the outer objects which it actually thinks about, must be, by implication, so related to these outer objects that they are in reality, although external to this finite self, still not external to the true and complete Self of which this finite self is an organic part. If the analysis of consciousness has first shown me that my true Self is and must be far more in its essential nature than I can now directly know it to be, the analysis of the definition of "my world of objects" shows that, in order to be *my objects*, in order to be external, as they are, to my finite thoughts about them, "my objects" must be such as my true Self already possesses, — objects which it is aware of because they are its immediate objects, and which it knows to be mine because it includes both my meaning and their inner essence.

Uniting these two features we have, as our idealistic metaphysic, this result: The self of finite consciousness is not yet the whole

true Self. And the true Self is inclusive of the whole world of objects. Or, in other words, the result is, that there is and can be but one complete Self, and that all finite selves, and their objects, are organically related to this Self, are moments of its completeness, thoughts in its thought.

I begin here at once with the first of these two considerations. It is a familiar assertion ever since Descartes, yes, in fact, ever since St. Augustine, that, whatever else I am doubtful of, I am at least directly sure of my own existence. I am I. What truth, so people say, could be clearer? I exist, and I exist for my own thought; for I doubt, I wonder, I inquire, — in short, I think. And in my thinking I find myself, not as a possible dream of somebody else, or as a fiction, or as an hypothesis, or as a matter of doubt, but I find myself existent for myself. Such is one familiar way of stating the initial assurance of human thought.

A popular misunderstanding of the nature of idealism in philosophy supposes that, beginning thus with his own individual existence as somehow a thing very much clearer in nature and in definition than the existence of anything besides himself, every idealist as such must proceed, in a solipsistic sort of way, first to reduce all objective reality to his own ideas, and then to find, amongst these ideas of his, certain ones which dispose him, on purely subjective grounds, to assume the existence of outer objects. It is historically true, of course, that such methods have been followed by certain students of philosophy. It is also a fact that such methods have a value as means of philosophical analysis, and as preparations for deeper insight. As such I myself have made use of them more than once for purposes of preliminary instruction: not that they constitute the essential portion of the teachings of a metaphysical idealism, of the sort which the post-Kantian thought in Germany developed (for they do not), but merely because they are pedagogically useful devices for introducing us to the true issues of metaphysics.

As a fact, however, before one could undertake, in a serious fashion, to be even provisionally and hypothetically a "solipsist" in his metaphysical teaching, it would be needful to define the Self, the *Ipse*, whose solitude in the world of knowledge the "solipsistic" doctrine is supposed to maintain. The reason why in the end our post-Kantian idealism is, not in the least identical with "solipsism," either in spirit or in content or in outcome, is that the definition of the Self, the answer to the question, "Who am I?" is logically prior to the metaphysical assertion that a

being called "I" is better known than is any being called "Not-I." This assertion itself may be true. But in vain does a doctrine declare that a being called by any name, x or y , mind or matter, not-self or Self, obviously and with absolute assurance is known to exist, and is more immediately known to exist than is any other being, unless the doctrine first defines what being is meant under this name. Self-consciousness can only reveal my own substantial existence with absolute or even with merely exceptional clearness, in case self-consciousness first reveals to me what I mean by myself who am said thus so certainly to exist.

Idealism, then, has no more right than has any other doctrine to fire its absolute assurances "out of a pistol." That I exist is at the outset only known to me in the sense that this thinking, this consciousness, of mine, is no unreality. What reality it is, I shall not know until I shall have reflected long and with success. First, then, to say, "I clearly know myself, but I know not certainly anything beyond myself," and then by analysis to reduce the outer world to "my Idea," and then to say, "Beyond my ideas I can never certainly go," — all this method of provisional and halting reflection, which assumes "the Ego" as something perfectly transparent, may be useful enough as a propædæutic to philosophy. It is not yet thoroughgoing self-criticism. Nor is it upon such imperfect reflection that the idealistic doctrines of modern philosophy have been built up. Fichte, who is popularly supposed to have done his work in just this way, actually made the Self the central assurance of philosophy only in so far as he also made it the central problem of philosophy. Its very existence is, for him, of the most problematic kind, so that, in the first form of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, the true Self is never realized at all, and exists only as the goal of an *unendliches Streben*, an endless travail for self-consciousness. No sooner has Fichte declared at the outset that it exists — this Self — than he finds the very assertion essentially paradoxical, in such wise that, unrevised, it would become absurd. Moreover, as Fichte insists, the natural consciousness is far from a real self-awareness. "Most men," declares Fichte (*Werke*, vol. i. p. 175, note), "could be more easily brought to believe themselves a piece of lava in the moon than to regard themselves as a Self." In such a philosophy the *cogito ergo sum* no longer means that I, the thinker, as *res cogitans*, am from the very beginning an obviously definite entity, while all else is doubtful. The first word of such a doctrine is rather the inquiry, *Who, then, am I?* It is the Self which needs winning, and

which requires definition, and which is so far unknown, just because it is the object of our reflection.

Beginning thus our consideration, — asking, What is the Self whose existence is to appear to a wise reflection as the fact surely involved in our consciousness? — we find of course at once that the larger empirical Ego of the world of common sense is by no means this Self whose truth is to be thus directly certified by the thinking and doubting with which philosophy is to be initiated. *I exist* cannot mean, at the beginning of our reflection, “I, — Caius or Titus, — I, this person of the world of common sense, calling myself by this name, living this life, possessed of these years of experience, — *I think*, and so I am immediately known to exist.” For the Self of the world of common sense is inextricably linked with numberless so called non-Egos. He exists as neighbor amongst neighbors, as owner of these books or of this house, as father of these children, as related in countless ways to other finite beings. As such a creature, self-consciousness does not at first immediately reveal him. As such a being amongst other beings, reflective philosophy, at the outset, must ignore him. His existence is no more immediately obvious at any one moment, at the outset of our philosophical reflection, than is the “lava in the moon.” When Fichte’s opponents accused him of teaching that Prof. Johann Gottlieb Fichte was the only person or reality in existence, and that his own students, and even the Frau Professorin, were only ideas that Johann Gottlieb was pleased to create, — such critics forgot that *das Ich* at the outset of the *Wissenschaftslehre* is not named Johann Gottlieb, and at this point of the system could not be, and that the beginning of Fichte’s philosophy ignores the German professor named Johann Gottlieb as absolutely and mercilessly as it does the castles on the Rhine, or the natives of Patagonia, and knows as yet of nothing but the necessity that a certain pressing and inexorable problem of consciousness, called *das Ich*, must be fathomed, since every possible assertion is found to involve the positing of this as yet unfathomed Self.

The Self which constitutes our present problem is, therefore, like Fichte’s *Ich* at the beginning of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, a still unknown quantity. Its existence we know only in the sense that, in dealing with it, we are dealing with no unreality, but with a central problem and principle of knowledge.

How much of a Self, then, is clearly to be known to our most direct reflection? If we look a little closer, we next feel disposed to answer that if the Ego, as directly known in consciousness, is

not as yet the whole empirical Ego of common sense called in case of any one of us by his proper name, and involved in these external social and personal relationships, then the best account one can give of the immediate subject of the *cogito ergo sum* is, that it is *the knowing Self of this moment*. Here, in fact, is a definition that has become comparatively frequent in philosophy. I myself cannot accept this definition without modification. But it is necessary for us to examine it ere we proceed further. I know directly, so it has often been said, nothing but what is *now* in my consciousness. And now in my consciousness are these current ideas, feelings, thoughts, judgments, and, in so far as I choose to reflect, here am I myself, the subject in whom and for whom are these momentary thoughts. This is what I can directly know. To all else I conclude with greater or less probability ; or, again, the rest of reality is an object of my faith, or of my practical postulates. As for myself, I know myself just as the knower of these current thoughts of this moment. Thus, then, is our question to be answered.

Yet once more, is this new answer quite clear? For *how much* does the present Self, the self of this moment, immediately know? And does that which the self of this moment knows belong wholly to this moment? As soon as we try to answer these questions, we enter upon a labyrinth of theoretical problems as familiar, in some sense, as it is intricate. I should not venture to weary the reader with even a passing mention of these subtleties were not the outcome of the necessarily tedious investigation of such importance.

I am to know, then, "this moment," and I am to exist for myself here as "the knower of this moment." Very well, then, shall I, taking this point of view, say that I know immediately the past in time? No, apparently not. I have a present idea of what I now call past time. That must be all that I "immediately know" of that so-called past. Do I immediately know the future? No, again ; I have a present idea of what I now call future time. I am limited, then, in "immediate knowledge," to the present in time. This moment is of course, as the present moment, to be cut off from past and future. Very well, then, how large a moment is it, and how long? Is it quite instantaneous, wholly without duration? No, for I must surely be supposed immediately to know, in this moment, a passing of time. My psychological present is a "specious present." It looks backward and forward. It lasts a little, and then insensibly glides over into the next

moment. Such at least seems to be the definition that this doctrine of the "present moment" must accept as a good account of what the "present" is.

But, alas! the present, as thus defined, is only the more left undefined. This gliding "specious present," when does it cease to be present? When does it become past? Where are the boundaries? How much is there of it? For, remember, I am looking for the immediately certain truth. I wanted to know who I am, as an immediately sure reflection shall find or define me. The answer to my inquiry was, "I am the knower of this moment." So much I am to be quite surely aware of about myself. Well, I have tried to define this assurance, and of course, if it is immediate assurance, I must be able to give at once its content, *i. e.* to define just what is contained in this moment. But unfortunately I at once find myself baffled. And as an actual fact, if I look a little closer, I shall always find that, despite the assumption that I do know only the "present moment," I cannot tell reflectively the precise content of my present moment, but can only answer certain reflective questions about the consciousness which is no longer quite my own, because, before I can reflect upon it, it has already become a past moment. As a fact, then, the assumption just made about my knowing fully the content of the "immediately present moment" turns out to be an error. For I know *not* now in full what it is that is present to me, nor who I myself am to whom this is present. And I find out that I do not thus fully know myself at any present moment, just because, when I try to tell what I know, what I tell about is no longer my present, but is already my past knowledge.

This problem about the definition of the "present moment" is one of the most characteristic of the problems of self-consciousness. Let us give some examples of its curious complications. Let the present moment, for instance, be a moment of a judgment. I judge that the paper before me appears extended. This, as it would seem, I just now know immediately, since I chance to notice it. But extension even now already involves, for my consciousness, all sorts of consequences, which will begin to appear upon reflection. If extended, the paper is divisible. In so far as it appears to me as what I call paper, I already begin to think of it as something that I could fold or tear. Yes, upon reflection, I perceive that, even while I saw and felt it as extended, I all the while "sub-consciously" perceived it to be smooth to my hand as I wrote, and also saw it to be white, and knew it to be partially

covered by my handwriting, and knew to some extent what letters I was writing, and had furthermore in my mind the train of my more abstract thoughts. All this mass of "mind-stuff" was in me in a more or less latent form. What portion of it was immediately present to me at any moment during the writing of the foregoing half-dozen sentences? Yes, *how much of it all is even now immediately present to my consciousness?* I cannot tell. I know not. "This moment" has ceased to be "this" before I have observed its content, or written down its name. I know all the while that there just now was a present moment; and all the while also I am just coming to know this now flying moment. That is the actual situation. My "immediate knowing" ceases to be immediate in becoming knowledge, and the knowledge that I now have crumbles forever as it passes over into my immediately present state of feeling. I judge what just was my feeling, and feel what may straightway become an object for my judgment.

Enough; I shall never thus define in any precise way who I am. It is here I who ceaselessly fly from myself. My moments as such have no power to define in any sharp fashion their own content. I can therefore only say they must actually have such fleeting content as a perfectly clear and just Reflection would judge them to have. That alone is what I seem to be sure of. For they have *some* content. What it is, however, I can endlessly inquire; but I can never fully and at the same time immediately know. Unless I am an organic part of a Self that can reflect with justice and clearness upon the contents of my moments, these moments contain a great deal that exists *in* me, but *for* nobody. So much, then, for the first result of our inquiry. So much for the effort to define the "Ego" apart from the "external world."

Have I learned anything about myself by this weary and baffling process of reflection? Yes, one thing I have learned. It is the thing that I just stated. It is a difference which I inevitably find myself making between myself as I really am, and myself as I haltingly take myself to be from moment to moment. I am twofold. I have a true Self which endlessly escapes my observation, and a seeking self which as endlessly pursues its fellow. What I really am, even in any given moment, I never find out in that moment itself. I can, therefore, only define my true Self in terms of an ideally just reflection upon the contents of my moment; a reflection of an exhaustive character, such as in fact I in my momentary capacity never succeed in making. I must exist,

to be sure, for myself; and as I really am I must exist for myself only. With that consideration one begins in our present inquiry. It is reflection that is to find me. It is my consciousness that is to discover me, if I am ever to be discovered. But the Self for whom I am what I am is not the self of this moment, but is thus far an ideal Self, never present in any one moment. To repeat, then by way of summary: The Self is never *merely* the self of this moment, since the self of this moment never fully knows who he even now is. It is of his very essence to appeal beyond the moment to a justly reflective Self who shall discover and so reflectively determine who he is, and so who I am. For I am he.

III.

Another way of stating the foregoing result would, therefore, be to say that, unless I am more than the knowing and the immediately known self of this moment, I am not even as much as the self of this moment. For this moment implies more consciousness than I am now fully aware of. That which is just now in me to be known is far more than I just now know. That is the paradox, but it is also the inevitable fact, of my inner life; and thus I already begin to see how large may be the implications of self-consciousness.

But herewith our task is by no means done. We have studied the problem of the Ego viewed apart from a world of "external objects." What we have learned is, that the subject of the *cogito ergo sum* is in the beginning, strange to say, at once the best and the least known of the possessions of our knowledge. I cannot doubt its existence. But I am not yet aware how much of a self it is, nor how much it truly knows, nor whether it is or is not limited to a single series of moments of consciousness and reflection, nor how it stands related to any sort of inner or outer truth. Those who have begun philosophy by saying, "The self at least is known," have usually forgotten that the self as known is at the outset neither the empirical Ego of the world of common sense, nor yet merely the so-called "self of the one present moment." It is not the first, because philosophy has not yet at the outset come to comprehend the world of common sense. It is not the second, for the consciousness of the "present moment" can only be defined in relation to a reflection that transcends the present moment; whilst, on the other hand, no human reflection has ever yet fathomed perfectly the consciousness of even a single one of our moments. The self, then, is not yet known to us except as the

problematic truth exemplified by the still so mysterious fact of the *cogito* itself. Much less then is the relation of the Ego to outer objects as yet clear.

To this latter relation we must, however, next turn. Perhaps there we shall get a light which is refused to us so long as we confine ourselves to a merely subjective analysis of the inner life of this baffling Ego. The self undertakes to be not merely conscious of its own states, but of outer truth. Is its power in this respect indubitable? And if it is, upon what is founded our assurance that we do know a world of real objects outside the Ego? Possibly in getting a solution of this problem we shall come nearer to a true definition of the Ego itself.

The only way of answering the question about the external world lies in first asking, in a thoroughly reflective way, what is *meant* by a world of objects beyond the Ego. It is useless to try to find the philosophical evidence for the existence of a world of outer objects, unless you first define what an object beyond your consciousness is to mean for you. Amongst the numerous definitions of the meaning of the words *external object*, I may therefore choose three, which seem to me of most importance for our present purpose, and may consider each in its turn. The third will be my own.

1. "The term *outer object* means for me the known or unknown cause of my experiences, in so far as I do not refer these experiences to my own will," — such is a very common account of the nature of the external truth for the Ego. I need not expound this view at great length, since it is so familiar a notion. According to those who hold to this definition, it is somehow perfectly evident to me that my experiences need a cause, and that I myself am not the cause of all or of most of them. The Ego itself is thus definable as that which is conscious of more experiences than it causes, and which therefore looks beyond itself for the causes of most of these experiences. An "external object" means just such a cause, known or unknown.

It is strange that this, the most familiar definition of the nature and meaning of the word "object," should be the most obviously inadequate. In case of my perception of a house, or of a hot iron when I touch it, or of a wind in my face, I do indeed conceive myself as in relation to an object which is causing experiences in me. But most of the external truth that I usually think about and believe in is not truth now perceived by my senses, nor, as I think it, is it *now* in any causal relations to me at all. I at present believe

in it because I "trust the validity of memory," or "have confidence in the testimony of mankind," or follow some other such well-known criterion of common-sense opinion. When I read my daily newspaper, light-waves are causing retinal disturbances in my eye; but as for me, I am thinking, not about these causes of my experience, but about the news from Europe, about the Russian famine, about the next Presidential canvass, and about other such "external objects," all of which objects I believe in, not because I reflect that my present experiences need causes, but because I trust tradition, or "current opinion," or the "consensus of mankind," or my own memory, or whatever else I am accustomed to trust. The object of my belief is only in the case where I attend to immediate perception, at the same time the cause of my belief. Our "belief in the reality of an external world" is concretely definable, then, much more frequently as our belief in the validity of our memories and social traditions, than as our belief that our experiences have present causes. We all of us believe in the future of this external world of ours. There will come the time called ten years hence, or a million years hence. Something will be happening then amongst the things of the physical universe. That future event is an "external reality;" we all accept it as real, however little we know of it. But is it for us a "cause" of our present experiences? We are sure that such an event will come. Does that future event now "cause impressions" in us?

Yet more, were "my object" once defined as that x which causes my inner experience, my feeling, f , then one would still have to ask, What do I mean by causation? Causation is a relation between facts. I must myself have some inner idea of such a relation before I can attribute to the outer object the character of being a cause. By hypothesis, x , the object, is outside me. Its causal relation to my feeling is therefore also, in part at least, external to me. To believe in my object, x , as the cause of my feeling, f , I must therefore first believe that my notion of causation, derived from some inner experience of mine (*e. g.* from my own consciousness of my "will" or from my exercise of "power"), does itself correspond to an objective truth beyond me, namely, the outer causation of x , as bringing to pass f . In other words, I make x my object, if all this account is true, only through *first* holding that the inner experience of a relation, called "causation" in me, corresponds to an outer truth, namely, the external causation, whose validity is needed to give me an idea of the very existence of x .

But this means that there is here at least *one* external truth, and so one "object," (viz.: — the external fact of the causation itself), which I believe in, not because it is itself the cause of my idea of the causation, but because I trust that my idea of causation is valid, and corresponds to the truth. And it is only by *first* believing in this objective truth, viz., the causation, that I come to believe in *x* the cause.

Hence it follows that even in case of immediate sense-perception, my belief in the external object is always primarily not so much a belief that my experiences need causes, called say *x*, as an assurance that certain inner beliefs of mine are as such, valid, *i. e.* that they correspond with that which is beyond them.

2. "By *object*, then, I mean that which, beyond me, reduplicates, repeats, corresponds to, certain elements or relations of my own ideas." To this definition the foregoing one, as we have now seen, must lead us, when once properly understood, and when freed from the inadequacies thus far noted.

Here is a definition of what I mean by "outer object," — a definition which is far more true to the facts of consciousness than was the foregoing. My belief in such external objects as the space beyond Sirius, or the time before the solar system was formed out of the primitive nebula, or in the existence of Cæsar, or in the presence of monasteries in Thibet, or even in the things that I read about in the newspapers, or learn of daily in conversation, — my belief too in your existence, kind reader, — all such beliefs are assurances that subjective combinations of ideas have their correspondents beyond my private consciousness. So far then this definition appears adequate. And yet it is really not enough.

For this is not *all* that I mean by an outer object of my thought. It is not enough that beyond my thoughts there should be truths whose inner constitution and relationships resemble those of my thought. For the world of my own external objects is not merely a world which my thought does resemble, but a world which my thought, even as it is in me, intends to resemble. Here I cannot do better for my present purpose than to repeat language I have lately used in the "Spirit of Modern Philosophy," p. 370. "My object," so I had just been saying, "is surely always *the thing that I am thinking about*. And," as I continued, "this thinking about things is, after all, a very curious relation in which to stand to things. In order to think *about* a thing, it is *not* enough that I should have an idea in me that merely *resembles* that thing. This last is a very important observation. I repeat, it is *not*

enough that I should merely have an idea in me that *resembles* the thing whereof I think. I have, for instance, in me the idea of a pain. Another man has a pain just like mine. Say we both have toothache, or have both burned our finger-tips in the same way. Now my idea of pain is just like the pain in him, but I am not on that account necessarily thinking about *his* pain, merely because what I *am* thinking about, namely my own pain, resembles his pain. No, to think about an object you must not merely have an idea that resembles the object, but you must *mean* to have your idea resemble that object. Stated in other form, to think of an object you must consciously *aim at* that object, you must pick out that object, you must already in some measure possess that object enough, namely, to identify it as what you mean."

If this be what is meant by the relation of a self to an outer object, then the relation surely becomes, once more, highly problematic. Unless, namely, the self in question has already its own conscious idea of its object, it cannot formulate its belief in this object. But just in so far as it has its own conscious ideas of the object, the Ego under consideration would seem to possess only inner knowledge. It defines for itself the object of its belief. The definition is internal. The self appears as if cut off from the object. Its ideas shall be "its own." The object, as it seems, is beyond them. The only relation that can exist is so far correspondence. But, alas! this relation is not enough. Another relation is needed. If the self in question is actually thinking of the object, it is already meaning to transcend its own ideas even while it is apparently confined to its ideas. And it is actually meaning, not self-transcendence in general, but just such self-transcendence as does actually bring it into a genuine and objective relation to the particular object with which it means to have its ideas agree. Am I really thinking of the moon? then I not only have ideas that resemble the objective constitution of the moon, but I am actually trying to get my ideas into such correspondence with an external truth called the moon. In other words, whether I succeed or not in thinking rightly of the moon, still, if I am thinking of the moon at all, my thought does transcend my private experience in a fashion which no mere similarity or correspondence between my ideas and other realities can express. The true relation of thought and object needs another formulation.

Shall we attempt such a formulation? In so far as I am fully conscious of my meaning, in any thinking of mine, I am confined to my private ideas. But in so far as I am to be in any relation to an

object, I must really be meaning that object without being, in my private capacity, fully conscious that I am thus really meaning just this object. At the moment of my thought of the object, I am conscious only that I am meaning my ideas to be not merely mine, but actually related to some object beyond. Am I, however, actually thus related to a particular outer object, then my present consciousness of my meaning is so related to that which is truly, although at present unconsciously, my meaning, that, were I to become fully conscious of my meaning, the object would no longer be external to my thought, but would be at once recognized as the object that I all along had meant, and would be included in my now more completely conscious thought. Complex as is this formula, it is needed for the sake of expressing the facts.

In other words, the only way in which I can really mean an object that is now beyond me is by actually standing to that object in the relation in which I often stand to a forgotten or half-forgotten name when I seek it, or to the implied meaning of a simple and at first sight obviously comprehensible statement, when, as in studying formal logic, I have to reflect carefully before I discover this meaning. And thus we are led to the following formulation of our own definition of the phrase "my object."

3. "My object is that which I even now mean by my thoughts, although, in so far as the object is beyond my private conscious thought, I cannot at present be fully conscious of this my relation to it. Yet the relation, although just now to me unconscious, must in such wise exist, that a true reflection upon my own meaning would even now recognize the object as actually meant by me. Such a reflection would, however, be an enlargement of my own present thought, a discovery of my own truer self, a consciousness of what is now latent in my consciousness. On the other hand, as a consciousness of my meaning, if complete, could still contain only thoughts, my object, as my object, must even now be a thought of mine, only a thought of which I am not now, in my private capacity, fully aware. In other words, my world of objects, if it exists, is that which my complete self would recognize as the totality of my thoughts brought to a full consciousness of their own meaning."

To sum up both aspects of the foregoing argument, whether you consider your inner life or your supposed relation to a world of objects external to yourself, you find that, in order to be either the self of "this moment," or the being who thinks about "this world of objects," you must be organically related to a true and

complete reflective Person whom your finite consciousness logically implies, fragmentary and ignorant though this consciousness of yours is.

Thus, then, the essential nature of our idealistic view of reality begins to come into sight. I know not directly through my finite experience who I am, or how much of a personality I truly possess. If, however, I am really a self at all, as even my fragmentary finite self-consciousness implies, then my true Self is aware of its own content and of its own meaning. If directly I cannot through finite experience exhaustively know my own nature, I can examine the logical implications of my imperfect selfhood. And this content and this meaning, which, as I find, are logically implied by even my finite selfhood, must include my whole "world of objects," as well as the whole truth of my inner life. If, then, this analysis of the concept of Personality be sound, there is logically possible but one existent Person, namely, the one complete Self.

Yet perchance to the foregoing argument an answer may be suggested that will seem to some readers, at first sight, conclusive. This idealism, it will be said, is, after all, unable to give any notion of the extent, or of the content, or of the magnitude, of this world of the complete Self. What is proved is at best this, that *if* my thought is truly related to objects outside of my finite consciousness, then, in so far as this relation exists, that is, in so far as I truly think of these objects, they are in themselves objects possessed by my true or complete Self, whereof this finite consciousness is only a *moment* or organic element. But perhaps the assumption that I ever think of objects beyond my finite self is itself an error. How, at all events, can I ever do more than postulate, or hope, or believe, that it is no error? How can the way to an objective knowledge of the objective relations of my finite thought ever be opened to me? How can I ever transcend my finitude, to know that I am really thinking of objects beyond, or that I am implicitly meaning them?

It is at this point that the argument concerning the "Possibility of Error," as I developed it in my chapter so entitled, in the "Religious Aspect of Philosophy," becomes immediately important to the present discussion. If, namely, in my finitude, I am actually never meaning any objective truth beyond my finite selfhood, even when I most suppose myself to be meaning such truth, then one must accept the only alternative. I must, then, be really in error when I suppose myself to be referring, in my thoughts,

to outer objects. The objective truth about my finite consciousness must then be, that I never really refer to any objective truth at all, but am confined, in a sort of Protagorean fashion, to the world of the subjective inner life as such. I think, let us say, of the universe, of infinite space and time, of God, of an opposing philosophical doctrine concerning these things, of absolute truth, of the complete Self as he is in himself, or of what you will. Well, these are all, it may be supposed, subjective ideas of my finite self. It may be an error to regard them as more. No objects outside my finitude correspond to them. I do not really mean any outer truth by them. I only fancy that I mean outer truth by them. Could I clearly reflect on what I mean by these objects, I should see this illusion, this error, of supposing that I really have in mind outer objects. So our skeptical objector may respond to all the foregoing considerations.

But, once more, if this be true of any of my ideas, if my intent to mean outer truth by them is itself an illusion, then under what conditions, and under what only, is such an error, such an illusion, possible? I err about any specific object only if, meaning to tell the truth about that object, I am now in such a relation to it that my thought fails to conform to the object meant. I cannot be in error about any object unless I am meaning that object. If, then, when I think of infinite time, or of infinite space, or of the universe in general, or of the absolute truth, I err in supposing that there is beyond my finite self an object corresponding to any of these notions of mine, then my error can only lie in this: that whereas my finite self *means to mean* outer objects, my true Self, possessing a clear insight into what truth really exists beyond my finite self, completing the imperfect insight of my finitude, discovers that what I take to be an outer object is only an idea of mine, and that in the world of the complete insight there exists nothing corresponding to my intended meaning. But thus, after all, we surely change not the essential situation which my finite self must really occupy. For still, whatever its errors, my finite self is an organic element in the correcting insight of the true Self. My notions of time and of space, of truth and of the universe, may be as imperfect, in all specific respects, as you please. Only, in so far as they are erroneous, the complete Self, having possession of the complete truth, corrects them. And even if I do not *mean to mean* an outer truth at any one moment when I imagine myself to be in relation to such truth, even then, this paradoxical situation can only be the objective, the genuine situa-

tion, in which my finite consciousness stands, in case my truly reflective Self detects the meaninglessness of my finite point of view in just this case. For, in the case as thus supposed, I am still defined as objectively in error, just in so far as what I *mean to mean*, namely some particular kind of outer truth, is, from the point of view of the Self that knows my objectively true relations, not in correspondence with what I really mean.

Or, again, to put the case once more in concrete form: I am trying to think of an outer object. I conceive of that object as existent. But I am supposed to be in error. I care not what the supposed outer object shall be, — infinite time or infinite space, or any other form of being. If I am in error, then, even now, unknown to my finite self, the objective situation is this, namely, that the world of truth as I should know it if I came to complete self-consciousness, that is, to complete awareness of what I have a right to mean, would not contain this my finite object, but would contain truth such as obviously excluded that object. In any case, then, we cannot escape from one assertion, namely, the assertion upon which the very “possibility of error” itself is based. This is the assertion that there is, even now, the existent truth, and that this exists as the object of my completely reflective Self.

But, finally, does one still object that the completely reflective Self, the possessor of my complete meaning, and of its genuine objects, the Self aware of the world of truth in its entirety, is still, after all, definable only as a possible, not as an actual, Self, namely, as the possible possessor of what I should know *if* I came to complete self-consciousness, and not as the present actual possessor of a concrete fullness of conscious insight? Then we must reply that the whole foregoing argument involves at every step the obvious reflection that, if at present a certain situation exists, which logically implies, even as it now stands, a possible experience, which would become mine if ever I came to complete self-consciousness, then the possibility thus involved is *ipso facto* no bare or empty possibility, but is a present and concrete truth, not, indeed, for me in my finite capacity but for one who knows the truth as it is. Idealism is everywhere based upon the assertion that bare possibilities are as good as unrealities, and that genuine possibilities imply genuine realities at the basis of them. A merely possible pain, which nobody actually either feels or knows, is nothing. Yet more, then, is a merely possible reflection, which nobody makes, an unreality. But the foregoing argument has been

throughout devoted to proving that the finite consciousness implies the present truth of an exhaustively complete and reflective self-consciousness which I, indeed, so far as I am merely finite, never attain, but which must be attained, just in so far as the truth is even now true.

IV.

Mere outlines are always unsatisfactory. The foregoing argument has been merely a suggestion. There has been no space to answer numerous other objections which I have all the while borne in mind, or to carry out numerous analyses which the argument has brought more or less clearly into sight. My effort has been to make a beginning, and to lead this or that metaphysically disposed fellow-student to look further if he finds himself attracted by a train of thought to which the whole of modern philosophy seems to me to lead.

Such, at all events, is the path of philosophical idealism. What, now, is the goal? What definition of the complete Self does one thus, in the end, get? I have elsewhere used the tentative definition: "The Self who knows in unity all truth." I have accordingly laid stress upon this character of the divine World-Self as a Thinker, and have labored to distinguish between this his fullness of Being, as idealism is obliged to define it, and those customary notions which define God first of all in "dynamic, rather" than in explicitly rational terms, and which, to preserve his almighty power as the director of Nature, and his exalted separateness from our weakness in so far as He is to be our moral Judge, find it necessary, first of all, to make Him other than his world of truth, and only in the second place to endow Him with a wisdom adequate to the magnitude of his "dynamic" business. All such opposed definitions I find, indeed, hopelessly defective. But in insisting upon thought as the first category of the divine Person, I myself am not at all minded to lose sight of the permanent, although, in the order of logical dependence, secondary, significance of the moral categories, or of their eternal place in the world of the completed Self. That they are thus logically secondary does not prevent them from being, in the order of spiritual worth and dignity, supreme. That evil is a real thing, that free-will has a genuine existence in this world of the Self, that we beings who live in time have ourselves a very "dynamic" business to do, that the perfection of the Self does not exclude, but rather demands, the genuineness and the utter baseness of deliberate evil-doing in our finite moral order, and that Idealism

not only must face the problems of evil and of moral choice, but, as a fact, is in possession of the only possible rational solution for these problems, — all these things I have tried elsewhere to show in a fashion which, as I hope, if not satisfactory, is at least sufficiently explicit to make clear to a careful reader that the God of the Idealist is at any rate no merely indifferent onlooker upon this our temporal world of warfare and dust and blood and sin and glory. To my mind, one of the most significant facts in the world is furnished by the thought that all this is, indeed, his fully comprehended world, and that if these dark and solemn things which cloud our finite lives with problems are in and of the universe of the crystal-clear Self, then, whatever the tragedy of our finitude, our problems are in themselves solved; while, as for our own personal destinies, they are, after all, and at the worst, part of his self-chosen destiny. For, as I have elsewhere explained, an absolute Reason does not exclude, but rather implies, an absolute choice; while such a choice does not exclude, but of necessity implies, as it includes, a finite and personal freedom in us. That this our moral and individual freedom belongs, after the fashion first indicated by Kant, not to the temporal order of our daily phenomenal world, in so far as it is merely temporal and phenomenal, but to a higher order, whereof we are a part, and not unconsciously a part, — all this does not militate either against the true unity of the Self, or against the genuineness of the moral order. Every being who is rationally conscious of time, is, by that very fact, living in part out of the world of time. For what we know we transcend. To live in time by virtue of one's physical nature, but out of time by virtue of one's very consciousness of time itself, is to share in the eternal freedom, and to be a moral agent.

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HOW I CAME INTO CHRISTIANITY.

"How did you come into Christianity?" is a question often put to me. In the following pages I intend to answer this question in a somewhat full manner. But to answer it is tantamount to setting forth certain facts connected with my past life; and hence, to accomplish my end, I can do no better than to declare: Who I am; how I was brought up; what my early religion was; how I became a Christian; what was the social and religious condition of Japan when I was converted; how I came to study theology; what sort of difficulties I had about religion in general and Christianity in particular; how I came to think of studying abroad, and how I finally came to continue my theological studies at Harvard Divinity School. For the sake of convenience and clearness, let me sum up all these points under three different heads: Something about my early religious experiences; how I became a Christian; and how I came to devote myself to the study of Christian theology.

But before entering into a detailed consideration of these points, I must not forget to emphasize the fact that the succeeding pages all refer to the time before I came to this country, in the autumn of 1890. The questions concerning God and Christianity which formerly made me almost desperate are not necessarily the difficulties of this present moment. I feel a good deal of difference in my theological attitude between now and then; but in this paper it is my express object to present the facts and thoughts of my former attitude.

I.

In December of the year 1865 I was born in the town of Okayama in the province of Bizen, as a second son in a family belonging to the knight-caste or gentry-class, as one may choose to call it. This knight-caste or gentry-class is the highest of four different castes or classes into which the people of Japan were divided in feudal times, — the knights, the farmers, the artisans, and the merchants. Above these "four peoples," as these classes were called, stood the nobility, consisting of the Emperor and his blood relatives. Below them were the outcast, including butchers, grave-diggers, beggars, and vagabonds. The knight-caste consists of lords or masters and their vassals or dependents, with the Shōgun, the military commander, at the head of the whole caste. My father was a vassal of one of the barons of the province, and when I was

born he was far away from home on military service, at one of the fortresses protecting the entrance of the Bay of Yedo. The year 1865 is memorable in America as marking the close of the civil war; but in Japan it was one of the most turbulent years preceding the revolution of 1868. The unexpected expedition of Commodore Perry in 1853 broke the long dream of peace and isolation of the Empire of the Rising Sun. Soon the country was thrown into a state of general disturbance. Mingled fear and hatred of the "red-bearded and blue-eyed" foreigners were almost universal. At the entrances of the main seaports, where foreign ships were likely to make their appearance, fortresses were built and garrisoned with troops. It was in one of these fortresses that my father was doing his military duty.

When the revolution of 1868 was finally brought about, I was only three years old. This revolution marks the point where the history of "Old Japan" closes, and that of "New Japan" opens. This revolution compelled the Shōgun, the military commander, to yield his long-usurped power over the country to its legitimate lord the Emperor. This revolution did away with that magnificent system of the Japanese feudalism; abolished the distinction of the "four peoples;" threw the whole country open to foreigners, and laid the foundation of the present constitutional monarchy. Soon the old institutions of feudal times began to disappear, and their place was gradually taken by the new institutions copied from the Western countries. But until I was seven or eight years old, no common-school system was introduced, at least in my native province; so my earlier education was almost entirely in the hands of my father and an old Buddhist priest, who lived in a temple not very far from my home. The first books which my father taught me were the "Great Learning" and the "Book of Filial Piety," two of the most important books of Confucianism. In the temple where I attended daily, the old priest used to teach me to read and write. He taught me many Confucian books, being a good Confucian scholar; but he never taught me any Buddhistic books. It may sound rather strange to many to hear that the Buddhist priests teach the Confucian writings, without teaching anything about their own sacred books. To make this point intelligible I must pass to the consideration of that curious phenomenon which the different systems of religion and morality present in Japan — the phenomenon of the *religious compound*.

To persons accustomed in this country to sharp distinction and

mutual exclusion, not only between different religions, but even between different denominations of one religion, it will naturally be difficult to realize the fact that, in Japan, three distinct systems of religion and morality live on very friendly terms with each other. Buddhism came from India ; although in one sense it is a religion of faith and charity — faith in Amida-Buddha, and charity especially to the poor and the lower animals, — it is essentially a religion of ascetic pessimism. Confucianism was introduced from China ; it teaches obedience and faithfulness, particularly devout loyalty to one's lord and pious obedience to one's parents, as the key-note of morality. Shintoism is the native religion ; its principal elements are nature-worship and ancestor-worship, and from another point of view it may be defined as a religion of purity and of merry-making. In these two characteristics, Shintoism is absolutely different from Buddhism. The saké, the "Japanese wine," which indeed "cheereth gods and men," is the rice-fermentation, and plays such an important part in the Shinto sacrifice that without it no feast is complete. The physical purity or cleanliness of the Japanese is proverbial and almost unique ; and the cause of this fact is to be found in the very nature of Shintoism, which is a religion of purity. Now these three systems, which are essentially irreconcilable with each other, not only live together in peace, but unite together to form a religious compound supplying the deficiencies of each. Strangely enough, our people draw their spiritual nutritions from all three of these different systems, ignoring, rather I should say leaving unnoticed, the fact that they are contradictory to one another in many respects and can hardly be theoretically reconcilable. Shintoism furnishes the objects of worship, Confucianism offers the rules of life, and Buddhism supplies the way of future salvation. We need all these things, but separately none of these systems can satisfy all of these demands. This is the reason, it seems to me, why they unite to form that peculiarly interesting phenomenon of a religious compound. Thus when we say there are three religions in Japan, this does not mean that each one of these three religions has its own distinct and exclusive body of believers ; on the contrary, the three bodies of believers overlap each other so freely that, generally speaking, one and the same person plays a triple part, worshiping the Shinto gods, adopting the Confucian rules of life, and believing in the Buddhist salvation in the blessed nirvâna.

To make the nature of this simultaneous belief in different systems of religion and morality still more intelligible, a few illustra-

tions will not be out of place. But before giving them, I must call attention to the fact that the proportions of these three ingredients are naturally different with different individuals and under different circumstances. With the Buddhist devotee, the Buddhist element will naturally predominate; with the Shinto adherent, the Shinto element; and with the follower of Confucius, the Confucian element. But all this is a question simply of proportion or predominance. Now, if you visit a Shinto or Buddhist temple of a considerable size, you are very likely to see both the Shinto god and the Buddhist idol worshiped within the same temple limits, if not under the same roof. In some temples, one and the same priest is found serving both the Shinto god and the Buddhist idol, thus serving two masters; while, on the other hand, there are many gods of mixed nature, some of which are half Shinto and half Buddhist, while we can hardly trace the exact origin of others. In the household where I was brought up, as in every other household, there were the visible representatives of these three systems: the Confucian books; the "Buddha-case," containing the wooden tablets with the Buddhist names of the deceased ancestors of the family; and the "Gods'-shelf," dedicated to the sacred symbols and representatives of the Shinto gods. My father, who used to teach me the books of Confucius and his followers, also taught me to worship the sun, — especially when it is rising, — the full moon, the new moon, the evening star, and the like. As he was fond of attending festivals, we often went together to the famous Shinto temples of the province, usually at their annual festivals. My grandmother was a strong believer in the Buddhist salvation, as the aged people usually are in Japan; she often took me to the temples to worship the idols and to hear the preaching, which consisted mainly of ancient fables and simple stories, illustrating the importance of trust in Amida-Buddha and of living an upright and charitable life. I often went to our family graveyard where the bodies of our ancestors lie buried, and offered prayers to them, especially to my grandfather, who died while I was very young.

Thus, when I was young, I had many things to worship, — the sun, the moon, the stars, the divine waters, the divine animals, the dead ancestors, the deified heroes, the Buddhistic idols, and many symbols of the Shinto gods. Why and for what did I worship these gods? In the first place, I worshiped them simply because it was natural for me to do so, simply because I was taught to do so, and simply because it was a matter of course for any one to do so. As to the motive of worship, I prayed for almost anything I happened

to want at a particular moment. If I had nothing special to pray for, then I repeated the common formula of prayer, just as children repeat the Lord's Prayer in Christian countries. The formula is this: "Prosperity to the family, cessation of disasters, long life, plenteous harvests, and success to the trade." This formula is used almost everywhere, by all sorts of men, and under all circumstances. I myself used to repeat it in the graveyard or before the "Gods'-shelf," to the new moon or to the fox-god, to a deified hero or to the image of Buddha. When prayers, however, are of a definite and specific character, it is very natural for the worshiper to choose the gods whose natures or functions are most closely connected with the points of his prayer.

I had many experiences in worshiping these various divine objects for their special favors. Out of these experiences I will here mention only one or two. The first experience was the worship of Michizané-kō for penmanship. Michizané was a poet, scholar, patriot, and statesman, who flourished about nine hundred years ago; and he is, even at this moment, one of the most extensively worshiped and most influential gods of Shintoism. As he was a fine penman, one of the functions of this god, who is popularly and improperly called Ten-jin-sama (which means Honorable God of Heaven), is to make a poor penman an excellent one. As I was anxious to become a good penman, so that I could get the first prize in the penmanship contest, I often went to the temple to ask the help of Ten-jin-sama. The second experience was the worship of our household well for the recovery of my sore eyes, which repeatedly troubled me. Our household well is a common one, in no respects different from other wells; but whenever I had sore eyes, I used to take a dishful of table salt to the well. Then showing the dish to the well, that is, letting the image of the dish be reflected upon the surface of the water, I prayed, "If thou wilt cure my sore eyes, I will offer this salt to thee."

II.

In the fall of 1880 there happened one of the most important events of my life, perhaps the most important. This was my going to Dōshisha College, or Rev. Dr. Neesima's school,¹ through the help and influence of my brother-in-law. This brother-in-law of mine was not a Christian, but he was somewhat interested in Christianity, so that his own residence was used for some time for

¹ Professor A. S. Hardy's *Life of J. H. Neesima* gives a very good idea of this remarkable person.

the preaching of the gospel. He knew Dr. Neeshima personally, and was one of the admirers of his noble Christian character. One day, almost without any preparation, he said to me, that if I were willing to go to Dōshisha, he would help me financially. Then, as I was a boy of fifteen, anxious to excel my companions in knowledge and skill, and ambitious to do something which they could not do, the thought of going to a distant country and studying in a better school than the academy, where I was studying then, pleased me very much, and drew from me an almost instantaneous answer, that I was perfectly willing to go to Dōshisha. At that time I was staying at my brother's house, and as my resolution was taken without consultation with my parents, I immediately hastened home, told them about my brother's kind offer, and asked their sanction of my resolution, which I thought I could get without any trouble. But to my great disappointment and distress, my mother (my father had no special objection) was exceedingly displeased at the thought of having one of her children in a school belonging to that "wicked" and despised sect called "Kirisutan" (Christian); and therefore she was almost crazy to prevent my going to Dōshisha College.

Why did my mother oppose my going to a Christian school? Why was Christianity looked down on as something wicked and despicable? There are many reasons for this universal prejudice against Christianity. The most powerful reason was the universal misunderstanding to the effect that Christian religion makes children disobedient to their parents, whereas filial piety is regarded by the Japanese as the most fundamental and the most essential of all virtues. There are many facts which seem to favor such misunderstanding. The first is the words of Christ himself, when he declares: "Think not that I came to send peace on the earth, but a sword. For I came to set a man at variance against his father and the daughter against her mother. . . . He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me." This striking passage, the meaning of which is unmistakable by those who are familiar with the Bible, sounds to the Japanese ear as if it would contradict or even destroy that fundamental virtue of filial piety. The Buddhists and other opponents of Christianity took advantage of this, and taught the people that Christianity inculcates filial disobedience, and that Christ himself was disobedient to his parents when he was twelve years old, when he remained in the temple without telling them, and thus caused them sorrow and anxiety. A second fact is that there were actually

presented many cases of such apparent filial disobedience among the Christians themselves. These Christians came to understand that it is their duty to obey Christ more than any one else, and thus they were obliged to profess their faith in Christianity, even in spite of their parents' displeasure and disapproval. This was a tragic necessity on their part; but from the standpoint of their parents and relatives, who were ignorant of Christianity and prejudiced against it, all these poor Christians appeared to have become disobedient to their parents. Moreover, a third fact is that these Christians would naturally refuse to bow their heads before the images of their ancestors, as they used to do before their conversion. This, too, was interpreted as implying a lack of that respect and gratitude to ancestors which is considered to be one of the principal elements of filial piety. These facts worked together to produce the universal misunderstanding that Christianity teaches filial disobedience; and no one can deny that, under the circumstances, it is quite natural for such a misunderstanding to become general.

A second and equally powerful reason for the general prejudice against Christianity is the belief that Christianity makes the people disloyal to the Emperor, and that the native Christians are therefore betrayers of their own country. For this belief there are many reasons. It must be remembered, first of all, that devout loyalty to one's lord is another of the most important virtues of Confucianism and of the Japanese people. Some antichristians thought that one who becomes a Christian becomes a subject of the kingdom of Christ, and thus ceases to owe allegiance to the Emperor of Japan; on the other hand, the Christians would not worship the deceased Emperors, and this was understood to mean their unfaithfulness both to the present Emperor and to his ancestors. Some remembered very well the fact that the Roman Catholics resorted to an open rebellion some two hundred and fifty years ago, quite forgetting that long and bloody persecution drove them to this last and desperate measure. To some, again, the motive of the missionaries who are spending so much money and labor "for nothing," as they thought, was a problem causing mingled fear and anxiety, while others believed the notorious story to the effect that the real and ulterior object of the missionaries is to prepare an easier way for conquering Japan, and not the preaching of the gospel, which is a mere pretext. These different causes were strong enough to produce a deeply impressed prejudice that Christianity makes men disloyal to the Emperor, and that those

natives who believe in the religion of foreigners become their subjects, and thus betray their own country.

A third reason, not less powerful than the two already mentioned in producing the universal prejudice against Christianity, is the idea of dread and danger associated with Christianity; this is a necessary outcome of the trials and persecutions under which the Japanese Christians groaned for a long time. The memory of the people kept fresh the stories of persecutions, trials, confinements and crucifixions, which culminated in a wholesale massacre of the Catholics in the year 1637. Even within the reach of my own memory, there was put up in the public places of my native town a placard-board, having the following "law:" "With respect to the Christian sect, the existing prohibition must be strictly observed. . . . Evil sects are strictly prohibited." The original form of this "law" was this: "The wicked sect called Christian is strictly prohibited. Suspected persons should be reported to the proper officers and rewards will be given." This original form was too severe for Christian foreigners to endure. (I say "Christian foreigners," as there was not yet even one professed Christian among the natives when this placard-board was put up in April, 1868.) An effort was made by the missionaries to induce those who were in authority to remove the board, or at least to change its wording. So in November of the same year, the "law" was softened to the first form given above. Still persecution went on, both publicly and privately. Great rewards were offered to informers against the wicked sect; while many were cast into prison who sympathized with missionaries or their religion. This state of things continued for some years even after the removal of the placard-board in 1872, just twenty years ago. In a word, to be a Christian meant, not only to lose one's position in life, but to be treated as a wicked and disgraceful person, who deserves death.

Now my mother was a thorough victim of this universal prejudice against Christianity, and hence she was opposed to my going to a Christian school. As she loved me and was anxious not to lose me — indeed, to her my going to a Christian school meant her losing me, — it was very natural that she should do her utmost to prevent my going. She was doing what she felt to be her duty; but, alas! her knowledge was not wide enough. Through her influence the family-council, consisting of the principal relatives of my house, was summoned more than once to discuss the question in hand. There were differences of opinion among those

who met together, and it was with an extreme anxiety that I listened to the fluctuation of the general opinion, now favoring my going and then forbidding it. Finally, my father, who is a liberal sort of man, and whose nature is different in many respects from that of my mother, solemnly declared in my favor, saying that this kind offer of my brother-in-law was too good an opportunity for my education to be lost; that he had no objection to his son's going to a Christian school, and that he thought it more proper to know what Christianity is, before denouncing it as a wicked religion. This opinion of my father, aided by the fact that he was my father, was strong enough to shut the mouths of all the others, and at last, to my great joy, I was allowed to go to Dōshisha.

As I had some knowledge of English and a better knowledge of other subjects, which I had studied in the governmental academy of my native town, I was admitted to the sophomore class of the collegiate course of Dōshisha. I enjoyed my studies very well, but I did not like the general tone of the school, which I thought to be too Christian. Although I myself used to pray to the sun and the moon, the prayers which the fellow-students were offering to the Creator of the Universe appeared to me absurd and useless. Although I had repeated mottoes and formulæ for idols and images, the Christian hymns sounded to my ear funny and childish. Indeed, I did not like Christianity very well, and hence I thought of changing school more than once. But, owing to several circumstances, I was not able to carry out this thought.

Meanwhile, being gradually accustomed to the tone of the school, and coming under the influence of the Christian teachers and friends, I bought a copy of the Japanese version of the New Testament, and began to study it in a class, as well as by myself. In this investigation of Christianity many questions and difficulties presented themselves. The centre of the first group of difficulties was the Christian conception of God. If God is one, how can He be three at the same time without destroying his being one? If God is everywhere, how can every object of nature be anything else than a part of God? If I cut a piece of paper, am I cutting God himself? If God is all-powerful and all-wise, why were sin and evil allowed to enter the world? Is this the best world God can create? Has He no power to create a better and more perfect world than this? If God be all-just and all-loving, why did He choose the people of Israel as his own people and leave the rest of the world to sin and darkness? Why was not Christ born in Japan, or at least why did he not come earlier than he did, so

that more people could hear the gospel? Is there any way by which those who have had no opportunity to know concerning God and his Christ may be saved? Is Confucius saved, for instance? If God is omniscient, what is the use of telling Him what we want? Can God answer our prayers? If He can, how can we know that He has done so? If God is merciful to all, especially to Christians, and hears their prayers, why must his own people, the Christians, lead a poor and despised life, full of trials and persecutions, in this present world?

Another group of difficulties surrounded the problem of the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures. The problems of prophecy, miracle, resurrection, immortality, the trinity of the Godhead, the deity of Christ, and the like, seemed to me at this time to be all secondary in importance to the doctrine of the infallibility of the Bible; I thought, if the Bible is infallible both in its word and in its spirit, and if this doctrine can be conclusively and incontestably established, all these other problems can be settled without any serious difficulty, as far as they are expressly taught in the *infallible* Bible. But how can the infallibility of the Bible be established? Suppose that the Bible is infallible, because it is the word of God. Then all the facts and teachings contained in it must be harmonious among themselves, and they must not be in contradiction with the facts and truths of science and philosophy. But are there not many points on which the teachings of science and philosophy cannot be reconciled with those of the Bible?

As I felt the pressure of these and many other difficulties, I had recourse to almost every means then accessible to me, in order to make my own mind a little more clear so that I could embrace Christianity with a tolerable degree of intellectual courage and satisfaction. While on the one hand I had thus a good deal of these distracting intellectual difficulties, on the other hand, the spiritual peace and satisfaction which the knowledge of Christianity imparted to me were remarkable indeed. When I came to learn that the one true God, who created the universe and preserves it now, also made me and knows my heart and everything, so that even the very hairs of my head are all numbered, I came to feel myself strong in the world and contented with my own lot. When I came to comprehend the meaning of the words of the Apostle Paul, "For scarcely for a righteous man will one die: yet peradventure for the good man some one would even dare to die. But God commendeth his own love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us," I could not but fall down

on my knees, repent my sins, and praise God for his unbounded love. When I came to realize something of the eternal life and the way to get it, as it is vividly put by the Apostle John, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life," death, the fear of which was peculiarly strong in my mind, lost its sting, and the darkness beyond the grave was dispersed. Although I had no special experience that my prayer was ever actually answered, yet whenever I offered my prayer I felt joy and blessedness in my heart, and I felt as if God drew nearer to me, and the burden on my heart was all removed. Now these spiritual experiences, not unaided by the favorable results of my intellectual investigation of Christianity, worked a gradual change in my heart, which resulted in my conversion.

On the 5th of February, 1882, when the new church building of the First Church of Kyōto was dedicated, I was baptized by the late Rev. Dr. Neeshima, with many fellow-students. There is one thing in connection with my baptism which I would like to mention. When we were baptized we did not, at least I did not, know anything about the existence of any other denominations among the Protestants than the one which I then joined. It is only four or five years ago, when the question of the union between our own denomination and the "United Church" came up, and especially when the attempt proved a failure, that I came for the first time to realize the existence of other denominations, and also learned the reason why these denominations are different from each other. As Dōshisha College is helped by the American Board for Foreign Missions, and as its founder, the late Rev. Dr. Neeshima, was a member of the Congregational Church, it is quite natural for Dōshisha to be regarded as belonging to the Congregational denomination. But when I was converted I did not know of the existence of any other Protestant sect than my own, nor had any one told me that I was joining the Congregational Church. As far as my consciousness goes, I did not join any special denomination, but I did join the Christian Church, pure and simple.

III.

In the summer of 1884 I finished the five-years' collegiate course at Dōshisha. I will mention the subjects which I studied during my senior year, in order to show the nature of this collegiate course. The subjects and books were: geology, Dana's; astronomy, Steele's; logic, Jevons's; ethics, Fairchild's; psychology,

Haven's; politics and economics, lectures; English literature, Underwood's; and Chinese and Japanese. Just at this time many of my fellow-students were going abroad, and I myself was in some danger of being drafted to serve in the army. Under these circumstances I was not a little moved by the thought of studying abroad. To this end I made some effort. But the time was not ripe enough; or, more truly, my resolution was not strong enough, so that all my effort bore no fruit. As my thought was not settled as to my life-work, I considered it wise to stay at home for some time and study by myself, till my thought on this point should become settled, or circumstances open a way before me. Thus I stayed at home about half a year. But at the close of this time I was quite convinced that studying by myself was very apt to become irregular and unfruitful. Finally, I concluded that it was far better for me to enter some school where I could continue my studies in a more systematic way. Just then, in the spring of 1885, one of the missionaries residing in my native town asked me to accompany him on a short missionary trip to the province of Hiuga in the Kyūshū Island. I consented, and we went and preached the gospel in the several towns of that province. After one week's stay the missionary was obliged to return home, but I was asked by those interested in hearing more about Christianity to stay another week; and this I agreed to. During these two weeks, as I have elsewhere written: "Almost every day I preached at least twice. One evening, after my sermon was finished, some of the audience remained and asked me several questions about Christianity. One of them, who looked very thoughtful, spoke to me in this way: 'I am very much indebted to you, for you led me to the conclusion that Christianity is a very good religion. But all that you have told us heretofore seems to me to be a mere introduction to Christianity. Now earnestly I ask you, please tell me the *essence of Christianity*, the thing which makes Christianity what it is, so that I can embrace it with my whole heart.' Then I tried to answer this in one way or other. But my answer was not able to satisfy him; and, in fact, I myself was not satisfied with it. The truth is, at that time I had no definite idea about what the essence of Christianity is, although I knew a good deal about Christianity." This incident produced such a strong impression upon my mind concerning the importance of a thorough study of Christianity, that soon after my return home I hastened for the second time to Kyōto, to enter the theological department of Dōshisha. Though

the school-year was more than half spent, I was allowed to join the first-year class, on the condition that I should make up all the studies necessary for that purpose. The subjects and textbooks which I studied in the three-years' theological course were these: in philosophy, Spencer's "First Principles," Bowne's "Criticism of Spencer" and "Metaphysics," Mill's "Three Essays on Religion," Janet's "Final Causes," and Porter's "Moral Philosophy;" in theology, H. B. Smith's "Systematic Theology," Van Oosterzee's "Christian Dogmatics," Butler's "Analogy," Chadbourne's "Natural Theology," Wright's "Logic of Christian Evidences," with lectures on natural and systematic theology; in Biblical study, beside exegesis of the Old and the New Testament, Oehler's "Old Testament Theology" and Van Oosterzee's "New Testament Theology"; in history, lectures on church history; and in homiletics, Broadus.

When I finished this course in the summer of 1887, I was asked to become a teacher in Dōshisha. But, owing to several circumstances, I was obliged to decline this call. In the autumn of the same year, however, I became a teacher in the governmental academy of the Shiga Prefecture. After being there a year and a half, I was called to Tōkwa School in Sendai, the largest city east of Tōkyō, where I was engaged in teaching till the summer of 1890. During these six years, the first three years spent as a theological student and the last three years as a Christian teacher, I was always studying Christianity both theoretically and practically. The horizon of my knowledge of Christianity and the world was much widened. Gradually I came to understand the nature of present Japanese society, and also the nature of the difficulties which the Japanese mind cannot help feeling about the Christian religion. The more I studied Christianity, the more I felt its difficulties. The more I felt its difficulties, the more I realized the importance of a thorough investigation of these difficulties, both for myself and for my country. Two problems, the one indirectly and the other directly connected with Christianity, may serve to indicate the nature of these difficulties which I then felt: What is the purpose of human existence? and what is the essence of Christianity?

1. "What is the purpose of human existence?" The reason why this problem troubled me so much was the following fact. The social and political disturbances accompanying the revolution of 1868, by which the entire system of the feudal institutions was abolished and the foundations of the present form of administra-

tion were established, were succeeded by intellectual, moral and religious disturbances. There seem to me to be two main causes for these. The first cause is the reaction against all the old institutions. *Blind and unquestioning obedience* to usages, precedents and authorities was the fundamental characteristic of the intellectual, moral and religious life of "Old Japan." But the people, having done the same thing in social and political affairs, began to call in question usages, precedents and authorities in morals and religion. Thus the spirit of doubt and inquiry became universal. The second cause is the introduction of agnosticism, atheism, pessimism, utilitarianism, materialism and skepticism, which rushed in with the introduction of material civilization from Western countries. The influence of these doctrines in aggravating mental and spiritual disturbances is too plain to need any statement.

These two causes, of which the first is negative and the second is positive, united to produce the intellectual, moral and religious confusion. Intellectually, the more or less educated people were so much influenced by the universal spirit of doubt and inquiry, that they were at loss to distinguish what is true and what is false. In fact, they were in doubt whether there can be such a thing as truth under the sun. Morally, the people, it seemed to me, *lost their standard of morality*, so to speak. Filial piety and chivalrous loyalty, which had been the fundamental virtues of the Japanese people, came to appear something antiquated and obsolete. Benevolence and righteousness, the cardinal virtues of Confucianism, came to be looked down upon as behind the times. Religiously, cold indifferentism prevailed among those who were "enlightened" in the Western learning. They regarded religion as nothing more than superstition, which might be of some use to the "ignorant" people, but could be of no use whatever to themselves. "No religion" was their cry, and the cry passed for the voice of wisdom and learning. (Remember that "no religion" by no means implies "no morality" in Japan.) Although these enlightened people were to a great extent under the influence of Western ideas, yet the influence of the old spirit of the Japanese nation, well represented in a well-known poem of Michizané-kō, was not slight. The poem, if I may venture to paraphrase it, is this:—

"Only if our heart is in harmony with the True Way,
The gods will protect us, even though we do not pray."

I was not myself free from these disturbing influences. Is

there any solid basis for morality? If so, what is its proper standard? Is there such a thing as truth after all? If so, what is truth? Is morality alone insufficient? Is religion anything more than superstition? What is its essential nature? Is the personality of God a rational conception? Can the efficacy of prayer, which is in my judgment the fundamental question of religion, be rationally established? Does not Christianity injure the proper development of individual peculiarities and naturalness? Does not Christianity spoil the spirit of independence and self-help? Can the immortality of the soul be proved? Is religion both impossible and useless, if the soul is not immortal? These were the questions which taxed the utmost effort of my mind, and I was not satisfied with any superficial answers. I knew quite well what Christianity would answer to these questions, but what I was anxious to investigate was not what answers Christianity would make to them, but rather, how we can show that these answers made by Christianity are correct and true. To my mind, the mere fact that these answers are made by Christianity was not sufficient. I thought that there must be some independent standard by which the value of these answers can be determined, and that this independent standard can be nothing else than the *purpose of human existence* itself. Thus the first thing I was eager to do was to make an extensive and unprejudiced investigation concerning the purpose of human existence, so that I could judge properly whether the answers made by Christianity are really true or not.

2. "What is the essence of Christianity?" There are three questions connected with this problem about which I would like to say something. The first question to which my special attention was directed in my investigation of this fundamental problem was this: *Is Christianity anything more than a mere superstition?* Among those who taught Christianity in Japan there were some, I know, who used to look down upon all the non-Christian religions of the world, as if they were nothing more than mere superstitions, and as if they had nothing true and good in them. But I was not a bit satisfied with anything of this sort, for I thought, if all other religions are nothing more than mere superstitions, how can Christianity alone be anything more than a mere superstition? How can we know that Christianity is not a mere superstition if all other religions are such? Can this be known from the fact that Christianity is the religion specially revealed by God? But how can we know that Christianity is the special

revelation of God? If there is any method by which this can be known, it can be no other than one showing the superiority of Christianity to all other religions of the world, and this superiority of Christianity can be shown only by *comparing* it with all other religions. But before these other religions can be compared with Christianity, their origin and nature must be thoroughly investigated. Without this investigation and this comparison, the superiority of Christianity cannot be said to be scientifically established. To stigmatize as superstitious such a profound religion as Buddhism, and to denounce as false such a splendid system of morality as Confucianism teaches, simply advertises one's own bigotry and ignorance. It is not without some reason, however, that there is a general presumption among us that the Christian religion is superior to all other religions of the world, for it is an undeniable fact that the countries where civilization is most advanced are the countries where Christianity is the professed religion. Then the questions arise: Why is the "progress of humanity in science, art and literature coextensive with Christendom"? Is this purely an accidental coincidence, or is there a necessary connection between Christianity and civilization, between Christianity and the progress of humanity in science, art and literature? What is this connection? What is the essence of Christianity?

The next question which forced itself on me in my investigation of the essence of Christianity was this: *Can there be any essential truth in the so-called fundamental doctrines of Christianity?* As far as I was able to understand, the trinity of God, the divinity of Christ, the vicarious atonement, the infallibility of the Bible and related dogmas are the essential and vital doctrines of Christianity. But I must confess that to me these doctrines were not very easy to believe, for my mind was singularly checked by the philosophical difficulties connected with these doctrines; and even after I came somehow to believe them, this belief was formal and mechanical, and these doctrines, as such, made no deep practical impression upon my mind. While I was in this condition, the German missionaries, who arrived in 1885, began to preach their new liberal theology, on the one hand; while on the other hand, the Unitarian commissioners, who arrived two years later, commenced to attack the orthodox theology in a radical fashion. The theological views of these two Christian bodies were very different from those of the orthodox denominations. Many of the doctrines which the latter regard as vital to

Christianity are either altogether rejected or regarded as unessential by the former. The introduction of these new ideas produced some confusion of thought among the Christians, even among the preachers, of the orthodox denominations. I, for one, was very much perplexed to learn that there are Christian bodies which do not regard those doctrines as essential which I myself was given to understand are the essential doctrines of Christianity. If these other bodies can call themselves Christian without accepting the trinity of God and the vicarious atonement, for instance, and are found among the educated people of Germany and the United States, then these doctrines, I came to suspect, might perchance not be the essential doctrines of Christianity at all. Is there any really essential doctrine of Christianity? What can be the essence of Christianity, if its so-called fundamental doctrines might not be essential to it?

The third and last question was this: *How can we find out the essence of Christianity?* I felt that there is surely some solid element in Christianity, — the very essence which makes Christianity what it is. But I was not able to grasp it. All that I could ascertain about the essence of Christianity was, first, that the essence of Christianity cannot be anything which is *contradictory* to well-established scientific laws and fundamental philosophical truths. Religion is neither science nor philosophy, but it is the mutual relation between God and man. Christianity is a religion, and hence it may comprise many things which do not come directly under the domain of science and philosophy. The essence of Christianity may be something deep and mysterious, but it cannot be anything which is absurd and unreasonable. The essence of Christianity, again, may be found in the *common element* or elements which run throughout all the different interpretations and manifestations of Christianity. In one sense, Christianity is always developing with the development of humanity. The Christianity of Rome is not the Christianity of Greece. The Christianity of the nineteenth century is not the Christianity of the Reformation. Again, in one sense, Christianity manifests itself in different manners according to the capacities of those who embrace it. The Christianity of a peasant is not the Christianity of a philosopher. The Christianity of a Methodist is not the Christianity of a Unitarian. But all this is only one half of the story. There must be some permanent and hence immutable element or elements in all these different manifestations of Christianity, which make all these different manifestations possible, and allow them to

call themselves different manifestations of one and the same Christianity. Thus there is suggested one possible way of finding out the essence of Christianity, namely, the method of finding out the common elements by the elimination of the elements not common. Reduce Christianity to its *lowest terms*, that is, find out the common factors of all the different manifestations of Christianity, and possibly the essence of Christianity may be found in these common factors! But what are the contents of these common factors? and can we actually find in them the essence of Christianity?

These two problems, that is, the purpose of human existence and the essence of Christianity, were in my mind the two foci, so to speak, around which all other problems revolved.

It is both true and natural that the Japanese mind has its peculiar difficulties about Christianity, and if these were properly met, I see no reason why the religion of love and righteousness might not become the religion of the Land of the Rising Sun. Of course in a country like Japan, where Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintoism are already in existence, Christianity ought to be presented in such a way that its real superiority over these other systems of religion and morality would be impartially shown, and its compatibility with science and philosophy would also be properly vindicated. As I gradually came to realize the fact that my own difficulties concerning religion in general and Christianity in particular are also the difficulties of many a Japanese mind, I reached the firm conviction that the thorough investigation of these difficulties is the mission to which my life should be devoted; for I felt that, if I could first succeed in clearing away my own difficulties, then I could help others in clearing away their own difficulties and thus lead them to Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life. This is the reason why I came to America to continue my theological investigation.

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NEW FORMS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION.¹

I.

IN addressing you to-night, I am somewhat painfully conscious that the title I have chosen for this little paper may well seem too far-reaching and too ambitious; that the handling of such a subject in itself appears to imply knowledge I am conscious of not possessing; and above all a certain claim to novelty and originality of thought, to new clues of guidance through difficult paths, which I have no intention whatever of putting forward. To some, at least, of those in this room anything I can say on such a topic will merely represent ponderings and meditations long familiar to them, probably in connection with practical needs of teaching or preaching much wider and more perplexing than anything I have myself struggled with. I can only ask such persons for their sympathy and indulgence, as any traveler may ask it of others more way-worn and more wise. And for the rest, I should wish these thoughts to be regarded as the outcome of a certain personal experience, limited in point of range, but fairly long and strenuous, and touching two sets of problems,—the problems connected with the Christian education of children of different classes and ages, and the problems connected in these troublous times with that life-long education of *ourselves*, as Christian citizens, on which character and conviction depend. Of these last matters, however, I shall only have a few scattered things to say towards the end of my paper.

Every age has produced its new forms of Christian education. As Professor Green has said: "The visible church of one age is never essentially the same as that of the next; and it is only in word or to the intellectually dead that the creed of the present is the same as the creed of the past." The Calvinism of Calvin and the Genevese Ordinances is not the Calvinism of the Scotch peasant, of that delightful Thrums which a recent novelist has drawn for us, closely kindred though they be; and the Anglicanism of the eighteenth century, engaged in "hewing and chiseling Christianity into an intelligible human system, which they then represented, thus mutilated, as affording a remarkable evidence of the

¹ This paper was delivered as an address to the University Hall Guild, a body connected with the University Hall Settlement in Gordon Square. It has been revised and enlarged for publication, but I have not thought well to interfere with the main lines of its original form.

truth of the Bible," was very far indeed from being the Anglicanism of that far-reaching movement of fifty years ago, which chose these contemptuous terms wherein to describe the theology of the age of common sense. To the supporters of the Holy Alliance Catholicism meant political reaction; to Montalembert and Lacordaire, in the days of *L'Avenir*, it meant a free church in a free people. And in a generation the Catholicism of Newman, with its eagerness about speculative theory, its abhorrence of Liberalism and Liberals, its remoteness from this workaday world, and its comparative indifference as to whether there be "too many public-houses in England or no," passes into the Catholicism of a Manning, ready to join hands with any heretic so long as temperance be preached, the child protected, or the laborer raised a step nearer to manhood. The same great words are there, as it were, but the *emphasis* changes; and with the emphasis, the leading, urgent meaning of the whole, that meaning which stirs the blood, which attaches the heart.

This, however, as we all know, is only half the truth. If there has been change there has been also constancy. The proud device of the Catholic Church, "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus," does not rest upon mere delusion. Christianity starts from a *history*, and, broadly speaking, up to the present century the main facts of that history, and the main outlines of the dogmatic scheme in which they very early became embedded, were the same at least for all *Christendom*, for Edinburgh and Madrid, for Rome and Geneva. The fall and natural depravity of man; the divine scheme of salvation, announced centuries beforehand by prophet and type; the Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection; the presence of Christ's church on earth, whether its essence was supposed to lie in the community of believers, or in the permanence of a traditional hierarchy; and the expectation of a future Day of Judgment, and of another life wherein man's blessedness or torment depended upon his acceptance or rejection of the salvation provided for him by God, — as to these great declarations of the Christian creed there was practically no divergence of opinion within the limits of the Christian churches, however differently the *emphasis*, as we have called it, might lie at different times and places, and however much might be added here to be passionately rejected there. These convictions, however, rested upon two others of far less importance and interest to the every-day life of the pious heart than the touching and overwhelming dogmas of salvation and grace, yet everywhere taken for granted in some sense, even when they

seemed to be set the one against the other, and in reality the foundations of the whole. These beliefs, as we all know, were the beliefs in the inspiration and infallibility of the Bible, and in the inspiration and infallibility of the church. The Bible guaranteed the great story of man's salvation, and the church — in the case of the Protestant, the primitive undefiled church; in the case of the Catholic, the visible Catholic body under the governance of the Vicar of Christ — guaranteed the Bible.

Broadly speaking, from the second Christian century, which saw them emerge, up to the period following the French Revolution, that is to say, up to days within hail of our own, these great root-beliefs of Christendom remained intact. Not that the recurrent pressure of rationalism has ever been wanting to the Christian church, at any rate since the revival of the common intellectual life of Europe. In the early Renaissance, the Florentine platonist, Ficino, put forward his translations of Plato and Plotinus in order that, by "this new theology, poets may cease to count the mysteries of religion amongst their fables, and the crowds of peripatetics, who form almost the whole body of philosophers, may be admonished that religion must not be reckoned as old wives' stories." Two centuries later we shall find the great soul of Pascal wrestling with the problems of faith, while his consciousness of "les incrédules," and what they dare to say, darkens the world for him, and turns his mind to the invention of ever sterner and sterner means of repression for the flesh and the fleshly intellect. Another lapse of years, and Butler, driven out of patience by the talk of "skeptical and profane men," whether at Queen Caroline's supper-parties or elsewhere, is penning the famous advertisement to the first edition of the "Analogy." "It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were, by way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus much at least will be here found, not taken for granted, but proved, that any reasonable man, who will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his own being, that it is not, however, so clear a case that there is nothing in it." What ironical force in every word, yet an irony betraying suffering, born out of pain!

No. The thirty-eight most recent Defenders of the Faith, who in these last weeks have been drawing attention through the columns of the "Times" to the currency of "certain impressions that Holy Scripture has been discovered not to be worthy of unquestioning belief, whereby the faith of many Christian people is unsettled," have had a numerous ancestry. That great process in which the Christian battle of belief is but an incident is in truth perennial. The new plant pushing against the sheath which both imprisons and protects it,—this familiar figure will always remain the fittest allegory of human thought in its two eternal aspects of movement and resistance.

Nevertheless, it is conspicuously true that, within the special Christian field, the rapidity of disintegration and reconstruction during the last hundred years has far exceeded anything previously known to the Christian world. In Lord Rosebery's brilliant sketch of Pitt, he sums up his remarks, in excuse of whatever serious errors as a statesman Pitt may have committed, in these words: "He ruled during the convulsion of a new birth at the greatest epoch in history since the coming of Christ, and was on the whole not unequal to it." The sentence refers, of course, to the French Revolution, and the words have since clung to my mind in relation, not to the course of political evolution, but to the history of Christian belief. *The greatest epoch in history*—let us add *religious history*—*since the coming of Christ*. Is it not about that? When we look at it as a whole—that vast manifestation of new forces which had been swelling through innumerable channels, and burst forth at last, towards the end of the last century, for the temporary ruin and ultimate re-fertilization of great tracts of human life and thought—can we doubt that its significance in the religious field has been at least as great as in the political? *History and science*—think of what those great words meant in relation to religion before 1789, and what they have come to mean since. "The disrespect," says Mill, "in which history was held by the French philosophers is notorious; one of the soberest of them, D'Alembert, we believe, was the author of the wish that all record of past events could be blotted out." Warburton, the most truculent and confident of English apologists, and one of the worst of scholars, if we are to trust the verdicts of Mr. Pattison and Mr. Leslie Stephen, said of that great collection of chronicles and other materials for English history, in sixty-four volumes, published by Hearne the antiquary in the first third of the century: "There is not one that is not a disgrace to letters; most of them are so to common sense, and

some even to human nature." The exquisite folly of the sentence is apparent enough to our age, which cannot have enough of "documents," and would give a cartload of Warburtons for another Pepys; but it expressed a very common eighteenth-century judgment. Hume's history — I take my facts from one of the ablest of the "Essays and Reviews" — sold forty-five copies in a twelve-month, and the Deists carried on the struggle with their orthodox opponents, whether as to the conformity of Christianity to nature, or as to the validity of the Christian evidences, amid a level of historical knowledge so low that it is often difficult for us who live "since the Germans" to realize it. When Lardner and Paley produced their triumphant works on Christian evidence, towards the end of the century, "the materials," says Pattison quietly, "for the investigation of the first and second centuries of the Christian era were not at hand."

It is *the rise of history* in the modern sense, a rise which, broadly speaking, Europe owes to the Germans, just as, broadly speaking, she owed the revival of classical learning to the Italians, which has shaken the traditional fabric of Christian orthodoxy as nothing earlier had been able to shake it. No great conception is ever destroyed till it can be replaced. The petulant common sense of the eighteenth century did invaluable service in creating a social and political atmosphere, and a cleared ground, in which the new growth of a true history and an enlarging science could live and develop. But in itself it was wholly barren. It could bespatter and deface the current picture of Christian reality. It could put nothing in its place, because the materials for a new picture — harmonious, intelligible, consistent — did not yet exist. Hence the easy defeat of the Deists, and the Catholic reaction in France, which triumphed so cheaply and through so poor a champion as Chateaubriand. But while Chateaubriand was writing, the founders of modern history were growing to maturity; and the first steps towards the elaboration of that new conception of the Christian reality which with every decade of the century has slowly gained, like all the lasting growths of human thought, in clearness, fullness, and convincing power were being made.

I have no intention of entering into any detailed consideration of that long and triumphant process to-night. Let me only lay stress on one point. The attack of history and science, such as it was, upon orthodox English Christianity in the last century, was mainly carried on from outside, by men either hostile to or detached from the church. The interest of our religious history during the present

century lies in nothing more than this, that whereas the *forces* acting upon religious opinion have been no doubt largely supplied from outside, fostered by the growth of scientific or social knowledge, or generated by the diffusive influence of a great foreign learning, the *landmarks* of that action have been reared not without, but within, the church. Look back over the hundred years, — over the influence of Coleridge casting into English orthodox thought the ferments of German philosophy; over the Tractarian movement, in itself a contribution to criticism, little as its authors suspected it, since it called attention to origins and early processes, and so prepared the way for a more radical and scientific handling of its own subjects; over the Liberal reaction marked by “*Essays and Reviews*,” over the Broad Church movement, that “*beautiful ineffectual angel*,” to make a bold transference of Mr. Matthew Arnold’s saying of Shelley, “*beating in the void its luminous wings in vain*,” over the steady advance into this country, throughout the whole period, of German methods of thought and criticism, marked by each successive commentary and cyclopædia and church dictionary, and in the field of action by innumerable “*wraths of Achilles*,” by battle here and expulsion there, such as we can all remember, to culminate for the time in that extraordinary transformation of religious opinion which in my judgment has been effected during the last fifteen, nay, the last ten years.

The widespread overthrow *within the Christian churches* of the older orthodox conception of the Jewish Scriptures, and of their place in Christian evidence which these years have seen, represents a change of which it is very difficult for us who stand so close to it to estimate the true philosophical importance. But it is at any rate clear that the whole order of the apologetic argument will have to be, and is being, reset. To return to those root-beliefs of Christendom so long inviolable: What becomes of the fall of man, the scheme of salvation, and the whole Pauline theology, as such, if the story of Eden and the creation is a Chaldean myth recast by Hebrew poetry and faith? What becomes of the Christian witness of psalmist and prophet in the dogmatic sense, if the Christian, instead of resting in and triumphing by the texts which have been the traditional support of his faith for centuries, must rather spend his anxious thought in explaining and apologizing for the use in the mouth of Jesus of Nazareth of passages which he — our Master — most naturally took to be by Moses or David or Daniel, but which criticism tells us are by unknown writers of the eighth century B. C., or of the

Persian and Greek and Maccabean periods? Every page in which the modern scholar, whether he hold the traditional conception of Jesus of Nazareth's place in the eternal scheme of things or no, has thrown light on the growth of the Jewish sacred literature, and on the genesis of the prophetic conceptions, on the sources and analogues, that is to say, of the priestly legislation of the Pentateuch, or the literary methods and ethical conceptions which moulded the great poetical figure of the Servant of Jahve, and the later Messianic expectations, — every page of this kind is in reality a contribution to the Christianity of the future. The necessary elements, limitations, and conditions of thought, whether in the mind of Jesus or in the minds of those who proclaimed and divinized him, are being, through studies of this kind, gradually determined; we are beginning to understand in rich detail whence Jesus sprang, and how it is that he and not another stands in history as the leader and symbol of a great movement of converging philosophies and kindling enthusiasms which coincided with the birth of modern Europe under the ægis of the Roman Empire, and is still capable of infinite expansion; and with the exception of some missing links between Judaism and Greek thought which, it is probable, will remain permanently uncertain, the Christian riddle, as a whole, is being read with a self-verifying accuracy and subtlety which a hundred years ago were still among the unconceived births of time. The force of the evidence, the power of the argument, grows from year to year; and both evidence and argument are being largely supplied in England at the present time by men *holding office within the orthodox Christian bodies*. It is true that like all their reforming predecessors they draw a line. But such lines are and have always been among the warning examples of the history of thought. The attitude of men like Canon Driver and Professor Robertson Smith towards the New Testament, the religious arguments and critical concessions made by Mr. Gore, the able and high-minded leader of the younger school of Oxford High Churchmen, in "*Lux Mundi*," seem to me to find a very competent criticism in some words of Mr. Leslie Stephen's, written years ago in a different connection: —

"A new opinion," he says, "emerges as a rule in regard to some particular fragment of a creed. An acute thinker detects an error of logic or a want of correspondence between theory and fact. Whilst correcting the error, he does not appreciate the importance of the principles involved. He fancies that he is removing a morbid excrescence when he is cutting into a growth vitally connected

with the whole organism. Controversies, which are afterwards seen to involve radically antagonistic conceptions of philosophy, begin by some special and minor corollary. The superficial fissure extends deeper and deeper, until the whole mass is rent in twain."

So, in our midst, the fissure spreads and deepens. One church congress listens patiently to denials of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, while it meets with cries of shame the suggestion of an over-bold speaker that the twenty-fourth chapter of St. Matthew, the famous discourse on the Mount of Olives, is in all probability an Apocalyptic fly-leaf from the days of the siege of Jerusalem. A year or two later, nevertheless, the same body receives an Anglican archdeacon, pleading before it that a certain legendary element in such biographies as the Gospels, written at such a time, was to be expected, and could hardly, without a special miracle, have been avoided, with a tolerance which would surely have seemed to Newman or to Pusey the death-knell of a church. Everywhere, in all Christian bodies, or almost all, the ear catches the same vibrations of change and new birth. It is as though the Christian conscience, pondering anxiously the evolution of texts and the crumbling of doctrines, were tremulously saying to itself, like the chief of some wandering nation who looks round a camp before leaving it on the further march of aspiration and faith: "Here — aye, here perhaps — we have no abiding city, but we seek — we *seek* — one to come."

II.

"We seek one to come."

For us who are thrown upon this time of change, who, in the midst of it, have our own lives to guide, have to teach our children, to bear sickness, and — if you will let me strike so grave a note — to face death, is it not indeed the one important, the one essential matter that we should meet our difficulties in the spirit of these words, and not in the spirit of the laggard and the straggler, who drops out of the march before he must?

Yet how many of us drop out before we must? In the midst of the wrestle which now occupies the Christian mind, how many quietly conclude simply to withdraw from it! Perplexed by questions to which they feel themselves unequal, they fall back either upon a traditional religious practice, which is divorced indeed from their intellectual life, but which soothes and shelters, or upon a complete renunciation, so far as it is possible to them, of a Christian language which they feel to be unreal, and Christian

conceptions they have not the energy to reshape. Every year adds to the number of those who thus stand aside, who give up in despair what they hold to be an impossible task. "Why talk to us," they say, "of new forms of Christian education? If the great story of orthodox Christianity, with its tangible hopes and fears, is untrue, why trouble ourselves any longer with a system which has become a mere part of history in ceasing to be the authoritative solution of life and its enigmas? Why alienate the workingman by the use of names and expressions which the recoil from bigotry or patronage has taught him to dislike and distrust; why teach our children matters which can only lead to superstition or confusion? Rather leave the whole thing alone. Trust to science and to ethics; train the sense of citizenship; cultivate the power of sympathy. The Theist, who separates himself from the special world of Christian memory and speech, does but gain a wider and freer field in which to build his own argument. And as for the man who can claim no religious certainties of any kind, let him look in the study of social obligation and its development, in the compelling facts or the piteous spectacles of life, for that driving emotion which religion used to supply."

We are all familiar with this language and this dilemma. I cannot, of course, on this occasion dwell upon it at length. Let me only say that to me, at any rate, the distrust and weariness of Christianity, which is common among some of the best men and women of the present day, is the most wasteful, the most uncalled-for surrender of its own wealth that modern life can make. In presence of a system, founded, as every great and victorious religious system must be founded, on perennial needs of human nature, bound up with the hopes and sorrows, the tears, the agonies, the joys of eighteen hundred years, which has absorbed the ethical thought of Greece and the governing power of Rome, and has added to them an emotion and an enthusiasm all its own, are we to refuse the task of collaboration in which every age has joined from the beginning, because the toil of adaptation and reconstruction laid upon our generation is in some ways a peculiarly heavy one? Is it so little to us for whom, thanks to those who have gone before us, a new interest in, and a new sense of responsibility towards, our brother man is possible; that History should once for us Europeans have lifted a human life so high; that in divinizing the sufferer of Calvary our race should have made so vast an effort to set forever before its wandering eyes the type of truth, purity, and self-forgetting pain? In these days when we are all so much

more conscious than our fathers of hurry, and multitude, and the perpetual struggle of great interests, are we so rich in symbols, in rallying cries, which may bring some order and dignity into this "darkling plain," "where ignorant armies clash by night," — is it so easy to touch, to bind, to lift men, — that we can turn away from the images, the thoughts, the aspirations which have touched and bound and raised them in the past, and which come to us, therefore, steeped in and consecrated by an unfathomable human experience, without an effort, without a pang?

Is not the *real* difficulty that we will not take a certain trouble, — we will not, even for our children's sake, or for the sake of those, perhaps of another class, whose starved education we, more fortunate and more responsible, may long to help from our own, go through a certain drudgery which must be faced if the old Christianity is ever to become in us something once more new and living? We do not know, we say, what weight to give to the Christian documents; we cannot see our way through the contradictions of the evidence. On innumerable points experts are divided, and how are *we* to form conclusions? What is the true significance of the life of Jesus of Nazareth? Did he regard himself as Messiah, or Son of God, or did he not? Did he address his message to the Jews only or to the world? How are we to sift the body of his sayings, among which are many that repel us, beside a multitude which belong to the admitted best of literature and thought? If miracle is to be cut away from the life, what remains? And if the idea of a risen and glorified Saviour and the vision of an incarnate Logos are denied any present reality, what profit is it still possible for us moderns to get from the speculations of St. Paul or from the discourses of the Johannine Christ?

These questions, it has always seemed to me, can be answered in two ways. There is the answer of the scholar, and there is the answer of the ordinary man or woman, forced to deal with the practical trust of life, and bound to let go no help that may serve one in dealing well with it. The scholar takes a lifetime, perhaps, to give his answer. He is at once the pioneer and the trustee of his brethren, and upon his faithfulness now depends the common life and thought of thousands hereafter. He cannot lay his foundations too deep, cannot take his work too seriously. But for the parent or the teacher, with only a section of time and energy to give, the case is different. Just as the young curate, talking with the accent of conviction and personal judgment to a

congregation about matters with which he has no first-hand acquaintance, and on which strictly speaking he has no right to an opinion, is yet supported and justified first by the needs of practical life, and next by the mass of expert opinion behind him, on which he consciously or unconsciously relies, so is it with us, on our side of religious thought. In the camp of reconstruction a working opinion is no doubt harder to form, and demands more of the individual than is the case in the camp of tradition. Nevertheless, it is within the reach of everybody who seeks it with some conscience and earnestness. The matter is not so complex, not so difficult, as our own timidity and indolence believe. The body of expert opinion is there for us also; the books which embody it have been both multiplied and simplified of late years; and the consultation of it up to a point sufficient for the purpose is neither beyond the powers nor the leisure of any parent or teacher who feels the value and the attraction of religious education. No doubt there are many books still wanted. Above all there is still wanting an English Life of Christ which shall enrich not the literature of popular edification, but the literature of a true and responsible knowledge. Still, what we have is amply enough if we would only use it to the best of our ability and so far as we can, as we are indeed constantly using the available materials for judgment in other departments of our life.

Let us take in illustration two kinds of religious teaching: the teaching of children at home, and especially children of what is called the educated class; and teaching of the Sunday-school type, addressed to those whose book education is scanty, and leaves off early in life.

Let me speak of the last first, in a few passing words, all I shall have time for this evening. The Sunday-school type of teaching represents what is of necessity a less perfect kind of teaching than the first,—the long-continued home-teaching, that is to say, of the educated class. The time for it is less, and the contribution on the part of the taught must also, owing to the comparative scantiness of the parallel education available, be much less. My own belief is that Sunday-school teaching among the poor cannot for some time to come—if I may so express it—be too experimental. The language of popular Christian teaching is too often a language worn and blunted by long conventional use. In training the poor the Bible has been used so clumsily and so short-sightedly that it often seems as though the best way to win a coming generation to a new conception of Christian real-

ity must be to put the Bible aside for a time altogether. By which I do not mean, so far as the New Testament is concerned, that we should dream of putting the Christian story and the Christian material aside. Far from it. But what I should like to see would be the growth of a teaching among the less educated classes, depending less and less upon the direct use of books — even of the Bible — and more and more upon a certain spiritual and imaginative power in the teacher. In work of this kind the Christian texts, if I may say it boldly, want to be first absorbed and then retold. By the use of words and illustrations familiar to their common life, by a vivid telling of the story in a fresh set of phrases, as far as may be, and with the help of different kinds of association ; by a free employment of pictures, and by a running comparison of old with new, — of the life by the Sea of Galilee with the life of their own courts and lanes, — I believe the attention of the poor may be once more caught and held, and the Christian lessons once more enforced through a kindled imagination. But a teaching of this kind will naturally make a much greater demand upon the teacher than the old has done, and the teacher, to do it well, must himself go to school, and learn to attach a new interest and a new honor to his Sunday class and its opportunity.

With these few words of digression, on a subject which might well take an evening to itself, let me return to the field of home-teaching, and the home-teaching of what we call the educated class, — as it seems to me, the most important of all at the present moment, and the key of the situation. Here the parent, generally the mother, unlike the Sunday-school teacher, who must do the best he can under every sort of disadvantage, has ample time and opportunity to look forward to. If the general pressure of life and experience has cut her off from beliefs commonly received, without drying up the springs of religious aspiration, or deadening the sense of something forever beautiful and sacred in the Christian temper, she has but to give herself to a little patient thought and reading, she has but to take up her task with resolution, to find the rewards of it growing upon her with every step. Her object, let us suppose, is twofold, — first, to form an ideal in the child's mind, a vivid and perpetual image of the good, dressed in the living detail of a human story, which may become an everpresent influence on conduct and feeling. In the second place, she desires to form a link between the child and that world about it which remains so largely Christian, and in which so much of the noblest

work is still Christian, and Christian of the old type. If she were to train the child on the Comtist calendar, or on pure literature, or any other of the modern substitutes for Christianity, she perceives that she would be simply cleaving a quite unnecessary division of sympathy and interests between the child and its surroundings, between it and many persons and things whom she would most wish it to love. To remain ignorant of Christian language and the voice of Christian feeling can but isolate us from some of the best of our fellows; whereas the power of common work and sympathy is hardly impaired where two hearts hold the same image, however differently the intellect may interpret it.

So for many and good reasons she begins, as her forefathers had begun before her, with the Gospels, with the lives of Jesus. But they are to be treated as any other accounts of the life of a dead friend or saint would be treated did they present the phenomena of the Gospels, and were they to be examined week by week and day by day for the purpose of an ever truer and closer understanding. The teacher should have two qualifications, the interest of a student and the love of a disciple; and the lesson, to be complete, should have two parts.

There should be, first of all, the continuous study of the narrative, in which one version of a story is perpetually compared with another, parable with parable, saying with saying, and in which the teacher, by the use of a few obvious and easily accessible books, does her best to create an atmosphere and a scene wherein the whole drama may move and live with an ever fuller imaginative truth. No one can easily realize, who has not tried it, how soon intelligent children, whose imagination and memory are developed at the same time in other fields, will learn to take delight in the effort to grasp the Christian story as reality, how quickly and simply they will feel an interest even in what we call critical questions, — the different points of view of the biographers, the probable reasons why Mark tells a story in one way, and Luke or Matthew in another; the chasm in chronology and fact and tone between the Synoptics and St. John; the history of certain additions to the text, such as the angel and the bloody sweat in the Garden of Gethsemane, or the troubling of the water at the pool of Bethesda, or the last twelve verses of Mark; the throwing back into the mouth of Jesus of the parables and sayings of a later preaching, embodying the ideas of a later historical situation; and so on. If such matters are dealt with as they ought to be, under the guidance of a love which sees in them the first steps towards

what it seeks, the result should be to enable the child to use its own mind and imagination with increasing freedom and firmness. "It cannot have happened quite in such a way," you will find it saying to you, "because you see there is that other account; or the story is one of a kind likely to be invented; or those who wrote many years afterwards understood and described what they were told, or what they had seen, each in his different way. But it *may* have happened like this? Yes, I am *sure* it happened like this!"

And so in the end you will find the child building up its own conception, under the pressure of yours. It is very little matter, indeed, whether at every point it represents — this conception — the maturest critical knowledge. As we are now coming to read the Gospels, each mind will more and more form for itself its own working conception, and there are innumerable points where criticism can only clear away and illuminate, and will probably never make good a claim to dictate. But do not suppose for a moment that this comparative uncertainty as to details, which must always cling to certain portions of the story, need in the end, if your teaching is a true teaching, affect the clearness of the general conception. Minds submitted to such a training as I have sketched, and troubled by no hindering remnants of an earlier system, make short work of the common orthodox dilemma "either God or nothing," or "either God or a man of no particular ethical importance." The figure as it was, growing distinct year by year, not by negative subtraction, but by virtue of an ever-increasing intelligence and sympathy in the beholder, becomes at last the constant and familiar friend of heart and imagination. The child and youth at Nazareth, nurtured on the high hopes and the ancient poetry of his people, yet drawn partly by a peculiar genius, partly in half-conscious accordance with a well-marked school and tendency of the day, to spiritualize and deepen the voice of prophet and law-giver, till the old conceptions answered to the new needs of a time big with religious change and moral reform; the man of thirty, torn from a silent and meditative life of humble labor by the passionate attempt of another to lay the first foundations of that kingdom of God on which he himself had brooded so long; taking up that attempt when his forerunner was silenced, and transforming it by the aid of a far richer thought and a more sensitive and disciplined genius into an ideal conception of extraordinary potency and range, and carrying that conception, together with the ethical convictions and enthusiasms which hung upon it, and had been nourished by it, into the missionary life, teaching, persuading,

subduing, amid the little crowded towns of the Galilean lake ; the wrestler with disease of mind and body, as he and his age understood it, employing in all simplicity, and as it often seems to us with a sweet resignation, powers he could not but regard as the natural accompaniment of that spiritual power he saw and felt himself to possess, yet constantly troubled, amid surroundings which made the doubt of miracle both for himself and his followers an impossible anachronism, by the coarseness of the popular demand for miracle ; the champion of the outcast and the poor, living in all the life about him, whether of nature or humanity, sensitive to the clouds, the flowers, the birds, still more sensitive to human sin and human pain, exciting love, trouble of conscience, a passionate devotion wherever he went, with many friends and much success, and no conspicuous enemies, — there you have the first half of the picture, the first act of the drama.

But you and the child you are leading pass on, and gradually, like all the great thought and great action of the world, you see this thought and this action deepen into struggle and agony, darken into tragedy. Is he Messiah? He himself, astonished by his own influence, haunted perhaps by the suggestions and coincidences of prophecy and popular legend, and conscious alike of God with him and of rising forces of fierce opposition, admits the marvelous, the inconceivable idea, yet feels none the less passionately the pressure of those ethical convictions which are in truth his being. If he is Messiah, it is still only that he may minister, may be among men as servant of all, may give everything, friends, success, life itself, if need be, for the saving of his brethren, and the realization of the kingdom. For what is Messiah, in one aspect, but the last and greatest of the prophets? "A prophet," said Moses, in speaking of him, "shall the Lord your God raise up unto you, like unto me," and every age has stoned the prophets and laid on their sacred and atoning heads the iniquity of all. For neither himself nor his mission is any retreat possible, nor, to the strung heart and will, conceivable ; and yet, as his keen eye surveys what he himself calls "the signs of the times," and measures his own resources against those of an offended and tyrannical orthodoxy, he begins, first dimly we may suppose, then with a tragic clearness, to foresee the end. His soul rises to the "great argument" laid upon it ; he sets his face for Jerusalem, the sacred and beloved city, to which the prophet of Jahve naturally tends, and where each prophetic message must be ultimately delivered ; and while his followers debate and plan around him, in language drawn from the current

Messianic legend of the time, *his* inmost thought is rather with the Suffering Servant of Jahve, led as a sheep to the slaughter, oppressed, afflicted, dumb, — stricken for the transgressions of Jahve's people. Yet he is most human, and there are moments when by a natural reaction and relief he, too, adopts the conceptions of the national hope, and talks of judgment and triumph, and the rule of a risen Messiah. The religious consciousness even at its highest contains always these two elements, the transient and the permanent; and that which is to last makes its way at first in human life by virtue of that which is to pass away.

But the time for preaching in words is almost done. An *action* is before him, an action which, as in all true martyrdom, is but the natural and inevitable outcome of a compelling thought. How little in a sense we actually know of the last days, — what scanty fragments from a preaching which has taken a new note alike of vehemence and of matured experience, and must have roused hundreds now to wonder and sympathy, now to fierce anger and resistance, what contradictions in the narratives, what critical and historical difficulties, even at the most touching and vital points of the story! Yet the main lines are clear. He dies for the freedom of the spirit, for the Kingdom of God, for an ideal conception, that is to say, of the relations between God and man, too great, as it would seem, at times, even for his own mortal's strength and for the natural resources of his mortal's thought; yet *his* nevertheless, and owing to *him* — and not to Paul nor any other — the realization which it afterwards obtained in human life. For him his death is but the fidelity of the matured soul to the continuous training of life; for those about him it is first despair, and then — revelation! The first true communication of his spirit to those who had labored and wandered with him seems to have come when he could no more be touched by sympathy or cheered by love. When — incredible! — they see him die, they *begin* to understand. And when all is over, and the force of such a personality and such a death acting upon physical and mental conditions not difficult to conceive, though now impossible for us to recover in their entirety, has evolved from the sore protesting anguish, the smarting love, the reacting speculative faiths of those left behind the burning belief of the resurrection, — God and man, so to speak, have met in the founding of the most significant and, on the whole, make what deductions we please, the divinest work of human history. Light has dawned at last for the slave, the outcast, the woman, the poor; and the faithfulness of one human soul, thrown on the fitting

moment of history, has evoked from the race that electric power of sympathy and passion which is to take from east to west, from the stored labor of Greek ethical thought, the ordered power of Roman life, and the moral and imaginative wealth of Jewish theistic faith, for the actual building in earth's midst of the New Jerusalem, and the practical founding of the City of God.

I feel as though I had to ask your pardon! We may all think — it is better for us all to think — that the matters I have been dealing with are too sacred, too dear, for much speaking. Yet I felt that to treat of a Christian education, which under such modern conditions as I have described is to provide us with a living ideal, and a perpetual presence in the soul, without giving some such sketch of the conception practically resulting, as I have just attempted, would be vague and incomplete. I do but offer it as a suggestion, a point of departure for thought to those who may not have much time to read, and who may be suffering to-day, as we have all suffered, from the difficulty of forming to themselves any definite picture or image of the central Christian reality, amid the conflicting clash of evidence and explanation.

One more word, however, to carry the suggestion just a little further. Of this Christian reality I have tried to sketch for you, one half — the half which is concerned rather with what the Master was and did. There still remains the great and vital question of what he *said*, — of that body of teaching on which many who feel themselves detached from Christian dogma tacitly fall back, but which is in reality as full of difficulties, as much in need of critical sifting and the reconstructive processes of the trained-historical imagination as the "pragmatic" portions of the documents. A great deal has been done; a great deal still remains to be done. To myself it seems clear that as parable after parable and saying after saying has been cut away from the genuine record of Jesus, by processes purely critical and historical, and such as would be employed without question in any other field of the past, the figure of the Master has become ever clearer and grander. We can well spare the parable of the unjust judge, or the story of the cursing of the fig-tree; our grasp of the tender and beautiful reality does but strengthen as sentence after sentence of personal self-assertion, moulded by the beliefs of discipleship and the needs of a primitive preaching, fall away; we lose nothing essential by the relegation of a large number of those parables which deal with the return of the Son of man, and the course of the "last things," to a later generation and time; we positively gain by the exclusion of much Apocalyptic

prophecy, which in its present form at any rate cannot possibly be the speech of Jesus. And as gradually we learn to discriminate with some firmness between forms of thought, and even an idiom of speech, which the mere study of literature shows us to belong to the world's best, and to be therefore beyond the invention of disciples, and later transformations and additions traceable to known historical causes, or to the natural play of ordinary minds under given conditions, — as we learn to do this, we come so near to our Master, the eyes of the mind are so far cleared, that much is ultimately given back to us, which we had begun by relinquishing in reluctance and despair. It is hardly possible, for instance, that all the Seven Words from the cross can be historical; probably very few of them are. But in the end we come to feel that whatever may be the historical truth, they have at any rate the profounder truth of poetry. Some of them at least were conceived by the generation which had stood within sight and sound of the cross of Jesus of Nazareth. Such words he — being he — must have spoken. The testimony is to something deeper far than words. It is to a spirit, a character, a life.

So in the same way with the discourses of St. John. The last words of Jesus to the disciples, his prayer before he leaves them, have in one sense little to do with history; in another, they are far more revealing than history ever is. They show us what, in the conception of one who had at any rate come near to those who had come near to him, he must have thought and said in the hour of parting. The conception is conditioned throughout by the personality and culture of the writer, but it is still testimony of its own kind. Only character of a certain stamp could have produced the effect; and if we are able to read it in something of that spirit of high and passionate poetry in which it was written, it will take its true and right place with us as one more reflection of a sacred reality, always the same, yet taking many shapes in many minds.

Again, a number of sayings come to us as fragments, as condensations probably of larger wholes. The reader who is steeped in the Gospels, the teacher who guides his pupils week by week in the patient study of them, will find himself often venturing on reconstructions which tend at least to illuminate the irrecoverable past. "*Come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy-laden*" — what are they, those immortal words, but the rounded fragment of some discourse, recast by memory and the influence of nascent dogma, but pointing back to a primal reality so full of emotion, poignancy, beauty, that it could not be forgotten, and still under

its slight though most significant disguise haunts the hearts of men? Of that reality the incommunicable phrase, the first glow, the living detail, are lost forever. But imagination may perhaps frame the bare and pale image of a logical order of thought which our fragment now represents.

"The Scribes and Pharisees bind upon men's shoulders burdens grievous to be borne — but my yoke is easy and my burden is light! — For the yoke of love is peace, and the effect thereof quietness and confidence for evermore. Take this yoke upon you — and learn of me! For I speak unto you that I have known, I declare unto you that I have seen. These things hath the Father hidden from the wise and prudent, and revealed them unto babes. Come unto me, ye that are meek and lowly in heart! — Come unto me, ye that are weary and heavy-laden! — I will show you the path of peace — I will give you rest!"

Such would be natural words of religious passion; in some such sort, with the magic aids of personality on the one side and hungering need on the other, may Jesus of Nazareth have spoken. I only wish to point out to you by this passing suggestion how in these imperfect ways love may try to recover what love first concealed.

Still another point remains. I have said that the Christian teacher should throw his lesson into two parts. The first will be concerned, as we have seen, with the better understanding of the Christian Founder and of the work begun by him in human life. The other will surely consist in the endeavor to put the special Christian thoughts and materials into connection, first, with the universal thoughts and conceptions of religion, and next, to bring them to bear on actual human life about us and at our doors. I can conceive a Christianity without the hope of God. But you will not require of me in this place, and on this occasion, that I should spend time on so difficult a dream. For most of us, perhaps for all of us here, Christianity still claims us, because, in its best forms, it is the most moving and beautiful, the most striking and concrete testimony that history affords to the power of a Divine and Eternal Life, a life which is perpetually revealed in conscience, law, and knowledge, and which so presses on and appeals to the human spirit, that while its action leaves the half of existence a mystery, it can yet generate within the sphere of contact between it and man a faith which can transfigure these passing years, and take even the terror from the face of death. For those who ask teaching from us, let us, if we can, make the life of Jesus of

Nazareth the perpetually attractive symbol of this contact between God and man ; let us connect with it the picture of the growth of conscience and the many-chaptered story of the human struggle for good, and we need have no fear, as it seems to me, that it will ever fail to meet religious need or strike out spiritual response.

As to its practical bearings, they cannot be too closely or too familiarly insisted upon. As we draw the picture of the Master moving among the sins and needs, the sufferings and affections, of Galilee and Jerusalem, and as communion with him quickens in us, and in those we teach, reverence for the life of duty and of pity, let us be constantly ready to pass from old to new, from the mothers and children, the husbandmen, carpenters, weavers, the teachers and missionaries of Palestine, to the daily relations and tasks, the familiar figures, of our own world. Each of those relations and duties may, if we will, be connected with the beloved and sacred name of him who stands both by inherent genius and by the irrevocable choice of men at the head of the spiritual life of Europe, and still bequeaths even to our far-off generation the maintenance and spread of his work. All things may be done to God in Christ ; and that our children should learn from us so to do them is the task of Christian education. Only in the patient struggle to fulfill it week by week, and day by day, till the education of childhood merges in the sterner education of maturity, can we hope, parent and child, teacher and taught, for the growth which alone is true life, — growth in that temper of seriousness, sympathy, and noble passion for undying aims whereof the chief representative in history is Jesus Christ.

MARY A. WARD.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Vedic Hymns. Translated by F. MAX MÜLLER. Part I. Hymns to the Maruts, Rudra, Vāyu, and Vāta. (Sacred Books of the East. Vol. XXXII.) Pp. cxxv, 556. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1891. 18s. 6d.

When the series of Sacred Books of the East was begun, people naturally supposed that one of its chief objects was to bring out duly before the world a translation of the Rig-Veda. That was, above all others, the record with which the name of the editor was associated; he had, as it were, preached Rig-Veda for many years to the English-speaking public, giving specimens of it, and setting forth its importance as the Bible of Indo-European religious history, the key to the mythology of Greece and Rome and Germany. No English version of it having any value was in existence; and there was no satisfactory version in any European language. In the programme of the series, dated 1876, the first item promised was "Hymns of the Veda." Yet the whole proposed series of twenty-four volumes went through the press without a word about the Rig-Veda. The editor had laid under contribution many scholars, some of them eminent, and had brought out in a conveniently accessible form, but generally not for the first time, the early records of various Eastern religions; but his own contribution had been only a version in two volumes of the Upanishads, one answering fairly well the purposes of such a series, but of a degree of inaccuracy very discreditable to him as a Sanskrit scholar, and hardly explainable save as the publication, without due revision, of a work made when its author was a young and comparatively inexperienced student.

A second series of twenty-four volumes was then projected, and, after some difficulty, ratified by the publishing body. The first of them appeared in 1885, and soon there was definite promise made of a book of Vedic hymns, which is now at last in our hands. It is a stout volume, of nearly 700 pages, and more costly by a half than any other save one in the whole double series. It contains the translation of 49 out of the 1017 hymns of the Rig-Veda—both in hymn-number and in verse-number about a twentieth of the whole text. Even of this, a considerable part is a mere reprint of what was produced near a quarter of a century ago (1869) under the title of "A Translation of the Rig-Veda," as the first of eight promised volumes, which was never followed by a second. What we have now is precisely what, at the end of the Preface to that volume, the author declared himself to be then "preparing for press." The former work appears to have been adopted into the present series, as a sort of prophetic forerunner, for the reprint of its formidable Preface is here entitled "Preface to the First Edition." Why it should have been reproduced at all is explained to us on p. xxvi of the new Introduction: "I was obliged to place them [the Marut hymns] once more

in the foreground, because the volume containing the translation of these hymns with very full notes has been used for many years as a text book by those who were beginning the study of the Rig-Veda, and was out of print." These beginning students must have been, it would seem, the author's own private pupils, since it is hardly credible that any others should have been made to use a book so particularly unsuited to such a purpose, when real Vedic chrestomathies were easily accessible; its users, certainly, are much to be pitied. But even this furnishes no excuse for the reappearance of that old Preface of a hundred pages; it was an excrescence in the former volume, having, as a whole, nothing to do with the translation of the Veda; and it is still worse here, as it has nothing whatever to do with religion or mythology; and how it should help a class of Vedic beginners is a puzzle. It is, however, solely for the benefit of such classes that a complete glossary of 77 pages (prepared by another scholar) to the texts translated and referred to is added at the end of the volume. Thus it appears that, while he was supposed to be laboring for the advantage of the comparative students of religion, what the author really had in mind as principal object has been the production of a Vedic chrestomathy! If his collaborators had treated after the same fashion the Koran, the Vendidad, the Shu-King, and the Dhammapada, he would probably have been quick to see the utter impropriety of the proceeding.

With such a perverted plan, it is less surprising to find that the big volume contains less than 70 pages, solid, of Vedic translation. They are buried in 350 pages of notes — enough, certainly, if duly distributed to the divinities addressed and those mentioned in the text, to give a fair account of the whole Vedic religion. But in these notes also the object of the "Sacred Books of the East" is as little regarded as in the rest of the work. They are almost exclusively philological and exegetical; and, even as such, they often show the most surprising and exasperating wastefulness as regards space: for example (as was noted in criticisms of the "first edition"), under the very first verse translated, there is a note of more than ten pages on an adjective meaning "red" — a note utterly useless not only to the student of religions, but also to the student of the Veda. The same failure to appreciate what is desirable and useful runs through the whole mass. To be sure, there is one conspicuous case of mythological exposition among the 60 pages given to the hymn i. 166 (2½ pages of translation): namely, 23 pages upon the goddess Aditi; but in it, too, the needs of the special Vedic student are chiefly considered, and it contains extremely little that is edifying.

To enter into any detailed criticism of the translation, or of any part of it, would be to imitate the author's error of judgment in the make-up of his volume; it would be doing what is of no value to the student of religions. The Rig-Veda is full of unsolved, and in great part also probably insoluble, problems of detail, and Müller has dealt with them

as he was able, with more or less success, but with not a particle more of authority than would belong to any one of a dozen or a score of other living scholars. Against striking oversights and blunders, such as he is not very seldom guilty of, he has, in that part of the present volume which is new (from hymn i. 167 on), measurably insured himself by taking in as partner an able younger scholar, Professor Oldenberg, of Kiel, who, as we are informed on p. xxvii of the Preface, has revised his translation and notes. To the same scholar he has now at last committed the task, for himself too burdensome, of continuing the work; and it is promised that the next volume shall contain the hymns to Agni, the fire-god. Probably this will appear in less than fifteen years from the time of announcement, and will not try to be also a beginner's Reader. If the series is to be made to contain, before it is finished, a complete translation of the Rig-Veda, then it will be well that all the hymns to Agni be given; but certainly not otherwise; for they are an immense mass, and they exhibit the usual Vedic iteration and reiteration of commonplaces; so that the omission of the greater part of them would be far more than made up for by the inclusion of hymns to other deities, or of the miscellaneous hymns.

Our author has been more than once unfavorably criticised for beginning his translation with the obscure and tedious hymns to the Maruts, and in the present Preface (p. xxiii) he gives his reasons for it: 1st, they are peculiarly hard to translate; 2d, when translated, they are peculiarly hard to understand, and so may be relied on to discourage casual intermeddlers with Vedic sacred things; 3d, they set forth with especial clearness the character of the gods to whom they are addressed. The last would be a better reason if better founded; but the Maruts, though less obscure than some of the Vedic divinities, are decidedly more so than certain of the others that have a far higher importance and interest, as Agni, Indra, the sun, the dawn. As for the first and second reasons given, they constitute an even startling confession of ill-judgment: as if students of Vedic religion were so numerous, and so importunately eager, as to require to be fought off (to use our author's own simile, "our grapes, I am glad to say, are still sour") like foxes who attempt to rob the vines! It is a pity there were not some supervising body competent to restrain the editor's vagaries.

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Manual of the Science of Religion. By P. D. CHANTEPIE DE LA SAUSSAYE, Professor of Theology at Amsterdam. Translated from the German by BEATRICE S. COLYER-FERGUSON (née Max Müller). Vol. I. Pp. xiii, 672. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co.

The first volume of the translation of Professor de la Saussaye's "Manual of the Science of Religion" bears witness to the increasing interest felt

in England and America in the study of the history of religions; and we are greatly indebted to the translator for a welcome addition to the English literature of the subject. The translation has had the advantage of a revision by the author, who has made additions to, and corrections of, the German text, so that the English issue is in the nature of a second edition. Some paragraphs are rewritten, and in a number of places changes have been made for the purpose of bringing the presentation up to date. The translator has been successful in giving the work an idiomatic English form,—a task of no small difficulty. In some cases, indeed, the effort to put German idiom into familiar English phrase has produced undesirable expressions. The indefinite *man*, for example, is commonly rendered by “people,” a word that in most cases fails to convey the exact sense of the original; thus the frequent expression *man glaubt* here means “it is an opinion held by scholars,” and cannot well be rendered by “people think.” In a considerable number of places the translation might be bettered; and some of these may be mentioned in the hope that the suggestions will be of service, in case a second issue of the present excellent volume is called for, or a translation of the second part of the “Manual” is undertaken.

Hegel's errors are said in the German text to be of “subordinate importance;” it is not said that we may “forget” them (p. 4). The author urges a “really scientific” study of the subject, not “honest conscientious” study (p. 7). It is said that Spencer's arguments fail “in part” to touch the question (p. 44), not that “the greater part” fail (unless this is a change by the author). When Prof. de la Saussaye contrasts the “large-hearted” views of Max Müller with the *doctrinarismus* of the animists, he hardly means to charge these gentlemen with “learned pedantry,” as the translation has it, but rather with reckless devotion to a theory (p. 45). Hegel, according to the text, still “controls” (*beherrscht*) scholars, instead of “influences” (p. 50). *Bildlich* (p. 76) is “figurate,” not “figurative.” *Völker* (p. 110) is not “people,” but “peoples.” Mr. Tylor is credited by the author (p. 112) with “fine,” not “ready,” tact. *Gedankenschärfe* (p. 126) is more than “cleverness;” *freilich* is not “of course;” *Annahme* is here rather “supposition” than “adoption.” For “distinctly nature-side” (p. 128) read “nature-side distinctly” (no doubt a typographical error). *Wohl* (p. 129) is not “nearly.” For “stoic” (p. 207) read “stoicheiastic” (typographical error?). *Irgend einen lehrhaften Inhalt* (p. 228) is “some sort of didactic content,” not “a didactic character;” “refers to” should be “is true of” (*gilt*). Those religions (p. 235) which exclude philosophy “have fallen into” stagnation, not “are doomed to.” “Famous” (said of a saying of M. Renan) is not a complete rendering (p. 313) of *epochemachend*. “System of prophets” (p. 315) should be “prophetism;” in the next paragraph, in the statement that Professor W. Robertson Smith “does not care for the natural explanation” the word “natural” is not clear. The expres-

sion (p. 365) "many beautiful sayings are expressed in the service of this negative morality" does not convey clearly the meaning of the German *im Sinne dieser negativen Moral sind manche schöne Sprüche gemeint*. "Some people" is not the proper rendering (p. 401) of *manche* (but the author may have changed the word). The expression (p. 406) "with many" is not clear. Stanislas Guyard is described (p. 464) by the author as *der seitdem allzufrüh verstorbene verdienstvolle*; the translation, "who has since met with an early death," is inaccurate as a rendering, and not in desirable English form. In the paragraph on books of reference (p. 480) *die Religion* should be rendered by "the religion." By oversight *feindlich* (p. 497) is translated "friendly," instead of "hostile." The original declares that the Rig-veda cannot be regarded as a witness to *eine erhabene Urzeit*; that is, to "a noble or grand primitive period," not to "a supposed great antiquity" (p. 518). The three opening sentences (p. 525) of the paragraph are not properly articulated. Instead of "influence" (p. 531) we should read "limits." For "list of the literature" (p. 536) read "list of works" or "survey of the literature." *Dagegen* (p. 540) is "rather," not "again." *Festgesetzt* (p. 567) is "accepted as fixed or certain," not "established;" "such knowledge" (p. 591) should be "and this knowledge;" for "because" (p. 595) read "as." *Weltschmerz* (p. 597) is not "universal suffering." The sentence beginning (p. 621) "The philanthropic institutions" is wrongly articulated. In the foot-note (p. 643) the punctuation disguises the meaning; "foreign influences" (p. 653) should be "foreign relations;" instead of "strong point" (p. 658, *Schwerpunkt*) read "central point;" *also* (p. 664) is, by oversight, rendered "also." The word "Mussulman" may be regarded as obsolete, having been superseded by "Moslem." Notwithstanding this list, the general sense of the work is well given in the translation, and the inaccuracies are such as may easily be corrected.

Professor de la Saussaye's work is too well known to need description here. It is generally recognized as equally admirable in its arrangement and in its tone. He has collected the materials for the history of religious customs and systems with industry and skill; his presentation of the facts is clear and judicious; his own judgments are impartial and sensible; within the space allowed, he has given a remarkably full and satisfactory account of a very large subject, and his bibliographical sections are very valuable. The division of his material into four sections, the general or introductory, the phenomenological, the ethnographic, and the historical, is convenient, and his treatment of each of these parts is admirable. He endeavors to do justice, in his discussion of the origin of religion, as well as elsewhere, to the rival schools of the mythologists and the animists, though to these last he is not very friendly. One of the less satisfactory parts of the Introduction is the account of the origin of gods; and, in general, more stress might well be laid on the relation between

the growth of a religion and the cultural progress of the community to which it belongs. Despite the reasons assigned by the author for omitting the consideration of Israelitism and Christianity, it would be better to include them in a work like this. There need be no fear of offending religious sensibility, and the treatment of these two great religions in the purely scientific-historical way adopted by Professor de la Saussaye could not fail to be helpful.

C. H. Toy.

Brahmanism and Hinduism ; or Religious Thought and Life in India, as based on the Veda and other Sacred Books of the Hindūs. By Sir MONIER MONIER-WILLIAMS. Fourth edition. Pp. xxviii, 603. New York : Macmillan & Co. \$4.00.

The object of Colonel Boden in establishing the Boden Professorship of Sanskrit at Oxford was "to enable his countrymen to proceed in the conversion of the natives of India to the Christian religion." The Occidentals sent out to convert them have often been narrow sectarians, and often — nay, perhaps generally — unable, through ignorance, to estimate aright the essential elements of strength and of weakness in the religions of India. The plan of Colonel Boden was a sagacious one, and his munificence has borne much good fruit in the works of Wilson and Williams, the distinguished incumbents of his chair. Their books have been a not inappreciable factor in bringing to light the new world of thought and of faith, in which, among other things, the missionary enterprise of the twentieth century will be conducted. The hope that any great part of the quarter of a billion of souls in India are to be converted to any creed-religion is, in this time of the dissolution of creeds, a forlorn hope. Converted, indeed, by all means, they must needs be, but to the religion of the new world ; and this religion must be of such sort that it is capable of becoming a world-religion.

In the evolution of such a religion, one among the myriad contributory factors is the just understanding of the religious developments of the past. If the Boden bequest is not bearing precisely the fruit that the testator had in mind, there could, nevertheless, hardly be a happier case for the application of the rule of *cy pres* than here. The history of India is preëminently a religious history ; it extends over thirty centuries, more or less ; it presents a long series of phases, which we can study from recorded documents, from architectural and other monuments, and by observation of the Hindus of to-day ; and, above all, these phases are in great part typical, and have a discoverable genetic connection. For these reasons they constitute "perhaps the best key to the study of 'Comparative Religion,' as Sanskrit is the best key to the study of 'Comparative Grammar'" (p. vi).

The chief phases may be designated as Vedism, Ritualistic Brahman-

ism, Philosophical Brahmanism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism (or Çaivism and Vaishnavism). Of the first three, this volume (Buddhism is the subject of a companion volume by the same author) treats incidentally, and in rather meagre fashion; its proper subject is Hinduism, the saddest and most heart-sickening chapter in all the long history. It is one with which, nevertheless, the student of religions must reckon. It is full of pathologic interest, and furnishes most instructive counterparts to many of the strangest aberrations in the course of Christianity and other religions. For example, the conceptions of hell and torment, as set forth by our author on pages 232, 291-294, and by some Hindu artist in the picture at the beginning of the last book of the *Mahā-bhārata* in the Bombay edition, may be compared with the mediæval descriptions thereof, and with the sculptures over some of the portals of the Cathedral of Rheims. Indeed, the reader of this work will find that the Indian sects show typical examples of almost all the extravagances into which religious fanaticism is wont to degenerate: such are the dancing of the Chaitanyas (p. 141); the wild songs of the Viṭho-bā pilgrims (pp. 264, 265), with whom we may compare the negroes of our Southern States; and the licentious doings of the Vallabhas (p. 137) and Çāktas (p. 190).

Hinduism is an ocean of incoherencies, a reflex of the character of the Hindus, with all the infinite diversity thereby implied (pp. xi, 57, 58). It is all things to all men: it is the worship of tree, or of serpent, or of fetish to the degraded; to the educated man, it is a pure and noble theism; to the philosopher, a lofty and hopeless pantheism. I cannot forbear quoting Sir Monier's form of stating the Vedantist dogmas (p. 27): "The living spirit of man . . . is identical with God's Spirit. It is that Spirit limited and personalized by the power of Illusion." It teaches us by way of example that our world-religion must have universal adaptability; but also, by way of warning, that it must be strictly and intrinsically coherent. If the religion of our children is to be better than that of the fathers, we now must "look forward and not back;" and precisely this are we practically admonished to do by the study of Indian religions. The attempt to restore faith or dogma to what we assume to have been their pristine truth and purity is all too often illusory.

Most interesting and welcome to sympathetic New Englanders will be the appended chapters on modern Hindu theism and the sketch of Rammohun Roy and his successors. (The name of Theodore Parker still echoes in Calcutta.) "Probably Rammohun Roy" — we quote from Sir Monier — "was the first earnest-minded investigator of the science of comparative religion that the world has produced" (p. 479). He regarded inspiration as "not confined to any age or any nation;" he deemed it "a gift coextensive with the human race" (p. 484). Even to those who do not sympathize with his life-work, the story of the theistic move-

ment is most interesting as a recent, easily studied, and normal type, and its lesson will not be lost upon the Christians of the Occident.

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The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter. By THOMAS KELLY CHEYNE, M. A., D. D. Pp. xxxviii, 517. New York : Thomas Whittaker. \$4.00.

Canon Cheyne, in these Bampton Lectures on the "Origin of the Psalter in the light of Old Testament Criticism and the History of Religions," has given us the finest specimen of the higher criticism of the Old Testament which has been produced in many a year. The structure of the book is, however, ill-adapted to his purpose. He has been fettered by the lecture form, from which he could not depart. He has therefore been obliged to supplement many of the lectures by additions, and to mass an immense amount of valuable material in notes and appendixes. This makes it difficult, even for the trained scholar, to follow him closely in his reasoning. We have found it necessary to re-read the volume several times; and even now, we are not sure that something of great value may not have escaped our attention. As to the main purpose of the book, the meaning of the author is plain enough. In the first five lectures he treats of the literary origin of the Psalter, and in the three lectures following he traces the origin and development of its religious ideas.

In the five lectures Professor Cheyne divides the Psalter into three parts, representing essentially the Persian, Greek, and Maccabean periods. He recognizes no pre-exilic psalm, unless we find one imbedded in Psalm xviii. In order to establish this position, he takes up a group of psalms in the last books, and endeavors to prove that these are Maccabean; he then takes this result as a presumption in dealing with the other psalms of these books. He uses all the resources of the literary, religious, and political history of Israel during these periods to illustrate and to determine, so far as possible, the origin of the different psalms. It is impracticable for us to follow him here in a detailed investigation and criticism of his work. We can only say in general that he has established his positions as to the major part of the Psalter, that it is post-exilic, that there are not a few psalms which are Maccabean, that sacred psalmody extends through a long period from the return until the Maccabean revival, and that the psalmists, as a body, were influenced by the great prophet of the exile more than by any, or all other, previous writers; but it seems to us that, in the full tide of his argument, he sweeps into later periods not a few earlier psalms.

It seems to us that Professor Cheyne is at fault in regarding his three divisions of the Psalter as representing three stages in the development

of the Psalter. He has not altogether escaped from the traditional way of studying the Psalter. After scholars had abandoned the ancient tradition that David wrote all the psalms, they began to interpret the titles as indicating authorship by a number of persons and families mentioned in them, and it has been the common opinion that the division of books represents different stages of authorship. But we cannot see any strong reason for this opinion. The division of the Psalter into five books and one hundred and fifty Psalms is based upon the division of the Pentateuch into five books and a three-years' course of synagogue readings, which remind us of the five Megilloth and the five great feasts of Judaism. A critical examination of the Psalter and the Pentateuch shows that these divisions were purely mechanical, and must have had some kind of liturgical reasons underlying them. The one hundred and fifty psalms were gained by breaking up long psalms and by piecing lesser psalms together. A critical study of the Psalter changes the number of the psalms, and also finds an older division into three books. It seems likely that this older division of the Psalter into three books was based upon an older division of the Pentateuch into three books. If this be true, this division of the Psalter was due to an editor, and has nothing whatever to do with its historic origin. We think, therefore, that Professor Cheyne errs at the start in attempting to build his theory of the Psalter upon the division into three books, which was not made earlier than the age of the Maccabees.

In another respect, Professor Cheyne has not sufficiently broken with tradition. While he admits that "David" in the title of the Psalms of the first book may indicate a Davidic Psalter rather than Davidic authorship, he is forced by his theory to suppose that the Davidic titles in his Greek and Maccabean Psalters indicate authorship. This is an inconsistent position, and so far hurts his theory. We do not doubt that in the later tradition the name David came to imply authorship. It is not unlikely, also, that some of the later psalms in the Hebrew text, as well as in the Septuagint, received the name of David on the theory that David was their author; but our studies have led us to the conclusion that the name "David" in the title of the psalms of the fifth book, as well as in the psalms of the first book, indicate that these psalms were alike taken from a Davidic Psalter, and that therefore originally the great mass of the Davidic psalms in all the books were taken from a Davidic Psalter not composed by David, but gathered together from different authors and periods of composition under David's name. We agree with Professor Cheyne, that the Davidic Psalter was the earliest; but we disagree with him when he separates the Davidic psalms in books II.-V. from the Davidic psalms in book I. and thinks that the latter came from a Davidic Psalter, while the former imply a traditional or conjectural Davidic authorship. We hold that they should all be

regarded as taken from a Davidic Psalter, unless strong evidence in each case is presented to the contrary. In that case we should agree that the psalms received the name of David in the title through the conjecture of a later editor.

The psalms of Asaph and the Korahites are massed in the second section of the Psalter. They do not, therefore, present the same difficulties as the psalms of David which are scattered through the Psalter. However, the psalms most commonly recognized as Maccabean are just in these minor Psalters, and this fact is also contrary to the theory of Professor Cheyne, that the second section of the Psalter precedes the third section in its origination. Professor Cheyne finds seven of these Maccabean psalms, and thinks that they were inserted by a later editor in the second Psalter. This is possible, but the necessity of such a supposition weighs in a measure against his theory that books II.-III. of the Psalter were collected prior to books IV.-V.

One of the most important questions which springs from a study of the titles of the Psalms is as to the meaning of the reference to the Director *למנצח*. Professor Cheyne passes lightly over this term and does not explain it. For some years I have been working on the theory that there was a Director's Psalter made up by a selection from several earlier minor Psalters, and that this Director's Psalter is the real backbone of our present Psalter, about which the final editor grouped his entire material. Professor Cheyne's theory does not account for the select psalms assigned to the musical Director.

The origination of the Psalter seems to us much more complex than Professor Cheyne finds it. We find in books IV.-V. at least two minor Psalters, namely, the group of Pilgrim psalms, — all of the same pentameter measure, with a single exception which has been obtruded upon the group for liturgical reasons, — and a group of "Hallels" which were originally together, but which have been broken in two at the final arrangement of the Psalter. The Royal psalm, which rivaled in length the Law psalm, No. 119, has been broken up, while the Law psalm has remained intact. It seems to me, therefore, that we must allow a considerable interval for the composition of these psalms of the minor Psalters, their collection in these minor Psalters, and their comprehension and distribution in our present books IV., V. Professor Cheyne's theory does not give sufficient time for this.

We have spent considerable space in criticism of this fundamental fault of Professor Cheyne's position, because we feel strongly that it has been detrimental to sound results in his conception of the origin of his minor Psalters and of the historical composition of quite a number of the psalms.

The more we study the Psalter, the more we are convinced that the Psalms have passed through editorial changes and adaptations similar

to those that we see in the history of Christian hymns. This is shown by different versions of the same psalms in the Psalter, by the breaking up of long psalms, the piecing together of short psalms, and the additions of strophes and lines of different measurement; the changes that have taken place in the alphabetic psalms; editorial changes in the divine names, and other minor insertions, corrections, and removals of words, lines, and strophes. All this is suggestive of many other changes, which may have been made where we are unable as yet to trace them. These changes mislead us in determining the date of psalms by the commingling of material representing different periods of composition. It will be necessary for the knife of criticism to go much deeper in the analysis of the psalms than any one has as yet ventured to use it. The criticism of the Hexateuch is preparing the way for the more difficult and delicate criticism of the Psalter. Not until we are able to enter upon this detailed and thorough-going criticism of each and all of the Psalters, shall we be able to reach solid results as to the dates of their composition. Into this delicate criticism Professor Cheyne does not go. It seems to us that he has not given sufficient attention to the marks of earlier language, style, and religion in many of these psalms, and that a sound criticism still finds some psalms of David, more psalms of the prophetic period, and many exilic psalms, while the great mass of the Psalter will remain where Professor Cheyne puts it, — in the Persian, Greek, and Maccabean periods.

In the last three lectures Professor Cheyne has given us valuable material for which every student of Biblical theology should thank him. He has shown that the religious ideas of the Psalter are a product of genuine Jewish theology and the resultant of preëxilic types. He has not depreciated the influence of the Persian and Babylonian religions upon them. But there is a lack of real development in his conception of the religion of the Psalter, due to the fact that really it has the mass of Hebrew literature behind it.

Professor Cheyne's book will remain a classic for all who hereafter desire to study the Psalter, and learn its great lessons. The traditional theory is no longer of any interest whatever to scholars. We must work out the problems to the end by the methods and problems of the higher criticism.

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Hiob, von der dritten Auflage, anerklärt von Dr. AUGUST DILLMANN, ord. Professor der Theologie zu Berlin. Vierte Auflage. Pp. xxxviii, 361. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel. 1891.

The third edition, dated 1869, of Professor Dillmann's "Job" has been out of print for some time. A new and somewhat altered edition

seemed to the author to be demanded by the stages through which the criticism of this Old Testament book has passed since 1869. This fourth edition is the result of a study of the text, word for word, and an examination of old translations and of late interpretations and hypotheses. Many points that called for consideration when the third edition was written have been found to need it no longer, and their place is taken in the present volume by new material. Dr. Dillmann's former conception of the general plan and meaning of the book has, however, not been changed, and he still considers the Hebrew text superior to that of the LXX. In his introduction he says that, though it contains narrative, the book is not the narration of history, but belongs rather with the wisdom literature of Israel, differing, however, from the Book of Proverbs in its connected treatment of a single great problem, and from Ecclesiastes in connecting this problem with the life and history of one definite personality. "Das Buch Hiob ist ein kunstvolles, episch u. dramatisch gehaltenes Lehrgedicht."

Dr. Dillmann presents, in a few compact sentences, an outline of the content and subject of Job. The subject is taken to be the suffering of the righteous in connection with the question of the meaning of evil in relation to the moral life of man and the divine government of the world. By way of explaining the choice of this subject by the writer, the commentator goes on to show the important place it held in the religious thinking of old Israel. Misfortune was considered a sign of God's displeasure and a punishment of man's transgression; while a quiet and prosperous life was supposed to show that the Deity was well pleased with the man who enjoyed it. Connected with this view of suffering was the idea of its remedial influence in recalling man from wrong-doing and making him worthy of higher blessing. This general theoretical background failed, however, to justify itself in the every-day experience of the individual; to the future, therefore, was left the justification of the theory, by way of the sudden and early death of the transgressor and the destruction of his family after his death; or an explanation was found in the supposed unreality of what men took to be the good fortune of the wicked, because of its attendant evil conscience and inward unrest. A still more serious phase of the difficulty was found in the suffering of the pious man. Chastisement, or discipline, this suffering did not seem to be when the pious man was harassed through his whole lifetime, though ready at any time to follow the slightest suggestion of the will of God. The very foundation of religion seemed to be herein involved. To this suffering, which seemed to be beyond all desert, there was added the bitter thought of being suspected by friends, since the good man's sufferings seemed to witness against him.

With this problem, then, touched upon in Proverbs, the Psalms, Malachi, and Ecclesiastes, the writer of the Book of Job concerned himself, that he might offer to the faith of his contemporaries the support of his

new points of view. He would show men that the teaching of retribution is not to be given up, but he would guard them against the misunderstanding that a man's lot in life is indicative of his moral worth or unworth, or that the extent of misfortune may be taken as the measure of guilt (xlii. 2 f.). Nor does the view that suffering is for the sake of discipline cover the ground. A man may suffer in a way to be explained neither by his sins nor by his sinfulness (i. 1, 8; xxvii. 2-6; xlii. 7). Nor is an explanation found in the possibility of suffering for others, as in the thought of Is. xl.-lxvi.; it is not found in this, but in the reality and purity of the fear of God, unmoved by the experiences of time, and in making the enduring one more worthy of the rewarding righteousness of God. As "Prüfungsaliden," then, the writer of Job would have his hero's suffering understood. Professor Dillmann finds this taught in the prologue and epilogue and in iv.-xxviii., the body of the book; x. 9 f.; xiv. 15; xvi. 19 ff.; xix. 25 ff.; xxviii. 28; xvii. 9. The sufferer he takes to be an individual, not a personification of Israel, whether as a whole or in part. No passage in the book does he find either demanding or allowing any such interpretation. The author never consciously makes his hero a representative of humanity, in so many words, unless, perhaps, in xvii. 9; and when the Deity is himself represented as speaking, it is only of a well-considered plan respecting Job that mention is made, without revealing it fully; but the whole structure of the poem shows that the author had this conception continually in view. "Es ist nicht Sache eines guten Kunstdichters die Idee seines Stückes mit dünnen Worten auszusprechen." The Elihu episode (xxxii.-xxxvii.) does not come within this estimate of the teaching of the book, since these chapters are not taken to have been an original part of the composition.

The material of the book Dr. Dillmann does not consider a pure invention by the writer, but as consisting in part of a historical framework into which he wrought his teaching. The book as a book is, of course, not taken to be history, nor does the critic agree with Reuss that it is a parable. Ezekiel's mention of Job along with Noah and David Professor Dillmann takes as evidence that Ezekiel held him to be a man of the early time. This would not prove, indeed, that Job really lived, but it would follow that in certain circles he existed as a traditional character. Thus the author had at hand his hero in the person of the traditional Job.

In the plan of the work are involved the three parts, "Anknüpfung," i.-iii., "Verwicklung," iv.-xxviii., "Lösung," xxix.-xxxi., xxxviii.-xlii. With respect to the unity of the book, Professor Dillmann concludes, after discussing the point, that the narrative pieces at the beginning and the end are so interwoven with the body of the book that the work would have been greatly wanting in clearness and significance had they not belonged to its original make-up. The Elihu speeches, however, are taken to be in language, art, and content out of keeping with the rest

of the book, both as a work of art and as a theological conception. They are placed about the fifth century. Nor is the descriptive passage, xl. 15-xli. 26, taken to be original, though there is in the passage a certain connection with the context immediately preceding. Job has already confessed his weakness to such a degree that no further confession is needed. As a second effort, it is unworthy to be a speech attributed to the Deity. Still another passage disturbing to the unity of the work is xxvii. 11-23. Had the author so written, he would have made Job retract what he had said of the wicked in xxi. and xxiv., and it would have been a yielding of the victory then won. Aside from the above passages, together with a few others reëdited and added, Professor Dillmann seems to present the book as an artistic whole. After a learned review of the work in regard to its language, content, and literary-historical significance, he prefers to locate it in the reign of Jehoiakim or of Zedekiah, and probably in Palestine. One rises from the reading of this commentary impressed by the marvelous learning of the author, and with the feeling that he indeed knows what it means to write "*kurzgefasst*."

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The Early Religion of Israel as set forth by Biblical Writers and by Modern Critical Historians. The Baird lecture for 1889. By JAMES ROBERTSON, D. D., Professor of Oriental Languages in the University of Glasgow. Pp. xiv, 524. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood & Sons. \$2.25.

Professor Robertson here makes a determined and skillful attack on the scheme of Old Testament criticism as representatives of which he takes Kuenen, Wellhausen, and Stade. He calls in question its methods, denies the validity of its arguments, and rejects its results. He carries the war into Africa by smiling pleasantly at what he conceives to be the contradictions and unwarranted assumptions of his opponents, and by denouncing their conclusions as in many cases inconceivable. His tone is that of a man who is thoroughly persuaded in his own mind, and his writing has the force which such a persuasion gives. He has diligently read the works of the critics with whom he measures swords, and is master of an easy and vivid style. His method of procedure, also, is one that will commend itself to all readers. Following the example of Kuenen, he takes his stand in the eighth century B. C., with the prophets Amos and Hosea, and assumes only certain religious and literary phenomena which lie on the surface and which are generally admitted. From this point he undertakes to work his way backward and reconstruct the prophetic religion. The critical question, he says, is whether the prophets were originators or reformers. In order to show that the earlier religious conceptions of Israel were not so bare as modern critics assert,

he examines the names of the deity, the Biblical statements concerning the dwelling-place and the visible representations of the deity, and the history of Moloch-worship and fire-worship. After discussing the alleged development into ethical monotheism, he examines the ritual institutions, and reaches the conclusion that the codes of law were given substantially as represented in the Old Testament. Finally, he insists that modern critics are arbitrary in their treatment of the Biblical writers ; that there is much more in the religion of Israel than they are able to see or willing to acknowledge ; that there was indeed a development from the time of Abraham to the close of national independence, but that this development was an expansion and organization of existing ideas.

To criticise the arguments of this book in detail would be to go over the whole question of the nature of the Old Testament religion ; I must limit myself to a few general remarks on Professor Robertson's line of discussion. In the first place, he seems to me not to distinguish clearly between literary culture and ritual development. He properly lays stress on the literary ability apparent in Amos, and thence infers the existence of a considerable literary training among the Israelites in the centuries preceding the eighth. On this point there need not be great difference of opinion. With him I would insist on the gradualness of the growth of Hebrew thought, though it does not seem necessary or prudent to suppose that Amos had predecessors like himself. But, however this may be, it must be allowed that advance in purely religious conceptions does not necessarily carry along with it progress in ritual organization ; the first of these movements may belong chiefly to the ethical, the second chiefly to the social sphere, or the two may represent the outcome of quite different social-religious conditions. It is, therefore, by no means decisive to point to literary and religious excellence in the prophets of the eighth century ; the ritual must be studied as an independent phenomenon.

Professor Robertson does in fact mention and examine the data bearing on the history of ritual, and my second remark is that he does not do literary justice to the documents. I take as an example the way in which he deals with the question of the legal place of worship. The tone of Deuteronomy on this point seems clear ; in insisting on the lawfulness of one sanctuary alone, it is evidently combating a current opinion ; it is opposing a custom which it recognizes as existing in the land of Israel ; that is, its tone is not that of a lawgiver who, standing on the border of the land and speaking to an unformed people, lays down the prescriptions he wishes them to follow. Dr. Robertson sees in it the Mosaic statement of an ideal which was, as it turned out, to be realized by slow degrees. But omitting all consideration of the historical difficulties in the way of such a view, it seems to me to do violence to the words of the text and carry us away from the natural interpretation. Professor Robertson appears to be not untouched by some such feeling, for he adds : "The stronger emphasis laid by the Deuteronomic code than by the book of the covenant on this requirement will be explicable on [from?] the greater

fullness of the longer code, on the special object which it aimed at, or even on the supposition of a later editing or revision of it" (p. 404 f.). I have italicized the concluding words, which seem to surrender the question; if changes have been made by a later editor, who can say how far the changes have gone? Another example may be found in the writer's judgment respecting the attitude of the earlier prophets toward the ritual. The indifference, not to say contempt, of Amos and Isaiah, and Jeremiah's affirmation (whether it be taken literally or not) that God gave the Israelites no command concerning sacrifices when he brought them out of Egypt (Jer. vii. 22) scarcely comport with the supposition that the body of the Levitical legislation then existed as a law revealed to Moses at Sinai.

Professor Robertson's style is bright and vigorous, and his treatment of his theme is always fresh and interesting. Every such new examination of the facts and of the critics is to be welcomed; new discoveries or constructions of facts are always possible, and the best critics are liable to exaggerations and blindness, and need constant overhauling. On the other hand, one who sets himself to attack a line of argument is in danger of falling into an isolated way of reasoning. One can always find considerations which appear to rebut other considerations. But there are arguments and impressions which derive all their force from the concinnity of parts. On this very point Dr. Robertson has some excellent remarks in his last chapter, and he declares that the modern theory is strikingly incompetent to set the great facts of the Israelitish history in their true perspective. This statement suggests that the best defense of the traditional view would be a history of Israel in which the facts given by the prophets and the historians should be set forth in their natural order. If Gideon, Samuel, David, Solomon, Isaiah, and Jeremiah could be shown to be, in their traditional shape, quite natural personages, that would go far toward demonstrating the substantially Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch. It would seem not difficult for students to reach something like unanimity on this point. In order to attain this most desirable agreement the members of the two opposed schools should be willing to hear and examine one another's arguments without prepossessions. It is not likely that a body of intelligent men, who have made conscientious studies, should hold opinions for which there is no foundation. It is a fault in Professor Robertson's otherwise admirably written book that he is not disposed to recognize sanity and conscientiousness in his opponents; he regards them somewhat as conspirators. It is noticeable also that he adopts distinctly the tone of an apologist. Neither of these positions is desirable. There should be neither contempt nor apology, but a fair clash of argument, with blows as hard as may be, always with and against facts, real or supposed. That he is capable of striking hard and fast, Professor Robertson's book abundantly shows.

C. H. TOY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

Anthropological Religion. The Gifford Lectures, delivered before the University of Glasgow in 1891. By F. MAX MÜLLER, K. M. London and New York : Longmans, Green & Co. \$2.25.

This volume of lectures has all the characteristics of Max Müller's average mind and work. It overflows with that personal kindness which has stripped him of his titles in the imagination of the reading world, and made him "Max Müller" simply and plainly in our affectionate regard. It is loose, disjointed, discursive, scrappy, diffuse, inconclusive, and dogmatic. It is pleasant reading, and it does not tax the mind, so small is the amount of thought and argument compared with the bulk of the volume. Nothing could be more admirable than the spirit that is displayed in the preface and the opening chapter, both of which treat the "Freedom of Religious Discussion." The manly courage of such writing is of greater value for the community at large, at the present stage of theological discussion and transition, than would be a more serious study of Anthropological Religion than we have in the subsequent chapters. "Is any kind of religion possible," he asks, "without an unquestioning trust in truth? No one knows what it is to believe who has not learnt to believe in truth, for the sake of truth, and for the sake of truth only." But when in the next sentence he says that "miracles, instead of being impossible, are really inevitable," that "they are the natural outcome of what Mr. Gladstone has well called 'imperfect comprehension and imperfect expression,'" however perfect his own comprehension, is not his expression most imperfect? For evidently what he means is not that miracles are inevitable, but that the belief in them is so. In the same chapter, the plea for sincerity with children is a golden text, and has a good story in the way of illustration, — that of the mother who allayed her boy's anxiety for Noah's safety in the ark from the wasps that he had taken aboard, by telling him that the wasps were kept in glass bottles.

There is a suggestion of inadequate material in the second lecture, which infers the duty of toleration from the teachings of comparative religion; and in the third, that epitomizes the lecturer's former course of Gifford Lectures, which dealt with Physical Religion. This lecture ends with an outburst of indignation over the attempt of Dr. Lippert to discredit the identity of the Greek Zeus and the Sanskrit Dyaus. The argument of the fourth lecture is that "*Securus judicat orbis terrarum*" which pulverized Newman's "*Via Media*." But while the whole world, whose judgment Augustine and Newman accounted safe, was an insignificant area compared with that which Professor Müller can appeal to for his universal belief in God, it may well be doubted whether he can, with scientific accuracy, appeal to it for such a belief. Much more must it be doubted whether such a universal belief would prove the actuality of the believed-in deity. For Professor Müller the passage is always easy from beliefs and from words to facts; but there are those for whom this passage is more difficult.

It is not until we arrive at the fifth lecture that we come to the proper subject of Professor Müller's book. In this lecture he discusses the character of ancestor-worship, and takes issue with Spencer and others of his way of thinking in their making of ancestor-worship the original and only source of the religious sentiment. He proceeds to show how such worship is the property of higher as well as of lower races, considers it less primitive than the Spencerians do, and finds that it implies a belief in the soul, i. e., an antecedent anthropological religion. The last named point seems to be well made, and it will be interesting to know what reply will be made to it by those who have staked everything on the opposite opinion. If the sixth lecture, which treats of the untrustworthiness of the materials for the study of religion, does not advance the question much, it teaches an important lesson by the way.

In the seventh lecture, "The Discovery of the Soul," we have the gist of the whole matter. "You cannot have animism unless you first have an *anima*;" and he traces the process by which the belief in the *anima*, the spirit, the soul of man, arose. We are shown how such symbols as the blood and the heart were discredited as expressions of the life of man, and how the breath gained credit more and more; how it became the word not only for the breath that had left the body, but also for all that had formerly existed in or with the breathing body, the intellectual and moral life, and how, with the conclusion that this must still be somewhere, the heavens and the hells came into being in the world of thought and feeling and desire. There is certainly nothing novel in all this, and few will gainsay it. But many will part company with Professor Müller entirely when he proceeds to treat this process of thinking as a process of actual discovery establishing the soul's immortality.

There is much iteration and some illustration in Lectures VIII., IX., X. and XI., with a good deal of doubtful matter, as where the feeling that led some one to throw a valuable ring into Lord Palmerston's grave, and Rossetti to bury his poems with his wife's body, is attributed to the early savage, and made to explain his gifts to the departed spirits. In general, Professor Müller imports a vast amount of modern thinking into the primitive man. Equally questionable in another field is the fling at "the few biologists who, undeterred by the absence of facts, still profess to believe in the descent of man from some known or unknown animal species."

Lecture XII. is a recapitulation. In the next and last there are many fine and helpful things, but there is much more that is the offspring of the writer's fancy, where he has not done a scholar's patient work. He would seem never to have encountered a doubt of the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel, for his treatment of the self-consciousness of Jesus is based entirely upon it. Probably it would be difficult to pack more absurd untruth into a score of words than we have in the sentence, "To the Greeks divine

sonship would have meant no more than a miraculous, a mythological event, such as the birth of Hercules." Professor Müller should read Dr. Edwin Hatch's "Influence of Greek Ideas on the Christian Church." But then, upon the other hand, the same number of words could not express more truth or higher than the following: "Those who assign a divine and miraculous character to certain consecrated events only in the history of the world are in great danger of desecrating thereby the whole drama of history, and of making it not only profane, but Godless."

JOHN W. CHADWICK.

BROOKLYN.

The Soteriology of the New Testament. By WILLIAM PORCHER DU BOSE, M. A., S. T. D., Professor of Exegesis in the University of the South. Pp. vi, 391. New York and London: Macmillan & Co.

This is a book without a preface — an excusable omission; and without an index — an inexcusable omission; so that he must read it who will ascertain its purpose and the subjects in detail of which it treats. It comprises twenty-five chapters, of which the first nine treat specifically of the New Testament doctrine of salvation, considering the meaning of salvation in general and in the New Testament; Jesus as our salvation, our reconciliation, our atonement, and our redemption, as our redemption and righteousness "subjectively and objectively," as our resurrection, our propitiation; and the final cause of the incarnation. The next thirteen chapters are Christological, treating of the human personality, the divine sonship, the human birth and sonship, the sinlessness, the human nature, the work, and the sacrifice of Christ; "the flesh and the spirit in relation" to him; Christ as the Way, and as our High-Priest. The last three chapters discuss salvation in the Church, baptism, and the Lord's Supper.

From the foregoing list of his subjects, the point of view of Dr. Du Bose would appear to be that of traditional orthodoxy, and in a sense it is. But while he holds the traditional doctrines, and employs their conventional terminology, he is very bold and independent in his treatment of them. In fact, some of his positions are directly opposed to generally accepted interpretations. This fact is not, however, due to his adopting novel methods of interpretation, but rather to a predominant mysticism which bids defiance to all real interpretation, and tends to a reckless rationalizing of Scripture in the interest of bringing out a profound meaning, a deeper sense than the writers had in mind. Accordingly, the result, instead of being the Soteriology of the New Testament, is a mystical construction, a philosophy of the author's. His state of mind appears to be a not unusual one in theologians at the present time, a hospitality for rational ideas and traditional presumptions regarding the New Testament, without the consciousness of their incompatibility to which a development of the critical spirit would give rise. He

repeats the well-worn phrase: "We believe Christianity to be true because it reveals these facts, and not that they are true because Christianity reveals them," and yet he maintains the unity of the New Testament, and declares its mind to be "one mind." To him there are in its several writings no different conceptions of salvation and of the nature and mission of Christ. A Soteriology of the New Testament which would be a contribution to scientific theology should be an exegetical examination of the Gospels and Epistles, in which the various phases of the apprehension of salvation by the earlier and the later writers of the New Testament are set forth in their relation to one another, with a view to ascertaining whether or no they show a development, and if they do, of what sort it is. But to set out with the presumption of the unity of the New Testament is to predetermine an unscientific result. The author's subjective point of view, however, predetermined this result from the beginning.

Dr. Du Bose's conception of salvation is remarkable for its comprehensiveness. Redemption from sin is redemption from death, freedom "from all natural ills." Sin and disobedience are "the cause of physical death, and the abolishment of them shall be the abolishment of it"! The mysticism which dominates his entire treatment of the subject culminates in the doctrine of salvation as a spiritual and personal union with God through Christ, in which "our natural body is changed into a spiritual body, and physical mortality is swallowed up in a higher and eternal physical life." Since we can hardly charge the author with the inconsequence of teaching that "the abolishment of physical death" for us is to take place after we are dead, we must believe him to teach that this change of the natural body into a spiritual body is to be effected in this life, and that our "eternal physical life" is to begin at least here below! Are we then to be "translated"? That all men are fallen in Adam our author regards as evident. Original sin is such "an inherited weakness for good or disposition to evil, *not in ourselves* properly, but *in our natures*, as renders it practically impossible for us to overcome evil or to do good." Against this sin and our own personal transgressions is directed "the wrath of God," which is removed by the atonement of Christ. "Sin is abolished in Christ himself in the simple fact that in Him in our nature there is no sin." If the meaning of this were that by making the virtues of Jesus ours we overcome sin and are reconciled to God, the matter would be rational enough. But this would be too simple, not to say too rational, for Dr. Du Bose. To him Christ was "representatively our reconciliation." "We were sanctified or reconciled in Christ prior to any faith or even knowledge of it on our part." In his crucifixion "an objective reconciliation" was effected. "We were sanctified in Christ prior to any sanctity in ourselves." How this could be effected, how by his crucifixion Christ "broke the power, abolished the sway, abrogated the law, and did away with all the consequences of sin," the author does not show. In employing the old terminology, and at

the same time emphasizing the necessity of personal self-conquest, he discloses the fact that his thought renders a divided allegiance to the two powers, Traditionalism and Reason. The magic in salvation appears to be conceived as lying in the identification of man with Christ. His death was "in a real way *our* death for sin."

Our space does not permit us to dwell upon Dr. Du Bose's Christological speculations, which occupy a considerable part of the book. His remarks on the human birth of Christ will serve to indicate his point of view, which is an incongruous combination of naturalism and supernaturalism, to which is totally wanting the correction of a critical exegesis. Jesus was born, he says, "out of the spiritual, moral, and natural womb of *humanity*." He was "the product of a divine seed in a human soil, of the sperma of God in the womb of humanity." "The virgin Mary represents the highest reach, the focusing upward, as it were, of the world's susceptibility for God." As our author's speculative soteriology is passed off for a genuine doctrine of the New Testament, so, it may be supposed, this theory of the birth of Christ is intended to pass for that of the first and third evangelists! His naïve unconsciousness of the absence of all exegetical foundation for it is characteristic of his method. The hospitality of his mind for contradictions is remarkable. He maintains that Jesus was at the same time man and God. Finite powers and infinite capabilities, limited knowledge and omniscience, were united in the same personality. He thinks it doubtful whether he is able to explain "*how* the Divine Logos could contract himself to the beginning and growth of an actual human knowledge," but he has no hesitancy in dogmatically affirming that he did do this. Jesus possessed at the same time the possibility of sin and the impossibility of sin. The author concedes that he cannot reconcile this contradiction; but he appears to think that since nature presents antinomies, as he says, he is warranted in dogmatically constructing more of them for the confusion of his readers. It is not surprising that a man should complacently entertain this contradiction who can affirm that "God can become all that a man is," that is, become finite, sinful, and fallible, and still remain God!

The chief source of the weakness of this book is the author's inability to discriminate between the provinces of Biblical and systematic theology. The ideal treatise on the Soteriology of the New Testament would not only distinguish, as has already been remarked, between the different types of doctrine of its various writers, but would first of all elucidate that sober and heroic righteousness of Jesus, who did not assume that man *could* not do whatever he *ought* to do. In passing by this and launching his craft upon the wide ocean of Pauline speculation, our author has suffered the shipwreck of many of his predecessors in the like perilous voyage.

ORELLO CONE.

BUCHTEL COLLEGE.

The Place of Authority in Matters of Religious Belief. By VINCENT HENRY STANTON, D. D., Fellow of Trinity College, and Ely Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. London and New York : Longmans, Green & Co. \$1.75.

This work is well written, and, while stanchly Anglican, moderate in its general positions. In the preface the author refers to the publication of Dr. Martineau's book on "The Seat of Religious Authority," and to the death of Cardinal Newman, as among the circumstances which render timely the discussion which the book undertakes. In the body of the work little space, however, is occupied with direct discussion of the views of these two writers. Dr. Martineau's use of the terms "natural" and "revealed" religion is criticised (p. 31); but we do not recall any other reference. Dr. Stanton's object appears to be to take away the ground from under the positions held by Martineau and Newman, by insisting upon an idea of authority less technical and pronounced than that which was opposed by the one and maintained by the other.

So far as the authority of the Bible is concerned, the evidence of fulfilled predictions and miracles is referred to (p. 38); but comparatively little stress is laid upon this kind of authentication. The writer recognizes the fact that distance in time weakens the force of the miracle, but holds that, by means of this very distance in time, the moral evidence may gain in actual weight (p. 40). It is upon the moral evidence that he chiefly relies. He maintains that this evidence is stronger or weaker, according to the moral condition of each individual. He does not mean that the believer is necessarily better than the unbeliever, but that he has a deeper sense of sin and a greater aspiration after holiness (p. 54). It is not, however, upon his own insight merely that the individual Christian relies for his faith. It is the common faith of Christians which supports and quickens his private faith (p. 98). Thus the authority of the Bible rests to a certain extent upon the authority of the Church.

The authority of the Church is however affirmed under a somewhat moderate form. The author recognizes the fact that the Councils were, by their constitution, unfitted to stand as trustworthy authorities in the matter of doctrine. The authority of their decisions rests very largely upon the fact that they have been accepted by the Church (p. 177). This recognition of what may be called the diffused authority of the Church in contrast with the authority of Councils and decrees is, perhaps, the most characteristic feature of the work. The church that possesses such authority is said to have three characteristics. The first of these is "continuity," marked by the apostolic succession of its ministry through its episcopate (p. 196); the second is "unity," which implies "joint membership in one society," and the third is "freedom." The second characteristic would exclude "non-conformists," and the third appears to exclude the Papists. Dr. Stanton here speaks very cautiously. He affirms that the Christian consciousness upon which church authority

rests is, "in actual fact, wider than it" (p. 202). He exhorts "separatists" and "non-conformists" to become "reunited to the Catholic Church" (p. 204); but it is obviously only the Anglican Church that can speak with authority.

We do not wonder that the Anglican has a special sense of church life. If we were to form, *a priori*, the ideal of a continuous and united church, that of the Anglican, with its episcopal succession, its common prayer, and its sober pomp, might be the form which this ideal would assume. When we consider, however, the Papal church on the one side, and on the other the great bodies of Protestant believers, — in England, on the Continent, and in America, — who are not attracted by its forms and its polity, who are excluded by its creeds, or who, for other reasons, stand outside the Anglican Church, we are reminded of a dictum of Bishop Butler in regard to revelation, which is more than once referred to in the work before us. Bishop Butler insists "that we have no principles of reason upon which to judge beforehand how it were to be expected revelation should have been left." In like manner we may say, that we have no principles of reason upon which to judge beforehand how it were to be expected that the Church would manifest its unity.

CHARLES C. EVERETT.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

The Bible, the Church, and the Reason, the Three Great Fountains of Divine Authority. By CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS, D. D., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology in the Union Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.75.

Two books treating of the same general theme could hardly be more unlike than the work of Dr. Stanton, which we have just noticed, and that of Dr. Briggs. In the former the Church occupies a position so prominent as to seem to cast the other elements of authority in religion somewhat into the shade. In the work of Dr. Briggs, though the authority of the Church is named in the same line with that of the Bible and the Reason, the treatment of it seems somewhat more perfunctory than that of the others. This may in part arise, however, from the circumstances under which the book was written. It is not, like that of Dr. Stanton, a calm discussion of a matter of merely general interest. It is a personal defense, and it has the vigor and pungency that spring from this personal relation to the discussion. Dr. Briggs was accused of having, in his inaugural address, placed the authority of the Church, and especially that of the Reason, on a level with that of the Bible. In the present work he explains and justifies the language which raised against him the cry of heresy. Naturally, it is the relation between the authority of Reason and that of the Bible which claims the chief attention; especially as he may be said to recognize the authority of the Church by pleading his cause before it.

Dr. Briggs undertakes to show that the position which he took in regard to authority in religion confirms wholly to the standards of the Presbyterian Church. In this effort he seems to us to have been wholly successful. He shows that the confession of the Church recognizes the fact that the assurance of the truth of the Bible depends upon the spiritual insight of the believer. The Confession, speaking of the Holy Scripture, says : —

Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts (p. 35).

And again : —

The heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole, . . . and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God (p. 74).

Dr. Briggs defends his right to say that the "Scriptures *contain* the Word of God," instead of "*are* the Word of God," by showing that, while the larger Westminster catechism uses the one phrase, the shorter catechism uses the other. He sometimes leaves the defensive attitude, and carries on a sharp offensive war against his critics. He devotes a chapter to the assumption of the Inerrancy of the Scriptures. This is the doctrine that the Scriptures, as first written, were absolutely without error. He shows that this contradicts the Westminster Confession (p. 97). He attacks it with ridicule : "What possible advantage is there, in making statements as to documents to which no man has any access at the present time, or has had access for centuries?" He represents the dogmatician as replying to the English reader who finds errors in the Bible : "Oh, but these errors were not in the original autographs." The inquirer asks : "But how do you know that? Have you ever seen these original autographs? Has any divine for a thousand years or more seen them?" The dogmatician can only answer : "No," and reaffirm his theory that Holy Scriptures must have been inerrant, for God could not give a revelation that would not be inerrant; "and thus they reproach the *real* Bible in which errors are found, in order to exalt an *imaginary* Bible which neither they nor any one else has ever discovered" (p. 114).

While the personal and controversial nature of the work gives it brilliancy and force, it detracts somewhat from the fullness of the discussion. The author fortifies himself in the direction from which the attack had come. He does not think it necessary to fortify himself in the rear. We do not say this in criticism of the book, which fulfils admirably the purpose for which it was written. There are, however, questions left unanswered and difficulties unexplained in regard to which, if the plan of the book had allowed, we should gladly have had more light. The relation between the authority of the Bible and that of the Reason is made clear enough from the side of orthodoxy; but the fundamental relation between

the two seems to us to be left a little in doubt. By Reason the author means the judgment of the individual aided by the divine Spirit. In one place we have the Reason defined as "embracing the conscience, with its categorical imperative, the religious feeling, the metaphysical categories, and the fundamental laws of thought" (p. 10). At times, unlimited authority seems to be assigned to it. We are told that whenever Holy Scripture seems to oppose the Reason, "we may conclude that its meaning has been perverted by dogmatism" (p. 67). Again, we are told that if the Reason persists in opposition we may be sure that it "is giving a divine decision, so far, at least, as that phase of the dogma, which has been presented to it" (p. 68). On the other hand, in upholding the authority of the Bible, the author says: "We maintain it over against Rationalism, which makes the Reason the ultimate test by which to determine the validity of all statements of Holy Scripture and Holy Church" (p. 65).

Possibly, the explanation of statements apparently so opposed to one another is to be found in the confidence that is expressed in another place where we are told that "experience shows . . . that the decisions of the Reason eventually are shown to agree with Scripture against tradition" (p. 68).

There is one other point in regard to which Professor Briggs would, probably, have been more explicit had the object of his book been more general. As we understand him, he claims infallibility for the Bible in whatever concerns "religion, faith, and morals" (p. 92), that is, so far as its teaching has reference to "faith and practice." This assumption would seem to require a certain amount of qualification which, doubtless, the author would have given us under other circumstances. It would be interesting to know how he would reconcile with his general view such portions of the Bible as are referred to by Professor Ladd, when he says: "It is not surprising, therefore, to find various passages, and even some entire books, of the Old Testament, manifesting a low moral tone, and containing relatively many moral imperfections" ("The Doctrine of the Sacred Scriptures," p. 464). Yet Professor Ladd could easily affirm that the Bible *contains* "the only infallible rule of faith and practice," for he assumes the infallibility of the teaching of Christ.

Dr. Briggs has given us so much that it is ungracious to complain that he has not given us more. Doubtless many will be surprised to find that the statements of faith in the Presbyterian Church are so large and tolerant in regard to theories concerning the authority of the Bible; and they will understand better from reading this book how such men as Dr. Briggs can accept these statements conscientiously.

CHARLES C. EVERETT.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

The Chalcedonian Decree, or Historical Christianity, misrepresented by Modern Theology, confirmed by Science, and untouched by Modern Criticism. By JOHN FULTON, D. D., LL. D. New York : Thomas Whitaker. \$1.50.

Rev. Dr. Fulton has long been known as a careful and critical student of the great councils of Christendom, and he is the author of a fascinating book of travels in the Holy Land. In the volume before us, we may see the expansion and presentation in popular form of his "Index Canonum," published a decade ago. The six lectures which it contains were delivered on the Charlotte Wood Slocum foundation at the Michigan University at Ann Arbor. Dr. Fulton's fourfold object is to show what historical Christianity is: that it is obnoxious to none of the moral objections to which provincial and popular opinions have exposed it; that it is in no way invalidated, but marvelously confirmed by the progress of physical science; and that it is untouched by Biblical criticism of either the textual or the higher sort. In short, his purpose is to show by a simple statement of facts, that Christianity, rightly understood, is relieved of almost all the objections which ethics, science and criticism can bring against it; that nine tenths of the grounds of division in Christendom appear to be factitious; that substantial unity of faith is evident; and that "the only possible basis of visible unity in the future is made plain."

In the first lecture, the author frankly and fully admits the change of view of God and the universe which has come from a wider knowledge of the human race and the world and the revelations of modern science. Further, the literary movement inaugurated by Niebuhr has come like an earthquake beneath that vast mass of traditionary scaffolding which had so long enveloped Christianity, even as the timber and ropes for centuries hid the splendors of Cologne Cathedral. Dr. Fulton's purpose is to clear away the débris and dust, and to show the simplicity and majesty of what is left after things temporary and non-essential are removed. This he does with plainness, directness, and in felicitous phrase.

Summing up the lectures on "What is Christianity?" and "The Chalcedonian Decree," he says: "We have seen that it [the Nicene Creed] was then set forth, with the moral consent of all Christendom, both as a sufficient statement of Christian Doctrine and as a constitutional law of Christian liberty, so that opinions which are not in conflict with it may be freely held without prejudice to the Christianity of him who holds them." No consentient action of the Christian church has ever repealed that unanimous decree, and not only are the truths expressed in that symbol held by the immense majority of Christians, but the separated bodies of Christians are at one in that faith, though at one in hardly anything else. In his analysis of this august document, the lecturer shows its significant silences as well as affirmations. The Nicene Creed is the touchstone of error, and reveals the citadel of Christianity. It made Christianity unsailable on any possible ground of scientific discovery, or on any conceiva-

ble ground of critical research. It excluded false philosophies of the Divine Decrees and presumptuous doctrines of future punishment. It neither set forth nor allowed scientific schemes of the plan of salvation, nor any hard and fast theories of the operations of divine grace, either directly to the personal soul, or mediately through the sacraments. In two concluding lectures, Dr. Fulton argues that the triune God of the Nicene Creed is the only God which modern science has left it possible to believe in; and he demands that Christianity be subjected to a process of rigorous verification. In other words, destructive criticism leaves the vital evidences untouched.

This book will be found refreshing, stimulating, and helpful to all earnest men. Seekers after Christian unity should read it. Strong and clear presentations of what Christianity is, and what it is not, are now in order. A good statement is a good argument, and this is one. The weak points in the book are that the author fails to point out that the Nicene Creed is absolutely silent as to any theory of church government, while at the same time the theory of the sect to which the lecturer belongs, and which he stoutly champions, is apparently in direct contravention of the teachings of the New Testament. The boastful statement (p. 84), "Our church stands firmly by the church of the first centuries," seems little better than the average boast of the other sects; and until "our church" actually respects the discipline of other churches, and modifies its sacramentarianism, it will scarcely prove itself the irenarch of the coming centuries.

WM. ELIOT GRIFFIS.

SHAWMUT CHURCH, BOSTON.

Sons of God. Sermons by the Rev. S. D. McCONNELL, D. D., Rector of St. Stephen's Church, Philadelphia. New York: Thomas Whittaker. \$1.50.

These are thoroughly bright, fresh, and invigorating sermons. There is not a dull, conventional, or professional page in them. It might be said, indeed, that their life is intellectual rather than spiritual, and that the preacher seems to address himself rather to the theological problems than to the moral needs of the day. Yet this is perhaps rather a question of method than of aim. The sins of the world are perhaps to be reached, in the preacher's opinion, by inculcating right views of the great questions of religion. But the intellectual atmosphere is, as a whole, clear and bracing. Both style and thought are manly and straightforward. The preacher has unwittingly drawn his own portrait. "To preserve unbroken the continued spiritual life of the Christian centuries, and at the same time be in whole-hearted sympathy with the age in which we live, — to think with it, feel with it, hope with it, speak its speech, and share its spirit, — this it is to be a preacher of the gospel to-day. The most fatal thing which can befall him is a doubt of the spiritual capacity

of his own generation" (p. 230). Dr. McConnell is eminently a preacher of to-day, a reader of its science and its philosophy, a student of its social problems, and in touch with thoughtful men of the world. He accepts the doctrine of Evolution, ranking it with the Reformation, as "an enormous step forward in the knowledge of God" (p. 138). Copernicus "*changed the Christian religion*" (p. 190); the spirit of Democracy has brought about "a similar change in the very substance of religion" (p. 223).

The theological position of the preacher is very clear. He is of the Broad Church, and upon the very edge of its left side. There are times, indeed, at which he is not quite as outspoken as we could wish. He evidently believes strongly in a visible Church, and wishes to remain in it. It is "the body of Christ," the organization in which his spirit dwells. "Humanity, under the operation of the spirit of Jesus, is slowly producing righteousness. This righteousness becomes organic in the Church" (p. 144). The Church of Jesus Christ has always been the reforming agency of the world (p. 35). Yet we are told (p. 130), in words which seem closer to historical facts, that "her machinery is not adjusted primarily to carry forward reforms, but to produce and conserve in individuals the spirit which leads to work for humanity." Again: "The Divine origin and authority of the Church will never be indicated by emphasizing its separation from the world, nor by tracing up her title-deeds in the spirit of an attorney or conveyancer" (p. 144).

As to miracles, Christians "are not so credulous as to accept blindly the literal reality of everything in profane or sacred literature which claims to be a supernatural portent. But they find no difficulty in believing that at certain times and for certain well-defined purposes, there have occurred what the materialist calls 'divine incursions.'" These "clustered about the time and place of Jesus Christ. . . . Gradually the spiritual disturbance subsided. It had swept through the universe as an electric storm illuminates the northern sky, deflects the normal currents of earth, and sinks again into wonted equilibrium" (p. 82). But Copernicus has made many miracles harder to believe than they formerly were. Such portents as the stopping of the sun and moon over Gibeon "stagger the imagination of the Christian faith." "The holy Scripture lays more stress upon our faith than it did upon the faith of our forefathers" (p. 192).

But it is in regard to Christ that Dr. McConnell's words are most significant. Starting from the genealogy in Luke, which begins with Jesus, and ends with "Adam, which was the son of God," he says: "The third chapter of St. Luke contains the strangest family-tree ever erected. Its root is God; its stem Adam, Noah, Abraham and his descendants, and the fruit is Jesus. There is no break in the descent anywhere. There is no intimation in the record anywhere that at some point a new kind of being has come in. The author seems to assume with the strongest sim-

plicity that all the persons named are of the same species." When Jesus describes himself as the "Son of man" and the "Son of God," "we miss the point when we think of this being true *only* of Him. On the contrary: the burden of His life was that men would not see that it was true of all men. The double revelation of Jesus is, if one may use the phrases without being misapprehended, the *humanness* of God, and the *divineness* of man" (Sermon I.). These words may be compared with Dr. Channing's ("Works," p. 313): "The mind of Jesus Christ, my hearer, and your mind are of one family, nor was there anything in his of which you have not the principle, the capacity, the promise in yourself." Dr. McConnell also denies the common evangelical idea that Jesus introduced "a more potent opposing force . . . which beats back and reverses the natural movements of life and man. . . . Jesus' work was to uncover a spiritual energy which had always been at work, and which had never been altogether without witnesses" (p. 153).

To all who admire vigorous, fresh treatment of the theological questions of the day on the Christian side, these sermons may be most emphatically recommended.

WILLIAM H. LYON.

ALL SOULS' CHURCH, ROXBURY.

Ethical Christianity. A Series of Sermons by the Rev. H. PRICE HUGHES, M. A. E. P. Dutton & Co. \$1.25.

If one can read these sermons in sympathy with the manly and wholesome impulses out of which they came, keeping his critical faculty well in subjection, they will be found to contain much that is helpful and inspiring. The glow of generous feeling often reminds one of Frederic W. Robertson. But we miss the clear-cut precision of Robertson's thought. In feeling Mr. Hughes is as broad; but in thinking he is as narrow as "General" Booth. In attempting to expound at the same time "the core of Christianity," and what he calls "Ethical Christianity," Mr. Hughes entangles himself and his readers in a network of *non sequiturs*. For the "core of Christianity" is to him a total surrender to Christ as the Son of God — a surrender of mind, soul, and body, which can be made possible only by a miracle of grace. "We must put ourselves and all that we possess as absolutely at the disposal of Christ as the Jesuit puts himself at the disposal of the General of his order." He says, again, that "nothing could be more unscientific or unphilosophical than to doubt the existence of Satan, a personal spirit of evil." It will be unnecessary to quote passages, after this, to show that Mr. Hughes' "Ethical Christianity" resolves itself into the old Paleyan doctrine of right as simply "the will of God." Having settled on this basis, he feels free to trust his generous impulses, and does so to the detriment of his consistency. He scouts the notion that orthodox thinking is essential, or that we are required simply to imitate the actions of Jesus, and he takes great

pleasure in the good deeds of unregenerate men. He believes in God as the Universal Father. His sympathy for man is inclusive. His spirit is tolerant, and in trying to get at the heart of modern social problems he shows himself to have hopes for man upon the earth, here and now, which must of necessity bring him into working sympathy with many who cannot understand, much less accept, his mystical interpretation of Christianity.

GEORGE BATCHELOR.

Theodor Christlieb, D. D., of Bonn. Memoir by his Widow : and Sermons, translated by T. Y. KINGSBURY and SAMUEL GARRATT. New York : A. C. Armstrong & Son. \$2.00.

Among the leaders of the Protestant Church in Germany Theodor Christlieb occupied a foremost position. He was an incisive and eloquent preacher, a believer of pronounced and positive faith, and one of the most zealous and enthusiastic advocates of Christian missions the nineteenth century has known. It is well, therefore, for the public to know more clearly the personal history and life of the man, and the steps by which he rose from the fireside of a country parish to such a commanding position in the religious world.

This sympathetic memoir, written by his widow, gives a pleasant and interesting sketch of his career. Born in the year 1833 in Birkenfeld, in Würtemberg, where his father held the post of village pastor, he was consecrated from childhood by the pious prayers of his parents to his Master's service. A well-worn Bible picture-book was the companion of his early days. The bracing mountain air of the Black Forest strengthened his physique, and its picturesque scenery stimulated his spiritual emotions. The fragrance of his childhood's forest home, indeed, gave freshness and flavor to his speech and writings all through life. At the age of ten he was sent to school at Tübingen. He prepared for the university at Maulbronn, and by his studious work and fine abilities secured for himself a free scholarship at Tübingen, where he entered the theological department. The two prominent professors at Tübingen at this time were Baur and Beck. The critical and iconoclastic work of Baur only repelled the devout young student; but the strong orthodox piety and wide erudition of Beck gained the strongest influence over him. Christlieb's trial-sermon in his last year at the university aroused glowing anticipations of his coming career as a preacher. His full, rich and musical voice, the ease and grace of his delivery, and the deep earnestness and heart-felt unction that he exhibited marked him at once as a natural orator, destined to be an ornament of the German pulpit. After his graduation, he first taught in France, and served as pastor of a country church in the valley of the Neckar, till a call to London placed him over an incipient German congregation on the north side of the great English metropolis. The schoolroom where the meetings were at first

held became too small for the congregation which his eloquence and earnestness drew together, and a neat church was soon erected.

It was Christlieb's seven years of work here in Islington that gave him his wide acquaintance with English foreign missions, and aroused in him that deep interest in the missionary work of all nations, all over the globe, which later was to bear such noble fruit. Here, in London, also, he began his studies and lectures in defense of Christian faith and in combating the varied forms of "modern skepticism" which have made his name so well known to both English and German readers. In 1865, at the invitation of the King of Württemberg, he returned to Germany to take the living of Frederickshaven, where the court and royal family would be his hearers during the summer season. After three successful years of work here, his reputation as a scholar, preacher, and trainer of youth had so increased that he was appointed by the Prussian Minister of Public Worship to the professorship of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology at Bonn. Thither he removed in 1868, to spend the rest of his life in the service of the university. The work was thoroughly congenial to him. Here he wrote his most important book, "Modern Doubt and Christian Belief," and gave the young men preparing for the Christian ministry the inspiration of his glowing zeal and the wise fruits of his experience and practical sagacity. He had an open ear and sympathetic heart for all about him; he was called, like Tholuck, "the father of the students."

Not content with his professional routine, he threw himself with fervent enthusiasm into the work of Christian missions; organized associations devoted to this cause, and also branches of the Evangelical Alliance; founded the "Universal Missionary Magazine," and later established an institute for training lay evangelists, men who, though without university training, had 'yet the faith and zeal to spread the gospel and the knowledge of the Bible in the overgrown parishes of the large German cities. This last innovation drew upon him a storm of criticism and opposition; but the early prejudices that the enterprise met were ultimately lived down, and the system proved itself a most practical and effective instrumentality in strengthening the cause of religion among the common people.

Professor Christlieb's broad Christian sympathies were a recognized force in fostering international fellowship between the evangelical churches of the Old World and the New; his clear and eloquent addresses before the Evangelical Alliance both secured him a warm reception in the United States on his visit here, and gave him a high reputation on the two sides of the Atlantic. Had his life been spared a little longer, he would undoubtedly have been promoted by the young Emperor William to a still more important post at Berlin; but, while he seemed in the prime of strength and health, his physical powers suddenly began to fail, a secret cancer preying upon his vitals. His sufferings

were borne with great patience and a serene trust and resignation; but, before the last and most painful stage was reached, a stroke of apoplexy, on the 15th of August, 1889, gave his spirit an easy release.

The sermons annexed to the Memoir seem to have been faithfully and intelligently translated, and, without doubt, they were selected with good judgment. Nevertheless, they will disappoint the reader who expects to find in them justification for Dr. Christlieb's high reputation. They exhibit little thought or learning or originality. Christlieb had no sympathy with the distinctive spirit of our age; and his fervid exhortations whirl and glow in a purely dogmatic or sentimental sphere, quite outside the circle of modern interests. But the source of his power lay in quite another direction — in the man's magnetic personality, intensity of emotion, positiveness of conviction, and wonderful power of communicating his own moral and spiritual earnestness to his audience, and kindling in them the same flame of faith and hope that burned in his own breast. His personal convictions clung to the gospel in the traditional form endeared to him by early association. He belonged to the church militant, and believed that the live Christian should not sit still with folded hands, or merely stand on the defensive, but should be ever moving forward on the outworks of sin and unbelief. He was a great spiritual dynamo to rouse the sleeping and formal ecclesiasticism of his generation to a consciousness of its duties and opportunities, and, as such, has left behind him an example of courage, energy and aggressive activity in the cause of Christianity by which Germany cannot but be greatly benefited.

JAMES T. BIXBY.

YONKERS, N. Y.

The Autobiography of Isaac Williams, B. D., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford. Edited by his Brother-in-Law, the Ven. Sir GEORGE PREVOST, late Archdeacon of Gloucester. Longmans, Green & Co., London and New York.

The avowed object of this publication is to throw some further light on the history of the Oxford Movement. If it has not this justification, it has not any, for the Oxford Movement absorbed everything in Mr. Williams' personality that was of public interest, as the writing of Latin verses absorbed everything distinctive in his academic years at Harrow and Oxford. It was contact with the Kebles that first gave his life a turn to serious things, and his love and admiration for both John and Thomas, as evidenced by these pages, was more pronounced than for any others, not even Newman excepted. Williams knew them and Hurrell Froude for some time before he met Newman. The uncertainty of Newman's standing for a few years before the beginning of the Tractarian Movement comes out clearly in a letter of Thomas Keble's, objecting to Newman's liberal principles, and the advice of a friend warning Mr. Williams against the Kebles, and recommending him to seek the acquaintance of Newman as a soundly evangelical person.

There is here the same disproportion in the personal impression made by Hurrell Froude and the accounts of his sayings and doings that is marked in all the memoirs of the Tractarian set. He is never spoken of without admiration, and seldom quoted as otherwise than noisy, arrogant, and superficial. He said to Williams: "Isaac, we must make a row in the world. Why should we not?" To make a row, to do something striking, histrionic, seems to have been the chief end of this showy and unscrupulous talker, whose lack of spiritual perception comes out plainly in his estimate of Keble's "Christian Year." Neither Williams nor Froude cared for it, and Froude objected to its publication. "People will take Keble for a Methodist," he said. When it was published it was much too delicate meat for the Anglican stomach, and the editor of this volume informs us that he bought ten copies to encourage the slow sale. But the ecclesiastical apathy was not less remarkable than the spiritual. Mr. Williams furnishes an amusing proof of this. On Saints' days he "was often nearly the only one in church listening to the usual hack preacher," who once said to a scholar of Trinity, "I wonder what Williams so much admires in me; he is the only person in the University who comes to my sermons on Saints' days. It is very complimentary of him, but it puts me to a little trouble, for I am obliged to look out for sermons on the day." It was no compliment to him, but it was one of two or three of the weak and faint beginnings of that multiplication of church services to which the Anglican revival finally attained.

The beginnings of other things are here set down, some of them provocative of a smile, should one allow his sense of humor to invade these sacred walks. Thus, for example, we hear that Thomas Keble read from a little prayer-book to save his big one when he took to daily services. John Keble and Newman next did so for the same reason, and Newman was obliged to hold the book close to his eyes; whereupon all the neophytes must go and do likewise, and because he read the service rapidly they must do that also: even so subtle is the evolution of ecclesiastical absurdity. As in these lesser things, so in the more important, it is evident from this book that the beginnings of the Oxford Movement were antecedent to Newman's interest in it and control of it. That his control of it, in the period of his most positive ascendancy, was less real than apparent is evident from various particulars. Of these the most important is that, of the Tractarians proper, Newman was the only one who went over to the Roman Church. Of these Tractarians proper, Mr. Williams makes out fourteen. Those who went to Rome were younger men, like Ward and Oakeley, who attached themselves to Newman, hurried him forward, and in their impatience got to Rome before him in several instances. These facts would seem to justify the writer's inference that Newman's influence was much greater with his juniors and inferiors than with those meeting him as equals in both age and mind.

A certain distrust of him was inseparable from the admiration of the latter class. Williams' own admiration and affection for him were very great, and continued till Williams' death in 1865, as did their intercourse; but he could not but distrust Newman's eagerness for sensible effect, the restlessness of his intellect, his suppression of his domestic affections and his demand for a like course in others. In these representations of Newman we find a sensitiveness to the opinions of others inconsistent with a genuine self-respect. A single adverse criticism of his poems stopped his verse-writing altogether, if we except the "Dream of Gerontius," and even that was dropped into his waste-basket after it was written, and then saved by happy chance. Mr. Williams calls attention to the fact that the Churchmen among the Tractarians all remained Anglicans. Newman, the only one whose antecedents had been Evangelical, was the only one to go to Rome, — a fact which argues both the restlessness of his mind and the binding force of a tradition.

This nearer view of the Tractarian Movement does not enhance its value in our eyes. Mr. Williams' own part in it was considerable. His tract 80, "Reserve in Religious Teaching," was the object of hardly less animadversion than Newman's tract 90. He suggests that Newman found in it some excuse for keeping back his Roman Catholic opinions after they were clearly formed. But in general these pages are convincing of Newman's sincere desire and strenuous endeavor to remain an Anglican. The charges of duplicity that his brother Francis has brought against him are again disproved, — a quite unnecessary slaying of the slain. It is "significant of much" that he wrote to Williams in 1863 that the Anglican Church upheld far more truth in England than the Roman Catholic Church did or could.

JOHN W. CHADWICK.

BROOKLYN.

The Elements of Ethics. By J. H. MUIRHEAD, M. A. Pp. 239. London : John Murray. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.00.

The author of this carefully written University Extension Manual modestly tells us in his preface that, "though attempting to deal with the most recent phases of ethical problems," he does not profess "to treat them in an original manner, but merely to apply to their solution ideas which, owing to the labors of the best thinkers of our own time and country, are now common property." The reader, however, who happens to be at all versed in ethical literature will speedily discover that among the "best" thinkers only those are included whose thought on moral questions proceeds on the lines laid down by Hegel, and followed by T. H. Green, Mr. F. H. Bradley, Professor E. Caird, and Professor J. Dewey; that is to say, the book is an able attempt to popularize what is commonly known as the "idealist" or "Hegelian" theory of ethics. As such, it is

a welcome and valuable piece of good, honest work ; but as a manual to put into the hands of young men or women who are beginning the study of ethics, it is open to the serious objection that it is likely to give to many of its readers the false impression that the leading views set forth in the book are views in respect to which there is pretty general agreement among all the more competent authorities. The fact, however, is that throughout a large portion of the volume the doctrines propounded are fundamentally at variance with the well-weighed conclusions of such thinkers as Professor Henry Sidgwick, Dr. James Martineau, and the late Hermann Lotze. This being the case it appears unfitting and misleading to appropriate the expression, "the best thinkers of our time," to one particular set of champions in the present field of ethical controversy. This objection would have been to a large extent neutralized if Mr. Muirhead had given tolerably full accounts of those ethical theories which are opposed to his own. Unfortunately, however, he has not done so ; and, in regard to intuitionist theories especially, his treatment of them bears no proportion to their intrinsic importance and influence ; such striking and profound analyses of our moral consciousness as are presented in the writings of Bishop Butler and of Dr. Martineau being thought worthy of no further notice than two or three slight references in brief footnotes.

In one rather important respect the present Manual deviates from the course followed in the larger works on which it is founded ; for while Green, in his "Prolegomena," and Mr. Bradley, in his "Ethical Studies," early initiate their readers into that Hegelian metaphysics of knowledge and will with which their ethics is inextricably bound up, Mr. Muirhead endeavors to keep ethics and metaphysics as far as possible apart. Accordingly, the first of the five books, of which his volume is composed, is devoted to an ingenious, but hardly successful, attempt to represent ethics as a *science* which can be profitably discussed apart from its relations to the general philosophy of the universe. He admits that this so-called science of conduct is after all but a partial and abstract account of the matter, and so finds himself compelled to crowd into a short chapter, at the close of the volume, a far too brief description of that Hegelian doctrine of the relation of thought to reality which is so elaborately discussed in the first book of Green's "Prolegomena."

The second book in the Manual treats of "The Object of Moral Judgment," and lays down the sound doctrine that this object is voluntary action. On this matter the idealists and intuitionists are quite at one. This, however, of necessity leads to the further question, What is Will ? and at this point the two schools at once part company. In his account of the Will and its freedom, Mr. Muirhead simply follows Green, and seriously assures his readers that to regard human nature as so constituted that a man could possibly have left undone the sin for which he reproaches himself is to undermine all human responsibility. Human responsibility, we are told, is only compatible with the doctrine that a

man's self is nothing more than his character, and that as his character in every stage of its development can manifest itself (i. e., can *will*) in only one way, the growth of that character for good or ill admits of no possible alternative. As Green says, "the determination of the will might be different, but only through the man's being different." The idealist thus inverts the ordinary view, which surely is that man would not be a fitting subject either for moral approbation or reprobation were it not for the assumed fact that in all crises of temptation it was open to him to have decided otherwise. For a critical discussion of the points at issue between Libertarians and Determinists, Mr. Muirhead refers his readers to Professor Sidgwick and to Green, but he strangely forgets to mention the much fuller and more searching treatment of this subject which is to be found in the second volume of Dr. Martineau's "Study of Religion." This is the more to be regretted as Dr. Martineau deals expressly with the fallacy involved in the assertion that the self *is* the character, and shows that both language and the common consciousness of mankind declare that the true account of human nature is that the self *has* its character, and that therefore it is open to man, by his own free acts of moral self-determination, to improve or deteriorate his character.

From this unsatisfactory section of Mr. Muirhead's treatise, it is a most agreeable change to pass to the third book, in which he examines with much acuteness that school of thought which maintains that the Ethical End is Pleasure. Bishop Butler's epoch-making doctrine, that man has many other desires than the desire for pleasure, is here indorsed and very ably developed. Particularly clear and forcible, too, is Mr. Muirhead's exposure of Mr. J. S. Mill's fallacious attempt to establish a legitimate passage from Egoistic Hedonism to Utilitarianism on the ground that pleasures differ in kind as well as in amount. But the most original feature in the Manual is the treatment of Evolutionary Hedonism, which involves the criticism of the ethical views of Mr. Spencer and of Mr. Leslie Stephen. It appears from Mr. Muirhead's account that Mr. S. Alexander's work, on "Moral Order and Progress," falls also into this category. This fact that Mr. Alexander, who formerly studied under Green at Balliol, has now given up the idealist theory, coupled with the circumstance that Mr. Muirhead's sympathies go a long way with Mr. Alexander's views, suggests the question whether the present drift of neo-Hegelian ethics is not in this direction.

In the fourth book Mr. Muirhead expounds his own theory. The fundamental principle of idealist ethics is that of "self-realization." The reason of man gradually reveals to him that in his nature there appear to be two selves or two lives. On the one hand, there is the self which is peculiar to the separate individual, which seeks its own private advantage and gratification; and on the other hand, there is what may be called an infinite self, which more and more unfolds its resources and desires as the individual devotes himself to the duties of his station, and practically

realizes his essential spiritual unity with his fellow-men. Out of the realized relationship of these two selves, or lives, to each other grows the moral order and progress of the world. In Mr. Muirhead's own words: "Wherever we have moral judgment approving a line of conduct as good, whether among the rudest band of savages or in those circles which in the most highly moralized countries in the world recognize the highest moral standard, it is seen to rest upon a more or less consciously recognized contract between a permanent and a transient self; between the satisfaction of a higher, or true self, and of a lower, or apparent one" (p. 195). To inquire how far this conflict of higher and lower desires is of itself adequate to explain the consciousness of moral obligation, and what is the relation of this gradually advancing social ideal to a philosophical theory of the cosmos, would carry us far beyond the due limits of this notice into a full criticism of idealist ethics in general. We conclude with the hearty recognition that Mr. Muirhead's treatise, if not altogether fitted for an elementary text book, is certainly an admirable exposition of the ethical theory of an important philosophical school, and will be read by the advanced student with much interest and advantage even where, as in the case of the present writer, it does not command entire assent.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

MANCHESTER NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD.

The Spirit of Modern Philosophy : an Essay in the Form of Lectures.
By JOSIAH ROYCE, Ph. D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University. Pp. xv, 519. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. \$2.50.

If Professor Royce's former work as a philosopher has to any one seemed to indicate a degree of fascination with his own dialectical method somewhat out of proportion to his interest in the conclusion to be attained, that impression is agreeably dissipated by the evident earnestness of purpose of the present essay. Here he does not hesitate to avow, from the first, the "presuppositions" which he expects to establish. He says: "I do not know how you have found it, but for my part, as I have read the writings of some of the modern authors whose intelligence and caution I most value, I am frequently tormented with their tenderness of conscience about risking a statement of their personal beliefs. They have been driven to take this attitude, no doubt, through the warning which is given them by the traditional dogmatism of certain theologians. . . . But, after all, it is what a man by chance believes, not what he does *not* believe, that enables him to be of service to his fellows as a thinker; and whatever fragment of knowledge one may possess will surely remain undiscovered, unless he sometimes ventures assertion of his temperament for whatever it may happen to be worth. . . . We have our faith in life; we want reflectively to estimate this faith. . . . A positive philosophy is an effort to express, and by

criticism to establish, the presuppositions of the age which it reflects upon."

With this feeling Professor Royce announces himself a constructive idealist. The purpose that dominates these pages is to show the evolution, in modern philosophy, of the doctrine of idealism, until it reaches the position of competence to meet and interpret the conclusions of modern science. "To many minds idealism appears rather the outcome of a moral enthusiasm than an embodiment of a cool and critical scrutiny of the world as it is. . . . The doctrine, such as I conceive it to be, seems to me rather the outcome of a rigid logical analysis. . . . Arbitrariness in our interpretation of things is the curse of immature idealism; but mature idealism will certainly find out how to return to an order as fixed and supreme as was Spinoza's Substance. . . . The outer world is indeed show, but no illusion; and our life has an organic fixity, a lawful completeness about it, such as every philosophy longs for. . . . Why we are bound by our inner nature to see this world of sense-facts, we can surely never say, until we shall have first learned empirically what sense-facts we are bound to see. This only science can teach us. . . . However the objective world may appear to freer spirits, or however it ultimately appears to the Self in his wholeness, to us it must appear, for the first, as a world of formed and well-categorized experience, that is, as a world of orderly universality."

In the pursuit of his purpose, our author traces, with as little technicality as possible, the development of the doctrine of idealism from the seventeenth century down to the present day. He distinguishes three periods. The first, of naturalism, pure and simple, belongs almost wholly to the seventeenth century. The second period returned to the study of the inner world of man's soul. Its beginnings may be seen in Locke; it culminates in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," and continues through fifty years of post-Kantian speculation. The third period is that revival of philosophical activity in the midst of which we live.

To trace briefly the process of this development: We find first an estimate of the world as a hard-and-fast fact, a world of geometrical certainty, as established by Galileo. Descartes tests all surety by its conformity with the laws of his own thought, — his innate ideas. Spinoza recognizes one sole Substance, characterized by both extension and thought, and adores the world as God's eternal order.

Then succeeds a period which questions the rigid geometrical certainty, and the assumption of a divine order, — a period of doubt. Locke denies the existence of innate ideas, and finds only sense-impressions and reflection upon them. Then, says Berkeley, we are sure only of the impressions, and have no proof of an outer world corresponding to them. The world is a world of ideas. They are God's ideas, and we are face to face with him. Hume also accepts Locke's conclusion; but he admits no realm of divine ideas, and no abstractions, only matters of fact and relations of ideas.

Now arises Kant, the destroyer of the old and the creator of the new. He discovers that all truth about the world is dependent on our ideas of space and time. Nature itself is conditioned on space and time; therefore nature is no outer fact at all, only a phenomenon of our minds. Our sensations, indeed, indicate things external to ourselves, but these things can never be known for what they are in themselves. The moral law is imperative, binding us to conform to the rational order, and it implies a Moral Ruler, whom we must obey. Our world is simply an orderly system in the mind of a sane thinker. We do not know things in themselves, or God in himself.

Kant is followed by Fichte, who proceeds to discard that remnant of an outer world which Kant called "things-in-themselves," and recognizes these sense-impressions only as the materials for moral obedience, which are held in common by sane minds. The *ego* is the measure and criterion of all. The universe of selves constitutes the embodiment of the infinite Reason. This is ethical idealism. It is a *détour* from the main line of development; it loses hold of all external reality.

Fichte had said that the self fashions the world as a means of expression of moral ideas. But there are other elements in human nature besides the moral; there is passion, sentiment, imagination. Why should not these create their world? Thus arose the Romantic School. Schelling, who was of this school, came to see that Fichte failed in not recognizing the medium between the finite and the Infinite Ego, which is afforded by the world of sense. The natural order must be the autobiography of spirit.

Hegel also recognizes the deeper Self. We exist only as we are recognized by our deeper Self. All consciousness is an appeal to other consciousness. Life consists in the effort to reconcile conflicting aims and purposes. The infinite Life is forever differentiating itself in the finite. The concrete universal constructs the differences which form the total organism of the world.

The next stage is that of Schopenhauer. To him, as to his predecessors, the world is a world of ideas only. But its facts must be learned by experience. Its activity can be known only after the similitude of our own will. There is, therefore, a World-Will, who makes the facts of the world as they are, simply by his own choice, — his caprice. This caprice gives a world of conflicting evils. The will to live is essentially evil. But Schopenhauer prepares the way for modern realism, by insisting upon the necessity of studying the world as it is, and not deducing its facts *a priori*.

So far, the treatment is historical and analytic, and is as satisfactory as can be expected of any attempt to trace a definite continuity of thought through a succession of thinkers each liable to the modifications of his time and temperament. The remainder of the book, by far the most valuable part, is the author's original discussion of the modern

problems of science and religion, and is especially suggestive in its interpretation of the doctrine of evolution. The lectures which follow consider the Outer World and its Paradox; the Inner World and its Meaning; the World of Description and the World of Appreciation; and Optimism, Pessimism, and the Moral Order. The author develops anew the theory already made familiar to us in his "Religious Aspects of Philosophy," in which he shows that both truth and error alike necessitate the belief in a larger Reflective Self contemplating an objective reality in common with our own consciousness. The closing lecture contains a searching criticism of our religious weaknesses, and, by revealing the depth of the problem of evil, leads us to the only source of eternal strength and eternal peace.

This work is one of the most important contributions to spiritual philosophy that has appeared in recent times. The belief that the whole system of nature, with its real objectivity, is a world of ideas, not dependent upon any finite consciousness, but held in the mind of Him who is at once our deeper self, and the Self of all selves, approves itself more and more to rational thought as a truth both reasonable and reassuring to our faith.

JAMES C. PARSONS.

The Real Japan. By HENRY NORMAN. Pp. vi. 634. Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.00.

THE title which Mr. Norman gives to his "studies of contemporary Japanese manners, morals, administration and politics" implies that previous writers on Japan have been unable to resist the glamour to which all sojourners in that fascinating land have been subject, and that therefore no true picture of it has before been painted. Yet a glance through the pages of "The Real Japan" plainly shows that, though not open to this censure to such a degree as Sir Edwin Arnold, who is by nature incapable of discrimination, Mr. Norman himself has by no means been able to withstand the charms of the land and its people. He also, like Sir Edwin in his recent gushing farewell to America, says in effect: "I went to Japan her friend; I come away her champion, her servant, her lover." Apart from a few criticisms, not indeed on the Japanese people and character, but on the baneful influence of the foreign invasion, together with the exceptions taken to the survival of popular superstitions (as if there were no instances of the kind in the Western world), there is nothing in the book which justifies the title, if this be meant to convey the impression that the fascinations of the land had been overdrawn, and that the other and darker side of the picture needed delineation. No one, always excepting the tremulously susceptible Sir Edwin, seems to have surrendered himself so completely as Mr. Norman to the glamour of Japan. All the things which make a sojourn there so delightful a dream,

— the refinement and grace of the people, the atmosphere of kindliness in which even the lowliest live, the simplicity of life and the love of beauty which everywhere prevail, and the thoughtfulness in little things which lies at the basis of the universal politeness of the nation, — receive from him the most cordial recognition ; and the total impression given by his estimate is that this picture which we Occidentals persist in saying must be merely an idealized sketch is, after all, the real Japan.

The truth is that the real Japan can never be depicted by a foreigner, even though the attempt be made by a long-time resident possessing the amplest powers of discrimination and portrayal. Could we have a book from Captain Brinkley, the editor of the "Japan Mail," or from Professor B. H. Chamberlain, — the two men most competent from their long residence and their trained powers of observation, — something like a glimpse of the reality might be had, albeit they are both ardent lovers of their adopted land. But they are the very persons who most of all shrink from giving judgment, because of the bewildering complexities and contradictions which the Japanese character presents to those who have made it their life study. The real situation is perhaps best expressed by Miss E. R. Scidmore, herself a long-time resident, who says in her "Jinriki-sha Days : " —

The Japanese are the enigma of this century ; the most inscrutable, the most paradoxical of races. They and their outward surroundings are so picturesque, theatrical, and artistic that at moments they appear a nation of *po-seurs*, — all their world a stage, and all their men and women merely players ; a trifling, superficial, fantastic people bent on nothing but pleasing effects. Again, the Occidental is as a babe before the deep mysteries, the innate wisdom, the philosophies, the art, the thought, the subtle refinements of this finest branch of the yellow race. To generalize, to epitomize, is impossible ; for they are so oppositè and contradictory, so unlike all other Asiatic peoples, that analogy fails. They are at once the most sensitive, artistic, and mercurial of human beings, and the most impassible, conventional, and stolid ; at once the most logical, profound, and conscientious, and the most irrational, superficial, and indifferent ; at once the most stately, solemn, and taciturn, and the most playful, whimsical, and loquacious. While history declares them aggressive, cruel, and revengeful, experience proves them yielding, merciful, and gentle. . . . There is no end to the surprises of Japanese character, and the longer the foreigner lives among them, the less does he understand the people, and the less do his facts contribute to any explanation.

No, it is only the transient tourist or newspaper correspondent who would dare to label his estimate of the Japanese character the "real Japan." So far as Mr. Norman confines himself to statistics, or to description of the institutions and industries of the country, he is a fairly accurate guide. The articles on Japanese Justice, Education, and Industrial Art, are valuable contributions to knowledge of the country, because of their lucidity and conciseness, but they are marred by the frequent boast of the author that his information on many points is exclusive. In

fact, there is nothing in the way of information on such subjects which the politeness of Japanese officials does not make accessible to every resident who cares to inquire.

Mr. Norman's estimate of the qualities of Japanese womanhood is vitiated by the very evident fact that it has been formed from observation of only those classes of Japanese women with whom the transient tourist is commonly brought into contact, — the tea-house girls and *geishas*. For any one desiring knowledge of real Japanese womanhood there is now one source, at least, of accurate information. In Miss Alice M. Bacon's recent book on "Japanese Girls and Women" the whole story is told, — so far as it is possible for a foreigner to know it and to tell it, — and it is told with charming simplicity and directness. Miss Bacon's opportunity for gaining an insight into Japanese domestic life and possessing herself of "exclusive" information was, indeed, exceptional. It is to such observers, and to those who are now on the spot, patiently and conscientiously studying special phases of Japanese character and life, that we are to be indebted for the glimpses, — they can be nothing more than glimpses, — which we shall obtain of the "Real Japan."

ARTHUR M. KNAPP.

Home Prayers. By JAMES MARTINEAU. London and New York : Longmans, Green & Co.

A prayer at the close of a day of toil, a benediction after sermon, the *pax vobiscum* of a departing friend, — all are fitting, and at times may convey a significance that is inexpressible. All these we seem to meet in this little volume. A prayer it seems after the toil of years, a benediction after a life of preaching, the *pax vobiscum* of a revered teacher and father who has heard his call. To criticise the book we should have no mind, even if it spoke home to us with less prevailing tone. It is a slender volume of prayers, prepared for the home circle, and admirably suited to this use, though hardly less fit to do service as a private *vade mecum*. They are some thirty-two in number; on the average about half as long as those of Theodore Parker; suited to morning invocation or evening thanksgiving, and adapted to various circumstances of joy or grief or contrition. Not effusive, they breathe the pure spirit of devotion, speaking in subdued tones as becomes the child of earth in addressing the heavenly Father. Dr. Martineau concludes the volume with two services for public worship, which seem to us models in their way.

The brief preface touchingly tells us of the feelings which have brought forth the volume, and so in a sense interprets it to us. Hitherto, Dr. Martineau tells us, he has shrunk from sending "prayers to the press," — "both as a vicarious intermeddling with the free devotion of souls unknown, and a gratuitous exposure of a sacred confidence between the personal conscience and the Searcher of hearts." He has come, however, "to a gradual softening of this scruple." "At all events, I am

more aware than I was of the need of fellowship in the spiritual life, and less disposed to trust to its pure spontaneity." The confession closes with the reflection that "so easily lost are the tender voices of the spirit that we need to overhear each other." Surely not a few will be grateful to so exalted a spirit that he has thus made audible his own soliloquy.

A. W. JACKSON.

A Traveller's Narrative, written to illustrate the Episode of the Bab.

Edited in the original Persian, and translated into English with an introduction and explanatory notes by EDWARD G. BROWNE, M. A., M. B., Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge, and Lecturer in Persian to the University of Cambridge. Volume II., English translation and notes. Pp. liii, 447. Cambridge: at the University Press. New York, Macmillan & Co.

It has not been easy for Western readers to obtain accurate information respecting the nature of Babism, its aims and tendencies, and its probable outcome. Mr. Browne gives a long list of books on the subject, but in most of them the statements have been incomplete and the materials have not usually been drawn from reliable sources. The reason of this fact is that the Bab himself was almost from the beginning denounced by the ecclesiastical authorities as a heretic, and his followers have since been a proscribed sect, communication with whom was difficult and dangerous. The treatise of Kazem-beg in the "*Journal Asiatique*" for 1886 is the fullest account which we have had of the history of the Babite movement; and the chapter which the Comte de Gobineau has devoted to this subject in "*Les religions et les philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale*" (1865) is regarded by Mr. Browne as "a classic unsurpassed and, indeed, unapproached in the subject whereof it treats." In the present work we find information on many points which had not before been clear. The "traveller" whose narrative is here translated is a devout disciple of the Bab, and seems to have had access to good sources for the history. Moreover, the translator has had the advantage of a personal interview with the present head of the Babites, and is able to enlighten us in a special manner as to the present situation of the sect. The notes at the end of the volume embrace a great variety of topics, historical and theological. It is impossible within the limits of a book notice even to mention all the points of interest which the book presents; it is to be hoped that the subject will receive in *THE NEW WORLD* the fuller discussion which it richly merits.

Babism is a branch of the Mahdi-faith, which has played so important a rôle in Persia. It is an essential doctrine of the Shiite or Persian creed that the twelfth Iman, the incarnation of God and the source of all religious guidance, shall be manifested in the world and conduct the faithful to happiness. It is held, however, that certain prodigies and signs shall usher in the advent of this Iman Mahdi, and it is by these signs that

every claimant to the dignity is judged. The highest ecclesiastical court in Persia declared that Mirza Ali Mohammed, called the Bab, had not exhibited these signs and was not entitled to the name of Mahdi. But it appears from the present narrative that Ali Mohammed never claimed to be the final manifestation of God; according to our author, when he called himself the "Bab," that is, "The Gate," he meant, that "he was the channel of grace from some great Person still behind the veil of glory, who was the possessor of countless and boundless perfections, by whose will he moved, and to the bond of whose love he clung." He claimed, indeed, a certain independence of religious judgment; but his followers gathered from his sayings that he was to be succeeded by another, who should be the true representative of God on earth. That other, according to the opinion of a majority of the Babis, has been manifested in the person of Beha, who, by permission of the Persian and Turkish governments, is now living in dignified seclusion near Acre in Palestine. He is the real centre of the Babite world, and his home is a place of pilgrimage.

Persecution of the sect has never ceased in Persia, though it now enjoys a sort of toleration. From the accounts given it appears to be spreading, though slowly. It is doubtful whether it has before it any great prospects of success as an organization. It is, indeed, if we may judge from what seem to be the best reports, entitled to respect on the moral and humanitarian side. Its alleged aim is social and religious reform, the elevation of woman, the recognition of the rights of all human beings, the dissemination of true religious views — in a word, the bringing of all men into a life of communion with God. The reports of immoral practices and theories among the Babites seem to be unfounded. But it has against it the whole power of the traditional Mohammedanism of Persia, a faith in which the people have been trained for many centuries. Babism does not differ from the national faith in its assumption of the Mahdi, but only in its affirmation that the Mahdi now exists in the person of a particular man. So far as regards the moral teaching, it is only through education and time that this can be appropriated by the mass of the people. The issue of the movement we shall watch with deep interest, and we hope that Mr. Browne will publish from time to time the results of his studies on the subject.

C. H. TOY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A Memoir of Honore de Balzac. Compiled and written by KATHARINE PRESCOTT WORMELEY. Boston: Roberts Brothers. \$1.50.

At last the genial and potent Jove of the art of fiction, who wrapped himself in clouds of reserve while he constructed the little world of the "Comédie Humaine," is partly revealed by means of a biography, the work of his able translator, Miss Wormeley. She has exercised sympa-

thy and insight in her interpretation of his personality ; and it is pleasant to find that to comprehend Balzac is not to pardon, but to admire and love him. He was unhappily, yet not always maliciously, misunderstood ; the manifold qualities of his nature misled the judgment of his friends as of his enemies. He was careless — as an honest man often is, but rarely can afford to be — of public opinion. For the purposes of his work, he would at times go into eclipse ; a few intimates only having access to him, and this by a system of countersigns. He destroyed the letters which would have illuminated the middle period of his history, from motives of a fine reticence sure to be misinterpreted. Such modesty of soul was hardly divined by those who saw him fighting with hearty vigor against adverse circumstances, or laughing joyously at worldly anecdotes. His physical nature was as powerful as his imagination : some persons supposed that he must lack practical capability, others believed him gross and material. It is unnecessary to cite Virgil upon Rumor or Don Basilio concerning Calumny in order to prove how prompt society is to distrust that which it does not understand, and how quickly the yelp of the first hound is chorused by the pack in full cry. The charge of immorality which was brought against his novels was a grievous surprise to Balzac, conscious of his righteous intent.

Those men persist in ignoring the *ensemble* of my work in order that they may pick the details to pieces. My blushing critics veil their faces before certain personages in the "Comédie Humaine," who are, unfortunately, as true as the others, and set in strong relief the morals of the present day. There are vices in our time as there were in former times. Do they wish, on behalf of innocence, that I should vow to purity all the two or three thousand personages who figure in the "Comédie Humaine" ? . . . I write for men, and not for young girls. But I defy them to cite a single page in which religion or the family is attacked !

Balzac's sister, Mme. Surville — from whose souvenirs of her famous brother the above is quoted — adds that, having said these words, Balzac dropped his face between his hands, exclaiming, "What tortures success is made of !" The colossal cartoons of the "Comédie Humaine" were, indeed, inspired by profound moral convictions, and by an immense ambition, of which Balzac wrote in a letter to Mme. de Hanska : —

Here, then, are the stakes I play for : during the present half century four men will have had a vast influence on the world — Napoleon, Cuvier, O'Connell ; and I desire to be the fourth. The first lived on the blood of Europe, he was inoculated with war ; the second espoused the whole globe ; the third incarnated in himself a people ; and I shall have carried a whole society in my brain.

Mme. Surville's narrative is very complete as regards the early years of Balzac. There was a difference of only two years in their ages, and Honoré was always the brave defender of little Laure. "He was good to live with," she notes, a testimony not too frequently true of literary persons.

Naturally, Miss Wormeley has availed herself of all that was written by Mme. Surville, whose portrait of Balzac has the double charm of truth and affection. He was, above all, healthful and sunny, abounding in vitality, strong in the solid armor of courage and the delicate chain-mail of illusions. His father, a man of pronounced views, had designed Honoré for the career of a notary. Only under restrictions could the young Balzac gain permission to pass two years in Paris, where, in a garret of the Rue Lesdiguières, he tried his powers, and subsisted on dreams and a crust, for love of the literary art. Surely there was never a more patient apprentice in the craft than this brave youth, who published forty volumes of fiction before he would sign to any the name of Balzac. His natural gifts of intuition, comprehension, memory, were marvelous. To these he added a peculiar power — “of avatar,” his biographer names it — by means of which he entered in and possessed divers personalities.

Balzac considered that he had no literary style, and the Romanticists of his time also held this opinion concerning him. Miss Wormeley, however, who in her translations has most conscientiously followed the inflections and involutions of his speech, rightly defines it as a style, because it is the perfect expression of its author. First, tremendous impulse, then repeated and strenuous revision, was the order of his processes of work. His publisher, Werdet, tells of the first copy written with a crowquill “that ran at full speed over the paper, emitting electric sparks.” And Théophile Gautier, who better than other contemporaries understood Balzac, makes a most striking sketch of him at work : —

In his presence Shakespeare’s words in “Julius Cæsar” came to my memory ; before him “Nature might stand up and say to all the world, This was a man !” He wore the monk’s habit of white flannel or cashmere. . . . Perhaps it symbolized to his eyes the cloistral life to which his work condemned him ; and, benedictine of romance, he wore the robe. . . . As to the eyes, there were never any like them . . . two black diamonds, dashed at moments with gold reflections, eyes to make an eagle drop his lids, . . . the eyes of a sovereign, a seer, a subjugator.

He worked at night, by the light of seven candles, struggling to embody his ideas, conquering form by tremendous efforts. A single sentence sometimes required the labor of a whole night before it satisfied Balzac. The manuscript then went to the compositors and returned to the author in the impersonality of print for corrections. These were a bizarre confusion of cabalistic signs — stars, suns, crosses, ciphers ; lines that darted, meandered, entangled themselves, to lead finally to additions, subtractions, total changes of phrases and words. Other amendments were on strips of paper attached to the pages by wafers and pins. It was a purgatory of the printers ! The next revision by the author was even more devastating. At last, above the ruins of the desperate toil, perhaps of various nights, the idea would arise perfect and triumphant.

In literary theory, Balzac may be called the father of realism, as dia-

tinguished from mere naturalism ; while at the same time his impressions of sound, light and color, of intangible effluences and motives, ally him also to the modern symbolists and sensitivists. Altogether, the character, genius, and art of Balzac form an imposing figure — a man strong enough to know evil and good, and to preserve always immaculate the ideals of his great human heart.

E. CAVAZZA.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

IN "Mind" for January, 1892, Mr. S. Alexander considers *The Idea of Value*, with particular reference to moral values. Ideals, he says, are nothing but formulations of desires. The moral ideal is a very complex and highly-organized system of such objects of desire. "Sollen" is thus one kind of "Seyn." That which "ought to be" represents the sentiments of good men, and these sentiments are as much facts as hunger or love, and more powerful. In morals, in fact, we never step outside the sphere of human sentiments. The moral order, indeed, abides, though I disobey it ; but it abides only in the sentiments of those who support it and enforce it against me. Destroy the good man, and the moral order perishes too. The sharp separation which is made between fact and value is made by thinkers who have failed to ask themselves how value itself came to exist. The experiment by which social equilibrium is attained is therefore a process in which many guesses are made at the future ideal, and some one of these enlists on its side all the force of public sentiment as the result of a struggle with all the rest and with existing standards. By perpetual repetition of this process, as human nature enlarges and refines, the moral ideal moves on, from age to age. At each step a new standard of value is created by the struggle between conflicting ideals of social good. It is evident that this process by which morality changes its standards resembles the process by which, in lower forms of life than ours, new organisms are developed, new forms of healthy and possible life. Moral ideals are but forms of healthy social life. The two main principles, Mr. Alexander concludes, which he has endeavored to state and demonstrate, are these : Value is nothing but the efficiency of the conscious agent to promote the efficiency of society, to maintain the equilibrium of forces which that society represents. While pleasure is truly a measure of value, it is such only because it depends on a true distribution of portions of pleasure, and this distribution is itself the cause of the prosperity of the moral standard. In the second place, value is not something separable from other mental facts by a wide gulf ; it is itself a fact of a purely natural order. The standard of value is only the formulation of desires, and the value of each separate part of the standard is only the sentiment of approval of certain actions and certain

characters. Thus the idea of value becomes something to be described and discussed and put into relation with all other facts of organic life, and thus we have followed that method which removes ethics, æsthetics, and the science of truth from the domain of metaphysics to class them as the last, or psychical, class of natural sciences.

In the "International Journal of Ethics" for January and April of this year, Mr. J. S. Mackenzie, M. A., discusses *The Three Religions*. Quoting a familiar passage from Kant, in which he speaks of the infinite in nature and the infinite in the moral ideal as the two things most worthy of reverence, Mr. Mackenzie makes three great religions which worship these two, separately or in combination. The two cultured and sophisticated religions of the day are Agnosticism and the Worship of Humanity, while Christianity represents the endeavor to combine the two elements of worship in a popular religion. All religions worthy of the name have held, although often under strange disguises, to these two constituents: reverence for the power from which all things flow and reverence for the moral ideal. Christianity seems to embody most clearly the two elements. Religion might almost be defined as the refuge of human feeling from the incompleteness of life. We demand poetic justice; we demand that the world of our experience should be a rounded whole, with reason as its ruler, and love as its principle. We ask for a system, and we are disappointed and shocked, because in our ordinary life we are presented only with a fragment. We ask for an intelligible world, and we are presented with a puzzle. Now the central problem in the puzzle of life is the separation of power from goodness. Why, then, is it that we have grown dissatisfied with Christianity? It is partly the result of a moral growth, or, perhaps one should rather say, a moral expansion.

I am not disposed to interpret the signs of the times as tending to the revival of primitive Christianity. In any special and distinctive sense of the term, Christianity has left us. It is sometimes said that Christianity was socialistic, but Christianity was, in fact, an individualistic religion, its primary problem being, "What must I do to be saved?" — a problem which the moral consciousness of the civilized world has now, in a sense, left behind, desiring rather to ask, "How shall I save others?" In the person of Christ himself, the religion may have been all that could be desired. The more one studies his character, as far as any authentic record of it is to be had, the more one feels inclined to regard him as a kind of Shakespeare of the moral life, — the man of infinite moral depth, as Shakespeare was the man of unbounded human sympathy. But that moral depth was not communicable. Hence the imitator of Jesus became an ascetic. It is not possible to strip off the dogma and return to the original position of Jesus. The religion of Christ, even as he held it himself, cannot be altogether freed from the charge of individualism. There is a certain paradox, indeed, and a certain falsehood in representing Christianity as purely individualistic. Yet the unity which Christianity

recognizes is only a spiritual unity, — a unity which is not realizable on earth; and for this reason it has influenced the world, on the whole, only in a negative way. It is our aim to bring ethical principles more directly into contact with the problems of the world. The new religion must contain, as an essential element in it, the recognition of the organic unity of mankind. It must be a more perfect combination of the two sides of worship than Christianity has yet shown itself to be. The reason for the existence of Agnosticism and the Religion of Humanity is largely that Christianity did not fully represent the truths which they contain. The new religion must represent them fully. But how exactly this is to be done, how these two elements are to be brought into combination, and what are the other elements that are to make the combination possible are questions which it is not easy to answer.

In the "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science" for March, President Charles De Garmo considers *Ethical Training in Public Schools*. The task is double, not only to make obedience to conscience the supreme law of the soul, but also to impart to the child those ethical ideals that form the content of the highest morality. The teacher's problem is to discover the fundamental ethical ideals, to find the available forms in which they are embodied, and to devise the best pedagogical means for utilizing them. Four great ideas that lie at the basis of modern social and economic life are the ideas of good-will, of rights, of requital, and of service. Two other ideas of utmost importance to the individual are Inner Freedom and Efficiency of Will. Now the school must help out other institutions and prevent immense waste of human welfare by enabling the child to master ideally, himself, in thought and experience, what the headstrong soul must experience really. To bring home to the child the four great ethical ideas, we turn most naturally to history as the record of man's will in action. The best literature, again, embodies in a thousand forms every phase of virtue and its opposite, and we should use this literature to guide the imagination and hold the interest of the young. In the bustling daily life about us we have perpetual illustrations of ethical or unethical principles, reduced to concrete practice. In the economic activities of the day and in our political life, we should see the underlying moral principles which are applied in this large field as in the commonest transactions. The greatest idea of modern civilization is that of service to self through service to others. Each contributes his mite to the good of all, and gets it back vastly multiplied. Man serves his fellows truly in every honest piece of work he does.

In a recent number of the "*Revue Chrétienne*," Professor A. Sabatier answers, in the negative, the question, *Does the New Testament contain Dogmas?* A dogma is a statement, as by a church or council, of what has previously existed as a doctrine freely discussed and indefinite in form. Thus stated, a dogma becomes a law for every member of the Church; it contains a doctrinal element and an element of authority, but

both the word and the idea implied in it are pre-Christian, and they are to be sought in the history of Greek philosophy and politics. The rule laid down by the council of Jerusalem (Acts xvi. 4) is the first and only dogma, in the proper sense of the word, in the New Testament. Only much later was a distinction made between practical rules and doctrinal distinctions. There cannot be dogmas, then, in the Bible since it is earlier than the period in which decisions on doctrine were given by the Church. We reach the same conclusion, substantially, when we consider how the Canon of the New Testament was formed, who were the authors of the books that composed it, what purpose they had in mind, and the nature of the revelation which we find in it. The canon was formed very gradually, and the general plan of the New Testament was fixed only about A. D. 200. The Church collected the books of the New Testament, and the dogmatic authority of the Bible is hence, practically, the authority of the Church which did this work of collection. All the New Testament writings originated in fortuitous circumstances of the time. None of the authors had any desire to give or formulate dogma. Supreme authority is in Jesus Christ, and there are no dogmas in his teachings, because he aims rather to give life than to set forth abstract supernatural truths. His revelation of God does not consist in a list of dogmas. Jesus manifests in a concrete form the normal relations between man and God. Man's conscience accepts the experiences recorded in the New Testament as a type of a life of faith and love. The New Testament asks for a submission of the heart, and not of the intellect. It does not pretend to satisfy those who seek supernatural knowledge of things in heaven or earth, but desires to satisfy those who hunger after righteousness and seek life everlasting.

In the "Contemporary Review" for February last, Professor S. R. Driver has an able controversial article in reply to Principal Cave on the Hexateuch. Principal Cave affirms very strongly the composite origin of the Book of Genesis, composed as it is of two strata of narrative, the Elohist and the Jehovistic; but he denies that the five subsequent books are composite. Professor Driver holds that this position is logically untenable, and that whatever grounds exist, in Principal Cave's judgment, for believing in the composite structure of Genesis, grounds of equal cogency exist for believing in a composite structure from Exodus to Joshua; and his arguments are directed solely against those who take Principal Cave's position. He affirms that all the other important marks of the Elohist style (except the use of the word "Elohim") that are traceable in Genesis continue to present themselves, aggregated, as in Genesis, in particular sections, to the end of the Book of Joshua. He endeavors to show that the hand of the Elohist indicated in Genesis by certain peculiarities is just as manifest in the three following books, in the presence of precisely similar circumstances. The instances which Principal Cave alleges of differences in the *usus loquendi* are declared to be unfounded.

Professor Driver illustrates his argument with copious details, and carries the war into Africa by alleging that Principal Cave has not mastered even what Professor Driver has recently written in his "Introduction," and does not address himself to the positions really held there.

In "Hebraica" for January last, Professor W. Henry Green, of Princeton, offers a striking contrast to Professor Driver's paper, in his fourth article on The Pentateuchal Question, in which he considers Exodus xiii.—Deuteronomy xxxiv. Professor Green considers that a practical proof that the partition of any other work can be effected quite as readily as that of the Pentateuch, and in precisely the same manner, has been furnished by Professor C. M. Mead's recent brochure entitled "Romans Dissected." The opening paragraph of this paper, of some fifty pages in length, sufficiently indicates the thoroughness with which Professor Green rejects the positions of the now prevailing school of Old Testament critics.

The further the examination proceeds, the more convincing is the evidence that the critical division of the Pentateuch is based not on evidence afforded by the Pentateuch itself, but on the subjective fancies of the critics. A continuous, self-consistent, well accredited narrative, with every indication of unity of authorship is rent asunder upon flimsy pretexts, which give no warrant for such a procedure. It is not merely severed into sections or paragraphs of considerable size, whose style and diction, it might with a show of reason be claimed, could be fairly compared with one another, but in order to effect a separation it is found necessary to reduce it to minute fragments, clause is torn from clause and each assigned with positiveness to its particular author. And passages so firmly bound together that no artifice can sunder them are nevertheless violently broken up, and supposititious passages, which might be imagined to have been blended together in their formation, are confidently paraded as their true sources. The appearance of contrariety is created, where none exists, by attributing meanings to isolated fragments, which are simply the creation of the critic's own brain, and by the double process of ejecting from the text and importing into it a purely arbitrary manner, and as may best serve the purpose of the critics. The methods employed evince a determination to force through a preconceived scheme of division at all hazards, and would be equally successful, if applied with like ingenuity to any other treatise, secular or sacred, however compactly united.

In the "Contemporary Review" for April, Miss Julia Wedgwood contrasts Greek Mythology and the Bible: "If we tried to put the difference between the two as shortly as possible, we might say that a single letter sums up the difference of Greek and Hebrew thought on theology. Men to the Greek were sons of the gods. Man to the Hebrew was the son of God. The divine world was not more real to the Hebrew than to the Greek; the connection between the human and the divine was not felt less certain. But God, as revealed to us in the Scriptures, is the God of the conscience. He is the God who hates iniquity, who abhors all evil. The divine world, as revealed to us in Greek literature, is made up of beings just as different in this respect as men and women are different.

The Greek had a vision of righteousness; but it was as one idea out of many, all of which were mirrored in the divine world above humanity, with what we may call a kind of artistic impartiality. 'In Greek thought the divine world is as various as the human world, and in Hebrew thought the divine world is the source and centre of unity. Greek fancy interposed itself before the divine as a prism before a sunbeam, and colored the divine and human world alike with rainbow hues. Hebrew reverence turned all the variety of color back into one pure white ray, and saw all human activity in strong light and shadow, according as it transmitted or obscured that light. That contrast supplies us with a clew to all that is most important in the series of narratives we seek to follow. Good and evil to the Greek differed as one color differs from another color. Good and evil to the Hebrew differed as light differs from darkness." This position Miss Wedgwood illustrates by choosing the story of Heracles, and setting by its side passages in the Old Testament with which it most invites comparison, the most prominent of which to her mind are to be found in the Book of Job. She concludes with the practical lesson: "Whenever we suppose that in choosing the wrong instead of the right, we are enriching life with new coloring, instead of turning from light to darkness (and we are so tempted very often), there, I believe, we make the largest error that it is possible for man to commit, and turn away from all that makes the hope of humanity. But when we quit the inclosure of our own personality, and seek to understand the moral forces that move the world — then I believe also that we err, unless we take up, *for a time*, the Greek point of view; regarding those impulses which result in wrong as something to be explained rather than abhorred, and trying to understand what we call evil as carefully as we try to understand what is good. What we do need to beware of is, not so much that we should take either of these views to the exclusion of the other, — for hardly anybody fails to condemn wrong when he, or one he loves, is the agent in it, — but that we should mix up the two points of view, diluting our condemnation of wickedness by putting ourselves in the place of the criminal, and imagining his excuses; and then again blunting our comprehension of the faults it is not our business to condemn by insisting that they, too, are of the nature of evil. But how shall we know, it may be asked, when we ought to take the Greek view and when the Hebrew? God reveals to human spirits their ideal function in the moment of presenting that issue which is their opportunity, and to try to determine it by a rule that can be interpreted apart from the conscience is to seek the living among the dead."

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THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

THERE was a time when the essence of Christianity was believed to consist in a number of fixed dogmatic opinions and ecclesiastical customs, and when the only point to be discussed was the question, Which one of the various churches or sects possesses the true dogmas and rites constituting the essence of Christianity? To-day we have left this point behind, for we know that dogmas and rites appertain merely to the phenomena of a religion, but do not constitute its real and original essence. On the contrary, this consists in the specific way and manner in which man experiences his relation to God and the world, in feelings which become established as a permanent emotional tendency, and are held in common by many people. Of course this does not render the difficulty any less. The history of Christianity exhibits the greatest possible variety in regard to the kinds of emotion which — some of them side by side, others in succession — controlled certain classes and entire centuries. Which one of these various kinds of emotion is to be considered the peculiarly Christian kind? Is it that of the earliest Christians, who, in expectation of the speedy arrival of Christ, despised and shunned the world and endured its persecutions in silent sufferance? or is it that of the Catholic crusaders, who, sword in hand, tried to conquer the world for the Church, the proudest of all secular powers? Is it that of the monk who, withdrawn from the world, in his cloister cell mortifies himself and in ecstatic phantasies attempts to raise himself to heaven? or is it that of the Protestant who finds in the moral order of the world the presence of the heavenly

kingdom, and is convinced that he serves his God in the fulfillment of his various ethical duties? It is evident that the diversity of emotional forms in the phenomena of Christianity is hardly less than that of dogmatic and ritualistic forms. This fact is not surprising, since the dogmas and rites are merely the temporary deposit and expression of the prevailing kinds of emotion.

The difficulty in correctly perceiving the peculiar essence of such a great historical phenomenon as Christianity is due to the fact that this essence does not manifest itself immediately or in its completeness and purity in any one single form of its historical development. It is the ideal principle which lies at the bottom of the whole development, the spiritual power of life which it brings forth, the commanding law which is inherent in its historical progress and guides it, the ideal, final aim which from the beginning is striven for, and is gradually approached by the historical life of Christianity without ever being attained in definite perfection. As everywhere the law of a development can only be deduced from its whole progress, the perception of the essence of Christianity ought really to be obtained from a survey of its whole history. But a shorter proceeding is also possible. For it is clear at the outset that the peculiar principle of the Christian religion can be perceived most definitely in its *Biblical beginnings* when, as a new religion, it confronted Judaism and Paganism, and in its struggle with both became conscious of its new essence with increasing clearness.

In particular, the religious personality of Jesus from which the new religion arose is the most important source for the perception of its essence. But it must not be supposed that the essence of Christianity consists simply of all that is reported in the gospels of Jesus' life and teaching. Even apart from the consideration that we find in the Gospels many accounts the historical certainty of which is subject to doubt and criticism, the fact must not be overlooked that the peculiarly new principle did not by any means manifest itself with equal pureness and power in all the features of the life and teaching of Jesus. Like every reforming genius, Jesus was, from one point of view, far above his time and surroundings, as the bearer of an original, world-renewing power. From another point of view, however, he was also a child of his time and his people, who had grown up in its traditions and was partially restrained by its limits. Jesus himself did not make his appearance with a conscious intention of founding

a new religion ; so the community of his disciples was, at the outset, far from realizing the essential difference or opposition between Judaism and itself.

This conviction was formed gradually and not without many a struggle, when Paul brought Christianity to the Gentiles and freed it from the fetters of the Jewish law. Then only did the new religious principle, which had been implicit in the consciousness and life of Jesus, become disclosed as a new reality. Then for the first time, with Paul and on Gentile-Christian ground, did Christianity become conscious of its peculiar essence in opposition to Judaism and Paganism. But here, too, the essence and the reality were far from being purely and simply identical. The theological form in which Paul and his followers gave a definite consciousness to the new essence of Christianity, was itself, again, a garb taken from the ideas of the time which served both as a clothing and as a protection for the pure, ethico-religious nucleus of Christianity. The essence of Christianity is therefore as little identical with the teaching of Paul as with the Gospels ; it cannot be gathered *immediately* from the writings of the New Testament or from any other witnesses of the church. Nevertheless the former are certainly the preëminent sources from which *mediately*, through scientific investigation and comparison of particular points, the common essence can be ascertained, which, as the new nucleus, — full of great promise for the future, — was hidden among the various temporary forms and coverings. Since, moreover, the creative life-principle of a phenomenon contains at the same time the critical norm and the regenerative power in case of its degeneration and deterioration, the essence of Christianity as ascertained from the New Testament will also prove itself to be the motive power of the Reformation in the sixteenth century.

From what has been said it follows that we shall have to consider as the essence of Christianity whatever — after deduction of temporary and transitory coverings — stands forth as the real permanent nucleus of the religion and morality of the New Testament and the Reformation.

That the characteristic feature of the religious personality of Jesus was his consciousness of sonship of God may be considered universally admitted. But all depends on what we understand by this consciousness of Jesus : whether a universal-human religious relation — which first in him became completely real, but can and should also be realized in all of us, by him and through him — or an exclusive, peculiar, and unique relation of an eter-

nal-metaphysical and temporal-physical descent from God, in the dogmatic sense of the doctrine of the Trinity and the Christ. In the latter case the divine sonship of Jesus might be an object of our cognition, but it could not become a subject of our own religious experience or repeat itself in our feeling of our own relation to God. Indeed the conviction that at one time there had appeared in Jesus Christ such an exceptional son of God might be taken as the historical presupposition of the origin of the Christian religion, but it could not be considered as its universal essence, so far as the latter consists in a kind of consciousness of God common to all. But it is evident that Jesus, according to the first three Gospels (which are alone considered in this connection), called God *his* Father in no other sense than the one in which he taught us to pray: "*Our* Father in heaven" and in which he said of the merciful and the peacemakers that they shall be called the children of the Father in heaven who makes his sun to shine on the evil and on the good. In exactly the same sense Paul says, "Ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus" (Gal. iii. 26), and he therefore calls Christ the "firstborn among many brethren" (Rom. viii. 29). Hence it is evident that we must consider the divine sonship which formed the fundamental character of the religious self-consciousness of Jesus, not as a unique, metaphysical relation between him and God, but as the first actual and typical realization of that religious relation in general in which *all* men should stand to God because of their divine origin and destination, and which becomes a real experience in all who believe in Christ, — that is, make their own his filial spirit. We may therefore consider the consciousness of divine sonship, — this salient new feature in the personality of Jesus, — at the same time the characteristic essence of the Christian religion, its distinguishing mark from all that is pre-Christian and extra-Christian, and the nucleus of all specifically Christian utterances concerning God, man, and the world. Before we analyze the threefold objective relation which is comprised in this consciousness, let us first consider what subjective emotions correspond to it.

"Ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the spirit of adoption whereby we cry, Abba, Father" (Rom. viii. 15). In these words the apostle Paul indicates in the plainest manner the distinctive feature of Christian as contrasted with the Jewish-Gentile piety. The fundamental feeling of the heathen was fear of their gods and demons; they

felt that they were exposed without defense to the superior power of their divinities, while they were at the same time unable to cherish any firm faith in their good-will; they feared the incomprehensible whims, jealous envy, and malicious joy of their various gods and spirits, and, above all, the blind power of fate reigning over gods and men, a power whose aimless and heartless rule could inspire them with naught but terror. The Jew also was afraid of his God, just as the slave is afraid of his master whose will is to him a dire necessity, or as the criminal fears the judge whose very righteousness is a decree of punishment to him. With the Christian, however, the place of this slavish spirit is taken by the childlike spirit of confiding love which drives away fear. But the feeling of dependence does not cease or weaken for this reason. On the contrary, the Christian feels himself, in his natural condition, not only entirely dependent on the all-ruling divine Omnipotence, he also feels himself in a moral sense absolutely bound to the holy will of God whose demands extend not merely to man's outward conduct, but also to his inner self, to the inmost recesses of his heart. Not simply the killing, but even the hatred of our neighbor; not only adultery, but even desire for another's wife, is sin before God. For God requires not merely such and such actions, he demands the devotion of the whole man, of his undivided pure heart to his holy will and to the highest purposes of his kingdom. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy strength, and thy neighbor as thyself." Herein are comprised, according to the teaching of Jesus, the whole law and all that the divine will exacts of man.

The full force of this deeper meaning of the requirements of the law involves at the same time the abrogation of all external exactions of the law. When man devotes his whole heart to God and his perfect good purpose, then the barrier falls that separates the divine will from the human. No longer with reluctance does man feel himself subject to coercion by a foreign, superior, and despotic will, which his own willfulness ever defies and desires to resist, because subjection to foreign compulsion is annihilation of one's own will. On the contrary, by entire self-devotion to God's perfect will man finds his own true will fulfilled, his better self satisfied, his inmost being and life freed from the painful discord between desire and obligation; he finds the salvation of his soul. "Whoever would preserve his soul (in willful selfishness), he shall lose it; but whoever loses it for the sake of the kingdom of God

(by surrendering his own will to God's will), he shall preserve it for eternal life." He will find in unity with God his own true self, the fulfillment of his life. But if man finds his true life and salvation in devotion to God, then the most complete dependence becomes at the same time complete freedom, since freedom is, after all, nothing else but self-realization. The free dependence, however, that finds its own self preserved and fulfilled in its submission to the other self is *love* which "does not seek its own, but another's," and finds in this voluntary devotion its self-satisfaction, its highest good. Thus, in place of the unfree dependence of the servitude of the law, appears the free dependence of childlike love that sacrifices its own will to God in order to find in God's will its true self, its life's element, its salvation. "I can do nothing of myself; I seek not my own will, but the will of the Father." "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me and to finish his work." "He that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God and God in him" (John iv. 34; v. 30; 1 John iv. 16).

Love, therefore, is the fundamental mood of the pious feeling in Christianity, and, more accurately speaking, *childlike love*, since man feels himself then to be altogether the recipient. "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?" (1 Cor. iv. 7.) This sentiment of thankful humility is seen through all the epistles of the apostle Paul and it forms the real keynote of his doctrine of salvation. His pious gratitude is not at all confined to goods and gifts of this world, it refers particularly to the highest spiritual goods, the consciousness of redemption and reconciliation, the possession of the Holy Spirit as a pledge of divine love and eternal life. The Christian knows that he does not possess these spiritual goods of himself, has not obtained and deserved them through his own will and action, but that they are gifts of undeserved divine love and mercy, effects of the divine spirit which works within us the will and the deed, and through which the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts. This divine spirit discloses to us the depths of Deity and consecrates us as pure temples to God. This is the natural consequence when once love has been perceived as the essential religious relation. Is love an arbitrary action that can be done at the word of command, or does it proceed from motives of self-will, from fear of punishment, or from hope of a requiting reward? Is it not rather an involuntary feeling, the origin of which is beyond the limits of the Ego, reaching deep into the mysterious basis and connecting bond of spirits? As this holds true of all love among men, how much more forcibly does it apply to

the love that binds men and God together in a unity of life and will! How could man by his own efforts in view of the narrowness of his isolated individuality and his limited self-will be capable of such love, if this barrier were not abolished by that higher spiritual power to which he surrender himself in love? "If any man love God, the same is known of him" (1 Cor. viii. 3). "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us" (1 John iv. 10). It is the work of God who is above all and in all that the barrier of selfhood is broken down within us and our heart is ennobled and impelled to devote itself to Him. What in one sense is man's own free obedient action, the sacrifice of his will to God, is — viewed from another point — at the same time the work of God in man, the gift of his mercy, the drawing and impulse of his holy spirit. "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 20); so says the apostle. It is Christ the Lord who is the spirit, the spiritual man from heaven, or the divine and eternal in man, who breaks through the barriers of the natural individuality with its sensual and selfish tendencies, and becomes the prevailing principle in the Ego, transforming the latter into a "new creation" (*καὴν κτίσις*). Thus man, the child of earth, becomes the citizen of the heavenly kingdom, the unfree slave becomes a free child of God; he who was lost in the lust of the world is brought back to the paternal heart by the Father's love; through God, man, who is descended from Him but became estranged from Him, is reconciled with God; he becomes a man of God, a spiritual man, an heir of eternal life. Here we stand before the deepest mystery of Christian piety, the proper and real miracle which the understanding with its discerning conceptions cannot penetrate or measure, and which is nevertheless as true a reality of experience as any condition of life in which we become directly aware of the reciprocal relation of the particular forces and the governing whole, of freedom and dependence, of self-existence and life in others.

We have thus attempted to describe the essence of Christianity in its centre of unity as the fundamental sentiment of the pious soul. We now turn to an exposition of the cardinal declarations in regard to God, Man, and the World which are involved in that nucleus and in which are found the elements of the Christian precepts or "dogmas." The latter do not really concern us here; we have to do with the original religious nucleus which is essential to Christian consciousness as such, and which in dogmas found manifold and diverse ecclesiastic-scholastic forms and disguises.

When the Christian feels himself in the relation of a child to God, he perceives God as father or holy love. Herein lies the essential difference of the Christian conception of God from the Jewish and Gentile. The heathen gods are personified powers of nature and potentiated, æsthetically idealized men, who are superior in power to mortals but do not rise above them in spirituality and morality. It is true that we find in the higher Pagan religions various tendencies to an ethical idealization of the gods, but they nowhere arrive at a consistent completeness, nor can they on the basis of natural religion where the difference of the spirit — the holy will of the absolute good — from nature is not yet perceived. A partial equivalent is certainly given by the æsthetic idealization of the gods of nature in the Greek religion. In the Greek gods crude nature has been overcome; in them is imprinted the ideal of the balanced harmony of the natural powers and impulses of that spiritualized, refined and transfigured naturalness or beauty, which was the ethical ideal of life of the Greeks, the *καλοκαγαθία*. But just as the latter did not go beyond the natural *εὐδαιμονία* and form the consciousness of an absolutely binding law, so the æsthetic idealization of the gods of nature could not lead to the conception of a supernatural free spirit that makes its own will the absolute law for all beings. The heathen divinities in all their transformations remained so deeply entangled in what pertains to nature, they were so complexly affected by the imperfections, shortcomings, passions, and contradictions of sensual human nature that the conception of an ethical perfection that is one with itself, or of "holiness," cannot be applied to them.

Just this, on the contrary, was the specific characteristic of the God of Israel; He is the "Holy One," that is, He is absolutely above all natural existence, free in himself, the all-powerful, incomparable, terribly majestic Lord, who makes his own will the absolute law for men, and jealously watches over its fulfillment in unquestioning obedience. His will is revealed in definite commandments, which, together with ethical precepts, — answering the special purposes of human society, — contain also many external regulations of a ritualistic kind; all these commandments, whatever their particular contents, are considered of equal literal authority, simply because they come from God, whose will alone determines what man must accept as good for himself. In relation to this revealed will of his God, man must not ask: Why? Wherefore? On the contrary, he must blindly obey what he has once been commanded to do. If he transgresses the com-

mandments, he has to fear the punishment of the severe judge, whose holy majesty becomes for the disobedient man a terrible judgment of wrath, by which the holy God of Israel avenges his offended honor. It is true that the Prophets and the Psalms know also the merciful, gracious, patient, and forbearing God who does not punish relentlessly, but benevolently forgives the repentant sinner; but these tendencies to the evangelical conception of God were not carried out in the legal religion of Judaism. The more consistently the latter developed, the more they were diminished and repressed, and from a logical point of view this was a very natural proceeding. For where once the religious relation is conceived as the legal relation between master and servant, lord and subject, there the execution of the divine will can consistently be nothing but the sentence of the judge, — reward or punishment. The divine and the human will are separated from one another in this case by a boundless chasm; to the divine command is opposed the human action, and the man who by his own power satisfies the divine command acquires thereby a claim that God will satisfy his wishes by a corresponding compensation. An inner unity of divine and human will in childlike love cannot be brought about in this case; the holy God remains ever equally distant from the unholy man, who is only flesh, and thinks after the manner of the flesh. It does not matter whether God be the terrible judge before whom the man, conscious of his guilt, trembles, or He appear as the rewarder with whom the man, just by his own actions, pleads and bargains as to his rights to compensation. Pharisaism, with its piety of works, its outward legality, its haughty self-justification, and its unamiable pride, — however foreign all this was to the nobler spirit of the prophets, — was, nevertheless, merely the natural consequence of the law-religion in which God is only the holy lord, not the father, not holy love.

The God of *Christianity* is not, like the Pagan divinity, a power of nature, or a refined human nature, but He is, like the God of the Jews, a supernatural spirit, an ethical will. But, on the other hand, He is not, like the Holy One of Israel, merely an opposite will, infinitely above man and human purposes of life, a stranger to man and over against him as a lord and judge; He is love, whose essence it is to communicate itself, to descend to weak and sinful men who are not simply flesh, but also spirit from God's spirit, and are made to be his images and his children, to be received into the community of divine life. It is true that it is also an essential characteristic of the Christian God to be a *holy will*

that makes its own purpose of good the absolute law of all creatures, and punishes resistance against his holy command by the destruction of the sinner. "Fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. x. 28), says Jesus, and Paul warns the Galatians: "Be not deceived; God is not mocked; he that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption" (Gal. vi. 7, 8).

It would be a grave error to suppose that in Christianity the holiness of God, and consequently the inviolability of the laws of the ethical constitution of the world, are no longer valid. Nevertheless, the idea of holy love with which the Christian conceives the essence of God is in many respects essentially different from that of the "Holy One of Israel." In the first place, the meaning of the divine will that binds us is not an arbitrary statute, foreign and indifferent to our own being, but it is the aim of the all-wise love that only wills what is best for us, it is the purport of the eternal will of reason, in which therefore all true and reasonable aims of the human will are not denied, but affirmed; only the unreason and disorder of willfulness are forbidden. Therefore the meaning of the divine will is no longer expressed for us, as it was for the Jews, in a number of commandments and ordinances, the letter of which as such should be a binding authority, once for all time; but as we are pledged to God to live for the good, and to make his kingdom and justice our highest goal, He leaves it to us, in the course of our historical experience, to perceive and prove, in an ever better and better manner, what is in particular cases the will of God, — "that good and acceptable and perfect will of God" (Rom. xii. 2), for all as well as for every single individual in his particular place, and according to his particular kind. Thus, instead of crippling our own ethical insight, and binding it fast by a solitary literal revelation of the law, holy love demands from us, on the contrary, a progressive growth in the independent perception of the good. Therefore the divine holiness signifies for us not the denial, but the affirmation and foundation, of ethical "autonomy." Although it is still entirely true for us what Isaiah says, "God that is holy shall be sanctified in righteousness" (Isa. v. 16), yet the judging and punishing, as an assertion of God who is holy love, has received another meaning than the one it had in the religion of law. The punishment is no longer a requiting act of the law that is an end in itself, and still less is it inflicted to avenge the offended honor of God and procure Him satisfaction, but it is the means of the "teaching grace" (Titus

ii. 12) which through the evils that are connected with sin as its unavoidable consequences is to cure us of the greatest evil, that is, willfulness, and then lead and compel us to reflect, examine ourselves, reform, and consequently be saved. "God chastens us for our profit, that we might be partakers of his holiness" (Heb. xii. 10).

These words lead us finally to the most important point of discrimination. The Holy One of Israel set up the law of the commandments as demands with which the human will had to comply, and this was man's own affair. Holy love, however, not only demands the good, but also procures the fulfillment of its demands; as Augustine pertinently said: "Jube quod vis et da quod jubes." The will of holy love does not remain a letter of the law that is foreign to man, and can merely judge and slay, without giving him life; it becomes in the heart of man himself the living power of the Holy Ghost (2 Cor. iii. 6), the new and free principle of life (Rom. viii. 2) that betrays its divine origin in the begetting of godly sentiment (Rom. xii. 2). Its fruits are the Christian virtues; above all, love which is the actual fulfillment of the law, because "love worketh no ill to his neighbor," but overcomes evil with good (Rom. xii. 21; xiii. 10; Gal. v. 22). The highest revelation of God as holy love is the fact that He arouses in man too the impulse of holy love, through which the power of sin — one's own and that of others — is overcome, and the community of the good is established, in which every individual becomes a free collaborer in the realization of the divine purpose of the world. Just in this efficacious *overcoming* of sin — as God's holy spirit achieves it in the inmost recesses of man's heart, and by virtue of this spirit man achieves the same in his brethren — is included the *forgiveness* of sin. This forgiving is certainly a gracious gift of divine love; yet it is holy love which does not simply overlook sin and exempt the sinner from the punishment of his guilt, — as it might seem, — but it effaces guilt itself by breaking and overcoming the power of the natural impulse of sin through the higher power of the holy impulse of the spirit. "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death (Rom. viii. 2). This is the redeeming and reconciling revelation of the essence of God as love, which is one with holy justice.

To the Christian consciousness of God corresponds the estimation of man as the child of God, in which the highest idealism is united with the most sober realism. In the heathen opinion of

the human race the saying that man's heart is at once defiant and despondent proves generally true. There appears on one side the heaven-storming presumption which is typically represented by the myth of the building of the tower at Babel and by the story of Prometheus. Man in his striving after civilization, with his knowledge and power deems himself equal to the gods; he considers himself, as the enlightenment of the sophists and stoics taught him, the measure of all things, and convinces himself by his reasonings that he is lord of the world, a king and a god, dependent on no one and responsible to no one. The counterpart to this deification of man which reached its climax in the cult of the Roman Cæsars is found in the intense contempt for man which is everywhere a characteristic of the Pagan world and manifests itself in the treatment of women, slaves, strangers, and enemies. It is not man as such to whom dignity and rights are conceded; the citizen of the state alone possesses them, the free man who by his personal capacity, bravery, prudence, renown or wealth represents a value for the whole community. On the other hand the stranger, barbarian, and slave pass for beings of a lower order, destined by nature itself to servitude, devoid of all personal rights, and even woman is not considered equal to man, because she is no match for him in the virtues which are of the greatest importance for the commonwealth. The estimation of man in general and of every individual is everywhere in the ancient world an external one, according to his political and social position and capacity. As for an estimation of his value based on his inner being, the purity of his heart and the force of his character, there are found but a few weak attempts. Among the Jews the national egoism and contempt for the Gentiles were even harsher than the disdain which prevailed among the Gentiles for the barbarians, because the national consciousness was heightened by that of their religious peculiarity and superiority. The Pharisee considers the Jews alone as objects of divine pleasure and providence; the heathen are to him the objects of the wrath and punitive judgment of God, and consequently the pious Jew must assume an exclusive attitude towards them. Even within the circle of the Jewish community the estimation of the individual was hardly less external and superficial than among the heathen. There was this difference, that the criterion, corresponding to the theocratic ideal of the people, took more account of religious ritualistic merit than of worldly cultivated capacity and meritoriousness. To the heathen self-deification corresponded the

Jewish self-justification and sanctimoniousness; to the Pagan contempt of the barbarians and slaves answered the pharisaical contempt of the Gentiles and the low people that had not the law.

Esteem for the dignity of man in all men without distinction of nationality, rank or sex was first brought about by Christianity. "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus" (Gal. iii. 28), says Paul to the Galatians. The reason for this fundamental acknowledgment of universal humanity which is decisive for the whole later history of the human race lay in the religious consciousness of the universal equal relation of all men to God. Moreover, this equal relation exists in a twofold sense, positive and negative. On one side we read: "For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God" (Rom. iii. 23); on the other side it is nevertheless true that God makes his sun shine upon the good and the evil alike (Rom. iii. 29); that He is a God not only of the Jews, but also of the Gentiles (Matt. v. 45), and that every individual human soul has in his eyes a value not to be outweighed by the whole world (Mark viii. 36). It is, however, noteworthy and characteristic of the sober realism from which the Christian ideal of humanity rises that the Bible everywhere speaks much less of the general dignity of man than of the universal unworthiness, lack of merit, weakness and need of redemption. This judgment is applied, by Paul and even by Jesus himself, in particular to the haughty self-justification of the Jews, but of course it holds good just as much of the Gentiles. The messengers of the Christian tidings of salvation were not, like modern world-improvers, optimistic visionaries who suppose human nature to be excellent and derive all evil from incidental outward circumstances. Like the prophets, Jesus and the apostles knew that the ground of all outward evils must be sought deeper; they found it in the selfish desires of the human heart which will disregard the eternal ethical order of God. "From within, out of the heart of men proceed evil thoughts" (Mark vii. 21) which defile man. "Every man is tempted when he is drawn away by his own lust and enticed" (James i. 14). "For the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal. v. 17). "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Rom. vii. 23, 24.) This is the unanimous judgment found in the New Testament.

Paul added that this universal wretchedness of sin is owing to a divine sentence or curse pronounced upon the whole human race in the fall of Adam (Rom. v. 12, etc.). This theory, derived from the theology of the Pharisees, was later made the basis of anthropology in the Augustinian-ecclesiastical school. A great many still believe that with this particular theory the whole Christian judgment on the natural man stands or falls. This is a complete mistake. That Pharisaic and Pauline theory of the curse on Adam's race forms neither in the Old nor in the New Testament the basis of the doctrine of the ethical condition of the natural man; this is derived purely from sober and unprejudiced ethical judgment of human nature, as it manifests itself in *general experience*. This experience always remains the same whatever opinion we may form as to the historical beginnings of our race. He who thinks the history of Adam's fall a myth cannot but acknowledge the correctness of the judgment of the New Testament that all that is born from flesh is flesh, and that the "flesh lusteth against the spirit," so that we cannot find the fulfillment of the good and are devoid of the glory which we ought to have before God. In short it must be admitted that sin, the tendency of godless willfulness, is a power that has its root in the inmost recesses of human nature, and rules over the whole race. In the unequal battle with this power the individual is unable by himself alone to gain the victory unless the redeeming and educating power of the divine spirit in the community of the kingdom of God comes to his aid.

The reverse side of universal sin and need of redemption is found in the universal ability of all men to be redeemed, which is based on the indestructible essence of the divine image that is in every man, and even amidst the thorn-thicket of sin and worldly lust never becomes entirely extinct, but remains, the living germ of a better future, of a new man of God. This divine germ manifests itself less in "knowing" (*Wissen*), as the Greeks supposed, than in the conscience (*Gewissen*), the "light that is in thee" (Matt. vi. 23), the inner law of God lightened by the eternal "Logos" (John i. 9; Rom. ii. 14) which makes us perceive what we are and what we ought to be. It manifests itself in the painful feeling of our spiritual weakness and poverty, in grief over the impurity of our heart that separates us from the holy God, in sorrow over the servitude in the bond of which we are held captives by sin, and in the affliction we feel as we are lost in the labyrinth of wordly lusts and cares. It manifests

itself in hunger and thirst after righteousness, peace with God, freedom from sin and the world, — in brief, in the deep feeling of our need of redemption (Rom. vii. 24; Matt. v. 6), which, as such, is at the same time the guaranty of our ability for redemption. In this manner an entirely new estimation of man is reached. It is no longer what he is and does externally, or what he is considered by the community to be, that decides his worth. This is determined by his inmost feeling, the tendency of his soul towards the divine good, even if this be at first only a painful regret for the loss of it and a heartfelt desire to regain it. Whenever Jesus met this feeling, he knew that salvation was for such; therefore with the love of a rescuing saviour he took pity on the unshepherded, languishing, and scattered people. Therefore he interested himself in the publicans and sinners, and in those who were expelled from respectable society; therefore he said that much was forgiven to the repentant sinning woman, because she had loved much, and that the humble, penitent publican came out from the temple justified before the self-exculpating Pharisee. He offered to those that were sick in body and spirit, to the weary and the oppressed, the very fulfillment of their yearning after salvation; it was the awakening and enlivenment of their better self and the new life that were in bondage in them. In him who subdued and expelled impure spirits through the power of the holy spirit of love, those who were anxious to be saved found the realization of what hovered before them as the goal of their endeavors, — the peace of the soul united with God and the power to bear joyfully the burden imposed on every one in the kingdom of God. Thus they found in him the master, shepherd, physician, and lord; they believed in his vocation as saviour because they experienced his saving power in themselves. Thus there formed around him a group of disciples, in which his spirit of saving and sanctifying love united and animated all, and laid the foundation for a new community of the ethical kingdom of God, in which the fellowship of the good manifests itself as a victorious power over sin and evil.

This is the redeeming force which went out from Jesus Christ, as the earlier evangelists describe him to us. Thus Paul also and the other writers of the New Testament understood redemption through the belief in Christ or the gospel; it is true they differ somewhat as to the form of statement, but there is hardly any substantial difference as to the essence of the matter. Redemption, in the sense of the Gospels, is not a miraculous event occur-

ring once, and brought about outside of humanity by a super-human mediator, between the Godhead and humanity; it is an inner process within the heart of man which always and everywhere repeats itself when the fettered and diseased powers of the soul are freed and healed, when the image of God and the child of God that slumber in every one are aroused to life, reality, and power. Such a force proceeds in every community from those who are relatively sound and strong, and through them affects others. The educating influence of the community consists in the very fact that those who are still on a lower stage of development are drawn up by those who have advanced and in whom that which in the others is still to be realized is already a reality. Those in whom the spiritual gifts of humanity are enhanced so far above their surroundings that they raise the ideal of man through their personal being and action to a higher stage of historical development we call heroes and prophets, pioneers and leaders of humanity in the struggle toward an ideal goal and ethical freedom. From them all a certain redeeming force proceeds and affects their contemporaries and posterity. The effect is the greater, the higher and purer the ideal is which was awakened and realized in them. The ideal, the ethical-religious *truth* is the freeing and elevating power (John viii. 32); the individual is such only in so far as he is the type and voice of the idea.

Among all these ethical and religious geniuses and heroes of history Jesus Christ occupies the central position. For at a time when the ancient world did not know what to make of its hitherto existing ideals, and was, so to speak, facing spiritual bankruptcy, Jesus perceived the new and most exalted ideal of man — sonship of God — through the revelation of the eternal Logos in his inmost heart. He represented it in his life and teaching typically and evidently, with impressive and educating power for all who were willing to receive his message. Finally he surrendered his life for its realization in a community of the children of God, — that new spiritual kingdom of God, — which took the place of the carnal hopes of the Messianic kingdom of the Jews. Therefore Jesus is rightly called the redeemer and saviour of men, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, and his life-work the work of redemption or the revelation of salvation, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. His appearance was the turning-point of the times, and his work was the decisive victory of liberating truth and love over the power of darkness and the impure spirits of sin and error, in the bonds of which humanity had been held captive. By his death, which was at the same time the victory of his cause,

the victory of the divine principle in humanity was decided forever and guaranteed for each of his successors. A deep meaning therefore lies at the bottom of all that the church has said in relation to Christ's person and work, and particularly as to his redeeming death. Yet we must not forget to distinguish between the significant essence and the mythical symbol. We must not forget that the real redemption cannot be in a unique miraculous sonship of God of Jesus Christ which — as it would be his exclusive property — could be of no avail to us. It is in the universal human sonship of God, the ethico-religious ideal of humanity which he typically represented for all of us by the original power of genius in his person, and thereby established its realization and rendered it feasible for all men. In the truth of this ideal of man — the divine sonship — the essence of Christianity consists; the true, redeeming, and saving faith of the Christian consists in his adopting this ideal as the conviction of his heart and the principle of his whole life. This faith exists wherever the spirit of Christ, the firstborn among many brethren (Rom. viii. 29) lives in the heart and manifests itself in the life.

All practical ideals lead to the foundation of communities. They produce a common conviction and sentiment — the strongest bond of all human communities — by raising into clear consciousness what before existed in all men as an unconscious predisposition, and in many men as a half-conscious presentiment and yearning. The more true and pure an ethico-religious ideal is, the less can its signification remain confined to a narrow, national circle, and the farther will its value as a determinative authority, and consequently its power to found communities, extend. Hence it is evident that the highest ideal — the ideal of man as the son of God — must also have the most extended sphere of power, and that it is qualified and destined to found a boundless, all-embracing community of men. This universal community founded on the divine ideal of humanity is the ethical conception of the "kingdom of God;" this ethical conception is included in the idea of the child of God, as its necessary consequence. That Jesus in gathering his community of disciples laid the foundation for the historical realization of the ethical kingdom of God is a matter of fact. This fact is in no wise essentially altered by the consideration that we do not know certainly how far he grasped this ethical-universal conception of the kingdom with a conscious distinction from the Jewish, relatively apocalyptic conception of the Messianic kingdom.

The universal-ethical consequence which was included in the ideal of the child of God, and was, perhaps, more or less veiled in the consciousness of Jesus, was drawn out by the Apostle Paul very positively and vigorously. To him the gospel of the heavenly (ideal) son of God revealed in Jesus is the universal power of salvation for all believers, Greeks as well as Jews (Rom. i. 17), and consequently the bond which is to unite all nations and men in the unity of the "*body of Christ*" (1 Cor. xii. 12). In this conception Paul gave to the idea of an organism of humanity governed by *one* spiritual-ethical principle a profound expression, the range of which reaches far beyond the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics. This was a reaction against the ancient deification of the State; the strengthened personal self-consciousness emancipated itself from the preponderance of the State-community, in which it had been confined hitherto in a subordinate position. But while national barriers and ties were depreciated and even destroyed by the skeptical understanding, there arose no new and higher form of community to take their place. The socialistic one-sidedness of the ancient conception of the State was merely confronted by the just as one-sided principle of the self-glorifying and self-sufficient Individual. The Stoic cosmopolitanism did not express a positive common-consciousness binding each man to humanity, but merely the negation of the narrower bonds which unite the citizen to the State-community of his nation, in favor of an atomic individualism and egoism dissolvent of all ethical community.

While the moral philosophy of antiquity, after breaking away from ancestral custom, thus fluctuated hither and thither between opposite extremes, the gospel of the sonship of God of all men revealed a *new ethical principle*, which embraces in a higher unity both principles, the binding power of fellowship and the independent right of the personal mind. The community in Christ forms an organism in which the one spirit of sonship of God, or of holy love, unites all such as belong to it, not merely in outward appearance, but in fact and in truth, in such a manner that individuals feel themselves members and instruments of the whole, and serve its universal purposes with unselfish devotion. On the other hand, this selfsame spirit animates and governs the whole life also in the individual members as the principle of their ethical personality, of their independent, ethico-religious building up of conscience and character. According to Paul, not only the whole community, but every single Christian, is a temple of the Holy Ghost, a man of the spirit; and of the latter Paul says :

"He that is spiritual judges all things, yet he himself is judged of no man" (1 Cor. ii. 15), that is, in questions of ethical and religious truth the highest authority is not without him, but within him. Likewise John says (xiv. 23) that God and Christ will come in the Holy Spirit to him that loves Him, and make their abode with him. Consequently every Christian possesses, by virtue of this love of God, his full salvation within himself, and is directly united with God.

Characteristic of the efficacy of Christ is also the fact that he addressed his invitation to come to the kingdom of God, not to the masses, but to single individuals, to receptive souls, and tried to permeate them, through an educating process, with his spirit in order to form of spiritually enlivened persons a living community of God, the new temple not built by hands. What else is the hope that pervades the whole New Testament, the hope of the resurrection of individual Christians at the Parousia, but the pledge of the eternal right of the ethical and spiritual personality? To question this right is to misapprehend the essence of Christianity; to assail it is to strike at the very heart of Christianity. But since this ethical right of personality has a religious foundation in Christianity — being based on the faith that makes us children of God, and on the love of God in which we feel God dwelling within us — it excludes from the outset the extreme of an egoistic, anti-social individualism, into which the principle of personal autonomy in the non-religious moral philosophy, in the Stoics, and in modern enlightenment, for instance, inevitably deteriorates. As children of the same eternal Father, the Christians form a family-community in which individuals feel themselves bound together in solidarity; each feels the other's weal and woe, and each bears the other's burden; not only the burden of nature, but also the burden of conscience, responsibility for ethical difficulties, and care for ethical advancement. The question of Cain, the first individualist: "Am I my brother's keeper?" is excluded by the Christian principle which unites all men in solidarity as members in the body of Christ. The brotherly love which sees in each fellow-creature, — although only potentially, — and esteems the child of God, is the practical synthesis of the two great antithetic principles whose struggle pervades the history of the world, egoism and altruism. Love that is bound to God makes itself the voluntary servant of all, and yet at the same time guards its divine right to the dignity and freedom of personality. It endures all things, and yet does not demean itself; it serves all, and neverthe-

less does not degrade itself ; it condescends to all, without becoming the slave of any one ; it becomes all things to all men, and at the same time remains ever itself ; it overcomes evil with good, and conquers the world through meekness (1 Cor. xiii., Matt. v. 5).

In this fundamental principle of Christian ethics, brotherly love, lies also the inner correction for that aspect of it which at the beginning, from transitory reasons, appeared in one-sided force, its asceticism. It was the purpose of Christianity to found a new world of the Holy Spirit. When it made its appearance to a humanity enchained by worldly lust and carnal desires, it had first to engage in a desperate struggle with all that bound the heaven-descended spirit in servitude to the world of sense. "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee, for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell" (Matt. v. 29). "If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die ; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live" (Rom. viii. 13). "Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth" (Col. iii. 5). "I keep under my body and bring it into subjection ; lest by any means when I have preached to others I myself should be a castaway" (1 Cor. ix. 27). In these and many like passages an austerity finds expression which seems to recommend extreme asceticism. As we well know, it has often been understood and practiced, or been impeached and censured, in the sense of a dualistic hostility to nature. A historical treatment will stand aloof from both of these views. On one side, it must be admitted that the principles of Protestant ethics concerning our relation to sensuous nature are not plainly identical with the views of early Christianity. The most emphatic proof of this fact is found in the Protestant idea of marriage as compared with the opinion of Paul (1 Cor. vii. 7). The departure of Protestantism, and especially of Luther, from the Christianity of the New Testament is nowhere so conspicuous as in this particular point.

On the other hand, the conclusion drawn from this peculiarity of early Christianity that the essence of Christianity was, in general and in principle, a dualism hostile to nature and asceticism was very irrational. A single phenomenon due to temporary conditions was mistaken for the universal and permanent essence of Christianity. The fact was overlooked that the New Testament itself considers the body as a temple of the Holy Spirit, and its members as weapons and instruments of righteousness unto God (Rom. vi. 13 ; 1 Cor. vi. 19). Consequently, the New Testament

knows very well the positive value of the senses as a useful medium for the purposes of the spirit, and therefore does not mean to oppose the senses as such, but only in so far as they set themselves up for masters of the spirit, instead of being its servants for ethically good purposes. "All things are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any" (1 Cor. vi. 12). These words express the correct ethical attitude towards the senses. An ascetic, monkish ethics which combats nature in man as devoid of rights cannot energetically promote the purposes of human society. These purposes, as well as the means for their advancement, are rooted in man's nature by countless fibres; if these roots were cut, the noblest blossoms of human society, the family for instance, would necessarily become extinct. If love which feels itself compelled to effectively promote the purposes of fellowship is the fundamental principle of Christian ethics, then a partial monkish asceticism finds no place in it. Therefore Protestantism did not, as has been asserted, set itself in opposition to the essence of Christianity; on the contrary, it drew from the rightly understood essence the correct conclusion by limiting the rigorous asceticism of the early Christians to the proportion which answers the conditions and purposes of the human society in which and for which the Christian is bound by love to live and to work. The difference of Protestant ethics from the ethics of the early Christians is not in the principle, but in the application of it. This difference is explained especially by the preponderance and the decline of the eschatological expectations and sentiments. We are thus led to the third conception, in the description of Christian consciousness.

The religious opinion of *the world* seems to be essentially the same in Christianity as in Judaism, from which the doctrines of divine creation and government were taken. Nevertheless, here too, the peculiarity of specifically Christian piety becomes noticeable. In the case of the Jewish religion, as in any religion which is confined to a nation, the purpose of the establishment and course of the world is found in the aims of that particular nation, in the fulfillment of hopes of a glorious future, of external might and power and internal prosperity and welfare. But if every occurrence in the world of nature and of history is to serve such a limited purpose, this is possible only through the constant interference of an all-powerful ruler who, unmindful of the ordering of the whole, is intent only on the advancement of the special purposes of his favorite people. To the national limitation of the

consciousness of God corresponds the unlimited nature of the divine arbitrary will, the supernatural omnipotence. This supposition came into severe collision with the reality, which remained ever farther and farther behind the hopes of national glory, while the people of God, instead of triumphing over all their enemies, fell more and more hopelessly into the power of the Gentiles. If, in face of this fact, the belief in a time of national glory (the Messianic kingdom) — which stands and falls with the national religion of Judaism — was to be maintained, it could only be through transferring the fulfillment of that proud hope to a new world, which divine omnipotence would soon substitute for the present world, in such radical contradiction with the purposes of the people of God. Thus, since the time of the Maccabees (Daniel) the thoughts and aims of Jewish piety were concentrated in the disclosure of that new, wondrous world which, coming from heaven, was to fulfill the wishes of all. The favorite writings of the Jews were the “apocalypses,” in which the terrestrial hopes of the old prophets were magnified to supernatural dimensions, and became a *Fata Morgana*, a visionary fancy.

The Christian view of the world is distinguished from the Jewish idea by the fact that it finds the purpose of the world no longer in a single nation, but in entire humanity; no longer in a condition of material happiness, but in an ethical ideal; not in the carnal-Jewish Messianic kingdom, but in the spiritual-ethical kingdom of God. This profoundly religious and truly logical thought, that the whole world, including Nature, exists for the sake of the ethical ideal of humanity and the divine-human good, and has its final cause, its *ratio essendi* herein, — a thought which from the beginning lies at the foundation of all Christian assertions in regard to the world, — this thought needs only to be carried out consistently in order to win the field against abstract Jewish supernaturalism and abstract Pagan naturalism. According to the heathen view, the world is, as a whole and in detail, the product of the aimless fancy of the gods and demons, or, according to the enlightened philosophers, of the accidental motions of the atoms. There is nowhere a final cause nor an absolutely worthy purpose for the whole, which at the same time may be the highest regulating principle of the world; there are only finite efficient causes whose interworking keeps in motion the aimless rotation of becoming and disappearing, — in one word, there is *nothing but Nature*. According to the Jews, the world is indeed the means for a divine purpose, but as the conception of this purpose is

morally limited, and therefore contradicts the real world, the latter is negatived, as a world that ought not to be, and a new imaginary world is postulated as an expected miracle of divine omnipotence. Consequently, Nature appears here as a nullity ; its place is taken by the Super-Nature of the world of wonders. This, considered in itself, is not spiritual-ethical, but fanciful-sensuous ; therefore it is in reality only the postically idealized reflection of the natural world, only its reduplication in fancy, not a spiritual victory over it. The abstract Jewish supernaturalism shows itself, in the main, a mere potentiated and disguised naturalism.

Christianity alone really overcame naturalism. It succeeded in this by recognizing the spiritual-ethical kingdom of God, the absolute ideal of the good, the divine sonship of all men, as the final cause of the world. Consequently, it found the efficient cause of the world, not in an abstract, omnipotent and despotic will of the deity, but in the eternal Logos, the purposeful and world-ordering thought of God.

The assertions of the New Testament that the world was created through the *Logos*, the Son, and for him (John i. 2 ; Heb. i. 2 ; Col. i. 16), contain profound thoughts, the burden of which is still too little comprehended, because men have not known how to distinguish the real nucleus from its mystical envelope. The latter consists in the identification of Jesus of Nazareth, the prophet of the ethico-religious idea of humanity, with the eternal idea preëxisting from the beginning in the divine thought, — the eternal, ideal Son of God, or *Logos*. However absurd the idea would be that the world was created through Jesus, and for him, there is a profound truth in the thought that the world is a work of divine reason, which brings order into the chaos of forces from eternity to eternity, and guides the course of the development of the world according to the ruling conception of a kingdom of divine, ethically perfect spirits. That the divine idea of man as "the son of his love," and of humanity as the kingdom of his Son, was the immanent, ordering final cause of all being and becoming, even in the world of Nature, has been the fundamental thought of the Christian Gnosis since the apostolic age, and no philosophy has ever been able to weaken or loose its hold. Indeed, the whole idealistic philosophy of modern times is nothing but the realization and confirmation of this conviction that Nature is set in order by the Spirit and for the Spirit as a subordinate medium for carrying out its eternal, ethical purposes ; consequently Nature is not what the Pagan naturalism supposed, the one

and the all, the last and the highest, but it has the spirit and its ethical purposes as lord and master over it. This is the true and only genuine supernaturalism, which is just as different from the abstract Jewish supernaturalism as it is from Pagan naturalism. For if the Logos, the rational, purposeful thought of God, is the creating, regulating, and ruling power over Nature, then Nature is an orderly system of purposes, and its process of becoming is a development from lower purposes to higher. In this totality each and every thing has its necessary place, and serves according to its definite kind, and in conformity with eternal laws, the final purpose of all-wise love. Here, too, Nature, as the arrangement of means for purposes of the spirit, obtains its full rights; it retains its immanent lawfulness and rationality; it does not become the plaything of a divine, despotic will, or the arena of fantastic actions of omnipotence, the supernatural miracles of which would supplant real nature by an imaginary super-nature that is unnatural. This is the perception of the world, corresponding to the essence of Christianity, and logically to be derived from its principle; it is an ethical idealism which is one with a sober realism, and as remote from abstract Jewish supernaturalism as from abstract Pagan naturalism.

The practical significance of this Christian view of the world is seen in the judgment pronounced upon particular events, benign and calamitous, experiences of happiness and misfortune, which come to men in the course of the world. The Gentile world saw in the vicissitudes of happiness and unhappiness the effects of a will of the gods, acting more according to incalculable whims than in conformity with fixed and rational purposes; or it perceived in the events of life the agency of an entirely aimless, blind fate. In either case, then, no ethical significance could be ascribed to human life, and man had simply to bow in silent resignation. In Israel the prophets rose to a belief in the government of the world by divine justice, the purposes of which the world of nature and mankind were supposed to serve. In the calamities of their people they perceived the judgment of the divine wrath on the faithlessness and wickedness of the people or their leaders. This thought of the requital of human conduct by external happiness or unhappiness was repeatedly verified in its application to the life of the people. It sufficed as long as religious reflection was diverted exclusively, or at any rate prominently, upon the destinies of the nation as a whole, whose responsibility and fortunes the several members shared by virtue of solidarity.

But when, with the fall of the national State after the exile, the religious consciousness of Judaism began to be more and more individualized, the destinies of the individual necessarily occupied the religious mind. Then observation soon showed that in the life of the individual outward happiness and moral worth by no means always correspond; on the contrary, the just have to suffer many calamities, while the wicked are often happy. How is this fact of experience to be reconciled with divine justice? This was the great problem; and the religious thought of Judaism, from the time of the author of the Book of Job, made incessant, eager, and vain efforts to solve it. The poetic conclusion of the Book of Job ends with the resigned confession that these things are too high and incomprehensible for man's understanding. In the narrative conclusion, Job's unhappiness is finally compensated by increased happiness; thus it falls back upon the selfsame doctrine of visible reward, the insufficiency of which — as contradictory to experience — was precisely the motive of the whole poem. Even in later times, Judaism has never gone beyond the postulate of a final evening between terrestrial happiness and ethical worth and merit, for this postulate was rooted in the very essence of its national, legal religion. The incompatibility of experience with this postulate was the enigma, the insolubility of which brought about the religious and political destruction of Judaism. Only in a few isolated cases in the Psalms do we meet expressions of a deeper religious consciousness, which rises above the theory of external recompense to the certainty of an inward happiness in peace with God, that outweighs all outward happiness, and even heaven and earth (Psalm lxxiii.).

This height of inward religious certainty, to which the presentiment of a few pious thinkers in Judaism had risen, became the foundation of the religious perception of the world in Christianity. "We know that all things work together for good to them that love God. . . . If God be for us, who can be against us? . . . I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. viii. 28, 31, 38, 39). "Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day; for our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory" (2 Cor. iv. 16, 17). "As having nothing and yet possessing all things, as dying, and behold we

live" (2 Cor. vi. 9, 10). In these and many like words of the Apostle Paul, the Christian sentiment concerning the evil of the world is manifest. It is as far remote from Jewish depression or despondency (which, presuming on its own righteousness, bargains with divine justice or is perplexed by it) as it is from that stoic apathy which in proud resignation bids defiance to fate and, weak, deceives itself in imaginations of strength. The Christian sentiment is the feeling of the child of God, who possesses in the certainty of God's love an inward happiness independent of the vicissitudes of the course of the world, and is able to rise, consoled, above the sufferings of life. The Christian sentiment is that of the warrior of God, who, in leagued union with Him, courageously joins battle with the world, and joyful in hope, is certain of his victory over all adversaries and all disasters. It is the sentiment of the servant of God who, in any and every condition in which he is placed by circumstances, recognizes his task in the fulfillment of which he may and should be a co-worker for the advancement of the universal purpose of good. To this purpose the whole system of the world serves as a means, and consequently every single experience of life embraced in it may and should likewise be a means. If the belief of the Christian is the certainty that God's essence is holy love, that man's destination is sonship of God, and that the world is the means of divine wisdom for the education of its children, then this belief involves a confident hope that the divine good will ever prove itself a victorious power over the world, and that devotion to this power guarantees to each person the highest good,—the salvation of his soul. "Our faith is the victory that overcometh the world" (1 John v. 4).

The combination of idealism and realism, which has been indicated as the characteristic feature of the Christian perception of the world in general, holds good also in regard to the evil of the world. The Christian is no abstract idealist who in ecstatic optimism thinks the world as it is perfect, and considers all that is actual to be reasonable, having no eye for evil and wickedness, and underestimating their grave significance. His heart is not so hard and apathetic as not to feel pain in his own and others' sorrows; his conscience and ethical judgment are not so dull and thoughtless as to call evil good, and mistake delusion and falsehood for truth. Since he is wont to judge the worth of men and social constitutions, not by the outward appearance, but by their inward life and merit, he perceives wrong and error in many

things that appear right and good to others. His attitude towards reality is always, in certain respects and to a certain degree, critical and polemical, since he measures it by the ideal, and cannot overlook the contrast between the two. "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth; I come not to send peace, but a sword" (Matt. x. 34); and James (i. 4) says that whoever will be a friend of the world is the enemy of God. But this sober circumspection and critical keenness of judgment are, on the other hand, far remote from pessimistic gloom, hopeless despondency, and loveless acrimony. The Christian knows that the world, despite its numberless evils, is after all the work of God, and must serve the purpose of God, the kingdom of the good. He sees everywhere destructive and dissolving forces confronted by preservative and constructive powers. He sees the diseases of the natural and ethical life provided with remedies. To him the order of the whole is so wisely directed that even evil and sin must become means for higher purposes, for a richer development of the powers of life and a higher evolution of the ethical ideals. Together with belief in God's government of the world, Christian love keeps us from the dejection and ineffectiveness of pessimism. Thus love, even amidst the defilement of human coarseness and meanness, still recognizes the glimmering spark of divinity, which needs only to be awakened and enlivened in order to erect out of the dead in spirit the man of God. "Love believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things." The divine power to heal and animate which it bears within itself causes it also to believe in the efficacy, and to hope for the victory, of the divine spirit of good in others and in the whole human race.

From faith and love, which bind the Christian to God and humanity, and discover and advance the kingdom of God in the midst of the world and time, springs also the hope which, above and beyond the world of sense and life on earth, rises to ideals of inconceivable height. From the beginning it has been characteristic of the Christian way of thinking — and it always remains one of its essential features — that the kingdom of God is conceived both as already present and as a kingdom to come. On the one hand it is a present possession, an actual fact, the greatest and most mighty fact of the history of the world. It is here the communion of men in the spirit of sonship of God, — that spirit which went out from the first-born among many brethren, and formed the Christian community into the "body of Christ," the organism of the divine-human spirit. But, on the other hand,

the kingdom of God is still one to come, an ideal, the realization of which is expected from the future, the glory of which has not yet appeared, but is still to appear. Without this hopeful glance into the future, the enduring power of faith and love would weaken amidst the obstructions of the present time. But, on the contrary, hope in a future ideal would be baseless and untenable, and vanish in ecstatic fancies, if it did not rest on the confiding love of the child of God, who possesses and realizes the higher life from God and with God as a present good and a living power within himself. That this life — as it has sprung from eternity out of the divine will of love — shall not fall a victim to time, but shall outlast terrestrial death, and in transcendental existence reach a new, undreamed-of development and efficacy, and that the kingdom of God, besides its terrestrial militant community, shall also embrace a transcendental triumphant community, — this is the transcendental ideal of the Christian hope, which completes and crowns the ideal of the terrestrial future of humanity. What is common to all these ideals of the future, whether terrestrial or transcendental, is the fact that, since they surpass experience, they can only be surmised in indefinite images of phantasy, and cannot be thought in clear conceptions of the understanding. Like the origin of our race, its end lies concealed from knowledge, but faith sees it in the hand of the eternal love of God our Father.

But this reserve in regard to the ideal of the future was not practiced by the first generations of Christians. For them, expectation of the speedy end of the present world, and of the beginning of the new world that was to come with Christ from heaven stood in the foreground of faith and hope, of thought and purpose. The young community had received from Judaism, as an inheritance, the Messianic apocalypse. Just as the call of John the Baptist to the baptism of repentance, in view of the approaching Messianic kingdom, had formed the external point of departure for the activity of Jesus, so the apocalyptic-Messianic ideas and sentiments supplied for the success of his reformatory activity the necessary presupposition and the most powerful lever. How far Jesus himself shared these ideas; whether, and in what sense, he himself connected them with the consciousness of his vocation as saviour and with his ideal aims, cannot be certainly known. But this much is certain, that the community of his disciples saw him — not from the beginning, to be sure, but still before his end — in the light of the Messianic expectation of the people, and that after the visionary occurrences by which they felt themselves as-

sured of the heavenly transfiguration of the crucified one, the person of Jesus became entirely blended in their consciousness with the apocalyptic, ideal form of the Messianic king descending from heaven to establish his kingdom. Thus, from the beginning, the sluices were opened through which the stream of apocalyptic ideas, and with them the abstract supranaturalism of Judaism, flowed into the religious consciousness of the early Christian community.

On the part of the Gentiles, kindred sentiments and tendencies of thought aided in bringing about this result. The world-weariness of antiquity in general, and the social misery of the lower classes in particular, joyfully welcomed the message of the near destruction of the present order of the world and of the beginning of a new era. Platonic philosophy had opposed the higher world of ideas to the lower world of phenomena as the prototype to the reflection, the essence to the vain appearance, and had thus created a counterpart to the "future world" of the Jewish apocalypse, which was likewise conceived as coming from above, from heaven. We see from the Epistle to the Hebrews that the two conceptions, so nearly touching each other, became blended at an early date, and thus, by the mediation of Jewish-apocalyptic supranaturalism, Hellenistic spiritualism entered the religious thought of the Christian community.

Thus resulted, in particular, from the combination of these two kinds of ideas, the development of the ideal picture of Christ, the central dogma of the rising church. The heaven-descended apocalyptic Messianic king and son of God in the theocratic-Messianic sense (the conception of the earliest Jewish-Christian community), became the heavenly original and ideal man of Hellenistic speculation (the conception in Paulinism). This preëxisting, spiritual man became the divine Logos, the Son, superhuman but yet subordinate to the Father. He became the mediator of all divine revelation since the creation of the world (the conception in John). Finally, the divine son became eternal God, of the same essence with the Father, the second person of the Trinity, who in the incarnation added to his divine nature a human nature, but remained nevertheless, after as well as before the incarnation, essentially a divine, superhuman, super-temporal, transcendental being. Thus the historical founder of the community, and the prophet of the ethico-religious ideal of humanity, had become an abstract supranatural being, entirely removed from the historical ground of humanity, a miraculous picture painted by apocalyp-

tic phantasy and Hellenistic scholasticism. This mythology served as the covering which was destined to protect and preserve the genuine ethico-religious nucleus of Christianity during the centuries of the minority of the Christian nations. At the same time it concealed and disfigured the truth of Christianity, and weakened and corrupted its ethical power of salvation. It would be easy to show — but this is not the place — how from this same abstract supranaturalism which dominates the church dogma throughout, the ideals of life of the Roman Catholic church arose, — monasticism, fleeing from the world, and the dualism of natural morality and supernatural sanctity, of world and church, of laity and clergy, of State and Hierarchy.

The reformation of the sixteenth century did away with the excrescences in practice of the Roman Catholic church system which too evidently contradicted the ethico-religious essence of Christianity. It brought again to light the ethical power of salvation, which is attested by conscience. It thus made a beginning for the spiritual-ethical conception and realization of Christianity. But, indeed, it was only a beginning. For in dogma there remained that unspiritual, ghostly supranaturalism which, since the time of Jewish apocalypse and Hellenistic Gnosis, ruled the religious thought of Christendom, and hid the true essence of Christianity under mythological disguises. To strip off these veils, and thus let its liberating truth shine with a new light, and its healing love penetrate suffering humanity with a new power is the task, the holy mission, of all who believe in the coming with power of the kingdom of the children of God, and hope for the appearance of the new world, in which God shall be worshiped in spirit and in truth.

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ECCLESIASTICAL IMPEDIMENTA.

Two facts are patent to-day, — the decay and the vitality of ecclesiasticism. Both are really phases of the religious life instituting and nourishing itself with continuity and progress into a vital organism of the life of the spirit. The term *impedimenta* is a convenient one for describing the general characteristics of this critical and vital movement of ecclesiasticism. We may use it, first, in its vulgar sense, of those things which impede and are not necessary to the being or the well-being of the church; secondly and chiefly, in its classical sense of things which encumber but still are necessary, assisting as well as impeding progress, — the necessary means of subsistence and equipment, the supplies, baggage, and ammunition carried along with an army.

"The age of criticism" is no longer a sufficient formula to describe our own age. Neither is the cognate term of "individualism." There are many signs that we are passing into an age of a revaluation of all vital forms of institutions, along with an increased appreciation of the social organism in which individuals are relegated to ministrant functions. Criticism and individualism began more than a century ago their iconoclasm against all forms of the social fabric. State, church, art, and philosophy seemed destined to receive their death-blow. In spite of all such work, however, these mighty works of the spirit are extant in even more than former strength. But they conserve that which apparently sought to destroy them. The worth of the individual and the normal function of criticism are recognized to-day in those theories of society and institutions that are conservatively constructive. Church and state are better for the ordeal through which they have passed. Reaction to their previous forms is impossible except in some local eddies of romantic absolutism. On the other hand, the equality of an abstract individualism is seen to be utterly anarchic in politics, as the right of private judgment and the salvation of the individual soul are in ecclesiasticism. Then the conception of growth has quite supplanted that of manufacture in the study of organic forms of human activities. No amount of individual effort or private judgment can suffice to make *instantly* a new state or church. The most that can be looked for is some modification of older forms. This is what criticism has availed to do in the long run. It proves to be the progressive element in reconstructive conservatism.

Thus the general temper of the thought of the day, containing both the elements of dogmatism and criticism, is becoming more than merely patient of all great institutions of the human spirit. It is becoming conservative and reverent rather than iconoclastic. This temper is less apparent, however, in respect to the church than it is in respect to other institutions. Much criticism seems to be hostile to the church, and much ecclesiasticism seeks to repel all criticism as an enemy.

Yet it must be evident, from the wide historical study of the manifestations of human nature, that man is by nature a churchman or ecclesiast, as well as a political being. And, on the other hand, it must be evident that the form of the church changes with changing needs and environment. Ecclesiasticism is as genuine and rational a manifestation of human nature as domestic and political institutions. Any merely destructive criticism of the church is unhuman, and ends with pouring out the baby with the bath, to use the German illustration. We can no longer rationally say that men would be none the worse off if the whole of ecclesiasticism were dumped into the ocean, though it would be all the worse for the fish. Nor can we say that the whole mass must be swallowed uncritically. We find that in opposite quarters both these terms — ecclesiasticism and criticism — are in ill repute, as, indeed, they should be when divorced from each other. But they should not seem to be as mutually repugnant as water and oil. Both stand for real and necessary phases of an organic process. Both are, in varying proportions, age-old, and give promise of being as age-long as man's secular existence. They are both necessary factors in the ethical life of man. Ages of the most absolute ecclesiasticism have never been free from some ferment of the critical element, and ages of the most radical criticism have never been without their romantic side.

The rational ideal to-day seems to be that of a critical ecclesiasticism, that is, of a visible working church, fully recognizing the results of the modern criticism of its own historical elements, and yet basing itself upon these criticised elements as answering to human nature and needs on their religious side. Men of culture to-day cannot accept an ecclesiasticism which has not been through the fires of criticism, nor will they tolerate mere negative critics, "those nomads of the intellectual world, who will not permit any steady cultivation of the soil." We must frankly and fairly apply all the critical powers of the human spirit to all sources of information as to the genesis and growth of the church, in order to get

that concrete rational comprehension of it that proves it to be the very rock against which the gates of hell cannot prevail. The work done in this line during this century has been prodigious, both in quantity and quality, enabling us to put ourselves in the place of the chief actors, of those who have been the mouthpieces and the toolmen of the nascent and developing church. Granting all the results of such work, the question comes, Is the church worth preserving? But the vitality of the institution answers the question by continuing to exist. Hence the question is only whether we can interpret such a mighty organism, thus generated and growing, and find its place in the totality of the education and the manifestation of the human spirit. No merely romantic backsliding into uncriticised absolutism is possible, but only the assent that comes from a comprehension of it as an element in the total of what man has done and become.

The question may be raised as to the possibility of a critical ecclesiasticism, of a church that lives and thrives under criticism. It is at least certain that we can have critical ecclesiasts. Dean Stanley, Professor Edwin Hatch, and the authors of "*Lux Mundi*" show us the union of the two elements. No critic was ever more free and thorough-going in his study of the origin and growth of ecclesiastical institutions than Dean Stanley, and no ecclesiast was ever more heart and hand with a conservative form of the church than himself. Consider, too, that the huge amount of critical and historical study of Christianity by the Germans during this century has been done by Christian students, from within the church itself. The *spes ecclesiæ* to-day is in such men as fully master the processes and results of Biblical and ecclesiastical criticism, and interpret the church accordingly.

We are to say something of the impedimenta of the church, — distinguishing between those which come under the vulgar use of the term and those which come under its classical sense. There are two large questions, however, demanding at least brief notice beforehand. What is the church? and What is the ideal of knowledge by which we are to estimate it and its impedimenta?

The church, considered as an objective historical fact, may be described as the religious community, springing from and embodying the religious self-consciousness of Jesus Christ. It is the visible community to which the religious spirit in men, influenced by the spirit of Jesus Christ, gave rise, — not as an absolutely new organization, but as having its roots primarily in

Judaism, and later on its branches in the Græco-Roman civilization. It is the institution which the new leaven worked in the social lump coming under its influence. It is visible, one, organic, and continuous through nineteen centuries. It is as objective a fact as a continent or a nation. It is something to be reckoned with in making an inventory of concrete human nature or reason, regardless of any *a priori* theories as to the method of its organization. As an organism it has functions. It exists for the edification of its members, and for propagation, or conquering by discipling all foes. Hence it has an official organization of life, doctrine, and worship. It grew, and it still grows, and demands appreciative interpretation. After all the work of critical and historical investigations as to the how and why of its various external forms comes the deeper task of rational estimation. We need be bound by no traditional views of its historical genesis and variations, but may accept the general results of modern scientific investigation on these points. The organization of the early Christian churches and their consolidation into the Catholic Church under Constantine, are matters of history pretty well understood. In every way the church is open to as free historical investigation as any other religious, social, or political organization. We must take it for what it is, and for what it has been, rather than yield to the assumptions of either an abstract supernaturalism or an equally abstract intellectualism.

What the church is for us depends upon our ideal of knowledge, of reality. Here again we must claim to be passing beyond the eighteenth, yes, and largely the nineteenth century's abstract conception of reason, as a disembodied ideal appearing first in visions of the night to certain elect minds, and then painted in vulgar colors for the common sense of mankind. The vulgar rationalism of the *Aufklärung* and the *Illumination* had an easy task in applying a few intellectual formulas to existing institutions and pronouncing them all to be irrational. However, as these have had the further irrationality of continuing to exist and grow, there has come some doubt as to the sufficiency of their canons of criticism. It has become insufferable to see these shallow rationalists thrust their rigid but cheap intellectuality into the throbbing life of the world's greatest realities, dissecting manikins rather than describing living realities. They utterly lacked the historical spirit, and had no conception of the modern idea of development. They judged the Jew by the Gentile, or the re-

verse, and the tenth century by the eighteenth, never able to put themselves at the *point de vue*, or in the circumstances of those they were criticising. Nor had they any suspicion that even reason is a development; that it never has existed as an inborn finished codex of clear, fixed notions. Still less could they apprehend the conception that the truths of reason have been developed only through institutional forms of human activity; that every category which is now used has had a history of incarnation, and that the highest spiritual truths are the most elaborate products of a long process of the developing impulse of the human spirit. Hence with their shallow intellectual criticism they could never penetrate to any rational understanding of ecclesiasticism as one of the forms of the real in which the rational — that is, human nature in its highest sense — was realizing itself.

Though an ultimate metaphysic must make thought prior to and causal of being, yet for us deed precedes intellectual formulation of creed, action, reason, — in the vulgar sense of the term reason. What human nature or reason is, is to be learned only from human history. The ideal of knowledge on this plane should then be a concrete view of the human spirit developing in the various spheres of its activity. To the query, What is truth? the old rationalism answered confidently, logical intellectual form for the individual. Now the answer should be, that human reason to date is the organic sum total of the æsthetic, ethical, religious, scientific, and philosophical manifestations of the human spirit. The impulse to rationality in man has not confined itself to the channel of the logical understanding. Its generous flood has made other and deeper channels, and left æsthetical, ethical, and religious categories as monuments of its self-manifestation. Hence, in treating of ecclesiastical impedimenta, we should recognize the absurdity of misapplying the canons of logical truth. Granted that these canons of formal truths have been developed out of the impulse of our mind toward logical knowledge, and toward bringing phenomena to unity, we must also grant that religion rises out of an impulse to establish a right relation between ourselves and God. The church rises out of the organization of the religious need. Ecclesiasticism, no less than logic and science, rises out of an invincible need of human nature, and as such is a manifestation of its progressive rationality. It can no more rationally be called a disease or a perversion than the other manifestations. Is there any need of a church? Human nature has given the affirm-

ative answer historically. Is the church a member of the civic order of the nation? The same answer is given by history. Is it a development of the impulse to rationality? Yes, or else nothing is, and we have absolute agnosticism instead of an ideal of knowledge.

We are exceedingly far from identifying the truth of ecclesiasticism with all truth, or of giving it an undue supremacy. It is much better and quite proper to distinguish the church from the kingdom of God. We may well use this latter term for the organic sum total of the developments of the human spirit in all phases of its activity. It is one with our ideal of reality. It is reason so far as it has been incarnate. But it is therefore far too lofty and developed a form to apply to ecclesiasticism in testing its impedimenta. That would be measuring the part by the whole. The church is not even identical with moral and spiritual goodness wherever found. It is a definite, visible organization, though a very real and lively member of that total organization of the true, the good, and the beautiful among men which we term the kingdom of God. It exists, not to teach formal logical truth, or natural science, or even æsthetics and ethics, though its mission is much more akin to these latter two, and its kind of reality to theirs. It seeks to elevate man above time and sense relations into communion with the eternal fountain of life, and to do this through maintaining an ethical communion of its members in this effort. Hence its teaching must be largely symbolical, using literal time-and-space things in a transcendent sense, and thus rendering void all merely literal criticism of its symbols. Its reality is the ideal of perfect piety, of a communion of saints, and not that of common rationalism, nor even of a philosophy of religion. It has little to do with dry, unveiled literalism. The vulgar rationalism still lingering among us to-day is devoid of the historical and the humane spirit. It despises all symbolical acts, and cannot understand a cult, which is essential to the edification of the church in worship. It cannot understand dogma, which is the essential intellectual work of the church in defining its supersensuous reality. It cannot understand its sacred literature, and, using its own canons, it cannot understand any literature beyond that of the multiplication table and the syllogism. It can partially understand its polity, but only to hate it for being an efficient means of maintaining and propagating itself in its rôle of the educator of the race in the communal religious life. It would also dispense with the historical basis for the world's

evangelization, and with all incorporations of the ideal in living forms and marked typical events of history. Given its way, it would either dispense wholly with the church, or endeavor to manufacture one which would be no church, and would afford no home for the religious life.

The church knows what edifies, and its strenuous maintenance of these means is justified by the power which they have given it to live and grow. This is one of the most practical of all tests of the reality of an organism. Treat art as the old rationalism would treat religion, and it would vanish away from among men. We should ask what the church has done in the world and what it is now doing, and take the most objective of all judgments, that of history, as to its being a genuine world-power, manifesting and promoting the great reality which all religion seeks. Thus, in studying ecclesiasticism, one should reflect on the nature of religion itself, its own proper idea and function in the complex of human nature's activity, as well as upon the ground for its appearance in this or that form, in order to appreciate and thus only to understand it. As an objective reality, the church and her ways stand as a marvel of unconscious logic realizing itself in history. Only an *a priori* hatred of religion, which pessimistically sees in it nothing more than a prolonged disease of human nature, can treat this objective institution with disrespect. And only a barren intellectualism will insist on criticising it by other canons than those of its own nature and function.

I. Are there, then, no ecclesiastical impedimenta, in the vulgar sense of the term, — is there no negative criticism of the church? Is not our criticism like Balaam's curse? — "I called thee to curse mine enemies, and, behold, thou hast altogether blessed them." We have, indeed, thus far sought to ward off the irrational subjective criticism which is so plentiful. We need not, however, shun full criticism of the impedimenta that hinder the church from fulfilling its own true mission. We only insist that these can merely be such as are foreign to its genius, or have outgrown their usefulness. Taking the church's ideal and mission, many things can be pointed out as being useless and injurious hindrances. The church militant is not the church triumphant. Its follies and sins are patent in all ages. But the same is true of every other institution. The political history of the race is full of errors and crimes. The evils of the law are enormous. And yet we would not abolish the state or law. The history of any one of the natural sciences shows follies as absurd and errors as

injurious as can be found in either state or church. The ideal of any organization is never realized, and yet the ideal only comes into consciousness through the progressive realization of the impulse. The church simply takes her place with other secular institutions in pleading guilty to such failures.

Let us frankly refuse to admit any real impediments to the marriage of humanity with the bride of Christ. Let us insist upon the church putting away all such impediments. The critical and historical studies concerning the church have doubtless disclosed a vast amount of dead ecclesiastical rubbish, trash, needless scaffolding, bric-a-brac, chips from the growing statue, decayed branches of the growing tree, suckers that are needlessly and criminally draining its strength, fungoid growths, parasitic vines, superfluous clothing upon the racer and armor on the warrior, — things that do not make for the edification or the propagation of the church, and which the church, nevertheless, holds on to as essential. It is a sympathetic and generous criticism which calls the attention of the church to these impediments, many of which, however, she has encysted into innocuous inactivity.

Again, from the longest-lived branch of the church to the most novel modern sect, there is not one form that has not outgrown, and of itself cast aside, much of its earlier impedimenta. There has been sufficient of the normal life-power in every one to use up much of its supplies and to drop the rubbish. That ecclesiasticism is ultra-conservative is one of the facts of human nature on that side that is to be taken into account. Demands cannot, therefore, be made upon it that should be made upon other inherently less conservative institutions. To each according to its nature is certainly a canon of rational criticism. In the long run the church discards what does not, and adopts what does, edify. The indictment against the evils of conservative traditionalism is made none too strong by even hostile critics. This temper has often led her champions to commit the most glaring crimes against the very foundation principles of morality and humanity, in order to maintain the old as the true, and defeat the new as the false. But in the long run it shows a capacity to assimilate the best elements of the life of any age, toward the close of that age, and to renounce its own defects and malformations on its way to new and fuller life. It has life. Hence we find in every form the normal though tardy process of excretion going along with that of assimilation. Volumes would be needed to catalogue the mass of impedimenta thus discarded. We must decline to renew the task here

which has already been accomplished by friend and foe. From the dropping by the early church of the rites of foot-washing and the Agapæ instituted by Christ himself, to the change from hooks and eyes to buttons by the Dunkards, perpetual changes through additions and subtractions have been going on within this organic body, moved by its own vital, semi-unconscious ideal of reality.

The form and the interpretation of her sacred literature, her sacraments, her ceremonies and ritual, her organization and her creeds, have undergone wondrous changes, considering the inherent conservatism of the church. The Episcopal Church has practically discarded her once dominant standard of the XXXIX. Articles as "forty stripes save one." The Preface to the Prayer Book sets forth, as the rule for all such changes, "that which may seem most convenient for the edification of the people according to the various exigencies of the times and occasions," "seeking to keep the happy mean between too much stiffness in refusing, and too much easiness in admitting, variations in things once advisedly established," although "in their own nature indifferent and alterable," always allowing "such just and favorable construction as in common equity ought to be allowed to all human writings." The late decision of the Church of Rome in regard to the novel "Faribault example," as well as the late recognition of the republic in France, and the Encyclical on the labor question, illustrate the tardy but generally forthcoming adaptation of the most ultra-conservative form of the church to the needs of the times. Ample apology, however, could easily be made for the church's tardiness in all such matters. Conservatism is bound up with her very life and with her power to fulfill her mission.

Again, criticism of impedimenta from within the church itself, is affected by her relatively peaceful or militant condition. Her general attitude is that of the church militant, — an army always preparing for contest even when in secure camp or fortress. A church passing through a reformation, like a ship in a storm or an athlete in a race, will spontaneously cast aside as real impediments many of the articles of luxury and of relative necessity in times of peace. Baggage will be thrown into the furnace for fuel, or cast overboard to lighten the vessel, which otherwise forms a part of its precious cargo. After the storm, the race, the battle, much of the discarded impedimenta will be recovered for renewed use in edifying and propagating the church. An ecclesiastical renaissance is sure to follow an ecclesiastical revolu-

tion. Protestant scholasticism followed quite hard upon the revolt against mediæval scholasticism, and the drift from a bald Protestantism to the more constitutional and æsthetic forms of church life has been going on ever since the Reformation. The Society of Friends, starting with the quaking excitements of its founder, soon settled down into a formalism of quiet informality, and now furnishes a large number of members to the most liturgical of the Protestant communions. Unitarianism, having fairly won its negative victory against a dead intellectual orthodoxy, is likewise sending its large quota to the same church. The New Theology, now carrying on the more constructive criticism of Calvinism, claims to be a theological renaissance rather than a novelty. Back to the Fathers and the early and mediæval church! is the war-cry of the most narrow type of zealots in the Episcopal Church to-day, and yet they have enough truth to carry a large part of the interest of the church towards a somewhat needed ecclesiastical renaissance.

Distasteful as may be the methods, spirit and ethics of many of the promoters of such a renaissance in our day, we may gladly have the work done. However much more congenial one may at times find the intellectual fellowship of those who are fully in touch with modern culture, he cannot allow his taste to prevent him from enjoying his larger spiritual heritage, and encouraging the renaissance which is to put him in touch with all his spiritual ancestry. The modern spirit has been in danger of having its interest so centred upon local affairs as to neglect its classical inheritance. Humanism is often a needed antidote to Philistinism in the church as well as in literature.

History, however, never repeats itself except *with a difference*. The healthy life of the church will make abortive all attempts at a mere renaissance of any earlier form. In any renaissance many new forces and materials are added, many of the old forms are discarded, and the remnant is modified and transmuted by the differing environing needs and culture. The old gospel is ever new, even in its donning of ancient garb. It is impossible to specify in detail the amount and sort of ecclesiastical rubbish thus discarded. This would require a history of each great branch, and of every minor form of ecclesiastical organization. Hooks and eyes may be dropped for modern buttons, but days of luxurious peace may come when the old hooks and eyes will regain their place, though they will then be made of pure gold. The use or disuse of all such unessential impedimenta must be left to the

taste, intellectual and moral as well as æsthetic, of the various societies. But the general temper of the religious mind will in the long run be that of Wordsworth, —

Great God ! I'd rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn

than to be a "New Light" unsuckled in any creed yet born.

Doctrinaires of Liberalism and Puritanism alike would strip the church bare of decent clothing in their Philistinism. Both are utterly unappreciative of the sentiment and symbolism that are inseparable from the instituted form of the religious life. In vain will they attempt to unclothe historical Christianity by setting up the literal form of the anti-ecclesiastical religion of the Christ when on earth. In vain will they stigmatize as "baptized Paganism," and "caricatures of the holiest," the concrete forms of the living church, which claims to be the extension of the Incarnation, the Christ widened into the concrete life of the community. They denounce the letter of the church against the spirit of the gospel, being incapable of appreciating the spirit of the letter of the church, the æsthetic and edifying side of ecclesiastical symbolism. Once an infant, always an infant, expresses the unhistorical Puritanic view of Christianity. "The invisible church" is another term for the same abstract view of Christianity. This answers to the conception of an unincarnate soul in this world. It is a contradiction of terms. For what is invisible is not actually the church, and what is the church is not invisible. Even the largest term for human reason, "the kingdom of God," as the organic sum total of the work of the human spirit under divine education, is not without visible embodiment. The term "ethical Christianity" is another abstraction supposed to represent the real elements of Christianity. But the subjective ethical is itself the product of the objective *ethos* of the community, of its manners, customs and clothes. The ethical is the social even in Christianity. It is expressed Christianity, the leavened lump.

II. This concrete, historical, objective view of Christianity brings us to the second or classical sense of the term impedimenta, as those things which incumber but still are necessary to existence and progress, the necessary means of subsistence and of armament of the church militant. For the double purpose of self-edification and self-propagation, the church has always found that it needs an official organization of its life, teaching and worship. The intrinsic difference between an army and the charac-

ter, functions, and end of the church necessitate a somewhat broader use of the term *impedimenta*. To abbreviate the matter without refining too much, let us take the Declaration of the House of Bishops in the General Convention of 1886, and of the "Lambeth Conference of Bishops of the Anglican Communion" in 1888, as stating the essential *impedimenta* of the Catholic Church, viz. : —

1. The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, as "containing all things necessary to salvation," and as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith.

2. The Apostles' Creed, as the Baptismal Symbol; and the Nicene Creed, as the sufficient statement of the Christian faith.

3. The two Sacraments ordained by Christ himself, — Baptism and the Supper of the Lord, — ministered with unailing use of Christ's words of Institution, and of the elements ordained by him.

4. The Historic Episcopate, locally adapted in the methods of its administration to the varying needs of the nations and peoples called of God into the unity of his church.

To substantiate these positions in brief, appeal can be made from all subjective tastes and local and temporary prejudices to the objective judgment of history. The history of the church is the judgment of the church. The organic force of the new leaven, the extension of the Incarnation, has always and everywhere manifested itself, edified itself and propagated itself through these channels. We have here two classes of *impedimenta* : 1st, those which minister to the edification of the body, — the Holy Scriptures and the Sacraments; and 2d, those which minister to its extension, — the creed and polity of the church. In some form, these essential *impedimenta* are found in every branch and sect of the church. The test is, what administers to edification and to growth? The instinctive logic of the vital organism of the church has always found these four points to be essential. Surely the church is sufficiently able to speak for itself. Surely its presence in history as one of the greatest institutions of the human spirit is powerful and great enough to warn off any external abstract judgment as to what is essential to it. To be a world-power, it claims that it must be catholic in length as well as breadth. It therefore rightly denies the rationality of utterly modernizing the church. It demands continuity in these four essentials.

We must grant that religious experience is only one extract out of the whole circle of the contents of human effort, that the kingdom of God is the truly catholic manifestation of human na-

ture; but taking this limited range of ecclesiasticism, we must claim for it that the present Christian consciousness forms but a small part of the catholic Christian consciousness. That of every age has been modified by the larger consciousness of humanity in all the range of its experience. Every age has the defects of its own virtues. Let us recognize all the virtues of our own age, but not mistake them for the total of those of many ages. "Modern culture" is a convenient term for housing the results of human nature's conquests in the later centuries. But the very word "modern" defines it as a limited culture. The scientific and historical and critical and social and philosophical acquirements of the times are not the manifestations of the whole of human nature. Ecclesiasticism is also a part of this complex. They may very wrongfully and irrationally repudiate their connection with the past, but the church does not. Its consciousness is age-long and world-wide. They do not meet all humanity's needs, and it claims its part in this supply. Moreover, it claims its catholic pedigree. It claims the need of preserving the old within its present living fold, in order to continuity, strength and expansion. We may adapt an illustration from Von Hartmann.¹ In a tree, the real life from the roots is found in the present new layer. The solid stem of dead wood which defies the storm is formed by the earlier growths. The leaves and fruitage of past years help towards this year's fruitage only as they fall to the ground and form soil for the roots, while the slight annular growth has increased its girth, height and solidity. Holding all these in the embrace of its newest layer gives it expansion as well as strength. Hence the first law for the newly sprouting ring is really to embrace and enfold all its predecessors; the second, to grow from the root upwards semi-independently. Such has been the method, the unconscious logic, of the Catholic Church. Many of the supposed impedimenta have really been encysted to give strength and expansion, and all the essential impedimenta have been preserved in its growth from the root upward, — a catholic polity, creed, sacraments, and sacred literature. No criticism can destroy these four facts done into history by the church. Open as they are to the most free investigation of their historical how, when and why, they still remain as essential impedimenta of an institution that must command the respect of all that have respect for any of the works of man under divine tutelage. At times and in places, each one of them has been used so as to unnecessarily impede the prog-

¹ *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, 3.

ress of the church, as well as of the larger spiritual realm of the kingdom of God. Bibliolatry, sacerdotalism, orthodoxy and ecclesiasticism, in the vulgar sense of this term, have sinned against as well as served the religious edification of many generations. The criticism which removes the false gloss from these four facts seems powerless to destroy them. It can only remove the false abstract, "Thus saith the Lord," before each one of them, to replace it with a concrete historical vindication of them as genuine works of the Lord.

It is an old ecclesiastical illusion to identify a divine origin with a certain method of that origin. It is a somewhat modern delusion to deny a divine origin to anything which can be traced to its nascent form in the womb of human nature. Some things are divine, and no things are divine, — these are twin forms of error that the concrete, rational estimate of institutions is to correct. In doing this work, it will receive but scant thanks from some in both camps. The narrow zealot and the zealous liberal will each have epithets of malignity to hurl at those who seek to set forth the objective rationality and divineness of human institutions. We are familiar, on the one hand, with such terms of reproach as pantheism and rationalism, and superstition and anthropomorphism on the other hand. And yet the work goes bravely and rapidly forward, and seems destined to bring out the fuller inclusive truth of the body and soul of the progressive creation of man.

In reading over the estimate here given of the impedimenta of a church, the fear arises that it may possibly be misunderstood as being a plea for an uncritical acceptance, at their own old over-estimates, of previous phases of Christianity, — those of dogma, cult, organization and evangelicism, or Protestant mysticism. Without going into detail as to the interpretation and relative emphasis placed upon all these forms by the scientific method, we may sufficiently guard against such a misapprehension by referring to complementary points of view already presented in the pages of "The New World." We are in hearty sympathy and essential agreement with the more critical estimates given in the March article by Professor J. G. Schurman, on "The Future of Liberal Religion in America," and in the June article, by the Rev. Dr. McConnell, on "The Next Step in Christianity." It is the historical and practical estimates, and the changed emphasis of them, that enable and compel us to hold to these four points in a strictly non-sectarian and super-denominational spirit. We have used the term "ecclesiasticism" throughout, only in its rational sense of the vis-

ible organization of the Christian religion. It has not come within our limits to deal with it in its current vulgar sense. Like the term "politics," it is commonly, and fairly enough perhaps, used to denote a perverted and vicious method and spirit in the practical working of the organization. The indictment against these twin evils cannot well be made too heavy or severe. The mere ecclesiast is always practically a Jesuit, as the mere politician is a Machiavellian. There is always need of keeping alive a vigorous sentiment against them both, in order to minimize the evils connected with the practical working of the two great rational and necessary forms of well-being in the kingdom of God on earth — the Church and the State.

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NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF.

IN the course of human progress the adjustment of men's religious beliefs to the changed aspects of knowledge and to new conclusions of the understanding becomes frequently necessary. How the religious view and interpretation of the world are modified by intellectual advance, and with what struggles such modifications are brought about, may be seen in the history of the so-called conflict of religion and science. Whether this might not more properly be called a conflict of theology and science is a question upon which it is not necessary here to enter. It should be remarked, however, that in general, men's religious opinions are either dominated by theological conceptions, or inextricably combined with them, and that it is to theological prepossession and dogmatism rather than to religion pure and simple that the obstinacy and bitterness are due with which scientific progress has been opposed. Religion, pure and simple, is indeed largely a matter of feeling, that is, of a sentiment which finds expression chiefly in worship, and in practical activities. But as feeling is found psychologically to be always combined with some elements of cognition, so religion is inseparable from certain theological postulates. Its purity is largely determined by the character of these, and not a little, also, by their number and the prominence which is accorded to them. If the highest type of religion was taught and exemplified by

Jesus, it is evident that the purest and noblest expression of religion may exist in connection with only a few cardinal doctrines. Here we see religion connected with such theological conceptions only as are vital to its existence and to the development of its appropriate activities. Here we also see religion existing under conditions in which no opposition to knowledge or science, properly so called, could proceed from it. Unencumbered with speculative dogmas, it could hospitably receive all the wisdom of ages, and accommodate itself in its ample flexibility to the widest thought of mankind. The difference is manifest between the attitude which religion so apprehended would take toward the intellectual progress of the world, and that which must be assumed by an ecclesiastical institution, which, in connection with religion, holds an immense mass of unessential dogmas believed to be essential. The religion of Jesus was not, apparently, incompatible with the exercise of great freedom on his part in dealing with the sacred writings of his nation; but the Christian church has appealed to these same writings to dispute, inch by inch, the progress of science and Biblical learning.

These considerations are important in the discussion of the relation of New Testament criticism to religious belief, since it is essential to determine in what sense this latter term is to be understood. If there be included in religious belief all, or even a considerable part, of the theological tenets which are identified in the popular mind with the essentials of Christian faith, then, without question, an irreconcilable opposition exists between it and the criticism of the New Testament, and from the outset the latter must be regarded by believers as hostile to the Christian religion, and as an occupation to be resisted and put down at all hazards. The doctrine of the supernatural origin of the several writings of the New Testament, which is very widely held as a fundamental tenet of religious belief, in the larger acceptation of that term, is radically opposed to the presumptions with which criticism sets out and on which it proceeds. Accordingly, from this point of view, the methods and processes of criticism are contested from the beginning, and the attempt is made to suppress them in the interest of self-preservation by an appeal to prejudice, and by the outcry that they are subversive of the Christian religion. This consternation in the camp of the believers at the appearance of the outposts of criticism is doubtless due to an identification of Christianity with its historical documents. But it should be remarked that while the supernatural origin of Chris-

tianity and the nature of Christ are not problems with which criticism is immediately concerned, the distinction between a religion and its documents, and between the origin of the one and that of the other, is of great importance to it, whether its opponents will recognize this fact or not, and that in dealing with writings assumed to contain a revelation from God, it can allow no presumptions in favor of the inspiration of their authors, since the results of its investigations furnish the only means of deciding this question. The contrary procedure would manifestly be a prejudging of the question, contradictory to the scientific method of investigation of which criticism is a special application.

If, then, religious belief, in the comprehensive and popular sense, appears to be irreconcilable with the critical point of view, it remains to be considered whether there is not another and legitimate sense of the term in which the methods and processes of criticism may be on a peaceful footing with it. The situation is certainly anomalous, — a situation unfavorable to the progress of knowledge and to the establishment of an intelligent faith in Christianity, — when candid and learned inquiry into the origin and early history of the Christian documents is regarded with uneasiness and suspicion by those who believe them to be the productions of inspired men. If the historical facts relating to the production of these writings, and the writings themselves in their relation to one another, will bear investigation, if there is no conflict between a course of affairs proceeding under general divine direction and an historical construction of it, then ought the historico-critical method of inquiry to be welcomed rather than regarded with alarm, and he should receive the heartiest recognition who prosecutes it with the greatest thoroughness and candor. Now, the principle of the ultimate harmony of all truth requires us to believe that, when a conflict arises between religious belief and the interpretations of nature and history resulting from the advance of human knowledge and the discoveries made by science, the religious belief is wrong, or that a mistake has been made in the processes and interpretations of knowledge, or that an error lurks in both. In the heat of the contest, the opponents on both sides are strenuous in maintaining extreme positions. The adjustment of the differences comes by way of mutual concession. The truths held by the contestants then meet in a divine accord, and men rejoice in the new light in which nature and history appear. In the great conflict between science and religion, it is evident that religious belief has been in error in maintaining dogmas

which do not legitimately belong to religion, and that science has erred in transcending its proper limits by laying down metaphysical propositions. The real contest has been one between opposing metaphysical theories. The adjustment, so far as it has proceeded, — and it is yet far from complete, — has been effected, not by the surrender of any truth on either side, but by the giving up on both sides, with more or less grace, of a little metaphysics. There is ground for believing that conditions similar to these exist in the conflict between the criticism of the New Testament and religious faith, which is likely to have far more important consequences for Christianity than that between science and religion has had. What are the limits within which New Testament criticism and religious belief should be confined, what is the real relation between the two tendencies of thought, and how an adjustment of the two to each other must be effected, if indeed it be at all practicable, will be made apparent, it is hoped, in the course of this discussion.

The first task of New Testament criticism is the establishment of the text of the several writings. It would take us too far from our present purpose to enter into a detailed account of the methods and processes of text-criticism. Suffice it to remark that the principles underlying this work are precisely those which are applied to the determining of the text of other ancient writings. The oldest existing manuscripts of the New Testament date from the fourth century. These, along with the numerous later manuscripts, the versions and the many quotations from the writings of the New Testament made by early Christian writers, constitute the material from which criticism has established a text which is doubtless substantially that of the authors themselves. An absolutely correct text is, of course, indeterminable. The quotations of the early writers furnish, indeed, to some extent a check upon interpolations and corruptions which may have crept in before the fourth century. But many of these citations are inaccurate, and for a considerable time after the composition of the latest of our synoptical Gospels the fortune of their text in the hands of copyists is unknown.

The text having been approximately established, the work of the criticism of the Gospels, which, as the most important part of New Testament criticism, will here chiefly occupy our attention, proceeds in a detailed and minute examination of these writings separately, and in their relation to one another, although these two processes cannot, of course, be carried on independently. The

consideration of the Gospels separately includes an examination of the several parts of each in their relation to one another; the individual structure of each writing; the chronology of the narrative; the connection of the different sections; the setting of the discourses of Jesus and of the incidents of his ministry; the repetition of accounts of events and of sayings of the Teacher; the fragmentary character of the composition and the transpositions and shiftings of material incident to it; the language and style of the writer; the doctrinal point of view from which he proceeded; the purpose or "tendency" by which he was influenced and the modifications of his narrative thereby induced; the historical circumstances amid which the writings were produced and their effect upon the latter; the antecedents of the Gospels, that is, their sources, traditional and written; the authenticity of these four biographies of Jesus, that is, the degree to which they may be credited as accounts of his life and teachings during his brief public ministry, including the question whether some of the words ascribed to him are traditional accretions, prophecies after the event, or products of the reflection of the evangelists, of Messianic expectations and of the exigencies of later times; the approximate date of the Gospels; and, finally, their genuineness, or the question whether they were written by the men to whom their authorship is traditionally ascribed. The critical study of the Gospels in their relation to one another includes an examination of their respective arrangements of the material; the various connections in which their writers place the sayings of Jesus and the events of his ministry; the different reports which they give of both; the relative originality and credibility of differing narratives; the chronology and theatre of the biography as conceived by the several writers; and a comparative study of their points of view and purposes as affecting their construction of the history. Here belongs, also, in particular, the investigation of the complicated synoptical problem which involves the relation of the first three or synoptic Gospels to one another. The solution of this problem is inseparably connected with the discussion of hypotheses of the origin and composition of these Gospels and of their relative dates and interdependence. The remarkable resemblances from which they have received their designation, and the striking differences which a comparison of them discloses, furnish the principal materials of this problem. Since historical considerations regarding the relation of the New Testament writers to the events and questions of their age enter

considerably into the critical processes, these have received the designation historico-critical in contradistinction from the traditional dogmatic method of treating the sacred writings.

From this brief sketch of the task of New Testament criticism both its difficulties and its perils are evident. Of its difficulties nothing need here be said. A few words regarding its perils may not be out of place in this connection. The history of criticism during the last hundred years very clearly reveals the character of these, and shows them to lie in the nature of the process and the data to be dealt with. In many cases the materials for forming a judgment are extremely scanty, and the greater *probability* is the most that lies within the reach of the investigator. One of the perils to which he is exposed is that of drawing positive conclusions from slender premises. That prepossessions play a prominent part in the aberrations of criticism is also evident. Preconceived theories have too often been allowed to turn the scale of judgment among liberals as well as among conservatives. Another peril lies in the fascination which hypotheses have for their authors. In the nature of the case, the critical process deals largely with hypotheses, and there are not a few who are disposed to reject criticism altogether on this account. But the hypothetical nature of the process and the uncertainty of many of its conclusions should not be urged as an objection to it, since the nature of the material renders any other condition impossible. The numerous hypotheses which have been set up and overthrown do not show the defects of the critical method. They rather reveal the difficulties with which it has to contend. While criticism is not an exact science, it is very far from being a mere matter of more or less acute guessing. If hypotheses have too often been taken for demonstrations, and made the basis of positive conclusions, the history of criticism shows a steady and assured progress and a tendency of extremes to meet upon a common ground of agreement as to many of the most important facts. Despite all the difficulties with which criticism is encumbered and the perils to which it is exposed, it is evident that if the truth regarding the origin and structure of the New Testament writings is at all attainable it must be arrived at by its methods, employed with learning, candor and reverence.

The point of view of criticism is determined by a theory of the sacred writings. Some presumption regarding them must be entertained, since to approach them with entire indifference is impossible. It is, however, indispensable to the purity of the critical

procedure and result that no presumption be entertained which is of a character to determine the conclusions. That the approximation to truth in the result of criticism is in inverse ratio to the amount of theory held at the beginning is a proposition inductively established from the history of Biblical study. Now, the theory of the New Testament writings which assumes that their writers were supernaturally directed and guarded from error; that they were not subject, like other writers, to the influences of their times; that the authors of the Gospels were divinely illuminated to such a degree that they wrote nothing incorrectly of the events of the life of Jesus, and set down as his words only what he actually said, correctly reporting in every case the connection of sayings and circumstances; and that the writers of the Epistles have in all cases given a perfectly uniform and infallible interpretation of Christianity, their teachings having been determined by divine inspiration and in no way by their education and by the opinions of their age, — this theory evidently does not constitute a favorable point of view for criticism. Such writings would be substantially above criticism, and to apply it to them would be nothing short of presumption.

On the other hand the theory of the New Testament writings upon which criticism proceeds is that they constitute a literature. In this is implied that their authors wrote as men subject to the laws of thought and employing words in their ordinary human signification; that they were susceptible to the influences of race, education and intellectual environment; that the men who wrote the Gospels depended, like other biographers, upon the ordinary sources of information, and hence did not receive the facts of the life of Jesus by supernatural communication; that in the acceptance and rejection of events and sayings, and in the arrangement of them, they exercised their judgment, often determined by considerations which must remain unknown to us; that, as men, they could not have been unbiased with regard to the questions which were mooted in their time; that the writers of the Epistles employed their reason and imagination in dealing with their themes after the manner of other men who construct theologies and philosophies, or preach and exhort; and that they wrote with reference to the religious and philosophical opinions of their race and age and in adaptation to the exigencies which called their writings forth. In a word, from the critical point of view the New Testament writings are not a collection of oracles, intended by their authors to serve as a sacred Scripture for future ages, but produc-

tions of the time and for the time, which derived their origin from, and owe their importance to, the great spiritual teaching and life of Jesus. If criticism were to regard these writings in any other way it would stultify itself by substantially admitting at the outset that it had no occupation. As to the inspiration of the New Testament writers, then, it is evident that the critical theory could not admit it as a presumption in any sense which would exclude their productions from literature, that is, withdraw them from intellectual contact with the thought of their age, and exclude them from more or less determination by this contact, as to both form and content.

Although the relative validity of these two theories of the New Testament can only be thoroughly tested by a study of it, they do not by any means stand upon an equal footing as regards the presumptions which may be urged in their favor. The former theory can hardly be said to have any presumption for its support. If it be assumed that Christianity, — that is, the religion of Jesus, — is a revealed religion (and criticism has no objection to urge against this assumption), there is no reason for supposing that writings giving an account of it should be supernaturally provided. No one can be said to know enough of the divine method of revelation to hazard such a declaration. This purely *a priori* assumption would necessitate the further assumptions that the text of these writings was supernaturally protected from corruption, and that their collection into the canon was directed by a supernatural oversight. In fact, the warrant for taking out of the category of human productions writings which make for themselves no such claims as this theory sets up for them, and which appear on their face to be simple biographies, theological speculations and exhortations, could be nothing less than a special revelation from heaven declaring their supernatural character.

On the other hand the theory of criticism has in its favor the presumptions that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, all writings are to be regarded and treated as literature, or as human productions; that the New Testament writings show upon a casual examination that they belong to this order; that their authors do not assert or intimate that they were in general conscious of a supernatural direction; and that a miracle is never to be assumed in order to explain a phenomenon until all the resources of a natural explanation of it have been exhausted. This point of view is the only one consistent with the conception of a historical Christianity which criticism is frequently charged with tending to

subvert. For if there is a historical Christianity in any intelligible sense of the term, then so far as its documents constitute a part of it they must be regarded as historical phenomena which are to be approached and judged precisely as we approach and judge other phenomena of this class. In other words, the writings of the New Testament must be looked upon as products of their time in vital connection with its thought and life, as the works of men who stood in historical relation with the intellectual and spiritual forces which prevailed about them, and as determined by the dominant influences moulding the ideas and events amid which they originated. The Gospels, then, must be regarded as not only histories, but histories of the kind that, under the circumstances amid which they were produced, might reasonably be expected to be written. Whatever presumptions are furnished by a historical knowledge of the conditions under which they were composed, regarding the prepossessions, ideas, and expectations of the men who would be likely to occupy themselves with making such records, may, from the historical point of view, be legitimately entertained in approaching these writings. In like manner, other writings of the New Testament composed by Jewish Christians should be assumed to stand in a historical connection with antecedent Jewish religious doctrines and to show modifications of them determined by Christian ideas. These presumptions are inevitable if, during the first century after the death of Christ, Christianity had, in the proper sense of the term, a historical existence and development. On the contrary, if the New Testament writings were produced by means of a supernatural intervention, they must have been so separated from a vital connection with their age that they could not represent Christianity conceived as historical, but rather a suspension of the laws of historical development. It would then be a difficult question to answer where a miraculous Christianity ended, and a historical Christianity began. It is, accordingly, evident that the critical theory of the New Testament, far from subverting historical Christianity, is precisely the one theory that distinctively and consistently recognizes it.

The critical theory of the New Testament furnishes, moreover, the only point of view from which its writings are susceptible of a real interpretation. It is axiomatic that writers in order to be interpreted by men must be assumed to write as men. There exists no revealed hermeneutics which may be applied to the interpretation of superhuman writings. If manifestly true in regard to the language, this principle is equally evident with respect to

the historical connection of literary products. That is a sealed book to us which we cannot interpret in its relation to its antecedents and its environment. The structure of the Gospels is unintelligible to the student of them who does not take into account the antecedent materials from which they were composed, a plastic tradition and fragmentary writings, or the dependence of some of their writers upon one or more of the others, — in a word, such conditions as give rise to the synoptic problem, and justify a comparative study of the four Gospels from the point of view of their dependence upon one another. The Gospels cannot be understood until we take into account the fact that their authors were profoundly influenced by Jewish ideas and preconceptions. How else can we explain their misapplication of passages from the Old Testament, intended to show that events in the life of Jesus were foretold by the prophets? The Jewish Messianic expectations furnish the only explanation of this phenomenon when they are regarded in connection with the traditional Jewish methods of interpreting the Old Testament. There are features of the first Gospel which can only be understood as indications of an attempt to adapt the biography of Jesus to Jewish-Christian readers; and the third Gospel shows traces of a Pauline influence and of sources which the first evangelist either did not have, or rejected for reasons best known to himself. How, on the assumption that the authors of the Gospels enjoyed a supernatural direction, can we explain their different reports of the words of Jesus spoken under circumstances represented by two of them as the same, and the manifest revision by a later evangelist in some cases of the narrative of an earlier one? The fourth Gospel is an insoluble riddle until it is interpreted as the product of an age in which there had arisen a conception of the nature of Jesus and a philosophy of Christianity which had no place in his original tradition. Paulinism is an independent dogmatic structure which has few points of connection with the teaching of Jesus, and presents a Christology and a doctrine of the law and of righteousness of which he had no conception. The Epistles to the Hebrews, the Colossians, and the Ephesians show a more developed Christology than that of Paul, and quietly disregard his doctrine of salvation, while the so-called Epistle of James contains a pointed criticism of it. The attempt to interpret all these writings so as to find in them only a single type of doctrine, a single conception of the nature of Christ and of his mission, a single philosophy of Christianity, can only result, as it always has resulted, in a most glaring misinter-

pretation of them. The sins against the laws of hermeneutics which have been committed in this endeavor can only be forgiven in this age, or in the age to come, through the charity which regards with indulgence the aberrations of a sincere but mistaken dogmatism. It is evident, then, that the key to the understanding of the New Testament is the conception of it as a literature which, like all other literatures, took its rise amid definite historical conditions, and was determined in its growth not only by the impulse from which it proceeded, but also by antecedent opinions and modes of thought and by its environment of ideas, tendencies, and events. With its roots in the Jewish religion, with the great spiritual impulse of the life and teaching of Jesus, and with the conflicts of the age and the influence of the philosophies which it could not escape, it naturally became what it is. Only by a miracle could it have become something essentially different.

There is apparent from the foregoing considerations the fundamental difference between the presumptions of dogmatism and those of criticism with reference to the New Testament. Dogmatism goes to the study of the New Testament with the presumption, contrary to all the analogy of experience, that it has to deal with a literature produced by a supernatural intervention. Criticism sets out with the presumption, in accord with universal experience, that the literature in question is a natural product. All that dogmatism assumes regarding the nature of the writings — that they must be in substantial accord, that they must be without important errors, that they must present essentially one type of doctrine — is purely *a priori*. Whatever criticism assumes about the writings is grounded on inductions from facts of the human mind and what is known of literature in general. The presumptions of dogmatism predetermine its conclusions. Those of criticism do not. Its presumptions are tentative. It proceeds to seek what it may find. If it should find that the writings were such as the unaided human mind could not reasonably be supposed to have produced under the existing conditions, it could, consistently with its spirit and aim, admit a miracle. If it should find errors, it would not be required by its presumptions to make them appear, through the sacrifice of reason, to be truths; and if it should discover contradictions, to reconcile them at all hazards by a violation of the principles of interpretation.

Opposed, then, to dogmatic presumptions of every sort, to all presuppositions that tend to predetermine its conclusions, criticism is equally irreconcilable with traditionalism and theological or

dogmatic rationalism. By inaccurate thinkers it is often erroneously confounded with the latter. But it really has no affinity with it except that its application requires the use of reason. The two methods of dealing with the Scriptures are fundamentally opposed. The system known to theologians as "rationalism" is, in fact, nothing but a special application of dogmatism to the interpretation of the Bible. Like the allegorical interpretation it proceeds upon the assumption that the Bible must necessarily contain the truth and nothing but the truth; and as the allegorists made the Scriptures say what they did not say (*ἄλλα ἀγορεύειν*, to say other things), by seeking for a deeper spiritual meaning in trivial or commonplace sayings, so the "rationalists," in disregard of hermeneutical principles, rationalize them in order to bring them into accord with doctrines which they have predetermined ought to be found in them. A very good illustration of the method is furnished in Kant's doctrine of the moral interpretation of the Bible. The moral betterment of man, he reasoned, being the object of religion, must contain the supreme principle of Biblical interpretation. It is obvious that this is as thoroughly dogmatic a presumption as any which the most extreme traditionalism has ever set up. Kant had the candor to concede that the sense arrived at by this method is not, indeed, to be given out as that had in mind by the author interpreted! The remarkable frankness of the great philosopher is, in fact, an admission that the so-called "moral interpretation" is decidedly no interpretation at all, but consists simply in reading a writer in the light of what one thinks he ought to say for the moral improvement of mankind, — that is, in reading into his writings one's own preconceived ideas of what the moral betterment of mankind is, and what teaching will contribute to it. Now the "rationalistic method" of treating the New Testament, which has played a very important part in the history of theology, and still thrives vigorously in some quarters, has always proceeded essentially upon the principle that the Biblical writers do actually teach, or must at all events be made to appear to teach, what is preconceived to be true and rational. Since, then, according to the presumption of such rationalism, the supernatural is not acceptable to reason, it cannot, from this point of view, be supposed that the New Testament writers intended to record accounts of miracles; and hence in recording events which appear to be such they must really have meant to record something else. Likewise, since such beings as Satan and demons cannot rationally be supposed to exist, and to

influence or possess men, the evangelists did not actually intend to represent them as existing and taking part in affairs, but quite another meaning may, and must be, put upon the words in the Gospels which appear literally to convey such a teaching.

Much of the older and of the more recent theology abounds in examples of the application of this principle of "rationalism" to Biblical interpretation. Since the serpent cannot be supposed to have talked with Eve, or Balaam's ass with his master, the narratives of such conversations are assumed to have been intended by their writers to convey, not the objective facts which appear on the surface to be recorded, but merely subjective phenomena, or what passed in the minds of the persons concerned. In like manner the appearance of Satan to Jesus in the wilderness, and the words which he is said, in the first and third Gospels, to have spoken to Satan in the temptation, are intended to express in a figure the struggle which Jesus underwent with certain tendencies in himself before entering upon his ministry, and the considerations which prevailed in the issue. From this point of view, the author of the Book of Acts, in recording the Pentecostal phenomena, really intended to relate nothing that may not be explained by the supposition of unusual religious excitement and the appearance of electric sparks. The "rationalist" regards it as an error in an interpreter to explain this account according to its natural meaning, since the writer did not really intend to speak of cloven tongues of fire and of an actual preaching in many languages.

Assuming as an indisputable fact the unbroken and universal prevalence of natural law in the physical realm, "rationalism" declares that the Biblical writers did not intend that their accounts of phenomena which appear to imply the suspension of the usual order of things should be understood as teaching a direct divine intervention, but that these narratives took the form which they have from the Oriental religious view of the world that traced all natural events to the immediate agency of Deity. This is plainly a dogmatic presumption which predetermines the conclusion. Accordingly, the story of the descent of Jehovah in flames on Mount Sinai is, really, only an account of a thunder-storm; it was a stroke of lightning which prostrated Saul on the road to Damascus; and the wonderful deliverance of Paul and Silas from the prison at Philippi was, in fact, nothing but the result of an opportune earthquake. It is even supposed that in those accounts which contain no intimation of a natural cause this has been overlooked by the narrators, or that they have, through ig-

norance, taken for an immediate intervention of God what has actually a sufficient explanation in accordance with the regular order of events. Thus the accounts of the resurrections of the dead in the New Testament, including that of the resurrection of Jesus, are to be interpreted as actually relating awakenings from a state of suspended animation; and the miracle at Cana becomes in the hands of these interpreters a mere "wedding jest," since Jesus really caused the jars to be secretly filled with wine. Words are treated with great arbitrariness and with ingenious refinements of explanation by this method, so that Jesus' walking on the water is interpreted as a walking on the shore of the lake, and the piece of money to be found in the mouth of a fish becomes the money which was to be received from the sale of the fish. Thus was the real meaning of words distorted by Paulus and his school, and whole passages and sections were made to convey the opposite of the sense intended by the writers, to such a degree that Zeller's judgment is not too severe when he says that no account of miracles was so evidently such that the "rationalistic" interpreters would not transform it into a natural occurrence, and no difficulty so great that their acuteness could not overcome it. For violent exegesis, sophisms, and unlimited torture of texts, the "rationalistic" dogmatism may well dispute the palm with its opponent, the orthodox supernaturalism. In attempting to remove from the Bible whatever was repugnant to reason, it made this appear to be the most irrational of books. "Rationalism," indeed, rendered an important service to theology as a method of transition. More than a method of transition, however, it cannot be regarded; and as a theological point of view, it may be characterized as a halting-place in the progress of thought and interpretation from the old orthodoxy to the historical and critical treatment of the Bible.

From the point of view of religious belief, objections are urged against the critical treatment of the New Testament, some of which deserve consideration. If the objection be made that this method has a tendency to subvert the traditional faith in the Scriptures as the inspired and infallible word of God, it should be said to the objector that if criticism is once admitted as a legitimate means of ascertaining the nature, date, authorship, and real meaning of the books of the Bible, it must be allowed to take its natural course. That it is the only means of attaining these ends there can be no question. One must either resort to criticism or blindly accept tradition. If the conclusions which criticism reaches are unfavorable to the doctrine of the infallibility of

Scripture, then the objector may well ask himself on what grounds this doctrine rests, and whether it can be logically and securely established by any other way than this same critical and historical process to which he is opposed. A candid consideration of these questions shows that his objection is not so much to the method as to its conclusions, and he would find himself in the position of an advocate of the Ptolemaic system, who should have objected to astronomy because the study of it resulted in establishing the Copernican system.

No little prejudice exists against the historical and critical method of studying and interpreting the New Testament because it often results in the conclusion that some of the Gospels and Epistles were not written by the men to whom they have been traditionally ascribed. This result is, however, shocking rather to the sentiments of men than to their intelligence. For, if one will fairly consider the matter, one cannot but see that there is little evidence of any sort, and none that can be called immediate, for the authorship of many of these writings. Of traditional evidence there is, indeed, an abundance, while of contemporary evidence there is none, for the authorship of the Gospels. But experience in historical investigation soon teaches us to receive the testimony of tradition with great caution. Precisely what, then, are the facts in brief? The earliest traditional testimony to the authorship of our first Gospel, for example, dates from a period about seventy years after its supposed composition, does not relate to the Greek recension of it at all, and runs to the effect that Matthew wrote the sayings or oracles (*λόγια*) of Jesus in Hebrew. Traditionally, then, Matthew is connected with the composition of a writing which probably furnished the basis of our Greek first Gospel. When this Greek Gospel was composed, by whom it was written, how it stands related to the original Hebrew work ascribed to the apostle, how much of the latter was included in it, how much other material, and from what sources derived, was employed by the writer of it in Greek, — of these things our informant, Papias, tells us nothing, perhaps he knew nothing. We are also in doubt about the character of the original Hebrew or Aramaic writing, and about what the term *λόγια* really means. Criticism alone can help us here, and it cannot entirely clear up the question. Papias does not even mention the Greek Matthew, and the first knowledge that we have of its existence dates from Justin Martyr, about the middle of the second century, and he gives us no information as to its authorship.

As to the other supposed apostolical Gospel, the fourth, there is a trace, much disputed, however, of its existence in Justin Martyr, but not until near the end of the second century do we find any one ascribing it to John. Papias, who is said to have been a disciple of John, does not appear to have known of its existence. It must be conceded by every unbiased mind, that such data are altogether inadequate to establish the genuineness of the writings in question, which are here taken as examples, in this respect, of a considerable number of the New Testament books. There are certain things very necessary to be known about this testimony before we can place much reliance upon it, which we cannot find out, — for example, what the nature of the information was which these early writers depended upon when they ascribed a book to a certain author; whether they had trustworthy evidence, or followed a current tradition without careful examination. In all that they say on this subject, there is no indication that they entered into a critical investigation of the genuineness of the books in question. They appear either to accept tradition or to give fantastic reasons for their belief. It is accordingly a significant fact that the most trustworthy information that we have regarding the origin of the greater part of the New Testament books is not to be credited to the Christian writers who lived from sixty to one hundred years after they were written, but to the historical criticism, so much suspected in some quarters, which took its rise some seventeen hundred years later.

The worth of the testimony in question is greatly impaired by the fact that no earnest attention was given in the early church — that is, for about one hundred years after the probable date of composition of the oldest of our synoptic Gospels — to what we now call the canonicity of a New Testament writing, so far as this is concerned with the question of genuineness. The writers of this period do not appear to have concerned themselves greatly about the authorship of a book provided only that the book served their purpose. Along with our Gospels, or instead of them, others were used which often deviated from them. The Jewish Christians and the Gnostic Christians used different Gospels, and neither party recognized those of the other. Justin, together with our first and third Gospels, used another containing matter different from anything found in our canonical Gospels, and, as late as the end of the second century and the beginning of the third, writings of trifling importance, more distinguished for their weakness and puerility than for any qualities of worth, were treated

with great consideration, and even thought to be inspired, by eminent leaders in the church. These facts show very clearly how much importance is to be attached to the opinions of the so-called witnesses of the early church to the genuineness of the New Testament books, and furnish a complete justification, — if, indeed, any justification were required, — of the rigid application of historico-critical processes in order to ascertain whatever can be known regarding their origin.

Regarding the objection to the historico-critical method of studying the New Testament and its times, that its conclusions show some writings to have been falsely ascribed to men who had no part in their composition, it should be considered that this result of the inquiry is not to be charged to the method, but to the character of the age in question. Nothing is easier than for pseudonymous writings to pass unchallenged in an uncritical age, particularly when they are favorable to a prevalent religious interest. That the critical spirit was not abroad during the first two centuries of the Christian Church is a fact which scarcely needs proof to an intelligent reader. Men certainly were not critical who could with the utmost confidence and *naïveté* quote the Sibylline Books, in which Messianic prophecies are put into the mouth of the ancient Sibyl; and that was not a critical age in which an Origen could defend these writings, and Clement of Alexandria quote from Aristobulus shameless falsifications of the Greek poets, in which Orpheus is made to speak of Abraham and Moses and the ten commandments, and Homer to discourse of the sacredness of the sabbath. No one will regard it as improbable that pseudonymous writings should circulate undisputed in such an age, who reflects upon similar cases in more recent times, and recalls the facts that Fichte's "Criticism of Revelation," for instance, was in its first anonymous edition almost universally ascribed to Kant; that in the collection of Hegel's works were included a treatise by Schelling and another by F. von Meyer; that the authorship of some of Shakespeare's plays is doubtful; that the Memoirs of the Duchess von Brieg were long regarded and quoted as genuine; and that the "Eikon Basilike" was, in spite of Milton's objections, and Toland's fifty years later,¹ devoutly believed

¹ Toland remarked concerning this forgery: "When I reflect how all this has happened in our midst within forty years, in a time of great learning and culture, when both parties were watching each other's actions so closely, I can no longer wonder that so many surreptitious writings were published in the early Christian times under the names of Christ, the apostles, and other great

to be a genuine writing of the "martyr" Charles I. of England! Besides, no one acquainted with the history of literary deceptions of the kind in question will be surprised to find them in the early Christian centuries. Frauds of this sort were committed in perfect *naïveté* and good faith in ancient times. Of about sixty complete treatises and fragments from the Pythagorean school attributed to the master, the greater part are demonstrably spurious, says Zeller, and were written by neo-Pythagoreans about 100 B. C., in order to give authority to certain innovations. If this could happen, as it did in great part, in Alexandria, it is not to be wondered at that pseudonymous writings should easily gain currency and acceptance among the fathers of the Church, who were credulous enough to accept the most fabulous and absurd traditions, and even to believe and circulate the marvelous and extravagant promise of the Messianic vineyards as a genuine word of Jesus.

Should any devout person be shocked at this conclusion, and incline to repudiate the critical method by which it is reached, let him reflect that it is not so sweeping as it may at the first glance appear to be. There is, indeed, no good reason why criticism should be apologized for; but in the interest of clear views of this matter it ought perhaps to be said that the conclusion in question affects only certain New Testament books, the most of which are of subordinate importance. A distinction should also be made between the conclusion that a writing is not genuine and that which declares it to be an intentional counterfeit. A writing would come under the latter classification if its author expressly ascribed it to another. But this is not the case with the writer of any one of our Gospels,¹ which may have been designated as "according to" Matthew or John, without any intention of an ascription of authorship. But in fact we do not know by whom these titles were prefixed. Even the Tübingen criticism does not dispute the genuineness of the four great Pauline Epistles, and finds in the synoptic record a historical basis for the teachings of Jesus. As to the charge that the conclusion in question makes Christianity persons, when it was of so much importance that these books should find credence, when the deceptions were on all sides so frequent that people might have charged one another with them." See Holtzmann in Bunsen's *Biblenwerk*, viii. p. 6.

¹ The last chapter of the fourth Gospel was probably not written by the author of the rest of the book, and even the twenty-fourth verse does not ascribe the work to John, but to "the disciple whom Jesus loved," who is not, in the Gospel, said to have been John.

and the Christian Church a product of fraud and deception, it is quite too superficial to merit consideration. It originates in the erroneous identification of Christianity and its literature, disregards the historical fact that there was a Christianity long before there were any books written about it, and assumes that the authorship of a book is, indeed, a matter of vital importance. Besides, the ascription of a book to an apostle by a later writer is not to be judged with respect to its morality as we should judge such an act at the present time. For how such a procedure is to be morally judged depends upon the way in which it was regarded when the forgery was committed. Every age must be judged, if we will judge it fairly, by its own standards. In a time when the personality of an author counted for little or nothing, when critical investigation of the authorship of writings was not undertaken in order to establish their credibility or importance, and when the principal consideration was whether or no a given book favored the good cause, it cannot be surprising that it was not thought morally reprehensible to credit a work written with good intentions, in the interest of the common faith, to some man of renown, whose name, associated with it, would give it currency and authority. The wide prevalence of this practice in more ancient times and even in the early years of the Christian Church, should make one cautious about denying the probability of its existence in the time immediately succeeding that of the apostles.¹

The application of critical processes to the New Testament writings establishes incontestably the validity of the presumptions with which criticism sets out. This requires no elucidation for any one who is familiar, even in a general way, with the results of New Testament study during the present century. The writings in question when subjected to an examination present precisely the phenomena which go to establish the hypothesis that they are the work of writers who wrote as men of their antecedents and environment and of their resources as to material might naturally be expected to write under the existing conditions. A comparison of them with contemporary Christian writings shows their authors to have excelled those of the latter in the qualities of sound and sober judgment which contribute to the permanent value of works of biography and history. It appears to be largely due to these qualities that the writings composing our New Testament canon made their way amid the mass of early Christian literature to general recognition in the Church, as constituting the rule of

¹ See Zeller, *Vorträge*.

Christian faith and practice, or as canonical. While, judged by a purely literary standard, they do not rank with the great classics of the world, they are entitled to the eminence of being the Christian classics of the first and second centuries. That the impulse proceeding from the personality and teaching of Jesus stood in a causal relation to these writings, there is no doubt. So far as their writers were moved and determined in their work by this impulse they may be regarded as inspired. Considered from a purely historical point of view, they appear to have become by means of a great and fruitful spiritual influence such men as before they were not, and otherwise could not have been. A direction was given to their thought and an elevation to their feelings which enabled them to produce a new sort of literature, a literature which is unique in the history of the world. But a critical study of this literature does not show them to have been under an immediate supernatural direction in the selection and arrangement of their material, in their theological reasoning, in their apprehension of Christ and his teachings, and in the construction of their works. The various groupings of events and of the sayings of Jesus in the Gospels, the different conceptions of his person and mission, the striking contrast which the fourth Gospel presents to the synoptic records, and the different types of doctrine which the Epistles disclose when compared with one another and with the teaching of Jesus, are irreconcilable with any assumption of this kind. Rather do these facts tend to establish beyond question the presumptions with which criticism approaches the New Testament.

Enough, perhaps, has been said to show the general nature of New Testament criticism and the limits within which it should be confined. It has been shown that criticism oversteps its legitimate limits whenever it departs from the scientific method by setting up assumptions which tend to predetermine its conclusions; that in view of the nature of its data it often errs in drawing positive conclusions from doubtful premises; that its ends are defeated by every prejudging of the questions at issue; and that the presumptions of "rationalism" are as incompatible with its spirit as are those of dogmatism. A discrimination which cannot be too much emphasized is that criticism is concerned not with the origin of Christianity as a religion or a revelation, but with the literature of Christianity comprising the New Testament. It has nothing to do directly with the question of the miraculous nature of Christ or of his works. If its conclusions as to the composition,

date, and authorship of the Gospels tend to invalidate their testimony to the miraculous character of the works ascribed to Jesus, this is an incidental result, as is also its conclusion regarding the historical character of the accounts of the birth and childhood of Jesus. But the question whether supernatural events may or may not occur is outside its province, just as the problem of the ultimate origin of the universe is outside the domain of science. It would certainly argue a want of confidence in the processes of the human mind to maintain that criticism proceeding within the limits proper to it does not tend to arrive at the truth respecting the documents with which it deals; and since it cannot be held that a true belief in Christianity is inconsistent with the truth regarding its literature contained in the New Testament, the conclusion appears to be necessary that an adjustment is practicable of criticism and religious belief. The question, then, already referred to, of the proper limits of Christian religious belief here presents itself for consideration. If criticism is limited to a literary and historical investigation of the documents of Christianity composing the New Testament, and religious belief to the acceptance of Christianity as a religion, the adjustment of the two would not seem to be either impossible or very remote. The real difficulty of the problem evidently lies at this point. For religious belief is required at the outset to surrender the dogma of the supernatural origin and infallibility of the writings of the New Testament, which has long been held to be fundamental and essential. That this is not essential, however, is evident. If it be said that in order to believe in the Christian religion we must know precisely and literally what it was as delivered by its Founder, it is clear that the demand is irrational, since this would require, as has been before remarked, that a divine supervision should preserve the text of the Gospels for several centuries, and determine the canon,—propositions which no one will have the hardihood to maintain. The dogma is not fundamental to Christian faith, because it is evident that the essential teachings of Jesus and the events of his life which disclose his character and manifest his example might be preserved and transmitted in a natural, human way by means of tradition and writings. In fact it is a fairly well established conclusion of criticism itself that the essential features of the teaching and life of Jesus are preserved in the synoptic Gospels. We find here the fundamental teachings of the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, righteousness, self-renunciation, repentance, purity, love, the divine judgment

upon sin, mercy and forgiveness, worship, faith and religious consecration. Here, too, the example and spirit of Jesus are set forth with a vividness and simplicity which mark the tradition as original and substantially true.

If, now, a restriction of criticism within its proper limits is necessary to its scientific character and to its accuracy, no less is it essential to the purity of religious belief and to its performance of the functions which belong to it, that it also be restricted to the great fundamental principles of religion. It should contain the maximum of religion and the minimum of theology. It should include the utmost possible of what concerns the relation of man to God and to his fellow-man and the least possible of what concerns dogmas remotely related to worship and duty. These propositions are equivalent to saying that it should resemble religion as apprehended and lived by Jesus. The course most earnestly to be recommended to the Christians of the present day is a return to Jesus. That they have very widely departed from him in holding as Christianity a mass of dogma which he did not teach, and could not recognize as belonging to his religion, is manifest. The Christian Church has been broken into fragments in disputations about dogmas which are as remote from the original teaching of its Founder as they are unrelated to its mission to mankind. The defense of these dogmas engenders a consuming zeal for the institutions in which they are embodied, which cannot but induce a neglect of the practical religious needs of men. The energy thus expended is so much force abstracted from the real work of Christ. The defense of creeds, the elaboration of rituals, and the proscription of thought exclude, by so much as they are forcefully conducted, the Christlike ministries of pity, helpfulness and love. This dogmatic attitude of the Church presents an obstacle to the progress of mankind, and prevents the adjustment of religious belief to the conclusions of the intellect and to the results of science and critical inquiry. Since neither a legitimate science nor a legitimate criticism affects a single doctrine vital to religion, it is evident that the Church may fairly be called upon to surrender its unessential dogmas as constituents of required religious belief. It is equally evident that in no other way can an adjustment of the conflicting tendencies be effected. The intellectual progress of mankind is certain to continue, and the revolt of scholarship against dogma within the Church will become more distinctive and forcible than are the present ominous examples of it. It is manifestly essential to the stability of religious belief that it be eman-

culated from the unfruitful dogmas which encumber it. So long as it is identified with them, it is exposed to the peril of sharing their fortune. If the infallibility of the New Testament writings is made a cardinal article of religious belief, the whole structure of faith is liable to be shattered when this dogma is found untenable, as sooner or later it must be found. If the Church will maintain the Pauline theology instead of the religion of Jesus, it exposes itself to the danger of being involved in the decline of Paulinism. To establish religious belief upon the dogma of the unity of doctrine in the New Testament is to place it upon a precarious foundation. It is to disregard differences, varieties of interpretation, and departures from the teaching of Jesus, which are obvious to every thoughtful reader of these writings.

The clear discrimination, then, between the essential and the non-essential, the permanent and the transient, in the New Testament; between the divine word of Jesus and its human accretions and interpretations; between the intuitions of the great Master and the speculations of his followers; between religious truth and metaphysics; and between revelation and apocalypse, appears to be the only means of bringing about the reconciliation of religious belief with the results of the critical investigation of the New Testament. The process is surely going on, and it will continue to go on, just as the adjustment of religion and science has been proceeding during the last quarter of a century. As the steady progress of science has effected the latter, so will the progress of criticism effect the former result. One spirit lives and works in both, — the scientific method. The adjustment in question cannot be forced. It is a matter of development. Traditions are long-lived, but they wither in the noon of enlightenment. When Christian faith shall have become critical, that is, when men shall have come to reason about what they believe, instead of unthinkingly accepting traditional doctrines, they will see the divine accord of all truth, and the adjustment of religious belief to the conclusions of scholarship will be effected.

ORELLO CONE.

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THOMAS PAINE.

MR. CONWAY'S handsome volumes¹ celebrate the hundredth anniversary of the most brilliant incident in Paine's career. In February, 1792, he published the second part of "The Rights of Man." The two parts had attained an enormous circulation and made him the object of a boundless fear and admiration, when, in September, he was simultaneously elected a member of the National Convention of France by the three departments of Oise, Puy-de-Dôme, and Pas-de-Calais. He could only serve for one of these, and Calais was his choice, that department having been first to send a messenger to him, urging his acceptance. He got away from England just in time to escape arrest, thanks to his friend William Blake, yeleft Pictor Ignotus, who rightly anticipated that his "inflammatory eloquence" on the 12th, at a meeting of the "Friends of Liberty," would hasten a catastrophe which had been long impending. Arrived in Calais, Paine received a great ovation, walking through files of soldiers, embraced by their officers, presented with the cockade by a charming lady in a pretty speech, carried to the town hall and presented to the municipality, while cries of "Vive la Nation!" "Vive Thomas Paine!" rejoiced his sanguine heart. How could he know that nothing like this would ever come to him again, that the descent would be easy into hell, and that few and brief would be his glimpses of the cheerful day! Mr. Conway's biography is the most gracious testimony to his abilities and virtues that has been accorded him from that September day to this.

It is strange that Paine, dying in 1809, should have waited so long for a biography deserving the name. His evil fame, like that of Henry Eighth and Judas, and Satan himself, might well have attracted Mr. Froude, or some other biographical romancer, to revise, and if possible reverse, the popular judgment. Or some honest admirer of either his political or his theological opinions might properly have been moved to vindicate him from the aspersions which ignorance and cowardly indifference have combined to heap upon his name. The early lives by "Oldys," the pseudonym of one Chalmers, a miserable hireling, and Cheetham, whose own name was the best possible expression of his character,

¹ *The Life of Thomas Paine.* With a History of his Literary, Political, and Religious Career in America, France and England. By Moncure Daniel Conway. Two volumes. Pp. 380, 489. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. \$5.00.

were the mere diatribes of political enemies ; yet they have done more than any others to fix the popular judgment. The later lives, by his friends Clio Rickman and Gilbert Vale, were loyal attempts to stem the tide of misconception and abuse, but they were written without critical research or literary skill. Thus it has been left for Paine to point a hundred morals and adorn a thousand tales of infidel death-beds. His memory has been cherished most by those who have cared nothing for his enthusiastic belief in God. Though Bancroft, Fiske, and other historians have made honorable mention of the "prodigious effects" ascribed by Franklin to his "Common Sense," and also of his "Crisis," which was a more "sovereign cordial to the dying" than Hamilton's National Bank, yet other writers, from whom we had a right to expect something better, have made themselves the merest echoes of the popular abuse, and even added to it from their inner consciousness. Thus, Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, in his "Life of Gouverneur Morris," calls Paine a "filthy little atheist," and Professor McMaster offers Paine's infidelity as a reason for his lack of authority in public matters ten years before his theological career began.

Mr. Conway evidently came to his task with a lively prepossession in Paine's favor, less because of his theological beliefs, which were far from being Mr. Conway's own, than because of the natural sympathy of one free-lance and come-outer with another, and especially because of Paine's humanity, which is so obvious that it needs no search to be made evident, and can only be escaped by willful blindness. No less evidently, Mr. Conway has studied his subject more carefully than any one heretofore ; he has investigated the charges against Paine's personal character with as much judicial fairness as his prepossessions and his habitual temper would permit ; and his admiration for Paine steadily increased as he went on. He deserves our gratitude for his laborious investigations, the more because the truth that he sought was often buried in unsavory stuff, from which a less courageous purpose would have turned aside. He has brought many interesting things to light, setting his hero in his proper round of circumstance and personal association. But when baffled in his search for facts, Mr. Conway has sometimes fallen back on vague conjectures, and the surmises of one page are too often the certainties of the next. In general, these transmutations are quite innocent. They are less pardonable when the calling Paine a Quaker, simply because his father was of that persuasion, grows into the prevailing habit of the book ; when Mr.

Conway's "feeling" about this or that matter takes the place of proof; and when his passionate fancy takes its wildest liberty in the suggestion that Paine, if he could not rise again in three days as Talleyrand advised an impatient reformer, rose again in a dozen years in Elias Hicks, from whom the Hicksite Quakers have their name; for this, the only occasion is the fact that Willett Hicks, the cousin of Elias, was a good friend of Paine in his last days, and one of the meagre company which followed him to his lonely grave. During those years the air was full of the thought of Channing and Ballou, protesting manfully against that doctrine of the atonement which was to Elias Hicks the one intolerable thing! Mr. Conway has too much the habit of viewing Paine in isolation, while he was one of many working to the common ends of truth and good. The best biographer tends to exaggerate the part his hero plays in great events, but Mr. Conway's isolation of Paine is quite too remarkable. The "prodigious effects" of his "Common Sense" left much for other men to do. Without him they would have produced the great result of Independence; he never would have done it without them. Mr. Conway isolates his hero equally in his religious activity, failing to exhibit him in his relations to the deistic movement of the eighteenth century, both in England and in France, of which he was the last noisy echo, rather than an original genius, doing a work peculiar to himself.

In general, in these important volumes, Paine is conceived on too grand a scale. Mr. Conway takes him even more seriously, if possible, than he took himself. He was not a man of lofty genius, but a man of brilliant talent. He was not a philosophic statesman, but a dashing pamphleteer, one of the greatest of that line of which Wiclif has been called the first, of which the mendacious Defoe was a great example, and William Cobbett another. Paine's rival in the art, at first his foe and afterward his eager friend, Cobbett, carried his bones to England, and there left them "lying around loose," so that apparently they were not again reburied. Mr. Conway is continually applying epithets to Paine which are so much too big for him that, however they may satisfy the following he has already, they will make the more judicious grieve, and will be little likely to attract to him a new appreciation.

This also must be said, that, however successful Mr. Conway has been in rebuttal of the charges that have soiled the memory of Paine, he has not been equally successful in showing Paine as a man with solidity of character equal to the effectiveness of his talents. When we consider these, and the passport they afforded,

again and again, into the best society, — using this term as not abusing it, — the wide range of his information, and his ability to talk instructively on many things, especially of that young science which found in Franklin its chief representative, and was so fascinating to his generation ; his habitual manners, so cordial and benign, making him a good listener as well as a good talker, “ swift to hear and slow to speak ” being the custom of the man ; that admirable style, picked up no one knows where, but so good that it triumphed over the deficiencies of its syntax and orthography, as clear as day, and yet a day of stars : those phrases which, since he minted them, have had universal currency, such as “ the times that try men’s souls,” and “ He pities the plumage and forgets the dying bird,” — how was it that, with so many gifts and graces, Paine was not more secure in his position in the years that intervened between the war and his departure for England in 1787, that Washington must write of him as “ Poor Paine ! ” and that he stood thus in the general esteem ? Mr. Conway has not solved the riddle ; he has only made it more perplexing than before. After Paine’s return to America in 1802, with outraged Federalism and Orthodoxy inciting each other against him, it was not strange that the old friends fell off. Moreover, by this time, Gouverneur Morris had reported him a habitual drunkard, getting abundant credence for his tale. But when every adverse influence has been considered, it remains a mystery that after his services to the Revolution Paine had so little personal weight, charity and condescension plainly mingling with the praises of his most valued friends. The reason was not that Paine was “ an adventurer,” for Charles Lee was such *par excellence*, and this did not prevent some of the noblest spirits preferring him to Washington as commander-in-chief. The reason was not, again, his imperfect education ; compared with Washington’s, it was superior. Declining his just earnings and lavish in his generosity, he must needs exploit his services and be always claiming some substantial recognition. His conduct in the Silas Deane affair, which cost him his secretaryship of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, was not even formally a breach of trust, but it was easily construed as such, and it made him many enemies, where it should have made him friends. Still the wonder grows, what was lacking in the man that could prevent his establishing himself on a more equal footing with the men who recognized his great abilities and his matchless aid. Even if his vanity had been already as overweening as it came to be at length, this would not sufficiently explain the mystery.

Of Paine's evil habits, real or imaginary, we hear nothing during his first sojourn in America. In England he had been an exciseman, like Robert Burns; if he had been an equal poet, his faults would have been much more readily condoned. He was twice discharged from the service, and he could not live happily with his second wife. Both discharges were for neglect of duty; the nature of the domestic trouble we do not know. These things would never have been heard of if it had not been found necessary to blacken the character of the revolutionist who wrote "*The Rights of Man*." Mr. Conway believes that he has reduced the fact of Paine's intemperance to a brief period in 1793, after the arrest of the Girondins, to whose party he had belonged in the Convention, when he was in daily expectation of imprisonment, which was delayed until December, and then continued for ten months. No personal disappointment, but the ruin of a nation's hope, which he had made his own, drove him into fierce excess. Mr. Conway's argument for Paine's reform some months before the beginning of his imprisonment is one which will make a different impression on different minds. It is that during these months he wrote "*The Age of Reason*," which, were it the work of a drunkard, would recommend his favorite drink. But the "orthodox" would find in the intemperance of the book, judged by their standards, an argument for the intemperance of the man. Quite possibly the book, which is a matter of fifty pages only, was written in the lucid intervals of a prolonged debauch; this is the more probable hypothesis, as Paine's imprisonment was coincident with a violent illness, from the effects of which he did not recover for many months after his release, though he had the tenderest care in the family of James Monroe, who had succeeded Morris as Minister to France.

The reports concerning Paine's habits after his return to America are various and conflicting. Grievously disappointed in his reception here, the object of great theological and political animosity, deserted by some on whom he had reckoned confidently and finding others dubious and cold, without a real home, or any of the tender care demanded by his years and his infirmities, — it would not have been strange if he had sought that fountain of oblivion which the Bible recommends to those who would forget their sorrows and remember their miseries no more. But whether this recommendation was negatived for Paine by his general distrust of the Bible and his particular distrust of Solomon, or whether he was determined to give no occasion for his enemies to

rejoice, the fact seems to be that he was somewhat more temperate than the average parson, and much more so than some of the greatest statesmen, of his time. His relations with Madame Bonneville, with whose husband he was on the friendliest terms before and after her coming to this country, were so honorable that they never excited the suspicions of a community eager for any ground of accusation. Even the general defamer, Cheetham, waited till Paine was dead before he assaulted his character on this side, when he was promptly sued for libel and found guilty. It would then appear that Paine had not the fault for which the statesmen of his time had a notable predilection, which revolutionary France particularly affected as the only fault the church was eager to condemn, and in the commission of which some of the most distinguished of our own Republicans and Federalists maintained a shameful rivalry. As for Paine's care of his person, the wonder is that, when both the republican and the literary vogue favored the habits of Swedenborg and Dr. Johnson, which were neither neat nor clean, the testimonies are so general in his favor as a well-kept gentleman. Any inference from the last years of his life, when for a time his hands were paralyzed, and hirelings took his money but abused his trust, should amount to nothing; but, even here, the wish has generally been father of the thought. Those who read Mr. Conway's pages, or my own, may say, "Something too much of this;" but it is worth while to know the truth as far as may be, when malicious falsehood and the rumor which increases as it goes have had control so long.

With much that is conjectural in Mr. Conway's account of Paine's life in England from his birth on January 29, 1736-7, until his coming to America in November, 1774, there is enough of solid fact to set Carlyle's "rebellious needleman" well up above the crowd of characterless folk. Thetford, where he was born, is a town in Norfolk with its Heathenman Street, a reminiscence of the Danish invasion, on which Mr. Conway would fain have located his birthplace but could not do so. Paine's father was a Quaker; his mother was of the Established Church, in which he was confirmed and presumably baptized. Late in life the mother is believed to have joined the Quaker Meeting. That it had no attractions for the son as he grew up is evident from his preaching as a Methodist or Independent in 1759, and, less doubtfully from his application for a certificate of his qualifications for orders in the English Church, — the most amusing fact in his entire career. What a doughty champion of the Establishment he might have been had

not his application been refused ! Altogether the most precious recollection of his childhood is that embodied in "The Age of Reason," which Mr. Conway "has no reason but a woman's reason" for "feeling" that he wrote on the eve of his imprisonment in Paris. It shows how early he began to wander in "the way that some call heresy : " —

I well remember, when about seven or eight years of age, hearing a sermon read by a relation of mine, who was a great devotee of the church, upon the subject of what is called *redemption by the death of the Son of God*. After the sermon was ended, I went into the garden, and as I was going down the garden steps (for I perfectly recollect the spot) I revolted at the recollection of what I had heard, and thought to myself that it was making God Almighty act like a passionate man that killed his son, when he could not revenge himself in any other way ; and as I was sure a man would be hanged that did such a thing, I could not see for what purpose they preached such sermons. This was not one of those kind of thoughts that had anything in it of childish levity ; it was to me a serious reflection, arising from the idea I had, that God was too good to do such an action, and also too almighty to be under any necessity of doing it. I believe in the same manner to this moment ; and I moreover believe, that any system of religion, that has anything in it that shocks the mind of a child, cannot be a true system.

In this revolt of his young heart there is the essential quality of Paine's ultimate message to his generation ; from first to last it was his confidence in God's goodness that made him reject those representations of the divine character which would cast disgrace upon a mortal man.

That Paine had no proper boyhood is merely Mr. Conway's inference from our ignorance of its course. Unless the boy was not the father of the man to an appreciable degree, he must have had an inventive genius in his play that could make the slenderest resources magical. At thirteen he was apprenticed at staymaking, so helping Carlyle to a good epithet, and at seventeen he ran off to join a privateer, so helping us to one more pleasant allusion to his "good father" who brought him back. There are several such allusions in his works, but none to his mother, the rumor of whose temper is not sweet, while a letter of her writing, the only one preserved, reflects severely on his character, and not favorably on her own. Paine was apparently a wayward youth, for in 1756 he joined another privateer, and this time got away ; he soon had enough of it, but did not return home. At twenty we get the first glimpse of the coming man : following his trade in London, he

buys a pair of globes and attends scientific lectures. But still he was a rolling stone, and in 1758 we find him at Dover and then at Sandwich, whence comes the rumor of his preaching. Here he married the next year, only to lose his wife in the next following. Her father was an exciseman. Paine, attracted by his occupation, got an appointment as a gauger in 1762, from which he was discharged in 1765 for setting down pretended surveys on his books. In 1766 and 1767 he was a teacher's assistant in one London suburb and another, and it was to his principal in Goodman's Fields that he applied for a certificate to the bishop of London when he aspired to be a servant of the Church. Meantime he had been restored to the excise and got another place in 1767 at Lewes in Sussex after a brief term in Cornwall. Here in 1771 Paine was again married, but in 1774 he formally separated from his wife. About this matter Mr. Conway does some of his poorest "guess-work," as he frankly owns it is. Here, too, Paine made his first attempts that have been traced in literature; their form was generally poetic. "I had some turn," he says, "and I believe some talent, for poetry, but this I rather repressed than encouraged, as leading too much into the field of the imagination." He had little to fear in this direction. Mr. Conway allows his fancy to soar into the empyrean when he represents Paine as a repressed poet, and adds, "It is your repressed poets that kindle revolutions." Judging the poetry that Paine repressed by that which he expressed, it had no kindling quality. A master of prose composition, he wrote verses that were the most wretched doggerel, the jolting vehicles of florid compliments, bombastic politics, and pleasantries which were sometimes quite as broad as they were long.

Thomas Paine was long in coming to himself, but in 1772 there were signs of that event in an address to Parliament which his fellow-excisenen commissioned him to write, requesting an increase of their salaries, for the good of the service and their own. That he was selected, and that a subscription was raised to pay him for his work, marks him as one known to be above the common. The address was well written, but had in it slight suggestion of his later style, and still less of that of "Junius," whose famous "Letters" Mr. W. H. Burr believes he had written before this. Mr. Burr is equally confident that Bacon was the real Shakespeare. This confidence might well be allowed to cancel the other, but Mr. Conway gives several reasons to show that Paine could not have been "Junius." He does not say that Paine's vanity could never have been equal to such self-effacement. Paine would have ad-

vanced his own interests as an exciseman much more by sticking to his business than by writing an address to Parliament. In April, 1774, he was again dismissed from the service for having "quitted his business . . . and being gone off without paying his debts." A little later, all the effects of "Thomas Paine, grocer and tobacconist," were sold at auction, and his separation from his wife was the next step in his humiliation. Things were going hard with him, and already he had traveled more than "halfway upon the road of this our life." But if it is not always the darkest hour before the dawn, it was so in this case. Paine had already met Dr. Franklin in London, and become interested in his electrical experiments. November 30, 1774, he reached America, with a letter from Franklin introducing him to his son-in-law. In the terms of this letter there was nothing extravagant. It recommended Paine as one likely to do well "as a clerk, or assistant tutor in a school, or assistant surveyor." But the source from which it emanated indefinitely multiplied its force. The bearer got employment straightway as a tutor, and shortly after as the editor of the "Pennsylvania Magazine," a new venture, to which he was a great accession. With about equal strangeness, we find him pleading the rights of animals and the rights of women; but his most significant article was in the "Pennsylvania Journal" of March, 1775, an arraignment of African slavery, so forcible and eloquent that, though it did not fall upon good ground, it should hereafter give the name of Thomas Paine an honored place in every history of the beginning of the anti-slavery conflict in America. Mr. Conway may well feel a thrill of cordial sympathy when he finds Paine, in October, 1775, doing almost exactly what he did himself in 1862, with his "Rejected Stone," — endeavoring to make the war an instrument of justice to the slave. The brief communication ends: —

"And when the Almighty shall have blessed us, and made us a people *dependent only upon Him*, then may our first gratitude be shown by an act of continental legislation, which shall put a stop to the importation of Negroes for sale, soften the hard fate of those already here, and in time procure their freedom."

When these words were published in October, Paine's pamphlet, "Common Sense," must have been germinating in his mind. It was published January 10, 1776. The value of its contribution to the Independence party was immense. The personal testimonies to this effect are numerous, and sufficient of themselves, without the fact that in two months about one hundred and twenty thousand

copies were sold, and before the event of July 4 had answered its demand, double or treble that number. Even where its arguments are least impressive to the political student of to-day, they were admirably adapted to the exigencies of the immediate situation. Less than six months before its publication, Thomas Jefferson had been "looking with fondness towards a reconciliation," and the same temper was then almost universal, though the battles of Lexington and Bunker's Hill were already historic events. Paine, who had just left the mother-country, had no such fondness for her as those who had been long away from her. It is evident that all the misery of his personal associations with her government was translated into terms of public indignation. With the dismemberment of her empire he would punish "Britain" for his broken fortunes. Though there was no word of this in the writing, it was in every line, to give its cleaving rhetoric a keener edge. The curiosities of literature or personal experience can hardly show a transformation scene more interesting and dramatic than that in which Thomas Paine, the disgraced and ruined exciseman of 1774, was, in 1776, one of the most powerful agents in the dismemberment of the British Empire and the establishment of an independent nation in the western world.

Mr. W. H. Burr contends that Paine not only wrote the "Letters of Junius," but also the Declaration of Independence; Mr. Conway, without refuting, or even mentioning, the general proposition, imagines that "there can be little doubt that the anti-slavery clause struck out of the Declaration was written by Paine, or by some one who had Paine's anti-slavery pamphlet before him." He gives Paine's words and those of the rejected clause in parallel columns, and the reader can judge for himself about the matter, remembering Jefferson's own anti-slavery sentiments. The resemblance does not seem remarkable. If Paine had been spoiled at once and forever by the praises lavished on his "Common Sense," and the sudden rehabilitation of his personal repute, and if he had been as expectant of the highest honors as Charles Lee, it would not have been strange. But instead of mounting a pedestal he shouldered a musket in the Pennsylvania division of the patriot army. Later, he joined the force of General Greene, and was made by him a volunteer aide-de-camp. In November, when the army had retreated as far as Newark, he began the first "Crisis," a pamphlet as well suited as the former to the end in view, which was to cheer the fainting spirits of the patriots and their soldiers in the field. It was read upon the eve of Trenton, to squads or

companies of the disheartened men. How bravely it began! No better watchword ever nerved men's hearts upon the eve of battle. And it went on as it began. It was soon followed by another and another, till there were thirteen in all, one for each star in the new flag; though none after the first had quite the magic of that Tyrtæan ode, each in its turn answered some pressing need. If Paine's ancestors had come over in the Mayflower he could not have identified himself more completely with the revolutionary cause.

We must here pass over Paine's experience in the war and "the critical period of American history" which came after it. If his conduct in the Silas Deane affair was discreditable to his judgment, it was not so to his patriotism. The trouble was that he knew more than others, and yet not enough. Congress was obliged to make a scapegoat of him or endanger its French alliance. He was dismissed from his clerkship to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but was soon appointed to that of the Pennsylvania Assembly. In 1781 he went to France with Colonel Laurens, to negotiate a loan, and though it was his influence, with Franklin's, that prevailed, he had no official standing in the matter, and no pecuniary reward. Prodigal in his generosity, he was soon "Poor Paine!" in the most literal sense, and a suppliant for favors which he might have disdained if he had had a better title to his favorite *nom de guerre* in the management of his own affairs. In 1787 he returned to England, intent upon the construction of an iron bridge, for which he had made experiments and plans. It would be interesting to know his exact relation to an enterprise which was already, figuratively speaking, in the air. Mr. Conway's flattering allusions from the "Encyclopædia Britannica," are unfortunately taken from the eighth edition; in the ninth these disappear, and in their place is a denial of Paine's claim to any part in the construction of the famous Wearmouth bridge. His mother was now very old, and in the few remaining years of her life she found in him the filial devotion which formerly she had missed. His engrossment with his bridge was such that the first stages of the French Revolution did not much excite his interest. Even when, in May, 1790, he writes to Washington concerning the key of the Bastille which Lafayette has intrusted to him for his old friend and chief, his pulse keeps excellent time, though he was going over to Paris when the new constitution was proclaimed, to carry the American flag in the procession. But when Burke's "Reflexions on the French Revolution" appeared the following

November, the tide of his emotion rose so fast that his bridge was swept away and out of sight, and he was borne, as in a moment, into the revolutionary current, to be in a little while a helpless swimmer in its awful swirl. He began at once to write "The Rights of Man." In February it was published, and sold at a wonderful rate. If the course of events justified Burke's worst anticipations better than Paine's sanguine hopes, it was in good part because the former were efficient causes of the evils he deplored. Mr. John Morley has said that Burke was in the wrong with humanity and breadth, while Paine was in the right, without these inestimable qualities. But was not the intelligence that sympathized with the agonies of a people broader and more humane than that which fastened on the misfortunes of a giddy woman and the ruined splendor of a royal house? Many of Paine's definitions of forms of government would be refused admission to the dictionaries of our own time, but his strength was less in these than in his hatred of all real oppression. Yet his interpretation of the English Constitution, and not Burke's, is that of Bagehot and Freeman, — that the monarchy is the creation of the people, and exists during good behavior, not by any hereditary right. Paine is least engaging in his personal assault on Burke, and this has unmistakably the vulgar tone. He is always weakest in his political philosophy, having an over-confidence in the ability of the people, as such, to manage their own affairs. He fails to perceive that "paper-constitutions" are so many palimpsests; that what is written underneath is the acquired character of a people, written as in sympathetic ink, and certain to come out in the fierce light that beats on every human institution, as upon a throne.

Paine was over in Paris and back again in London before the second part of his "Rights of Man" appeared in February, 1792. He was much thought of in France, and was consulted by Lafayette and others on matters of importance in the ever-changing posture of events. It would have been better for the nation if his counsels had had more weight. His inability to speak the language must have been a serious bar to the exchange of ideas with his friends. After he had taken his seat in the Convention, his most intimate relations were all with the Girondin party, and especially with Condorcet, one of the noblest spirits, with whom he labored on the Constitution which the party that had come to regard the revolution itself as an unmixed good continually deferred. Paine's voice and pen were steadily employed for all the

better things, such as the sanctities of established law and the banishment of the king. The earnestness with which he pleaded for poor Louis's life went far to alienate from him the Terrorists, and after the arrest of the Girondins he absented himself from the Convention. His own arrest is veiled in mystery. He himself attributed it to Robespierre, among whose papers the decree was found, and never suspected even the complicity of Gouverneur Morris, then our Minister to France; but Mr. Conway is persuaded that the arrest was due to this gentleman. There is no question that Morris was jealous of Paine's influence, often greater than his own, and little question that he could have prevented his imprisonment, if he had cared to do so, or have brought it to a speedy end. When Monroe succeeded Morris, Paine was soon released, but it should be remembered that after the death of Robespierre the general tension was relaxed. Mr. Conway's contention that Morris deliberately plotted for the imprisonment and death of Paine seems too harsh a judgment of that easy-going man-of-the-world to be accepted on such constructive evidence as is here adduced. Paine's escape from the guillotine by the merest accident — his door being open when it got the mark of doom and shut when the prisoners were huddled up for death — would have been regarded as a miracle of providence by the Orthodox believers of his time if he had happened to be a defender of the faith instead of one who had already written both the first and second parts of "The Age of Reason."

The first of these was written just before Paine went to prison, in December, 1793, and the second during his long confinement which ended in November, 1794. What is generally published as Part III. was the last publication of his life (1807); in 1810 several miscellaneous matters, including a part of the intended reply to Bishop Watson, were published together as Part IV. The first alone would never have given him so bad a name as he has had. Brief as it was, it contained an excursus of several pages attacking classical studies, the manifest reflection of his own ignorance of them, — the old story of sour grapes. Paine was quite as ignorant of the literature of his subject, and thought himself a daring innovator where many had in fact preceded him. But this only makes more evident the natural keenness of his mind. His criticisms are often shrewd anticipations of the results of later scholarship. But the most sensible of them jostle the most arrant nonsense upon every page. There is a Quaker reminiscence in Paine's "two distinct classes of what are called

Thoughts : those that we produce in ourselves by reflection and the act of thinking, and those that bolt into the mind of their own accord." "I have always made it a rule," he says, "to treat those voluntary visitors with civility : taking care to examine, as well as I was able, if they were worth entertaining ; and it is from them I have acquired almost all the knowledge I have." There is evidence of the truth of this on every page of "The Age of Reason." The book is strongest in the way of general reflections ; it is weakest in the realm of facts. Paine took "the high priori road" and came down upon the facts with his theories as grossly as Hegel, resolved to wring from them the required confession.

There is not the slightest reason why Paine's protestations of a moral and religious purpose in his book should not be taken at their face value. The man was thoroughly in earnest ; as compared with Bishop Watson, he was earnestness itself ; his cheap buffooneries were but transient scum upon the surface of a current deep and strong. His appeal was not to licentious hatred of religion, but to genuine moral instincts ; he was even passionately convinced of the irrationality and stupidity of the prevailing creed, which he took always at its worst without a particle of sympathy or imagination. He was honestly shocked by the representations of God contained in the Old Testament ; honestly grieved that such a story of "man's inhumanity to man" should be regarded as a special revelation ; honestly persuaded that the religion of 1793 was hostile to religion and humanity, and that he could construct a system of deism which would be infinitely more religious and more moral ; infinitely more honorable to God and helpful to mankind. Above all things, he was a hearty lover of his kind, a good hater of all cruelty and oppression. He had a real enthusiasm for humanity. What he wrote of Jesus was a true description of himself : "He called men to the practice of moral virtues and the belief of one God. The great trait in his character was philanthropy." If one can read Paine at first hand, or Mr. Conway's life of him, without seeing this, he might as well be blind.

Paine's was no merely negative assault. The general argument against "a word of God existing in print, or in writing, or in speech" is stated clearly and in terms that still hold good. They are, the want of a universal language ; the mutability of language ; the errors to which translations are subject ; the possibility of totally suppressing such a word ; the probability of its being altered, or fabricated, or imposed upon the world. That the Bible,

as Paine queerly names the Old Testament alone, and the New Testament were so "fabricated and imposed" he devotes himself to proving in the later parts of "The Age of Reason," and here he shows preëminently the limitations of his culture and the poverty of his imagination. But he set out to be positive as well as negative, and he is eminently so in Part First and only less so in the other parts because following the lead of adverse critics, to his own hurt as well as theirs. His positive statement has the merit of extreme simplicity. It cannot be abridged from his own words:—

"Secondly [his 'firstly' is the denial of the possibility of a written revelation], That the Creation we behold is the real and ever-existing word of God, in which we cannot be deceived. It proclaims his power; it demonstrates his wisdom; it manifests his goodness and beneficence.

"Thirdly, That the moral duty of man consists in imitating the moral goodness and beneficence of God, manifested in the creation, towards all his creatures. That seeing, as we daily do, the goodness of God to all men, it is an example calling upon all men to practice the same towards each other; and consequently that everything of persecution and revenge between man and man, and everything of cruelty to animals, is a violation of moral duty."

To these statements Paine returns again and again with almost wearisome iteration. Unquestionably, Mr. Conway would have been glad if he could have found in Paine some confirmation of his own evasive doctrine that "God is good,"—by which he means that God is so much of goodness as is manifest in human life, while the Nature in which Paine had as much confidence as Emerson is relegated to the sphere of evil. Mr. Conway, long a student of the dualists, is "one of themselves;" his dualism is Man against the Universe. But than Paine's doctrine of deism—which, for no good reason, Mr. Conway persists in calling theism, which it was not—Mr. Conway could not find more intractable material. His doctrine and Paine's are made up of radically different and mutually destructive elements. "No doubt he would, says Mr. Conway, "were he now living, incline to a division of nature as organic and inorganic, and find his deity . . . in the living as distinguished from the 'not-living.' In this belief he would find himself in harmony with some of the ablest modern philosophers;" notably, we presume, with Mr. Conway himself. But Paine could come to this opinion only by the subversion of the opinion that he held a century ago. It is peculiarly the in-

organic world, the astronomic universe, that is Paine's argument for God. He quotes with admiration Addison's magnificent rendering of the Nineteenth Psalm, which lighted up the face of Addison for Thackeray "with a glory of thanks and prayer." If Paine had been a poet he might have written that. It was an exact expression of his thought. When he said "God is good," he was indulging in no subterfuge. He meant the God whose "moral goodness and beneficence" are manifested in creation. "The wrong which pained his soul below" and which he "dared not throne above" was not the indifference of inorganic nature to the happiness of individuals, but the cruelty of the most highly organized of God's creatures to each other.

As for Paine's negative assault upon the Bible as a written revelation, in its general terms its force is conceded by all the higher criticism of our time. In its particulars we have only to compare him with the most prominent of his contemporary critics, Watson, Wakefield, Priestley, Winchester, — all liberal Christians, — to see that often he was nearer to the truth than they. His poor equipment in languages and history often laid him open to their thrusts. But his vulnerability was in his extremities; theirs in the vital parts. He succeeded well in showing that the Bible is no infallible revelation; but not so well in showing that it is not the record of such a revelation disfigured by the devices of ignorant and foolish men. This was the position of his more liberal opponents. The more orthodox questioned whether such a position was not equally fatal to a supernatural revelation with "The Age of Reason." It would now appear that they did not question unwisely concerning these things.

As to Paine's special judgments on the contents of the Bible, many of them were monstrous and absurd, as where he says of Isaiah that "a school-boy could scarcely be excused for writing such stuff." There are many things as bad as this, and still the worst is what he does not say. He had no appreciation of the moral and spiritual beauty of the Psalms and the Prophets, and the New Testament. Paul's "greatest thing in the world" made no appeal to him. While he has only praise for Jesus as "a virtuous and lovable man," preaching a morality "not exceeded by any preached by other men at any time," he is perfectly satisfied with this and similar general assertions, and never draws out a syllable of the teachings of Jesus. This is Paine's great injustice and defect. It was as if some one had paraded his ribald songs and miserable excesses, and said nothing of his "Common Sense," his

"Crisis," and "The Rights of Man." His treatment of the Prophets was remarkable for the judicial blindness that it showed. He confounded an accident of their function, the poetic form of their writings, with the essence of their work. As a trip-hammer to a tack-hammer for the demolition of their miraculous prevision, is Kuenen's work to Paine's; but this demolition only makes their moral dignity stand out in clearer light. This also must be said, that Paine had no perception of those mythopœic processes by which miraculous and extravagant stories are gradually developed and widely accepted with the intervention of but little pious fraud. For Paine, lying and cheating were the only explanation, except as dreams were sometimes taken for the truth. Much that the Bible is not, he saw with lidless eyes, but little that it is; and both for what it is not and what it is, we have to-day a thousand times his learning and his vision easily at our command. That in him which was most germinal of things which in our time are full of power and use, was his feeling, and persistent statement, of the religiousness of science, of its essential piety, and of the fact that science is theology in the making. With many sad defects of taste and education, and with some of character as well, Thomas Paine "was ever a fighter" for what he honestly conceived to be the good and the true; he was one of the most humane of men, not only in his theories but in his daily life. Mr. Conway has done well to try to rescue him from the misrepresentations of the ignorant and malicious, and to demand for him the liberal admiration and affection of all honest and progressive men.

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SOCIAL BETTERMENT.

THERE are many cheering signs that the discussion of Socialism, which is so marked a feature of the present intellectual and moral situation of civilized mankind, is reaching a more philosophic and constructive stage. While socialism has been comparatively an old story in France and Germany, a warm interest in it on the part of Englishmen and Americans is of comparatively recent date. More especially here in the United States (and I write with special reference to the whole matter as it takes shape in this country), socialism has been running in some ways the course of a "fad." America has the distinction of having produced the socialistic romance of modern times which has been the most widely read; it has been talked about by millions of people in the Old World as in the New. Mr. Edward Bellamy, whose reputation previous to the writing of "*Looking Backward*" was founded entirely upon stories of odd characters and eccentric situations, has, indeed, become an extreme convert to his own romance. At one time there were not lacking, likewise, so-called students of sociology who were convinced by the sale of a third of a million copies of "*Looking Backward*" in this country, that there were at least a million, if not two million, thorough-going socialists in the United States,—all of whom might be considered ready to inaugurate "nationalism" at the earliest possible moment. Such naïve methods of taking the intellectual census of a civilized people were sufficiently amusing at the time, and only the process of a few months has been needed to convince even the takers that they were over-hasty in substituting a simple process of multiplication for a house-to-house canvass. Very slight consideration should show any one at all acquainted with American life, that the enormous sale of "*Looking Backward*" indicated the existence of a million or two of convinced socialists no more than the much larger sale of "*Robert Elsmere*" indicated that countless Americans were ready to join a new sect in Christianity, holding the beliefs of the author. "*Looking Backward*" was issued at a time when public attention was widely directed toward social questions; it became the "book of the hour," and a people numbering sixty millions, great readers of the newspapers and patrons of the bookstands, soon absorbed a large quantity of a volume written with fervor and conviction. It has led to the production of a very considerable number of imitations and supple-

ments by authors much less talented than Mr. Bellamy, who considered that the temporary interest in "Looking Backward" was a plain invitation to the sentimentalists to come to the front and take charge of modern civilization. Of Dean Swift's two great requisites, these writers have certainly had a good deal of "sweetness," but "light" has been conspicuous for its absence.

The socialistic novelists and poets, however, have already had their day, having plainly shown their incompetency to do more than excite interest in social problems. Careful thinkers and students who, unlike Mr. Bellamy and his disciples, have been studying for years the phenomena of the economic and social life of modern man are now receiving from the general public the consideration which they deserve. Men who have a right to be called philosophic and scientific observers in sociology are coming to the front, and the sentimentalists are, gradually but surely, being relegated to the rear.

It is the almost invariable tendency of sentimental social reform in this country to identify itself in its second stage with a political party. Almost as invariably, every such reform at once loses more ground, in the eyes of the judicious. Generally failing to find any particular encouragement from either of the two leading parties which possess the field of politics, it has recourse to some third or fourth party. Such a party, in this country, is in recent years quite sure to be a collection of "cranks" of numerous varieties, who, failing to convert each for himself any considerable number of Americans endowed with ordinary common sense, agree to "pool their issues" and enter the political arena as a "Farmers' Alliance," a "People's Party," or with some other such vague and ineffective designation. Of the Farmers' Alliance, with its absurd notions of currency and finance, it may be sufficient to say here that no political party in America has ever yet succeeded which frankly avowed itself the representative of a class; the working farmers of this country have been, and are now, too sensible to think of arraying themselves as a body against the remainder of the community. In a country, too, where every man votes, and laudation of "the people" is the conventional staple of politics, no designation could be more tame or uninspiring than "The People's Party."

Leaving to one side, as out of the main current of intellectual tendency in American life, the vagaries of the so-called "Nationalists" and their allies, we may profitably consider here, but necessarily with much inadequacy, the probabilities of the social

betterment which one might call "rational socialism," — a socialism based upon the study of the facts of the existing order and quite in harmony with what one might style "the higher individualism." No conviction is probably more central in the minds of thoughtful observers of existing civilization than the conviction of the persistent need of social reform. The marvelous and speedy development of material civilization has brought with it intellectual and moral problems that deserve not only instant but prolonged attention. One of the first cautions to be observed in the discussion of these problems is the necessity of discriminating between them. The old precept, "Divide and conquer," is nowhere more applicable than in the social field. We should perceive with clearness, and act consistently upon the view, that the so-called "social problem" is a vague and extremely comprehensive phrase, covering a multitude of matters, more or less related simply because they are all matters of interest to man. The "social problem" is coextensive with modern progress and civilization; the whole life of civilized mankind might be brought under such a heading. Social problems are not one, but very many; while it is impossible to consider any one of them without some reference to others, confusion of thought and a large absence of intellectual or practical results must ensue from ambitious discussions of "the social problem" as if it were a matter within the ability of any human brain to handle effectively. If we note only the most important divisions of this immense field, there is "the labor question," which for convenience' sake might well be restricted to the proper relations between employers of labor and their employees; this, again, is properly subdivided into the questions of wages, factory supervision, liability for accidents, arbitration and conciliation, and the like. The very important matter of the comfortable housing not only of the poor, but of the moderately well-to-do, especially in the cities, is another important phase of the so-called "social problem" which, obviously, has little connection with the direct relations of the manufacturer and his mill hands.

Then there is the question of the advisable limit to which the various political and governing bodies in a free country like ours may go in respect to such matters as supplying water and gas in cities, and the control or ownership of street railways; this is evidently a special problem relating to the functions of the State. This class of problems under our American system would be reserved for settlement by the various commonwealths, which could confer or deny powers desired by cities or towns in respect to the

matters just mentioned, and could, in other ways, enlarge their functions in the sphere which lies between purely local administration and the field which the national constitution reserves for the action of Congress. National questions in the social field are the propriety or advisability of a United States governmental telegraph system, and ownership by the nation of the railways, canals, and other means of transportation between different parts of the country.

Enough has been said to indicate the uselessness of general declamation concerning the "social problem." The prime necessity at the present hour is a careful, specific, unbiased and thorough study of particular problems. It is not advisable here to enter into details concerning any of the matters which I have indicated. Sufficient be it to say that an unprejudiced consideration of the situation in this country leads to some such general conclusion as follows : —

We have already incorporated in our institutions and in actual every-day practice, a large amount of what, to Mr. Herbert Spencer and his school, would seem offensive "socialism." Such a socialistic institution is the one in which above all others the American takes a just and rational pride, — the system of free public education. That a writer of such eminence as Mr. Spencer should, in his discussions of socialism and individualism, pay no attention whatever to the experience of the greatest republic of the world in dealing with public education is not a little astonishing. The fact offers a striking commentary on the inevitable limitations of any person, even the best equipped, who would take the universe for his province and attempt to declare all its laws, physical and social. The public library system of a State like Massachusetts is another cardinal instance of what would be styled "socialism" by the extreme individualists of the day, such as those who contribute to "A Plea for Liberty," edited by Mr. Thomas Mackay. In a hundred other directions, the practice of American legislatures has been in the direction of that dreadful "slavery" which Mr. Spencer sees "coming" upon Anglo-Saxon mankind.

It can be said with entire confidence that the American legislatures, and the American people who are the primal source of the laws in point, have not made them out of unquestioning adherence to a rigorous and vigorous theory. Socialism has hardly been known in these United States until within a few years, save as a matter of bookish interest to students of European history ; and nothing has occurred, since socialism has been more warmly

discussed here, that indicates any fundamental alteration in the temper or the tendency of the American people. They have legislated for their own actual condition, with no particular reference to theories of individualism or socialism. They have been guided and governed by the political instincts of the Anglo-Saxon race, a race which has shown itself, thus far, in the history of the world the most able to establish political freedom on solid and lasting foundations. The fathers of the American Republic, in Lowell's words, —

More devoutly prized
Than all perfection theorized
The more imperfect that had roots and grew.

Their genius for political freedom has always led the American people to respect the limits of the practical and the attainable. In the future, we have a full right to expect the same quality will be displayed in regard to any steps yet to be taken.

To take an instance, here in Massachusetts: one of the issues of the day having a plain tendency toward the extension of the powers and functions of local government has been the furnishing of electric light by the municipality. When this question, some years ago, was first vigorously advocated before the General Court, it found a large number of supporters, who could not see why a town which furnishes water to all its citizens at certain rates might not, so far as general principles were concerned, also furnish electric light to them, or, at the very least, manufacture electric light for the lighting of its own streets and squares. The power to take such a step would seem, on general grounds, to be plainly inherent in the local government, under the presumption that powers not reserved to the State by the Constitution of the Commonwealth inhere in towns and cities. In order that no mistake should be made, however, the question was referred to the Supreme Judicial Court, which gave its opinion that, under all the circumstances, it would be advisable for the Legislature to pass a law to the effect that towns and cities might manufacture electric light under certain conditions. A law was subsequently passed, embodying a number of limitations conducive to wise and gradual action on the part of the municipalities. These were required to pass on the matter at two successive meetings, for instance, at a considerable interval. Under this statute a number of Massachusetts towns and cities have taken preliminary action, and several are on the point of establishing electric light works. The fact is notable in this connection, that in one town (in which all the preliminary

steps had been taken under the championship, in particular, of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, an ardent advocate of the scheme) the necessary appropriation to carry out the project has been more than once refused by town-meeting, mainly on the ground that other expenditures were more pressing; a course of proceedings less *doctrinaire* could not well be imagined.

A large number of towns in Massachusetts are greatly interested in seeing the practical results to which a trial of the electric lighting system by the municipality will lead, in the case of the towns and cities which have already taken action looking toward such a system. We shall have, ere long, a body of experience on this matter deserving most careful study. It is quite probable that this experience will be of the most diverse character, and that the various circumstances of different towns and cities will vitally affect the result in different cases, and therefore the conclusions to be drawn from them by these other municipalities which are waiting, in more than one sense, for light. Just as the student of sociology does well to isolate different phases of his most comprehensive subject, in order to arrive at results of value, so the municipality does well to attempt a definite and specific trial of one such scheme as electric lighting, and allow time for the consequences, immediate and remote, to fully appear before taking action, favorable or unfavorable, on other schemes which, so far as logic goes, are of one piece with the plan already adopted. So highly complex and inter-related is the structure of modern society that very few persons are at all capable of prophesying the full body of effects to result from such a comparatively simple matter as the manufacture and supply of electric light by the municipality. Much less does it need to be said, when we consider the confessed weakness, not to say failure, of American democracy in dealing with the problem of city government, that other more complicated and difficult measures, such as the assumption of street railways by the municipality, need to be approached with the most thorough understanding of the situation and the utmost caution. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has, therefore, rendered a service, by its rejection of the thoroughly untimely "municipal coal-yard" scheme, as plainly unconstitutional.

It is obvious to the clear-sighted, as Dr. Schäffle, among others, has insisted, that in our humane concern for the welfare of those now in the rear of the industrial progress of civilization we should not exaggerate the importance of these persons or classes to total civilization. The very fact that they are to-day poor or ignorant,

or both, is a sufficient proof that, with all their claims upon the consideration of the successful, they are not the persons of most importance to the growth of mankind as a whole. The human race has always had its quota, and usually more than its desirable quota, of the inefficient, the incapable and the intellectually and morally deficient. In the few millions of years which, the scientists kindly tell us, are all that remain to this round earth, it is not probable that such persons and classes will be totally abolished. Poverty, ignorance and inefficiency are relative terms, and until human nature, in its infinite variety, has been entirely remade, we must expect infinite variety in the circumstances and conditions of individuals. The important thing in modern life is that the moral and intellectual leaders of human progress should be still allowed, yes, encouraged in every possible way, to continue their leadership. Most of all is this needful in democratic countries. It is a matter of vital consequence, not only to the poor but also to the classes that are now well-to-do and successful in the battle of life, that all the resources of human talent should be improved to alleviate and brighten our human lot. To this end, every plain dictate of Nature — Nature, the most severe and unrelenting of aristocrats, who pays little heed to “petulant schemes” of equality and uniformity to which sentimentalists would postpone “Time’s slow proof” — should be obeyed, out of a simple view to the welfare of the whole body of mankind, who are deeply concerned that such obedience be ready and complete.

No phenomenon of the closing years of the nineteenth century is more promising for the moral and intellectual future of the race than the earnest discussion of socialism, so far as this implies deeper interest in methods that have long been followed by some of the successful for the upraising of the poor and the ignorant, and in new methods logically consistent with these. A sign of the prosperity of civilized man, — for only those who are successful themselves can be asked to spend much time in improving the lot of others, — it is a proof of the gradual humanizing of mankind, and a sign of the greater extent to which practical Christianity is penetrating the mind of modern life. Conscious and deliberate effort by the educated and the prosperous of to-day to improve, much more speedily than has ever been before thought possible, the lot of every less fortunate and less capable brother is a tendency sure of continuance and an increase of power. But when, carried away by generous emotion or the whirl of self-conceit, any go so far as to assure us that improvement in the lot of the “des-

stitute classes" is the only thing needful for the salvation of civilized man, we must very plainly demur. The one thing needful, the one thing indispensable, for the very uplifting of the "destitute classes" themselves is that the progress of civilization continue to be at least as rapid as it has been in times gone by. If any considerable improvement in the lot of the poor and ignorant is to be made, it must be from a large increase in the speed and the vigor of the civilizing process, and this cannot be effected unless every road be made plain and smooth before all the individual talent and force of character that modern man possesses. If any civilized society should so far lose that sense of proportion in which reason essentially consists as to make its chief object the alleviation of the poverty of the poor instead of the increase of the wealth of the whole community, it would dig a pit into which both rich and poor would speedily tumble.

The method of civilization, long since substantially determined by centuries of experience, requires certain intellectual qualities, such as the hearty acceptance of the actual facts of man's condition and of human nature itself, and readiness to follow the lead of unusual talent or character, which can never be abandoned except to the injury of the whole structure of modern life. We need not exert ourselves to find apologies for the existence of the idle classes of the fashionable world, whose one motive seems to be anxious search for some new amusement more expensive than the last. They are the classes whose tendency to immorality needs the most careful attention of the preacher of the gospel of righteousness. Leaving these butterflies out of view, and fixing our thought upon the men who in the world of commerce and finance actually lead the industrial development of these United States, — the railway captains, the great manufacturers and the prominent financiers; considering, in another direction, the comparatively idle persons (such the mill-hand might call them) who write the histories, the essays, the biographies, — yes, even the poems and novels of the day; considering, too, the men and women who devote themselves to the fine arts of painting, sculpture and architecture; reviewing in our minds the very large number who sustain the cause of religion and philanthropy in a thousand different ways, giving their time, their money and themselves to humane pursuits; considering, once more, the lonely astronomer in his observatory, the patient natural scientist in his laboratory and every like devotee of pure knowledge; here we see activities and tendencies at least as worthy of encouragement and fostering as the

comfort of the thousands upon thousands of Nature's average, or less than average, workmanship. No gospel needs to be preached in this luxurious age more than the gospel of the "dignity of labor" (a phrase unhappily falling into disrepute among hand-workers themselves). But there is extreme need, also, that the hand should not dream of exalting itself above the head. Modern civilization never was due to mere distension of muscle; it is primarily the fruit of the intense action, much rather, of the human brain, and the great mass of mankind can follow no surer path of welfare than that of high respect for the cunning inventor, the great manufacturer and the master of commerce or finance, who may seem to be working purely for their own good, but whose efforts can never benefit themselves without producing, at the same time, an immense improvement in the lot of their fellow-men. Probably no more ingenious scheme than scientific socialism has ever been imagined by the perverse intellect of partial thinkers for arresting the progress of civilization, by reducing all men to one level of opportunity and reward. Nothing in their scheme is more repellent to the philosophic thinker than the exaggerated emphasis which they place on the material comfort of that part of the human race which has virtually confessed failure. The palace of the multi-millionaire, whose conscience does not forbid his assailing legislators with every argument in his power, may not be a spectacle to afford comfort to the philosophic observer of contemporary life; but a proposal to strike a dead average for all men between the palace and the poorhouse would be much less agreeable. The result would probably be millions of homes not far above the material, intellectual and moral level of the poorhouse. No more complete enemy of sound thought or of secure progress has been imagined than the dream of a monotonous uniformity of human life which possesses the mind of the thorough-going socialist.

In certain other respects the socialist deserves little regard from philosophic thinkers. There is no line which he more commonly follows, in America or elsewhere, than that of unmitigated denunciation of all who are rich; we must bear in mind that the notion of wealth is purely relative in the mind of the speaker. He improves upon the motto of Terence so far as to say that nothing human is alien to him, *except* the man of wealth. Now if we consider that as a simple fact, the vast majority of the rich people of this country at least have acquired their wealth by honest and legitimate efforts, and that their wealth, in a rough way, corresponds to the amount of actual capacity which they have shown;

and if we consider, still further, the fact that in acquiring this wealth they have contributed greatly, and of necessity, to the welfare of thousands upon thousands of their fellows, we shall desire a socialism of a more rational kind, including within its sympathies the honest rich as well as the honest poor. The great body of the American people are neither rich nor poor. They are not exposed to the temptations or disadvantages of extreme wealth or extreme poverty. They are, the greater part of them, capitalists, to the extent of knowing in some degree what the possession of private property means. They are, it should never be forgotten, all the more largely and highly developed human beings because of this possession of capital, — for capital, rightly interpreted, means power and opportunity. With this great mass of people, neither rich nor poor, the solution of every industrial and social problem in this country actually rests. They are not making a great amount of outcry, and certainly they are not clamoring for the discontinuance of many existing institutions. They probably feel quite strong enough discontent with their own lot, but their condition happily renders them quite incapable of such indiscriminate denunciation of the rich as the socialist usually falls into. They are perhaps only too ready to perceive the advantages, rather than the disadvantages, of wealth, as compared with the modest competence which leaves personal exertion of a regular character essential. This great body of people, who have no notion, as American citizens possessed of American ambition, of leveling things down to their own standard of comfort, but on the contrary are determined to level up their own lot to the highest attainable point, are to determine the limits of any kind of socialism in this country. Just so fast and so far as this great body, neither rich nor poor, becomes cultivated and refined by the higher education (and it desires nothing more ardently than the best educational opportunities), will the material and moral problems of advanced civilization gradually receive satisfactory solution. No socialism will succeed in commending itself to their minds which virtually denounces leadership by the men who have shown their capacity; no religion or philosophy, in fact, will lead men to put themselves permanently under the leadership of the plainly incompetent in the race of life.

The fundamental antecedent to any form of rational social betterment must be the willingness of the individual man to think upon the lot of other men with some visible share, at least, of the interest which his own lot daily excites. Experience amply shows

that a certain degree of material comfort is almost indispensable, with the great mass of mankind, for the manifestation of any considerable degree of such interest in others. When the simple effort to obtain bread enough for the day requires all the strength and ability of the individual, there is evidently little room for altruism to work in, and small opportunity for putting ourselves, imaginatively, in the other man's place. So great is the number, however, of the well-to-do, in our own country, as compared with the number of the positively indigent, that there never can be too much appeal to the comfortable and prosperous classes to interest themselves, individually and coöperatively, in the welfare of their brethren. It may be impossible yet to improve civilization in that extreme geometrical proportion which the ardent philanthropist too often imagines; but we need perpetually to combat the native tendency of the prosperous man to be satisfied with himself, considering the comfort of others outside his family as of little consequence, so be it that his self is luxuriously appareled, royally housed and honored with the obsequience mankind is ever too prone to exhibit to wealth. But here we have to deal, not with any transient or superficial phenomenon of a passing year or generation, but with that "old Adam," as the theologians once delighted to call it, of selfishness and sin, — two words which have reasonably been taken as synonymous by many. Yet while the preacher denounces "self" and "sin" as thus equivalent, the man of science and even the man of philosophy more contentedly recognize that human nature is as it is, and must be taken *as it is*, and that, in all probability, the theologian, the philanthropist and the preacher would fail miserably in making it over, according to even the highest and brightest ideal in their earnest minds. Condescension and superciliousness toward actual human nature, groping its way toward something better and higher, are out of place. Human nature as the main feature in the social situation must be recognized without praise or blame. The very multiformity and complexity of human nature forbids — let us thank God or Nature for the fact, as we choose to frame it — the acceptance of the depressing, discouraging and enervating pictures of the future which are all that socialism has thus far presented.

The scientific temper, both as respects calmness in observation and sobriety in expectation, is one of the factors on which we may safely rely for the rationalization of socialism and individualism alike. The cool and deliberate spirit which, first of all, inquires

carefully into the facts of the situation, whether in the world of physics or the world of human nature, and then infers the lines on which movement is likely to take place, in conformity with the past evolution, is very remote from the temper of the ordinary socialist. He almost invariably gives a most one-sided, and, in fact, unjust picture of existing industrial civilization, contemplating with a jaundiced eye the unpromising phenomena of the present, and neglecting to inquire, first and foremost, to what actual current of social tendency we must intrust ourselves in order to attain, not at once but gradually, such an ideal as he has in mind, if it is practicable. The man of scientific temper will take a more cheerful view of the existing situation, as he compares it with the past, and, at the same time, will have a more moderate conception of the possibilities of progress in the immediate future, the only future concerning which he cares to occupy himself much. In another direction, however, he offers a much more cheerful prospect of probable achievement in the near future than does the thorough socialist. It is curious, indeed, in the midst of a century of discovery and invention that the socialist should put so entirely to one side the possibilities of social improvement which we may rationally expect from the progress of applied science and new inventions. The socialist is strangely biased by his propensity to rely upon legislation as an instrument of progress. Surely, one need consider but briefly the history of the last hundred years, to see how small a part legislation, as such, has played in the tremendous development of modern society, by the side of science, invention and discovery. The merest allusion to the great steps in this amazing scientific and industrial development will here suffice. As in the past, so in the future, in all probability, we may trust ourselves for much of our salvation to an advance in man's mastery over the powers of nature, — such a mastery as this last century has wonderfully demonstrated. The first step in such mastery has ever been a submission of the mind to the facts of a universe of law and order. The most striking phenomenon in the socialistic agitation of our time is, on the contrary, the obstinate endeavor to impose on our complicated society, — the result of tens of thousands of years of evolution — an ideal scheme, not yet even thought out with tolerable theoretical consistency, and never yet presented in such a practical form as to assure careful thinkers that it would keep in running order for a year, in any civilized nation. Here in the United States, to speak again from an American standpoint, we suffer far more from con-

stant over-legislation than from any lack of guidance by Legislature or Congress of the natural development of civilization. I would not copy the prominent fault of the socialist, whose prophetic strain is not that to which old Experience hath attained, but one may feel safe in anticipating that however the pace may be accelerated, the future development of civilization will be on the same lines which it has followed in the last hundred years.

It is advisable for those who do not accept socialism as a scheme capable of working in logical completeness to mark their own position by some other word than "socialism," even if qualified by such adjectives as "practicable" or "rational" or even "Christian." Individualism represents an extreme view of the relation of the man to the State; socialism represents another extreme view. For the sake of clearness of thought and expression, it is desirable that the term "socialism" be dropped by those who accept neither of these extremes, but believe in steady amelioration, continuous betterment or persistent reform in social matters, as one may choose to phrase it. Every species of socialism thinks to find in an enormous extension of the functions of the State a substitute for charity and individual initiative, — a substitute with such wonder-working power that poverty, and the moral evils which poverty brings, would disappear inevitably. A more sober view recognizes the weakness and imperfection of human nature. In all probability, charity, especially if organized in a business-like and scientific manner, will for a time indefinitely long have a part to play under civilization, without respect to the industrial and political changes which may come to pass. Until intemperance, for instance, involving, as it does, the annual expenditure of nearly a thousand of millions of dollars a year in this country, — a sum which, it has been estimated, would procure a life-insurance policy of ten thousand dollars for every head of a family in the United States, — becomes a thing of the past, charity, however organized, is likely to retain a necessary office.

Until the civil service of the American city, State and Nation is placed upon a thoroughly sound business basis, utterly divorced from politics and the inevitable corruption of politics, proposals to extend its functions over new industrial fields will have a plainly unpractical complexion. Social reformers of every kind should first seek to divorce service under the State from connection with a political party. Especially is this kind of reform needful in the government of the American city, at present the plague-spot in our civilization. The new powers which it is

often suggested should be put into the hands of city governments involve the control and expenditure of enormous sums of money. Until we have so far reformed our city governments in theory and practice that we can trust them to do honestly the work which they now have authority to do, it is foolish to talk of opening to them fresh opportunities for incapacity and plunder. The argument sometimes used, that the effect of adding new responsibilities to city councils here in America would be to sober them, and also to make the people at once much more careful about the choice of their city government, is obviously theoretical. This kind of talk Tammany Hall would doubtless approve; but it can hardly be expected to commend itself to hard-headed tax-payers. In every direction, whether in city or State or Nation, the enlargement of the functions already discharged is plainly a question not of absolute right, but of practical proportion, a matter of more or less need, — not a matter of absolute wisdom or folly, or of pure right or wrong. A point is reached, sooner or later, in any of these directions, where individual ownership or control of a certain business, more or less affecting the public interest, is plainly superior to ownership or control by the city, State or Nation, with its inevitable disadvantages. Long before this point is reached, there are many cases in which it is matter for argument whether the State or the individual is capable of working with the more efficiency and satisfaction to the public. In these cases the practical American instinct decides that the State should make out a strong case before disturbing individual control, whatever its evils, for these may be capable of regulation.

In numerous instances what we have to consider is not the specific ability of the State to do a certain thing by itself, — to manage the telegraphs of the country efficiently, for instance; the point is whether, with its already large load of responsibilities and duties, the State may advisably go on to assume other functions. The United States government, for example, discharges with tolerable efficiency the important business of carrying the mails. While the system is by no means perfect, or deserving of the adulation which it receives from the indiscriminating, it is plainly, on the whole, an advantage to the entire country that the mails should be under control of the general government, especially as they are, in fact, carried by railways and stages owned by individuals. At the same time, the palpable deficiencies of the government mail system are largely supplied, at the present day, by the telegraph system under the control of individuals. The case is

not sufficiently made out for government ownership of the telegraph system, also, if we show that the government could send messages at least as cheaply as they are sent at present, without incurring a deficit. The further question must be considered whether the service rendered at any price by the government would be as prompt and efficient as that now supplied by the great corporation which owns most of the telegraph lines in the country. If the government both carried letters and sent dispatches, having a monopoly of the entire field, there would be no such easy corrective, as at present, of governmental shortcomings. In general, it is altogether probable that regulation by governmental authority of telegraph companies, railway companies, trusts and every other variety of business corporations is much to be preferred to governmental ownership. It will be ample time to consider thoroughly the question of ownership when the policy of control has been proved to be insufficient; this point, evidently, has not yet been reached in our country.

A direction in which a great and far-reaching change, first in public opinion and then in positive law, is to be anticipated is in respect to the rights of property and systems of taxation. One need have no tincture of scientific socialism to recognize the obvious fact that it is society which secures property rights as they exist. It is obviously within the just powers of society to modify these rights, in the interests of society in general. Not only do we need new and more moral conceptions of the duties and responsibilities of the rich, who are now wealthy in such numbers and to such a degree as the world has never known before; but we need also to consider very carefully the advantages and disadvantages to the public of great fortunes. Simply to prevent enormous corruption and bribery of private voters and of legislators, a democratic country like ours would be justified in taking vigorous measures, so far as they are found feasible, to shorten the term of immense fortunes. Such a step, for instance, as the appropriation to the State, on the death of a man of millions, of a considerable fraction of his property for public uses, would be entirely defensible from the point of view of the statesman and the philanthropist alike. The right of property is most illogically extended when it is supposed that a person who has been protected by society in the accumulation of fifty millions of dollars in the course of a lifetime must also be endowed with power to continue the ownership of this fortune in the hands of one or two heirs. The prospect is that, whatever dangers to the political

soundness of a democratic state were involved in this immense accumulation will be increased if it is held together, for generations, in the hands of a single family. It is a bloated individualism, indeed, which would defend the right of an individual to threaten the political life of a commonwealth in this way; a life-lease of his millions is all that any citizen can properly ask of the State. If he does not, as Mr. Carnegie recommends, dispose of a great part of his property during his lifetime for public or philanthropic purposes, a heavy inheritance tax which would somewhat reduce the overgrown fortunes going to his legal heirs should tend to lighten, if not remove, the burden of taxation on the generality, and at the same time work no manner of real hardship to the heirs. I fully agree with the students of taxation systems who look for large relief from the adoption of plans of inheritance-taxes, such as have been adopted with favorable results in Pennsylvania and New York.

One risks the savor of cant in closing an imperfect discussion of social reform by saying that, after all, the difficulty with the men and women of to-day, rich or poor, is moral rather than economic. More than once of late years it has been said, with the greatest reason, that if men and women were morally fit for socialism, — morally good enough to give the scheme a fair chance to work, — there would be no need of setting up the socialistic State, because every advantage which it promises would have been already secured through the moral elevation of the men and women who would make up that State. This assertion is quite unanswerable as a calculation of the probabilities, moral and economic. We cannot be at all sure that any socialistic scheme ever yet outlined would work in practice; but socialists, in admitting this, declare the necessity for a long preliminary period; this must be largely given to a preparation of the heart and conscience. Altogether probable is it that such a preparation would anticipate the benefits of the fanciful industrial and political scheme.

Once more, too, despite the superficial enthusiasm for equality in comfort and in possessions among citizens of the socialistic State, we must note that socialism, beside laying little emphasis upon morality, almost entirely dismisses from its calculations the religious sentiment. Nearly invariably in the literature of socialism the emphasis of its advocates is upon the material side of life, and, among the various means for reaching the ideal, upon legislation rather than upon moral advancement. Now they have a very inadequate view of the desires of human nature who suppose that

any social ideal realizable here upon earth can take the place of religion, or remove the grounds of human hope entirely from the hereafter and the elsewhere to a near future upon this round world. The absence of religion from socialism is not sufficiently explained by the opposition of the Christian Church, naturally a very conservative power, to extreme projects of social reform. However much the Christian Church has erred in the past through the extreme conservatism of the religious sentiment and other causes, it has been profoundly a social rather than individualist force in human society. Undoubtedly the ideal of the Christian Church has already been greatly modified, and every trace of the ascetic ideal of the church of the Middle Ages has well-nigh disappeared. Altogether undesirable is the monastic ideal of life in the eyes of the nineteenth-century man. On the other hand, the ideal of socialism must appear, even to men engrossed in the furthering of a civilization largely material and tending strongly toward the comfort of the flesh and luxury in external surroundings, too materialistic. There are deeper wants in human nature than those of which socialism makes so much account, as if they were the only thing. There are spiritual appetites and hungerings which socialism scarcely notices. With all its faults and follies on its head, the Christian Church is more true to the undying aspirations of the human soul than the socialistic scheme. Any system must come to naught, however prosperous its present hour, which practically neglects the relations of man to God. Socialism to-day is unhappily destitute of religious enthusiasm, and its apostles show little of deep conviction that they must rise "to do the task He set to each who shapes us to his ends and not our own." The lack of religious enthusiasm, more perhaps than any other failing, indicates for the socialistic scheme inevitable defeat. No such accusation lies against those who are profoundly convinced that the words "kingdom of God" still express a commanding truth, and that in persistent reform of human society, in constant progress toward such an ideal, purified by wider knowledge and deeper insight, stand the hope and the salvation of the human heart, never, indeed, to be satisfied by complete attainment, since full satisfaction of its craving is obviously impossible.

A middle course between so-called extremes is not always the wisest, even if it is possible always to find it. Yet there is great force in the declaration that "Socialism is individualism run mad." As I take it, this saying implies that a scheme is irrational which exalts, as the main matter, the material comfort of

every individual. It is very plain that human society has, thus far, not progressed in such a fashion. Whoever is responsible for the fact, — God, or Nature, or mankind, — the advance of our race in knowledge, art, wisdom and righteousness has been, on the contrary, the main and transcendent matter. Thousands of individuals may suffer and even perish in the tremendous struggle for existence, following the unseen but imperative leading of the power that makes for righteousness, — we can only say, "So it has been, and so it must be." There is a Calvinism of natural science which we may not decline to receive. Let us temper the severities and cruelties of our human lot with all the charity and kindness that we can muster; we may not well deny these. Yet not man but God declares the lines on which humanity must advance. "A god it is who fixed the goal;" a god it is who decrees the way. The one right and reasonable attitude of man is to bend his mind in patient study of the facts and laws of a God-ordained universe, seeking to derive strength and mastery by submission to the forces of nature and of the human spirit, very sure that social betterment lies in the difficult line of obedience and righteousness, not in the flowery paths of the assertion, comfort and indulgence of the lower self. A prophet may yet arise who shall preach socialism with religious fervor and devotion, in the name of the Most High God of the actual universe. Thus far it is evident that moral earnestness and depth of self-sacrificing devotion to the cause of our race, self-forgetting enthusiasm for humanity, the prophetic forces and powers of the time, are not proclaiming socialism as our salvation, but the strenuous and difficult labor of unremitting social reform. In this labor each generation must take its allotted part, — a part which men deceive themselves if they dream it to be the whole. No generation, present or to come, can rationally think for a moment that the task is over and the duty done.

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THE RÔLE OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS IN MODERN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

THE history of religions is a modern science. Like all newcomers it is obliged to make its way in the world, where no one willingly yields his place; to introduce and present itself in the venerable society of classic disciplines, and to justify, in some sort, its claim to rank by their side. It would not be impossible, indeed, to establish for it some ancestors. Without going back so far as the third century of our era, where we might plead the great curiosity of Græco-Roman society concerning Oriental religions and the mysterious doctrines of Egypt or India, it will be sufficient to recall the fact that since the Renaissance men of letters have always shown a lively interest in the gods of Olympus, and that, with the eighteenth century, savants and adventurous or philosophic minds began to extend their vision beyond the religions of the classic world. In 1617 Selden published his remarkable treatise on the Syrian gods, "*De Diis Syris*." In 1646, in a curious and rather fanciful work entitled "*Phaleg seu de dispersione gentium et terrarum divisione facta in ædificatione turris Babel*," Bochart attempted to show the primitive unity of the different mythologies of pagan antiquity, in which he recognized many altered reminiscences of the history of Noah. In 1660 an Englishman, A. Ross, brought out the first very imperfect history of religions, "*The Religions of the World*." We must not forget the "*Histoire critique des dogmes et des cultes depuis Adam jusqu'à Jésus Christ*," by Jurieu (1704), the celebrated Protestant opponent of Bossuet.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the general fermentation of ideas produced a great abundance of essays in religious history, full of views that were new and bold, and for the most part premature indeed, as they dealt with questions insufficiently studied, but generally suggestive. The president De Brosses in his "*Dissertation sur les dieux fetiches*" (1777), made the first serious study of the religions of the non-civilized races. Count de Gébelin, in France, in his "*Monde Primitif* (9 vols. 1773 to 1784), and Herder, in Germany, in his "*Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte*," with much greater philosophic power and literary charm, opened vast horizons of knowledge, which the study of the ancient documents of religion furnished to philology and the philosophy of history. The French translation of the *Zend-Avesta* by Anque-

til-Duperron, was the beginning of the series of publications of Oriental texts which are the indispensable material for the history of religions; and the "Grundriss aller Religionen," by Meiners (1785; second edition, very much enlarged, in 1816), was the first of the collective expositions which are necessary to the comparative study of religions.

Thus, the history of religions was born with this century. We must not be under any illusion in the matter. With the exception of the last few, the men whose names we have just cited were precursors rather than representatives of the new science. Moreover, why should the science be ashamed to date from yesterday? Are there not many other branches which, like itself, have pushed forth from the tree of human knowledge in our own day, and which are none the less for this reason to be ranked among the finest and most vigorous. Very far from desiring to create ancestors for itself, let it rather recognize its youth, and invoke the benefit of it, to excuse its mistakes and its inexperience. For although it was born with this century, it has been especially developed as an independent discipline for fifty years only. In the first part of the century, under the influence of speculative philosophy, the "Philosophy of Religions" literally stifled the "History of Religions." Men constructed religious history by successive logical deductions; they described its evolution before they had made acquaintance with the facts, and when they had demonstrated what it ought to be they believed themselves free from the labor of discovering what it was in reality. The history of religions became truly scientific only when these two factors had changed places; when the historic method triumphed over *a priori* speculations even the most profound, and put to the front this principle which is so evident to us: we must, first of all, discover and state in a serious manner the facts, the *realia*, of religious history, and then only should we attempt to disengage its laws.

In order that the science of religion should develop, three essential conditions were necessary. In the first place, there had to be facts of the religious order to study; in the second place, one had to be disposed to study them seriously; and thirdly, one had to know how to study them, — that is to say, one had to apply to them a scientific method. Now it is not a long time since these conditions began to be realized. Doubtless, with the Reformation the history of religions awakened from the long sleep in which the Middle Ages had plunged it. In order to justify their claim,

that they were reëstablishing primitive Christianity in its purity, the reformers felt themselves bound to make historital researches, and the Catholic apologists took the same course in order to combat them. But, with some rare exceptions, which we have already noted, their researches and those of later theologians bore exclusively upon the Christian religion. Outside of Christianity and Judaism, its predecessor, there was no religion for them. All that remained they ignored, or, if they had a vague knowledge of it, they disdained it. Other religions were the work of the devil, the pitiable products of the human mind unable to grasp truth by itself, and deprived of the benefit of divine revelation. They were so many varieties of error, and of what use was it to study error?

Thus the history of religions was reduced to the scope of ecclesiastical history. This field, moreover, was sufficiently vast to absorb all the intellectual strength at the disposition of the age. We know what magnificent harvests were gathered, and what a remarkable school of criticism and history the masters of ecclesiastical history have offered to the view of the learned world. But for a hundred years now those other religions, hitherto ignored or disdained, have been drawing to themselves the attention of all cultivated men. Thanks to the progress of philology, — above all, oriental philology, — the ancient texts of the sacred books have been exhumed; the inscriptions and the symbols of the most ancient civilizations have been deciphered; and the moral and religious literatures of Asia have been made accessible to our Western world. The religions of Persia, Egypt, the Vedic Aryans, Assyria and Chaldea have been resuscitated in succession by the wand of the Orientalist. At the same time, the great religions still professed by hundreds of millions of our fellow-men — Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism — have been studied more closely, either through new relations established directly with the peoples who adhere to them, or through the examination of the religious writings which expound their principles. Islam itself has let us perceive a part of the diversity which is concealed under its external appearance of unity and simplicity. Comparative philology, too, tracing the affiliation of languages, has established some features of a religious past so remote that documentary history had preserved no trace of it. Prehistoric archæology has come to its aid, and although we must use with prudence and moderation the information it furnishes, it offers us none the less a certain number of conclusions sufficiently sure to authorize us

to speak of the religious life of our ancestors in the neolithic age. In the last hundred years the great extension of missionary activity, the increasing taste for scientific exploration, and the almost bewildering multiplication of relations between all parts of the world, thanks to steam-power, have opened to human curiosity the rich domain of the non-civilized races; missionaries, travelers and sailors, hardy pioneers of our civilization, are accumulating veritable treasures of knowledge concerning the child-like and primitive religions of savage peoples. Finally, among ourselves, under the varnish of our civilization, the most advanced and nearly the most highly cultivated of our scientific world, careful collectors of tales and popular legends, indefatigable hunters after folk-lore, are discovering in the beliefs, the manners, the customs, and the practices of country people a great number of survivals of the religions of another time, which are also the belated witnesses of a religious past, all the more curious for us in that, without being aware of it, we are still living every day under its traditional influence.

How is it possible to limit the history of religions to the sole history of Christianity and Judaism, in presence of this overwhelming revelation of the infinite variety and universality of religion? Such narrowness is more and more difficult to justify, for it is equivalent to the veritable mutilation of a science. On the other hand, the very abundance of this material, which the different parts of the science afford, and the great, not to say the predominant place, which all these religious phenomena occupy in the history of humanity, render increasingly indefensible the indifference or the disdain which superficial freethinkers have shown for so long a time in respect to all that touches religion. Without regard to any religious interest, the simple desire to be a man of culture, and not to be a stranger to any fundamental element in human evolution, demands that we should grant to the science of religions the attention which it deserves. There is nothing, then, surprising in the fact that the study of religions without limitations has already been encountering for some years a reception more and more favorable. In proportion as the materials of the new science accumulated, curiosity has awakened, and the public has become better disposed. Theological narrowness is, unhappily, still intense in certain quarters, and the bigotry of anti-religious sectaries, which is not a whit better, has not yet disappeared. But if one can look from a height, and compare situations quite remote from each other, in order that this com-

parison may allow a serious judgment on the modifications which have come to pass in the interval, it is incontestable that the spirit of tolerance, of breadth, of universality, has made immense progress in the last hundred years. It is no longer possible to restrict human history to the revelation through Judaism and Christianity. We are no longer allowed to reject with disdain all that does not come within the old or the new covenant. In cultivated circles we are understanding with growing clearness the necessity of studying the history of religions in order to be able to reconstruct the history of religion.

The final stroke that gives the history of religions to-day a scientific character is the more and more general application of the critical method. We have already said, and all the world knows what admirable results this method has brought about in ecclesiastical history, and how it has transformed our knowledge of the Old and New Testament. History is a science only so far as it is the work of historical criticism. To apply the rules of this criticism to the documents of every nature which make us acquainted with the different religions; to apply them afterward, without partisanship, without the prejudice of the apologist, and without the doctrinarianism of the philosopher, to the comparative study of religions, — such is the task which is imposed on the historian of religions as well as upon the specialist who occupies himself above all with a single religion or a family of religions, and upon minds of a wider scope, who attempt to combine the results acquired by others in different parts of the vast field of religion. Without doubt, this task is far from being finished; it has hardly begun; the science of religion is in the making; it is not made. But already it counts a sufficient number of truly scientific essays, and of institutions devoted to its service, to have the right to demand its place in the great family of sciences, and consequently in the programme of public instruction, instead of being the simple distraction of the amateur or a mere specialty of the *enfants perdus* of science.

The history of religions is no longer obliged to supplicate for official recognition of its existence. Its titles have been already admitted in scientific circles. In the last twenty years great progress has been made in the direction which we have been indicating. The science already counts a respectable number of university chairs, or scientific foundations devoted to its propagation. Holland led the way, showing in this direction, as in so many others, a noteworthy spirit of initiative. The law concerning su-

perior education, which, in 1876, deprived the faculties of theology of their confessional character, and imposed upon the churches the task of supporting, in these faculties, professors of dogmatic theology or of matters especially ecclesiastical, created in each of the state universities two new chairs, one for the study of the history of the idea of God, the other having for its object the comparative history of religions outside of Judaism and Christianity. In France the great minister to whom we owe the establishment of compulsory, gratuitous and secular education in the primary schools and the resurrection of superior education, M. Jules Ferry, established in 1880 in the Collège de France a chair for the history of religions, and six years later one of his most worthy successors, M. Goblet, established in the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, at the Sorbonne in Paris, a section of the religious sciences, which comprises at the present day no less than eleven courses. These include the study of the religions of non-civilized races; the religions of the extreme East and America; the religions of India, Egypt, the Hebrews and the Western Semites; Islam and the religions of Arabia; the religions of Greece and Rome; Christian literature, the history of Christian doctrine, ecclesiastical history, and, finally, the canon law. In addition, any one who holds an important university or scientific title can obtain from this section authority to give lectures upon a subject agreed upon in advance, but without compensation. In this way, within the last two years, despite the secular character of the quasi-faculty of universal theology, in which there figure Protestants and Jews, two abbés have given instruction, one on the history of Abyssinia, and the other upon the Assyro-Babylonian religion. Nowhere else, probably, is there so complete a body of instruction in this study as at Paris; but all the resources which such a city offers are needed to bring together a sufficient number of students and auditors ready to follow lectures purely technical, through simple love of knowledge, without any possibility of a practical aim in the course. The Ecole des Hautes Etudes, indeed, offers no examinations, and leads to no career, and the very title of graduate, with a diploma which it confers on some few students as a recompense for a notable scientific publication, has only a purely moral value. Nevertheless, we must believe that its lessons are not devoid of influence, since one of the most distinguished masters of the Catholic Institute of Paris, the Abbé de Broglie, has thought it necessary to meet them with a course of lectures in the history of religions under the patronage of the Roman Church.

Holland and France have not been alone in founding courses of lectures on the history of religions. Under different designations we find them at Brussels, Louvain, Geneva, Lausanne, Zurich, Copenhagen, Rome, Naples, Freiburg in Breisgau, and Tübingen. Yet it is strange that the German universities, generally so amply equipped, have almost all remained refractory to the official teaching of the science of religion.

In England we do not find any professors of the history of religions, with this title. But it is none the less one of the countries where the new science counts some of its most eminent representatives, above all Professor Max Müller, whom it would be an act of ingratitude not to salute in passing, as the man who by his brilliant writings has done more perhaps than any other to arouse the attention of the public to the history of religions, and who will live in history as an initiator in this order of studies. Mr. E. B. Tylor is steadily teaching the history of religion, like Max Müller, although this is not his official function. Two important foundations should above all here claim our attention, as they testify to the increasing interest which the science of religion inspires: the Hibbert Lectures at Oxford and London, which are delivered there by an English or foreign scholar and subsequently published, and which since 1878 have constituted one of the finest series of lectures in modern times, all devoted to the origin and the development of religions; and the Gifford Lectures, instituted in the four university towns of Scotland, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and St. Andrews, by a princely legacy from Lord Gifford, in 1885, and intended to promote the study of natural theology in the largest sense. It is impossible to estimate too highly the penetrating influence which these institutions are exercising and will exercise in the world of English theology. We should mention also the courses at University Hall; the Sunday lectures at South Place Chapel, in London, under the charge of the Ethical Society, where the different religions have been studied in a series of discourses published under the title, "The Religious Systems of the World;" and the courses delivered at Manchester New College, now at Oxford, by Professor Carpenter. We must conclude that in England, as well as on the Continent, the teaching of the science of religions has already gained the day with enlightened men.

In the United States of America the readers of "The New World" know what progress has been accomplished in these latter years. The comparative study of the great Asiatic religions has

been conducted in Harvard University for the last twenty-five years. For several years courses of lectures have been carried on, in the winter season, by the University of Pennsylvania, and for two years in the summer at Plymouth, Mass., by the School of Applied Ethics. A special chair has been founded at Cornell University for the teaching of the history of religions. Elsewhere courses for the study of religions have also been established. Finally, the announcement is made of the organization of a committee which proposes to establish in America the counterpart of the English Hibbert Lectures, in annual courses, intended to diffuse the results of scientific studies of religions; these lectures will be given, successively, in Boston, New York, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Ithaca, N. Y.

The general diffusion and the extent of all these recent organizations intended to give instruction in the history of religions, in all the countries which possess an advanced civilization, constitute one of the most interesting and significant phenomena of our modern spiritual evolution, and they show plainly how far the need of a scientific study of religion and of all the forms of the religious life of the past has developed. The science of religions has to-day not merely university chairs and centres of oral propagation. It has also its periodical publications. In addition to the numerous theological reviews which gladly receive essays on the history of religions, we may here cite in particular: the "*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*," published in Paris, which numbers twenty-five volumes; the "*Revue des Religions*," established by members of the Catholic clergy in France in opposition to the preceding periodical; in German, the "*Zeitschrift für Missionskunde und Religionswissenschaft*," and a special section in the résumé of theological literature published every year, entitled "*Theologischer Jahresbericht*." If we were obliged to enumerate the reviews which have been established in the last few years to extend the study of folk-lore, and of anthropology, moral and physical, and which contain innumerable studies of religious beliefs, superstitions and practices among the uncivilized races, or the peasantry of civilized countries, our article would be transformed into a veritable library catalogue.

What would it be, then, if we should attempt to give a glance at the publications of every kind which appear in such great numbers in the field of our studies that the simple enumeration of them fills several pages of the bibliography printed every two months in small type at the end of each number of the "*Revue*

de l'Histoire des Religions"? To accomplish our purpose, which is to show that the science of religions is to-day a science definitively constituted and in possession of all its organs, it will be sufficient to mark this abundance of new books devoted to it, and to mention but a few of the great scientific collections on which it has a right to pride itself. Let us name in the first rank the admirable series of "Sacred Books of the East," published at Oxford under the direction of Professor Max Müller, which is one of the indispensable working tools of the historian of religions, since it furnishes him in a language everywhere understood, that is, in English, authoritative translations of all the books which are or have been the religious nourishment of one half of humanity. In French the "Annales du Musée Guimet" form another precious collection in the translations of sacred texts which they offer, and in a variety of historic studies. The section of religious sciences in the Ecole des Hautes Etudes at Paris has likewise begun the publication of a library, but this is, as yet, in its first stage. In Dutch we have the very interesting series entitled "De voornaamste godsdiensten;" in German, the "Darstellungen aus dem Gebiete der nichtchristlichen Religionsgeschichte," a work of scientific popularization, undertaken in as liberal a spirit as its Catholic management permits.

The science of religions has its manuals and its museums. The University of Holland has given us these manuals, that by Professor C. P. Tiele translated into French and English, and that by Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye, written in German, and translated into English, which was reviewed in the last number of "The New World." The museum was founded at Lyons by a generous friend of science, M. Guimet, and removed later to Paris, where it occupies a large building; we strongly urge all our readers who come to France to visit the noble collections of Oriental material which it contains. This museum at present is unique in its kind.¹ The religions of India, China, Japan and Egypt are largely represented. In proportion as it becomes more complete it will be more deserving of the title, "The Museum of Religions." Officially, it bears the title, "Musée Guimet," after its founder, who is also its director.

The science of religions is young; we have recognized the fact. It is not yet completely constructed; it is in the making, as we have taken no pains to conceal. Nevertheless, the signs of its ex-

¹ M. Réville is apparently unaware of the existence of the Semitic Museum recently established at Harvard University. — Ed.

istence which we have just briefly enumerated are so many and so considerable that no one can longer ignore or disdain them. It can no longer be refused, on *a priori* grounds, the legitimate place which belongs to it in the encyclopædia of the sciences, as if one were occupied with a passing fancy for the object of a scientific infatuation. Thus the question naturally arises, where and how is it fitting to introduce the science of religions into programmes of public instruction? As this science has for its object religion, that is to say, the most abundant and the most powerful source of moral energy, the most intimate and the most effective motive force in human education, the question which we raise here is immediately complicated with one more delicate: What influence may the teacher of the science of religion exercise on education, and how must we arrange matters so as to make this influence as salutary and as general as possible?

Down to the present time the science of religion has hardly penetrated into superior education, except in a few universities, in some schools for advanced studies or in courses of lectures addressed to a very cultivated public. Beyond some attempts made by liberal clergymen in Holland, and in a few Swiss schools, we believe that it has not yet been introduced anywhere into the programme of secondary instruction, and much less into that of primary education. There is no room for surprise here and, to our mind, no reason for complaint. So far as concerns primary education, the only education which the great mass of children receive, it is very evident that its programme is necessarily limited. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to make a place there for matters which can be understood only by persons who have already had a certain amount of education, and there would be no advantage in burdening the memory of children with a series of names of gods, or of definitions of religions which will not correspond to any clear idea in their minds. The same objection, although here less weighty, arises concerning the teaching of the history of religions in *colleges* and establishments of secondary education such as *lycées*, gymnasia and "realschulen." It is almost the universal complaint to-day that young people in secondary schools are overburdened with work; that they are taught too many things and that they learn them poorly. It is not a time for adding new subjects to programmes already overloaded, — new subjects which, in order to have real usefulness, would demand quite full explanations. Moreover, in all the schools of this sort which are established by the State, or in those private secondary schools which

have not a confessional character and which contain, consequently, pupils belonging to several cults, it would be almost impossible to render the teaching of the history of religions obligatory without the risk of wounding the religious convictions of some families.

The true place for the science of religions is the university, in superior education, not only because one may here labor on its development and distinguish profitably what is assured in its utterances from what is still hypothetical, but for the further reason that here only has one auditor capable of understanding the whole scope of the lessons given. In secondary and primary education, it is not so important to diffuse information relative to the religions of other countries or of the past; the important thing is to substitute for the old sectarian, narrow and unjust spirit in respect to all religions beside that of the teacher and his pupils a spirit more broad, generous and comprehensive, which will permit young people to learn to judge religions with more fairness, and make them care for the basis common to all manifestations of the religious life rather than their secondary differences. It is not at all necessary to teach children who are the gods of India, or the religious customs of the Persians; but the master, when he makes them repeat their geography or their history, should have some just ideas concerning the religious and moral life of the peoples whom he is passing in review with them. He should be capable of making his pupils feel the community of mankind and the permanence of morality through all the varieties and dissensions of belief, ritual and practice, into a knowledge of which his teaching leads them. In a word, it is the master who should be initiated into the science of religion, not that he may transmit it as such to his pupils, but that they may profit by the spiritual emancipation and the moral elevation which this science will certainly have inspired in him. Where shall the master receive this instruction if not in the university, completing his courses in letters, science and general history with a course in the history of religions?

So much for public instruction. Important in a different way is the rôle of the history of religions in the religious and moral education of adults. The true masters of the people in this religious and moral education, as we must not hesitate to acknowledge, are the clergy of the different churches. It is to them above all that we must teach the science of religion, not indeed that they may make savants of all their parishioners, but in order that they may profit personally at the outset, and that they may then make their hearers and their catechumens profit by all the

instruction which the science contains. If I believe it necessary for the future teachers of youth to gain initiation into the history of religions, this duty seems to me still more urgent for the future religious leaders of adults. It is a curious fact that the greater part of the faculties of theology, especially in the country of theology *par excellence* — Germany — have remained thus far absolutely strangers to the science of religions, and give it no place in their programmes. This is the point to which it seems to me essential to draw the attention of all those theologians who are concerned for the future of theological science and the spiritual progress of Christianity.

The study of the history of religions is indispensable to theology to-day if it would preserve its scientific character. Whatever definition one may prefer to give it, theology is always the science of God and of religion, that is to say, the bonds that unite God and man. If it should remain metaphysical and occupy itself with defining dialectically the nature of God and man ; if it should continue dogmatic and concern itself with determining the true sense of the formulas bequeathed to us by the past ; if it should be, above all, historical and critical, and seek chiefly to reconstitute the diverse manifestations of the religious life in the past, — it would condemn itself to impotence, so neglecting all the facts of religion outside of Christianity and Judaism. What value can we attribute to its demonstrations ; what will its religious psychology be worth ; what will be the scope of its conclusions, if through partisanship it leaves on one side the immense majority of the religious phenomena of the past to occupy itself with Christianity and Judaism only ? In vain will it invoke the superiority of the Christian religion ; from the scientific point of view it will be none the less mutilated. Man is incontestably the highest being in the animal kingdom ; but it is not less certain that the biologist who should limit his study to man and despise all other animals as unworthy of study would likewise condemn himself to impotence.

Moreover, this very Christianity and this very Judaism, is it possible to study them scientifically without attending to other religions, and is it permissible to judge them seriously without having terms of comparison carefully under control ? Christianity and Judaism did not rise like mushrooms, without roots in the past, and without relation to surrounding society. If there is any one thing which Biblical and ecclesiastical history, scientifically studied, has solidly established, it is the impossibility of understanding Judaism without acquaintance with the other Se-

mitic religions, the religions of Assyro-Chaldea, Egypt, Persia, and even Greece; it is that the formation and evolution of Christianity will always remain a mystery if one does not recognize, at different epochs, the profound influence upon it of Alexandrian Judaism, of Hellenism, of the Oriental religions diffused through the Roman Empire, and, later, of the superstitions of Gaul, Germany, and the Slavic countries, which the heathen, converted by the Church, piously preserved under a Christian disguise. Is it possible to comprehend the history and to grasp the great historic problem of the past, present and future conflicts of Christian and Mohammedan peoples if one has not penetrated into the genius of Islam?

We might continue thus at length. Judaism and Christianity, like all living organisms, have caused and have experienced constant exchanges with all the intellectual, moral and social agencies, in the various conditions under which they have developed; we condemn ourselves to a failure to understand them in their living reality, if we study them apart, out of connection with other religions. If theology wishes to remain a science, it must conform to the exigencies of the scientific method. It must bring together, in the beginning, the largest possible number of religious phenomena; it must amass facts of the religious order without excluding any through an *a priori* judgment; it must apply tests of exactness; it must establish the real scope of the facts by submitting them to the rules of historical criticism; and it must then classify them, compare them, let them illuminate one another. Then only may it seek to disengage from this totality of observations the laws of the religious life of humanity. If the theologians will not consent to this enlargement of the field of observation, they will place themselves more and more outside the republic of the sciences.

The history of religion, on its side, can only gain, if it is largely cultivated by men who show a lively interest in religion, as they propose to devote their life to it, and the greater part of whom know the religious sentiment through personal experience. In order to comprehend the manifestations of the religious sentiment in the past, it is indispensable that one to-day should be capable himself of religious emotion. So, in order to write the history of art, it is necessary to have taste and a delicate artistic sense. Otherwise, one seizes only the external appearance of the religious life of the past; one studies from without the form of the temple, but does not penetrate its recesses; one does not suc-

ceed in putting himself in the place of the faithful, who found in the beliefs, the rites or the practices which are in question the satisfaction of their religious needs.

But, it will be said, the faculties of theology are not solely concerned with making scholars; they have, above all, to prepare ministers of the gospel. Would it not be an abandonment of the Christian cause to extend to all religions the privilege of a study hitherto devoted exclusively to Christianity? We do not think so. The faculties of theology have for their mission the preparation of the future religious leaders, the future inspirers of the spiritual life; that is their true and holy task, one much greater and finer than the raising by hand of curates of any sect. In order to lead men into the religious and moral life, it is well to begin by learning much of it one's self. The authority which the minister of religion enjoys is so much the greater as it rests upon a serious and profound study of the human soul and the religious life. Where will he find the elements of this study, if not in the history of religions?

The science of religions will teach him the universality of religion and its profoundly human character. It will teach him to recognize, under temporary and infinitely varied forms, the permanent needs and aspirations of religion in the human soul. It would be absurd to treat as impious the modern believer when he celebrates the splendor and magnificence of the immeasurable universe unveiled by modern science, with all its laws and its infinite energy, rather than limit himself to repeating the beauties of the Biblical creation in seven days, or the glorifications of the Divine power once uttered with the limited horizon of the Psalmists or the author of the Book of Job. In the same way it would be irrational to pretend that it is better to found religion on the religious history of the Jewish people alone rather than upon the history of entire humanity. The science of religion not only furnishes the *ensemble* of facts upon which the theologian is to construct the scientific conception of religion; beyond this it provides for the minister of the church the most solid foundation for establishing the moral and social necessity of religion in the very heart of humanity.

It teaches him to disengage the essential characteristics, the general elements of all religion, those which, in one form or another, are found everywhere, and which are the most important to cultivate in believers. We do not attempt here to give an exposition of all the conclusions which the history of religions authorizes

in these matters, but it will suffice to indicate some of them, in order to show their value from the practical point of view. Does not the religious history of entire humanity, from the most savage races down to the foremost Christian peoples of modern times, prove the universality of the feeling of the powerlessness of man when he is left to himself ; of the consciousness of his dependence upon a superior and mysterious power whose aid he seeks ; of his need of pardon, and of his intuition of the life after death ? Do we not see there the grand picture of the gradual spiritualization of belief and practice, and the progressive evolution, slow and often traversed by obstacles, of the religious life of humanity ? Is there nothing in such lessons, and is their value for contemporary religious education only a chimera ?

The science of religions is a great teacher of toleration, for the same reason as ecclesiastical history, and even more so. When one sees to-day how many subjects of controversy are forgotten, the solution of which men once believed inseparable from the salvation of mankind, and on account of which men excommunicated, anathematized and exterminated one another, we learn to tolerate with more satisfaction the diversities of dogmatic belief, or of ecclesiastical practice. How much more, when the general history of religion initiates us into other forms of the religious life of humanity and teaches us to recognize truths, moral beauties, and holy and pious dispositions among those even whom Christians formerly disdained under the name of "heathen" ! The filial piety of the Confucians, the inexhaustible charity of the Buddhists, the assurance of a moral retribution in the future life among the Egyptians, — do not these afford us so many subjects of edification and, in various respects, so many motives of religious inspirations ? What an advantage for our modern society it will be if the impartial and truly scientific study of the religions of the past should inspire, in the religious leaders of the present, respect for all sincere manifestations of the pious soul and recognition of the legitimacy of every effort to find the true and the good !

We shall be accused, perhaps, of issuing immediately in religious indifferentism. This vast tolerance, this recognition of the relative value of all religions are, for many Christians, equivalent to desertion of Christianity. "Since all religions appear to you good," they say, "you will no longer profess any !" The old leaven of Jewish particularism is still active among us, and the notion of the jealous God still stifles, with the greater part of

Christians of the more ecclesiastical tendency, the evangelical conception of the Heavenly Father, who makes the rain to fall upon the evil and upon the good, and is no respecter of persons. There are many Christians, still, who divide mankind into two groups: on one side, a small number of the elect, taken from Jews and Christians only, and especially from the church to which these modern sectaries belong themselves; on the other side, the immense majority of men who have passed over the earth, the innumerable millions of human beings who have lived in darkness and error, far from the revelation in a little corner of Palestine, and who are eternally lost. If this is Christianity, if this is the religion of Jesus, then the science of religions is indeed the radical condemnation of this monstrous conception.

But if Christianity is the salvation of humanity, its regeneration through a new ideal of justice, purity and love, through a new effusion of moral energy and hope, then, wherever in the history of mankind we encounter an affirmation of the same justice, a similar need of purity, a like intuition of the solidarity of man, a kindred recognition of the supreme beauty of love and spiritual communion, a like effort toward moral regeneration, a similar prayer for propitiation or pardon, a like outpouring of confidence in God, a similar submission to the Divine will, and an equal hope in his goodness, — we can and we ought, as Christians, to feel ourselves in communion with the men who have confessed these sentiments, and should recognize in them our brothers, more or less developed, more or less instructed, but belonging in all their diverse degrees to the same ideal and invisible community of children of the Heavenly Father. This is not denying Christianity or betraying the gospel; it is affirming the universality of Christian truth, or, to speak more exactly, the fundamental identity of this religion of humanity of which the gospel of Christ is for us the highest expression.

Religious universalism, and I should add in this connection, Christian universalism, — this is what the science of religion teaches modern society. Very far from seeing in this teaching a danger for theologians or for the church, I see there, on the contrary, a great power on the side of the religious sentiment of modern times, and a true revelation for religious thought. From the point of view of Christian theism, the science of religion teaches us that everywhere, and at all times, the call of God has been addressed to man, and that everywhere man has responded according to his degree of civilization and his differing aptitudes.

From all religions there is thus disengaged a sort of substratum which constitutes the religion which is broadly and universally human, a true Catholicism which, more faithful to its grand ideal than its homonym of Rome, embraces in one immense communion all religious souls of the past and the present, and which, from the centre of all the ephemeral forms of the religious life in history, affirms itself as the eternal and permanent religion of humanity, of which one may say in truth, that God is there "all in all."

These, then, are some of the principal lessons which the science of religion has for the theologians and the churches. They are in harmony with the teachings of the philosophy of history and evolution, and they certainly have the future on their side. For this reason we claim for the science of religion a recognized place in superior education: first, for the instruction of the future teachers of our schools, higher and lower, for our future philosophers, historians, and men of letters; then for the theologians, to give a new life to their science, upon a basis broader and more universally known; finally, and above all, for the religious educators and leaders, for the ministers of the different churches, in order that their ideal of religion may be enlightened and purified, and that they may have at their disposal a new and abundant source of religious edification to meet the wants of modern society.

JEAN RÉVILLE.

ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES, PARIS.

A POET OF HIS CENTURY.

If it be true that a twilight of the lyric gods darkens this *fin de siècle*, yet there are not lacking poets who, unafraid of their environment, chant bravely amid the dusk. The clear morning of the epic story-tellers, and the high noon of the great dramatists, are past. Literature has lost its unconscious youth, its satisfaction in dreams and myths. Poetry can no longer dwell apart in her little upper room, seeing the world only in the reflections of an enchanted mirror. For as soon as she looked out of that window which is called science, the magic glass cracked and flew into fragments.

We who believe that our lady the Muse is to live so long as people need a few ideal comforts in this world of prose and toil,

understand very well that she must do something to save herself if she would not, floating supine with the stream, arrive at the journey's end "dead-pale," to be taken up and commented upon by the courteous critic, sure of her beauty, but only piously hopeful as to her salvation : —

Said he, "She has a lovely face ;
God in his mercy lend her grace !"

But let us not fear. Poetry has completed her avatar as the Lady of Shalott, and, despite certain misbelievers, will accompany with her song the march of scientific discovery. She has no more than a passing quarrel with modern science, and this slight dissension may be examined very briefly. The chart of the universe at present before the gaze of Poetry is, compared with the cognitions of the classic or the renaissance periods, like the world-maps after and before the voyages of Cristoforo Colombo. 'Tis easy to imagine a poet, at the close of the fifteenth century, complaining, "What are we to do now that this prosaic Genoese has cleared up the shadowy arcana of the great Dark Sea? This fellow with his discoveries has destroyed a hemisphere of imposing and invaluable mysteries. Where be now our mermen and sea-monsters, our Earthly Paradise, and before it the whirlpool where the ship of Ulysses, having thrice turned upon itself, went down in the abyss? In giving a new continent to geography and to trade, this Colombo has taken violently from us the vast Unknown, the region of poetry."

Surely we of to-day, in talking about the wrongs done by science to poetry, are quite as unreasonable as this supposititious complainant who could see nothing but prose ahead. Every century — not this nineteenth alone — has its distrustful *fin de siècle*. Therefore, we may reassure ourselves: the present conditions, deplored as fatal to poetry, are merely those of a period of new and unassimilated knowledge; poetry stands hushed in attention as it perceives, studies, and possesses itself of the fresh material proffered to it by science. The poets are men who have not lost their birthright of wonder; when they are no longer amazed like children, they must learn to marvel as men in presence of infinity. The poetic gift has been believed often to include the prophetic; less strangely inspired, perhaps, but not less worthy is the talent able to recognize and express, clearly and without hesitation, the spirit of its own time. This is the distinction of Mr. George Francis Savage-Armstrong, an Irish poet, whose remarkable sentiment and art, which embody high and original thought, will have a special interest for the readers of "The New World."

From the outset, Mr. Savage-Armstrong appears to have had the good fortune and the good sense to understand the quality and the direction of his poetical gift. Examining the various volumes of his work, — the early poems (just now revised and reprinted), the souvenirs of his own country and of travel, the dramatic books, and the latest volume of lyrics, “One in the Infinite,” — we find the author obedient to his inspiration, and following a natural process of development. His mind is, above all, speculative and analytic; he is no egoist, except in so far as his individuality may avail to interpret that of others. Nor is there anything skeptical or morbid in his views; a man of the world, he has neither fear nor shame of his environment, but, instead, the courage to face the facts, moral and physical, of his time, finding in them mystery indeed, but also matter for hope and belief greater than logic could supply. We shall not hear from him the monotonous hum of ignorant optimism, any more than the angry or weak cry of pessimism. Mr. Savage-Armstrong has an acute and serious intellect, free from ascetic weakness; his imagination is quick and expansive; his Celtic fluency has been moderated by highly intelligent study of his art; and his powers are well trained and balanced. He has much to say to his contemporaries, and his subjects and his manner are in harmony with the interests and the tastes of the present. While Mr. Savage-Armstrong’s voice is the voice of Erin, — full of words, and not soon wearied, — it is dominated by an intellect of that English type of which Mr. John Addington Symonds is an eminent representative. Such scholarly and sensitive Britons have a nostalgia for the South; they adore Italy and Greece with a passion in which associations of history and art are blended with delight in the smiling skies and lavish lands of the citron and myrtle. For these accomplished visitors the past is, perhaps, the strongest charm of the present, mingling with it in an incomparable whole. In Mr. Savage-Armstrong the artistic temperament is ruled, but not narrowed or stiffened, by a peculiarly strong moral and religious nature. Let it be emphatically noted that he is averse to all sectarian fashions and formulas; his is the instinctive and reasonable worship of a healthful soul and brain.

It was in the year 1869 that a volume was published in London, entitled, “Poems, Lyrical and Dramatic,” by George Francis Savage-Armstrong. The work of the young author immediately made an excellent impression upon English reviewers, who rightly found in him great promise. M. Sainte-Beuve, in a letter, gave

him enviable praise, calling him "a poet of lively and grave sensibility, almost austere, and with accents of tenderness. . . . The lyric poem, entitled, 'Sundered Friendship,' has shaken many fibres within me. What thoughts! what shadings! what lines that take hold upon one by their naturalness, poetic at the same time by their imagery and by the truth of detail!

'The shadow, crossing o'er the gravel-walk
Will draw thee to thy window.'

Here, as usual, the great French critic touched the keynote of the merits of his subject. Mr. Savage-Armstrong has never neglected facts or lost himself in speculation and fantasy. He produces fine results by visible realities, applied in illustration of spiritual ideas. As a young poet, he appeared mature; something less than impassioned, but sincerely affectionate; already concerned with great problems, and this in no overweening temper, but by natural inclination, and with the seriousness of a man who intends to do his best in life. Perhaps this early direction of his thought to religious themes may have resulted from the devotion with which he followed in spirit the brother Edmund, whose death, at the outset of a very promising literary career, remained a constant and inspiring grief to the young poet. Although we may not distinguish in the new edition of Mr. Savage-Armstrong's early poems those which have been recently added, we have his word for it that these are in harmony with his youthful moods; and therefore we may regard the volume as altogether representative. At that time he had not altogether restrained his voice from the diffuse lilt, loose in accent, of Irish poetry; and he was not a little in debt to Mr. Swinburne's amazing riches of metre and rhyme. He had, however, a wholesome desire for discipline, and the strong young talent was evidently training its forces. It is an individual voice that sounds in the poem so much praised by Sainte-Beuve, — a voice of a young psalmist in love: —

Ah, sitting at thy side, I felt that God
Slept not, nor had forgot us in disdain!

Mr. Savage-Armstrong's intelligent study of rhyme and accent is apparent in the remarkable triptych of the three "False Christs," where without actual adherence to the canon of the *chant royal*, he has been able to preserve the stiff Byzantine majesty of that most exacting verse-form. Had this first volume contained no love-song without its philosophy, there would have been cause to suspect that the author might be an ascetic spirit

likely to miss the richest sun-ripened side of life's apple. In the poem just cited, however, the reflections were not beyond his years ; and in "The Dance," the duet of Him and Her, rapturous with the cymbals and violins, sways to the waltz-tune of Metra or Strauss, until the music breaks sharply off in silence. Evidently this young poet had no vocation for a cell in the Thebaid, nor was his religion the result of anæmia ; but he was already concerned with the sorrows of existence and its veiled future, —

The sweet pathetic life close hedged about
With barriers dark hiding the far Unknown, —

and he laments for a Lost God, the venerable benign image — such as looks down from antique Italian altar-pieces — that his childhood knew.

God lives — but, O Unfathomable,
What shape or soul or thought is thine ?

We may recognize in this poem the germ of the patient and elaborate meditations in the author's latest volume and fullest expression. To lose conventional forms, yet to preserve and confirm faith, appears to be his constant endeavor ; and this is apparent in the varied lyrics, æsthetic, affectionate or boldly imaginative, of the book with which he first faced the public.

His second, dramatic period began with "Ugone," which is the least successful of Mr. Savage-Armstrong's works. It is tentative, diffuse, nondescript, and rather spasmodic ; although, like all his verse, it shows capabilities far beyond the common. An Italian tragedy which is neither suited to the theatre, nor characteristic of Italy, is at least ill-defined, although many excellent dramas are written simply for the study. But in this sub-dramatic, psychological work the characters, against a background of Italian scenery, assume the color of Italy as viewed by the cultivated British tourist. This sort of observer, though full of literary and æsthetic appreciations, retains prejudices which depict Italians, all of one piece, from the Alps to Cape Spartivento, as a curious mingling of the Machiavellian craft of the Renaissance despots with the manners of the Neapolitan lazzaroni. In point of fact, a Maine man and a Cuban are not more unlike than a Lombard and a Calabrian ; from racial and historic causes readily understood, nowhere else are neighboring districts so clearly divided by dialect and customs, while united in national sentiment, as in Italy. Notwithstanding the errors of form and of localization in "Ugone," it still has value as a document in the author's close analysis of human nature ; and it contains many beautiful passages.

Other volumes of Mr. Savage-Armstrong's verse, worthy of extended notice, must here be passed in very rapid review. Three books, "*Stories of Wicklow*," "*A Garland from Greece*," and "*Mephistopheles in Broadcloth*," were of later date than "*The Tragedy of Israel*,"—a group of three dramas requiring fuller comment. The narratives of the Irish region of Wicklow have much poetic merit, together with a quality that to-day seems a trifle old-fashioned. They are, however, picturesque and thoughtful verses. Still better is the volume upon themes of Greek patriotism, scenery, and legends, with its high intellectuality and generous enthusiasms. Mephisto appears in a black and red volume, as a satirist of British personages and institutions of the year 1888.

In the Israelitish trilogy, Mr. Savage-Armstrong has classified and confirmed his dramatic ideals. "*The Tragedy of Israel*" is not, indeed, intended for the stage; it is, instead, a series of portraits of three successive kings, the protagonists, studied under the guidance of modern theories of heredity and psychological analysis. Strict adherence to the color of the time and place is not a law of their design; while the author evokes these ancient spirits, his thought is of his own century. The hero of each of the tragedies is always prominent; the other figures are subordinated to him, with excellent art, while he stands forth as a type of human character. In this subjective and universal treatment of his personages lie the relative strength and weakness of Mr. Savage-Armstrong's work. Although it is possible to question the dramatic propriety of some of his methods of humanizing the severe images of Hebraic history, he certainly has known how to revive them, breathing into them the spirit of to-day, of which, indeed, they could have had little prescience!

Saul, the great, troubled, royal rebel, is the hero of the first book of the trilogy, which opens with a chorus of the people. Since Mr. Savage-Armstrong has elsewhere acknowledged his debt to Mr. Swinburne, there is no need of criticising the imitative rhythm and idiom, conspicuous in the lyric choruses, slighter and quite allowable in the blank verse. Rather we may recall the just remark of Mr. Edmund Clarence Stedman, as to the Hebraic tonality of the "*Atalanta*" choruses, and recognize the almost inevitability of the adoption, in a drama of Jewish history, of these modes. "*Saul*" and its companion tragedies are modeled in a free imitation of the Greek drama. With the modern theatre, they have nothing to do; their intention is entirely moral and

spiritual. Except for some verbal diffuseness and certain instances of metrical redundancy, there is no special reason to find fault with the design or execution of these poems. They are vigorous, original, highly imaginative; meaning and characterization were the object of the author's chief attention. Mr. Savage-Armstrong's Saul is a man in advance of his century, aggressive, impatient of traditions, a proto-martyr of the malady of thought. In reply to the touching hymn of the captives, —

He is just, he is good, we who judge are but wind :
 With death pain dieth, new life the soul lighteth,
 All ill is but ill to the soul here blind, —

his searching spirit answers : —

So think ye ? It is well, and sucks the sting
 Out of the flesh. What if ye wake and find
 The soul in deeper darkness, keener pain ?
 What if this painful life the sweetest is
 Of all He yieldeth of His lavish hurt ?
 Or what if, missing happiness in this,
 Ye miss all opportunity of joy
 Time granteth, finding neither hope again
 Nor any flicker of life itself ?

In each section of the trilogy a king and a prophet are contrasted. Here it is Samuel, who is the representative of established religion, wise but conservative, and opposed to liberty of speculation. His rebuke to Saul is fine : —

Before thou wast, or the Earth, mother of thee, —
 Thou grain of dust in deserts of thick sand, —
 There rose the rebel Satan, prince of the air,
 To pluck Him from his seat. . . .

. . . Ye are but fools

Confusing Pain with Evil, Virtue's self
 With Ease, and God with Man, and have no tongue
 For naming, and no skill to crown with names
 Seeming antagonisms of mortal thought
 In His that made you reconcilable
 From unbegun to unconcluding Time.

Yet we must not forget that the deity from whom Saul revolted was the jealous God of Israel; and that in this very rebellion is implied the longing for the justice and mercy of later revelation. Passing rapidly through the pages, we may note the solemn monologue of Samuel, who prays God to enlighten the king, not to leave him

To judge Thee ill by ill not born of Thee.

The contrast is beautiful of Saul's dream and David's song of

the Messiah ; and even at a higher pitch is the vision of the world redeemed, which rejoices the last moments of the prophet. In lighter passages Mr. Savage-Armstrong displays poetic warmth and effectiveness. But the theme of this book is the pathology of the melancholia of King Saul, sadly isolated among his people, subdued to the unquestioning worship of the God of Moses the law-giver.

How will they write, how speak of my vexed years
 Hereafter. . . . Will they say
 His heart was valiant in unwonted war,
 And though more fierce his pain, and heavier
 The burthen of his curse than oft men bare,
 He sent his sword not home into the sheath,
 Nor swerved from battle ; but with steadfast face
 Fronting his torment, to the last dark hour.
 Endured ? . . . Nay, who hath loved
 Israel as I ? Can ever fall the fruit
 Of promise, and this people sorely crossed,
 Mightiest of tribes, arise and sway the world,
 If evermore He strike them through their kings,
 Thwarting, undoing ? . . .
 Their tyranny above all tyranny
 Toppleth, with terror overwhelming the duped world,
 Who stand and cry, We know the secret ways
 Of the Ineffable Will, and through our lips
 He speaketh who hath framed the mystic soul ;
 And this and this He sayeth ; and this do,
 Or ye shall crumble in his fires ; and this
 Leave undone, and the immeasurable years
 Immeasurable torments shall renew.

The pity of the case of Saul is heightened by the great affection inspired by him in other persons of the drama. The scene of David's consolation of Saul is tender and lyric. Mr. Savage-Armstrong's young psalmist is imaginative, holding the pure beliefs learned in the lonely sheep pastures, and his faith easily sets itself to music : —

His face was like the golden light on sheaves
 All gold amid the harvest good,
 Who came to me below the terebinth leaves
 Where my tent stood. . . .
 But like the morn he came, with shining feet,
 And where the rivulets wind apart,
 Sate down, and drew me 'mid the grasses sweet,
 Near to his heart,
 And laid his arm about my neck, and told
 In many a soft and mellow word
 Of bliss, of life the glimmering worlds enfold —
 My Christ and Lord !

This is a dramatic conception quite different from the monologue in which Browning's David relates the rapture of intellect and faith with which he heals the despair of Saul. Perhaps there is no need to compare the relative verity of the two personations: one brings to the distressed monarch the coolness of

. . . a little cloud,
That yields a one-hour shadow, and no more,
And earth and heaven are as a yelling fire
Around me and above me ;

the other, running rapidly through the arguments of nature, set to music loved by the sheep and the quail and the jerboa; the "help-tune of our reapers" and their wine-song; of glory and of fame after death, chanted by reeds grazing the papyrus of history, up to the superb conclusion of ineffable law and of love, — attested by sorrow, —

Would I suffer for him that I love ? So wouldst thou, so wilt thou !

Certainly the design of Mr. Savage-Armstrong's tragedy required that all other figures should be kept subordinate to the magnificent dark image of King Saul. Finally, the tormented soul set free, a dialogue of the people with their chosen king, David, ends the drama in a chord of grave hopefulness.

If Saul was ruined by violent and rash revolt, David falls into a subtler snare of the malady of the mind; for this thesis is as plainly wrought out in "The Tragedy of Israel" as in a play of Æschylus or a social romance of M. Zola. The enemy of King David is his uncontrollable imagination. He affirms: —

My life hath been a splendor and a vision. . . .
A lone child shepherding my father's flocks,
I gazed into the golden-fringed clouds. . . .
Subtly hath imagination woven
Vision with truth confused; the thing which is
With that which is not, blending; the mind's realm
Peopling the actual with phantasmal shapes
And mingling its wild glory with the world's.

To this undisciplined artist soul, grave interests, even involving life, seemed no more imperative than the change or the canceling of a note of music or a rhyme. As the prophet Samuel mourned for the unique and fatal pride of Saul, so Nathan the prophet wails for the poet-king, set apart in a delusive cloud of fantasy. The king asserts, with stronger emphasis, —

My life hath been a passion and a storm ;
and the seer can only respond, "Woe, woe!" For this man is

lost by selfishness, enlightened and not altogether base. The ideality with which Mr. Savage-Armstrong has filled the personality of David raises his love for Bathsheba to a tragic level; and the same imaginativeness gives to the king "viewless wings at ankle," as he dies in a rapture of hope, pathetically broken by his "babbling o' green fields" and sheep-cotes.

Last of the tragic succession is Solomon the *viveur* of his century, wise in the human document, experimentalist throughout the range of the vicissitudes of life. He arrived finally at the conclusion that all is vanity; but certainly he was very well amused on the way to the moral of his fable! Even more than his predecessors, King Solomon invites modern treatment in his biography. For he not only possessed riches and spent them, imagined and procured for himself every pleasure, but also recorded and analyzed everything in the critical spirit of ennui. He got him men-singers and women-singers, and — like other amateur managers of grand opera — lost by the speculation; he instituted festivals, declared wars, and sunned himself in the brilliant influence of the intellect of the Queen of Sheba, that magnificent *précieuse*, with her clever questions and flattering homage. This royal image can easily be penetrated with the modern spirit which suited the purpose of Mr. Savage-Armstrong. Perhaps no scene of the trilogy is more sensitively imagined than that in which the intellects of Solomon and of Balkis are contrasted. The Queen of Sheba is wholly feminine, dreading contact with evil, impelled by a half-afraid curiosity, restrained by the woman's need to preserve her ideals. Solomon, instead, will search and examine everything, will prove evil and good, for to him knowledge is the chief attainment: —

I will dare all,
And touch man's utmost bourn before I die.

His ambition is that of the explorer; he is a spiritual Ulysses, far-sailing, viewer of the world. To this strong man all scars shall be honorable records of battle; but the woman from Sheba knows that, were her hands once stained, no perfumes of Arabia could sweeten them. King Solomon is also the modern liberal in religious matters; he comprehends that God sends the sun and the rain upon all nations. The sectarianism of his friend Chalcold disturbs him profoundly: —

I say, if He be such, and we, *but* we,
Born of one father, of the whole wide earth
Seeking, may find him — Javah, Israel's God —

Then seems the world to me a shaft mis-spel.
 . . . Cannot ye for once the narrowing bands
 Of custom break, and dwell a little hour
 Nearer the Gentile's breast ?

In a tremendous vision of a world without law, the prophet Nathan corrects the too wide tolerance of the king, as he had rebuked the poetic license of David, and Samuel reproved the overboldness of Saul. In a soliloquy by the margin of the Red Sea the king reviews his past : —

I know the best and worst ;
 And the true honor and the infinite time
 Gape like a chasm.

This large utterance of despair is succeeded by a startling picture of the mind ruined and haunted by evil cognitions and imaginings. Solomon arraigns his chosen teacher, Experience : —

Who grows
 Better by living, gentler, tenderer, . . .
 In conscience livelier, in aspiration
 More skyward ? No one.

It would be, however, a very grave error to confound these theories of the disillusioned and broken spirit of Solomon with the views really held by the author. Before closing this book, we hear the music — like one of Handel's tenderly scored heroic elegies — of the funeral march of Hadad. Then from the unnerved hand of Solomon the sceptre falls to Rehoboam ; for the wearied royal student of life, "death is a sight so stale" that he would have no tears or lamentations. To him, tranquillity seems the least of evils ; the terrestrial atmosphere is a veil before truth's face ; his learning has given him no assurance

of the unseen cause
 Or mind, or will, or essence.

Sin, he knows, is often only the breaking of man's self-made laws. Nature, with her forces and her flaws, has warred within him ; his will has failed to rule his acts ; the love of his friends will not long survive him, — and so in darkness departs this last and saddest of the three kings. The chorus, catching his mortal terror, cry out for an end of life : —

For we have seen the whole fair heritage
 Our fathers fashioned us, like smoke in air
 Melted, and Israel's utmost majesty
 Swept down the giddy shore of Time's remorseless sea.

It is indeed no small glory for Mr. Savage-Armstrong to have

been able to depict this awful tragedy with steady power, and in a manner which, if not entirely supported by history, has yet the value of lively significance to present civilization.

In his cycle of lyrics, "One in the Infinite," the identity of this eminent poet can be appreciated as it emerges from the dramatic masks behind which it spoke in the tragedies. We will permit the author's own voice to be heard, with but little comment. First, however, we must recognize the mature and adequate art to which he has attained through the energetic and untiring self-discipline evident throughout the course of his former works. He returns to his first mode, the lyric, but greatly enriched and vitalized by his dramatic studies. Now, intention and workmanship are well paired; nothing hinders the utterance of one of the most sincere and sane among contemporary poets. This volume represents, with great variety and charm of metre and of imagery, three stages of the progress of a soul: intellectual despondency, materialistic experiment and the resurgence of faith which leads to lasting peace. At first, the young spirit sees its childhood's faith shadowed by the phenomena of death, and also of life. The church is no longer for it an ark of repose, for human tyranny and greed have confused the pure religion of Christ. This is expressed in the quatrain "Desolation:" —

O Arm withdrawn into the thick black night,
O loving Face I find not any more,
How desolate, how void of life and light
Ye have left me who in vain your help implore !

But not Mohammed's wild cry in the desert, nor the lethal invitation of Buddha, can claim this man for their worshiper. He finds no saving grace in poverty and dirt; he fails to perceive the logic of total renunciation of human nature and of the world: —

1.

Sakya-muni, Gantama Buddha, what dost thou proffer of hope or of mirth?
"What shall I do to be saved" from the sorrow, passion, and terror and madness of earth?
What is thy gospel, O prophet of India? What hast thou left to me, child of the sun?
What is the balm for my pain thou hast promised me? What is the crown when the race has been won?

2.

"What shall I do to be saved?" Thou hast answered it, — "Labor not ever, but beg for thy bread;
Live as a Mendicant; marry not; mortify flesh; let a life of Nirvana be led.

So shalt thou find in the death of thy passions, growth of thy spirit, composure
and rest,
Passing through indolent days of humanity on to intangible joys of the blest."

3.

Sakya-muni, Gautama Buddha, bending I heed thee, but find in thy law
Something that baffles me, doubtful consistency, — Lo, in the weft of thy wis-
dom a flaw ! . . .

Look to it, Gautama ! . . . Sakya-muni, sweet is the bulbul, but hollow her egg.
How shall thy gospel suffice for the Many ? — If all men are Beggars, from
whom shall men beg ?

The terrible waste of metempsychosis appears to the poet con-
trary to divine economy and to human instinct, and Karma an
unlovely pilgrimage through forms

of vole or vulture, fox or ape,
To fade at last unconscious into Him, . . .
Life without Action, Thought a vapor dim,
And Bliss that shall not hear, or feel, or see.

Conscious individuality, so hardly won, is too precious to be
lost in the universal life of flower and leaf ; pantheism seems

Poorer than the poorest life that creeps
On the hither side of Death.

The poet is too self-respecting to unite in the specious aspiration
to "join the choir invisible," to die for the good of the abstract
race, —

Only that man may live, though to *each* man life be denied.

Rather, he turns to the mandate of Christ, the love of God and of
the neighbor, with the promise of the eternal mansions ; for the
abnegation of self for sake of a far-off consummate flower of man-
kind is like

A faith in the death of the soul and a worship of Man as God.

Speculation, and Science loveless, with her "word of ice," false
analogies, which

May misinterpret Nature's word,
Transform her light as through a prism,
Present her image warped and blurred,
Their work a wild empiricism,

the powerlessness of human love to protect its own, the eternal
enigma of the universe, trouble more and more the soul that
searches. Despair and apathy, like a chill fog, surround this
atom which feels itself alone in the infinite. Natural and dra-
matic is the recourse to materialism, which forms the theme of the
second part of the volume. Let us gather roses while we may,
since there was a philosopher who

Found a star and gave the star his name
 And died ;
 And still the heavens roll on, and still the same
 Abide.

Self only is certain ; let us then live for self, — though the loss of it were indeed small. Mr. Savage-Armstrong has made a series of extraordinary studies of egoism, in its forms more or less refined : —

1.

Philanthropist, reformer, martyr, saint, —
 Let whoso will attempt the joyless rôles,
 Beneath the world's huge burthen stoop and faint,
 Dash a vain life against the reefs and shoals ;
 Poor dupes, true Good for fictive Better giving,
 On worthless ingrates lavish fruitless care,
 Lose all the slender bliss of life in living,
 Mesh up the liquid seas and beat the air !

2.

If they in following their folly's bent
 Have their reward, their madness who would rein ?
 I, fall'n from barren heights, have found content,
 And in my bowery pleasaunce will remain,
 All woes of others from my ken concealing,
 All riches gathering in from every clime,
 To alien sorrow deadening every feeling,
 Making the best of earth, the most of time.

Law, to the lawless, yet appears a useful safeguard : —

Believing nothing, God a dream
 By ruthless Reason shown,
 No sanction left on Good to beam,
 No ban on Evil thrown,
 Good, Evil, but as cards a hand
 May shift to pass the time, —
 How stablish Order in the land,
 How bar the world from Crime ?

A fool must be the hero who saves life : —

What is the boon of his boasted humanity ?
 Only to rivet a wretch to his chain,
 Double the days of a vision of vanity,
 Quicken the fires of a furnace of pain.

Here the modern experimentalist, coming by the same road, arrives at Solomon's judgment, that all is vanity. There is balm in opiates, there is the final quietus of suicide, — one may choose. Then the poet repeats in newer notes the solemn warning of

Nathan the prophet, in a vision of a godless world. Among the vague shapes of fear and distrust, arise the throng of the dead, who silently control the spirits that remain embodied on earth. Because love is deathless, the poet calls a halt on the fatal march of unfaith, a rally, a charge through the darkness.

The first notes of the third part of the volume are detached and tentative as the cries of birds before the daybreak ; then various *motivi* of the earlier sections of this symphonic poem return, transposed into brilliant keys, richly harmonized. The new inspiration is Hope : —

Dawn, dawn, o'er all the pallid peaks of snow,
Bright and more bright the kindling summits glow,
And clear and sweet the gales of sunrise blow.
Look up, faint soul, and brace thyself to climb.

Peak upon peak with beams of morning kissed,
Each turned a spire of glittering amethyst,
Behold, high-soaring o'er the roseate mist !
Look up, face onward toward that realm sublime !

This rapture is not without its revulsions ; Mr. Savage-Armstrong is too genuinely dramatic a poet to change the tonality all at once and entirely. But the note of hope is everywhere heard ; if things here below are illusion : —

Oh, in this vortex of uncertainties
Why doubt a wise, fair purpose guiding all,
And choose, 'mid many, but the darkest dream ?
If all the mind may see, or deem it sees,
Be but phantasmal, past life's girdling wall
With what sweet largess may not Nature teem ?

A group of poems mourns the lost guide, plainly Robert Brown-
ing, —

who sung before us
Charmed our reasons, man and woman,
Held that God was leaning o'er us,
All was well with all things human.

The grief of the younger poet for the leader in his own line of thought is deep and sincere. Perhaps his own conception of the poetic office as God's minister may be comprehended in these lines : —

1.

Oh, use me as a tree of the wild woods
Wherethrough Thy breath makes music in all moods.

2.

Oh, use me as a wave upon the sands
That murmurs to the touches of Thy hands.

3.

I crave no more through all eternity
Than as Thy lute to be or cease to be.

Although the ancient creeds may not suffice the modern need,
they are still the scattered words of the Church Universal: —

Break not the Black-Skin's idol in blind ire,
And in the market let the Fakir stand
Offering the gnawing sun his wasted hand,
And let the Magian fan his mystic fire,
And the rude Arab to the dawn suspire,
Pressing his forehead in the desert sand.

To the poet, a crowd of thoughts continually suggest themselves
for comment under the light of hope; he may not indeed regain
the fairy-land of childhood, but he has before him an illuminated
field for action: —

1.

Oh, having gained a light at last
That shows thy space of life and earth
So good to live in, forward cast
Thy hope beyond thy narrower girth
Of fancies, lose thy haunting care
In action, rise and lay thy hand
To work that may complete the purpose fair
And rich design of Nature nobly planned.

2.

And sip the nectar of the world,
And bear its sweets to sadder doors;
Set thou thy sails, too idly furled,
And search the wealth of all its shores;
And trust thy gladness chimes aright
With theirs whom Death hath rendered free,
Thy peace is one with theirs, and thy delight
A foretaste of a fairer bliss to be.

The volume closes in a mood of elevated trustfulness: —

Oh, with what light this fragile mind may steer
Through the thick mists its dim and devious way,
I, having walked with Night and dwelt with Fear,
One truth have found, one steadfast Voice obey.
I, wafted through the immeasurable Deep,
Know not to what far Good my life is borne,
Yet, whether on my way I wake or sleep,
I wander not amid the Vast forlorn;
He guides, whose storms that o'er the midnight sweep
Melt in the scarlet radiances of morn.

This rapid and slight review of the works of a poet sensitive, profound, and brilliant, may at least avail to attract sympathetic readers to acquaint themselves with the beautiful verse of Mr. Savage-Armstrong, and with his extraordinary powers of philosophic thought and dramatic individualization.

E. CAVAZZA.

PORTLAND, MAINE.

DIVINE LOVE AND INTELLIGENCE.

THE doctrine of the Divine Love may be said to be the last refuge of religious belief. I use the word "belief" designedly, as distinguished from "sentiment." For we are familiar of late years with the claim that religion may be maintained as a sentiment, without any basis of belief. It is said that there are certain dispositions, such as the sense of dependence, awe, reverence, trust, humility, which are becoming to a human being in a world like this, and which suffice to keep him in the way of the higher life. These dispositions are undeniably religious, and it is supposed by some that there is no need of connecting them with any religious belief.

These dispositions, or sentiments, however, are cherished with reference to something. They are the attitude of the feelings in view of the condition of things in which we find ourselves — that is, toward some reality to which we are necessarily related. The character of the sentiments must depend somewhat upon the character of this reality. Every emotion is awakened by some idea. Reverence and trust are possible in a world like this, but we can conceive of a condition of things so out of joint as to provoke only feelings of bitterness and rebellion. Indeed, such feelings are undoubtedly cherished by some as a direct result of their estimate of the world they live in. To have religious sentiments, it is necessary, then, to have some religious ideas, some intellectual impression of the great reality to which we stand related. With some persons it may seem sufficient to let this impression remain very vague. But it is inevitable that man shall gain in intelligent apprehension of the universe of which he forms a part; and it is impossible for this gain of knowledge to go on without affecting the sentiments characterized as religious.

The change has already taken place. The idea of the great reality to which we stand related, that is, the idea of God, the

foundation of all religious sentiment, has undergone changes; it is unnecessary to rehearse them here in detail. Ideas of God's nature as limited and local, ideas of his character as changeable and arbitrary, have gradually faded away in the light of a growing intelligence, until sectarian differences are fast becoming eliminated, and there seems a tendency to settle down upon a few doctrines which are fundamental and essential. We all believe, we say, in God. We all believe, we say, in his love. Here all the sects agree. We cease our warfare here. Orthodox and liberal, conservative and radical, are willing to unite in this one humanizing doctrine. "To one fixed stake my spirit clings, I know that God is good." Through whatever long train of evils the world may have reached its present state, however dimly we may see the indications of a future blessed destiny, vast as are the purposes and methods of God beyond the scope of our individual needs and desires, the great body of religious believers rest securely in the thought of a Providence which is carrying on all things to the best results. Not only is God good to all, we say, but good to each; for there can be no aggregate of good which is not made up of good in the elements. There can be no such thing as good for the universe which is not apprehended by sentient beings as good. There can be no principle of good working out a final result, which is not active all along the way.

So each individual believer pursues the tenor of his life with the thought of being guided and sustained by an Infinite Love. The thought of this guidance awakens with returning consciousness in the morning, and ceases only with its close at night. It is a stimulus to duty, a rebuke to sin, a comfort in sorrow, an un-failing fund of sympathy in the dearth of human companionship and the disappointment of life's most earnest endeavors. In its immortal keeping rest the dead who were dearer than life. In the bitterest agony and the failure of all mortal hope, the sufferer looks up from his Garden of Gethsemane, and cries, "O, my Father," to One who knows and can save.

In our best moments, and in our familiar surroundings, we believe all this. Associating with kindred believers, reading our favorite literature, listening to the language of the pulpit, engaging in public and private devotion, our heart and mind seem to rest with intelligent confidence on this ultimate foundation of religious faith. But if the believer be one who thinks as well as feels, his reading takes a wider range. He follows with a keen interest the advance of discovery in the realms of nature and of

the human mind. He keeps up an intelligent sympathy with the latest conclusions in science and philosophy, and is familiar with the tone of thought of the foremost thinkers of the day. He there finds another aspect of the universe than that to which he is accustomed. Not only in scientific treatises, but also in works on philosophical or ethical subjects, he observes a general tendency to discredit any such conception as he has entertained of the Infinite Source of Being. Upon a common assumption of assured knowledge, and with an apparent freedom from all prepossessions, these writers seem to take it for granted that epithets of a personal character can no longer be attributed to the Controlling Principle of the universe, consistently with the conclusions of modern philosophy. It seems to be considered impossible that the Power which moves the vast system of things can concern itself with the details of this system. The man is looked upon as antiquated in his notions who continues to think of God in terms derived from the experiences of human consciousness. Be these experiences of a lower or a higher order, these terms are equally characterized as anthropomorphic when applied to the Deity, and ruled out of the vocabulary of a rational theism. Agnosticism would seem unwilling to rest in the negative position that we cannot know God, and proceeds to show that we *do* know that He cannot have intelligence, emotion, or will.

The religious believer is thus thrown back into a state of uncertainty and distrust. Knowing how many superstitions of the past, connected with the religious sentiment, have vanished like the mist before the sunlight of truth, while the burdens of life have continued to be borne without them, he questions whether this deepest sentiment of all may not also be but a favorite illusion, to be yielded to the advance of the inevitable reality. May it not be, henceforth, that the world is to move on to its unknown destinies, regardless, in its infinite sweep, of the transient human yearnings it has summoned into birth? Good, indeed, in its ultimate results, it may be, for the fortunes of whatever beings may finally survive, but neither in the meantime nor in the end, let any conscious being delude itself with the sense of an *answering Infinite Love*, which it fondly deems the highest good of all!

As the possible necessity of such a conclusion begins to steal upon the religious thinker, a horror of great darkness seems to close in upon him. The world, hitherto so full of human hopefulness, linked to the past by so many memories of guidance, and to the future by a boundless promise, and moving on from stage to

stage under the eye of an ever-present Sympathy, becomes all at once a vast and barren mechanism, fulfilling its results with an unvarying precision, but knowing nothing of the toilers on its surface, who act their tragic part from age to age, and then drop into endless oblivion. "Must my human loves and hopes," he asks, "thus perish as if they had not been? Must I exchange my former faith for this? Is this conclusion demanded by a clear-eyed and rational acceptance of the present facts of human knowledge?"

The importance of this question can hardly be over-estimated. For, let it be observed, it has to do not simply with arguments for or against the goodness of God, in view of the existence of evil in the world; nor with the possibility of a revelation, external or internal, by which the character of God may be known. It goes deeper than all this. It strikes at the foundations of religious belief. We have to meet the assumption — now becoming so prevalent — that it is irrational, in the light of modern philosophy, to hold any such conception of the Controlling Principle of the universe as will admit of the attributes of intelligence and love. If religion implies communion between the human and the divine, then religion is impossible, because there is no element in the divine, with which it is possible to commune.

To show that I have not stated this position too broadly, I need only call attention to those statements of a great master of modern philosophy in which he predicts the future of religion. In his essay, entitled "Religion; Retrospect and Prospect," Mr. Spencer plainly argues that as the tendency has been in the past to drop gradually the *lower* anthropomorphic ideas entertained of the Deity, this tendency will probably continue, until even the *higher* and more abstract anthropomorphic ideas will be eliminated from the conception of God, and He will be regarded simply as a mysterious and infinite Energy. Not only does Mr. Spencer infer this as a tendency, he also proceeds expressly to prove that neither emotion, intelligence, nor love is predicable of the Divine Being. He says: "The conception of a divinity possessing these traits of character (ideas and emotions) necessarily continues anthropomorphic, not only in the sense that emotions ascribed are like those of human beings, but also in the sense that they form parts of a consciousness, which, like the human consciousness, is formed of successive states. Such a conception of the divine consciousness is irreconcilable both with the unchangeableness and the omniscience otherwise alleged. For a consciousness constituted of

ideas caused by objects and occurrences cannot be simultaneously occupied with all objects and all occurrences throughout the universe.

“Like difficulties present themselves when the will of God is spoken of. Will, as each is conscious of it, presupposes a motive, a prompting desire of some kind. Moreover, will, as implying a prompting desire, connotes some end contemplated as one to be achieved, and ceases with the achievement of it; some other will, referring to some other end, taking its place. That is to say, will, like emotion, necessarily supposes a series of states of consciousness.

“It is the same with the ascription of intelligence. Not to dwell on the seriality and limitation implied as before, we may note that intelligence, as alone conceivable by us, presupposes existences independent of it, and objective to it. It is carried on in terms of changes primarily wrought by alien activities,—the impressions generated by things beyond consciousness, and the ideas derived from such impressions. To speak of an intelligence which exists in the absence of all such alien activities, is to use a meaningless word. These and other difficulties, some of which are often discussed but never disposed of, must force men hereafter to drop the *higher* anthropomorphic characters given to the First Cause, as they have long since dropped the *lower*.”

I have quoted sufficiently to show that I have not overstated the position we are called upon to meet. It is the teaching of the philosophy which has now the widest influence with thoughtful people, that we cannot rationally conceive of God as capable either of intelligence or love.

My object now is to examine the validity of this claim. Admitting the latest established truths of science and philosophy, I desire to show the fallacy of the teaching which denies the possibility of intelligence and love to the Controller of the universe. I shall endeavor to meet Mr. Spencer's arguments by showing that the tendency which he describes as eliminating human attributes from the conception of Deity has been rather a tendency more and more to discover Eternal Reason in the universe; instead of eliminating the attributes which are essential to mind, it separates from them all that is extraneous, and places them in sovereign possession of the field.

From the beginning of human existence upon the earth, it was inevitable that a being possessed of consciousness—the first distinguishing element of mind—should interpret all phenomena

in terms of mind. The external would be explained by what he knew internally. Nature around him could be deciphered only by the nature within him. The first and most obvious traits in himself were the first to be attributed to the power outside himself; *and the whole process by which man has enlarged his conception of the Being which environs him has kept even step with the development of his knowledge of his own humanity.* This tendency suggests that the process will continue, and *that its outcome will be seen, not in the final elimination of human attributes from Deity, but in the gradual discovery of divine elements in humanity.* Mind, in its highest and purest form, with all its essential and eternal elements, will alone be recognized as one in the finite and the Infinite.

In briefly tracing the course of development of the conception of Deity, it is unimportant for our purpose to decide as to the various theories of the origin of religion. It seems evident that long before any ghost-idea could have been reached, man's nature responded to the slightest unusual demonstration of the powers of nature, as betraying a vitality kindred to his own. Before he thought of himself as a personality, and knew only his separate vagrant energies, he apprehended similar vagrant energies in the world about him. As his own powers unified and took on personality, he began to discover personality in the various living objects which awakened his interest, and nature was populous with sprites. In the heaven above, as well as on the earth below, a multitude of quasi-human beings, superior and inferior, lived and contended. Superiority in his own tribe and locality was transferred to the patron deity of that tribe and locality.

In the meantime a development was taking place also in the mental and moral character of the personified agencies, in consonance with that of him who personified them. At first they were conceived of as warring among themselves, and actuated by contending moods and passions. Even physical appetites, as well as malevolent and changeable emotions, reigned as uncontrolled in tribal and local deities as in the subjects whom they ruled. But just in proportion as more intelligent motives and nobler sentiments began to gain a foothold in the human breast, an improvement is noticeable in the character of the god that is worshiped. This parallel development is so obvious that we are surprised to see Mr. Spencer's warped interpretation of it, in the interest of his theory. He says: "If we contrast the Hebrew God described in primitive traditions, man-like in appearance, appetites and

emotions, with the Hebrew God as characterized by the prophets, there is shown a widening range of power, *along with a nature increasingly remote from that of man.*" Increasingly remote from the primitive man, undoubtedly, but not increasingly remote from man as *he also* was rising in the scale of being. For it was only the nobler nature as emerging in the prophets, that could conceive and portray a nobler nature in the Deity. The prophets may have assigned a higher morality to Jehovah than they habitually exercised themselves; but this was simply in obedience to the idealizing instinct in man, which forever puts before him a standard superior to his performance. It is not, however, a standard remote from his nature, but strictly in the line of his development.

In this continuous evolution of man's conception of Deity, it came to pass that gradually, as the uniform and universal elements of human nature began to be recognized, whatever was partial and local began to disappear from the idea of God, and he became the One Ruler of the world and of humanity, elevated in character above all that was weak or ignoble, and so perfect a realization of the human ideal, that spiritual purity in man was made the passport to communion with the divine. "God is Spirit," said Jesus, "and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and truth."

In all this, the decay of anthropomorphism is simply the dropping away of the *earthly* characteristics of man, — his physical appetites, his malevolent passions, his selfish and partial motives, his unreasonableness, his imperfections and ignorance. There is *not the slightest indication* of a tendency to attribute to the Deity "a nature remote from that of man," as Mr. Spencer alleges, as man comes to be understood in his higher and essential nature. Less and less what is physical, more and more that which belongs to the intellect, the reason, the spirit.

So far — that is, down to the Christian era — the development may be said to have been instinctive and unreflective. Later it became metaphysical and philosophical. A stage was reached in which a clear differentiation had taken place in human thought, between mind and matter. The more obvious qualities of matter had become quite thoroughly observed and classified, and the operations of the human mind had also become outlined and systematized, as they are now generally accepted. It had become clear that here are two entities, unlike in nature and characteristics. Each orbed itself into a separate and definite existence.

Mind, as observer, reasoner, actor, is controller and director of matter, which is simply subject and submissive. The mind of man controls his body, and by a rational inference it was held that the Divine Mind was also the controller of the material world. Nature is the body, God the Soul. In man were the powers of intellect, feeling, and will; in God, also, it was believed, existed wisdom, love, and power, only in an infinite degree. The world was supposed to be controlled by Him, with a conscious purpose and foresight, as the body and the works of man were directed by an intelligent supervision. Whatever was inscrutable in the divine nature lay in the mysterious resources of mind itself, rather than in any want of affinity between the human and the divine. As to the mode of connection between mind and matter, there was comparatively little consideration. Whether the world of matter was created out of nothing, or was eternally self-existent, and what might be the bond of union between matter and spirit, in man or God, were subjects for philosophical discussion, but it was sufficient for theology that such a union and control actually existed. So long as the similarity or affinity was recognized between the human mind and the divine, the possibility remained of that personal sympathy and communion between the two which we have claimed to be essential to religious belief.

Such a condition of thought may be said to have existed from the beginning of the Christian era until within the memory of men now living. But within the last half century, a new epoch has begun, of the application of scientific analysis to the world of nature and of man. An intense interest has been developed in the study of elements and of origins. Matter and mind are traced, if possible, to their sources, to establish their identity, or at least the secret of their birth. *How* the material universe came to be what it is, — *how* the human intelligence had its origin, — to answer these questions has become the ultimate aim of scientific research. How the Controlling Power works in nature, — how the mind of man operates in his body, have been made the subject of wide and minute investigation. As the result of modern study in both these departments, namely, of *evolution* and of *physiological psychology*, an impression has come to prevail that Mind is, in some sense, but a stage in the process of cosmic development, and that intelligence is but an organic function.

In evolution there seems to be no necessity for intelligent direction of the cosmic process at the beginning. Certain tendencies in unintelligent matter itself provide for this progressive develop-

ment. First occurs a differentiation of homogeneous atoms in the primeval mist. With the advent of motion in the atoms, must have arisen a mutual accommodation between them, as the result of incessant collision, if not from inherent tendency. The conflict of stronger and weaker forces must result in the rule of the stronger. Mutual adaptations take place of necessity. Increasing variety of form gives increasing variety of operation. Organic life arises, and, as a function of this life, conscious intelligence.

In like manner proceeds the study of this conscious intelligence in man. Every mental act has been found to be correlated with some movement in the brain. The first evidence of consciousness is sensation, and for sensation it is necessary that there should be an antecedent oscillation of a nervous fibre. So, although it is acknowledged, on all hands, that there is no common nature between consciousness and a nerve-motion, and that "the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable," yet the prevailing habit of investigating the mind from the objective side constantly feeds the tendency to regard consciousness as finding its genesis in the nerve concussions which awaken it. In the process of analyzing consciousness in order to discover its *minima*, these *minima* are concluded to consist in a series of minute shocks at the nervous centres; and so strong is the tendency to interpret consciousness in terms of physics, that Mr. Herbert Spencer had made constant use of the words "nervous shocks," as describing the elements of consciousness, until his attention was called to the inconsistency by Mr. John Fiske, and at his suggestion he accepted the term "psychic shocks" instead.

In both these ways, there has come to pass a gradual belittlement of the conception of mind. It seems no longer to be thought of as one of the two fundamental and permanent realities of the universe, — underived, original, and eternal. It is rather something that flashes into existence at a certain favorable conjunction of atoms, and peering round upon the vast external scene, with speculation in its eyes, reflects the outward panorama for a passing moment, and then subsides again into non-existence. There is recognized no continuous substratum which can be called mind, but only a succession of states of consciousness. The tendency is to confound these states of consciousness with the nerve-shocks which accompany them.

We see how such a tendency of thought would naturally and insensibly have its effect in modifying the conception of God. It

does this in two ways. First, it seems to show that God cannot be intelligent, because intelligence is limited to the possessor of a brain. Secondly, even if there could be an Infinite Mind, the character of its action must be different from that of the human mind, — not being subject to the same limitations.

I. In order, therefore, to justify that conception of God which is the basis of our religious belief, we need to raise our thoughts from the estimate of mind which limits it to mere states of consciousness, and consider it in its essential nature as an independent and eternal reality of the universe. Notwithstanding all the tendency of modern thought to consider mind and matter as one, the inductions of science, as well as the intuitions of experience, are entirely opposed to any such conclusion. As far as observation and investigation of facts give us knowledge of realities, we have just as much warrant for deciding mind to be an independent reality, as for deciding matter to be such; and we have equally good reason for deciding both to be such. Each is distinguished by characteristics entirely unlike and diverse from those of the other. There is absolutely no community of nature between them. Matter constitutes a vast extended reality, perceptible to the senses, whose constituent elements have one common nature. It is unconscious, moves only in fixed courses, initiates no original action. Mind is invisible, conscious, initiative, directive. However undiscoverable the mysterious essence of matter, its phenomena remain forever of the same character. However undiscoverable the mysterious substance of mind, its characteristics are the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. And however deeply we may penetrate towards the origin of either, we make not the slightest approach to similarity in their elements. In its very first emergence as a phenomenon, mind is as distinctly *sui generis* as in its latest development.

What is that first emergence? We call it consciousness. Consider what is called a simple "state of consciousness." Upon some shock of a nervous centre, — it is instantaneously there. It is there, feeling and knowing the shock. It is not a vibration; it does not resemble a vibration in any respect; it is the *knowledge* of a vibration. It is so unlike that as to stand at the opposite pole of being; they have no common ground. The nervous shock does not produce it; this is acknowledged by all scientists. When the shock comes, it is there, ready to meet it. If the shock does not produce it, then it has its own independent origin and source. It is not a product of the soil whereon it appears, which produces

only of its own kind. It is a visitant from some unknown region, of a superior lineage. It springs Minerva-like into action. Mind is as truly itself, in this first act of feeling and cognition, as it will be in its supremest achievement of generalization or abstraction. For, from the first, it knows, it distinguishes; and this is the essence of all mental action. Its one mysterious, incomprehensible character is that it *looks abroad*, it *knows* its surroundings, which know it not. Matter knows not anything, even itself. But here comes upon the stage that which from some invisible, indefinable background, with entirely bodiless efficiency, scans all things outside of itself, and even its own workings within itself. What is it to be conscious, — to know? This is the most wonderful of all facts, — the only fact, we might say. So far from its being an unimportant, transient and ephemeral phenomenon, as compared with the vast processes of the material universe which go on forever, — so far from its being a form of existence which originates in time and subsides in time, without trace in ages past, and destined to final extinction, — we should be inclined to say that here, the essential, the permanent, the paramount, had borne witness of itself, if even for a moment. For it is at once distinguished by characteristics transcendently superior to the conditions in which it appears.

Passing beyond the first fact, — of consciousness, with all it implies, — we have to consider the accumulation of knowledge. Consciousness sees and knows. How can it take in these things which it sees; where can it hold them? For it does hold them, and add to them. The contents of consciousness do not simply appear and then vanish. Each succeeding state of consciousness contains more than the preceding. A state of consciousness in a mature thinker, though existing but for a moment, sees and knows the accumulated knowledge of a lifetime. How is this knowledge preserved and retained? Certainly not in the convolutions of the brain; for however capable these may be of indefinite expansion, however they may record successive impressions and materials for knowledge, — they are not capable of knowledge itself. It is the mind only that grasps, comprehends and retains knowledge.

We are forced, then, to the conclusion that mind, however invisible an entity, *exists*, with a nature peculiarly its own, and with a power of knowing and accumulating knowledge, not given to it by the brain. In its human form, and with its human limitations, its knowledge must be *first* received through the medium of a

nervous organism ; but, from the fact that the brain does not give it the power of knowing, we are led to the conclusion that a cerebral organization is not essential to its existence and operation.

But let us proceed still further to consider the fundamental characteristics of mind, manifested everywhere and always, and indicating, in each instance, a nature not derived from or dependent upon the constitution of matter. Not more surely does all observation agree in attributing certain fundamental properties to matter, like cohesion and gravitation, than in attributing to mind the separate functions of intelligence, emotion and volition. This classification seems to be ultimate, in the fact that these functions are essentially unlike, and cannot be resolved into simpler ones. Knowing, feeling, and willing, are experienced by the thinking subject as unlike states of consciousness. Each of these powers, in its highest development, carries on a process which is purely mental, and not physical. That is to say, the ultimate action of mind, in each of its three great powers, is concerned with ideas, which are immaterial existences, and constitute an immaterial realm in which it works. The knowledge which it gains is really a knowledge of ideas, the emotions it experiences are awakened by ideas, and the volition it exerts is the realizing of ideas.

First, of the mind as *intellect*. In this capacity, the mind cognizes something set over against itself which is not itself. This is indispensable to the mind's consciousness of its own existence. If the subject had no object to contemplate, it would cease to be conscious of itself. Whether the object be wholly extraneous to the mind, or a part of the mind's own furnishing, is unimportant, compared with the fact of its necessary objectivity. In the case of the human consciousness, we regard the object of cognition first experienced to be a world extraneous to the mind, — material. When the question arises, How can the mind know an external reality, possibly unlike itself, and be certain that it is like what it supposes it to be? we can fall back only upon the uniformity of the nature of that which we observe. Certainly the unlikeness of nature of mind and matter respectively would be an insuperable obstacle to either knowing the other, except through some medium which should accommodate the one to the other. This medium is recognized as what we call an *idea*. The material world photographs itself on the retina of the eye. The picture represents the material object in such a form that the optic nerve can deal with it. But that picture cannot be dealt

with by the mind, any better than could any picture, even entirely external to the body. The picture itself must have its representative to the mind, and that is what we call an *image*, a wholly *mental* phenomenon. The picture on the retina is wholly material, — the image in the mind is wholly mental. An image in the mind belongs to the realm of *ideas*; it is an idea of the concrete form or degree. The mind can go on reproducing an image of an image, to the last degree of abstraction.

This brings us to see that the real object of the mind's cognition is *ideas*, and only ideas. Whatever their nature or genesis, however difficult it may be to assign them any background for substance of being, they belong entirely to the mental realm. For we must remember that mind can be conscious only of what is mental; there is an unbridged chasm between consciousness and any molecular phenomenon. Ideas, then, are of a mental constitution, and form a world of reality, which, although constituted of the mind, is objective to the inner consciousness. It is quite possible, therefore, to conceive of mind as living, moving, and having its being in a mental universe, whose phenomena are ideas, kindred to itself, and yet objective to itself. Such a conception, I maintain, it is possible to form of the Supreme Being; an Infinite Mind, inscrutable, indeed, to observation, or even to imagination, but not more so than the finite mind; living, moving, and having its being in a universe of ideas, which are *of* itself, and yet objective to itself.

Secondly, of the mind as *emotion*. Feeling is a phenomenon of mind as indisputable as cognition. A mind never was known to be without it. We must regard it as one of its essential attributes. There are reasons why we are prone to think of it as not so essential or permanent an attribute of mind as intellect. One reason is that in its earliest and lowest form it seems to be allied so closely with the material world. It is the subtlest bond of connection between the outer world and the mind. In the form of sensation, it is the first witness and reporter of something foreign to consciousness. A painful or a pleasurable sensation seems to be as much of the body as of the mind. But a study of consciousness reveals to us the truth that, however dependent sensation may be upon physical excitation, the feeling itself is wholly mental, and can partake in no manner of anything material. There can be no blending of the two in consciousness. Matter cannot feel; and however truly pain and pleasure will cease with the removal of the external cause, they could never exist or affect

anything, were it not for the existence of mind which apprehends them. Another reason why the feelings seem to be allied with what is physical is their turbulent and fluctuating character as responding to the various excitations of the nervous system. But this is true only of that lower order and range of feelings which are peculiar to the human subject as associated with a material organism. Every object or idea apprehended by the intellect is attended by its appropriate feeling, and as we rise from objects to images, ideas, conceptions, abstractions, the feelings also rise through the grades of sensation, appetite, desires, affections and sentiments. The mind, therefore, is not dependent on the presence of a physical object for the exercise of feeling. It retains its nature as a feeling subject, in presence of the ideal world, as truly as in the simpler experience of sensation. Before it, in its highest attainment, exists forever the ideal world of truth, of beauty, of holiness; and responsive to these forever rise the sentiments of wonder, of admiration, and of reverence. To one forever in contemplation of these ideas, we can well understand that there would be no turbulence or fluctuation in the character of the sentiments attending them. They would flow on with the calmness of eternal life, in one unbroken stream of changeless love.

Thirdly, *volition*. Mind not only cognizes and feels,—in its most highly developed as well as in its lowest forms,—but it is also capable of acting. Cognition and feeling might seem inevitable in the presence of an object; but volition indicates a native power of independent action. This, also, in its lowest form, seems inseparably connected with physical conditions. We strive to carry a heavy weight a long distance, to reach a desired place of deposit. The strain of effort is real and intense. The tired muscles would gladly let go their hold. But the will, *in obedience to an idea*, demands their service, and retains it. Now, in all this, not only is the will obeying an idea, but it is an idea on which the will is exerting its control; that, and that alone. It has been generally supposed that we were conscious at such times of actually infusing physical energy into the muscles, and thus keeping them to their task. But the latest researches in psychology tend to show that the feeling of effort does not consist in imparting force to the muscles, but in keeping before the mind, as a reality, the *idea* of the strained muscles needed to accomplish the desired result. When we let the idea go, the muscles relax. The physical energy needed is circulating in the organism, and is

turned into any channel according as the opening of that channel is present as an idea of the mind. Volition consists in determining that that idea shall be present and retained by the mind as a reality for the time being. So, even in the act of physical causation, it is an idea that sets the stream of force in a given direction, and it is the mind, in its purely mental exercise of volition, that determines which idea it shall be.

Still more is the purely mental action of volition seen in the higher activities of the thinking subject. Every successive operation of the mind, from the simple comparison of things like and unlike, up to the remotest range of abstraction, and the most involved processes of reasoning, depends upon the power of *attention*, of holding the consciousness upon one idea to the exclusion of others, for the time being. This constant exercise of the power of attention is volition, a function purely mental, capable of being performed in an entirely immaterial universe, or a realm of ideas.

Not only is mind characterized by these powers of cognition, feeling and volition, each dealing with ideas, but it proceeds in its action in accordance with certain regulative laws, inherent in its nature. We call these the laws of reason. They are imperative. All ideas, when apprehended, range themselves in a system in conformity with these laws, as truly as molecules of matter take their proper places in the formation of a crystal. The elements of knowledge — telling of things as they are — gradually gather themselves into that orderly whole which we call the system of Truth. The ideals of action — seen as they ought to be — gradually constitute a coherent series known as the system of Right. All pleasurable emotions possible to consciousness combine to form a complete harmony, which we recognize as the system of Beauty. These rational systems are entirely of mental origin. That is, *it is only mind that can apprehend a rational system, and wherever a rational system is recognized as existing, it exists, as such, only as a mental discovery or a mental product.*

It is often said that the *system of thought* which is gradually becoming established in the human mind as the result of science, is but a reproduction of the *system of things*. That is to say, for instance, the adoption of the Copernican system in astronomy as a part of the mental picture which we form of the universe is due to the fact that we have discovered its reality in the outer world, and conform our thoughts to it. Or again, our classification of the

animal kingdom according to present methods is said to result from knowledge of the observed facts in nature. But mere observation does not give us any such picture. The eye never saw the solar system as a whole ; the animals are not arranged in nature, in genera and species, as in a zoölogical museum. It is a mental necessity which compels any such arrangement. The mere presence, however prolonged, of an objective world before the face of consciousness would never result in analysis and induction, were there not preëxisting tendencies in the mind which suggest analysis and induction. It is consciousness alone which detects likeness, suggests comparison, and proceeds by laws of its own to win the results which it seeks.

So much has been said to meet the argument which denies intelligence to God, upon the ground that intelligence is limited to a cerebral organism. I have endeavored to show that intelligence is an attribute of mind in general, and that mind has a nature and character of its own, — not brought into being at the moment when a nervous shock is attended by a flash of consciousness. This is only one of the ways in which mind uses a medium which it finds ready for its use. By a study of the phenomena and laws of intelligence, in such instances as we have had opportunity to observe them, we are as truly warranted in inferring an independent, universal entity which we call mind, as we are warranted in maintaining an independent universal entity which we call matter. There is no reason why we may not conceive of mind as illimitable, as permanent, as universal, as the material world is conceived to be. The fact that individual specimens of it seem to have their origin in time, and to be limited by mortal conditions, is no more inconsistent with its universal nature, than similar facts in regard to the nature of matter. It is true that intelligence, in its human manifestations, uses a peculiar physical basis, both for the material and the form of its expression ; but we recognize it as intelligence, not by its using these forms, but by the reason and system shown in its products. And if we observe the same reason and system shown in larger products of the universe, not of human origin, it is a rational conclusion to consider these also the result of intelligence, and to infer that the Universal Mind may have other ways of expressing itself in matter than those which condition its expression in the human organization. Is it a rational conception to think of an evolving universe, unfolding the harmonious order of the starry systems, ages before the advent of man, unattended by the slightest glimpse or dawn of intelligence,

until the formation of a little gray pulp should set a thinking creature on the stage, to read a reasonable meaning into the whole?

II. I come now to the second stage of the argument. The objection is made to the belief in an intelligent Supreme Being, — that, even if mind were capable of existence without a brain, it is impossible to assign its attributes to a Being whose nature is infinite. This is the argument used by Herbert Spencer. It is based entirely on Mr. Spencer's favorite conception of intelligence as merely a series of states of consciousness. According to his theory, whatever the mind knows or feels or does, is only for an instant. A shock from some external source causes for the moment an electric flash of cognition or emotion or volition, which then subsides and gives place to a succeeding flash — modified, indeed, by the preceding, while the whole is combined into a series of ideas, constituting a sum of intelligence. Consciousness — as thus conceived — has no significance as the action of a mysterious and universal essence, infinite in nature, but is simply a finite phenomenon, appearing and vanishing in a moment. It is not strange, then, that he should say that, "to believe in a divine consciousness, men must refrain from thinking what is meant by consciousness."

But if, as we have already seen, consciousness, however momentary in its exhibition, betrays a character entirely unique, unlike matter in its qualities and unproduced by matter, if it exhibits a capability of knowledge, of feeling, and of original action of its own, assisted only by matter to discover ideas and to express them, — surely there must be behind it a nature which is not itself material, and which subsists and continues with all the attributes of intelligence, as truly as matter subsists and continues as an independent existence. Granted that human consciousness is limited to connection with cerebral tissue alone, and that it is dependent upon momentary shocks for the materials of knowledge and the means of expression, yet it is not difficult to conceive of an infinite consciousness forever in immanent connection with matter *in all its modes*, and thereby maintaining a continuous knowledge and an unbroken means of expression. For we have in the action of even the human mind evidence that the contents of intelligence are not simply fragmentary and discontinuous, but that they are gradually built up into a coherent system, showing the control of a permanent and uniform agency working through all the transitory states of consciousness. Moreover, the mind

not only culls its materials with discretion and arranges them in accordance with the regulative laws of its own nature, but it forever suggests a fund of prior intelligence, of anticipation, and of ideals, pressing for expression even in advance of discovery. In all these ways, we are unavoidably led to conceive of an Original Mind, of which the human is but a finite specimen, of whose nature we can but reason from that we know. Mr. Spencer himself acknowledges that "the Infinite Energy wells up in us as consciousness."

Now if our bodies, as matter, must manifest the fundamental qualities of matter, in its vastest extension, it is reasonable to conclude that our minds must exhibit the fundamental qualities of the Mind from which they are derived, however infinite may be its nature. The human consciousness is undoubtedly unlike the divine consciousness, in its manner of apprehension, and in its methods of cogitation; but the nature and laws of intelligence must be conceived of as unchangeable and eternal.

It may be a needful warning to the superficial thinker that he should hesitate to conceive of the divine thought as analogous to his own; that he should bow himself in humble ignorance before that mysterious essence whose mode of being and expression is utterly inscrutable to our finite comprehension. But we should be careful to place the inscrutableness where it properly belongs. The mystery of the Infinite does not consist in its vastness. Mere greatness has not the attributes of reverence and awe. Difference of degree and extent is no barrier of separation in objects that partake of the same nature. The part has always affinity and community with the whole. "Our power of knowing and understanding the material universe," says Professor Huxley, "is practically unlimited." We are, indeed, at first overwhelmed by the disclosures of modern science as to the vastness of the stellar universe. Our minds are prostrated at the thought of system beyond system, in endless maze and complication. We shrink before the "terrible chaos that riots in the flames of the sun." But we soon grow familiar with mere vastness and power, and lose the sense of reverence for such attributes. Frequent visits to the sun would inevitably suggest only a larger blast-furnace, and the principle of centrifugal action once understood, we should cease to be overwhelmed by the number and variety of whirling systems that occupy the regions of space.

The real mystery is in quality, not quantity; in mode of operation, not in its extent; in essence, not in degree. The mystery

is in the process of life itself, rather than in the shapes which it assumes. I bow before the wonder in the growing blade of grass, "the flower in the crannied wall," as truly as before the inscrutable union of the Infinite Spirit with ultimate elements of matter in the beginning of creation; and while I am powerless to conceive how Infinite Intelligence is coördinated with the system of forces in the material universe, it is equally beyond my power to conceive how the mind of man can suck knowledge from the brain, and compel the physical energies of the body to fulfill its purposes. But, while I cannot conceive *how* this is done, it is entirely within my power to conceive that it *is* done. For it *is* done. So while I cannot conceive *how* the Infinite Mind can have intelligence of all that is, I can conceive that it *does* have such intelligence. And while I am compelled to recognize that the methods of the divine thought must be different from those of a finite mind, since the latter must gradually acquire what the former contains from the beginning, yet I must ever maintain that the laws of intelligence — of knowledge, emotion and action — are the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. Their character cannot be changed by their infinite extension. I bow before the infinite wisdom, love and power, not because they are *infinite*, but because they *are* wisdom, love, and power.

I proceed now to consider some of the specific objections raised by Mr. Spencer. They rest almost wholly upon his conception of intelligence as limited to a series of momentary states of consciousness. Such seriality and limitation, he argues, are inconsistent with the conception of an Infinite Being. First, he contends, they are inconsistent with the conception of divine omniscience. "A consciousness constituted of ideas and feelings caused by objects and occurrences cannot be simultaneously occupied with all objects and all occurrences throughout the universe." This would be true only of an intelligence and a consciousness limited, like the human consciousness, to one specialized mode of contact with the universe, and capable of acquiring knowledge only through the loophole of the senses. But if we take that conception of God which modern science has rendered familiar to us, and regard his being as immanent in the material universe, in immediate contact with every element and form of matter, organic and inorganic, it would seem that we have here the ground-work for an omnipresent intelligence, affected by limitations of neither space nor time. For, as we have seen, we must consider intelligence as a power of holding and arranging the materials of knowledge, by whatever methods these materials may be derived.

Indeed, in another part of this same paper, Mr. Spencer seems to forget this objection which he has made, and to yield the possibility of omniscient intelligence even to a being less than infinite. Speaking of the sentiment of wonder and of awe, which will remain at the last, as the substance of religion, he says: "Hereafter as heretofore, higher faculty and deeper insight will raise rather than lower this sentiment. At present, the most powerful and most instructed intellect has neither the knowledge nor the capacity required for symbolizing in thought the *totality of things*. Occupied with one or other division of nature, the man of science usually does not know enough of the other divisions even rudely to conceive the extent and complexity of their phenomena; and supposing him to have adequate knowledge of each, yet he is unable to think of them *as a whole*. Wider and more complex intellect may hereafter help him to form a vague consciousness of them *in their totality*. We may say that just as an undeveloped musical faculty, able only to appreciate a simple melody, cannot grasp the variously-entangled passages and harmonies of a symphony, which in the minds of composer and conductor are unified into involved musical effects awakening far greater feeling than is possible to the musically uncultured, so, by future more evolved intelligences, *the course of things now apprehensible only in parts may be apprehensible all together*, with an accompanying feeling as much beyond that of the present cultured man as his feeling is beyond that of the savage."

Mr. Spencer has not emphasized certain words in this passage as I have done, by placing them in italics; but it is not supposable that so careful a writer should have overlooked the importance of the meaning which his words conveyed. In saying that "to future more evolved intelligences, the course of things now apprehensible only in parts may be apprehensible all together," he certainly seems to grant as possible to a future finite intelligence what he denies as possible to a present Deity. Indeed, is it not the tendency of such a philosophy as Mr. Spencer's to suggest the possibility of evolving a God at the end of evolution, who did not exist at the beginning? I would yield to no prophet in conceiving the limitless possibilities of man's development in the future, and in imagining the emotions of adoring joy in his final contemplation of the symphony of the universe, but I must still think of those emotions as anticipated and those harmonious effects already "unified, in the mind of the Composer and Conductor."

Mr. Spencer's second objection is that "intelligence presupposes

existences independent of it and objective to it. It is carried on in terms of changes primarily wrought by alien activities, — impressions generated by things beyond consciousness, and the ideas derived from such impressions." Therefore, "the First Cause, if considered as intelligent, must be continually affected by independent, objective activities." The question is, how can there be activities independent of and objective to the Infinite Being?

The answer to this is two-fold. First, even in the human consciousness, it is only "*primarily*" that the changes of intelligence are wrought by "alien activities." After ideas are once derived from such alien sources, the ideas themselves form the material of intelligence, and intelligence may thereafter be continually exercised upon them and by them, — no longer henceforth alien activities, but constituting the interior property of the mind. In the case of the infinite intelligence, not even *primarily* is there necessity for the impact of alien activities, since we can and must conceive of the ideas being present from the beginning.

Secondly, the ideas which are present with the Infinite Intelligence from the beginning are of such a nature that they cannot be regarded as alien activities. They are the necessary contents of the Eternal Reason. Their nature is mental; they are in and of the essence of the Divine Mind, and in no sense external and foreign to it. They are objective in the sense that the thought is always objective to the thinker, — but as being placed there by himself, and not independent of himself. Even to Mr. Spencer, who knows only Infinite Energy, that energy must either be identified with the material universe or not identified with it. If the Infinite Energy is not identified with the universe, then it has something objective to and independent of itself. If the Infinite Energy is identified with the universe then the existence of the universe is purely ideal.

A third objection has reference to *will* as an attribute of Deity. "Will," says Mr. Spencer, "implying a prompting desire, connotes some end contemplated as one to be achieved, and ceases with the achievement of it; some other will, referring to some other end, taking its place. That is, will necessarily supposes a series of states of consciousness. The willing of each end excludes from consciousness, for an interval, the willing of other ends, and is therefore inconsistent with that omnipresent activity which simultaneously works out an infinity of ends."

Surely this is a very poor and insufficient account of will, even as a human attribute. To one momentary state of consciousness

there may be indeed but one idea, one feeling, one end to be achieved ; but such idea, feeling, end, is even then a resultant of previous ideas and ends entertained or accomplished. Each separate end, each separate act of will, is often but one of many means conspiring to fulfill some long-planned and far-distant result. Knowing how human sagacity may bring a multitude of volitions to conspire in accomplishing the cherished purpose of a lifetime, it does not require any perversion of our rational powers to conceive of an omniscient mind, foreseeing the end from the beginning, and directing and controlling all towards "some divine, far-off event, to which the whole creation moves." Of course, an act of divine volition may differ essentially from the human, in view of the immediacy of connection between the idea and the means of its fulfillment, but only the more would this obviate the necessity of conceiving of any limitation to the Divine Will.

Finally, we come to an objection underlying all the others, and based upon the same assumption. "The conception of a divine will, derived from that of the human will, involves, like it, localization in space and time." The objection of localization in *time* has been already met in the preceding argument. To a Being holding at once in consciousness all possible ideas, and their possible realization in past, present or future, and having but one perfect and unchanging purpose for their ultimate fulfillment, the act of volition would know no limitation in time, but would be one and continuous, in an eternal Now. The objection of localization in *space* requires a fuller consideration, because it is probably the most general obstacle in the way of a belief in the Divine Personality. As soon as the educated mind has outgrown its early childish conception of a Deity limited in place and form, it tends to lose all hold upon his personality, and from thinking of Him as diffused throughout the universe, it comes to think of his intellectual attributes as vanished also, and He is now no other than a force, like gravitation, or a vague tendency that makes for righteousness. It seems to be assumed that since we can no longer assign a definite locality as a base and centre of operation for the intelligent actor, and as a point toward which we can direct our thought of Him and communion with Him, that such an intelligent actor can no longer exist. To most thinkers the word "personality" seems to convey the idea of some geographical concentration in place or form.

It is of the highest importance to make clear that the centrality of action and point of communion, essential to personality, is not

a geographical one. To do this, we have but to study an intelligent personality, in the only specimen we have open to our immediate inspection, that is, in ourselves. I, that am now engaged in thought upon this subject, am conscious to myself of directing all my energies to the end of reaching an intelligent and rational conclusion in regard to it. I use my powers of body and mind to that end. I compel myself to sit to my task ; I exclude extraneous impressions ; I compare together the results of my previous experience, as gained from life, from books, from reason. I judge all ideas that arise, with a view to their bearing on the matter, and I act with one definite and uniform intention towards one definite end. In doing this, I am conscious of a *unity* of action ; I sit at a centre, and hold all the energies of mind and body and make them conspire to a given end.

Where is this centre ? It is limited, we will say, by my organism. But where is it, in that organism ? Who can locate it ? Neither I, nor another. My personality is central, because there are concentrated in it, as a single point, all impressions received from every direction, and there goes forth from it unity of intelligence, purpose, action, in every direction. My personality is central, by its very nature, — that is, it has unity of intelligence and action ; but it is not geographically central ; it pervades my whole organism. In early times, and in the immaturity of thought, it was the instinct to locate it, now in one part and now in another of the body, in the reins, the diaphragm, the head ; but now we know that personality cannot be located ; it is pervasive ; it is immanent.

Therefore I see nothing irrational or irreverent in conceiving of Infinite Intelligence, although diffused through the universe, and having no geographical centre, as yet central in unity of thought, purpose and action, and holding all the threads of his omnipresent and infinite energy, as I hold control of the vital energies of my finite organization. From that centrality, — that unity, — emanates every manifestation of wisdom, love and power, and towards that centrality I direct my own conscious thought and personal communion. There is no localization in space or time ; the Presence is everywhere ; to each separate personality it is here and now. When I commune with my earthly friend, I know not in what hallowed part of his physical form resides that personality with which I commune ; but my communion is none the less definite, intelligent and real. In like manner, I recognize no central spot in the universe when I commune with God, but my communion is none the less definite, intelligent and real.

I not only *may* have such a conception, rationally, but I *must* have. For when I send my thought abroad upon the universe, with its multiplicity of scenes and forces, although I behold infinite variety, and my attention is diffused as wide as boundless space, filled with countless agencies, yet seeing, in all, order, system and harmonious and progressive movement, I cannot but converge my thought upon some Unity as at the source and centre of it all. That, to me, is personality. It can be nothing other than this. For unity of thought, purpose and action *is* personality. Says Martineau, "In all spiritual natures, unity and personality are one. If God be not *One Person*, he is not *One* at all."

Such, then, is the line of my argument. Consciousness in man, although presumably not a perfect measure of consciousness in God, being limited in its means of acquiring and realizing knowledge, yet reveals the existence of a real, permanent entity, of a nature unlike that of matter, which we call mind.

The functions of mind are intelligence, emotion and will. These functions have for their object ideas. Ideas are in their nature rational and eternal. Intelligence groups them in order and system. Finite mind can receive these ideas only through the medium of a cerebral organism. But there is nothing irrational in conceiving of them as held, from the beginning, in an Infinite Intelligence, to whom, as realized in a perfect system, they constitute the universe. It is not irrational to conceive of that Infinite Intelligence as constantly directing all the energies in his control towards the realization of that perfect system, and moved forever, in contemplation and in action, with one abiding emotion of unchanging love.

One thing remains to be said, to complete the application of the argument, as a means of support to the religious sentiment. It would be of comparatively small benefit to such sentiment, to reach a conclusion favorable to belief in the love of God, if we were still to think of that love as but a general and diffused emotion, directed only to the grand result of a perfected universe, and without interest in the needs of each individual consciousness. To many, it seems possible to conceive of an Infinite Love which controls the general destiny of all beings, and yet difficult to believe that it can take cognizance of the career of individuals.

The doctrine of a "special providence," so called, interpreted as favoritism, — or direct interposition to turn aside the course of universal law, — has rightly fallen into disrepute. But with our

modern ideas of the immanence of God in the whole domain of matter and of spirit, we cannot help seeing that the only way in which God *can* act universally, is by acting on every *particle* that makes up the universe. That is, there can be no such thing as a *universal* providence, which is not at the same time a *particular* providence. Gravitation would be powerless throughout the stellar worlds, were it not felt by every atom of matter in each and every world. An eternal power cannot make for righteousness except as it touches and moves each individual conscience. So the Infinite Love which breathed the universe into existence and moves it to its final perfection, must flow around and bathe each unit of consciousness, and draw it to its proper destiny, with an affection which is immediate and direct and unending.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

The Old Testament in the Jewish Church. A Course of Lectures on Biblical Criticism. By W. ROBERTSON SMITH. Second edition, revised and much enlarged. Pp. xiv., 558. London: A. & C. Black.

The secret of the combination of critical frankness and educational considerateness is known to few. It may, perhaps, be learned most quickly by watching at their work those who have already found it. There are, surely, few greater masters of it than the author of this volume. How he came to deliver these lectures is a matter of history. They "had their origin in a temporary victory of the opponents of progressive Biblical Science in Scotland," which withdrew the author for a whole winter session from his professional work in the Free Church College at Aberdeen, and which ultimately became in appearance a complete triumph. Being debarred from imparting the New Learning to the receptive minds of his students, Professor Robertson Smith seized the opportunity which was offered to him of expounding the elements of Old Testament criticism to a more mixed audience, and met with the most gratifying success. These lectures, in their published form, have been in a certain sense the bread of life to many who were looking in vain for some better and more historical view of the Hebrew Scriptures. They have, however, been for a long time out of print, and the author has now republished them in a handsome form and with much additional matter. The additions are especially conspicuous in that part of Lecture V. which treats of the historical books; a new lecture is also introduced on the narratives of the Hexateuch, and the greater part of the lecture on the Psalter has been rewritten. Besides this, there are two fresh appended notes of much interest, especially to myself, — one relating to the text of 1 Sam. xvii., the other to the question of Maccabæan psalms in Books I.–III. of the Psalter; on both of which subjects I have had occasion to express views in recent works. The first of these I shall pass over, remarking only that Professor Robertson Smith is still unconvinced that the omissions of the Septuagint were dictated by a desire to harmonize inconsistencies. On the second I venture to speak at more length, because in my "Lectures on the Psalter" (1891), I professed myself unsatisfied with the theory offered by my friend to account for psalms like the 46th, in his very able article on the Psalms in the "Encyclopædia Britannica" (1884). The conclusions of this article are avowedly reproduced in the seventh of these lectures, and it seems only right, therefore, that students of the Psalms should give them a reconsideration.

I am, I think, in no danger of being an unfair critic of Professor Robertson Smith's theories, for two reasons. First, because in my own main conclusion, which is apparently so unpalatable even to many who count as liberal critics in this country, I have the full support of this

eminent scholar. Secondly, because supposing that his theory of Ps. xlv., lxxiv., and lxxix. is correct, I acquire the last piece of evidence that was wanting to prove my own view (which seems equally unpalatable to our new liberals over here) as to the date of Isa. lxiii. 7-lxvi.¹ Let me then heartily recommend, not only Professor Robertson Smith's Encyclopædia article (reproduced in Lecture VII.), but also Note D on pp. 437-440, in which the theory is again advocated that Ps. xlv., lxxiv., and lxxix. were written during the oppression of the Jews by Artaxerxes Ochus (about 350 B. C.). According to Professor Robertson Smith, this oppression included one important event of which no direct record has survived, viz., the burning of the temple (see Ps. lxxiv. 7, and cf. lxxix. 1). He remarks that our notices of Jewish history during the Persian period are extremely fragmentary, and that Josephus, though he does not mention the burning of the temple (as indeed he does not speak of the Jewish captivity under Ochus), certainly does mention a "defilement" of the temple by Bagôses under (as it seems) Artaxerxes II. (Ant. xi. 7, 1). Professor Robertson Smith says: "It seems to me that the objection to placing these psalms in the reign of Ochus comes mainly from laying too much weight on what Josephus relates about Bagôses. That Bagôses forced his way into the temple, and that he laid a tax on the daily sacrifices, is certainly not enough to justify the language of the psalms. But for this whole period Josephus is very ill informed, . . . and the whole Bagôses story looks like a pragmatism designed partly to soften the catastrophe of the Jews, and partly to explain it by the sin of the High Priest. The important fact of the captivity to Hyrcania stands on quite independent evidence, but comes to us without any details. The captivity implies a revolt, and the long account given by Diodorus (xvi. 40 ff.) of Ochus' doings in Phœnicia and Egypt shows how that ruthless king treated rebels. In Egypt the temples were pillaged and the sacred books carried away (*ibid.* c. 51). Why should we suppose that the Temple at Jerusalem and the synagogues fared better? Such sacrilege was the rule in Persian warfare; it was practiced by Xerxes in Greece and also at Babylon. I have observed in the text that a rising of the Jews at this period could not fail to take a theocratic character, and that the war would necessarily appear as a religious war. Certainly the later Jews looked on the Persians as persecutors; the citation from Pseudo-Hec. in Jos. c. Ap. i. 22, though worthless as history, is good evidence for this; and it is also probable that the wars under Ochus form the historical background of the Book of Judith, and that the name Holophernes is taken from that of a general of Ochus, who took a prominent part in the Egyptian campaigns" (p. 439).

It will be seen that three assumptions are made here. The first is that Bagôses is the same as Bagôas, — the name of the ruthless general of

¹ See "Critical Problems of the Second Part of Isaiah," Part II., in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, October, 1891.

the not less ruthless king, Artaxerxes Ochus. (This is a very easy one, though the character of Josephus's Bagôses does not agree with that of Bagôas.) The second is that Josephus almost completely transforms the true story of the events, out of regard for the prejudices of the Jews, who could not understand how God could have permitted his own faithful people to fall into such misery, and his own temple to be a second time polluted and burned by a heathen enemy. The third is that the rising of the Jews (the reality of which is, I think, disputed by Professor S. R. Kennedy only) had a "theocratic character" and a religious sanction. A few remarks may be offered on these assumptions. It is too strong a statement that "sacrilege was the rule in Persian warfare," and the Jewish temple had no images in it to irritate a faithful worshiper of Mazda. I admit, however, that the second and third Artaxerxes were "reactionary kings," who, both morally and religiously, "compromised the purity of Mazda-worship" (Bampton Lectures, p. 292); and if I am right in assigning a number of persecution psalms (such as vi., vii., x., xi., and xvii.) to the period of Persian oppression under one or the other of these kings, it is not a great step further to assign Ps. lxxiv. and lxxix. to that dark time. Even the consciousness of legal righteousness in Ps. xlv. is perhaps not much keener than that in Ps. vii. and xvii. It is true that in Isa. lxxiv. 5-7 (which very probably comes from the same period) the very deepest contrition for sin is expressed, but the great confession of sin to which this passage belongs may have been written in a greater depth of misery than these psalms. To the references to Pseudo-Hecateus and to Judith not much weight can be attached; but on other grounds I think it not impossible that after glutting his revenge on Sidon, Ochus sent his general Bagôas to chastise the Jews (cf. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, p. 176), and that the temple was not only desecrated but destroyed. I should be inclined at present to hold out as regards Ps. xlv., for I can scarcely believe the Jews had taken so prominent a part in the general rebellion as to account for Ps. xlv. 9. But as regards Ps. lxxiv. and lxxix., the objection to the theory of Ewald (ed. 1) and Professor Smith, which I expressed in "Bampton Lectures," pp. 91, 92, 102, has grown much feebler.

It may be said that Professor Smith's theory is bold and imaginative. So it is; but it is not on this account to be rejected. Unimaginative critics like Hupfeld are also very insipid, and do not greatly promote a vivid comprehension of the meaning of the psalms. It cannot of course be proved, and Hitzig's view (suggested by a passage in Solinus, xxxv. 6, Mommsen) that it was Jericho, not Jerusalem, which suffered so much under Ochus is not unworthy of attention. But it would be a great boon to be able to explain Ps. lxxiv. 7, lxxix. 1, and Isa. lxxiv. 12, without having to suppose that the liturgical poems to which these passages belong were written to commemorate more than one catastrophe. On Professor Smith's other critical remarks (directed against theories of my

own) I may be brief, referring the reader for my own estimate of them to my article in the London "Expositor" for August. He appears to me to be too much a prey to the love of systems; why psalms of the Greek age should not have found their way into Books I.-III. is not to me obvious, in spite of Professor Smith's remark (p. 437) on my "complicated hypothesis." That my view of Ps. xlii., xliii. is "fanciful," should be no objection to a historical student like the author. There are, as Milton has told us, two kinds of fancy: the nobler kind some of us prefer to call "imagination." Professor Smith, as we have seen, is himself not devoid of this priceless gift, without which there is no piecing together the scattered fragments of history, no vivifying the lifeless conclusions of a cold criticism. And surely it is hardly right to dismiss a critical theory too positively if you have no better substitute to propose. I myself cling less to my own views on Ps. xlv. and lxxii. than to many other parts of my system. But I cannot see much force in the prejudiced arguments brought against them; nor can I believe that Ps. lxxii. can be "a prayer for the reestablishment of the Davidic dynasty under a Messianic king according to prophecy" (why not call it at once a purely imaginative royal psalm?); nor that Ps. xlv. is most easily viewed "as a poem of the old kingdom." Nor can I see my way to explain Ps. lxxviii. of the hopes created by the catastrophe of the Persian empire. Verse 30 seems clearly to show that when the psalmist wrote, Egypt was a powerful empire, from which danger to Palestine might be reasonably apprehended. For my own present view of the passage, see "Journal of Biblical Literature and Exegesis," June, 1892; "Aids to the Study of Criticism," p. 341; and for a possible historical situation for the psalm, see Jos. Ant. xii. 3, 3.

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The Book of the Prophet Ezekiel. With notes and introduction. By the Rev. A. B. DAVIDSON, D. D., LL. D. Pp. lv., 368. Cambridge: at the University Press. New York: Macmillan & Co.

The Cambridge series of commentaries for Schools and Colleges has proved itself to be useful. The various volumes differ in ability, but there can be no doubt that those prepared by Professor Davidson stand among the very first. The same qualities which are visible in his commentary on Job appear in this volume, — precision and justness of statement, careful judgment, and intelligent and independent use of the best helps. The Introduction deals with Ezekiel's history, work, and teaching. Among the points brought out are: his relation to Jeremiah; the way in which he identifies the exiles with the nation; his imaginative power; his symbols and visions; the common expression in the Prophet, "I wrought for my name's sake, lest it should be profaned among the nations;" Ezekiel's portraiture of the early time of Israel as an apostasy; his conception of

individual obligation; his relation to the ritual laws; and the fact that statements in the book may have been colored by a final recension made by the author toward the end of his career. On all these points Professor Davidson's remarks are pertinent. He deals with the prophet as a living moral teacher, who moves with independence amid the problems of his time. He refers to the growth of moral and ritual ideas in the Israelitish people; but on this question he has, perhaps, said too little; for, in the case of a man like Ezekiel, nothing is more important than to determine and exhibit his precise relation to his predecessors among the leaders of national thought. In the short space at his command, Dr. Davidson could not, indeed, go into an extended discussion of this subject; what he does say is in the right direction.

The notes are models of brevity and accuracy. There are many difficulties of interpretation in Ezekiel, and therefore much writing is easy; Dr. Davidson states the difficulties clearly and expresses his own opinion briefly and distinctly, with indications of the grounds on which it is based. See, for example, his remarks on the symbol of the people's bearing their iniquity (iv. 4-6), where the difficult number 390 days occurs; on the long allegory in xvi., and especially the reference to shrines in verse 24; on the passage in xx. 25, in which it is said that Jehovah gave Israel, in the early times, statutes that were not good; on the prophecy concerning Tyre (xxvi.-xxviii.); and on the great vision at the end of the book (xl.-xlviii.). According to the plan of these commentaries, questions relating to the Hebrew text cannot be fully discussed, but Professor Davidson's remarks always take into account critical-textual material. The English text is that of the King James Version; this is so far a misfortune as it calls for many corrections. Not only for schools and colleges, but for clergymen and general readers also, this volume may be warmly recommended as one which will enable them to read Ezekiel with comprehension and sympathy.

C. H. TOY.

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Les Prophètes d'Israël. Par JAMES DARMESTETER. Paris: Calmann Lévy. Pp. xvii, 386. 7 fr. 50 c.

James Darmesteter is one of those rare scholars, the breadth of whose attainments is equal to their depth. He astonishes us by the ease with which he passes from one field to another. The leading Persian authority in France since the publication of his translation of the "Zend-Avesta" in the "Sacred Books of the East" series, he extends his studies over the entire range of Aryan philology in his "Essais Orientaux," and passing beyond philology in his "Chants Populaires des Afghans" he appears to be equally at home in Semitic literatures, — witness his charming little treatise on the "Mahdi," and his latest production, "Les Prophètes d'Israël."

The volume before us consists of an introduction and a collection of seven essays, written at various times during the past ten years. Three of these deal directly with the Hebrew prophets, two with the general aspects of Jewish history, and the last two, on "Race and Tradition" and on "Joseph Salvador," may be defined as illustrations of Professor Darmesteter's conception of the religious history of Israel, viewed in the light of its ancient and modern development. To understand this conception, which as he himself intimates in the preface, constitutes the unifying factor of the essays, we must bear in mind Professor Darmesteter's general attitude towards religion and religious questions. To this end we cannot do better than quote a notable passage from his "*Essais Orientaux*," in which he has unconsciously characterized himself. Speaking of the famous Anquetil-Duperron, he tells us (p. 9) that the latter set out on his journey of discovery to the East armed with two books — the Bible and Montaigne. "The union of those two books shows the presence within him of the modern spirit. Sharing the bold skepticism that marks him as the child of the eighteenth century, he foreshadows the broad intellectual sympathy and the ideal attachment to the grand movements of the past characteristic of the nineteenth century." Professor Darmesteter, thoroughly imbued in like manner with the spirit of merciless criticism, which stops short of nothing in its consistent course, is yet filled with profound reverence for the endeavors of mankind to scale the highest peaks of religious truth. He possesses in a remarkable degree the breadth, earnestness and impartiality which are the fruit of genuine scholarship. Setting aside, so far as is possible under human limitations, the personal equation, he does not lose a certain glow of temperament which is essential to an appreciation of the successive stages through which mankind has reached its present position.

Recognizing that great religious movements must be explained by great and worthy causes, Professor Darmesteter seeks for the elements of permanent value in the religions of both past and present. In this spirit he approaches the study of the prophetic movement which began to stir Judæa so powerfully in the eighth century before our era. He accepts without qualification the results of modern investigations with regard to the composition of the prophetic books, and his view of the general development of religious ideas in Israel is in substantial agreement with that of his distinguished master and colleague, Ernest Renan. Setting aside, however, questions of pure criticism, and viewing the prophetic writings simply as expressions of certain religious ideas and ideals, he submits these to an examination, with the avowed purpose of illustrating the power inherent in them to work a religious regeneration in our own day. It is well at times like the present, when the activity of scholars threatens to be directed too exclusively into the channels of historical and literary criticism, that we should be reminded of this phase of the Bible. Professor Darmesteter shows by his admirable introduction how

peculiarly he is adapted for treating it. Criticism leaves the question as to the profound influence exerted by the Old Testament upon the religious consciousness of mankind untouched; but a work like this is striking evidence that the application of critical methods to the study of the Old Testament serves to set this influence forth in a stronger and clearer light.

Professor Darmesteter finds the source and explanation of this mighty influence in the prophets. The Hebrew prophet of the eighth century sounded the note of a new faith—a faith not based upon ritual, or doctrine, but upon a spiritual conception of man's position in the universe and upon conduct as the outcome of this religion of the spirit. In their own day the prophets afforded a striking contrast, in their view of religion, to the one current in Judæa, as throughout the ancient world, which, associating religion with the family, tribe or nation, according to the prevailing social unit, found its final expression in rites performed on certain occasions, and in harmony with more or less strict regulations. Professor Darmesteter claims that the prophetic conception of religion and of life is as much applicable to our own times as to the circle for which it was originally intended. This introduction, distinguished by eloquence of diction and singular depth of thought, is devoted to showing the present mission of "Prophetism," which does not consist in "founding a new religion nor in converting the world to Judaism," but in unifying the two religions that to-day are arrayed against each other,—"the religion of science and the religion of Christ." Our author's brilliant exposition of the relations that should exist between science and religion, to secure the steady progress of mankind, is profoundly impressive. Apart from the intrinsic value of his reasoning, the views propounded are significant of the reaction in France against the indifference to religious problems that has for a long time characterized her scientists.

The single defect of the introduction and of Professor Darmesteter's general position on religious problems is that what he says is applicable too exclusively to conditions prevailing in France. When he speaks of the need of religion as a complement to science, pithily summing up the situation by saying that "science equips a man but does not direct him," the sentiment will find an echo on this side of the Atlantic; but when he speaks of the attitude of the church towards science, he appears to have in mind only the Roman Catholic Church. This is quite natural for one living in France, but it leads to assertions that can hardly be maintained in the general way in which they are put forth. Professor Darmesteter does not entirely ignore Protestantism, with its numerous ramifications, but he seems to regard it purely as the symptom of a disintegrating process,—a view that loses sight both of the historical rôle of the Protestant movement in the religious development of Europe and of the historical justification for the movement itself. Protestantism in

America is far from being merely a negative force, and there has come about in this country, during the past two decades, a profound change in the attitude of all religious bodies towards science,—a change in the direction of greater spirituality.

M. Darmesteter follows up his introduction with an elaborate essay (covering a third of the volume) on the Prophets, in which he develops his conception of their office in a systematic manner. Both in this essay and in the two articles in which he examines the views of M. Renan and of the late Dr. H. Graetz, he is particularly happy in his manner of setting the work accomplished by the prophets in the light of history. But for his equally successful achievements in other lines, one would say that M. Darmesteter's main strength lies in his keen historical instinct. Under the magic of his pen, pictures of the past are painted with a vividness that will be a revelation to the reader accustomed to the traditional treatment of this period. The prophets are brought directly into the centre of the political and religious life of the people, instead of being accorded a position apart. Their superiority consists in the fact that they are exceedingly human, stirred by their environment and speaking directly to their own time. Their grandeur, so far from being impaired by being brought nearer to our gaze, is accentuated by their complete unconsciousness that they were in reality speaking to all mankind. Professor Darmesteter's differentiation of the prophets is particularly successful in the case of Jeremiah, whose tragic figure fairly starts out of these eloquent pages. He leads up to his subject in the main essay of the volume, with an account of the religious history of Israel prior to the prophetic movement, which is notable for conciseness and clearness. In his review of Renan, he shows his remarkable powers of condensation, though his masterpiece in this direction is his third essay, a "*coup d'œil sur l'histoire des Juifs*," which is a complement to the main essay, giving a general view of the history of the Jewish people from the destruction of the Jewish state down to our days. The ignorance still prevailing regarding the Jews and their history during the past eighteen hundred years lends a special interest and importance to this essay. To most people the history of the Jews ends with the moment when their real history may be said to have begun. M. Darmesteter's essay should be particularly welcome to those who are deterred by the bulk of the ordinary Jewish histories; they will have the satisfaction of knowing that after absorbing forty of these pages, they will have taken in more than from four hundred pages of the average writer.

An essay on "*The Authenticity of the Prophets*," a refutation of the curious views held as to the age of the prophets by a French scholar recently deceased, calls for no special comment. In the essay on "*Race and Tradition*," the writer enters a timely protest against the present tendency to emphasize the element of race in accounting for differences of culture and religion; he shows how vague and unsatisfactory the

definition of race is, even in the sphere of pure philology, and how much more unsatisfactory it is in the sphere of religion. Applying his reasoning to the Aryans and Semites, he illustrates the weakness of the position that there is an inherent antagonism between the two groups of nations. The factor that M. Darmesteter would set up as determining the course run by different nations is tradition. The last essay is a tribute to the memory of a remarkable Frenchman of the first half of this century, whom Professor Darmesteter regards as a modern representative of the ancient prophetic spirit. The rather long biography is naturally not as interesting to us as it must be to French circles; for Joseph Salvador was not a man who made himself felt outside of a comparatively narrow field. Yet there are suggestive passages in this essay that belong to the best things in a book full of excellent things.

The impression left by the volume as a whole is profound. It is of absorbing interest, and intensely stimulating. M. Darmesteter's method is peculiarly adapted to the needs of the general reader. He bears his learning lightly; knowing just how much to leave for granted and how much to suppress, he carries his readers along with him easily, even through intricate questions. His glowing style adds to the irresistible charm of his volume, which will aid in bringing about a better understanding of the Old Testament as it appears in the light of modern criticism. The essays are distinctly popular, and in the interest of that large portion of the reading public to whom a foreign language is a bar to enjoyment, it is to be hoped that an English translation will be forthcoming.

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A Short Commentary on the Book of Daniel for the Use of Students.

By A. A. BEVAN, M. A. Fellow of Trinity College. Pp. xii, 235. Cambridge: at the University Press. New York: Macmillan & Co.

Mr. Bevan's book contains prolegomena, a commentary, and a couple of appendices. The prolegomena comprise a general introduction on the Hebrew text, the oldest versions, and the ancient and modern interpreters of the Book of Daniel; an account of the origin and purpose of the book, and a dissertation on its linguistic character, with a special section on the Septuagint text. Mr. Bevan holds that the book was written in the second century B. C., just before the death of Antiochus Epiphanes. The arguments by which he supports this position are such as have been adduced by other writers; but they are here presented clearly and succinctly. He points out the anachronisms in the book, and urges that its tone and its linguistic character agree excellently with the second century, but not at all with the sixth. It is commonly held by critics that the Belshazzar of Daniel is incorrectly represented by the author of the book as king of Babylon, but most writers incline to regard the name as a late misspelling of Bilsharusur, who appears in the cuneiform inscriptions as the eldest

son of the last king Nabunaid. Mr. Bevan is disposed to reject this identification, though such a change of spelling seems not at all improbable. He regards "Darius the Mede," of chapter vi., as inexplicable; in fact, up to this time it has been impossible to account for the introduction of this name. It is possible that further discoveries may enable us to see whence the author got it; at present it seems most likely that it represents a confused knowledge of Darius Hystaspis, who was supposed by the author to have been king of Babylon.

In connection with the dissertation on the linguistic character of the book, Mr. Bevan appends Hebrew transliterations and English translations of various Palmyrene texts, — a very desirable addition whereby the resemblance between the Palmyrene and the Biblical Aramaic is exhibited. In regard to the mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic in Daniel, he adopts the suggestion, which seems the most probable, that the book was originally written in Hebrew; that, later, it was translated into Aramaic for the benefit of the people, who no longer spoke Hebrew; and that a portion of the Hebrew original was then lost, and its place was supplied from the Aramaic version. This is the view of Lenormant, and Mr. Bevan adds that it is strengthened by consideration of the fact that under Antiochus Epiphanes a large number of Jewish writings were probably destroyed.

Mr. Bevan's comments are in accordance with those of the best modern critics. In chapter v. he adopts Clermont-Ganneau's interpretation of *mene, mene, tekel u. pharsin*, "a mina, a shekel and two half-minas" (that is, Nebuchadnezzar, Belshazzar, and the Medes and Persians). The double occurrence of the *mene* he does not explain. One possible explanation is that the repetition is for emphasis; another (offered by Professor Paul Haupt, of the Johns Hopkins University) is that the first *mene* should be rendered "there has been counted;" the suggestion has also been made that the repetition is a clerical error. It is not clear how it is to be treated. Mr. Bevan's grammatical notes are useful. He is to be commended also for his collation of the Septuagint text. The Hebrew and Aramaic texts of Daniel need revision, and a careful study of the versions is, of course, a prime necessity for this undertaking. Unfortunately, the Septuagint text is in a wretched condition. Mr. Bevan's book will be welcomed by teachers; the need of a good hand-commentary on Daniel has long been felt.

C. H. TOY.

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Theologischer Jahresbericht. XI. Band, enthaltend die Literatur des Jahres 1891. I. Abtheilung: Exegese. Bearbeitet von SIEGFRIED und HOLTZMANN. Braunschweig, 1892: C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn. New York: G. E. Stechert. 8vo, pp. 132.

The first division of Volume XI. of the "Theologischer Jahresbericht," comprehending the Biblical-exegetical literature of 1891, exhibits

the breadth and thoroughness which are characteristic of this invaluable report. The labor involved in giving a useful review of the religious literature of a year is enormous. One of the writers on the New Testament Apocalypse, mentioned by Professor Holtzmann, after expounding the signs of the times, adds the exhortation: "Prove all things, hold fast that which is good," — an injunction, says the editor, which, in view of the "tohu-bohu" of Apocalyptic absurdities, is more easily given than followed. The remark applies to the whole mass of the literature; and the editors show not only great industry in collecting the names of writers from the whole civilized world, but also great skill in distinguishing between the good and the bad. The reader, introduced into this huge, whirling work-shop, could hardly escape vertigo without the friendly guidance of a skilled hand. In spite of the vastness of the field, the critical estimate set by the editors on the various writings considered is sober and just; they have their own point of view, and are merciless in their treatment of what they regard as absurd and uncritical, yet show a catholic spirit of sympathy for other well-sustained points of view. It is hardly to be expected that they should know the English as intimately as the German literature, and in some cases they do not recognize the full import of English and American works; they scarcely do justice to Cheyne's *Rampton Lectures on the Psalter*; they do not see the importance, in the history of the English High Church, of Mr. Gore's recent utterances on inspiration and other religious ideas, and they fail to catch the spirit of Professor Steenstra's article on the possibility of Davidic psalms in the *Psalter*. But in general their judgments appear to be as sound as in the nature of the case is possible, and the "*Bericht*" is indispensable for those who wish to keep up at all with the literature.

The year 1891 seems not to have been fertile in works on the general history of religions. What appeared on the Egyptian religion and the old Egyptian history goes to confirm the view that the Israelites had no real intellectual or religious intercourse with Egypt before the time of Solomon. As to the Babylonian religion, cuneiform scholars seem to feel that many special lines have to be worked out before any general history can be attempted. No new results of importance show themselves in the study of *Hebraism*. The *Amarna*-inscriptions throw light on the political relations of Canaan in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but tell us nothing directly of the religious ideas of the Hebrew tribes in that period. Old Testament criticism has its picturesque features, among which are the attempts of Havet and Vernes to bring down all the prophets to the period after the exile, and of Klostermann to destroy all criticism by the supposition of an untrustworthy text; but such attempts do not interfere with the orderly advance of the science. In the New Testament literature we have the proof that the method of F. C. Baur has established itself firmly in modern criticism, as Weizsäcker points out. It is sometimes said that Baur represented a radical

outburst from which criticism has been ever since receding. It is true that some of Baur's results have been modified by recent researches, but it is also true that his main lines and his general conception of the history have been retained. On the other hand Baur is out-Baured by the group of Dutch scholars who are seeking to analyze the epistle to the Romans into a Pauline kernel and later additions, — an attempt that finds as little favor as the similar view of Vernes in the Old Testament field, and is cleverly parodied by Professor C. M. Mead (lately of the Andover Theological Seminary) in his "Romans Dissected." The "Hand-Commentar" to the New Testament, by Holtzmann, Lipsius, Schmiedel and von Soden, now completed, is critically compared with other similar works. No noteworthy progress in the Synoptics-question, or in the criticism of the Fourth Gospel, is mentioned. One rises, indeed, from this survey of the literature with the feeling that we have only begun the critical history of the Biblical writings. Certain things have been established ; much still remains to be settled.

C. H. Toy.

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The Teaching of Jesus. By HANS HEINRICH WENDT, D. D., Professor of Theology, Heidelberg. Translated by Rev. JOHN WILSON, M. A. In two volumes. Vol. I. Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark ; New York : Charles Scribner's Sons.

The Messrs. Scribner have rendered the American theological public a service in bringing out here the translation of Dr. Wendt's work, recently published in England. The original treatise consisted of two parts: "Die Lehre Jesu," a critical examination of the Gospels, and "Der Inhalt der Lehre Jesu," a Biblico-theological discussion of the didactic contents of the Gospels. It is this second part of the work which has been translated under this simpler title: "The Teaching of Jesus." About one half of this second part is comprised in this volume. The translation will be completed in another volume, which may be expected in the course of a few months.

The untranslated First Part of Professor Wendt's treatise has given him a place in the first rank of Biblical critics in Germany. In respect to conservatism he may be described as standing midway between Professors Weiss and Holtzmann, the two leading names in the field of gospel criticism. In respect to the Synoptic problem, he holds the generally accepted two-source theory. The Matthaic *logia* which underlies all our synoptics and the Gospel of Mark are our two oldest known sources of information respecting the life and teaching of Jesus. Dr. Wendt has made in this First Part an elaborate attempt to reconstruct the *logia* by a critical comparison of our Synoptic narratives. On this subject he is in substantial accord with Professors Holtzmann and Weiss, although he differs from them on minor points. For example, he main-

tains the use by Luke of our First Gospel as against Dr. Weiss, who holds to their independence.

In regard to the Fourth Gospel, Professor Wendt agrees neither with Professor Holtzmann, who denies its apostolic authorship, nor with Professor Weiss, who maintains it. He has revived a view which has found little favor in recent years, — that the Fourth Gospel is the work of a post-apostolic writer, who possessed and incorporated into it a genuine Johannine writing, which therefore bears a relation to the Fourth Gospel analogous to that which the *logia* sustains to the synoptics.

The second part of the work is sufficiently independent of these critical inquiries to be used with ease and profit without the knowledge of Part First. It is written in a clear and popular, and in fact rather diffuse style; unlike most German theological treatises, it may be read with no great strain upon one's attention. The volume consists of three main sections. The first is entitled "The Historical Foundation of the Teaching of Jesus;" it contains a résumé of the results of recent studies in late Jewish thought. The aim of this section is to exhibit the relations of likeness and difference between the current religious ideas of Judaism and the teaching of Jesus. This discussion serves to illustrate at once the frequent coincidences in form between the ideas of Jesus and those of his age, and the immeasurable height of his teaching above that of his contemporaries.

The second section deals with "The External Aspects of the Teaching of Jesus." Perhaps the most striking feature of this part is the discussion of the nature, variety, and interpretation of parables. That a parable is intended to teach only one idea, and that its details are not to be pressed into the service of theology by assigning to them an independent meaning, is made abundantly clear. The allegorical method of interpreting, now almost universally discredited, at any rate in theory, still predominates in the treatment of the parables of Jesus. He performs a useful service who aids the popular apprehension of these matchless compositions of Jesus by showing us their true simplicity and pointedness.

The third section is the most extended and comprehensive. Its three leading ideas may be represented by the phrases: "The nature of God," "The kingdom of God," and "The true righteousness." The discussion of Jesus' conception of God, its relation to the Old Testament idea, its uniqueness, and its adequacy to man's religious wants, is admirable. It is well summed up in the following passage, which will serve as a good example of the author's style and mode of thought, and is well worth quoting for its intrinsic value: —

The prevailing tendency of Judaism, in the time of Jesus, to regard the holiness of God, in other words, his transcendent exaltation above the world, as the principal aspect of the conception of God, on the one hand, led to the religious relation of men to God being regarded, by Pharisaism, as a legal

servitude, and the chief religious duties as external ceremonies ; and, on the other hand, by Alexandrianism, the religious intuition was transformed into philosophical speculation. But the high significance which Jesus imparted to the moral quality of fatherly love in the conception of God enabled Him to regard the religious relation between God and men as entirely moral, and to understand in its highest and purest sense the holy exaltation above the world inseparable from the idea of God. As surely as Jesus found in the Old Testament, and in the Jewish teaching founded on the Old Testament, a real basis for this conception of God, so surely did an epoch-making advance beyond the limits of the Old Testament religious consciousness lie in the certainty, clearness, and fullness with which He first apprehended and announced the Fatherhood of God (p. 209).

The principles of individual action and of social obligation which Jesus taught are presented with systematic fullness under the heading, "The Kingdom of God," in the last half of the volume. No results are here presented which are especially new to critical students of the New Testament. The author's view of the Fourth Gospel occasions the consideration of the relation between the Synoptic and the Johannine presentation of Jesus' teaching respecting salvation and the religious life, with the general result that the discourses in the Fourth Gospel on eternal life, love, and the gift of the Holy Spirit, are regarded as having an independent value for the supplementing of our other documentary sources.

We unhesitatingly commend this work, which we have inadequately described, to all earnest students of theology.

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The Evolution of Christianity. By LYMAN ABBOTT. Pp. viii, 258. Boston and New York : Houghton, Mifflin & Co. \$1.25.

Christianity must seem unaccountable to an agnostic evolutionist. Jesus Christ might be his ideal of man when he shall have attained his ultimate perfection ; but the intrusion of such a being midway in human history — a spiritual Melchizedek, "without father, without mother, without descent" — would either stultify theory by authentic fact, or discredit well-attested fact in behalf of theory. But equally difficult would it be to account for the greatest men in every department of life, — for epoch-making men ; for Moses, Isaiah, Homer, Wielif, Raphael, Shakespeare. These men — to borrow a phrase too significant to be appropriated by the race-course — "broke the record" by transcending it. They cannot be explained by heredity, antecedents or surroundings. While each, in his special type, shaped his age and the ages after him, his age did not shape him. The Greeks were unconsciously philosophical when they called their great men sons of gods, as when Apollo was the reputed father of Plato. Theistic evolutionism acknowledges spiritual

causation. The existing material universe has in itself the proof that it began to be and that it will cease to be. If matter is eternal, only co-eternal Mind can have endowed its molecules with the power of becoming worlds, organic being, animal life, self-conscious humanity. But if Mind was the sole first cause, why may not that same Mind, without setting aside the natural order of material evolution, have interposed in divers forms and ways to direct and expedite the development of nature's noblest birth, man's living soul.

Such evidently, in Dr. Abbott's Christology, is the genesis of the man Christ Jesus, — the ideal man realized; the God-man, into whose divine image it is God's will that all men shall grow, if not in this earthly life, in its progress beyond earthly vision. But the Christianity which he taught, or rather was and is, did not spring at once into full growth, nor has it yet given more than the sure and rich promise of what it is to be. It is subject, like everything in the universe, to the law of evolution, according to which, by virtue of its innate contents and forces, it passes progressively from lower to higher, from more simple to more complex forms, — from age to age, other yet the same, — assuming aspects and functions in which its first disciples would not recognize it, branching out into diversities of ritual, creed and operation in which believers seem in mutual antagonism, yet tending and destined to culminate in a multitudinous and many-faced unity.

Under this view the Bible is not an inflexible and infallible standard of faith and duty, but a record of the evolution of successive stages of the religious consciousness which first had its full incarnation in Jesus. It is therefore not to be rested upon, but started from; not a finality, but a directory for advanced movement on lines of religious and ethical thought in which it has opened and led the way. In like manner the primitive church furnishes no hard-and-fast rule for organism, ritual, doctrine or practice. It was simply a company of men who had engrafted on their Hebrew theology a sincere, yet not a deep-seeing or a far-seeing faith in their teacher and guide. But in that faith were included the germs of philosophies, sects, observances, forms of worship and modes of life to be evolved through successive generations in a number and diversity still increasing in this nineteenth century since the Founder left the world. Of these the larger portion are limbs, boughs, branches, twigs and flower-stalks of the many-fruited tree of eternal life. Others are abortive offshoots and arrested developments, which have left merely a name, sometimes even a bad name. But of those that last, and grow, and bear good fruit, there are none that have not sprung by natural development from the contents of that first utterance of the Christian consciousness of the early disciples, "I believe in the Lord Jesus Christ."

In the individual soul all growth is the evolution of what is native in it. Here, too, there may be arrested or abortive development; for the

capacity of good implies the capacity of evil. Yet even in such cases conversion is not a change of nature, but a return to nature, — a renewal of suspended growth, a forthputting and outblossoming of powers and affections which had never been dislodged, though for a season overlaid and suppressed by the abuse of that moral freedom whose right use means constant, symmetrical and healthy development of all that is in man.

The evolution of Christianity in the church, in society and in the souls of men has for its consummation the fulfillment of the prayer of Jesus, "that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us."

This book of Dr. Abbott's is a precious contribution to liberal Christianity, in the true and broad sense of that term. We do not claim it as a departure from conventional orthodoxy. We do not understand Dr. Abbott to be occupying dogmatically any other ground than that on which he has always stood; but he has so enlarged that ground as to give room at his side for many who would be slow to subscribe the precise articles of faith which he would undoubtedly accept as defining his own belief.

ANDREW P. PEABODY.

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Neutestamentliche Theologie, oder geschichtliche Darstellung der Lehren Jesu und des Urchristenthums nach den neutestamentlichen Quellen. Von Dr. WILLIBALD BEYSCHLAG. Erster Band, pp. vii, 410. Leipzig: Eugen Strien.

Beyschlag's "Theology of the New Testament" is the work of a prominent scholar in the ranks of the moderate liberals of Germany. It is characteristic of the representatives of this mode of thought to concede to the critical school such of its conclusions as no scholar can reject without risk to his reputation for learning and good judgment, and to assume toward the more radical results of criticism a "mediating" attitude with reference to the traditional theology. The outcome of this policy appears to be in some cases the substantial acceptance of many critical conclusions which are formally rejected under cover of the conventional orthodox terminology. Beyschlag, for example, opposes in decided terms the teaching which recognizes the revealed character of Christianity without "extending this recognition to the New Testament writings as such." But his advocacy of the inspiration of the writers in question goes no farther than to maintain that they produced works which are far superior to the uncanonical literature of the early church! He concedes that "the Biblical religion, together with its documents, is something born into the world according to the laws of human nature," and that "development, that great law which we observe in all natural as well as spiritual life," is not foreign to it. Revelation is not "a sum of doctrines unattainable by the human mind, communicated to it ready made from

heaven," and the Scriptures are not infallible documents given by Divine dictation.

The attitude which Dr. Beyschlag assumes toward the sources of the teaching of Jesus shows the influence upon his mind of the work of modern criticism. He does not attempt to combine the representations of the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel, but treats them separately in the first two of the three books into which the material of the volume is divided. To the Synoptics is accorded the preference in point of historical credibility; and while the Fourth Gospel is regarded on critical grounds as the work of the apostle John, the concession is made that "to him recollection and exposition had become so inseparable that he was able to produce the portrait and, in particular, the discourses of Jesus only out of the smeltery of his own mental life as a new formation." This hazardous admission of the subjective character of the Fourth Gospel of course opens the question as to the extent to which the doctrine of "subjectivity" and "new formation" may be applied in the interpretation of it, and practically concedes to criticism very much that it claims apart from the technical question of the authorship of the work. In treating the synoptic question Dr. Beyschlag favors the hypothesis of the logia-source, and admits the conclusions of criticism regarding the loose structure of the narratives and the different settings of the sayings of Jesus in the three biographies. His prepossession, however, in favor of the unity of the Old and New Testaments, and against the critical exclusion from the genuine words of Jesus of the apocalyptic sayings ascribed to him leads him to the conclusion that Christ's conception of the kingdom of God was not altogether spiritual.

In discussing the relation of Jesus to the Messianic expectations of his age Dr. Beyschlag rejects that interpretation of the title "Son of Man" which finds in it a designation of the human nature of Christ. Jesus could not have felt the necessity, he says, of assuring his contemporaries of his true humanity, which no one among them doubted. Thus is the doctrine of "the archetypal Man," maintained by Schleiermacher, Neander, Reuss, and others, disposed of, so far as it rests upon this synoptic expression. In spite of Jesus' use of the title in question at Caesarea Philippi, when he could not have intended by it to declare himself as the Messiah, Dr. Beyschlag decides for its Messianic interpretation, while conceding that neither in itself nor in its general Old Testament usage does it have this meaning. He finds a place, however, for the conception of the archetypal Man in his interpretation of the title "Son of God," which he regards as expressing "an elevation and uniqueness of his [Jesus'] relation to God which exalt him above all other children of men, and give him the character of true divinity without thereby excluding his entire humanity, but first realizing it in the highest, archetypal sense." In other words: "When Christ calls himself the Son of God he does it as the man absolutely at one with God." As to the doc-

trine of a divine and a human nature in Christ, Dr. Beyschlag declares it to be destitute of all Biblical support. "It belongs to the theology of the fifth century, and not to the Biblical mode of thought and speech."

The longest chapter in the book is that which, under the title "Weltgericht," is devoted to a discussion of the synoptic eschatology. As we have already remarked, Dr. Beyschlag accepts in their essential features the sayings ascribed to Jesus regarding his second coming; but he attempts to obviate the conclusion which might be drawn from this interpretation, that Jesus delivered the wildest apocalyptic dreams, by assuming a subjective coloring of the reports of the discourses, by resort to the expedient of figurative language, and by arbitrarily setting off some sayings as referring to the overthrow of the Jewish state, and others as indicating a historical judgment unfolding throughout the Christian ages. If he had succeeded in untying this eschatological knot, one might receive with equanimity his charge that the criticism which puts the apocalyptic prophecies to the account of the Messianic expectations of the time only cuts it. How readily liberal orthodoxy employs rationalistic methods appears in his denial that Jesus taught the doctrine of a general judgment, while conceding that the first evangelist represents him to have taught it; in the conclusion that Jesus' teaching regarding the resurrection meant "the perfection of the personality in God;" and in the interpretation of Jesus' reference to angels as "a poetic paraphrase of God himself," as an idea which "hovers between personality and personification," while what he expressed by the name of Satan was "the thought that evil in nature and history is an actual, unitary, fearful power." The author denies that Jesus taught either that men's deeds in this life determine their destiny, or that all will certainly be saved. He understands the gospel to include a future probation, together with "the possibility that human freedom and sin may advance to the destruction of the capability of yielding to the Divine grace."

The third and last book of the volume is devoted to a consideration of the views of the original apostles according to the Acts, the Epistle of James and 1st and 2d Peter. The author rejects the conclusions of the critical school regarding the Book of Acts, while admitting that "misunderstandings and legendary deposits are not to be denied." The Epistle of James is ascribed to "the brother of our Lord," and 1st Peter is regarded as genuine.

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The Witness of Hermas to the Four Gospels. By C. TAYLOR, D. D., Master of St. John's College, Cambridge. Pp. 148. London: C. J. Clay and Sons. 1892.

Dr. Taylor is known on this line of study by his "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, with Illustrations from the Talmud," an attempt to

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show that the "Didachè" is a thoroughly Jewish document adapted to Christian use. In the present treatise, while not disputing the universal critical verdict as to the literary insignificance of "The Shepherd" of Hermas, Dr. Taylor claims that its value as a testimony to the four Gospels has never been understood, and that it is "an incompletely worked mine of allusions to the Gospels."

This conclusion is not affected by the discussion concerning the date of Hermas. On either of the three hypotheses, which range from 58 to 140 A. D., the Gospels had attained their canonical position before Irenæus made his well known statement that there are four gospels only and necessarily. That Irenæus knew "The Shepherd," and quoted it as Scripture, is conceded; and his high respect for the work, thus indicated, makes it not unreasonable or improbable that he should, to a greater or less extent, have appropriated and reproduced the ideas of Hermas.

Dr. Taylor's position is somewhat more affected by the still open question of the relative dates of "The Shepherd" and the "Didachè." Neither factor of the problem can be considered as settled. Opinions as to the date of the "Didachè" range from 50 to 190 A. D. The author follows Bryennios and Harnack in claiming the priority for the "Didachè." He is satisfied that Hermas not only used but used up the "Didachè," so that anything very striking in that manual had only to be looked for in "The Shepherd," and it would be found there in one disguise or another. This gives us the rationale of Dr. Taylor's investigation. Starting with "The Shepherd," he finds in it the substance of the "Didachè;" and as there are in the "Didachè" something like thirty conceded allusions to the Gospels, allusions to the Gospels are to be, presumably, found in "The Shepherd," though under a disguised form.

A process which goes upon the lines of disguised allusion is necessarily somewhat precarious. The enthusiastic student is exposed to the dangers which always wait upon dealing with allegory. At the same time, the process itself is not altogether without its warrant, and in some cases is inevitable, from the well known allegorical habit of the early fathers.

Dr. Taylor has brought to his work good scholarship, ingenuity, and a fair degree of insight; but he is too often led away by superficial correspondences and incidental verbal agreements. In some instances his conclusions carry with them a moderate degree of probability; in others he has not escaped the danger which besets the special pleader. It is not unreasonable, for instance, that the "disguised trace" of the word *εὐαγγέλιον* should be discovered in the *ἀγγελία ἀγαθή* of "The Shepherd." This, one might be pardoned for thinking, would require no very long or very learned investigation; but we hesitate a little when we are told that, under the figure of "the bench" (*συμπέλιον*), standing firmly on four feet, Hermas refers to the four Gospels, comparing them, after the manner of Irenæus, to the four elements of the world. It is possible, indeed, for to allegory all things are possible.

Similarly, the traces of the features of John the Baptist in "The Shepherd's" two angels of repentance and retribution are scarcely more distinct than those of Peter and Judas in Da Vinci's "Cœna." The two angels clad in goat skins *may* possibly correspond to the Baptist's girdle of skin; and from John's wild honey it is a long and somewhat circuitous route round by way of the "Didachè" to Hermas' parable of a jar of honey made bitter by a little wormwood, and to the angel of retribution, who is described in "The Shepherd" as "wild of aspect and bitter to the sheep." The assumed allusion to the transfiguration turns entirely on the word *ἐστύλιν*, which is applied by Mark to the lustre of the Lord's raiment, and by Hermas to the gate cut out of the rock.

It would be easy to multiply illustrations of this kind. There are other cases where the correspondence of idea is striking and suggestive, notwithstanding the difference in figure. Up to this time critics have conceded to Hermas an acquaintance with Mark, James, and the Epistle to the Ephesians. If Dr. Taylor's case is made out, this range is considerably enlarged, so as to include all four of the Gospels. We should be grateful to any scholar who applies to an obscure subject like this such minute and careful study; and it can be truthfully said that Dr. Taylor's monograph is at once interesting and stimulating; but it cannot be denied that many of his conclusions are far from convincing, and that it would not be difficult to account for some of the apparent correspondences which he points out on other grounds than that of Hermas' acquaintance with the four Gospels. The book will hardly, we think, succeed in persuading scholars to attach to Hermas' testimony the weight to which Dr. Taylor thinks it is entitled.

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La Migration des Symboles. Par le Comte GOBLET D'ALVIELLA, Professeur d'Histoire des Religions à l'Université de Bruxelles. Paris : Ernest Leroux. 1891.

On page 18 of this work the author writes : "It is henceforth beyond contest that the cross of pre-Columbian America is a mariner's card (*rose des vents*); that it represents the four directions whence the rain comes, or rather the four cardinal winds which bring it; and that it has thus become the symbol of the god, dispenser of the celestial waters, Tlaloc, and, by extension of the mythical, personage known under the name of Quetzacoalt. . . . It is by an analogous reasoning that the Assyrians also came to represent their god of the heavens, Anu, by an equilateral cross." In support of this position Comte D'Alviella cites the symbol used for Anu in "Western Asia Inscriptions," II. 48, ob. 30.

This seems to me scarcely a correct statement. The equal-armed cross appears on Babylonian seals, both inclosed in a circle and uninclosed. The latter form is well known on seals of the second Babylonian

empire. I have also found it on seals (discovered at Niffer) of the period of the hegemony of Ur, between 2000 and 3000 B. C. It is a broad, equal-armed cross. In meaning, the disk and the square cross are identical; both are solar symbols, the cross being a representation of the disk by means of its diameters. I should have supposed this to be also the derivation of the American square cross. The disk with diameters, or the diameters alone, once used, lend themselves to the idea of the four regions and the four quarters; but I should suppose that in the order of development, the former preceded the latter, not the reverse.

The figure for Anu referred to above appears in an Assyrian god-list, and is a modification, under the influence of the Babylonian square cross, of the ancient symbol for Anu, namely, a star. A star composed of four wedges, and having therefore eight radii, was the oldest Babylonian symbol for *star, heaven, Anu, god*. In Assyrian this character as used for star, heaven and god lost one of its wedges and its star shape, but as the symbol for Anu all four wedges were retained. Under the influence of the solar disk and square cross, however, the wedges were no longer grouped in the form of a star, but of a small disk with four equal arms projecting on the four sides.

The gammated cross and the *swastika* are of the same origin as the square cross. Professor D'Alviella just fails to recognize this. He says (p. 67): "M. Gaidoz has defined the gammated cross as a graphic doublet of the wheel. The expression is exact and even most happy, on condition of understanding thereby not that the gammated cross is derived from the wheel by the suppression of a part of the felly, but rather that it is, like the wheel, a figurative representation of the solar movement." But the equal-armed cross, gammated or not gammated, is "a figurative representation of the solar movement" only because it stands for a circle, by suppression of the circumference. The gammated cross differs from the square cross in preserving an indication of the circumference at the ends of its arms. The *swastika* is a representation of the disk by curved instead of straight radii, and should be compared with a not uncommon form of the solar disk, consisting of a number of curved radii proceeding from a common centre and bounded by a common circumference. This represents motion better than the rectilinear radii of the Babylonian sun-disks do. The *swastika* is the reduction of such a disk to four of its radii. The *swastika* and gammated cross pass over into one another, as, for instance, in the ornamentation of many Cypriote vases. The *triscela* differs from the *swastika* or *tetrascela* in having three curvilinear radii instead of four. It has the same origin and significance.

Professor D'Alviella tries to show that square crosses, gammated crosses and *swastikas* were not of independent origin in different countries, but were all derived from one original source, which could not have been far from the Troad. He thinks that the *swastika*, for instance, probably found its way to India from the Troad through the Caucasus.

But in a note (p. 108) he adduces facts which by themselves would be sufficient to discredit this theory. We find the gammated cross among savages on the west African coast and among the North American Indians, and always, I believe, in connection with solar symbolism. Professor D'Alviella asks "by what mysterious ways this combination of lines" reached these peoples. It did not reach them; it developed among them, as it developed in Greece and in India, and as the square cross developed in Chaldæa and Mexico. It is a natural and self-suggesting device for representing a disk. As solar worship originated independently in unconnected regions, so did also the disk as a representation of the sun, and the square cross, the gammated cross, the *swastika* and the *triscela* as the natural abbreviations of the disk, and hence as symbols of the sun. Contact produced modifications of the special form of one nation or religion by that of another on the general lines pointed out by Professor D'Alviella in his excellent chapters on Causes of Alteration in the Signification and Forms of Symbols, and the Transmutation of Symbols; but to suppose a common origin for these self-evident and practically universal methods of representing the solar disk is contrary to all the facts.

Professor D'Alviella is, also, somewhat inclined to find crosses where none were intended. So he says (p. 21): "Among the Phœnicians and their congeners it [the crutch-shaped cross] was the character known under the name *tau*, and Ezekiel, in a passage often cited [ix. 4] tells us that it was reputed a sign of life and safety." The passage referred to reads: "And Yahweh said to him, Pass through the midst of the city, through the midst of Jerusalem, and mark a mark (*tau* a *tau*) on the foreheads of the men that sigh and that cry for all the abominations that are done in the midst of her." The verb is used again, in 1 Sam. xxi. 14, of David, who *taued*, or made marks on the doors when he feigned madness. An examination of the forms of the letter *tau* in Ezekiel's time shows that it had not yet assumed the crutch cross or T shape. It was substantially the same in its simplest form as the mark which illiterate people often make in lieu of signature, which is certainly not a conscious cross, but the most natural and primitive of marks. This was, in fact, its origin as a letter in the Phœnician alphabet. It was a scratch or mark added at the end of the then existing alphabet to denote another sound for which an additional letter was needed. At a later date the Greeks took the same method of adding a new letter to their alphabet, namely *chi*. The earliest forms of *tau* and *chi* are identical, because both are originally mere marks. The passage in Ezekiel does not require, and the history of the letter *tau* will not permit, Professor D'Alviella's interpretation.

But if his treatment of the origin and spread of the gammated cross is unsound, his treatment of the subject of sacred trees is admirably sober. Here, if anywhere, the similarity in detail of complicated forms in countries so far apart as Chaldæa and Mexico, as shown in the plates facing pp. 152 and 153, supported by striking resemblances of myth, legend and

use, might lead to the supposition of borrowing from a common source. Here is his conclusion: "Semites and Aryans knew the tree of heaven, the tree of life and the tree of knowledge. The first has for fruits the igneous or luminous bodies of space; the second yields a beverage which assures perpetual youth; the third communicates prescience and even omniscience." But he inclines to believe that however much the two races may have influenced one another in later details they (why not the Mexicans also?) originated the tree myths independently on lines of thought and imagination natural to primitive man.

In his treatment of the common Assyrian form of the tree with winged genii on either side, holding a basket and a cone, Professor D'Alviella follows Tylor, rightly, I think, in regarding the cone as the "inflorescence of the male date palm" with which the female tree is fertilized, and procreation symbolized. The winged disk, which plays so important a part in Assyrian and Persian symbolism, he traces to an Egyptian origin. But there is more to be derived from the study of Babylonian seals and the like for the study of the tree, the cone, the caduceus, cross, etc., than Professor D'Alviella has yet fully utilized.

I have played the carping critic's part and criticised so long that there is scarcely space left for that which the book most deserves, praise. But it goes without saying that what Professor D'Alviella writes is valuable and eminently well done. This is a desirable work for the student of the development and transference of religious ideas. It is brief, consisting of six chapters, covering in all 345 pages. It is profusely illustrated, but miserably indexed.

Regarding the curious resemblances of Mexican and Asiatic symbols, the author says (p. 328): "For my part I feel myself more and more inclined to admit . . . the intervention of certain artistic influences, radiating from China, Japan or the Indian archipelago as far as the shores of the new world long before the Spanish conquest." Concerning the sources of civilization and the spread of symbols, he says (328 f.): "In brief, let one start from Greece or India, or even from Libya, Etruria, or Gaul, one always ends, passing halting place after halting place, by coming out at two great centres of artistic diffusion partially irreducible one to the other, Egypt and Chaldæa; but with this difference, that towards the eighth century before our era, Mesopotamia went to school to the Egyptians, while Egypt never went to school to any one. Now, not only have symbols, as we have more than once proven in the course of this volume, followed the same routes as purely decorative themes, but they have also been transmitted in the same way, at the same times and almost in the same proportion. Everywhere, in the case of symbols as of artistic products, we find, by the side of the autochthonous types, the deposits of a powerful current which has its origin, more or less remote, in the symbolism of the banks of the Euphrates and of the Nile."

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Early Greek Philosophy. By JOHN BURNET. London: Adam and Charles Black. New York: Macmillan & Co. \$2.50.

By early Greek philosophy Mr. Burnet understands those speculations about the nature, origin and history of the external world with which Greek thought was occupied during a period of about a hundred and fifty years, to the exclusion of any inquiries into the nature of thought itself. It begins with the declaration of Thales that "all things are water," and ends with the atomic theory of Leucippus, beyond whom no further advance could be made without an admixture of subjective elements due to the teaching of the Sophists and Socrates. In fact, Mr. Burnet, contrary to the usual procedure of historians, excludes from present consideration Democritus, the more famous disciple or friend of Leucippus, on the ground that his philosophy was affected by the teaching of Protagoras. Modern scholarship has cleared away more than one grave misconception that formerly obscured this most important epoch in the evolution of the human mind. We no longer look for profound metaphysical principles in the fragments of a Heraclitus or a Parmenides; but neither do we dismiss their speculations as vain attempts to conceive the inconceivable, nor pooh-pooh them as the merely fanciful and unverifiable guesses of children. The philosopher has to thank these old Ionians and their successors in the Hellenic colonies of the West for his idea of a Cosmos, a fixed order of things; the physicist owes to them an admirable working theory of matter, while to the theologian they are above all interesting as critics of a barbarous mythology and pioneers of the higher theism as we find it taking shape in the Republic of Plato and the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Just here, in his treatment of the religious aspects of early Greek philosophy, Mr. Burnet has shown the greatest originality, and I limit myself to a notice of the passages dealing therewith.

It has generally been held that the great revolution inaugurated by Thales and his school consisted in the substitution of merely natural or material processes for the actions or passions of divine beings as an explanation of the universe. Mr. Burnet thinks this a misleading account of what actually happened. The distinction between personal and impersonal was, he tells us, not very clear in early times: and he would formulate the advance made by the Milesian school by saying that they "left off telling tales" (p. 8). The phrase does not seem particularly happy. If "telling tales" means relating a series of imaginary events as if they had really happened, then the cosmogonies of Anaximander and Empedocles come under this category just as much as the cosmogony of Hesiod; and in fact, the theories of the early physicists are referred to by Plato as being no better than fairy tales. Of course what we read in Hesiod sounds much more like what we are accustomed to call a tale; but this is just because it treats of persons rather than of things, or at any rate of things under the disguise of persons. After all,

the distinction between the personal and the impersonal was apprehended with sufficient clearness by the Athenians, when they hounded Anaxagoras out of their city for teaching that the sun was a mass of red-hot metal and the moon a lump of earth. Would it be too much to credit the contemporaries of Solon with an equal power of discrimination? It is now admitted that the Ionian physicists did not ascribe to any spiritual agency those transformations of a primary material substance by which they accounted for the existing universe. A belief such as theirs in the ability of matter to work out its own destinies is known as hylozoism. According to Mr. Burnet, hylozoism was with them simply a generalization of the primitive animism. The life attributed by savages to each material object taken separately was transferred in their cosmogonies to the underlying substance of the world. If so, we have a striking instance of progress effected by going back to an earlier stage of culture and making a fresh start — *reculer pour mieux sauter*, as the French say; for Homer and Hesiod must certainly be regarded as having advanced considerably beyond the animistic stage.

The chapter entitled "Science and Religion" is especially striking and suggestive. Mr. Burnet thinks that a religious revolution swept over Hellas in the sixth century B. C., marked by the recrudescence of superstition usually consequent on public anxiety or disaster. Foremost among the symptoms of this movement was the great vogue obtained by the Orphic mysteries, which the author characterizes as "an elaborate system of purification and taboo intended to protect the soul from the ghostly perils to which it is constantly exposed" (p. 86). Philosophy derived no speculative ideas from the mysteries, but under their influence it became a way of life — at least among the disciples of Pythagoras. The Pythagorean order, we learn, was not a political league, but a religious confraternity instituted for the cultivation of ceremonial holiness (p. 94). The famous rules of abstinence enjoined by Pythagoras were "an elaborate system of taboo" (p. 100). His vegetarianism was "neither ascetic nor humanitarian, but arose from belief in the kinship of men and animals" (p. 102); and the recorded fact of his eating meat at sacrifices is in perfect harmony with the explanation of primitive sacrifice given by Professor Robertson Smith in his profound work on Semitic Religion (p. 103). It was this religious reaction that drew forth the scathing denunciations of all mythology uttered by Xenophanes, who moreover came from a region in Asia Minor "where the popular cults were more than usually cruel and obscene" (p. 109). This philosopher is commonly regarded as the founder of Monotheism among the Greeks; but in Mr. Burnet's opinion he "did not believe in anything like a personal god at all . . . his greatest god was neither more nor less than the material world" (p. 124). Neither is Heracleitus, the great progenitor of the Logos-doctrine, allowed to have been, in any true sense, a theologian. By God he meant physical fire; and, "though not un-

affected by the religious movement of the time, his attitude towards it was, in the main, one of contemptuous hostility" (p. 172). Mr. Burnet will not admit that Heracleitus believed in the periodical consumption of the whole world by fire (pp. 160, 399); but I do not think that he succeeds in explaining away the Aristotelian texts adduced by Zeller in support of this interpretation, especially that in which the Heracleitean fire is mentioned in close conjunction with the *Sphairos* of Empedocles. Our author naturally agrees with those who hold the *Nous* of Anaxagoras to have been a purely material agent. In reference to the persecution suffered by this philosopher, his observations, though not new, are still worth repeating. At Athens "the temper of the citizen body was and remained hostile to free inquiry of any kind. The religious views of the Demos were of the narrowest kind, and hardly any people has sinned more heavily against the liberty of science. Socrates, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle [Protagoras might have been mentioned also] fell victims in different degrees to the bigotry of the populace, though of course their offense was political rather than religious. They were condemned not as heretics but as innovators in the *State* religion" (p. 276).

Mr. Burnet's volume is indispensable to the student of Greek philosophy. I have tried to show that it deserves in equal measure the attention of the student of the history of religion.

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The Dialogues of Plato translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions. By B. JOWETT, M. A., Master of Balliol College. Third Edition, revised and corrected throughout, with marginal analyses and other additions, and an index of subjects and proper names. Five volumes. London and New York: Macmillan and Co. \$20.00.

We welcome gladly a new edition of Professor Jowett's translation of Plato. The first edition was published twenty years ago. The second appeared four years later. With each edition the work has expanded. The four volumes of the first edition became five in the second; while in the third the volumes have become so portly, that it is obvious that they might have become six, had this method of expansion been preferred. While new and valuable matter has been added with each edition, the expansion has been largely due to typographical changes. The second edition was printed in large and sumptuous type to which we look back with a slight regret, even from the elaborate helpfulness of the page in the edition now before us. The type here, though smaller than in the second edition, is larger than in the first and is very satisfactory. On the margin of every page there is a running analysis of the subject matter, which will be found by many extremely serviceable. To the student of Plato, or to a person looking for any particular passage, these analyses will be invaluable; while they will aid the more superficial reader to follow the course of thought through the sometimes rambling dialogues.

Beside differences in form, there is in the new edition a certain amount of new and valuable matter. The preface, which is in part the same as that of the second edition, has been expanded. Especially have additions been made to the interesting comparison between the Greek and English languages by which, in the preface to the first edition, the difficulties with which the translator has to contend were illustrated. This comparison of the two languages is not of importance merely to the student of Greek. It may aid the general reader to gain an insight, however imperfect, into the grace and freedom of the Greek language.

In the introductions to the several dialogues various essays appear, for the first time, in this third edition. Some of these have direct reference to the study of Plato, while others consist of free discussions of the matters with which the essays are concerned. Of those which have to do with the thought of Plato, the most important to the general reader is perhaps the essay in the second volume which discusses his "Ideas." Professor Jowett insists that "Plato's doctrine of ideas has attained an imaginary clearness and definiteness which is not to be found in his own writings." He contends that in the study of Plato "poetry has been converted into dogma," and he calls attention to the fact that "the Platonic ideas are to be found only in about a third of Plato's writings and are not confined to him." He further insists that "the forms which they assume are numerous, and if taken literally, inconsistent with one another." "At one time we are in the clouds of mythology, at another among the abstractions of mathematics and metaphysics; we pass imperceptibly from one to the other. Reason and fancy are mingled in the same passage." Professor Jowett illustrates these positions by a brief examination of the manner in which, in various dialogues, Plato treats the "ideas." In connection with this analysis, he refers too briefly to the idealism of Plato which, as he contends, underlies these various forms of presentation. One cannot help regretting that Dr. Jowett had not exhibited more fully what he conceives to be the real nature of Plato's idealism. This would have been far more interesting and more to the purpose than the hasty discussion which he gives us of the relation of certain later systems of philosophy to the doctrine of ideas.

To the serious student of Plato the most important of the new essays, probably, are the one in the third volume which compares the Republic, the Statesman, and the Laws; and the one in the fifth volume which makes a comparison of the Laws of Plato with Spartan and Athenian laws and institutions. This latter essay is especially interesting, showing to what extent Plato in his Laws had borrowed from existing codes. Besides these papers, we have, in the second volume, a new essay on the myths of Plato and, in the third, one upon the Legend of Atlantis.

Other essays offer independent studies of matters referred to by Plato, or indirectly suggested by his work. Except so far as these serve to give a certain reality to the reasoning of Plato, bringing him, as it were, from

the past into the present, they cannot be regarded as equal in interest and importance to those that deal directly with the thought of Plato. They are brief and rather unsatisfactory discussions of great themes. The one on Psychology in the fourth volume, though full of interesting points, will probably be regarded as the most inadequate. In the first volume, there is an essay on the decline of Greek literature. This is naturally suggested by the satire aimed at the rhetoricians in the *Phædrus*. A striking picture is given of the dreary waste which stretched through a thousand years. One great cause of the lack of literary power during this period is found to be in the fact that "the human race was destitute, or deprived of, the moral quantities which are the root of literary excellence. . . . It had no great characters and therefore it had no great writers." The question naturally arises whether there is a possibility of a similar literary degradation in the future; and especially in what manner such degradation may be averted. "First" we are reminded of "the progress of education." We are told that "the great writers of ancient or of modern times will remain to furnish abundant materials of education to the coming generation." The enlargement of mind is pointed out that will come from familiarity with the thoughts of all peoples, and with "the increasing sense of the greatness and infinity of nature." Beyond this "First" we are, however, not carried except in the single sentence, that tells us that "the love of mankind may be the source of a greater development of literature than nationality has ever been." From what we had been told of the causes of the decline of literature in Greece we should have expected a warning that if the moral life of the world declines, creative genius will decline with it.

We have thus called attention to some of the new material that appears in this edition. Of the discussions that were contained in the earlier editions there is no occasion to speak. The translation itself, which has given its chief value to each edition, needs, after these twenty years, no introduction. Plato is more than any other the literary philosopher. He is poet, dramatist, and romancer. Of all philosophers, he most demands that every version that is made of him should possess literary excellence. We cannot be too grateful to Professor Jowett for having given Plato a position in English literature. We read, rejoicing in the presentation, and, except in passages where our English speech is inadequate, hardly realizing that what we read is not the original form of the work. Such unmanageable passages are met, for instance, in the *Charmides*, which is unintelligible unless the reader substitutes mentally the Greek *σωφροσύνη* in the place of "temperance" and "wisdom," neither of which translates it, while the use of both makes hopeless confusion. If any one, however, considers this unintelligibility a fault of the translator, let him suggest something better.

There are, probably, every year, proportionally to the increase of general readers and students, fewer that are fitted to enjoy Plato in the ori-

ginal, while, every year, there are more that are fitted to enjoy his thought. Greek is studied less ; philosophy is studied more. This being so, every year must bring a greater demand for this charming translation.

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God's Image in Man. By HENRY WOOD. Boston : Lee & Shepard. \$1.25.

Mr. Wood's eleven chapters on such great topics as the nature of God, revelation, universal law, the unseen realm, evolution and spiritual progress, are called by him "some intuitive perceptions of truth." He declares that "God cannot be seen through the intellect." With "simple lay studies" like these, which claim to be only "interpretations of the inner consciousness," there is no need of further criticism than to suggest that Mr. Wood tends (as on p. 178) to emphasize the fact of a higher and a lower in man as if they did not run into each other in an indivisible unity. He tends also to apply the idea of Trinity rather than induce it, in some cases. But we call attention here to Mr. Wood's volume, not through any desire to dwell upon its theological or philosophical limitations, but from hearty appreciation of the fine spirit of constructive religiousness which pervades it. "The real heresy," he well says, "of the present age is the non-recognition of the 'Comforter.'" He therefore aims directly at showing, in simple words, the spiritual content of modern ideas of God ; of Nature as the embodiment of his power ; of universal law as the expression of his will ; of Jesus Christ as the thoroughly human spiritual leader of the race in the religion of the soul ; and of the Bible as the natural record of a progressive revelation. "Evolution as a Key" is one of the best chapters of the book. Mr. Wood touches the fundamental matter in this philosophy when he writes : "In the great everlasting cycle of creation the primal energy which God first involved into the lowest, most general, and indeterminate conditions is at length, through a series of grand steps, gathered, organized, individuated, and evolved into 'sons of God,' in which form the return is made to the 'Father's House.'" It is a distinct pleasure to find a thoughtful layman thus giving a thoroughly spiritual construction, in popular form and style, to ideas most often presented as truth to the understanding, but not as inspiration to the whole man, to build him up in righteousness of living and peace of heart.

NICHOLAS P. GILMAN.

WEST NEWTON, MASS.

Essays on English Literature. By EDMOND SCHERER. Translated by GEORGE SAINTSBURY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.50.

For something like a quarter of a century the name of Edmond Scherer has been known to a select circle as that of one of the most able and conscientious contributors to the French press on literary and philosophical subjects, his "*Etudes sur la Littérature Contemporaine*" comprising some nine volumes, to which he added a volume of "*Mélanges d'Histoire Religieuse*" and monographs on Diderot and Melchior Grimm. Taken as a whole, these volumes present us with a body of literary and philosophical criticism to which we have in English no contemporary parallel; the volumes of Mr. Matthew Arnold, with which they suggest comparison, being both less in bulk and, so far as they deal with modern literature, more limited in their range. M. Scherer's continental position may be inferred from the fact that, since the death of Sainte-Beuve in 1869, he was, among those who know, the recognized master of criticism in France, though his volumes have never attained a very wide popularity. Mr. Saintsbury has therefore done a distinct service to English readers in gathering together into one volume, and rendering accessible to us in our language, a selection of criticisms from the *Studies in Contemporary Literature* dealing exclusively with English authors.

In his Introduction, Mr. Saintsbury alludes to a story which went the rounds to the effect that a practical joker once called on several of the booksellers of Paris, stating that he was a collector of second editions of the works of famous writers, and asking for the volumes of M. Scherer's "*Studies*" in that state — something which no bookseller could provide. The anecdote is interesting as showing the Parisian estimate of M. Scherer at the time, as well as his fellowship in this respect with his friend Matthew Arnold (in his early career), and with two authors whom he discusses here with so much appreciation and sympathy, Milton and Wordsworth. The fact may be borne in mind as an element in estimating M. Scherer's intellectual attitude; it was a state of affairs likely to react somewhat upon an author. In truth, M. Scherer, except to the intimate few, always seemed more eminent than attractive as a writer, as well as otherwise. One may believe that he more than made up for the slight reserve and austerity which such a state of affairs was likely to induce by his freedom from damaging attachments, and by the warmth of his enthusiasms whenever his sympathies were adequately moved.

M. Scherer was born in 1815 of mixed parentage, his father being of Swiss descent — though the family had been domiciled in France for several generations — and his mother an Englishwoman. At the outset, therefore, we have the basis for a complexity of achievement. From fifteen to forty-five, Scherer's energies were directed chiefly to the study of theology: "first of all," as his translator says, "in the mood of boyish doubt, then for many years in that of fervent faith, then in that of rationalizing but still confident criticism, and lastly in an active and rather

painful polemic on what may be called offensive-defensive lines in regard to his own complete though gradual abandonment of definite theological belief." To this period belongs the development of which we have one record in the "*Mélanges d'Histoire Religieuse*."

After a period of juvenile nostalgia which resulted in his being sent to England, where he was for awhile in the family of a clergyman at Monmouth, young Scherer returned to Paris and engaged in the study of law and philosophy. He soon, however, determined to become a clergyman, and for this purpose entered, in his twenty-first year, on a course of theology at Strasburg. Here he eventually took his degree, married, and was ordained in 1840, being then, as he described himself, a thorough believer in "the authority of the Bible and of the Cross." He remained domiciled at Strasburg, preaching and writing hymns, but without engaging in any active pastoral work. In 1845 he was appointed to a professorship in the *Ecole Libre de Théologie* at Geneva, where he embarked on a course of teaching designed to establish a variety of unecclasiastical but orthodox Protestantism, founded solely on the Scriptures. The result might perhaps have been anticipated: M. Scherer found himself in time unable to bring what he conceived to be the scheme of Revelation into harmony with his rapidly developing necessarian and negative-Hegelian views of the philosophy of existence; and he abandoned his professorship. He did not, however, completely embrace what M. Gréard calls his *profession de foi Hegélienne* until 1860 or 1861. From this time onward he seems to have had no further theological disturbance; for the rest of his life he was increasingly a somewhat uncompromising — and even at times a little irritable — Hegelian of what is known as the left-centre school. This phase of M. Scherer's mental history helps us largely, in connection with his inherited prepossessions and the circumstances of his environment, to comprehend his point of view and gives a key to much of his criticism.

While M. Scherer was at Geneva he formed his acquaintance with Henri Frédéric Amiel, and there that mingled attitude of deference and admiration was assumed by the younger man toward the older to which we find Amiel giving expression in the "*Journal Intime*." In 1852, before M. Scherer had completely broken with the church, he writes: "I cannot, like Scherer, content myself with being in the right alone: I must have a less solitary Christianity." Again, in 1869, when Sainte-Beuve dies, "What is Scherer thinking about his life and death?" is the thought which the event suggests to Amiel. He braces himself under the uncongeniality of his position and the restlessness that possesses him with the reflection of M. Scherer: "We must accept ourselves as we are." When he almost determines that he will actually write the book his friends persist in believing him capable of, it is largely that he may please and satisfy Scherer. In comparing the work of the two, we are impressed with the perverseness of Matthew Arnold's contention that the excellence of the

"Journal" is to be sought in its literary judgments and expositions rather than in its psychology, — perhaps, on the whole, as aberrant an opinion as its distinguished author left behind him. Amiel is greater and more permanent than Scherer in nothing more than in the fact that he is a consolator and stimulator, as well as a historian, of the soul.

About the time of his profession of Hegelianism, M. Scherer returned to Paris. Domiciled at Versailles, he busied himself in writing — principally for "*Le Temps*" — on literary and philosophical subjects, and contributing regularly to the London "*Daily News*" articles on French politics. During the siege of Paris he stuck to his post, and was chosen administrator of the affairs of Versailles during the German occupation. The position was very trying, as can well be imagined, to a sensitive and high-spirited French gentleman; but he discharged its duties with admirable skill and fidelity. In return for this service, the department of *Seine-et-Oise*, when peace came, selected him as its representative. This place he resigned only to become a life-senator, retaining the distinction until his death in 1889.

M. Scherer's English blood showed itself throughout his life, in one way, in frequent excursions to London and his interest in, and knowledge of English affairs. It showed itself in another and especial way, in the quality of his genius and the attitude of his mind. "He does not judge things with his intelligence, he judges them with his character," wrote one of the younger Parisians, of M. Scherer's criticism: the characterization is just, though it was intended to express disapproval. More than once in reading these essays, one is reminded of the English writer M. Scherer so much admired, who insists that life is three-fourths conduct, and that to ignore its ethical element is to exclude one's self from a vast part of the field. Though M. Scherer's attendance upon Matthew Arnold in portions of the essay on Wordsworth is not always judicious, he strikes a note in general of which his translator, as well as M. Edouard Rod, is too careless. We cannot divest ourselves of what we are; and the attempt to do so generally reacts upon our criticism either in depriving it of vitality or in causing it to display a certain incompleteness. We shall succeed in interpreting and portraying life, only when we look upon it as men, not as if we were achromatic intellectual lenses. The Hegelian in M. Scherer never quite succeeds in extinguishing the man; to this fact these essays owe their distinctive and abiding quality.

M. Scherer's criticism, as a whole, has body as well as method, and strength and gravity as well as sparkle. The proportion of substance to froth in it is indeed un-Parisian; it is strictly English in its solidity. Despite the occasional impatience which the volume stirs in us by its omissions — an impatience due to the fact of their general great ability — these essays are a very considerable and substantial contribution to the criticism of our literature, — perhaps the most considerable single contribution that any recent essayist has given us, when we consider at once

their quality and their range. Taken altogether, they are weighty as well as lucid, they have force as well as charm, and are often as cogent as they are brilliant. If criticism on the Continent must for awhile speak to us in the language of a rather nihilistic Hegelianism, these essays may be taken to show the high-water mark to which it has attained, possibly almost the limit to which it may aspire.

Of the three hundred pages of this volume, nearly one third part is taken up with a criticism of George Eliot, the several essays treating of "Silas Marner" (1861), "Daniel Deronda" (1877), and the "Life and Letters" by Mr. Cross (1885). Here we have M. Scherer, though not exactly at his best, certainly at his most appreciative. We may demur to his assertion that for George Eliot "was reserved the honor of writing the most perfect novels as yet known," and to the prediction that "she will have no successor; because we shall never again see the qualities of the thinker so combined with those of the artist," and suspect that this judgment is colored a little by the writer's sympathy with his author's mental history. He shows himself a trifle careless of a warning he himself has uttered in another place as to the possibility of danger to art and criticism from philosophical prepossessions. At the same time we are unaware of another criticism of their subject, within a similar compass, of equal interest and importance. M. Scherer is probably disclosing to us the motives that underlie his personal attitude when he tells us in the essay suggested by "Silas Marner," that what the reader "consciously or unconsciously seeks in a novel, what attracts or repels him in it, is, if we follow it home, the philosophy which is expressed there." To this fact we may attribute somewhat of M. Scherer's success in treating of this author. In any case it would be difficult to find elsewhere one hundred pages in which so much is told us of George Eliot, so freshly and discriminatingly, as in the three essays here devoted to her. They are, on the whole, the most suggestive, and at the same time sympathetic, criticism of their subject which critical literature has to show.

The pages on "Stuart Mill" are interesting as they throw light on M. Scherer's political and philosophical attachments; but any attempt to touch upon them would carry us too far afield, and M. Scherer's after-development, philosophically and politically, does not appear to have been quite at one with the positions here enunciated. The essay is suggestive both in itself, and as showing that M. Scherer's excursions at Strasburg and Geneva had taken him with some thoroughness into the fields of metaphysical inquiry. Here his superiority to Matthew Arnold is strongly marked, and this also appears in his treatment of problems of theology; but in neither case does his faculty seem to be monumental.

Of the essays on Shakespeare the first was suggested by M. Mézières's volumes; the second by contributions to Shakespearean literature from M. Montegu and Herr Rümelin. Taken together, the papers traverse in an altogether sane and admirable way pretty much the whole field of re-

cent Shakespearean criticism upon the continent, and give us something to think about, even where we are constrained to differ from their conclusions. No English-speaking reader will be quite content with the summing up of the first essay, in which M. Scherer tells us, with some *naïveté*, that "Shakespeare has enlarged the domain of the mind, and, take him all in all," he does "not believe that any man has added more than he has to the patrimony of mankind." This last sentence again, from the second essay, will not pass without a murmur: "Goethe, who is assuredly not so mighty a genius as Shakespeare, is a genius of greater extent and universality." This surely is a question upon which there is room for two opinions, and, above all, for a definition of the meaning of terms. We have here probably another evidence of the Hegelian and the contemporary in M. Scherer's point of view — an element not advantageous to his critical endowment. There is something a trifle constrained and distrustful at times in these essays — excellent as they are in general — towards the chief luminary in the poetical heavens of Christendom, which jars a little on the English ear. We do not like to have our gods handled with too consciously qualified an enthusiasm when they are of such undoubted authenticity and of such cosmopolitan acceptance.

The essay in which M. Scherer's equipment is at its best and his result is the most conclusive — the strongest, the most cogently coherent utterance in the volume — is the criticism of M. Taine's "History of English Literature." Not only in this instance is the author criticised a fellow-countryman, but the evil attacked is also contemporary and pressing. M. Scherer throws himself upon his subject with emotion, and for once the critic ceases to be restrained, and stirs in us a reflex of his feeling. Nowhere else is M. Scherer's skill so well tested, and nowhere else does he emerge from the contest more successfully. Nowhere else in this volume does he take himself so profoundly, unless in his almost faultless analysis of the elements of humor in the essay on Sterne and in portions of that on Wordsworth. The fault of M. Scherer's always serious volume, if it has a prevailing fault, is in its maintenance of almost too forbearing an attitude. It is almost aggressively complacent: it is necessary to remind ourselves once in a while that *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner* may be pushed too far until it becomes a heresy in literature, as in ethics. Even in his treatment of M. Taine we feel that, admirable as the essay is, it might have been still more admirable had not M. Scherer's urbanity tampered a little with his convictions — had he, in fact, but permitted himself to indulge in as trenchant a criticism of principles as he has given us of methods and results. M. Taine himself is so little patient with our beliefs and foibles and philosophies, that to treat his *lacunæ* with rigor is but to serve him with his own confection.

M. Scherer does not, sometimes, take himself quite profoundly enough; he has drawn some of the coverts of existence a little hurriedly, persuading himself too lightly that there is nothing there. This is the case espe-

cially with his estimate of Carlyle. Mr. Saintsbury, in one of his volumes on French literature, spoke unthinkingly of M. Scherer as "an untrustworthy judge of anything but the commonplace," — an expression which properly excited M. Scherer's ire: its author explains that he meant simply that the great critic's attachments shut him out from sympathy with the good in anything that appeared at first sight to be bizarre or hyperfervid. The ire may, in part, have arisen from a sub-conscious conviction of truth in the criticism so awkwardly expressed. Certainly M. Scherer misconstrues and misconceives in the case of Carlyle: his estimate of the man, of his attitude, and of the scope and influence of his work — despite some luminous paragraphs — is either wrong or insufficient. It is as perverse almost — it is quite as inconclusive — as Mr. Froude's estimate. Here the personal equation, as well as the mould Hegelian, plainly threatened danger, and the outcome was, probably, inevitable.

The essay on Milton has long been familiar to English readers through the praise it received from Matthew Arnold. Though one may not quite incline to rank it as high as that critic, or as Mr. Saintsbury, it is nevertheless an admirable piece of work, — perhaps, next to the essay on M. Taine, the most distinctive in the volume. We miss an occasional reference that our familiarity with the subject leads us to expect; the poetical selections are less happy than the quotations from the prose works; but, on the whole, it is as well conceived as could be, and almost as admirably carried out. There is more splendor in M. Scherer's style here than in any other essay, and more movement than is visible elsewhere, except in the paper on Taine. Despite the differences of their environment, there is much common to the great Puritan poet and his critic — the moral seriousness, the chastity, the restraint, the dissatisfaction with prevalent ideals, the noble theoretical republicanism, the elevation of mind which communicated itself to the style, even the rapt and glowing if somewhat austere idealism. The consequence is a study as near perfection almost as the author anywhere attains, though one should close his eyes to its tilt against the Puritan cosmology, and its charge of impossibility brought against the subject, incidental to the Parisian temperament. It stands out from the cool and more chastened tints of the body of the book like a piece of purple radiance. If in the essays on George Eliot we have M. Scherer's philosophy in its least constrained expression, we have here and in the essay on Wordsworth M. Scherer himself in his happiest and most congenial vein, since he is occupied with a subject which appeals to him profoundly.

The fifteen pages devoted to Lord Beaconsfield's "Endymion" have their chief interest in the novel light they throw upon M. Scherer's personality, disclosing his familiarity with contemporary English affairs of the political order. There remains the essay on Wordsworth and "Modern Poetry," the most ambitious and the most elaborately worked-out in the volume. It contains an estimate of Wordsworth, and an analysis of

poetry and the relation of Wordsworth to his *entourage*. In the last portion most of the best things are to be found. M. Scherer is more at home with the setting of Wordsworth than with his poetry; or, rather, he treats the setting more adequately and more profoundly. His philosophy of literature is here of conspicuous and commanding advantage to him, — a philosophy of literature widely distinguished from M. Taine's by its fidelity to facts and by its saneness. One is, indeed, not always constrained to follow M. Scherer in his estimate of the comparative importance of three or four of the poets upon whose work he touches. Keats he perhaps belittles; and one would like to hear his argument for placing Shelley above Wordsworth in certain points, after all the hostile batteries had been discharged. Of Tennyson he is conspicuously appreciative: "If he is not superior in strength or grandeur to Shelley, the metal of his poetry is purer, its workmanship is more ingenious and more exquisite, the work taken as a whole is of a more surprising variety. Tennyson possesses a consummate science of rhythm, the rarest resources of phrase, taste, grace, distinction, every sort of cleverness, of research, of refinement. He is the author of lyric pieces unequalled in any language, some of infinite delicacy, some of engrossing pathos, some quivering like the blast of a knightly horn. He lacks only one thing, one supreme gift — the pinion-stroke which sweeps Ganymede into the empyrean, and casts him panting at the feet of Jove."

Nowhere else in our language has the achievement of Lord Tennyson been so succinctly, so fitly, so judiciously, and at the same time so magnificently sounded. If it is the highest function of criticism to say most admirably what can truthfully be said of the best work of its subject; if the object of the critic is to present to us his subject at its highest and challenge our interest and admiration; if, in short, criticism is to be considered the final court of appeal in things pertaining to literature, and the anticipation of the lasting verdict of the best seeking for the best, — then within its limits this judgment of M. Scherer cannot be improved. In the case of Shakespeare, Milton, and Wordsworth, the note of sincerity and appreciation is not so firmly sounded. Nowhere else, except in the essays on George Eliot, does M. Scherer place himself so unrestrainedly in the power of his subject. The explanation may not be very far to seek: Lord Tennyson has all that is implied in a consummate mastery of the technique of his art, and he thus appeals strongly to the French imagination. Admirable as is M. Scherer's estimate of Wordsworth, it fails precisely as that of Matthew Arnold fails: it does not say the best, the final word. If we want to know what can be said for Wordsworth, we must still read Dean Church, R. H. Hutton, Principal Shairp, and F. W. Robertson; above all, we must read Swinburne. M. Scherer's essay does not advance the highest permissible claim for Wordsworth, much as it has to say for him; we miss explicit reference to Wordsworth's best, his most inimitable things. In opening he alludes to the

difficulty in presenting extracts from a foreign poet; the subtle charm which attaches to the form of his work is almost certain to evaporate in translation, especially when the idiom of two languages is so unlike as is the case with French and English. If the translator disregard the form and present only the sense or the thought of his author, he robs his subject of its most characteristic, its least dispensable distinction. But, making allowance for this, I find no reference in M. Scherer's study to "The Leech-Gatherer," the "Lines suggested by a Picture of Peele Castle," or "The Affliction of Margaret," — poems in which Wordsworth's muse strikes her wings into the empyrean. The reason can scarcely be their insusceptibility to translation, since sublimity of passion makes itself felt even through the least congenial rendering; and at least one of these poems is capable of profoundly impressing the imagination when rendered into prose. The point is worth alluding to, in view of M. Scherer's singular preference of Lamartine to Wordsworth on the score of the Frenchman's "greater tragedy of sentiment and sublimity of expression" — a preference which he supports with a sufficiently strange quotation.

But it is ungrateful to emphasize these omissions of a volume in which there is so much to charm as well as edify and instruct. M. Scherer is as superior to his shortcomings as he is generally to his national predilections. To the urbanity and lucidity of the Parisian he adds the thoroughness of the German and the sanity of the Briton, and that breadth and serenity which comes of familiarity with the verdicts of the minds of men in many ages. There is a freshness and clearness in his treatment of nearly every subject which we shall seek in vain in any contemporary English essayist. "He had," says M. Gréard, "some exaltations of intellectual satisfaction when he had arrived at proving the insufficiency of the common explanation;" and though M. Scherer's nihilism led him once in a while into vagaries of judgment that it would, perhaps, be difficult to justify, he had this peculiarity in a golden vessel, which, on the whole, he bore steadily. Never did he indulge in destructive criticism for itself alone; and rarely, indeed, did he permit himself the luxury of the nihilistic attitude. Rather does his impatience of existing standards act as an æstrum to incite him to attempt a profounder, a more satisfying treatment. If he pulls down, it is in order that he may reërect with truer, finer, and more commanding outlines. In contrast to Matthew Arnold, he had, and he assiduously cultivated, the historic sense. He recognized the influence of its environment upon genius, and refused to attempt to sum up its achievement apart from its surroundings or apart from its historical perspective. In his criticism we find not only a luminous treatment of single authors; we find also a satisfactory account of their relation to those who preceded, and those who came after — a rehabilitation of their literary *entourages*. Above all things, we find a profound philosopher of life as well as literature, who strives to trace things home to their origins and causes.

An extract from the essay on Wordsworth, so appreciative, and so full of unlooked-for recognition from what is an unexpected quarter as to call for congratulation, will fitly close this review. M. Scherer is writing of the conditions in human society which tend to bring about, as it were, a regeneration of mankind's poetic patrimony, and to impress upon it a new configuration : —

There is no country of our time where the succession of poetical masters, and with them of poetical influences, tastes, schools, and methods, has been so rapid as it has been in England. The reason is that (contrary to the notions of our Continental ignorance) the English are the most poetical nation in Europe, and, what is more, that Englishmen, reading much more than we do, are much more subject to the needs of change of which I spoke just now. In France we have not got beyond Byron. . . . But the English are long past Byronism.

This closing sentence gives us M. Scherer's return upon himself, and expresses his final verdict on Shakespeare and Wordsworth : —

If Shakespeare, as I hold, remains absolutely and forever peerless, Wordsworth seems to me to come after Milton ; decidedly, I think, below him, but still first after him. He is of the stuff whereof the immortals are made.

WILLIAM HIGGS.

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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

The issue of the "Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie," for April, 1892, is entirely occupied with an article by Dr. R. A. Lipsius, one of the editors, on "Luther's Doctrine of Repentance." Köstlin and Ritschl have maintained that the original question as to Repentance discussed by the reformers was : "How does the regenerated man, the *Christian*, who is troubled about his sin become certain of its forgiveness?" In other words, the question was of the Christian's personal assurance of the condition of grace despite the sin from which he cannot free himself, and not of the so-called *conversio impii*, the conversion of the unbeliever to the Christian faith. Now it is well known that Melancthon in "The Apology" completed the extension of the original conception of repentance to the *conversio impii*, or to conversion in general. Expression was thus given to the conviction that the process in the conversion of the non-Christian was essentially the same as in the continuous Christian repentance extending throughout the whole life, that is, that the fundamental form of repentance is not the so-called *pœnitentia evangelica*, but the *pœnitentia legalis*. Although this has generally been regarded down to the present time as good evangelical Lutheran doctrine, Ritschl and his school have not only vigorously

opposed it, but have sought to establish historically the view that it is not supported by the great reformer's teaching. It is argued that, in opposition to the *pœnitentia legalis*, the *pœnitentia evangelica* was, according to Luther's original opinion, as well the beginning as the abiding form of Christian repentance. According to Ritschl, John Agricola was the defender of the original doctrine, and called attention to "the principle repeatedly expressed by Luther" that conversion, particularly the terror of conscience pertaining to it, proceeds from grace, that is, from love of righteousness. Agricola's opposition to Melancthon is comprised in the two propositions, that by his preaching of the law he prejudiced Christian freedom, and that he derived repentance rather from fear of punishment than from love of righteousness. Accordingly, he joined in the general cry that Melancthon should "crawl back." For while the gospel preaches first the satisfaction of Christ and the manner in which we should repent, the Pope rather teaches that in order to become worthy of grace one must first regard and confess one's sins. Melancthon applied the term *fides* to *justificanti fidei ac consolanti nos in his terroribus*, while including the *fides generalis* under the name of *pœnitentia*. But Ritschl interprets this *fides generalis* as a "saving faith," and understands by it an attraction of the heart by the saving power of God, a recognition of the worth of God for the salvation of man from which the denial of sin can alone proceed. Thus he comes to the conclusion that the requirement of Melancthon to preach first the law in order to awaken the terrors of conscience, and then faith, was a falling away from the original doctrine.

After critically examining the views of Harnack, Loos and Hermann, who substantially agree with Ritschl in the interpretation of Luther's doctrine of repentance, Lipsius proceeds to an exhaustive discussion of this doctrine based upon a thorough study of the writings of the master considered in chronological order, beginning with his teaching before the indulgence-contest in 1513. It is shown that Luther referred the repentance that John the Baptist required, not to the love inspired by grace, but expressly to the preaching of the law which convicts man of the guilt of his sin, and threatens him with the judgment of God. The repentance in question is not at all confined to Christian repentance, but concerns John's preaching, which was directed to Jews, that is, to unregenerate men. To break the pride of the man who fancies that he has fulfilled the law is the *opus alienum* of the gospel. Lipsius finds that the thought that repentance proceeds not from the law but from love of goodness is not only quite remote from this teaching, but is as much as possible excluded by it. He sees in Luther's teaching a sharp distinction between *damnum* or *culpa* and *pudor* and *pœna* in sin. Luther complains that men fear punishment more than guilt, and holds that only those can obtain forgiveness of sin who bemoan and repent of their *guilt*. From an examination of numerous passages in his commentary

on Galatians the conclusion is drawn that nowhere does he treat of the daily repentance of the Christian and just as little of the *pœnitentia sacramentalis*, but of the *conversio impii*, of the conversion of men under the law and sin to faith in the justifying and life-giving grace. The dread produced by the law appears to be, in fact, the fundamental experience in the originating of faith, so far as the pedagogy of the law awakens the longing for salvation. In the German "Sermon on the Sacrament of Repentance," 1519, Luther declares that for the reception of absolution there are required a troubled heart which desires the consolation of forgiveness, and the faith that lays hold upon this consolation with firm confidence in the truth of the Divine word. But faith cannot exist where man is not troubled and disturbed in his sins. Him, then, who has not felt the need of the consolation one must shake "with the terrible judgment of God." If Luther had held that repentance does not arise from the fear of punishment, but from love of righteousness, he would, Lipsius thinks, have given expression to the latter doctrine here, where the question is: "How comes the sinner to seek the consolation of the Divine grace, and how does the faith originate which lays hold upon this consolation?" In the second commentary on Galatians, 1535, Luther expresses himself clearly on the relation of the law and the gospel. "Man must first be instructed by the law, learn to know his sin. If he is thus humiliated through the law and made to recognize his sin, then is he penitent, then true repentance begins from fear and the judgment of God, and he knows that by his own power he cannot become free from his sin. Thence spring the longing and the sighing for help. Now is come the right time for the healing word of the gospel: 'Believe, my son, thy sins are forgiven thee!'"

In the "Nineteenth Century" for July, the distinguished astronomer, Mr. J. Norman Lockyer, has a very suggestive article on "The Astronomy and Mythology of the Ancient Egyptians." One should be both an astronomer and an Egyptologist to pass a judgment of weight on Mr. Lockyer's positions; we simply state here a few of these. He concludes that the goddess Hathor certainly personified Sirius rising at the dawn. "There is evidence that many of the goddesses under discussion personified stars in exactly the same way that Hathor personified Sirius. . . . All these goddesses have a special symbol. Many are represented as Isis nursing Horus. . . . Some of the gods symbolized setting stars." Mr. Lockyer thus concludes:—

"I trust that I have shown so far as I can in a short article that there is, in all probability, a close connection between the mythology of the ancient Egyptians and the observations of bodies rising and setting, which they, like all the other early nations, had to make for the uses of their daily life. It will also, I think, have been perfectly clear that space has only permitted me to make two or three suggestions; I have by no means attempted to exhaust even any one of the small number of

subjects which I have brought forward, but if I have succeeded so far as I have gone, it will be abundantly evident that, if these inquiries are worth continuing, a very considerable amount of work has to be done. On the one hand, the astronomer must produce a table of the rising and setting conditions of the stars for periods far beyond those which have already been considered. The Germans have compiled a table of the places of a great many stars up to 2000 B. C., but to carry on this investigation we must certainly go back to 5000 B. C.; and while the astronomer is doing this, the Egyptologist on his part must look through the inscriptions with reference to the suggestions which lie on the surface of the inquiry. A very important part of that work will, I think, consist in arranging tables of synonyms like those to which I have referred in the case of the goddesses. My own impression is that this work will not really be so laborious as the statement of it might seem to imply. I have attempted to go over the ground during the last two years as well as my ignorance would allow me, and I have arrived at the impression that the number both of gods and goddesses will be found to be extremely small; that the apparent wealth of the mythology depends upon the totemism of the inhabitants in the Nile valley, by which I mean that each district had its own special animal as the emblem of the tribe dwelling in that locality, and that every mythological personage had to be connected in some way with these local cults. After this work is done, it will be possible to begin to answer some of the questions very definitely, which I have only ventured to suggest in this article, and only from the astronomical side. It is important to insist upon this, as the gods of the Egyptian pantheon may have been many-sided in their origin and may have possessed earthly as well as heavenly relations. Thus, for instance, the inundation was Osiris, the black earth Isis; but whichever was the first idea, the terrestrial one or that I have discussed in this article, there is no disagreement between them. We have the land appearing from the earthly waters in one case, the sun and stars appearing from the celestial waters in the other; Isis still represents the idea of rising or becoming visible, Osiris of disappearing; we still have perfect consistency."

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THE POSITION AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BRAHMO SOMAJ.

THE word "theism" has come into conventional disrepute. All religious bodies require a historical label. Unless one can give a denominational reference, one's religious respectability is very apt to be questioned. Cannot a simple faith in the Spirit-God, however, and a worship proceeding from natural impulses, alone or in company with men similarly stirred, using the words of the vernacular, and forms that have not yet hardened into liturgy, lead to truly religious results? Is organization the result of impulse, or is impulse the result of organization? This question rises at once when we reflect what elaborate machinery of dogma, ritual and polity seems to have become necessary to preserve the remnants of spiritual force in religious denominations of all kinds. The Brahmo Somaj proceeds to answer this question. As every Mussulman turns his face to Mecca at the time of the five daily devotions, so every religion turns its face to the past, to the old; the present is void, the future is a repetition. Under the pressure of circumstance, we here have begun the dangerous experiment of casting our lot with the present, turning our faces to the future, calling men of different races and creeds into a common brotherhood, and looking up to God for new light, a new departure, a new dispensation.

How far have we succeeded? The Brahmo Somaj was founded on a very unpretentious basis. Two thirds of it formed a protest against the polytheistic creed prevailing round about, and one

third only was a simple monotheism, a mere mustard-seed of affirmative faith, of weekly worship of the One without a second. Raja Ram Mohun Roy, at an ill-lighted house on a dusty thoroughfare at Jorasanko in Calcutta, met a handful of land-owning Bengali millionaires, with flowing robes, voluminous turbans, and Oriental perfumes. A few Vedic verses were chanted, a few improvised hymns were sung, and then the congregation dispersed. Apparently there was not much promise or potency of life in a movement of this kind. The orthodox ridiculed; the Christian missionaries looked down with contempt; the masses took no notice. Sixty-one years have passed; storms have beaten, floods have risen; and after passing through varied fortunes, we still stand here to day. It cannot be said that we have steadily pushed forward; it cannot be said that we have always presented an edifying example; but it can be said that we have survived our trials, and we look forward in the enthusiasm of hope and faith. We are a new society, a new church; our households are new; our relations to our countrymen and to other religions are novel; our moral aspirations are not those of old, we deal with our government in a newness of spirit; on most matters our position is singular. All this newness of life has arisen from simple faith in the Spirit-God, spontaneous worship, and unconstrained love of our fellow-men.

Perhaps many in America are aware that the Brahmo Somaj is now divided in sections, whose mutual relations are not most cordial. Wherever there is a break of this kind, it gives a wrench to the pleasant understandings of life. But, in the long run, things accommodate themselves to their surroundings, and we find a purpose where there was nothing but darkness before. Twenty-five years ago our first separation was unpleasant enough, but the Brahmo Somaj would never have become what it is now except for that lamented rupture. Thirteen years ago the second separation took place, and it was more unpleasant than the first. But now that all the purposes have been exhibited, and all the facts are before us, we find that here also the cloud has a silver lining. The three Somajes, with their corresponding societies in the provinces, stand on well-defined lines, and, if they will faithfully and steadily proceed on these lines, they will not only do important work, but be a source of strength to each other. The disagreeable effects of personal disunion are now wearing away with time; possible and actual grounds of coöperation are appearing; mutual

respect and sympathy are growing; and the union attempted a little while ago must some day become an accomplished fact. I have no doubt that our friends in Europe and America will look upon such a reconciliation as a new departure for the world-wide cause of theism. The Adi Brahmo Somaj is the original church from which we seceded in 1865; at its head there still presides the venerable Devendra Nath Tagore, the direct successor and disciple of Raja Ram Mohun Roy, our patriarch, our *Pradham Acharya* (chief minister), our beloved *Maharshi* (the great sage). Far past the allotted period of threescore years and ten, but bearing the weight of his great age with undiminished power of mind and soul, though nearly blind and deaf, hoary, tall, and refined in face, he is constantly absorbed in contemplation. Every one who approaches him feels exalted above the world's meanness and materialism, and realizes that the age of saints and seers has not yet passed away. Under him, the Adi Brahmo Somaj has always retained a national Hindu spirit, in agreeable contrast with the semi-Anglicized radicalism which we younger men have imbibed. The literary culture, the poetic devotion, the classical Sanskrit spirit and the æsthetic refinement which have always formed its leader's strong points, are objects of imitation to the whole community.

With the Bramo Somaj of India, the Church of the New Dispensation, of which Keshub Chunder Sen was the leader, I have such close relations that I would rather not say much about it. We are not in a prosperous condition just now. But our leaders and elders are the most prominent men in the Brahmo Somaj. One thing, however, I must say. The shadow of unpopularity which for a brief while obscured his reputation has now nearly passed away, and Keshub Chunder Sen, my beloved friend and master, now stands before the whole Brahmo Somaj a glorious figure, honored, admired and imitated by all. Even his opponents bear most cordial testimony to his transcendent worth; his character has risen above every division and disagreement. The Sadharan Brahmo Somaj is the youngest. Its youth, vigor and usefulness have impressed the public of Calcutta. All the old differences are not healed yet, all the old fears are not entirely gone; but, speaking for myself, I am bound to acknowledge that my brethren of the Sadharan Brahmo Somaj, by steady effort in several directions, have won for themselves a place which I hope will be lasting. The future of the Brahmo Somaj cause lies

very much in their hands. As their experience increases and their spirits sober down, there will be less and less cause for criticism. Even now they represent the energy, activity and public spirit for which the Brahmo Somaj has always been distinguished. May the guidance of the Spirit of God rest with them! If all the piety, purity and culture in the three Brahmo Somajes could be combined to serve the common cause, or any large common interest, it would be a tremendous moral force. For no other Indian community can count among its ranks men and women with the education, the refinement, the spirit, courage and experience possessed by the members of the various Brahmo Somajes. There are differences among them; it would be unnatural if there were not; but there is ground on which a very real and very wide union could be effected. Our future undoubtedly lies in the direction of such a union.

When a great national life is in transition, moral principles, too, suffer change. What this means exactly cannot be fully understood by people whose standards of right and wrong have been fixed by long ages of religious experience and progress. India is just now in such a state of transition; the very first principles of moral character have been unsettled by all kinds of revolutionary teaching from the West. Hindu standards are discounted; Christian standards are yet to be established. Doctrines of utility, worldliness, and self-indulgence are planting themselves, like microbes, in a social organism denuded of definite principles. All sorts of extreme reaction run riot where a vigorous conservatism has begun to decline. The reproach generally laid at the door of the educated Hindu is that he lacks healthy moral principle. Hence the Brahmo Somaj has had, and now has, to do ceaseless battle with moral radicalism of every variety. Every one who has broken loose from orthodox restraints is apt to claim kinship with us. We are in constant danger of being overrun by an army of free lances who owe allegiance to no cause except the spirit of social change. We Brahmo Somaj men suffer in reputation from all this irregularity. As in the case of the early Christians, practices are imputed to us which are abhorrent to every instinct of our nature.

The moral attitude of our movement has to be firm, austere, and sometimes fanatical. Brahmos have often been unpopular because of their stoicism. We believe in a puritanic morality. If we are liberal, we are accused of laxity. If we are stern, we

are reproached as bigots. The middle way is always difficult. Our leading men are dressed in coarse, primitive garb, and they are teetotalers as a rule. Most of them are vegetarians; they seldom remarry if they happen to lose their wives. These practices are not formally taught, but they are enforced by personal example. As the movement has a numerous membership, there is some variation in practice now and then; but there is a general agreement as to the necessity of rigid adherence to well-tried rules of conduct. Such rules, to be consistent with the spirit of the times and the possibilities of the future, require time, trial and experience, — perhaps sorrow and disappointment also; but, that the moral position of the Brahmo Somaj may be secure, it is necessary that our personal and social principles should be definitely formed, amidst the perpetual changes on all sides. The most recent movement in which we are engaged is the moral training of the students of the colleges of Calcutta. In this city there are about four thousand young men who deserve our utmost attention in the matter of higher training. But as they do not all belong to the Brahmo Somaj, it is a work which has to be done on a perfectly unsectarian basis. We began two years ago, and the Hindu leaders and the English officials have with equal graciousness joined this Society for the Higher Training of Young Men. Here, we hope, an undenominational basis will be laid from which definite standards of moral character will be gradually upreared, in harmony with the demands of the age, and the requirements of strict religious life. The work of the Brahmo Somaj is moral and social culture along with religious reform.

Every one expresses impatience at the condition of the Indian woman, for instance. She has been the victim of a civilization, or semi-civilization, controlled by foreign conquerors who had little respect for ancient Hindu usages. For the seclusion and repression of woman have never been principles of the national religion. Even now, where Mohammedan rule is not enforced in cruel severity, Hindu women are comparatively free: the whole region known as Maharashtra is evidence. The Brahmin housewife of Poona tramps about the thoroughfares in heavy anklets and substantial red slippers; in the domestic arrangements and the affairs of the neighborhood she exercises a will-force imperious and aggressive. Dozens of texts are often quoted from Manu declaring that where woman is honored, the Devatas are propitiated and love to dwell. Despite, however, all that has been said for

and against the condition of the Indian woman, the fact remains that she deserves more attention, more service, more elevation than we have given her. The Brahmo Somaj has girded itself to deal with this fact. During the last thirty years, various agencies have been started for female education. Societies, both religious and literary, have been established, schools founded, lectures given, journals and books published, and training households opened for the benefit of women. From these many and steady efforts considerable results have followed. The Brahmanee is not yet all that she should be, but she is certainly on the way of progress. Our wives and sisters may be said to belong to the elder generation of Brahmo Somaj ladies; but a new generation has now appeared on the scene. Our daughters and daughters-in-law are the newcomers. Not knowing what other model to adopt, we are training them very much on the European model; we are giving them university education, sending them up to the public examinations with the boys. These girls compete with surprising success. We have, I think, more than a dozen lady graduates in and about the Brahmo Somaj, and all of them passed by hard, honest work. But there is a feeling in our heart of hearts that this is by no means the right method for the education of woman. What is the right method? A mere artistic, rhetorical education, with a little cooking here, and a little knitting there, is superficial, and soon disappears. A mere cram, a mere sham of public examination, — and this is all our University does here, — is equally superficial, and very much more tiring. A system that cannot adapt itself to sexes and circumstances is a slavery; a freedom that cannot realize itself in an intelligible system is a delusion. We have not been able yet to reconcile these two extremes, and I should like very much to know how other communities have done.

I must take the liberty to observe here that there is a growing distrust of European models among our thoughtful men. European systems do very well in Europe; thus far they have not done very well in the East. Japan is an instance. The people have an ideal temperament, national freedom, and a power of imitation that is inimitable. They are happy, clever, well-to-do and free. Their awakening dates back to the time when English education took a firm root among us. Yet what originality, what solid development, has this boundless imitation of Western ideals produced? The same question might be asked about some of our

“emancipated” women in Bombay and Bengal. National models, due to national instincts, can alone furnish the solution. What will stir these instincts? A profound personal religion. An intensely spiritual ministration is the most powerful educational agency on earth. I do not oppose modern methods, but I maintain that religious culture should idealize these methods so that they may adapt themselves to the peculiarities of persons, peoples and circumstances. I pray and trust that, amidst all this clamor about “female emancipation,” we may not forget that the reform of the Hindu home is the real object we have in view. The home and the congregation are the lesser and larger dimensions of the same divine relationship. The church cannot be purified while the home remains impure and unhappy. We are a very indigent people; for long, long years there is no prospect of wealth, even of comfort. What other influence or culture can help us, save that which consecrates poverty into blessedness, and sheds the consolation of love and trust in God?

As I have intimated, the Brahmo Somaj is slowly building up a new society around itself. The loosening of the old caste system has now been effected to some extent among some classes quite as much by the influence of European education as by reforms similar to our own. Our population being very vast, nowhere else so much as in India has society been classified, and nowhere else are the classes so stereotyped in their habits and heredity. A ruinous anarchy would result if all the castes were to be suddenly broken, mixed up, and fused into a social conglomerate. Nay, such a process would be impossible, because not only the highest but the lowest castes would resist it, mutual respect and dislike forming equally strong forces of repulsion. Whatever we may have to say for or against an indiscriminate fusion, every one is agreed that the different castes and orders should come closer and form a brotherhood. In some parts of the country the old rigid rules about food and association have relaxed, and members of the Brahmo Somaj—wherever they go, and whoever comes to them—give and receive a brotherly welcome of the warmest kind. Even Europeans and Mohammedans have penetrated a part of the crust of the old society. About a dozen cases of Hindus marrying English wives have been known in Bengal. It cannot be said, however, that these alliances have been uniformly happy. They indicate a tendency. It must not be understood that only the Brahmo Somaj encourages such exper-

iments: the large and growing community of educated Hindus supports them. In an underhand way, reforms of all kinds find sympathy, though our people have done more, perhaps, than others to formulate and legalize them. It remains, however, to be seen how these heterodoxies will work in the long run. For my own part, though always advocating freedom, I am for preserving certain necessary distances; let society, then, arrange itself into a natural perspective. Nevertheless, the fullest and most unrestricted intercourse between the different classes must be encouraged, so that opportunity may be given to every germ of worth and excellence to grow into its right proportions. Such a free scope for social development always finds out the innate weakness and strength of men. The law of survival applies to the formation of a new society. It is a curious fact that the leading men of the Brahmo Somaj in every section, almost without exception so far, come from the three highest castes, though our rank and file include men of all castes, even some Moham-medans. It should be our principle to proceed in this matter as slowly and carefully as possible, leaving Time, the arch-architect, to build, shape, and modify the materials according to the intelligence and needs of the people. It is of the utmost importance that we ourselves should not get contracted into a caste, but keep our sympathies and courses open for all future contingencies. In America you have had great experience of the difficulty of controlling a multiform society. Have you been able to digest and assimilate all the nationalities you have received from Europe, Asia, and Africa? Heterogeneous as you are, your work is light compared with the variety of races, creeds, interests and customs which we must influence. Centuries only can accomplish the work. Let me quote here the eloquent words of Lord Dufferin shortly before the termination of his brilliant viceregal career:—

India is an empire equal in size, if Russia be excluded, to the entire continent of Europe, with a population of two hundred and fifty million souls. This population is composed of a large number of distinct nationalities, professing various religions, practicing diverse rites, speaking different languages. The Census Report says there are one hundred and six different tongues, — not dialects, mind you, — of which eighteen are spoken by more than a million persons, while many of them are still further separated from each other by discordant prejudices, by conflicting social usages, and even antagonistic material interests. Perhaps the most potent peculiarity of our Indian “Cosmos” is its division into two

mighty political communities, — the Hindus, numbering one hundred and ninety millions; and the Mohammedans, a nation of fifty millions. To these great divisions must be added a host of minor nationalities, — though minor is a misleading term, since most of them may be numbered by millions, — who, though some are included in the two broader categories I have mentioned, are as completely differentiated from each other as are the Hindus from the Mohammedans : such as the Sikhs, with their warlike habits and traditions, and their theocratic enthusiasm; the Rhillas, the Pathuns, the Assamese, and the Biluchis, and the other wild and martial tribes on our frontiers; the hillmen dwelling in the folds of the Himalayas; our subjects in Burma, Mongol in race and Buddhist in religion; the Khonds, Maris, and Bhils, and other non-Aryan peoples in the centre and south of India; and the enterprising Parsis, with their rapidly developing manufactures and commercial interests. Again, amongst these numerous communities may be found at one and the same moment all the various stages of civilization through which mankind has passed from the prehistoric ages to the present day. At one end of the scale we have the naked, savage hillman, with his stone weapons, his head-hunting, his polyandrous habits and his childish superstitions; and at the other, the Europeanized native gentleman, with his refinement and polish, his literary culture, his Western philosophy and his advanced political ideas. While between the two lie, layer upon layer, or in close juxtaposition, wandering communities, with their flocks of goats and moving tents; collections of undisciplined warriors, with their blood-feuds, their clan organization and loose tribal government; feudal chiefs and barons, with their picturesque retainers, their seignorial jurisdiction and their mediæval modes of life; and modernized country gentlemen and enterprising merchants and manufacturers, with their well-managed estates and prosperous enterprises. Besides all these, who are under our direct administration, the government of India is required to exercise a certain amount of supervision over the one hundred and seventeen native states, with their princely rulers, their autocratic executives, their independent jurisdictions and their fifty millions of inhabitants. The mere enumeration of these diversified elements must suggest to the most unimaginative mind a picture of as complicated a social and political organization as has ever tasked human ingenuity to govern and administer.

The inference from my previous statements is easily made that the theology of the Brahmo Somaj is of the simplest kind. During the last quarter of a century there has been a vast outpouring of the speculations and ideas of religious thinkers into this country. The orthodox and the heterodox of the Christian communion have exploited India. From Cardinal Newman to Theodore Parker, every one has tried to do his best for us. As Indian

jute and cotton are exported to Europe, to come back to us in fine fabrics of greater value; so the raw material of Hindu theology has gone to Germany and France, and come back to us manufactured into new systems. There is a New Buddhism, a New Hinduism, and even something like a New Islam, competing for the acceptance of New India. Members of the Brahmo Somaj have more or less sympathy with all these teachings, but we have not yet been able to codify them into theological forms equally acceptable to all. Our views on the nature and attributes of God are distinct enough in their main outlines; but, in the stir of the times, so many studies and such diverse subjects enter into the composition of advanced belief that the so-called "new theology" is yet an unsolved problem of the age. Theology too often means criticism, — historical, metaphysical or scientific. Endless discussions of creeds and Scriptures make up what is commonly called the science of religion. It is impossible to abstain from these discussions entirely, but the Brahmo Somaj has seemed disposed to regard them as somewhat unprofitable.

The theological problem in every modern church appears to lie between two opposite difficulties. A lack of definiteness and authority takes away from the solidity of religious training, while overmuch dogmatism and obtrusive authority clog the free fullness of spiritual thought, obscure the lines of progress, and not rarely outrage common sense. Boundless, reckless individuality, and an unthinking defiance of the "stream of tendency," constitute the double difficulty of which I write. We still retain our old basis of simple theism, with the universal doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of men. But on this basis affirmative ideas about God, the soul, creation, accountability, sin, judgment, revelation, incarnation, prayer, ritual, spiritual life, church organization, religious authority and similar important matters are still in the course of formation. We take no discredit to ourselves that our movement is fluent and formative. While other systems are breaking down, the Theistic Church is slowly building up. In this building up, our work is indebted to all religions, but to none other so much as to Christianity.

A great reconstruction will some day take place in the world, and if we can honestly claim to have laid a single brick in the edifice of the future, the Brahmo Somaj will not have existed in vain. Apparently, four processes are at work in this work of reconstruction, — renewal of old creeds; investigation of the Scriptures and the sacred literature of all lands; independent

studies and speculations in the philosophy of religion; apostolic life and spiritual experience. All four of these are of essential importance and interest; but, so far as we in India are concerned, we owe more to the last than to any of the other three. Yet each of the processes has its response in the Brahmo Somaj, our great advantage being that we wear no fetters in the search after truth. The infinite domain of divine verity spreads on all sides; we have to be and to grow, — not so much to accommodate ourselves to what has been, though there is no end of lessons to be learned therefrom. It must be owned that we are not in so much haste to complete our theology as to mature our spiritual life. With our simple theistic principles, we enter boldly upon all the lines of development which modern thought every day introduces in the science of religion.

One part of our programme has been partly accomplished. Vast numbers of educated men in every Indian province are convinced that God is a Spirit, and that He is One. We have fought and nearly ended our battle with Hindu polytheism; now, perhaps, one can afford to speak a word of apology in its behalf. An idolatrous faith — at all events this is true of India — is not necessarily a degrading faith; when it is once developed into something higher, it can never go back to the old forms again. There is no such thing as relapse in Hindu idolatry, as was the case with the Hebrews. Hindu idolatry and Semitic idolatry are different. The latter implies a substitute for God, a descent from the higher to the lower, a breach of the letter and spirit of acknowledged law. Hindu polytheism is an illustration of the nature of God; it comes closer to the particular from the general; it is an unconscious act of analysis, a limitation of human nature. The Hindu aspires always to rise from multiplicity to unity, from polytheism to Deism. Though the aspiration, in the absence of religious culture, rarely finds fulfillment, there is always in the orthodox Hindu a confessed reverence for the God of gods, the *Devadhideva*. Thus, though Hindu polytheism may present interesting refractions of the Divine nature, the unity of these properly constitutes what may be called the fullness of the Godhead. Christian orthodoxy presents three manifestations of the Deity; Hindu orthodoxy presents thirty-three millions; but both insist on the synthesis of the manifestations. On this synthesis the Brahmo Somaj takes its stand. We strive to construe and interpret the very complex phenomena of the religious world from the central position of the unity of God's nature; thus everything seems orderly.

Many movements in various parts of the country have taken in hand the work of controverting polytheism. Chief among these is the Arya Somaj of the Punjab, founded about a decade ago by the late Pundit Dayanand Saraswati, a man of primitive Hindu learning and austerity. The combative work being thus largely taken out of our hands, we have time and disposition to mind the deeper principles of our movement. We have always found — though orthodox Christian missionaries do not agree with us — that the cure of idolatrous views is not aggressive argument so much as tenderness and sympathy for the weaker brother. But whether because of aggression or because of affection, the hold of polytheism on the land is every day relaxing. We are not troubled by the slowness of this process; it is much easier to dig up an old faith than to plant a new one. If a faith is forcibly or untimely removed, atheism is more often induced than a purer creed. The ferment is now confined to the higher, learned orders of society. But in India great ideas have always filtered from the upper ranks to the lower; and any religious movement like Buddhism, or the Hindu Revival under Sankaracharya, that takes a firm hold of the classes, is bound to influence the masses, — provided, of course, that it has the genuine enthusiasm of humanity. The history of theism all over the world has been the history of adaptation to the theological environment. Hebrew, or Christian, or Mohammedan, or Hindu, this simple religion of humanity has repeatedly gathered up the fragments of faith and sentiment it found scattered about, and organized them into higher and still higher types of spiritual life. We feel very strongly that this will have to be done, nay is being done, in India. To be able to do its work completely, the Brahmo Somaj must nationalize itself more than it has yet done. How to reconcile its national and its universal character is the problem that we are trying to solve.

After all, it is the spiritual history of a movement that really makes its vital principle. Nothing is so easy as to mistake an intellectual and moral standard for the spirit-ideal. My impression is that spiritual life always includes these, and will do so in larger measure than now; but intellectual and moral standards do not necessarily include spirituality. In this country the first phase of every religious reform, in modern times especially, is a great strain upon the devotional sentiments. A flood-tide of emotion rushes in as soon as a reformer enters the field. Christians have been familiar with this fact in the history of Methodism; but may I be permitted to say that generally the high-caste Hindu is perhaps a

shade more refined than some of the classes who take part in Methodist revivals. Emotional excitement in India often leaves much more permanent effects on the character than would seem to be the case elsewhere. Nevertheless, the common danger of feeding on religious feelings only is always near, and the separation of religion from morality is a common reproach. Everywhere this is the fatal curse of modern movements. In Western lands the power of organization is often so great that the curse is perpetuated, as in the case of Mormonism; in Oriental countries, large combinations of men for a common purpose are seldom formed, and hence any serious moral defect surely tends to a collapse. Ordinarily, therefore, a religious revival does not outlast the stage of emotional excitement. In some cases, however, there is a survival. The movement of Guru Nanak in the Punjab, in the sixteenth century, was an instance, and so was the Vaishnava revival under Chaitanya in the same century; both these reforms have steadily degenerated of late in their moral tone. We venture to think the Brahmo Somaj will be the most prominent instance of such survival. It is never advantageous to get rid of strong and deep religious feeling; but, with most of us, the gaseous and explosive state has passed away. A few of us, at least, have got a lucid breathing interval in which to contemplate the real problem of spiritual life.

To realize the Spirit-God, to find the satisfaction of every religious instinct and yearning in communion with Him, has been the difficulty of every age. Worshipers always find substitutes, which, however good, however high, obscure the vision of the soul. Consciously or not, most theists take refuge in the unknowableness of God, or content themselves with sound opinions, excellent character, poetical feeling, or a well-chosen liturgy. That the Spirit of God may be an object of inner perception has long been, however, the teaching of the Brahmo Somaj. The glorious Indweller reveals himself to our consciousness. The religious sense of all men beholds God. Their intelligence, their moral sense, nay, even their bodily sense, perceive Him. No man, savage or civil, that has ever come into the world, has failed to catch a glimpse of the glorious face of the living God. This is a solemn and everlasting truth. Men behold Him, though they know not whom they see, and as many as know are accounted the seers of the world. That what a few know all may know, that the unconscious vision of the Glorious Countenance may develop into the fullness of universal faith and insight, is our earnest endeavor. The percep-

tion of the life and spirit of God is the secret of all life and sense. We define and realize God as the All-Life. He is the force and essence of all the worlds, the link that binds the bodily senses to the dimly perceived realities of the spirit, that connects man with the universe, and both with the Infinite. In order that all may be lovers and seers of God, that the vague uncertainties and clinging doubts of the age may disappear like a long-standing hereditary debt, we feel that a new dispensation of spiritual life is indispensable. Nor is it a mere matter of feeling and anticipation. In our community, humble as it is, this is an experience in which many have lived, and some have died with calmness and joy. But such experience requires intelligible testimony; we must lay bare to some extent, therefore, the profound movements of the soul, interpret the indications of divine dealings, and fearlessly speak of the self-revealed likeness of the Great Reality. It is impossible to do this in a brief survey. I will say a word, however, on God's self-revelation in nature.

When the Spirit of God fills the soul all things are seen as through a heavenly crystal. In the twinkling of an eye, as if by an unseen touch, by an inner magic, all is changed, all is new, all is spiritual. An unsuspected meaning suffuses creation, life and history. The power of the Spirit that inflames the seer inflames also what is seen. When the Spirit replies to the spirit, it is a wonderful music, a wonderful light, the vision of the New Jerusalem. As Whittier writes in "The Chapel of the Hermits:" —

We rose, and slowly homeward turned,
While down the west the sunset burned;
And in its light, hill, wood and tide,
And human forms, seemed glorified.
The village homes transfigured stood,
And purple bluffs whose belting wood
Across the waters leaned to hold
The yellow leaves like lamps of gold.
Then spake my friend: "Thy words are true,
Forever old, forever new;
These home-seen splendors are the same
Which over Eden's sunset came."

The earliest process of divine revelation is through the medium of nature. The later, fuller, human revelation of the Spirit does not exclude nature or supplant it, but supplements it, discovering in every one of its facts and laws a greater lustre, a purer life, a deeper mine of spiritual analogy. When man's mind interprets outer nature, the result is poetry, science, art; when God's Spirit

interprets nature, the result is Prophecy and Holy Writ. If nature loses its inspiring power, humanity also ceases to inspire, and Scriptures become unnatural, or simply a moral stimulant. Men take shelter under the "miraculous" when they have forsaken the Spirit, and correspondence with the Indweller becomes every day fainter; spiritual death is the result, sooner or later. Out of touch with God's creation, we are out of touch with the Spirit of God. Every seeker for inspiration must therefore return at times to the solitude of nature's sanctuaries, that the Spirit of God may there speak to him, and teach him through pregnant symbols which his own hands have made. If so much in nature, how much more in the soul! The revelation of the Spirit to the spirit was the theme of the greatest of our national scriptures. The predisposition to this transcendent communion is the bias of the Hindu's nature. To cultivate and keep alive this national disposition, amidst the engrossing activities of modern life, has been our aim.

The Brahmo Somaj has suffered in popularity by venturing often to lay before the country its views on Jesus Christ. But it has not heeded remonstrances on the subject, because its preachings have not been mere opinions, but utterances of the deepest conviction, of loving relationship, and personal communion with Christ as a quickening Spirit in the all-encompassing Spirit of God. The sacrifice of its own popularity has thus been the price at which the Brahmo Somaj has popularized the teachings, the life and the death of the Messiah. That loss is a gain. The name of Jesus Christ is an honored name generally in the country, and a sweet household word in every Brahmo family. Lives of Christ have been written in the vernaculars, and most widely read. The likenesses of Christ are reverently kept in family houses; and the festivals of Christ's birth and death are solemnly observed by not a few. But the intellectual acceptance of Christ, even an emotional acceptance, is insufficient. In order that he may fulfill his office in us, it is essential that he should be accepted in life, in spirit and in character; that we should recognize his personal relations, and realize his true place in the great edifice of humanity. Some people imagine that it is enough if they can talk glibly or mystically on the occult things of Christian theology; or if they heave a sigh or weep a tear over the Christian sentimentalities, or practice one or two precepts of the Christian morality, though this last is more rarely done. But all this is very different from making Jesus Christ the centre and rallying point of our

spiritual experience, — from making him the standard of our love to God and man.

The doctrine of incarnation is the central line that divides what is called natural from revealed religion. The old difference between personal and impersonal God — between the supreme, subtle essence of the Vedanta and the active incarnations of the Puranas, between the Absolute Unconditioned of the agnostic and the Hebrew's Jehovah, Lord of Hosts — is not the only distinction, though it is the most obvious one, between deism and theism. The doctrine of divine personality is not necessarily inconsistent with pure rationalism; because, after all, personality is a metaphysical thought, and we may brood much upon the thought without believing and realizing God as an *actual person*. Such brooding thought may, indeed, call up the emotions, stimulate the imaginative faculty, influence the motives, nay, call reason to its aid; and the entire mental process will be looked upon as faith, devoutness, spirituality, what not. Yet every form of metaphysical spirituality, when it loses its intense moods, falls back upon a plane from which the height of an attained consciousness that *God is a person* is separated by a gap which no mental strain is able to bridge over. The protecting, all-sufficing sense of guardianship by an encompassing personal presence is strangely wanting in these so-called theistic systems. In the last resort, despite all his fine doctrines of general and special Providence, the philosopher falls back upon his reason as the safest stronghold in which to escape from the assaults of infidelity and doubt.

The reality that God is a person, distinct from and outside of ourselves, either comes as a wonderful experience, as an unforeseen and matchless grace, or as a historical fact which time and events have made undeniable. Most often the inner experience and the outer fact coalesce. When these two coalesce, they make the objective reality of revelation. Just as the existence of God and his attributes of wisdom, power and goodness would be mere metaphysical talk without the beauties and beneficences of nature, so would the personality of God become empty jargon without the pregnant personality of man. The experience of personality in man unfolds with an undeniable authority the fact that God is a Person, and incarnates himself in the personality of world-compelling men. It would be a fatal error to limit Divine infinity by any, even the most exalted human perfections, but an adequate consciousness of God as the Person cannot develop without the experience of divinity in man. Not only is it necessary to eschew

all false fears of what is called "anthropomorphism," but we must, on the other hand, devoutly believe that the Supreme Person can adequately reveal his nature only in the regenerated, absorbed nature of the God-man. Christ was such a man. The world never knew fully what God was before Christ came. As human nature develops, the Christ ideal develops to guide it, comfort it, and assure its progress.

I will conclude this sketch by drawing attention once more to the composite character of the Brahmo Somaj. Its relations are national; it has to do preëminently with the peoples of India, various as these peoples are. Its relations are universal; it has to do with all religions, and preëminently with the Christian religion, the faith of the civilized world. Hinduism is an absorbent of all things, and I have no doubt it will some day absorb the Brahmo Somaj, if we do not take care to be most strict in our principles and faithful in our conscience, and keep in practical sympathy with Christendom. When India has absorbed Christ, we, too, shall be pleased to submit ourselves to the process. But before this is done, the Brahmo Somaj, I trust, will do something more to elevate and purify the national faith.

There are two ways in which religious reform has been lost in India: it has either been absorbed and reconverted, or it has died the death of isolation. Buddhism has been lost to us by the latter process; Sikhism and the minor reforms, by the former. But there must be some higher ground on which the national and universal tendencies may harmonize. Our Indian Christian missionaries, by keeping aloof from national tendencies, have made their system unacceptable. We men of the Brahmo Somaj must take care that, in trying to make ourselves acceptable, we are not sucked in by the abyss. The higher ground which suggests itself is a spiritual training which shall teach us to give a local and practical form to universal principles, and at the same time expand the instincts, tendencies, and prejudices of the land and people, according to a simple, universal standard. To my mind, the way to reach this higher ground is the way of the Spirit, — apostolic purity of life on the one hand, absorption in communion with the Spirit of God on the other. Self-consecration to the service of man need never affect the profound sanctities of character; on the contrary, it should sweeten and elevate them. Intensity of spiritual culture need never unfit men for practical humanity; on the contrary, it turns daily work into the holiest sacrament. The sad spectacle is where the law of work is a

mechanical, unspiritualizing law, or where meditation and continued prayer make men inactive and useless. The peculiar privilege of the East will, then, be redeserved and reattained when the practical humanity of the West is combined with it. The charge of Philistinism which is sometimes made against the European reformer will be completely refuted when he has recast his reforms after the spiritual model which converts work into faith, and endeavor into attainment. Such is the position and such are the principles for which the Bramo Somaj strives.

PROTAP CHUNDER MOZOOMDAR.

CALCUTTA.

THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIANITY.

IN taking up a subject which has already been treated with such candor and breadth of view in these pages,¹ I have no controversial purpose, and simply wish to present certain convictions of my own. Moreover, I do not pretend to be in any special sense a student of history or a calculator of the future, and I shall not attempt to say what the next step in Christianity will actually be. I have rather in mind the step that needs, or ought to be taken. Christianity may take this step or it may not; but only as it does, can humanity at large be expected to continue to care very much for it.

In the first place, the church should offer free room for the intellectual spirit of the time. The demand is sometimes made that the creeds should be simplified. I say something different from this advisedly. For when I am no longer carried away by popular currents of thought, and look at the matter critically, I cannot see that a simple creed is more acceptable than an elaborate one. Rather, if one thinks at all, one wishes to think thoroughly, — to take in all the facts, to have as perfect a theory of them as possible, and to follow out the theory to all its consequences. What would be thought of a philosopher who contented himself with two or three propositions, — of a man of science who gave us only a handful of facts and one or two generalizations? It is the extensiveness, the thoroughness, the systematic completeness, of a man's work that marks him as a thinker in any department. Now creeds, articles of faith, or confessions are ordinarily related to the

¹ "The Next Step in Christianity," by Rev. S. D. McConnell, D. D., in *The New World*, for June, 1892.

moral and religious life somewhat as philosophies and scientific theories are to their respective data. They are the fruit of thinking, of the effort to understand, to-explain, to formulate, to arrange systematically. The thinking may not always be as close, as thorough, in the religious as in the other spheres, but it is intellectual effort of the same order. The Athanasian Creed, for example, is in its main parts a marvel of thinking and accurate statement: you may disbelieve it, and yet, if you have been a sympathetic and broad-minded student of church history, you can hardly fail to admire it; and I very much question whether, in case you grant certain premises, you can deny its truth. So with the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England; so with the Westminster Confession of Faith, — we have only to look at them with care and serious attention to see that they are a sort of philosophy of Christianity. Christian thinkers may philosophize differently to-day, but these are the ways in which some of the most eminent and learned Christian believers thought two or more centuries ago.

It is not an advance, then, intellectually speaking, to make an elaborate statement give way to a simple one; it is only an advance to make the statement of one age give place to the statement of another, — to allow freedom to new interpretations, to give room for fresh minds. The objection to the old creeds is simply to their being made obligatory on the present.

Yet, if this much is admitted, we have only to reflect a little to see that logical consistency demands that we object also to making any new creeds obligatory. If different generations have their rights, so have different individuals. To make a revised form of the Westminster Confession, for instance, the law or standard of the Presbyterian Church would be as objectionable as to retain the present form; those who held to the old Confession could not accept the new, and some who wish a change might not be satisfied with the change actually made. Hence, if these various persons were intellectually earnest (as they should be), there would come fresh divisions in the church. The simpler and truer way would be to begin to allow liberty; not to revise or reprobate the old creed, but to let it stand as a historical monument, and to let the indorsement or rejection of it be a purely personal matter, — in a word, to cease to consider the Confession as the creed of the church.

Instead of adopting a new theology and rejecting the old, the church should give to both equal right and standing. Not to do

this is to continue the intellectually vicious course of the church in the past, — of the church, one must confess, in all its branches. There have, of course, been "Liberal" Christian denominations; but they have worked not so much for largeness and toleration as for some new set of views. The Unitarians, for instance, have allowed themselves to be stamped by a certain set of doctrines about God, Jesus, and the Bible; and Christians who could not agree to the Unitarian views have not felt at home among them. The Universalists have their one dogma; those who think differently about the fate of the wicked after death are virtually dis-fellowshipped by them. The thought has yet apparently to arise of a church in which all who wish to live the Christian life shall dwell together as brethren, tolerating each other in the varied results of their religious thinking. All who gain new views seem to want to form a new church; though in some cases the fact is rather that they are not allowed to hold their views in the old church, and so are compelled to form a new one, if they are to have a church at all. The Catholic Church, which claims to be above all sects, is really in a sense the parent of them all; instead of allowing varying types of theological belief within its pale, it allows only one, and will never, in the interests of true catholicity, recede from a definition it has made. Each Protestant sect reproduces the old seed of intellectual narrowness in its own form. Hence, instead of one great fellowship of men striving above all to make right and justice prevail on the earth and the will of God be done, there are a thousand and one sectaries, so prone in their warring with one another to forget their true and divine calling that the world outside the church sometimes comes nearer Christ than the church itself.

There has, indeed, been a better instinct now and then, but it has hardly ever become a distinct thought and policy. The Broad-Church party in each denomination may be said to incline this way, but its actual influence seems to be more to make men feel that they can subscribe to the creeds though they do not believe in them than to alter the church's attitude in relation to the creeds. A Broad-Church party seems always somehow ineffectual (save in keeping its place in the church), perhaps because it lacks the inspiration and the energy that come from downright honesty; yet its instinct is on the right side: it is for freedom and tolerance; and, were the church already what this party has hardly the energy to make it be, Broad-Churchmen would be in the right. The ideal church would be large enough to contain all varieties of

opinion that are consistent with Christian living. The higher inspiration is visible in the quaint language of John Hales, of Eton: "I do not see . . . that men of different opinions in Christian Religion may not hold communion in sacred things and both go to one church. Why may I not go, if occasion require, to an *Arian* Church, so there be no *Arianisme* expresst in their *Lyturgy*? And were *Lyturgies* and *Publique formes of Service* so framed as that they admitted not of particular and private fancies, but contained only such things as in which all Christians do agree, *Schismes* on opinion were utterly vanished." One of the church fathers, Epiphanius, even held that, in the first period of the church, wickedness was the only heresy, — that impious and pious living were the dividing lines between erroneous and orthodox. It is often said that at least accepting Jesus as one's Lord and Saviour is necessary for admission into the church; but Jesus declared that only one thing was a prerequisite for admission into his heavenly kingdom, — namely, doing the will of God; and surely what would open the gates of heaven should open the doors of the church on earth.

The true method of procedure for the Christian church is, then, not to abolish or revise the old creeds, but simply to grant complete liberty of belief with regard to them; to let them stand for those to whom they are still satisfactory, but to give others the right to amend or reject them; to take no position as a church upon these matters; to have no standards of orthodoxy; to say that from its standpoint there is only one heresy, namely, wickedness, and only one essential requirement, namely, the doing of the will of God.

Whether this method will be pursued, I do not pretend to say. If one judges of the future by the past, such a course may be said to be extremely unlikely; for there is not, perhaps, an instance in Christian history in which a church, having once committed itself to a doctrinal position, has relaxed the obligations of it; when a position is taken, the die seems to be cast, and, if other thoughts arise, they take other organs or media for expressing themselves. But if none of the existing churches will take the step I have indicated, then the next step in Christianity will be out of any of the existing churches; the spirit of progress will secure a new organ for itself, and more and more what is earnest and forward-looking in the old organizations will disentangle itself and go to swell the new ranks.

A Scottish divine of this century, whose horizon took in more than

his church, — Norman McLeod, — said : “ Neither Calvinism, nor Presbyterianism, nor Thirty-nine Articles, nor High-Churchism, nor Low-Churchism, nor any existing organization, can be the church of the future.” We overdo in these days the idea of evolution, considered as an unbroken continuity of development. In politics, a large part of progress has been by a break with existing institutions, by a revolution. In religion, almost every forward movement has been possible only by making a new beginning. The Reformation is an instance ; the liberal movement among the Congregational churches at the beginning of this century in New England is another ; a similar movement in the Society of Friends is still another. Christianity itself, if it had not broken with Judaism, of which it was at first a part, would probably have perished. All, indeed, might be different. I can conceive of a political community in which revolutions would be unnecessary, though, as states ordinarily are, a revolution is required now and then, else they would become unbearable. I can conceive of a church in which an unbroken continuity of development would be possible, though, as churches have been, progress has been often possible only by going out of them. Yes, I can even imagine the churches of the present time undergoing a thorough inward regeneration, and evolving without a break into the greater church of the future ; I do not hold to the dreary doctrine that the future must follow along the lines of the past. I fervently wish this might take place ; but whether it will or not, is another question.

So much for the needed advance on the intellectual side. As I turn to speak of what is necessary on the moral side, I shall urge what is in one sense a backward step. Strange as it may sound from one who does not call himself a Christian, I will say that the next step, morally speaking, in Christianity, is to go back to Jesus. As I look out on the Christian church at large, one of the things that strike me is the almost total lack of that idealism, that ardor, that faith and that hope that lived in the breast of the man of eighteen centuries ago after whom Christendom is named. I do not mean that the Christian church does not value morality, in the conventional sense of that term, that it is not itself humane, charitable, full of good works. I mean that its morality is without wings ; that there is no expectancy in it, no largeness of vision ; that, so far as this world is concerned, the Christian seems to look for nothing better from it than any one else does. Yet the attitude of Jesus and of the first Christians was that of looking for a great

change. It was as with those to-day who are carried away by what are called utopian social dreams. They believe that a new justice might be done in the world, that the state might be transformed, that a new industrial order might arise. The world as a whole looks askance on these enthusiasts, and so, alas! does the church, for the church has become a part of the world,—the church that at the beginning condemned the world as it then was and looked for a better. The church at the outset was but a body of those who were consumed with a great expectation; whose eyes were fixed on a new heaven and a new earth in which justice should rule; who blessed the name of Jesus for the priceless gift of this faith, and looked to him to come again to turn faith into sight and bring in the new age.

Where shall one look for such a faith now, and for the ardor and joy that go with it? How dreary are our lives and all the business of them, how dreary even our good works, our charities and philanthropies, if with the soul we cannot have the vision of a time when good shall conquer evil, when whatever oppresses shall be cast down, when the tears of humanity shall cease, when for sorrow there shall be gladness, and instead of wrong a triumphant right! The words of Emerson sometimes come over me with strange power:—

The politics are base;
The letters do not cheer;
And 'tis far in the deeps of history,
The voice that speaketh clear.

In the things of the spirit, in the realm of conscience, time counts for nothing; there are ideas in some of the world's oldest literature that are in advance of us to-day; the Christian church, instead of having outgrown the primitive Christian enthusiasm, has rather to go back to it, and to drink deep of those ancient springs, before it can take the step forward that is needed now.

Consider in some detail what it would mean to think now somewhat as Jesus thought eighteen centuries ago. It would mean, first, to look for a new order of things on the earth, to give up the idea that existing political and social arrangements are any-wise final. It would translate one into the attitude of a person looking for a better country. While, then, one lived on in the present order, one would feel in heart a stranger to it. He would never dream of being contented with it, or of going his way with his business, his family interests and intercourse with his friends,

and thinking these are all. Many features of the present order of society he would simply endure, looking for their overthrow. He would say to himself, — and console himself by saying it, — this and that law, and custom, and social arrangement, born of selfishness and injustice, are to perish; only what is good will last. Over against the present he would put the future, and balance the weight of evil which oppresses him with the vision of what is to be. For that a judgment, an end of wrong, a putting of evil in chains, is to come, — this would be the very faith on which he lived. This faith, too, would lead him to purify his own life; for, should he expect to see the new order, he would wish to be worthy of a place in it, and, whether he is to see it with his earthly eyes or not, he would wish to be one in spirit with it. If justice is to be done then, he would wish to be at heart just; if love is to be the coming rule, he would wish to drive out all contrary impulses now.

This is all very simple, every-day language, but it is somewhat as I understand the substance of the thought of Jesus. Literally speaking, it may be impossible for us to think as he and his disciples did. The kingdom of heaven itself, his central idea, has associations that take it to no small extent out of the realm of what is credible to us. But, at bottom, it was the best hope of Jesus' time and race for a reign of right and justice. It was the fine issue to which the spirits of men were then "finely touched." It gathered up whatever idealism was then alive. Jesus was daring enough to believe that the new era was near at hand. He had been inspired by another before him; he, in turn, inspired a multitude who heard him. His teacher had prophesied a judgment, so did he. He declared in detail who they were who should have a place in the order about to be: they were those who suffered and were at a disadvantage, — those whom society reviled and persecuted, those who were poor and oppressed; above all, those who were looking and hungering for a reign of righteousness, those who hated war and inclined to mercy, those who were humble rather than self-sufficient, those who would stand any amount of wrong rather than do wrong, those who loved even such as injured them, those who tried to be perfect. Such would be the constituents of the righteous social order near at hand; and into it no persons of a contrary sort, and, above all, no hypocrites or devourers of widows' houses, should come. In it, he once said, the righteous should shine forth as the sun. The thought is the

same as that expressed in a noble poem¹ of our own day, which begins: —

Have you heard of the Golden City
Mentioned in the legends old?
Everlasting light shines o'er it,
Wondrous tales of it are told.

Only righteous men and women
Dwell within its gleaming wall;
Wrong is banished from its borders,
Justice reigns supreme o'er all.

This social dream is the essence of Jesus' teaching; to look for its realization was the earliest meaning of his religion. On its side, he believed, were the Invisible Powers, however much the powers of this world might be against it; yes, he himself would introduce the new order; he would, under God, be the Judge; when death stared him in the face, he none the less kept his confidence, and said to the very court that inflicted the fatal sentence upon him, "Ye shall yet see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of power and coming on the clouds of heaven."

It is easy to point out the element of illusion in this expectation. Jesus has not come again in all these eighteen centuries; and it will not do to say that his coming refers to another world, since every reference to it that he makes shows that he has this world in mind. The very prayer that he taught his disciples asks that the kingdom may come on earth; the consolation for the meek was that they should yet inherit the earth. The important thing, however, is to get at the soul of truth in this expectation, and to dare to reproduce it under the altered intellectual conditions of to-day. If the churches should come into contact with the real Jesus, it would be their regeneration. They might worship him less, they would follow him more. They would extend a hand to the reform movements of the time, and welcome them to their midst; they would be one with them in their soul if not in their letter. Instead of timidly, hesitatingly following the progressive moral spirit of the time, they would begin to lead it; and as the early church struck blows at infanticide, gladiatorial shows, and other infamies of the Roman world, the church now would begin to banish some of the barbarities of this nineteenth century civilization.

The trouble is that the churches do not understand their Master, they do not catch the real drift of the New Testament. They

¹ By the founder of the Ethical Movement, Dr. Felix Adler.

have acquired such a factitious reverence for both that they do not study either with a scientific, truth-loving spirit; they have enveloped both in a sort of halo and see nothing distinctly. Liberal Christians think it a great achievement to discover that Jesus was a man; but there is no special value or inspiration in this discovery. The question is, what sort of a man was he? To regard him simply as the great teacher of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man is about as vague and unreal as any other traditional method of interpretation. To preach the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man may be one way of helping the world, but Jesus looked for a new order of society. He thought the world as it was (and it has not changed essentially since his blessed voice was heard in it) ripe for judgment; he was for punishing and abasing as well as uplifting, for putting evil and evil men in chains. It is evident that, were he living to-day and breathing the modern intellectual atmosphere, he would be neither a sentimentalist nor a religious rhapsodist, but the leader of a great, thorough-going reform movement, — finding it the will of his Father to do this, seeing that this is true religion, and that faith and hope have their vital meanings in connection with it. Never would he have been content with what most of his followers now offer to the suffering and the wronged, — the hope of recompense in another world; never would he have consented to let the earth be the Devil's and only heaven be God's; he would have said justice is for here and now, and the will of God is to be done on earth even as it is done in heaven.

What a new thing the Christian churches would be if they could catch this spirit! and who have so good a claim to it as they? How easy then would become some tasks that now seem giant-like in their proportions, so low is the tone of public sentiment, so little have the people the idea that religion means striving for justice and a just social order on the earth!

Back to Jesus, then, I say, back to his great ideal! The church cannot look to him to accomplish it as it once did, but from him it may perchance catch the spirit by which men may be impelled to accomplish it for themselves. No longer can Christians say (if they sincerely mean what they say), "We believe that thou shalt come again to be our judge;" but by fresh contact with him we may perhaps gain the faith that mankind can be its own judge, more and more destroying what is evil and garnering the good.

May the twofold step I have described be taken! May libera-

tion be given to the mind, and once more may the conscience be touched! Happily, then, the dividing wall between Christianity and much of what is earnest and good in the world outside it will be broken down.

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PROGRESSIVE ORTHODOXY.

IN writing of an orthodoxy which desires to be progressive, I follow my own conception of its nature, as well as my own predilection, in speaking of truth, conciliation and unity. In saying these words I give the best definition I can frame of Progressive Orthodoxy. It has a doctrinal principle of whose truth it is convinced, the universality of Christianity. It has its articles of faith, first of all and principal, that of the Incarnation, to which I shall mainly confine myself in speaking of its doctrinal grounds and aims. It has, also, its inferences and corollaries and hypotheses, for one of which it is called in question to this day and charged with heterodoxy. But it is in all this, and characteristically, an ethical, or, I would rather say a spiritual, movement and tendency, and capable, therefore, of entering into wider relationships and fellowships than any merely dogmatic or theological enterprise.

Moved by the spirit of truth, and making truth rather than orthodoxy its watchword, Progressive Orthodoxy seeks to coöperate with every effort to discover truth, and to encourage every method and employ every instrumentality appropriate and available for such a purpose. It has learned — I speak of course relatively, and not as though in anything it had already attained — how serious and baneful have been the blunders of orthodoxy in its over-confidence of mastery of divine knowledge, and its consequent exclusion of truth directly from above, as well as of many side lights. It is in hearty sympathy with one of the leading and most hopeful characteristics of later thought, its sincere and submissive homage to truth. It shares the profound conviction of our supreme obligation to truth; that as scholars, teachers, followers and friends of Christ, lovers of men in his spirit and power, we must make truth, in its simplicity and variety, its homeliness

and ineffable beauty, its appropriableness, practicality and inexhaustible fullness, the master light of all our seeing, the constant and commanding aim of our thinking and living. Before its divine authority all commandments of men are hushed to silence; against its behests no decrees of councils, no antiquity of error, no prerogative of custom, no institutionalism, can prevail. Our rationality, our freedom, our life are in the truth; and wherever there is a soul striving for truth we would fain rise to the dignity and honor of counting him a brother, and wherever there is a spirit hungering and thirsting for truth we would count it our highest privilege to minister to it in the name and love of Him who reveals himself to man as the Truth.

Closely connected with this emphasis upon truth is the accentuation of *life*. Here this movement or tendency called Progressive Orthodoxy is working in connection with what is predominant in modern thought. It claims no originality in this regard; indeed, I am not claiming anything for it, as though it were self-originated and self-sustained, but simply trying to represent it.

Christian doctrine began its history, as a reflective process, in the endeavor better to understand a great life and a great personality, and the significance of their relation to men in their deepest needs. It received its original and primary truths mainly through the evangelical traditions and narratives, the apostolic memorabilia, and epistles written, as occasions arose, for special ends. For a long time its expression was predominantly that of personal confession of the Christ, of prayer and hymn and homily, of sacraments and martyrdoms, of ethical instructions elevated and purified and made effective by the teaching the cross and the resurrection of Jesus. The impulse to dogma — I am not now speaking of the forms it assumed — was confession, and defense of such confession, of the one saving Name. How little was done beyond this, is evident from the fact that not until after the Council of Nicæa, in the year of our Lord 325, was there any pronounced discussion of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, nor till much later any generally recognized formulation of the doctrine of atonement.

It fell out at last, however, that theology well-nigh forgot its origin, and lost the true conception of its genesis and function. Although it was recognized that a man may accept all the dogmas of the church and be destitute of saving faith, it was far from

being understood that these dogmas themselves are impossible developments of religious truths save as they spring from religious life and are one aspect of it. Divine truth is the life of God in the human spirit. If a dogma is not ultimately thus verified and known, it is not known at all in its truth and power. The things of the Spirit are spiritually discerned. They are discernments of God and from Him ; they are motives to goodness, righteousness, integrity of life and benevolence to men, which are aspects of his being, character, and government. They are powers from above, succoring man in his contest with evil, recovering him to his true aim, giving him the consciousness of freedom and divine sonship.

This spiritual apprehension of truth as life and motive, characteristic of Progressive Orthodoxy, leads to a third note, the stress it puts upon character, especially in the forms of uprightness and sacrifice, as the indispensable test and vindication, the banner and fruitage, of a genuine orthodoxy.

When I speak of uprightness I include humility. There is no strength, even of an archangel, save as it is from God ; and something beyond this grace of sinless spirits is in the consciousness of recovery by the Holy One from sin. The uprightness of the Christian is the spiritual counterpart of the miracle "at the gate of the temple which is called Beautiful," where the man lame from his mother's womb received strength, and stood and walked, and entered into the temple, walking and leaping and praising God, — an uprightness and firmness the explanation of which is ever the old apostolic word : "And his name, through faith in his name, hath made this man strong, whom ye see and know." With such rectitude, too, goes ever the grace of sacrifice, the free offering of itself in all service to men of a soul that has learned its own true nature and life in the school of Christ and through the touch of the divine love. It is in terms of character such as these, and in such forms of life, that, as those believe for whom I would speak, the truth of any orthodoxy they would care to contend for is disclosed ; and if they can be as widely and abundantly realized and as surely guaranteed under other forms of orthodoxy or under other systems of belief, their own would cease to have to them any distinctive value.

I should not need in this age to plead for the importance of truth in religion. Without it, religion becomes an enervating sentimentality or a delusive superstition. The immediate question is,

how this truth may be found, as the ultimate problem is, can it be found? Progressive Orthodoxy accepts as the sufficient source and pledge of the truth, for which a soul conscious of sin and guilt and thirsting for righteousness craves with an intensity proportionate to its sense of need, Him whom the apostles preached as the Revealer of the Father, the Dispenser of the Spirit, the Lord and Saviour of mankind; and it is constrained, in the interest of the reality of this manifestation of God and of its restoring and unifying power, to confess his true divinity. In all this it believes itself to be in touch with the Christian faith, of which orthodoxy is an intellectual expression, and only of value so far as it is true to this faith; and at the same time it claims to be progressive in that it would adjust its conceptions of this truth, and its dogmatic forms, to God's constant revelation of himself "in his works of creation, providence, and redemption," and especially in that religious life which, running through the generations with increasing power, and broader than any lines of creed or ritual, or Christian confession even, is a testimony, in human experience and history, of that Spirit who searches the deep things of God, and witnesses of Him in every soul, yet so, as we believe and maintain, that all this life may be seen to be fulfilled and provided for, and alone is really possible, through Him who is the Beginning and the End of all God's ways to man and of man's to Him.

I may, perhaps, best illustrate the spirit of Progressive Orthodoxy, and suggest at least one way in which we justify to ourselves our doctrinal endeavor, by presenting a particular tenet and a special mode of approach to it. I select it because it seems to me to be the one that is most vital to the movement of which I write.¹ I follow the method of treating it which is freshest to me and nearest at hand.

¹ A few words may be expected here on the position of Progressive Orthodoxy respecting the question of future probation. It is not strange that attention has turned to this point, because it seemed most directly and incisively to penetrate traditional beliefs. It is, however, only an inference from the principle of the universality of Christianity, and a natural result of the change from an acceptance of the doctrine of limited atonement to that of a general atonement. It is conceded, also, that being an inference, in a realm not controlled by experience, it cannot rank as an article of faith, but only as an opinion for which some reasons may be given. There is a suggestion of it in certain Biblical texts, as 1 Pet. iii. 19, 20, and especially iv. 5, 6, where it seems to be imbedded in the argument. It is a natural inference from the doctrines of the Incarnation and the universality of the atonement. Christianity teaches

The question of the personality of Jesus — who He was, from whom He came, what are the sources of his power, what He is for us, what is the inmost and ultimate reality of his being, character, and life, so far as this may be known — is the most fascinating of all problems, but it is far more than this, and indeed, something other. It is preëminently a religious problem, on the right or approximately right ethical and spiritual solution of which depend untold and immeasurable human interests. Progressive Orthodoxy finds its task within the limits of this problem. Its theology is a Christology, though not in the ordinary and more technical meaning of this phrase.

Historical criticism never was more busy with this problem than it is to-day. It has brought into prominence the theological, the metaphysical, the philosophical elements, in part extra-Christian, which enter, it claims, into the ancient creeds. Sometimes it puts in contrast the Christ of the Sermon on the Mount and the Christ of the Nicene Symbol. It goes back of the earlier contention that the doctrine of Christ's divinity sprang from the Logos doctrine which the early Greek apologists, and others of that metaphysical Hellenic race derived from Philo and Plato. The same commingling, then witnessed, of philosophical and speculative thought with Jesus' practical teaching concerning God and the righteousness of his kingdom, concerning all holy living and sweet and beneficent piety, and love to men and the one Father of all, appeared within the apostolic age, and transformed the man of Nazareth into a preëxistent divinity and a mysterious principle of divine revelation.

I do not undertake here to test the value of this rendering of the early history, and I have no right, without meeting it on its own grounds, to question its conclusions. It is enough for my present purpose to say that, were these accepted in the main, the question I have stated is still unanswered. If, as is admitted, not only the early Greek Fathers, but the early disciples and the

that God seeks by the way of the cross for the lost. This truth goes beyond anything contained in the idea that men everywhere may seek for God, and that He is not far from any. There is a work of the Spirit of God under the conditions and motive of the Gospel. If the motive thus provided is at once unique and universal, it may be expected that it will have its proper opportunity. This reasoning points to a *Christian* probation for every man for whom Christ died. The construction of human history as an education of the race requires, if it is to have apologetic value, that each generation have an opportunity to share in the good of the whole.

apostle Paul, to use an ancient phrase, "theologized" Christ, the interesting problem is not in what Rabbinical or Alexandrian or Platonic forms of thought this occurred, but why it occurred at all, and what was the great reality behind it and prompting it? What connection had it with the new religious life which had come into the world and with what one of the earliest extra-canonical Christian writers calls the new type of character?¹

Having devoted myself for many years to the study of the history of Christianity, especially of its earlier records, I find myself increasingly unable to explain this history unless we admit that in Jesus Christ there was such an indwelling and manifestation of the very nature and life and love of God that all forms of speech still prove inadequate which do not confess, as did the early church, his unique Sonship and true divinity. The historical evidence, if I mistake not, which supports this position has gained in clearness and force and volume through the labors of scholars and the application of a rigorous scientific method; through textual criticism and the higher criticism; through the sifting of evidence previously possessed; through the discovery of manuscripts and new documents, and better methods of estimating their significance; through finer discriminations of the elements composing successive historical situations; through application to special religious phenomena of the wider laws of all religious beginnings and developments.

First of all, the Jesus of history has been, as it were, restored to us in his true humanity, and dogmatic interpretations which, to say the least, imparted a confused if not an impossible conception of his person and life have been swept away. But the manifest and manifested life of God in Him has thereby only come out into clearer view. The more closely men have studied the thought and new relationship to God which seemingly sprung from Him, the clearer and more necessary have appeared to be their vital connections, and the more inherently and essentially has been seen to be involved in the Christian faith the doctrine which is implicit in the earliest symbols, and which, as need was thought to arise, was more definitely and fully confessed. That this dogmatic process ran out into a confusion of faith and theology, and into a baneful substitution of orthodoxy for piety, and a lordship over men's consciences and beliefs contrary to the

¹ *Ep. of Barnabas*, vi. 11.

spirit and method of Christianity cannot be questioned, and ought not to be forgotten. But the whole history becomes, not merely a proper subject of criticism, for its imperfections and aberrations, but a hopeless enigma, a contradiction to clear thought and legitimate reasoning, save as we go back to an original impulse in a faith which held as its most cherished possession a true and unique revelation of God in the Person whom it made the object of religious trust, and to whom it offered its sacrifices of gratitude and suffering and unceasing worship. To put my point in a single sentence: Progressive Orthodoxy abides by the doctrine of the Incarnation and makes it central and controlling, because, — to limit myself to one reason, — without this doctrine, the history of the Christian church and the Christian religion becomes an effect without a cause. The doctrine is in and of the faith which creates the Christian type, informs the new life, apprehends the originating Person, and contains in itself the witness and assurance of its verity.

I leave out of account, for my present purpose, documents which are generally esteemed to be of religious authority. I will not appeal to them now in any way. I will start with the Christian consensus of belief in the closing decades of the first century and the first half of the second. I take the testimony of the Apostolic Fathers one by one, and seek to estimate the witnesses each in his individual and representative value. I see this warp of evidence shot through by the woof of the later testimony of one who is commonly supposed to have been a convert from Judaism and of Jewish education, and who found, in his journey from the East to Rome, a common faith. I study the forms and spirit of that early time; its day of religious observance; its sacramental commemorations; its baptismal symbol; its hymns and liturgical forms and paschal solemnities and Easter joy. Clearly and definitely stand forth its new knowledge of a universal Fatherhood assured in the Son of his love; its new rule of life in the commandment of love; its new sense of power in the conviction that Christianity is a thing of greatness through its Founder and Head; its conscious possession of new spiritual gifts, of a new and abiding presence of the Spirit promised and sent by its risen Lord; its deep and solemn sense of responsibility to Him as the final and universal Judge; its confident access through Him to God in prayer; its faith that his sacrifice had won for the whole world

the grace of repentance; its calm assurance of a profound and rich peace amid all earth's turmoil and conflict; its exultation in victory over death; and its joy in the leaving out afresh and blossoming of all rational as well as moral and spiritual life through his divine illumination, and his attraction towards God's marvelous light.¹

More impressive still are the testimonies of action and sacrifice, rendered with his sufferings always before their eyes, under the conviction of his constant presence and sustaining power, and of his acceptance of such offerings of grateful obedience and love. Beyond all this even, is the existence of the Christian society, a unique fellowship of men with each other and God in the new Name. All religions tend more or less to produce religious societies. Other religious founders than Jesus have been remembered, followed, and imitated. Others have pointed out ways of life and salvation. Jesus Christ, in the faith of his disciples, was present with them in life and in death, and the distinctive note of the Christian church was its realization in Him of a moral and spiritual fellowship with God. Were all our canonical Scriptures blotted out, there remains this Christian society, its faith, and assurance of faith.

Let us pass on to notice briefly the course of doctrinal thought for three centuries following. The immediate and living faith of the church in its Redeemer and Lord is confronted by innumerable questionings, both from within and from without. Life ever prompts to interrogation. It is always at once a mystery and a challenge to thought. So with this greatest of all lives — the new fellowship with God in Christ. We can almost hear the beginning of such a challenge in the opening sentence of the earliest homily that has come down to us: "Brethren, we ought so to think of Jesus Christ as of God, as of the Judge of quick and dead." It is much plainer in the resort of Justin Martyr and others to the Alexandrian philosophy for help in maintaining the Christian cause. The Logos is conceived of as the divine Reason, and not so predominantly as in the Fourth Gospel, or in Irenæus, as the principle of an ethical and spiritual revelation. He is the organ of creation, God's way to his works. The represen-

¹ Ign. *Eph.* ii.; *Rom.* iii. 6, 7; *Polyc. Phil.* vi.; *Ep. to Diog.* 8-10; *Clem. Rom. Ep.* ii. 7, 29, 49, 36. Cf. Bornemann's statement respecting the change produced by Christianity in the religious knowledge and experience of "the first Christians," though Jewish converts: *Unterricht im Christentum*, § 36, 2.

tation, through this association of his personality with the idea of the world, becomes deeply tinged with a philosophical subordinationism.

This is followed and partly accompanied by a tendency to obscure the Son's distinctive personality, which culminated later in Sabellianism.

During the first half of the third century the main stress lay upon the element of doctrine, which had been slighted or obscured. The divine Sonship of Christ, rather than the Logos doctrine, was ascendant.

Meanwhile, and subsequently, a monarchianism which excluded the Son from the divine nature grew in power, and brought in finally the Arian controversy, in which all the preceding conflicts revived, yet so that the main question worked itself clear and was answered: Does the faith held by the church from the beginning include, as an indispensable element, the true divinity of the Son?

The discussion naturally went over into a similar question respecting the Holy Spirit. I will not follow it further, as it confronted the problem of harmonizing the acceptance of three divine objects of faith and worship with the equally accepted doctrine that God is numerically one, — a natural and inevitable problem, yet confused and misleading, since it converted a religious problem too exclusively into a metaphysical one, and then reduced it to a question of arithmetic. What has been said suffices to suggest a process of reflective thought and its successive stages. I have described it in theological terms, in forms remote from life and from present thought. I would not conceal the abstractness of the discussion, nor its wanderings into distinctions more or less artificial, and to heights where the air becomes too thin to be breathed. What I would call attention to is, that, through this long, intricate, perplexed and sometimes tangled history, there is one unbroken and infrangible line of connection, — one steadfast faith, one central principle. It is that of trust in Christ as a divine Redeemer. It worked out into the doctrine of his co-essentiality with the Father. It gave to the conception of the principle of revelation personal concreteness and stability, and freed it from the trammels of Alexandrianism. It made itself felt in a new, wider, and deepened conception of the divine Fatherhood. It enlarged and enriched the thought of the divine Oneness. It vivified and illumined the whole doctrine of God, finding

in the depths of his eternal being the source and law and analogue of the entire historic revelation. It had tremendous difficulties constantly to confront, — the opposition of a stiff Jewish monotheism, the ridicule of its worship by Celsus and Lucian, the inherited philosophical conception of the Absolute and of the universe, the innumerable perplexities of thought that follow upon any reflective apprehension of the Incarnation, that in deed and in truth the personality of the infinite God is brought to us in Jesus of Nazareth.

Yet we cannot find, in the long, hard-fought contest, that the church ever relinquished its faith. Perplexities arose, clouds obscured the field of vision, untenable positions were taken and abandoned, but the continuity of development was never broken. New modes of statement came in; there were manifold changes in belief and polity, — the Nicene church was not the sub-apostolic; the doctrinal controversies bore evil and bitter fruits; there was a change of emphasis, an exaltation of dogma to the neglect of life, of creed at the expense of sincerity and liberty: but there was no revolution in belief, no cessation of the continuous worship of the Father and the Son and the Spirit, ever one God, no abandonment of what was held as a sacred trust committed by our Lord to the Christian society. To me there is a great impressiveness in such a history, and the creed which is the outcome of it, on the side of thought and doctrine, is inexplicable save as I find in the beginnings and in the inmost heart and soul of that Christian society a genuine and invincible trust in a divine Saviour. Let the current be found to be swollen or perturbed by never so many streams from other fountains, it has throughout a character, a movement, a power of its own, which must have been derived from its original source. It is a testimony to the depth and power and character of the impression Christ left of himself.

I think it is one of the important services to theology rendered by Ritschl and his school that God's revelation of himself is apprehended more than it has been as a divine kingdom. This is a recurrence to the original Christian point of view, to the testimony of Jesus. It is in accordance, also, with the general scientific method of our time, which proceeds from what is nearest to us and verifiable in experience to what is more remote. The historical process by which the church passed to the dogma of the Trinity — being a process of history, as I have before noticed, and

not a fabrication of abstract thought, the product of a school of philosophy — follows, however unconsciously, this method; for a true scientific method is simply a transcript into terms of reflection and thought of what exists first in actual process and fact. The church experienced, lived, worked out the process and achieved the result. We study the process and the issue, and see its law. Christ was believed on in the world. He was accepted as Saviour and Lord; He was seen and known as risen and glorified; He gave his Spirit as He promised; He was awaited as Judge of quick and dead; He revealed the Father. God was known as Father, Son, and Spirit. The knowledge was true and real, however imperfect. In its reality was given its divine content. It is the simple, clear, natural, inevitable path of all ethical or religious experience. In the near is the far, in the phenomenal the real, in the temporal the eternal. The form is finite, the content infinite. The human soul is capacious of God. Unless this be true, ethics is but a science of formal rules, theology a play with formulas, science a knowledge which has not even phenomena in its grasp.

In the just and necessary reaction from theological methods which began with the Absolute and the Infinite, and proceeded by deduction to a doctrine of the God of revelation, to a definition of his attributes, to an interpretation of his purposes, to an unrolling of the map of the illimitable future and unchanging destinies, we have learned to study the Life and Person of Christ, and the steps and progress of a historical revelation, and to dwell on those aspects of Christian truth which are reflected in human experience, — in the recovery to God of the individual soul and of human society. But we are ever exposed in our thinking, in our science, as in our worship, to formalism. We are not freed from the peril when we have broken with logical formalism. There is a deeper, more subtle, more tempting formalism of experience and of life when history is valued as a process, and not for what the process holds, — when experience is prized, not for what it brings to us of that which is forever true and good, but because of its motion and play and variety and freedom from restraint, for its being experience rather than for what is experienced. It is a correction of this superficiality in thought, and so promotive of sincerity and depth of religious character, to enter sympathetically into such an experience as that which the early church passed through, and which has been

substantially repeated again and again in individual lives. For it is not an arbitrary, wild, wasteful, purposeless process, with which we have nothing to do, but something with the Spirit of God in it, and flowing in its main principle and impulse from the original fountain of truth. It is a response to the challenging greatness of Christ, an amen to his revelation of God. The Nicene Creed, imperfect as it doubtless is, and more or less colored by philosophic strains of thought, has to me, from the point of view I have suggested, an almost indescribable beauty and power. It is a ladder on which men have climbed to heaven and to God. It is a ray of light which has touched and healed eyes made to see Him, yet blinded in sin and encompassed with darkness, — a ray along whose shining track men have looked up and seen their Father, their Saviour, their Helper, their God. Let me repeat what I have before said: It is a theological form of truth. I care not for the form, save as there is value in association and long-continued Christian use. It is the lesson of its method, the touch of its reality, the truth it seems to me to hold, that I find so attractive. One may read everywhere between its lines Athanasius' famous word: The revelation of God in Christ is in truth and not in name.

Modern thought has gone beyond the Nicene Symbol in its conception of God. It defines its Trinity not so much in terms of being as in terms of life and personality. It emphasizes what is ethical and spiritual rather than what is metaphysical. I count this an advance, though I do not believe we can have either ethics or theology without metaphysics, or, much more, a theological creed. But theology, as we have painfully learned, is not religion, and a theological creed is likely to be true just in proportion as it is practically religious. I esteem it to be the province and aim of Progressive Orthodoxy, holding fast to the Christian faith in the line of development I have tried to indicate, keeping to that point of view which seems to me for a Christian theologian to be central, to work out from it the related problems of anthropology, soteriology, and eschatology. In the light of Him who is the Light of the World we see light. It was the joy of the gentle and heroic poet who has recently been taken from us, and who with his brother poet across the seas has voiced the spiritual aspiration, the struggling doubt, the conquering faith of our century, — it was his delight to watch the dawn,

and he died in the dawn. Progressive Orthodoxy, I trust, has this characteristic: its face is toward the Sun of Righteousness.

The doubts we vainly seek to solve,
The truths we know, are one ;
The known and nameless stars revolve
Around the Central Sun.

EGBERT C. SMYTH.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

MICHAEL SERVETUS.

THE name of Servetus is to most persons best known, perhaps only known, by the ghastly martyrdom he underwent at Geneva. But it has a far higher interest and value from our present point of view, for he was the first to attempt that still unfinished task of modern criticism, to interpret the Christian doctrine straight from the Bible text, and that alone, discarding all the established creeds and all ecclesiastical tradition. The attempt shows faults of the man and faults of the time, — arrogance of temper, excess of self-confidence, haste, disdain of his antagonists, and total ignorance of much that the critic of our day must take for granted. But with whatever defect in knowledge or temper, it was intelligent, bold, self-consistent, made with absolute conviction of being in the right, and so not at all unworthy to be the pioneer in its own line of advance. Besides all this, the study of the life of Servetus is of singular value to the modern critic, if we would know the spirit of the Reformation during its second or organizing period, — that, namely, from the time when the line was sharply drawn at Augsburg, in 1530, which made all further hope of reconciliation with Rome impossible, and before the conflict was as yet definitely transferred from the field of reason to the field of arms.

We do not find it easy to understand the motive that made the death of Servetus appear at the time a necessary and even meritorious act; still less, the eager assent with which the leading reformers, almost without exception, triumphed in it. Calvin was not alone party to it; Servetus was, in the strictest sense, a victim to the general opinion of his time. He escaped from the fire of the Roman Inquisition, only to perish more cruelly in

the flame kindled by Protestant intolerance in the very month that Bloody Mary came to the English throne. It will be convenient to copy here the words in which Calvin introduces him to us in the first sentences of his "Refutation:" "As in our time God has bestowed upon the world this singular grace, to bring back to life the pure doctrine of the Gospel, which had so long been buried, so in our own knowledge the Devil has used his customary craft to darken this light, raising up many fantastical spirits, which have sown the seeds of various errors, as of Anabaptists, Freethinkers, and the like. But among the rest has been a certain Spaniard, Michael Servetus by name, who has heaped up a confused mass of lawless dreams, such that his impiety surpasses all the mischief which others have contrived to do. Though I plainly saw that his poison was more than deadly, still it did not seem to me expedient to apply the remedy direct, and contend against his errors of set purpose; seeing that their absurdity was so gross that I might hope they would soon vanish of themselves in smoke, without any man's opposing them."¹

This "Refutation," signed by fourteen others of the Protestant leaders, in which it is shown that heretics must be put down by the sword, was published a little less than six months after the burning of Servetus; and in reply to it Melancthon, gentlest and most scholarly of the reformers, writes: "I have read your brilliant refutation of his horrible blasphemies: I thank the Son of God, who has given you the prize of victory. The church now and hereafter owes and will owe to you her gratitude. I assent absolutely to your judgment. I assert that your magistrates have done right in putting to death the blasphemer by the regular forms of justice." "It is," he wrote three years later, "a pious and memorable example to all posterity."²

What was the career, and what was the theological offense, that called down this all but unanimous condemnation?

Michael Servetus was a gentleman's son, of Aragon, in Spain, born it is uncertain whether in 1509 or 1511,—his testimony at his two trials making the year doubtful. His father was a notary, of a family of jurists; his mother was of French descent. It is her family name, apparently, which he adds to his own, calling himself *Serveto alias Revès* in the title of his earliest book. For twenty years of his life, during his residence in France, he was

¹ *Works*, viii. p. 457.

² *Works*, ix. p. 131.

known only as *Michel de Villeneuve* (Michael Villanovanus), from the assumed name of his birthplace.¹

Of very precocious intelligence, he received his earlier instruction at the regular convent school, and afterwards at Salamanca. Somewhere about the age of sixteen, electing law instead of the ecclesiastical career he had been intended for, he was sent to the celebrated college at Toulouse. Here the traditions seem to have been grave, almost monastic, with some vivid memories of the old time of persecution. We read of "the iron cage, suspended from a beam above the river, for ducking heretics until they died," and of "the religious processions that filed incessantly through the streets."² Under these influences the attraction of law gave way to the keener fascination of theology. The Lutheran writings had at this time considerable circulation in Spain and in the south of France. We hear, too, of a treatise on "Rational Theology," by Raymund de Sabunda, making Nature as well as Scripture one way of ascent to divine knowledge, which may well have fallen into the young student's hands, and have affected him as later it did Montaigne. He says himself that he learned some things from Erasmus. As early as sixteen or thereabout he must have been an eager student of the Bible, bringing to it at least a fair elementary knowledge of Hebrew as well as Greek, with an extraordinarily vigorous and independent mind of his own. A genius for religion as well as a genius for conquest, we are told, was the haughty claim of his countrymen in those days. Spaniards were "the knights of faith."

In particular, Servetus is held to have been influenced by a small treatise of Melancthon, called "Theological Topics" (*Communes Loci*), which was then the universally accepted textbook of the reformed theology. This was first published in 1521, — the year that Luther appeared at Worms, — when its writer was only twenty-four years old, and was at once received with extraordinary favor. "That little book," said Luther, "contains more solid doctrine than any other since the days of the apostles."³ Its frank protest against the metaphysical method of the

¹ In his trial at Vienne (1553), Servetus declared himself a native of Navarre, aged forty-four; in Geneva, some five months later, to be of Aragon, aged forty-two. The later date is adopted by Tollin, though it adds to the marvel of his singular precocity.

² Tollin, cited in R. Willis's *Servetus and Calvin*, p. 12.

³ A "centennial" edition, a word-for-word copy of the first, was published

schools was sure to attract the student, eager for novelty, and encourage him to bolder steps. There might be prejudice against Luther, who had headed a revolt dangerous to state as well as church; but the young, eloquent scholar, associated almost from his boyhood with the studies of Reuchlin and Erasmus, was sure of a more friendly hearing. His words almost certainly confirmed the purpose, to which Servetus held with singular tenacity through life, to work out a more simple, a more logical, a more purely scriptural form of exposition than any reformer yet had dared to think. The result will appear in the later story.¹

These studies were interrupted, in the summer of 1529, by a summons (perhaps according to an existing pledge or engagement) to attend Quintana, the emperor's private confessor, to the coronation at Bologna, and to the Diet held the following year at Augsburg. Quintana was a Spanish monk, likely to be trusted by the emperor in counsel. But he was, besides, a man of open mind and liberal temper, put for the occasion in place of one more bigoted and severe, who was dispatched on a complimentary mission to Rome. Approaching, with slow and halting steps, a conference likely to decide his whole future policy toward the Reformers, Charles found it essential to be cautious and moderate in his dealing with them, and for this the qualities of his confessor were what he needed. At Spire, in 1529, the Reformers had signed the celebrated Protest against the terms enacted by the Diet there, and by that act had come to be known by the formidable name "Protestants." This attitude of theirs was menacing, backed as they were by the high temper of the German secular princes. But they had not yet learned to distrust the emperor's good faith, and, above all, they knew that their allegiance was of value to him, flanked as he was by the hostility of France and the Turk. They put forward Melanchthon, accord-

at Leipzig in 1821, giving with it certain fundamental changes in later editions. Those of 1535, 1543, and 1559 show a widening departure from the original point of view. The discussions at Augsburg, with the bolder criticism of Servetus, had forced attention to the metaphysical grounds of the creed then held to be orthodox.

¹ All this is very eloquently said by Tollin, in his most instructive book, *Melanchthon und Servetus*, without, however, giving any external evidence, that I can find, of such an influence. Servetus nowhere, except in a final appeal addressed to Melanchthon, speaks of him in person, though appearing as a constant critic of his argument; while Melanchthon betrays an anxious study of his critic, to whom he refers with increasing animosity, culminating in the words before quoted.

ingly, as their champion likeliest to keep the peace, detaining Luther at the safe distance of Coburg, a hundred and twenty miles away.

In the very critical negotiations at Augsburg, lasting nearly six months from early in April (1530), Melancthon appeared more than once to go dangerously beyond his instructions on the way toward Rome, and had to be held sharply in hand by Luther and the secular princes. Holding that there was no doctrinal point of difference with the papists, he was led to accept, one after the other, sundry positions of the scholastic metaphysics, which he found essential to maintain his own opinion in matters of faith, particularly the Trinity; and of these positions we shall find that he has a disturbing consciousness when he comes to face the argument of Servetus. But with the Catholic party the argument narrowed to the practical questions touching the efficacy of sacraments, the authority of the priesthood, and especially the value of "works" as essential to salvation. Once on this ground, compromise was plainly not to be thought of. "Salvation by faith" was the one thing at stake. The conferences were at an end with the rejection of the Protestant "Apology" on the 22d of September, and the Reformation itself was saved under a "Confession" that still left it something substantial to contend for.

As confidential secretary and friend of Quintana, Servetus was himself, if not a member of the emperor's household, at least very close to it, so that he was likely to be a witness of some of the more private discussions, and may even have come to know some of the leading reformers in person, — nay, have visited Luther, as Tollin thinks, as far away as Coburg. This critical time of the Reformation was, at all events, a critical moment in his own career. He had before been sharply offended by the ostentatious despotism of the hierarchy. He was now brought face to face at once with the strength and the weakness of the reformers. His own scheme of reconstruction was shaping itself more clearly in his mind, and personal independence might seem all he needed to complete it. Suddenly, without either quarrel or explanation that we know, he left the service of Quintana and retired to Switzerland, the common refuge of freethinkers. We find him next at Basel, in lively dispute with Œcolampadius, whose point against him is, "You do not admit, then, that the Son of God was to be a man, but [hold] that a man was to be the Son of

God,"¹ and ends by bidding him "confess the Son consubstantial and coeternal with God, that we may hold you as a Christian."² In his reply, Servetus appears to be afraid of some restraint, and begs that he may not be hindered from putting forth in France certain "books" which he has ready against the fair at Lyons.

This apparently means the first literary work of Servetus, "*De Trinitatis Erroribus*." This title we may render, "False Views of the Trinity;" we should call it to-day a "critique" of that doctrine. It is a neat volume of about two hundred pages, without name of publisher or place of publication, but with the writer's name in full, *per Michaellem Serveto alias Revès*. It was printed at Hagenau, near Strasburg. The disputes with Œcolampadius had probably made Servetus eager, and his publisher reluctant, to assume the risk.³ It was followed, in 1532, by two "Dialogues on the Trinity," in which the argument is expanded and reinforced, and four brief essays, on Justification, Christ's Kingdom, Law and Gospel, and Charity, bound up with it.

Before we consider the substance of the book, it is well to recall for a moment the argument and style of Melancthon's "Topics," which we may hold to have been, in a sense, the immediate occasion of it. The motive with Melancthon, as we have already seen, is almost purely practical and undogmatic. Speculations on the metaphysical grounds or reasons of a Trinity he seems altogether to disown. "To know Christ," he says, "is to know his works (*beneficia*), not, as the dogmatists teach, to gaze upon the mode of incarnation. . . . It is Christian knowledge to know what the law requires; whence you are to obtain power to fulfill the law, or pardon for transgression; how the afflicted conscience may be comforted" (p. 9). "The Holy Spirit," he says again, "is nothing else than the living will and act of God. When, therefore, we are new-born of the Spirit, which is the living will of God, we already of ourselves do that very thing which the Law commands" (p. 128). Here he appears expressly to discard the

¹ The Latin is not quite clear: *Non fateris igitur quod filius Dei futurus erat homo, sed homo futurus filius Dei*.

² *Works of Calvin*, viii. 861. See, also, the testimony as to Zwingli, p. 744.

³ The copy of the original edition which I cite (possibly the only one in America) was furnished me by the kindness of a friend. A MS. of the *Errors* is in the Harvard University Library. A second edition, almost a facsimile, was published after his death in Holland.

theory of "hypostasis," or quasi-personality, which had generally been made the groundwork of the scholastic doctrine of the Trinity. Nay, the term "hypostasis," which figures so largely in his later discussion of the subject, appears, so far as I find, only once in all this essay, and is then very inadequately rendered "*expectation of things hoped for*" (Hebr. xi. 1). This rendering, further, shows the weakest point in his view at this time, making salvation a matter of promise only, not fulfillment; against which Servetus, with strong emphasis, urges the assurance of *present* salvation — as an earnest of that hereafter — in the sense of Paul, and of all in every time who have best understood the mind of Paul. Again, in exposition of the Divine Word (*Logos*): "The Son is called *image*, or *word*: he is thus an image (or likeness) begotten of the thought of God." This is further explained by saying that, while our thoughts are but evanescent acts (*actiones*), into which we do not convey our own being (*essentia*), the thought of God is "an image of himself, not evanescent, but subsisting by the communication to it of his own being" (p. 250). This might be understood as a noble, poetic way of defining every act of creation; but when it is taken to explain the exceptional generation of One Divine Person in the image of the Father, it becomes a phrase of vague and wholly unintelligible dogmatism, opening an easy way to more rationalizing speculation, which Servetus takes prompt advantage of.

Turning now to the "False Views of the Trinity," we are struck, first of all, by the wonderful self-assertion of this boy of twenty — what some have called the haughty temper of the Spaniard — that shows in it. Servetus never appears in the attitude of the modest learner, not even as a sober reasoner, ready to meet an opponent on equal terms in courteous debate. He is always confident, ardent, aggressive. In explaining his point he has a tone of superiority, almost of condescension, and demands rather than invites assent. His argument is sometimes pure assertion; often, again, it is (as in speaking of moral liberty and the value of good works) plain good sense, cutting through the subtleties of formal theology in a fashion his opponents were no way prepared for. Perhaps they found it hardest of all to understand his plea (p. 78): "All my philosophy and science I find in the Bible."

It would be impossible, in moderate space, to give the argument of the book. For our purpose it is more important to see

something of its manner and style, especially to see those qualities of his which provoked a rage that might almost be called speechless among his adversaries; "maddest of men," he calls them, "who have plunged into such insanity." It is to be observed at the outset that he nowhere attacks the Trinity, or the deity of Christ, but only attempts to show how these most orthodox of terms are to be understood. The opening paragraph is as follows: —

"In exploring the holy mysteries of the divine Triad, I have held that one should begin with the Man; for I see that many, ascending without the foundation of Christ to speculation on the Word, ascribe little or nothing to the Man, and give even the true Christ completely to oblivion. These I will take care to remind who this Christ really is. Further, what and how much is to be ascribed to Christ, the church shall judge. Since the proper name (*pronomine*) shows that that which they call 'the humanity' is a man, I will grant these three points: 1. This [man] is Jesus Christ. 2. He is the Son of God. 3. He is God."

Again he says, regarding the Word as the image of God: —

"What is reflected in the Word is *Christ himself*; as, if I hold a mirror, you may see me both face to face and in the mirror, but it is only one person that you see; . . . in such a mirror God willed and ordained that He should himself be seen" (pp. 94, 108). . . . "The Word, then, in God uttering it, is *God himself speaking*; . . . and since the Word was made man, we understand by the Word Christ himself, who is the Word of God. . . . Christ is himself the face (*facies*) of the Father; there is no other 'person' of God but Christ; there is no other *hypostasis* of God but he; the entire deity of the Father is in him" (pp. 48, 112).

Again, in the interpretation of Scripture, he declares: —

"Throughout the Old Testament the name God (*Elohim*, not *Jehovah*) is applied to Christ, namely, the *revealed* God; he that created the world, appeared to Abraham and Moses, etc. So, too, the name 'Elohim' is given to Moses, to Cyrus, and to the angels, but never the name 'Jehovah,' which is *causative*, signifying the Fount of Being; while Elohim, Logos, and Christ are in their signification one. God in himself cannot be conceived in thought. He is known, not in nature, but in manifestation (*specie*); not by nature, but by grace (p. 12). All

theories of the divine nature apart from the Word are blasphemies against Christ" (p. 103).

Of the doctrine of the Trinity he writes : —

"The only Trinity is a trinity of manifestations, or modes of action, not of persons, and, as Tertullian teaches, that trinity will cease in the eternal world" (p. 82). Your trinity ("three things in one nature") is "only an imaginary play (*motus*) of appearances, which proves you witless" (p. 33). "The meaning of the word *person* [i. e., as 'mask' or 'impersonation'] is so well known to the Latins, that some devil put it into their hearts to invent hypothetical (*mathematicos*) persons, and to thrust upon us things imaginary and metaphysical" (p. 36). . . . "Plainly, therefore, we are tritheists, one God being in three parts; we are atheists, that is, without God" (p. 21). "There is no Spirit, properly so called, outside of man; Stephen saw in vision both God and Christ, but no third Person; angels 'behold the face of your Father,' not of a Trinity" (p. 30).

A few examples may be added to illustrate Servetus' pungent and epigrammatic style of expression : —

"Of Christ's kingdom the door is faith, the end Eternal Life, and all the way between is Charity." Of the dogmatists, "all seem to me to have part truth, part error; and every one looks down on the other's error, but no one sees his own." Again, "more faith is to be given to one truth confessed by an enemy than to a thousand falsehoods of our friends." "The church may remain, without remaining a church of God" (p. 43). Again: "Faith is the *substance* of things hoped for," — a present salvation, — "not the Lutheran faith" (p. 96). As to Predestination: "There is no past or future with God" (p. 81).

Such a challenge as this was sure to call attention. Melancthon, in particular, felt himself bound to reconsider his early position. For a time he seems to hesitate. "You ask," he writes to a friend in February, 1533, "what I think of Servetus. I see that he is keen and adroit (*vafer*) in disputation, but, frankly, I do not allow him weight. He has, I think, confused fancies and notions not well shaped out upon the things he treats. As to justification, he is clearly wild; *about the triad*, you know I have always feared those [disputes] would break out some time. Good God! what tragedies will this question stir among our successors! *if the Logos is an hypostasis, if the Spirit is an hypostasis!* I turn to those words of Scripture which bid us call upon Christ :

this is to render him divine honor, and is full of consolation ; but to seek out anxiously the notions and differences of hypotheses is no great profit."¹

This letter of Melanchthon has been called "the parting of the ways." So far, there might seem a possibility that the current of doctrinal opinion among the reformers would be turned into a broader channel, and that he had it in his power to say the decisive word. He is just now giving serious study to Servetus (*Servetum multum lego*), but with less and less of favor. In a little more than a month his course is clear ; "he has decided to retract," and to reconstruct his theology, as we have seen, on the lines of the ancient creeds. He approaches Rome by accepting the scholastic doctrine of the Trinity and the church doctrine of Works, influenced, perhaps, by memories of the radical outbreak of 1525 in Germany, and of the pressure brought to bear at Augsburg.² A few years later (1539) he writes to put the authorities of Venice on their guard against the dangerous spread of the "Servetian heresy" in northern Italy. "Spain," said Zanchi, "produced the hen, Italy has hatched the eggs, and now we see the chicks beginning to peep."

Meanwhile Servetus has vanished out of sight, and his name is unheard among men till he reappears, twenty years later, at his fatal trial in Geneva. Still in early youth, less than twenty-four years old at most, he did not care to face the storm he had raised. His reform might wait, and there was enough else he had to learn and do. Those twenty years he spent in France as *Michel de Villeneuve*. First he is a student for some years in Paris, learning anatomy with Vesalius, lecturing on astronomy and physical geography, disputing on theology with Calvin, and practicing judicial astrology, which brings him into trouble, and obliges him to seek another place and occupation. During some part of these years he has found employment with a publisher, Trechsel, in or near Lyons ; and of his labors at this time we have an interesting proof in a handsome Latin folio translation of the geographer Ptolemy, edited by "Michael Villanovanus,"

¹ The italics here represent the Greek phrases which Melanchthon is fond of using : the term *triad* is less compromising than *trinity*. "Where he agrees with Rome," says Tollin, "he talks church Latin ; where he differs, the language of the New Testament" (p. 84).

² What the alternative might have been is eloquently put by Tollin (p. 133).

adorned with rude cuts and some fifty ruder maps, published in 1535. The curious reader finds in this volume a paragraph on Palestine, which was made a serious charge against Servetus in Geneva, eighteen years later, as a fling in the face of Scripture: "Still you must know, kind reader, that it is wrongly, or in mere boasting, that such excellence has been ascribed to this region, seeing that the experience itself of merchants and travelers avows it to be rude, sterile, and lacking of every charm. Wherefore you may call the Land of Promise a land in promise (only), not worth praising in the mother tongue."¹

It happened that while lecturing in Paris Servetus had gained the friendship of a young ecclesiastic, Pierre Paumier, who was in course of time promoted to be archbishop of Vienne, on the Rhone, twenty miles south of Lyons. He now, hearing of his old friend as a practicing physician in a village not far off, persuaded him to remove to that city, giving him a home under his own protection in the precincts of his palace. For twelve years Servetus now led a life comparatively prosperous and at ease, with widening reputation as a practitioner and a man of letters. The most important work he did here was to revise and superintend the printing of a very elegant Latin Bible, — Pagnini's version, first printed fifteen years before. The new work appeared in 1542. In this Servetus took another important step in his chosen career of independent critic and expositor. He was, indeed, perhaps the first who introduced historical criticism into the systematic study and interpretation of the Bible, and he did it, naturally, in a way to bring him into trouble afterwards. Thus, in commenting on the Hebrew prophets, he takes the bold ground of asserting that all their predictions, rightly understood, refer to events and persons of their own time. He carries out this method, in his own positive fashion, in the case of those prophecies which have been and still are most confidently held to predict explicitly the messianic kingdom of Jesus Christ. He makes terms with current opinion, to be sure, by reserving a second or "spiritual" sense in which these prophecies apply to the Christian dispensation; but the natural sense is plainly what

¹ *Scias tamen, lector optime, injuriâ aut jactantiâ purâ tantam huic terræ bonitatem fuisse adscriptam, eo quod ipsa experientia mercatorum et peregre proficiscentium hanc incultam, sterilem, omnî dulcedine carentem depromit. Quare promissam terram pollicitam et non vernaculâ linguâ laudantem [laudandam] pronuncies.* The paragraph was not his, and it was omitted in the edition of 1541.

he most believes in. Catholic and Protestant were scandalized alike. Servetus anticipates the historical criticism which has since justified his bold sagacity in many cases, but in the eyes of his contemporaries all the great strains of Hebrew prophecy seemed to be profaned by mere audacious guesswork. The pierced hands and feet are those of David in flight among the thorny hills; the gall and vinegar given him to drink point at the churlish inhospitality of Nabal; the promised Child, the Wonderful, the Prince of Peace, only anticipates the glories of Hezekiah's reign; and, worst of all, the Man of Sorrows, on whom "the Lord hath laid the iniquity of us all," is King Cyrus, in the bitter conflict through which he fought his way to victory!¹ Only by a figure, and remotely, are the words fulfilled in the sufferings or the glories of a crucified Redeemer. To the mind of that day all this seemed, and it was, a gratuitous offense. To us the interest is in the premature attempt at a natural interpretation; still more, in the hint it gives of a restless, vain and reckless temper in the man.

This task, it is likely, was what drew Servetus back into the circle of irresistible attraction towards his earlier studies. In 1546, four years after the publication of Pagnini's Bible, he had completed the draft of his one elaborated and independent work, — that which he gave the best of his life to finish, and which in the finishing exacted the forfeit of his life. This work is his "Christianity Restored" (*Christianismi Restitutio*). It is, as we have it now, a thick duodecimo of 734 pages, made up in substance of three parts, — a recast, much modified and expanded, of his early critique on the Trinity (seven books); a series of essays on special topics, Faith and Justice of Christ's Kingdom, Regeneration, the Lord's Supper, and the Kingdom of Antichrist (seven books), some of these being treated with great vigor, power, and indignant eloquence; and a sequel of thirty letters written to Calvin in the correspondence which now followed, closing with an "Apology" addressed to Melanchthon. Servetus was now, at the age of thirty-five or thirty-seven, fully equipped, as he felt, to claim and hold his own place among the reformers of the church. He would measure himself first deliberately with those who seemed to be pillars of the Reformation; and so he sent a copy of his manuscript draft to Calvin "in confidence" (*sub sigillo secreti*), so eliciting any comment which he might wish to make.

¹ These instances are taken from the account of the book in Willis' *Servetus and Calvin*.

The fortunes of the book, as we shall see, were as strange, almost as tragic, as the fortunes of the writer. Calvin never returned the manuscript, — which was long after hunted up and used in evidence at the trial of Servetus. Instead of comment, he sent a copy of his own "Institutes," with the remark that he had no time for discussion: his opinion, he said, would be found recorded there. To his friend Farel he wrote: "Servetus has sent me a large volume of his own ravings, with the swaggering of a bully (*thrasonice*), saying that I shall see wonderful and unheard-of things in it. If I consent, he proposes to come here. But I will not pledge him my word; for if he should come, only let my authority prevail, *I will never let him go away alive.*"¹ Servetus, with like amenity, returned his copy of the "Institutes," with abundant comments in his own style written on the margin. "There is hardly a page," writes Calvin in his acrid phrase, "that is not defiled by his vomit." So the deadly battle of the books began.

"Christianity Restored" went slowly through the press at Vienne, under its author's supervision, at a small printing-office in an obscure quarter of the town. This was not, apparently, from any dread of publicity on his own part; possibly for the printer's sake, whom he did his best to screen upon his trial. But, to give the book its best effect, its publication was held in reserve as a surprise upon the public. Early in the fatal year 1553, a thousand copies were made up in two great bales of five hundred each, one being intended for the Easter fair at Frankfurt, and the other for distribution nearer home. With superfluous courtesy, or, as he would call it, effrontery, an advance copy was sent to Calvin. That copy is one of the two of the original issue which now exist: it was used in evidence at the trial of Servetus in Geneva, and is now in the great library at Paris, blackened by time and scrawled over with the notes of the prosecuting counsel. The other, which was used in the earlier trial at Vienne, found its way through many hands to Hungary, and at length, for safe keeping, to the imperial library at Vienna.²

Servetus, as we must remember, was not yet known by his true name in France. The only indications of it in the volume

¹ To Farel, February, 1546. He writes in the same terms to Viret (cited in evidence in the case of Bolsec).

² An edition, said to be an almost exact facsimile, was printed in 1790. A copy of this is in the Harvard University Library.

are in the text (in Hebrew) on the title-page: "At that time shall Michael the Prince stand up" (Dan. xii. 1),¹ and the initials "M. S. V.," at the end of the book. These were not needed for identification, but were enough for evidence; and Calvin at once, through a correspondence at second-hand, which he would gladly have disavowed, put the Catholic authorities at Lyons upon the track of the heretic sheltered at Vienne in the archbishop's own palace.² So promptly was this done that the bale of books lying there was seized unopened, and within a few days Servetus was a prisoner of the Inquisition. He was speedily tried and condemned, and would have been burned alive in April, but, while waiting sentence, he quietly walked out of the prison-gate at four o'clock one fine morning, by aid of some liberties allowed him, — expressly, it would seem, to invite his escape, since his medical skill had made him friends among the officials, — and for four months he was lost to view. His effigy was burned in all due form, and his books, except that single copy, were consumed in the same pile. The Protestant authorities at Frankfort were warned meanwhile, and the copies sent there were also destroyed.

For four months, then, Servetus wandered up and down in France, barred from Spain by the Inquisition, and vainly seeking a way of escape to Naples. On the 12th of August, on a Saturday night, he appeared at a little inn in Geneva, meaning to seek a boat and cross the lake next morning. But the strict Genevan Sabbath forced him to wait. An improbable account even has it that he lay hid there nearly a month, seeking to find friends, or make them, among the enemies of Calvin, — for this was a critical year in the town politics, and the contention was sharp between the "patriots," who made the civil, and the "strangers," who made the religious, aristocracy. On Sunday, the 13th, attending with characteristic rashness at the afternoon

¹ An allusion not only to his own name, but to the approaching reign of the saints (Rev. xii. 7), which he eagerly predicted.

² The part in this taken by Calvin is doubtful. He himself says "there is nothing in it," which Rilliet thinks conclusive. The letters were written by a friend of his, De Trie, and at his instigation, as Willis shows to be almost certain. The second letter is particularly damaging, as it proves that, to make the evidence conclusive, Calvin forwarded to Vienne private communications in Servetus' handwriting, which he had requested to have returned, but which were treacherously used against him. His arrest was procured by one of the basest tricks even of the Roman Inquisition, — sending for him to visit a sick patient, and waylaying him upon this errand of mercy.

service, he was recognized, and before night he was lodged in jail.

Of the tedious trial that followed, the record is given us in minute detail, which it would be impossible to follow here.¹ Two or three points, however, we need to bear in mind. Calvin, while he urged the prosecution, and did all he could to bring it to a fatal issue, appears only once in the course of the trial, at the end of the preliminary four days' examination (August 14–17), which was to prove the *fact of heresy*. After this, the trial was purely a criminal process before the Lesser Council (of twenty-five members), all laymen, to establish the guilt of the *propagation of heresy*, as a crime against the public peace. This tribunal was unfriendly to Calvin, and permitted no ecclesiastical interference; thus it ordered against his wish the appeal to sister churches, and rejected his final plea that the penalty should be death by sword instead of fire.

Again, this latter stage of the process, occupying just two months, shows three distinct periods or phases. In the first (August 21–24), Servetus, who has been thoroughly cowed by the ferocity of the attack, or else exhausted by the debates, is submissive and humble, standing only on his defense. In the second, he takes heart from the attitude of the Council, — which had just nullified a decree of excommunication pronounced by Calvin and his clergy against Berthelier, the leader of the hostile party, — and is so far emboldened as to make a formal counter-charge against Calvin, demanding that he be put on trial instead, with the same risks and penalties, including forfeiture of goods to him, Servetus. This stage continues till towards the end of September (August 28–September 22). Meanwhile it is resolved to ask advice of the four leading Swiss Protestant churches in Basel, Zurich, Berne, and Schaffhausen, — a course which occupies about four weeks, and still further encourages the accused. His fate really turned on the answers from these churches, and, foreseeing this, Calvin took due measures to forewarn them. In each case the reply was to the same effect: all confided in the wisdom of the Genevan Council to *put a stop to heresy*, while none hinted at the means. Rejecting Calvin's plea

¹ The record has been accurately studied, and is very clearly summarized, by Albert Rilliet in a small volume, of which a translation (by W. K. Tweedie) was published in Edinburgh in 1846. A briefer and probably fairer account is given in the article by Saisset, referred to below.

for mitigation, the council chose that the heretic should die by fire, under the old imperial law.

The sentence was drawn out at great length on the 26th of October. Servetus did not know it till the next day, Friday, two hours before the execution. On a rising ground near the lake, a little to the eastward of the city, he was chained to a stake, and, the oldest account (that in *Sandius*) says, for more than two hours, while stifling in the fumes of straw and brimstone, suffered the torture of a fire of "green oak fagots, with the leaves still on," the wind blowing the flame so that it would only scorch, not kill, till the crowd, in horror, heaped the fuel closer. His last cry was, "Jesus, Son of the eternal God, have mercy on me!" Farel's retort was, "Call rather on the Eternal Son of God!" "I know well," he had written not long before, "that for this thing I must die, but not for that does my heart fail me that I may be a disciple like the Master."¹

To modern thought, this "ferocious pedantry," as Saisset calls it, seems as idle as it was merciless; but, in truth, the entire process of thought for which Servetus suffered is contained in it. If we look through the whole long record of his cross-questioning, or the longer controversy that went before, we find it the one point on which he never varies. He will never admit the transcendental fiction of *hypostases*, or quasi-personalities, to represent the agency of the Eternal Word or the Holy Spirit in man's salvation. In this one thing he departs furthest from the thought of his own day, and approaches nearest to ours. His theology is, in the strictest sense, "Christocentric," in the sense that, as Tollin phrases it, "from the first he asserts Jesus Christ — the personal, historical, individual man — to be altogether (*durch und durch*) God, and always holds fast to that belief." It is Scriptural in the sense that every point of it rests on the exactest exposition of the Bible phrase, by a rule of interpretation, which he has honestly adopted, in full accord with Melancthon's earliest and most widely accepted work.

If now, upon a general view, we try to see what was the actual contribution Servetus made to the religious thought of his day, we shall find it to be something like the following: First, his rejection of the purely metaphysical or scholastic trinity, with the supreme exaltation of Christ, in which he approaches much

¹ The words were copied by Saisset from the Latin in Servetus' handwriting.

more nearly the "new orthodoxy" than either the Unitarian criticism or the philosophic rationalism of our day. Next in importance is his vigorous assertion of a *present salvation* through Christ, as opposed to the formal and feeble "expectancy" into which the living gospel of the New Testament had been dwarfed by Melancthon; together with the vindication of that gospel from the restraint of the Mosaic law. Next is his repudiation of infant baptism, which he attacks with a scornful vehemence quite unintelligible to us, till we see how to his mind it carried with it the theory of sacramental efficacy that made the evil power of sacerdotalism, with the assumption of a birth-curse, to be removed only by magic spells, or "sorcery." It is in this connection (Ep. xv.) that he calls Calvin "a thief and a robber," as bringing souls into the fold, not through the Door, but by another way, and recommends to him the following prayer (Ep. xvi.):—

"Most merciful Jesus, Son of God, who with such token of love didst take little children in thine arms and bless them, bless now and by the hand of thy power guide these little ones, that by faith in thee they may be sharers of thy heavenly kingdom. O most gentle Jesus, Son of God, who from birth wast wholly free from guilt, grant that we may abide without guile in the simplicity of these infants, that the kingdom of heaven, which thou hast declared to belong to such, may so by thy favor be kept for us, and by thy boundless mercy may they, made humble in spirit, be gathered into it."

These are not the words of one who, as has been said, in rejecting the baptism of infants, left them to eternal death.

Respecting the nature of absolute Deity, we have seen that Servetus regards it as, in the phrase of our day, "unknowable." His opinion on that matter is interpreted as being the "higher pantheism" of the neo-Platonists, of Spinoza, Schleiermacher, and Emerson. His later language on matters of religious speculation is increasingly mystical, as it has been with most men of native religious genius, and as it notably was with the apostle Paul. But in constructing a rational Christianity, whose mysteries are developed from the data of metaphysics, he is the forerunner, not of the modern mystics, but (says Saisset) of the philosophical schools of Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher.¹

¹ See the two admirable articles on Servetus in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of 1848, i. 585, 817.

In respect to the ultimate destiny of man, Servetus implies, if he does not positively assert, a universal redemption through purgatorial fire, purifying, not avenging. "Place, time, and motion shall cease," he says, "when sky and earth are passed away; after the resurrection we shall dwell in the Divine idea alone" (Ep. xvii.). Last, and from the human point of view most significant of all, is his vigorous assertion of moral liberty: "By such arguments to prove the will enslaved is as if you were to say, 'I cannot fly, therefore my will is in bondage.'" In keeping with this is his estimate of good works and his doctrine of salvation: "In the gospel, to save is to make whole, that is, to heal one who is sick." "Good works avail when they are naturally good; they are even of service to those who are justified already." All this was sorely against the mind of the Reformers, and weighed in the scale against him; but thus it was that he "won for the Lutherans their doctrine of liberty," says the Lutheran Tollin, "against the rigid Calvinistic Predestination, which he attacks with his keenest weapons." The pantheism he was charged with might, it is true, seem to swallow up all free-will in man; but, as he held it himself, the life of God in the soul necessarily implies free volition: "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."¹

By diligent search among Servetus' writings, a list was made out of thirty-eight charges, or counts, of heresy. Some of these turn on terms or phrases of pure metaphysics, — essence, substance, person (*hypostasis*), and the like, — which have little or no clear meaning to the common mind; some on matters of gratuitous offense, as when he compares the popular Trinity to a three-headed Cerberus or the monster Geryon, or says the Trinitarians are logically atheists, or calls the rite of baptism "sorcery." Some are offenses purely personal. In the final summing up are given these four: Scandals and troubles in the churches, lasting now these four-and-twenty years; blasphemies against God; infecting the world with heresies; calumnies against the leading reformers, especially Calvin. The grounds of these have been sufficiently shown already.

¹ It is to explain his theory of the Spirit working within us that he introduces his illustration, or discovery, of the pulmonary circulation of the blood (*Restitutio*, pp. 169-174). Contact with vital air in the lungs (such is his argument) is what gives life to the blood, and, by its circulation, to the body; so contact with the Divine Spirit is what gives life to the soul. This, perhaps, was what made his enemies say that he had reduced the Holy Ghost to empty air!

The real reason of his condemnation was a sort of terror that came upon the Protestant world, lest its great work should be all undone. Not heresy as opinion, but heresy as a social peril, was the charge on which Servetus was condemned. What the Reformation just then needed was not so much liberty of thinking as unity of action. Mere liberty of thinking it might well dread. There lay before it a century of struggle, always obstinate and often desperate, to save its very life. Servetus had the faults, along with the fine chivalrous quality, of a free fighter in a deadly field. Mere liberty of speculation, like his, runs out fast to individualism, to infinite subdivision, to moral weakness and decay. Servetus did, perhaps could do, no one great constructive work. "Calvinism saved Europe" is a verdict cited with approval by John Morley lately.¹ This is a testimony, not to the truth of Calvin's creed, but to the vigor of his administration. Protestantism, to do its work in the world, had first of all to take the form of a strong executive force, able to meet the Adversary on his own ground. Religion must be, not a private speculation, but a discipline of life. The relentless theocracy of Geneva, the rigid Presbyterianism that Knox carried from there to Scotland, the military temper of the Netherlands under the sternest creed of Calvinism, the sober valor that founded a Puritan commonwealth in England and America, — these made its dominating and fighting force. Servetus came "with a light heart" across its path, and was crushed. His martyrdom was its one great crime against the free conscience it had invoked. The one motive we can easily understand or pardon in that crime is the genuine alarm his prosecutors betrayed, lest, by forcing on their hard-won liberties into fresh fields of controversy, they should risk the whole. The error which looked to them so flagrant they hoped to burn away in his funeral pile. His truth is saved for us by that very fire which tries every man's work, of what sort it is. For without that baleful light it would doubtless have perished with him.

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¹ *The Nineteenth Century*, February, 1892.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.

NOT long ago, when liberalism had still all the buoyancy of youth, the clever people whose judgment was supposed to make public opinion were wont to speak of the Roman Catholic Church in a tone of hatred and contempt, as of something at once mischievous and exploded. If at any time their hearts softened towards her, it was to write her elegy and to lament that one so beautiful, for whom more heroes had suffered than for Helen of Troy, should have vanished from the earth. They glibly spoke of her in the past tense, with an arrogance which they felt to be insight. Her mysteries and her legends had passed, for them, into the realm of mythology. They had read in the reviews that the world was not made in six days and that Moses was not the author of the Pentateuch. They had an earnest conviction that priests were licentious and that monks and nuns were unproductive consumers. Miracles, they knew, were impossible, and they had a general impression that the writings of theologians were futile and tedious. It did not occur to them that, in spite of these hard facts, the church might still possess something of human value, or that some of the forces which originally established her ascendancy might still be active in the world. It did not occur to them that the source of her power might lie in her adequate response to certain permanent needs of human nature which these critics, to whom she seemed so empty, might have overlooked. They attributed her continued existence to the mere inertia of all sublunary things, and to the natural conservatism of vested interests. They waited calmly for her disintegration, and if they sometimes wondered at her lingering so long, they reflected that the quickest rising of the resistless tide is imperceptible to one who stands watching it impatiently by the shore.

Many things, however, tend to show that the Roman Catholic Church does not stand in the modern world merely as a survival; it is partly an embodiment of new and vital forces of society and a natural form, not yet outgrown, of the spontaneous life of the people. The ostracism of the church from reputable intellectual society has not been of long duration. Not only has she continued to produce theologians and preachers within her walls, as was to be expected, but the outer world has, since the beginning

of this century, given many and increasing proofs of a returning appreciation of her spirit and power. Symptoms of this were seen in France soon after the Revolution. Peace with Rome was a part of Napoleon's policy. His constructive political genius, more fruitful, if less brilliant, than his genius in war, made him see the necessity of it; a spirit of moderation and of submission to the conditions of the time won for him here that success which the absence of the same spirit made impossible for him as a general. The political restoration of religion found echoes in literature which, if they seem feeble to us at this distance, were strong in their day and generation. Chateaubriand felt the genius of Christianity and described it in a book full of eloquence and charm. To cogency or profundity it had, indeed, no claim; but these defects were in part supplied by the writings of Joseph de Maistre, a writer who defended the church and her authority with brilliant logic and wit. But for a certain pungent originality of his thought, he might be regarded as a traditional and professional apologist of the throne and the altar. He appeals, however, to the *enfants du siècle* and is one himself, by virtue of his underlying pessimism, which consists in a penetrating and sardonic exposition of the brutality of nature and the impotence of man. This sort of philosophy is, of course, very distasteful to our facile natural theologians who, not without some reason, call it one-sided and perverse; but experience abundantly shows that such insistence on the irrationality of things prepares the mind, as suffering does the heart, for the acceptance of a supernatural religion.

More or less in the spirit of Chateaubriand, the French romantic poets had much to say in praise of the Catholic religion. Lamartine and the young Victor Hugo sang melodiously the hymns of a new piety — not whole-hearted, perhaps, but sentimentally virtuous and humane. Alfred de Musset, with more depth and power, confined himself to expressing regret and tenderness for a faith he had entirely lost. He has expressed more perfectly than perhaps any one else the attitude common among men of intelligence and feeling in Catholic countries toward their church, — an attitude of estrangement not unmixed with self-accusation and discouragement:

Je ne crois pas, O Christ, à ta parole sainte,
Je suis venu trop tard dans un monde trop vieux.

There is in this and in many other passages the sentiment that

Christianity is not like any other religion which may be outgrown and yield its place to a new faith not less natural, hopeful, or inspiring ; there is the feeling that this has been the one great passion of the human soul, her one supreme illusion, and that after such a tragedy she can never again be young.

L'espérance humaine est lasse d'être mère,
Et le sein tout meurtri d'avoir tant allaité,
Elle fait son repos de sa stérilité.

No doubt this is an unfounded despair, born of too much brooding over particular disappointments. It is an evidence of the romantic conceit that mistakes the soul for the universe and the moods of man for the forces of nature. Never will the decay of a religion weaken the rays of the sun or stay the buds from bursting in the spring-time. The younger generation whose pulse will beat as strongly as their fathers' and whose hot blood will breed as luxuriant fancies in their brains, will laugh at us, when the grass is thick upon our graves, for thinking our griefs eternal. Yet such excessive discouragement proves how great a hold this religion can take upon the mind, since it is identified, even by those who no longer believe it, with the spiritual life and health of humanity.

While these regrets for the decay of religion were being felt in France, a movement was going on in England to restore Patristic doctrine and ritualistic worship. If this did not involve, necessarily, a recognition of the jurisdiction of Rome it meant an adoption of all that distinguishes Catholicism from Protestantism as a religion. A Roman Catholic, a Greek, and an Anglican belong to different churches, but they have the same religion ; they pray and preach, they live and die in the same spirit. The Catholic and the Calvinist, on the contrary, have nothing in common except the name of Christian and a few theological abstractions. The religious life of each is incomprehensible to the other. The Oxford movement was, therefore, an attempt to restore Catholicism in religion, if not in government, and as such it was a tribute to the moral and intellectual value of the Catholic church. No one needs to be reminded of its importance or of its success. To it the Roman Church owes some of its most notable defenders, and the English Church much of its vitality. Wherever the influence of this reform has extended, we have seen a transformation of Episcopal churches which, pleasing and needful as it is externally, is not merely external. We see a renewed

faith and spirituality ; a restoration of the sacraments as mysteries, or religious acts of intrinsic influence ; a consequent assiduity in devotion, and some approach to that familiar affection for sacred things and heavenly personages which is so eminently a note of Catholicism. But the fact which more than all this shows that the English High Church is a new birth and not, as the ignorant sometimes imagine, merely a new affectation, is its ability to reach the poor. It has the secret of that charity which does not allow its objects to forget that it is love. Both in its practical success and in its intellectual tendency, this reform of the English Church is the most hopeful sign which a Catholic can point to in the modern world. It accentuates that inevitable movement of Protestantism, foreseen from the beginning but slow to manifest itself, either back into Catholicism or onward into natural religion and wistful benevolence. The impartial observer sees, with ever increasing clearness, that if Christianity is to retain any strength, either as an intellectual system or as a social force, it must present itself as a divinely established and authoritative church capable of feeding the imagination and directing the conscience.

Other countries are not without similar evidences of a changed feeling towards Catholicism. In Germany we could hardly expect such a change to express itself in literary or religious movements. The intellectual life of that country is a separate and abstract pursuit carried on for the sake of the advancement of science and of her votaries, and not connected in any vital way with the life of the people. The great majority of influential scholars belong to Protestant Germany : if they are teachers of theology or philosophy, they may concern themselves with religion so far as to give a definition of it, and a classification of its varieties ; but apart from this they let the government deal with the matter according to its lights. The historians, to be sure, are compelled to treat of the history and influence of the church, and they do so in general with admirable impartiality and *Objectivität*. *In such discussions the Catholic version of certain parts of history naturally suffers cruel shocks ; it is not easy for any system, political or philosophical, to force all the facts into harmony with its preconceptions and requirements. Defenders of the Papal interpretation of history like Jannsen are, of course, not lacking ; but such writers, pledged in advance to conclusions already defined, can never inspire entire confidence. The apparent violence done

to history in the service of theology and ecclesiasticism, combined, no doubt, with a certain national jealousy of Papal authority, was the cause of the Old Catholic movement; but the political and social failure of this schism is plainer than its historical justification. The strength of the Catholic Church in Germany is more apparent in politics than in letters. A compact body of a hundred deputies, held together and guided by the influence of the church, has won signal triumphs, and is now lending active support to the social reforms which the German government has so earnestly undertaken. The failure of the Old Catholic party and the defeat of the Prussian government in the protracted *Kulturkampf* are most obvious signs of the renewed vitality of German Catholicism.

The state of things in Germany, however, is rather a proof of warmer allegiance of Catholics to their church than of the greater good will on the part of the general public. The same may be said of Italy and Spain. In these countries, as in Catholic states generally, Catholicism has become a "cause;" it is no longer so much the inevitable religion of all as the chosen system of a class or a party. In the days before the Reformation the religion of Christendom had in it something placid and broadly naturalistic; the multifarious influences of nature and of life, which had made the soul of paganism, mingled with it, so that the life of the imagination was one, and history and poetry, chivalry and faith were, together and indistinguishably, the sources of noble inspiration. The Reformation brought on a period of fanatical and misguided controversy; this singularly impoverished intellectual life among the Protestants, and the Catholic Church was reduced almost to a sect, and acquired the spirit commonly associated with the name of Jesuit. Religion steadily became less intimately bound up with common life and public ideals; it was felt to be an extraneous and disturbing force. The lovers of harmonious and fruitful civilization must needs lament such a moral disintegration; it impresses on the former national religion the eagerness and pettiness of a faction, and deprives the race of that fund of unquestioned traditions and beliefs, that common *Weltanschauung* without which nothing great is done in art or literature.

But even if we so desired, it would be impossible to go back. No nation can now withdraw itself from the influences of the age; there is no spot so retired and sacred as not to be swept by every wind of doctrine. We live in a universal society of science, let-

ters and manners. In such a society the divisions of mankind tend to become social and professional rather than geographical. All over the world workmen, professional men, society in town and country, are becoming like each other. The types of thought, also, like types of life, are found everywhere, and nowhere found exclusively. The structure of our minds is as various as the architecture of our houses. As on one street we may see a Byzantine theatre, a Gothic church, a Greek hall, a Romanesque club, and an Elizabethan mansion, — all newly finished, — so in one drawing room we may find a Buddhist and a Voltairean, a Unitarian and a Catholic, a neo-pagan and a neo-Platonist, — all thinking themselves eminently modern, as in truth they are, when taken together.

In such a world the church can no longer depend on the allegiance of whole peoples. Everywhere there will be a number of religions and a sect of the incredulous. The appeal must be made to the person, and the church must know how to deal with him, rather than with the prince or the government. At first sight it might seem that such individualism is essentially hostile to the principle of authority which the church embodies. When a country has no national religion, its inhabitants, we might say, are necessarily Protestants; for their religion is a matter of private judgment and individual choice. In one sense this is true. A modern man, no matter in what church he is born, feels that his attachment to it is mainly a matter of his own will; no insurmountable physical or social obstacle exists to prevent his abandoning that church for another. Thus the feeling of personal allegiance, which in unitary societies is hardly felt at all, is particularly vivid in our times. A man cannot take his religion, like his language or his manners, without questioning, from the society that surrounds him. He feels responsible for it, and is alternately proud of its privileges and embarrassed by its eccentricity. There is nowadays a greater self-consciousness in religion than perhaps ever before. This fact has been hastily taken to mean that this is a particularly religious age, but the position is paradoxical and indefensible. In history we see a gradual encroachment of the secular on the religious. Originally, religion permeated every human activity; it was indistinguishable from politics, science, morals and family life. It has steadfastly become a thing apart, until it has finally taken refuge in the occasional meditations and inarticulate prayers of a man grown spiritually dumb in his moral solitude.

Extremes meet, however. In an absolutely uniform democracy, where no one is naturally more than an infinitesimal and indistinguishable atom, some one is very apt to assume an artificial prominence and by pretending to embody the popular interest and by flattering the popular passions, to acquire an absolute and irresistible supremacy. The individual, on account of his insignificance and isolation, can gain a sense of power only by identifying himself with some hero, or, as too often happens, with some irresponsible demagogue. The more independent and equal the citizens are, the more easily will they yield to the influence of a leader or a cry — the more irresistible will be the contagion of every popular movement. The same is true of religion. No environment is more favorable to the growth of a spiritual despotism than a spiritual democracy. The helpless and obviously accidental character of merely personal views makes them easily yield to the impressiveness of any conspicuous and established faith. By the not irrational surrender of his private opinion, a man then gains a sense of repose, of power and of stability. He is no longer like every one else, a blind and inefficient atom. He is incorporated into a visible power, with a definite function in the world; he is represented by a universal society and counts all its past and future victories as his own. In this way the leveling down of all religious convictions and systems into personal views and sentiments without social control may lead men all the more willingly to listen to a voice that claims supernatural authority. Many of those persons who now and then join the Catholic Church do so from this cause. It is powerful over some natures, and may be expected to affect an ever-increasing number. When the ties of family and of religious training are loose, as they are among us, the man and, more especially, the woman commonly feel the need of some external support. When reason tells us that what imagination pictures is an appearance, the affections are apt to reply that what reason says is a lie. We should not wonder that the emotions carry the day. Twenty centuries of sentimental indulgence have made temperance — *σωφροσύνη* — an almost impossible virtue for our religious nature. More rationality is needed than even our philosophers possess to confront the mystery of existence with calmness and smile before the infinite in reverent silence. We are spiritual barbarians, and a just philosophy would be too sober for us. The other philosophies continue to comfort the souls of their authors, but it would be more than com-

mon fatuity to see in them a substitute for popular religion. The garden of logic may reward the faithful laborer with an equivocal rose, but its not too luscious fruits will never feed the people. Turning from such pathetic amusements, we feel all the more the attraction of a faith which, if not deducible from self-evident axioms, is beautiful and venerable, adequate to human nature, and capable of affording a real consolation to the sorrows of mankind.

What, then, has the Catholic Church done to meet these returning currents of public opinion, and to improve the opportunities which the times seem to afford? If she had done nothing, we should be justified in regarding any improvement in her position in the world as a momentary reaction in favor of an institution essentially decayed. But beyond a doubt she has done something, and in various ways. Even in the sphere of doctrine, where adaptations are most difficult, a theory has become prominent which is not without its hint of reconciliation and good-will. The theory of development, conceived as an explanation of the manner in which all the elaborate decrees and definitions of popes and councils may be said to flow from the verbal teachings of Christ, serves to give to these definitions an agreeable interpretation. The main points and general spirit of Christian doctrine being given in the beginning, it remains, we are told, for the church to develop now this consequence and now that, as the process of meditation or the exigencies of the times may make these consequences prominent and important. Equal emphasis cannot always be laid on all points. When a subject heretofore left obscure—the question of the nature of inspiration, for instance—is ripe for intelligent discussion, the church may pronounce her judgment upon it with full authority, although the propositions she sanctions were not uttered by the early Christians. Hence we are not left with an utterly rigid dogma, although the dogma that exists is entirely unchangeable. There cannot be mutilation, but there may be growth, and the doctrine of the church may be compared to a tree which continually puts forth new branches without losing a single leaf. We easily see that, intrenched behind this theory, the church can present her doctrines to the world in a more palatable form than if she were compelled to repeat to all time, with Byzantine fidelity, the very syllables of the Fathers.

Another point in which the Roman Church has shown her willingness to respond to the time and its needs is in her political

relations. A thousand historical ties bind her to the conservative parties and the dynasties of Europe. These embody and defend what remains of the times when the church and her teachings were the life of the state, when things political, social, and religious were inextricably mingled. But these ties, which history created, subsequent history might dissolve. This the church has come to feel practically, so that we see the clergy in France encouraged by Rome to become republican, and the lower clergy in Spain, despairing of a Carlist restoration, becoming republican despite official and hierarchical influences. In fact, the only political alliance which is natural and proper for the church is with the party whose policy is at the time most favorable to her cause. Belief in this identity of interests makes the Irish clergy Nationalists; it made Cardinal Manning a leader in humanitarian movements and even in industrial insurrection. It makes Cardinal Lavigerie the founder of a new military order, the "Armed Brothers of Africa," who, while checking the slave trade, will doubtless spread and maintain the Catholic religion after the glorious example of the Crusaders. It would be unjust to say that no direct and disinterested concern for the slaves is felt by these new knights, as it would surely be unjust to say that no natural kindness and pity prompt the sacrifices of the Sisters of Charity and the other charitable orders. What we may say is that religious zeal and devotion are the springs of their action, and that it is comparatively a matter of accident that their duties are of a beneficent nature. If the slave hunters were not Moslems, and if Mohammedanism were not spreading in Africa, there would probably have been no "Armed Brothers." For no feeling is so intense as theological passion or so capable of inspiring personal sacrifices. Pure philanthropy will never do half the work in the world which a religion that subordinates philanthropy does, as it were, by the way.

Still another direction in which the Catholic Church is making advances to the modern spirit is that of industrial and social reform. This policy, of which the consequences may be very momentous, has been only recently adopted by the Vatican. The energies of Pius the Ninth and his advisers were spent in protestations. They had been overwhelmed and bitterly disappointed by the liberalism of their time and they had no means of combating it except decrees and anathemas. Leo the Thirteenth is in a different position. He has not himself fled to Gaeta or been

deprived of the temporal power. His pontificate has been spent in successful and flattering diplomatic labors, in receiving pilgrims, celebrating jubilees, and composing scholarly encyclicals. Although the position of the Papacy remains unchanged in Italy, and, naturally, from the point of view of the Pope, is extremely unsatisfactory, yet time has softened somewhat even the bitterest animosities; compensations have been found in the freer international position of the church, and in the proof that even without the temporal power she can exist and extend her spiritual authority. These considerations, added to the character of the Pope himself, have led to better feelings towards the modern status. The Pope is a man of diplomatic experience, and an enthusiastic student of Thomas Aquinas; he spends his leisure in composing very graceful Latin verse, and he watches with the double dignity of a philosopher and a pontiff the movements of human affairs and the fortunes of princes. He has seen the fall of more than one who was not his friend, and not everything in the world can look black to him.

At the same time, the ideals of society have somewhat changed; they have changed in a direction which enables the church to interfere not only in the way of repression but also in the way of encouragement and support. The church might well seem to people inspired by the ideal of liberty only an enemy to be destroyed; being a positive power, she is naturally an impediment to all contrary positive things. But the ideal of liberty has lost much of its attraction. Experience has taught us that only a small part of the value of freedom is intrinsic. To be uncontrolled is pleasant, but it is not sufficient. We must have something to do with our freedom. The ideal which society seems now to be cherishing is that of social coöperation for the attainment of those ends which in our moment of liberty we have found to be nearest to our hearts. So long as men are oppressed, deliverance is a sufficient goal for their efforts; once liberated, they discover some positive good to be pursued, and if this cannot be attained by the isolated individual, they must organize for its attainment. This organization reduces their freedom; but they are now conscious of being controlled only for the better attainment of ends which are spontaneously their own. What we desire now is to extricate these real goods from the mass of conventional purposes which men think they have, and then so remodel society that these real goods shall be attained. This is a task in

which moral considerations and moral ideals are prominently concerned. The church cannot help making herself heard on such a subject. Her long experience, if not her divine character, gives her a right to instruct us concerning the true and attainable goods of life. Suppose, for instance, that the sole good which the working classes pursue in their industrial agitations is an increase of wages; the church, if they listened to her, would make them feel that a man is not truly happy because he eats and sleeps and has no one above him. The truth is trite, but few have the faculty of the Catholic Church for bringing it home. She leads the imagination of the people to soar, and makes their affections play about noble things. We talk of the elevating influence of the higher poetry, and read tragedy that our minds may be purified by pity and awe. What, then, must be the effect of the story of Christ and his passion, known and vividly felt as it is by a Catholic people, and become the traditional vision of the race? What influence must it have in civilizing the soul and training the affections? It has, in fact, taught us the secret of devotion, the dignity of poverty, and the sacredness of sorrow. These are not superfluous lessons for any one; but if they could be forcibly taught to the poor who are to be our masters, they would awaken a soul in the brutalized people, and prevent the establishment of the most sordid of democracies.

Not only in educating the moral perceptions of the people does the church feel that she has a function which no one else can perform; she also believes that she can give them that discipline without which they could hardly maintain the noble community to which our social reformers aspire. As the Pope has himself pointed out, our industrial Utopias will require the practice of sacrifice, and great patience and resignation as well as great enthusiasm for the common good. It is true that human nature is prone to occasional heroism and waits only for an opportunity to display those generous instincts which, like all others, have their seasons of supremacy. But to establish a social order on the principle of public spirit, generous instincts will never be sufficient, nor that natural morality and benevolence which is their expression. Discipline is needed. Through discipline Greek patriotism lived; through discipline the religious communities of the Catholic Church maintain, in their actual measure, their inner spirit and their external efficiency. But who is to impose this necessary discipline upon the omnipotent democracy of the future?

The Catholic Church feels her own exclusive competence, and perhaps is not alone in feeling it. She knows how to assume an attitude of authority, how to control or at least influence the life of men in its minutest details, how to win over their wills by all the arguments of love and fear. As she has afforded, in her own various orders, the most notable examples of successful socialism, so might her spirit, if it were sufficiently prevalent, maintain the needed unity of purpose in the society of the future.

Much of what I have been saying may have won a momentary assent from the reader. Yet upon reflection he will probably ask himself what profit there can be in dreams of the permanent revival and renewed supremacy of an institution which has had its day. Of what use is it to consider the value which a religion might have to society when society can no longer accept this religion? There never has been in the history of the world an example of a system which once having declined and lost its influence over the thoughts of men, ever afterwards regained its empire. What men have seen is the effort of governments to maintain an official religion, and the affectation, on the part of a few dilettanti, of an idyllic admiration for fables in which they no longer believed. The Roman Empire saw both these phenomena; we have before us in the Catholic Church another example. There are, of course, clever and well-informed men who sincerely believe even now in the divinity of the Catholic Church. No sect is without respectable champions; and one will not marvel who is aware how subservient reason is, even in the most rational of animals. Some converts also go over to the Catholic Church from the ranks of the educated classes; but natural causes for this are not hard to assign. Despite personal prepossessions and occasional partial reactions of public opinion, the overwhelming fact remains that our science and our philosophy have made the Catholic Church an impossibility. How are you to convince a tolerably clear-headed and unprejudiced person that the Catholic Church is essentially different in its origin and authority from any other? How are you to make the obvious simplicities and contradictions of the Bible appear inspirations of the Holy Ghost? How are you to rewrite history so that the church doctrines and the pretensions of the Popes shall appear to be unchanged from the beginning? To come to the main point, how are you to renew that state of mind — to be frank, we must call it superstition — in which the assertions of ignorant enthusi-

asts are received for the sake of a certain agreeable excitement which they cause, and their maxims embraced and defended with sudden and irrational ardor, — a state of mind which sees miracle and special providence everywhere, and, ignorant as it is of nature, and careless of the beauty and of the structure of the outer world, is quick to evolve the laws of a supernatural world out of scraps of tradition and misunderstood sayings of prophets! The monstrous unreality of the whole thing is too obvious: never can such elaborate inventions survive our habit of criticism or satisfy our need of conscientious belief.

Only one whose education has screened him from the influences of modern learning and inspiration can help feeling the force of such objections. It is impossible for the greatest lover of Catholic thought and practices, if he is at the same time in the full swing of contemporary life, not to feel at times an irresistible conviction that all this mediæval heaven is a land of enchantment and allegory, — the dream of an age and a society childish both in their susceptibility and in their assurance. At the same time the very science and philosophy that give us a sense of superiority to the illusion of the past ought to protect us from a similar illusion. We are always, by a necessity of our assertive reason, in danger of yielding to that weakness of which Hegel is supposed to have been guilty, in being annoyed that the world should continue to exist after he had attained the absolute idea. Our scholars fancy that they have facts, and that these facts, which are not to be blinked, are incompatible with belief in the Catholic Church. But although the facts they have discovered may be insuperable obstacles to their own faith, it does not follow that mankind will continue to take notice of those facts or give them the same interpretation. The conquests of science are no more eternal than those of war. The natural philosopher may see the universe obeying the law he has first formulated; he may rejoice over the exactness of his calculations and glory in the verification which events furnish of all his hypotheses. But he will nevertheless die, and it is doubtful whether his descendants will share his knowledge or his enthusiasm. That depends on circumstances. It depends on the social conditions of the time and not on what we call the truth of the theories themselves. It is not enough to point to your own knowledge or your own conception and say, "This is incompatible with your faith, therefore your faith must perish." You must show rather that social and intellectual forces are at work which

will compel me and all others to acquire your knowledge and acquiesce in your faith. Until that time your truth can be refuted by my truth, for I also have my facts and my ways of interpreting them.

The acquisitions of modern science, noble and inspiring as they are, are the acquisitions thus far of a few only ; a certain number of scholars possess them, and see their evidence and their implications. For the rest of the world these discoveries do not exist except in so far as their vaguely conceived results are accepted on authority. A social revolution that should send our professors out to dig might deprive us of our new sciences in one generation ; for these new sciences, certain and inexpugnable as they seem to the learned, have not yet got a deep root in the human mind. If we look far forward into the destinies of our planet, we must foresee a time when all our facts and all our hypotheses may be forgotten. The efficacy of science, beyond the scholar's own mind, lies in its character as a human experience which others may observe and possibly repeat. The same efficacy belongs to every phase of intellectual history. The fact that men have thought as they do, the fact that they have had these conceptions of nature and of history, will never be entirely unimportant or uninteresting. As we are curious about the notions of the savage, or the Egyptian's faith in immortality, so may the learned of a future age be curious about us. But it will depend entirely on their education and organization whether they will agree with us or not. Why does our physics differ from Aristotle's ? The evidence of the senses has not changed, nor the habits of matter. The solid as invariably falls to the ground, the flame as irrepressibly leaps to heaven, and the moving body as certainly comes to rest. A few men of genius have conceived simpler ways of regarding these phenomena, principles more general and abstract, by which the appearances of nature can be more subtly classified and more successfully foretold. This new method of dealing with facts, this new habit of reason, we call a discovery of the laws of the universe. If even natural science is so much an accident of human nature, what must we say of philosophy and religion ?

We shall generally find that a radical change of front, such as rationalism and liberalism constitute, when contrasted with Christian orthodoxy, grows less out of new discoveries than out of new aspirations. People are estranged from the church not so much

by an enlightened mind as by a materialized imagination. The physical world has become more interesting, the industrial world more absorbing. We have no time to see visions, we have lost the taste for miracles. To a similar change of imaginative habits, only in the opposite direction, the establishment of Christianity was probably due. Political life was dormant, social life was relaxed, military service was perfunctory. The mind had time to brood, and the idle heart was susceptible to conversion. Under such circumstances intellectual objections counted for nothing, as they count for nothing when such conditions are reproduced to-day. All that critics now tell us about the absurdity and danger of orthodox Christianity was well known to the ancients. The records of this ancient criticism, naturally, have not been preserved with care; but enough remains to prove that it existed. The writers of those days may not have possessed our Biblical criticism or our science of comparative religion, but they had the origin of Christianity visibly before them, its early confusions and superstitions, the popular and heterogeneous source of its doctrines, the ignorance and fanaticism of its professors; and they were more sensitive than any anti-clerical to its political intractableness and spirit of usurpation. The pagan opponents of Christianity were fully alive to whatever was ignoble in its origin, unnatural in its doctrine, and factious in its sectarianism. The church had not then the prestige, the wealth, and the organized experience which fifteen centuries of dominion have given it, and yet it had something in it which secured its triumph. What a triumph it was! The new religion won the confidence of the people and their princes; it completely dominated man's intelligence, its authority became an axiom in social intercourse and its supernatural world the chosen field of the imagination. When art and science arose, it was in the service of the church; only by a rebellion which was felt at first to be the worst of treason did they emancipate themselves from her control. Even now, in the freest institutions, any teaching which departs entirely from her doctrines produces a painful impression; we vaguely feel that all the assumptions of our common life are being subverted, that we are foolish if we pray and irrational if we are in earnest. A system which could so penetrate into the life of whole races, so weave itself into a complete social and intellectual civilization, cannot be very alien to human nature; it cannot help being one of the most notable and successful attempts man has ever made to express himself and his relations to the universe.

The Catholic Church seems at present, then, to be animated by the hope of regaining the confidence of the masses and becoming once more through their ascendancy the model of the imaginative and moral life of the world. Whether this vast ambition is capable of realization, it is, of course, impossible to say. All that we may predict with safety is that, if it is realized, it will be in a form materially different from that intended. The Catholic may be allowed to believe that the church is infinitely adaptable, and in all societies maintains the same doctrines and diffuses the same influences. But the impartial observer will nevertheless think that this elasticity of the church is a property of its organization rather than of its religious content, and that the world has already seen more than one religion under the name of Catholicism. One age and country, even if it adopt the doctrine and worship of another with apparent docility, necessarily makes them the vehicle of its own spirit. The success of the Catholic Church in the future is a prophecy which must lose in definiteness what it is to gain in plausibility. Perhaps the democracy of a future age may call itself Catholic — even this would be a strange repetition of history. But that new Catholicism would be something different from what we know, and something to which our affection or our aversion would be only partially transferable.

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THE CHURCH IN GERMANY AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION.

ALIGHTING from the train at a German railway station, one often sees posted up a placard, "Evangelische Rettung," — "rescue by the (evangelical) church." There is perhaps no fitter sign of the church's new and active interest in the problems which make the "social question." The world's life pours in and out of the town or city through the railway station. Many of the most disheartening difficulties of the reformer seem part and parcel of this connection between railroad and town; the tenement house, the beggar, the tramp, the workless, the prostitute, — all have a curious but very real relation to the simple fact that a score or more of trains come and go daily in and out of the station.

Professor Baumgarten sees in this placard a new promise for the church, doubtless because it stands to him for many new and rapidly increasing church activities that are distinctively social.¹ Dr. Pfeiderer says of the new interest: "First to understand and then to deal wisely and earnestly with these things seems to me the only way in which the church will deserve or retain the respect of serious people."

Significantly, the general secretary of the Evangelical Congress, Dr. Paul Göhre, hesitated some months between political economy and theology. "I, however, finally chose to study them both." After living three months the life of a factory operative in the city of Chemnitz, he wrote out his experience in a little volume, "*Drei Monate Fabrikarbeiter*," which has had a sale and an influence of extraordinary character, — extraordinary chiefly because the book *could* have such effect. He tells very simply, without heat or exaggeration, the story of the operatives' life — both men and women — as it is found in such busy manufacturing centres. To those who know this life, there was not a line that gave new information; but for those who believed the church was adequately coping with the problems of such towns and cities, the book was startling and extremely unpleasant reading. Dr. Göhre told his readers that the great mass of working men and women had forgotten even to talk or think about the church. He told them that every day these workers, in increasing numbers, are becom-

¹ Two lines of church work have been ignored here, partly for lack of space, but more especially because they do not differ from such work found everywhere in the church: (1) General charity, so far as the care of the sick, disabled and aged is concerned. (2) Temperance work. Germany has here little to show compared to the achievements of the church in Norway and Sweden, for example. Something, however, has been done, and more is now promised. An address given before the Inner Mission by Professor Nasse, in 1877, was the direct occasion of the building of homes for hard drinkers (*Asylen für Trinker*). In 1879 more energetic action was taken; the law of the Reichstag of 1881, that made drunkenness punishable, is to be traced to this activity. The law was a failure, but the action of 1884, and again of 1888, must be connected with the recent serious proposals of the government, which are probably the first really important measures taken by the State to cope with this evil. The whole work of the Blue Cross was made a part of the work of the Inner Mission in 1888. Before this time, almost all attempts had "moderation" in drinking as their end. Moderation and teetotalism became the watchword henceforth, and now an active body of teetotalers proper is at work. The rapid increase of coffee-houses is also a part of this movement. In 1888 these existed in twenty-eight cities.

ing socialists, with all that this means of hostility to religion and the family. He told them how almost unknown it is that a young girl leads in any of the mills a chaste life. "If there are even *any*, it is the rarest exception." He told also of wages, diet, hours and conditions of work in a way which brought the facts especially home to the clergy and the "church people."

Within a few months of this publication came another, upon the laborers' life in the country districts. It was written by a prominent pastor, W. Quistorp, of Pommern. It showed the condition of laborers upon the land in East Germany to be even worse than the lot of those in cities. He says that his hope is to excite in the public conscience some sort of sympathy that shall lead to intelligent dealing with the social question in the country. "If the church has become a subject of scorn to the godless, it is itself to blame." He finds "only indifference below and cowardice above, while the clergy are preaching abstract duties chiefly."

This spirit, which is now showing itself in a rapidly increasing literature, is not new. A few men like Todt preached and wrote of the new duties more than twenty years ago. The movement is now, however, general. It has stirred both the heart and the head of a large body of men, — especially the younger clergy. It finds expression in several papers and magazines. It has since 1871 produced literally hundreds of volumes and pamphlets. It has a large and powerful organization. In April it held in Berlin its third "Evangelical Social Congress." It has won the active sympathy and coöperation of several of the best German economists. Under the auspices of the Congress, and the editorship of Professor Otto Baumgarten, of Jena, a series of social studies is being written by men whose names carry weight in the whole country. The statistician, Von Öttengen, Professors Wagner, Von Goltz, Herrman, Lotz, and Dr. Oldenburg are among the contributors. Dr. Grossmann, in one of the soberest of economic quarterlies (*Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung*, etc.) has given a careful study of this new work of the Church Congress, in which he finds at last a purpose and method worthy of economic science.¹

What, then, is the German church doing to win such recognition? The English Positivists are fond of saying that the French Revolution of 1848 was far more important for the social

¹ "Die Wissenschaft kann den Kongress als Bundesgenossen wider die Social demokratie, für die Social reform nur sympathisch begrüßen."

issues that depend upon the growth of democracy than that of 1789. The movement of which we write began in Germany at once after the first thrill of sympathy with the struggle in France. At least a fraction of this history must be given to interpret rightly this "social revival within the church." The famous "Inner Mission" of the church grew out of the emotions of the great year 1848. Its real father, Pastor Wichern, wrote in that year his "Memorial to the German Nation." It was a passionate appeal to turn the energies of the church toward every social need "that could be made the object of saving love." The writer was one of the first to see the melancholy part which the city was to play in the future of industry. He saw, too, the necessity of wide and various organizations outside the churches, especially of clubs for working men and youths. "Even that portion that comes to our churches at all, we touch at most but two or three hours in the week; this is too little to make either habit or character." That there are to-day nearly nine hundred clubs for boys alone is largely due to Pastor Wichern.

The fact that so much of the literature of the movement is socialistic in tone, is traceable to this historic date and origin. Both academic and revolutionary socialism are vitally connected with the "great and sacred days of '48." Almost every religious writer upon social duties was under the same influence that made Marx, Marlo, Grün, Rodbertus, and later Lassalle, socialists. It should at once be made clear, however, in what sense these reforming pastors then and now are taken at their word. Many of them say boldly, "We are socialists." The Protestant scholar and pastor, Dr. Stuckenberg, in Berlin began a course of lectures during the last winter upon socialism, with the confident assertion that he was a socialist. It appeared, however, before the course ended, that he simply recognized very profound social evils which society ought to remove. The present general secretary of the Congress was asked if he were a socialist. "Certainly I am a socialist." He was asked, further, if he wished to prevent every one, the workman included, from renting a room in his house, from letting for profit a sewing or other machine in his possession, or from receiving interest on money. He replied, "No; that would work injustice." This is as if one were to say, "I believe in woman's suffrage, but do not believe she should vote." There is not a recognized leader of German socialism who is not wholly clear upon this point, that the very end and

aim of socialism is so to extend municipal and state functions that no private person can get either profit from any machine, rent from land or house, or interest from money. Every form of rent and interest is to be taken up socially by the commune, city, or state. The failure to be clear upon this vital point is a constant embarrassment both to the reader and the writer of this clerical literature. The assertion, "We are socialists," means, as it meant with many of the earlier Christian socialists in England, an earnest reaction against an industrial society in which competition so works as to leave the less favored worker, the ignorant, stupid, and weak, at a terrible disadvantage in the struggle. The aim is to equalize the conditions of the struggle. It is rightly seen that the egoistic instinct, under the old forms of private property, has had such a dangerous development that the social and unselfish impulses suffer. This church movement is therefore directed toward a spread of such institutions as shall tend to equalize opportunities, and also to put upon the favored classes heavier and more definite pecuniary responsibilities. To the old policy of moral persuasion is added the new force of political influence. The teaching which allies the voter to the social question began in 1848, and the church has learned the lesson which Lassalle taught. In every particular of this church programme we find proposals that depend upon organized political action,—high taxation upon inherited property, progressive income tax, taxing of unearned increments upon land and city betterments, Sunday rest, and fewer working hours, for instance. The long struggle of the Inner Mission has taught its leaders that active politics can no longer be ignored. We thus have, so far as action on the social question is concerned, a body of workers who are socialists only in that vague sense in which all persons can be called socialists who ardently wish and strive for great and radical changes in the present forms of industrial society. What the church has done and is now aiming to achieve will also show that a wider spread of wholesome individualism is as prominent among her aims as any that can properly be called socialistic.

It was early seen that the work of the Inner Mission demands a band of consecrated men and women whose entire services may be devoted, at the least expense, to the objects sought. Houses of Brothers (*Brüderhäuser*), as well as of Sisters, were therefore established. There are now sixteen of these houses in Germany,

where young men and women who wish to devote themselves to the work of the mission are trained. In many of the twenty-four tramp colonies, one finds these men as "house-fathers," or directors. They also work in the city *Herberge*, where those out of work are lodged and cared for. They become city missionaries, or take positions in the Rescue Houses. The Sisters' Houses have reached the imposing figures of sixty-three in number, with 8,478 workers. That nearly 1,500 of these have been added in the last four years shows both the vigor of this institution and the demand for its services. It shows, too, that something resembling the Catholic sisterhoods will more and more find its place in Protestantism. There are now 2,774 different fields of work for these sisters. Last year the income was nearly two millions of dollars, all but \$36,000 of which was spent. This great work has now spread beyond Germany, but in 1891 there were 588 houses for the sick in Germany alone, 846 houses for nurses, 130 educational institutions, 33 crèches, 27 homes for fallen women, 40 for the protection and instruction of servants, besides 147 institutions of more general character. In Berlin, for example, there are kindergartens for poor children and sewing schools.

The placard in the stations refers to one branch of this work which has very tragic interest. The city has made prostitution an object of commerce and business profits. Not only are there traveling agents to search for girls in the country with offers of "places" in the towns, but at the railway stations, and often upon the incoming trains, women especially are employed to intercept country girls seeking work in the city. In Vienna, Paris, London and Berlin this activity has reached appalling proportions, though it is by no means confined to the large centres. It was found, too, that the moment of changing from one position to another in the same town was watched by these agents. From 1872 to 1881, 469,687 girls came to Berlin seeking for places. In 1881 (one year only) 36,422 came who were between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine. During last year nearly 70,000 girls changed positions from one family or place to another in Berlin. No comment is needed to show what an opportunity is thus given to organized commerce in vice. There is no evidence that Berlin is worse in this than any other city of its size. Here the workers of the Inner Mission are fighting their bravest battle. The railway authorities were persuaded to allow a regular distribution of

leaflets and cards of information on incoming trains. Communion was opened between city and country, chiefly with the pastors and the country newspapers, with the purpose of getting the facts before all parents and guardians in the country. This difficult work is now so efficiently organized in connection with the new homes for girls in the cities as to have worked one of the most hopeful changes in modern society. In 1888 the number of these homes had reached forty. In the small city of Freiburg (having 50,000 inhabitants), the home accommodates 180 girls. Within two years, several of these homes have been turned into practical educational institutions. Including the "homes," there are now seventy-five such centres to receive and care for girls. It is a sure instinct that is directing the energies of the church to this question. The peculiar ideal of church and family has no enemy to be compared to that which has got itself fitly named "*the social evil*." Drink, even at its worst, is immeasurably less deadly to the foundation on which both church and family rest. One of the committee says: "We are learning that it is the greatest of all dangers to everything that we prize as Christians." The aim of this great work among girls is preventive. Dealing with the evil itself takes the form first of "Magdalen Homes," of which twenty-one have been established. The work is largely done by the sisters. The effort in these homes is now to insure as wide a variety of healthful and attractive occupations as possible. It has been found that sewing and washing are by no means adequate either to hold the girls or fit them for the kind of places into which they can most safely be put. Last year the committee made arrangements to take into these homes women discharged from prison. There are also twenty-nine institutions of a more specialized character, for the very young, for the "*erstgefallene*," and for those with a child. Every province in Germany now has a union known as "Friends of Young Girls," which stands ready to do for girls any service that may be desired. Though but indirectly connected with the church, there has been formed in the present year a *Bund* of women, the express object of which is to deal with this question. The number of members has already reached 4,800. Nine different associations now exist with the definite object of working upon public opinion. The union of men, formed in 1887, is now publishing a monthly for theoretic discussion and propaganda. These unions unite to influence legislation. They are scattered, like the Bund of the White Cross, throughout Germany.

On the preventive side, and closely connected with this general work among women, are the schools of hand-work for young girls. This kind of teaching is nearly universal in the public schools, yet so scant is the time allowed for it that little of marketable value can be achieved. Many of these special schools now exist under the direction of a trained sister. They seek so to educate the girl as to secure for her at once, as soon as she leaves the school, some paying occupation. When the fact is fully and clearly seen that the army of prostitution is largely recruited from those who are economically dependent, a reform in this most desperate of all problems is first seen to be possible. This economic dependence rests upon two facts before which society is by no means helpless. The dependence is caused chiefly by lack of industrial training, and by the fact that so few occupations are open to women that the labor supply (as with sewing-women) overcrowds the market. The church has realized at last that action must be directed to the sources of the evil. Dr. Uhlhorn has said that the destiny of the church is to be decided by the way in which it meets its present opportunities to deal with such social questions. One secret of General Booth's vast following is that he has so touched the imagination of women as to make sure of an element without which no great moral movement ever succeeded. The church in Germany has at this moment such a chance. The "Woman's Movement" has at last become organized and aggressive in this land where woman's relation to society is a curiosity of backwardness. Barring the vote, the whole purpose of these women's unions is so strikingly like that of the most enlightened endeavor in the church to save girls through education and economic independence as to bring both bodies into close practical sympathy. A leader among the women says: "I do not like the church, but her new work among girls must bring us together." In the report of the last Congress, just published, Rev. Dr. Naumann, of Frankfort, speaks bravely against the German superstition that woman's sphere is necessarily in the house alone. We must learn also, he says, that her place is as well in the markets of industry, and, that she may be safe and serviceable there, we must educate her into strength. Here the two movements become one in their aims. If the church proves broad enough to meet the issue, her reward will be great.¹

¹ The scantest justice has yet been done to the countless Women's Charitable Unions throughout Germany. There are 130 in Saxony; Bavaria has 243;

The new spirit may be seen, again, in the growth of the "Holiday Colonies." In 1880, poor children were sent to the seaside or into the country from only two towns in Germany. Last year, regular societies were in existence in 121 places, and nearly 30,000 children were sent out of unwholesome surroundings, and not, as in the beginning, for a certain number of days, or without discrimination as to needs. The work has so developed that the children are carefully selected, and sent, according to their condition, to some special baths, to the milk-cure, to the country, or to the seashore. Nearly 8,000 were sent to milk-cures. According to their needs, too, they remain from one to six weeks. If their improvement is not marked on their return, they are sent back. Berlin alone has above two hundred local committees, which, during the last four years, have sent away over 14,000 children.¹

The same practical tendency is shown in the relation of the church to men's and boys' clubs. The effort was first to amuse, "to keep from the street," and "bring the classes together;" but it was seen that neither man nor boy sins the less because of any such harmless diversion. Now, in the boys' clubs, which have reached nearly a thousand in Germany, effort is concerned more and more with the economic relations of the youth to society. Though the ethical element is supreme, their conductors realize that the moral gain is most surely secured through such training as shall make the boys' work socially valuable. Until within a few years, in Germany, the traditional guild, with its apprenticeship system, still obtained. The lads were kept in the family of the master, who had definitely defined responsibilities as to moral and technical education. Almost at once this essentially parental relation passed away, and the "cash nexus" alone has taken its

Prussia, 772. Experts are beginning to admit that no more cautious and efficient work is done in Germany than by the noiseless members of these unions.

¹ Little is to be said here of "church savings banks," because of such difficulties in getting trustworthy statistics, and also because only a part of the "thrift movement" has any connection with church interests. The work of the church is, however, of prime importance. In the province of Braunschweig alone are fifty-seven villages with "school savings banks," that seem to have their origin and control wholly from the clergy. There are certainly above 3,000 "savings unions" among the young which must be credited to this source.

The considerable work among those released from prisons must be passed over also, as only scant or untrustworthy data are accessible. The unions for this purpose had last year 468 "entlassene" in charge, for a part of whom situations were secured.

place. Wherever house industry has given way to the large mill or factory, or the corporation, this personal tie, embracing every moral obligation, has gone. In cities like Leipzig and Stuttgart, there are youths' club houses, where something of the lost family life is restored; regular instruction is given in singing, drawing, and book-keeping, with ethical and religious training upon Sundays. No single parish in Berlin, I believe, is now without such a club.

As the breaking up of the family relation between master and apprentice threw multitudes of young workers upon their own resources in town and city, so the rapid dissolution of the guilds left large numbers of men with no living-place except the tap-room and cheap boarding house. The resulting evils were aggravated by the traditional custom of traveling on foot from town to town. In the absence of protection from guild or family, idleness, debauchery and vagabondage swiftly developed. To meet this danger the "*Herberge zur Heimat*" were founded in the early years of the Inner Mission. They offer to the seekers for work a cheap and comfortable home, often under the direction of clergyman or "Brother." Nearly every town of any size in Germany has such a home. In 1890 there were 362, containing 12,777 beds, and I am told that several new ones have been established since 1890. Systematic religious and moral instruction is offered, though without any compulsion. Bureaus of information are often connected with these lodging houses, through which places are secured for those seeking work. In 1890, for example, 15,000 situations were found. The municipal bureaus now forming so rapidly will doubtless lessen this work in future. In sixteen cities, such offices are kept open by the city authorities. This is another instance of work begun and tested by "private initiative" passing into state control, thus giving to private enterprise new opportunity for work in "experimental sociology."

The lodging houses are connected with 1,957 "stations," where, for a given amount of work, a ticket to the lodging house is secured. These stations, where no money is given, are the result of a protracted struggle with beggary, it being found that, as long as money was given, the evil thrived the more. As the stations are not of church origin, and are supported by the counties, they are mentioned here only to throw light upon the vast organization of the lodging houses and the tramp colonies. These last are a direct result of the spirit and activity of the church.

Though Pastor von Bodelschwing began his study and agitation soon after the Franco-Prussian war, the first colony was founded but ten years ago. There are now scattered throughout Germany twenty-four of these institutions. They vary in size, from those having a capacity of thirty beds to the largest in Berlin, with its two hundred and twenty beds. The tramp of the lowest class is here taken in, and given more permanent work than the stations can offer. In the Berlin colony nine industries are carried on, such as the simpler forms of woodwork, and the making of toys, brushes and mats. With daily baths, nourishing food, regular instruction, both practical and religious, strict discipline, and regular work, all is done that can be to win these men to self-supporting positions. All but two colonies are in the country, in the hope of keeping the men out of the cities. Both the city colonies continually send men, after they have been tested, out to country colonies. Last year 6,000 men were taken into these institutions. Switzerland and Russia are now copying this work. When the next steps are taken to complete the organization among stations, lodging houses, tramp colonies, and the new state institutions for dealing with these questions, Germany will have the most thorough experiment of its kind in the world. It is the kind of social work, moreover, which is doing incalculable service for the church by winning the sympathy of those whom the church in Germany most needs. I heard a distinguished scientific professor say: "When I looked into this new work of the church, I was sorry that I had not stood by her."

More recent than the tramp colonies is the work of the church in establishing labor clubs. A socialist paper acknowledges that this important activity has been from the beginning under "the spiritual leadership of the clergy." It began in the Westphalia districts, where labor is high-paid, and has now spread throughout the empire. In 1885, only twenty-five clubs had been formed, with a membership of 11,700. In the first five years the number of unions grew from twenty-five to one hundred and forty; from 1890 to 1891 there was an extraordinary increase of two hundred and twenty. The indications are that the present year will show a like growth. Workmen, apprentices and clerks are admitted, with an important honorary membership of such as are willing to help by counsel, lectures, readings or lessons — teachers, physicians, clergymen, and others. In Breslau at present the membership is 3,200, divided into several working groups; in Erfurt it is 2,000. A general committee exists for the purpose

of using the local press as an organ of propaganda. Lectures are given, followed by discussion, on economics, science, history and other subjects. The clubs are rapidly forming "benefit societies," under state supervision to guard against failure. Sick and burial pay is given. The widow of a deceased member receives a small sum of money. Several clubs have coöperative stores in successful operation, while many have a savings bank, and the flourishing beginnings of building societies, through which better and cheaper homes may be secured. The clubs publish a year-book of information, a common song-book, and an admirable paper (*Der Arbeiterbote*), which appears twice a week. Excellent libraries are found in the more enterprising clubs, and arbitration boards to mediate in case of strikes, or any difficulty between employer and employed. After nine years' experience, a new programme has just been issued. The first programme, like all first beginnings in the social question, was vague and utopian. The new one is relatively definite and practical. Its first words are: "The Evangelical Workmen's Unions exist because the social question exists." Five general objects are named, Social, Economic, Patriotic, Moral, and Religious. Classified under each section are the various methods of moral and economic training through which it is hoped to make practically fruitful all the schemes above indicated, such as coöperation, banks for savings, and arbitration.

The chief interest and hope of this movement is in the widely various opportunities given for training and experiment in the matters upon the understanding of which "industry with peace and common profit" depends. Among the innumerable social remedies, we may say confidently, the most hopeful is that which makes possible a certain kind of moral and industrial education. At the top, church and university act powerfully; but in Germany, at least, the great mass of really influential working men and women are scarcely touched by either. Below, education, through socialistic groups, or some form of trade unions, is quite as powerful in its effects. But the two influences are so separated as to leave the one at the top helpless, and the other suspicious, angry, or contemptuously indifferent. There is a large literature of scorn and hatred of the church and the "morality of those that *have*." The trade unions have forty regular papers, while the socialists have seventy-three, and six magazines. They employ lecturers in all parts of Germany. This deep gulf between the

so-called upper and lower forces of education is recognized as a serious danger. Some idea may be given of the extent and character of the hostility by reference to Berlin alone. The socialists have at least three times as many meeting places as there are churches. One may see any Sunday quiet and attentive audiences of three hundred to one thousand men and women. The evening course at the Ethical Society, during the past winter, was wholly upon religious themes, and the hall was so crowded as to be uncomfortable. Despite the fierce political activity, no subject seems more welcome or is more frequent than the hour's address upon some religious or moral question followed by open discussion. One reads in the Saturday paper a long list of such "reading" or "discussion" clubs that meet on Sunday in every part of the city. They now carry on regular teaching among the children, and make an organized attempt to win the mothers. Their ideas are spread not only through an alert and intelligent press, but through peoples' libraries, by colporteurs, and by sales at all the meetings. Two of the large Berlin theatres are now regularly used as an express means of propaganda. At clubs and public meetings the tickets are sold beforehand by subscription. The plays are not only carefully selected, but in four large halls in different parts of Berlin the play is explained in detail. I have seen an audience of seven hundred men and women following eagerly for two hours Wilhelm Boloche's exposition of a play by Ibsen. This was distinctly a work of preparation for the theatre. The learned critic of the "Berlin Nation," Otto Brahm, has become a fervent supporter of this new plan for making dramatic art a vehicle of revolutionary education.

One of the most popular theologians of the University, who for the first time listened to one of these preparatory expositions for the theatre, said in my hearing: "The church will find some way of meeting this movement by a better and more powerful one, or it will cease to represent the religion that Christ taught." This is just what a powerful and influential part of the church is attempting. It is doing its best to bridge the gulf above described by the only conceivable means within its reach,—by establishing the only kind of education that can possibly mediate between extremes that had become so sundered as not even to understand each other. No inch of ground would have been won if the church had simply *preached* to the laboring man. She has learned that her action must be through organized labor-groups

that have bold and independent initiative of their own. She has learned that in this new education her spirit must act through and upon certain forms shaped by the industrial exigencies of the time. Therefore the building society, institutions for savings, profit-sharing, coöperation, and the like, are the chosen media through which she means more and more to work, — not that these are to her a final good, but that they offer the surest opportunity for a specific type of education that is as essentially moral as it is industrial. This is distinctly recognized even by the Catholic Church. There is a definitely announced purpose to have the priests in France taught political economy, in order that the spirit of the church may the better do its work. To the man who is trying to add this economic training to the priest's equipment, the Archbishops of Rheims and Angiers have written enthusiastic approval. The Bishop of Poitiers closes a letter to him with the words: "*L'Eglise, Monsieur, ne saurait trop applaudir à de si genereux et de si intelligents efforts; elle y voit le salut des âmes et le gage de la paix publique.*" As Cardinal Manning shamed the English Church into more active sympathy with these questions, so the Catholics both in France and Germany are, by the sheer force of their rivalry, putting Protestants on their good behavior. The Catholics are everywhere extending this same method of forming unions of men, boys, and girls that shall give the church wide and diverse centres of education. The astonishing growth of these societies under the patronage of the Evangelical Church in Germany shows how genuine a want was met, as well as how wide a field has been opened for further work.

The real strength of this movement may be succinctly stated thus: These organizations are identified with direct and powerful private and trade interests: they bring the members into closest touch with both the practical and theoretical questions in which they have the keenest interest and liveliest curiosity. The church has learned that the workers will go, with or without the church, into some form of organization. If they go without the church, they take their most ardent enthusiasms with them. To her cost, the church has learned that this means to her the loss of the laborers' sympathy and of her own influence. The interests represented by these labor-groups are so intense that the members' strength and enthusiasm are thus practically exhausted, so that there is little left over for another and different organization, such as the church. When, only seven years ago, the French law

gave freer scope for such societies, the number of labor unions rose from 68 in 1887 to 1,250 in 1891. The church in Germany has become consciously alive to these new facts in the social order, and has simply resolved to adapt her energies to the situation. Where the fullest life and healthiest ambitions of the laborer are being organized, there the church will have her part. The addresses that fill the reports of the three congresses are crowded with passionate assertions of this purpose. The Young Men's Christian Associations find a field for the best and most enlightened energies they can bring to bear, in working through and with these unions. Two or three thousand centres of moral, industrial and economic education, offering free and natural scope for all classes to work together in study, in theory and in practice, furnish an adequate mediating influence between separate and conflicting views and interests. Here is a possible good of immeasurable importance, due in large degree to this new spirit within the church.

Most of this effort must be distinguished from the express and conscious determination to win or overthrow the social democracy. At the start, the church's failure here is assured. Against the sharply defined policy of the socialists the church is weak and ineffectual at all points save one. While socialists have long since trampled religion under foot, they have taken the fatal step of accepting as a philosophy a type of materialism so crude that no scientific man of distinction in Germany acknowledges it. Even Professor Haeckel has cast it out, and only Dr. Büchner now preaches it. Here the church in time might win an easy advantage, but for her slowness in throwing off the dead hand of dogmas so outworn that she is the sport of nine tenths of Germany's educated men. The socialist lecturers upon religion and the church take their opponents at their word, and do easy and very deadly work before the working-people. Three leading clergymen in Berlin, who are at the front in this social movement, say that their chief obstacle is in this "load of mediæval lies." They are, however, well-nigh helpless under the iron hand of the government acting through a state church. Every civil official, every army officer, every schoolmaster, must, as public functionaries, *pretend* to believe. Von Egidy writes, while an officer, that he will no longer make the pretense, and he is instantly dismissed from the army. Students attend the brilliant lectures of Professor Pfleiderer without putting down their names, lest their conneo-

tion with so radical a theologian should handicap their career. It thus seems likely that the measure of success in the social agitation of the church, so far as it aims at the winning over of social democrats, must depend upon the capacity which the church shows of entering freely and boldly into the realities of modern life and thought. To ask a soldier in these days to go into battle clogged with ancient armor, through which a Lebel rifle can shoot as through pasteboard, would hardly be more incongruous than to face German workingmen to-day with catechisms and Lutheran theology.

Happily, fighting socialistic theories of religion and the family is not the chief work of the church. In results, indeed, it is the least of her services. The church once thought it of supreme moment to rescue the tomb of Jesus from infidels. This conscious and aggressive purpose of the Crusades failed, while undreamed-of results, many and quite incalculable in value, came with the new civilization that the Crusaders made possible. For these real achievements probably not one soldier of the cross would have lifted a finger. Something like this may be true of the brave struggle on which the German church has now entered. Her express antagonism to the social democrats may be seen, at last, to have furnished fire and enthusiasm without which other and better values would never have been won.

This wider and more permanent good will come because the new activities are more and more educational in the sense of strengthening human qualities so as to prevent those ills which the older charity only softened after they had arrived. The sacred mission of caring for helplessness resulting from age or misfortune will always remain, but a vastly greater proportion of it will be cared for through endowments, the municipality, the state. As compared to the past, the contribution of the church to charity in its older sense is insignificant in Germany when measured by that of corporate societies, communes, or the state. A score of charities once carried on by the church, or purely private exertion, have now altogether or in part passed into other hands. This tendency will increase with the growing sense that a large proportion of misfortunes are of social rather than individual origin. This fact enlarges the opportunity for the church in the direction of positive and experimental work that shall aim to prevent ills through such education and enlightenment as strengthen society at the points where its safety and health are most endangered.

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A WORLD OUTSIDE OF SCIENCE.

It is a commonplace saying — and I think it is Quintilian who recommends that in treating every important subject we should begin from the commonplace, though this is indeed not difficult — that we live in an age of science. We are assured without ceasing, and it is, within just limits, perfectly true, that modern science has transformed the world of thought. The world of action it has certainly transformed. Scientific mechanics are keeping pace, in the most astounding way, with abstract science; and we are all, as has been said, “gazing into the light of the future, our profoundest curiosity quivering under the currents of new thought as a magnet vibrates in the grasp of an induction-coil.” The wonders of the Arabian Nights are the commonplaces of living and moving.

It is the crowning beauty of these wonders that they have gone hand in hand with the progress of democracy, and have placed themselves at its service. A hundred years ago, when a prince wished to travel, he could at best only order clumsy horses to be attached to a clumsy state carriage in the hope of accomplishing, unless torrents or highwaymen interfered, thirty miles a day. It was not until the people got ready to ride that steeds swifter than the wind and stronger than the storm were harnessed in, and glittering bands of steel were spread in twin extension across the continent, that the carriages which bore the people might not swerve from their triumphant way. Two hundred years ago, if a king wished to convey to a distance the news of war or peace, or of the birth of an heir, he could do it best by lighting vast bonfires on successive hills, as in the Agamemnon of *Æschylus* (τοιιοῦδε λαμπρὰ δὲ φόρων ῥύμοι), until the tale was told. It was not until the people became as important as princes that all these lavish and clumsy fires were condensed into one little electric spark, and wires covered the land in a network of tracery, or sank below the ocean, that the humblest of the nation could telegraph to other lands and climes the news of war and peace in his household, or the birth of an heir to his modest throne. Nay, even while we dwell on these achieved wonders, we are all waiting eagerly for the time when all their apparatus shall be superseded, and laid away in museums of obsolete lumber; and we are all living in expectation of what a day may bring forth. Those of us who in youth saw men still habitually striking a fire with flint and steel may yet live to see

nearly every material convenience of life served by absolutely invisible forces. Yes, it is the age of science; beneficent or baleful, saving or slaying, its sway has come.

With this has naturally come a shifting of the old standards of education, and the claim that science, as such, is exclusively to rule the world. An accomplished German *savant*, long resident in this country, once told me that in his opinion poetry, for instance, was already quite superseded, and music and art must soon follow. Literature, he thought, would only endure, if at all, as a means of preserving the results of science, probably in the shape of chemical formulæ. He was a most agreeable man, who always complained that he had made a fatal mistake in his career through rashly taking the whole of the *Diptera*, or two-winged insects, for his scientific task, whereas to have taken charge of any single genus, as the gnats or the mosquitoes, would have been enough for the life-work of a judicious man.

We smile at this as extravagance, and yet we have, by the direct confession of the great leader of modern science, the noble and large-minded Darwin, an instance of almost complete atrophy of one whole side of the mind at the very time when science is carried to its highest point. Up to the age of thirty, Darwin tells us, he took intense delight in poetry, — Milton, Byron, Scott, Wordsworth and Shelley, — while he read Shakespeare with supreme enjoyment. Pictures and music also gave him much pleasure. But at sixty-seven he writes that “for many years he cannot endure to read a line of poetry;” that he has lately tried Shakespeare, and found it so intolerably dull that it nauseated him; and that he has almost lost all taste for pictures and music. This he records, not with satisfaction, but with “great regret;”¹ he would gladly have it otherwise, but cannot. It is simply that one whole side of his intellectual being is paralyzed; a loss which all the healthy enjoyment of the other side could scarcely repay. Yet it is possible that the lesson of Darwin’s limitations may be scarcely less valuable than that of his achievements. By his strength he revolutionized the world of science. By his weakness he gave evidence that there is a world outside of science.

We cannot, on the one side, deny that Darwin represented the highest type of scientific mind. Nor can we, on the other, deny the value and validity of what he ignored. Of the studies that became extinguished in him, we can say, as Tacitus said when the images of Brutus and Cassius were not carried in the procession,

¹ *Life*, by his son, Am. ed. pp. 30, 81.

— *Eo magis præfulgebant quia non visebantur*, — or, as Emerson translates it, “They glared through their absences.” It would be easy to multiply testimonies from high scientific authority to this limitation and narrowing of the purely scientific mind. One such recent testimony may be found in the late report of the head of the chemical department of Harvard University, Prof. Josiah P. Cooke; and another in that very remarkable paper in the “Forum” entitled “The Education of the Future,” by a man who singularly combines within himself the scientific and literary gifts, — Clarence King, formerly Director of the United States Geological Survey. After weighing more skillfully than I have ever seen it done elsewhere the strength and weakness of the literary or classical training of the past, he thus deals with the other side: “With all its novel powers and practical sense, I am obliged to admit that the purely scientific brain is miserably mechanical; it seems to have become a splendid sort of self-directed machine, an incredible automaton, grinding on with its analyses or constructions. But for pure sentiment, for all that spontaneous, joyous Greek waywardness of fancy, for the temperature of passion and the subtle thrill of ideality, you might as well look to a cast-iron derrick.”¹ For all these, then, we must come back, by the very testimony of those scientific leaders who would seek to be whole men also, to the world outside of science.

If there be an intellectual world outside of science, where is the boundary line of that world? We pass that boundary, it would seem, whenever we enter the realm often called intuitive or inspirational; a realm whose characteristic it is that it is not subject to processes or measurable by tests. The yield of this other world may be as real as that of the scientific world, but its methods are not traceable, nor are its achievements capable of being duplicated by the mere force of patient will. Keats, in one of his fine letters, classifies the universe, and begins boldly with “things real, as sun, moon, and passages of Shakespeare.” Sun and moon lie within the domain of science; and at this moment the astronomers are following out that extraordinary discovery which has revealed in the bright star Algol a system of three and perhaps four stellar bodies, revolving round each other and influencing each other’s motions, and this at a distance so vast that the rays of light which reveal them left their home nearly fifty years ago. The imagination is paralyzed before a step so vast; yet it all lies within the domain of science, while science can tell us no more how Mac-

¹ *The Forum*, March, 1892, p. 29.

beth or Hamlet came into existence than if the new astronomy had never been born. It is as true of the poem as of the poet, *Nascitur non fit*. We cannot even define what poetry is; and Thoreau says that there never yet was a definition of it so good but the poet would proceed to disregard it by setting aside all its requisitions.

Shelley says that a man cannot say, "I will compose poetry." The greatest poet even cannot say it, for the mind in creation is as a fading coal, which some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness; this power arises from within, like the color of a flower which fades and changes as it is developed, and the conscious portions of our nature are unprophectic either of its approach or its departure."¹ In the same way Schiller wrote to Körner that what impressed him when he sat down to write was usually some single impulse or harmonious tone, and not any clear notion of what he proposed writing. "These observations," he says, "arise from an Ode to Light with which I am now busy. I have as yet no idea what the poem will be, but a presentiment; and yet I can promise beforehand that it will be successful."²

So similar are the laws of all production in the imaginative arts that we need only to turn to a great musician's description of the birth of music to find something almost precisely parallel. In a letter from Mozart, lately condensed by Professor Royce,³ he writes: "My ideas come as they will, I don't know how, in a stream. . . . If I can hold on to them, they begin to join on to one another, as if they were bits that a pastry cook should join on in his pantry. And now my soul gets heated, and if nothing disturbs me the piece grows larger and brighter, until, however long it is, it is all finished at once, so that I can see it at a glance." In both arts, therefore, there occurs something which it is hardly extravagant to call inspiration, or direct inflow from some fountain unknown, and which at any rate lies outside of all science. The first essential of scientific observation — the recurrence of similar phenomena under similar conditions — is absolutely wanting. Coleridge's poem of "Kubla Khan" was left hopelessly a fragment by the inconvenient arrival of a man from Porlock; but there is no ray of evidence that its continuation could have been secured by placing Coleridge, at the same hour next day, before

¹ "Defense of Poetry," *Essays and Letters*, Am. ed. i. 56.

² *Corresp. of Schiller and Körner*, ii. 173.

³ *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 456.

the same table, with the same pens and paper, and placing a piece of artillery before the front-door to compel every resident of Porlock to keep his distance.

We have now the key to that atrophy on one side of Darwin's nature. It was in his case the Nemesis of Science, — the price he paid for his magnificent achievements. Poetry is not a part of science, but it is, as Wordsworth once said, "the antithesis of science;" it is a world outside. Thus far, as a literary man, I am entitled to go, and feel myself on ground with which I am tolerably familiar. But the suggestion irresistibly follows, — and it is surely a momentous one, — if poetry represents a world outside of science, is there nothing else outside? This question I must leave specialists to answer, hazarding only a few hints which are confessedly those of a layman only.

There is unquestionably much in common between the poetic impulse, the impulse of religious emotion, and the ethical or moral instinct, if instinct it be. So plain is this, that the mere attempt to recognize in either of these anything outside of science is met at the outset with suspicion by those who have risked their all on the faith that science includes all. This was strikingly seen, for instance, in the Brooklyn Ethical Association, the other day, when Dr. Lewis G. Janes, in a valuable address on "Life as a Fine Art," had allowed himself to say that "the art-impulse, spontaneous, vital, creative, breaks through the bonds of constraining legalism and restores the soul to freedom." He was at once taken to task by his stricter associates, and was assured that this was by no means "psychological science or evolution," but that he had "given poetry and rhetoric in the place of cold facts and scientific deductions."¹ From their point of view, the critics were perfectly right. It is a very dangerous thing to admit that there is a world outside of science. Once recognize thus much, and then, after the art impulse has burst through and claimed its place in that world, who knows but the devout impulse, at least, may also take its place by the side of the art-impulse, and the soul be restored to freedom in good earnest?

If the devout impulse thus takes its place with the poetic, in a world outside of science, the question must inevitably follow, whether the ethical emotion is to take its place there also. At present, as we know, the followers of Mr. Herbert Spencer claim to have utterly captured, measured, and solved it from the point of view of science, and they dismiss the whole conception of In-

¹ Brooklyn Ethical Association, *Essays on Evolution*, pp. 411, 429.

tuitive Morals as completely as Bentham thought he had annihilated the word *ought*, when he said frankly fifty years ago that it was meaningless, and should be expunged from the English language, or at least from the vocabulary of morals.¹ It is claimed by Mr. Spencer's ablest American advocate that "the moral sense is not ultimate, but derivative, and that it has been built up out of slowly organized experiences of pleasure or pain."² But if no possible experience of pleasure or pain, as it passes, can give us the slightest key to the sacredness and strength that lie in the word *ought*, how can that strength or sacredness be found by multiplying such pleasure or pain into millions of instances, or centuries of time, or countless generations of men? If it is perfectly supposable, and perhaps known to our personal experience, that a man may do what he simply recognizes as right, although it appears likely to cause only pain and not pleasure to every person concerned in the matter, present or to come, then how can any accumulation of pleasurable experience culminate in the word *right*, any more than the utmost efforts bestowed by horticulture upon the production of the potato, which is a tuber, can culminate in converting it into an orange, which is a fruit? If this is all that the most modern phase of science can offer, it seems to me an involuntary admission that science has here stepped beyond its limits, and that it may be necessary to remand not only poetry and religion, but ethics, to the world that lies outside.

But on these points I should hardly venture an opinion, in consideration of the fact that there are so many who have devoted their lives to these especial investigations. My whole aim has been to assert from the point of view of literature that a world outside of science exists. This done, I must leave the delineation of its boundaries to those whose studies have extended far more profoundly than mine into the astronomy of the soul.

THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON.

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¹ "The talisman of arrogance, indolence, and ignorance is to be found in a single word, an authoritative imposture, which in these pages it will be frequently necessary to unveil. It is the word 'ought,'—'ought or ought not,' as circumstances may be. In deciding 'You ought to do this,' 'You ought not to do it,' is not every question of knowledge set at rest? If the use of the word be admissible at all, it 'ought' to be banished from the vocabulary of morals." — Bentham's *Deontology*, i. 31, 32.

² Mr. John Fiske, in *Essays of Brooklyn Ethical Society*, p. 94.

THE BIRTH AND INFANCY OF JESUS.

I. CHRISTIANITY AND CRITICISM. — The persistent and indestructible element in Christianity is the Christian Ideal. By this we must understand a conception of human life determined by an ensemble of active virtues, pure sentiments, worthy affections, trust in God and sympathy for man, of which the original type was set by Jesus of Nazareth. Every form of innocence and of repentance, of modesty and of beneficent courage, of submission to the inevitable and of audacity in progress, of individual and of social reform, of confidence in the Supreme Power which governs the world and our destiny, of tenderness and of energy belongs to this ideal, which, under many aspects, has now presided for nearly nineteen centuries over the evolution of the civilized world, and is still far from being exhausted. There is no new application of the law of justice and of love which is not a partial realization of this ideal. Whatever may be the result of independent criticism of the Scriptures, the existence and the influence of the Christian ideal cannot be denied. This it is which justifies all who love it, though they may ever remain below its ineffable beauty. It has *grace*; that is to say, the attractiveness which charms and subjugates. It implies immortality, since it overpasses the limits of earthly life and illuminates the beyond. It is, in itself and by itself, independent of him who first made it shine into our souls. One may even speak against the Son of Man without necessarily speaking against the Holy Spirit (Matt. xii. 32). But, speaking historically, and even if the evangelical tradition, submitted to a radical criticism, is reduced to the lowest residuum of positive reality, we are not only unable to deny either the value, the richness or the permanence of the Christian ideal; more than this, we cannot contest the claim of him who lived under the name of Jesus of Nazareth to have been its initiator, and consequently its revealer.

This is what they should say to each other who tremble for the future of Christianity, in view of the curtailments which a free study of the gospel documents leads us to make in the body of facts which men have been accustomed to regard as constituting the history of the life of Jesus Christ. Once persuaded of this fact, they would assist with more peace of mind in researches guided by the love of truth, knowing well that nothing can take from them their real treasure.

With this preliminary observation we present to the readers of

this review a summary study of the chapters of the gospels which treat of the Birth and Infancy of Jesus. The results, in very great part negative, to which we are obliged to come leave standing all that is essential, and they can astonish only those who are ignorant of the conditions of time, method, and point of view under which our gospels were drawn up. The chapters concerning the birth and infancy belong to the second layer of the continuous stratification of gospel tradition. Of our four gospels, two only, Matthew and Luke, relate anything concerning the first years of Jesus. The primitive gospel history, as one sees by the Gospel of Mark, and as one may find the latest confirmation of it in the fourth gospel, did not go back of the ministry of John the Baptist.

The attentive reader who compares chapters i. and ii. of Matthew and i. 26-56, ii., iii. 23-38 of Luke is struck by the fact that apart from two matters, — the miraculous conception by the operation of the Holy Spirit, and the location of the birth of Jesus at Bethlehem, — these two narratives are in a state of irreconcilable contradiction, and that it is impossible even for the most subtle exegetes to harmonize them, that is, to find place for the data of the one in the framework of the other. This fact is easily demonstrated.

II. MATTHEW AND LUKE. — According to the first gospel, which has begun by unfolding a genealogy which links Jesus to David, through a descent from Solomon, we learn abruptly that Mary (Miriam) the mother of Jesus, who was betrothed to a man named Joseph, was found with child before becoming his wife. We learn without further preamble that this was through the operation of the Holy Spirit, but she said nothing of this to her betrothed husband. Joseph knew nothing of it, but being kind-hearted he did not wish to expose her to the consequences of the accusation which he could legally have brought against her (cf. Deut. xxii, 23, 24). Being unwilling, however, to legitimate so grave a misconduct, he sought to put her away privately (not through the "letter of divorce" which would have made everything known); but he was warned in a dream by an angel of God not to do anything of the kind. The child which Mary bore in her womb "was of the Holy Spirit;" it would be a son whom he should call "Jesus," that is to say "Saviour." Revealing dreams fill a great place in the narrative of the first gospel. We count five of them, — i. 20, ii. 12, 13, 19, 22. This is a sign of great naïveté. It seems never to have occurred to the narrator that there is no appreciable difference between "having seen or heard a

thing in a dream" and "having dreamed that one saw or heard a thing." But in this respect antiquity was usually credulous to a degree which confounds us. It is also a sign of naïveté on the part of the first evangelist that he has invoked in support of this miraculous conception the passage Isaiah vii. 14 where there is no question of a "virgin" (*bethoula*) in the precise sense of this word, but of a "marriageable young woman" (*halema*). The seventy inadvertently translated *halema* by *παρθένος*, and hence arose a misunderstanding which has lasted for long ages.

It was at Bethlehem, a village of Judæa, that Jesus, according to this same gospel, was born, without anything extraordinary to mark the moment of his birth. Bethlehem seems to have been, in the view of the evangelist, the regular residence of Joseph and Mary; at least he does not tell us that they came there from elsewhere, and they certainly did not come there from Nazareth, a "city" of Galilee, since ii. 22, 23 tells us the very particular reason which led Joseph to go and establish himself at Nazareth, with Mary and the infant Jesus.

But, after the birth of Jesus, Magi arrived from the East (we do not know whether Arabia or Chaldea is meant), who, informed and guided by a star which they had seen appear in their country, undertook a journey to render homage to the new-born king of the Jews. We shall need to return to this well-known episode. The point of interest at this moment is to know at what time after the birth the Magi arrived in Judæa. The evangelist does not fix it, but since in chapter ii. 16 King Herod, who, according to chapter ii. 7, had informed himself exactly concerning the time at which the Magi had seen the star appear, subsequently orders a massacre of the male children in Bethlehem two years old and under, we are to conclude that, in the view of the narrator, the visit of the Magi took place in the interval of two years after the birth of Jesus, — two years being the extreme term set by the disquieted tyrant. The journey of the Magi had been long, for they came from afar, and this circumstance implies that Joseph and Mary had not left Bethlehem, but continued to reside there, and that the infant Jesus was at least a year old at the time of this remarkable visit. We ask in vain why Herod, if animated by the fear which was ascribed to him, — a suspicious and entirely unscrupulous king, whose police was thoroughly organized, — did not have the Magi followed by trusty agents. Bethlehem was not far from Jerusalem, and he could have learned at once which was the infant that he wished to destroy.

What follows, as we all know, is that the Magi received "in a dream" the order not to return to Herod. Joseph "in a dream" is warned of the murderous designs of the king, and he is commanded to take refuge in Egypt, with the mother and child. There he remained, we are told in ii. 15, "until the death of Herod;" this does not at all determine the length of his sojourn in Egypt, but it implies that he did not leave the land of the Pharaohs very soon after his arrival. Herod had put into execution his cruel design. At last he dies; Joseph, still "in a dream," is informed of the fact, and plans to return to the land of Israel. But the kingdom of Herod, after his death, has been divided into three parts, and Joseph, fearing the evil disposition of his son Archelaus, who reigns over Judæa proper, and warned "in a dream," prefers to establish himself in Galilee where the brother of Archelaus, Herod Antipas reigns, and it is now, for the first time, that the family of Jesus comes to reside at Nazareth.

Such is the groundwork of the narrative of Matthew; let us turn to Luke's. This is more circumstantial and of a very different character from the narrative of the first gospel, which is by turns brilliant and sombre. The slaughter of the hapless children of Bethlehem contrasts forcibly with the oriental splendor of the arrival of the Magi. The sinister figure of King Herod towers over all. The narrative of Luke, on the contrary, is idyllic. We meet there only good and holy persons. After an introduction, devoted to the narrative of the birth of John the Baptist, we learn that the angel Gabriel in person comes to find in Nazareth of Galilee a young woman betrothed to a man named Joseph, a descendant of David (i. 26, 27) in order to reveal to her the designs of God. The power of the Most High shall overshadow her, and it is she, not Joseph, who receives the command to call by the name of Jesus the son who shall be born of her. Mary submits with docility to the divine will, and goes to visit in the country of Judæa "her kinswoman" Elizabeth, of whose unexpected pregnancy the angel has informed her. Elizabeth is the kinswoman (*συγγενής*) of Mary, and according to i. 5, she is one of the daughters of Aaron; hence we are to infer that, in the mind of the narrator, Mary is such also. She does not then descend from David, like her betrothed husband Joseph.

The meeting of the two women is marked by the leaping of John the Baptist in the womb, at the approach of him who is to be his superior and the Messiah of Israel, and Elizabeth sings a canticle inspired by these circumstances; Mary also bursts into

song. In the narrative of Luke, songs are as frequent as dreams are in the narrative of Matthew. We are to observe here also that Nazareth is indicated in this narrative as the habitual residence of Joseph and Mary, in contradiction to what the first gospel says, according to which Joseph did not come to settle at Nazareth until several years after the birth of Jesus, for reasons which we have seen.

How then can Luke declare, like the first gospel, that Jesus was born at Bethlehem of Judæa? This is one of the two points on which the two evangelists are in accord. There is needed, from Luke's point of view, something to explain why Jesus was born at Bethlehem of Judæa. The reason of it was that a census of the whole Roman Empire had been decreed by the Emperor Augustus, and that every one of his subjects was to be inscribed at the place where his family had originated. Joseph took with him Mary, and with her repaired to Bethlehem (ii. 1-6). Observe that Mary is not yet married to Joseph; she is still only "his betrothed" (ii. 5); this is one more point in contradiction of the first gospel, according to which the marriage of Joseph and Mary took place before the birth of Jesus.

Luke knows nothing of the visit of the Magi or of the persecutions of which the new-born Messiah was the object on the part of Herod. Everything here is calm and smiling; every incident is peaceful and joyous. Shepherds keeping their flocks by night in the fields (a feature indicating the fine season) are informed by an angel of the great event which has just taken place at Bethlehem, and they go at once to behold, lying in his cradle, the infant Messiah. They have heard the host of heaven singing the beautiful "Gloria in Excelsis," and they relate to all they meet the celestial wonders which they have witnessed (ii. 8-20). Jesus is circumcised according to the Law, receiving the name commanded by the angel. Then, the days of the purification of Mary being accomplished (forty days according to Numbers xviii. and Exodus xiii. 12),¹ Jesus is presented in the temple at Jerusalem by his parents, who discharge the offering required of a poor family (Lev. xii. 8). Here the child Jesus is the object of the blessings of the aged Simeon, who, taking him up in his arms, sings the "Dimittis servum tuum, Domine," and of the aged Anna, the prophetess. It is to be remarked that the expectations

¹ This detail, τὰν ἡμερῶν διαβολῶν μαρτυρα, is absolutely contradictory of the theory of the *partus utero clauso* imagined by Roman Catholic theologians, to support the thesis of the perpetual virginity of Mary.

of the two elders bear the impress, in the highest degree, of the characteristic features of Jewish Messianism. Simeon sees in the little child "the glory of the people of Israel" whose "consolation" he had not ceased to expect (ii. 25 and 31, 32). Anna praises God and speaks of the child to all who wait for "the deliverance of Jerusalem."

We are surprised by a feature which seems singular after we have read of the miraculous scenes which go before. At the outset, Mary seems to be at once astonished and enraptured (ii. 19) at what the shepherds relate to her, and she ponders in her heart all she hears, as if she needed to take account of such surprising events. In verse thirty-three the prophetic words of Simeon greatly astonish both the father and mother of the child. One would say that the third gospel has mingled two different sources, — one which relates the miraculous birth, and another which, making Jesus the child of Joseph and Mary, proceeded but gradually to the revelation of his Messianic dignity. This suspicion is strongly confirmed by what follows.

Joseph and Mary have returned to Nazareth, "their own city" (ii. 39), having discharged all that was prescribed in the Law. The child grows and waxes strong. There is not the least mention of a journey to Egypt or of a return to Palestine. At the age of twelve, Jesus accompanies his parents to Jerusalem on the occasion of the Passover. But, as they are returning with the other pilgrims, the parents discover that their son is not with them. They return to Jerusalem, and after three days' search they find him in the midst of the doctors of the law, astonishing all that are there by his questions and answers. When his mother gently reproves him for the distress of mind which he had caused them, he answers with a mingling of naïveté and hauteur, that they should not have sought him elsewhere than "in the things of his father."¹ Whereupon the evangelist adds that Joseph and Mary "understood not the saying which he spake unto them!" (ii. 50). How is this possible if they knew the mystery of his birth, a mystery with which both in fact were so well acquainted?

Luke and Matthew preserve the same complete silence as to what happened to Jesus from his infancy until the moment of his coming to John the Baptist at the Jordan. Luke only adds that he was subject to his parents, and that Mary carefully kept in her

¹ Ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου should designate the Temple and its annexes; for it is a question here of the *place* where he should have been sought, and not of the matters with which he was to occupy himself.

heart the remembrance of all that she had heard, and that "Jesus advanced in wisdom and stature and in favor with God and men" (ii. 52).

We have not at all exaggerated, then, in saying that the two narratives of the first and the third gospel spring from two traditions which have been developed on parallel lines without mutual agreement. If one of the two narrators was aware of the other tradition, this would have seemed to him a formal negation of the narrative known to himself; but there is no trace of an intentional polemic of this kind. The two legendary currents have diverged, each following its own course, and there is no method by which one can make them flow over the same bed.

For example, I challenge any one to find a place for the visit of the Magi and its consequences, as we read of it in Matthew, in the context of the narrative of Luke. The Magi, according to Matthew, found Joseph, Mary and the infant Jesus in Bethlehem of Judæa, before their departure for Egypt. The visit of the Magi, then, if it is to be included in the narrative of Luke, must be placed in the forty days which followed the birth, since, according to Luke, Joseph and Mary repaired to Jerusalem at the end of these forty days and then returned quietly to Galilee. But how can they come to Jerusalem under the eyes of Herod, who wishes to destroy their child, offer the required sacrifice without disturbance, and receive the public benediction of Simeon and Anna, which would have been so dangerous under the circumstances? How, too, will one find room for the journey into Egypt in the narrative of Luke? All the subtleties of the harmonizers have been broken by these stubborn facts. The only conclusion to be drawn is that, at the time when the first gospel and the third were written, there were two divergent and irreconcilable traditions of the birth and infancy of Jesus. We shall better comprehend this state of things if we take up in succession the principal episodes of the two narratives and confront them with each other.

III. THE GENEALOGIES. — Matthew¹ and Luke have set down the genealogy of Jesus independently. The common intention of these two tables is to show that Jesus is descended from King David, although Luke, going beyond Abraham, takes pleasure in

¹ We say *Matthew* to designate the first gospel, conformably to usage. We recognize, as coming from the apostle Matthew, only the great Discourses of Jesus reported in this gospel, and framed in a historical narrative which is generally parallel to that of Mark. The final redaction of our first gospel appears to be almost contemporary with that of the third.

attaching this sacred line to Adam, and through Adam to God (iii. 38). This is in harmony with the universalist tendency of the third gospel. In the controversies between Jews and Christians, the essential point to establish was that Jesus descended from David. It was one of the proofs of his Messiahship.

A more significant matter is that the two evangelists present genealogies which differ from each other. According to Matthew (i. 1 ff.), Jesus descends from David through the royal line of Solomon, composed of the kings of Judah down to the Captivity. Two points excite the reader's attention. The first is the care which the compiler takes to point out that there are precisely fourteen generations from Abraham to David, as many from David to the Captivity, and as many from the Captivity to Jesus himself. It is true that this symmetry is obtained only by a very arbitrary process. Four kings of Judah are lacking in the series. Joram, who is called the father of Uzziah, was in fact the father of Ahaziah, who was the father of Joash, he of Amaziah, and he, finally, of Uzziah (i. 8). In verse eleven Josiah is called the father of Jechoniah and his brethren. In fact, Josiah was the father of Jehoiachim, and it was the latter who was the father of Jehoiachin or Jechoniah. Finally, Jechoniah is counted twice, *before* and *after* the Captivity. In the series which follows this event the Old Testament indicates only two names, Salathiel (or Sealthiel) and Zerubbabel, and our genealogy makes Zerubbabel the son of Salathiel, while in 1 Chronicles iii. 19 Zerubbabel is the son of Pedaiah, the cousin of Sealthiel. But we recognize in this reckoning the pronounced taste of the Jews of the time for chronological symmetry. This taste united with the apocalyptic point of view from which men took pleasure in making prominent the symmetry of periods, as the mysterious index of the divine direction impressed on events in view of an end determined long before by the wisdom of God.

The second thing which surprises the reader is that in this genealogy composed of masculine names there are, nevertheless, four names of women, each cited as the mother of the person following: Tamar (v. 3), Rahab and Ruth (v. 5) and Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah (v. 6). Why, one asks, are these exceptions made, especially as each of these names is associated with accounts which could have little edification for a Jew of the strictest sect? Tamar became a mother as the result of a species of incest. Rahab was the *kedescha*, the sacred prostitute of Jericho. Ruth was a Moabitess, and her marriage with Boaz did not consist with the legal

prohibition which interdicted Jews from marrying strangers. There is only one way of explaining the importance which the compiler attaches to these feminine names. It is precisely because they shock the sentiments of the puritanic Jews that the mention of them is instructive. In the rabbinical schools they found a way to rehabilitate, by certain arguments, the memory of these women who made an integral part of the sacred tradition; nevertheless, appearances remained adverse. In the same way, when Mary, the mother of Jesus, was in question, it was to be expected that the Jewish doctors, in their hostility to Christianity, would attack the good name of the mother of Jesus, who had given birth to a child outside of marriage. The echo of these calumnies has been preserved in the Talmud, and the more the Christians insisted upon the miraculous conception the more the Jews, who did not believe in it, derided Christian credulity. The mention of the four faulty women in question is intended to remind these despisers that we must not trust to superficial appearances, that the ways of God are deeper than ours, and that external deviations may conceal a peculiar dispensation of supreme importance for the realization of divine plans. The first evangelist did not draw up this genealogy, as we shall see; he found it ready made, but to him must be assigned the addition of the four feminine names; for the spirit of this addition is in close connection with what follows (i. 18, 19), where we see Joseph, the betrothed husband of Mary, perplexed and afflicted by the apparent facts until an angelic revelation acquaints him with the mysterious and divine reality under this paradoxical appearance.

It is solely the Christian thesis of the miraculous conception which created the difficulty. Joseph and Mary being known as the father and mother of Jesus, it was necessary, in order to establish the miracle of the birth, to declare that Mary became a mother before her conjugal union with Joseph. Hence the turn which the tradition of this birth took.

We have said that the first evangelist did not draw up the genealogy with which he begins. Certainly the idea could not have occurred to a narrator relating the formation of the infant Jesus by a direct, supernatural act of the Holy Spirit, to show that Jesus is the son of David by exhibiting a genealogy which issues not in Mary, but in Joseph. In the mind of those who have drawn up this genealogy, Jesus is evidently the son of Joseph; otherwise, it signifies nothing. The evangelist was perhaps conscious of this antinomy when he added to the name of Joseph (i. 16), *τον ἀνδρα*

Μαρίας ἐξ ἧς ἐγεννήθη Ἰησοῦς ὁ λεγόμενος Χριστός, the name of Mary being the fifth feminine name cited. But in spite of this addition, which perhaps appeared to him to remove the difficulty from the legal point of view, Jesus according to this genealogy is only the "Son of David" if he is the son of Joseph.

In the Jewish theories concerning the expected Messiah those which were most popular certainly declared that he would descend from the glorious king of Israel, although during the whole time of the domination of the Maccabees no trace was discovered of any survivors of the ancient royal family of Judah. Yet occasions were not wanting when the existence of an undoubted descendant of David would have been the cause either of insurrectionary movements, or of measures of precaution taken by the government of the day. The title, "Son of David," none the less remained one of the honorable and popular titles of the future Messiah, very much as that of "Cæsar" became the appanage of all the Roman emperors although, after Nero, it was applied to sovereigns who, personally, had nothing in common with the family of the Julii. But for this very reason in the controversies between Jews and Christians, the friends of the latter attached importance to the fact that Jesus was really a descendant of David. Hence the efforts made on the Christian side to reconstruct to this effect the genealogy of Joseph, the father of Jesus; and this task was accomplished in a circle which was still unacquainted with the idea of the conception by the Holy Spirit.

Luke also presents a genealogy which makes David one of the direct ancestors of Jesus (iii. 23-38), but it departs completely from that of the first gospel, in that it gives, as the ancestor of the Messiah, not Solomon, the son of David, but another son of this king, much more obscure, — Nathan, whose name appears in 2 Samuel v. 14. We do not know where Luke found the list of the descendants of Nathan. Why this difference from Matthew? The only plausible reason is that the Davidic genealogy of Jesus was studied and compiled in different places, according to different motives. At first sight, it being granted that Jesus was a "son of David," it seemed natural to give him for ancestors the kings who had occupied the throne of Judah. But it may have occurred on reflection that it was unbecoming to attribute to the Messiah as his ancestors kings who had been idolatrous and criminal, and had been rebuked by the Deity. Recourse was then had to the line of Nathan, who had no history, and all appeared orderly. But it thus results that each of the two lists strikes at the heart

of the other, and that we cannot adopt one in preference to the other. Their contradiction brings into full light the fact that men did not believe Jesus to be the son of David and therefore the Messiah, but that they first believed him to be the Messiah and therefore the son of David, and that in this way men came to elaborate his genealogy without having the elements of certainty for it.

This difference between the two gospels has occupied the interpreters of the New Testament for a long time. The solutions which have been proposed, to make it disappear, are each more inadmissible than the rest. For example, it has been claimed that one of the two genealogies was that of Joseph and the other that of Mary, an assertion which is visibly inexact. Both genealogies issue inevitably in Joseph as the last link in the chain. Moreover, we have seen that, according to Luke, Mary was rather of the daughters of Aaron. It has been said that the levirate, commanded by the law in the case of a husband dying without issue, explains these two tables where, after David, almost all the names are different. We have, it is said, in one genealogy the legal fathers, and in the other, the actual fathers. But if Solomon married the widow of his brother Nathan (a fact of which we are entirely ignorant), his successor, Rehoboam, was the son of Naama, the Ammonitess, and not of the widow of Nathan (1 Kings xiv. 21, 31). Moreover, how can we seriously discuss such a hypothesis, which would demand in this line for centuries a perpetual application of the law of the levirate. This is absurd in its improbability.

According to Matthew, there were twenty-six generations from David to Jesus, according to Luke, forty-one; this gives an average of forty-six years to a generation in one case, and of twenty-five years in the other. The nearest ancestors of Joseph are indicated differently in the two tables. Matthew gives this succession, Eleazar, Matthan, Jacob, Joseph; Luke, the succession, Levi, Matthat, Heli, Joseph.

A thing to be especially remarked is, that, according to an incident related by the three synoptics, Jesus himself combated the teaching of the rabbis who made descent from David one of the characteristic traits of the Messiah (Matt. xxii. 41 ff.; Mark xii. 35 ff.; Luke xx. 41-44.)

This, however, did not hinder his disciples, when once the conviction of his Messiahship had been rooted in their minds, from proclaiming him the son of David after the flesh. This opinion

is very old, as we see it already declared by Paul (Romans i. 3). Paul, who was not much concerned to know Christ "according to the flesh" (2 Cor. v. 16), seems to have accepted confidently this assertion of the Judæo-Christian community. When, later, they wished to compile and fix the Davidic genealogy of Jesus, embarrassments arose. According to Julius Africanus (Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. i. 7-12), Herod had caused the genealogical tables of the Jews to be burned. If a successful attempt was made to restore some of these (Josephus, Vita 1; Cont. Apion. 1, 7), it was in the interest of the sacerdotal families, for whom an authentic filiation was of the first importance. If the modest family of the carpenter of Nazareth had possessed a regular genealogy, going back to King David, the brothers of Jesus would certainly have produced it when they joined the Christian Church and it would have become a document *ne varietur* of the primitive tradition.

Hegesippus, a Judæo-Christian writer of the first half of the second century, cited by Eusebius (Hist. Eccl. iii. 19, 20) relates that Domitian arrested the "descendants of David," the grandchildren of Jude, one of the brothers of Jesus. They had been suspected of seditious tendencies. Questioned by him, they replied that they believed themselves, indeed, to be descendants of David, but that the kingdom of which the Christ should one day be the head was to be of a celestial and angelic nature. Domitian, seeing that they were poor peasants living painfully on the produce of a few acres, their calloused hands attesting their humble condition, sent them back to the plow. If this episode is authentic, and nothing proves that it is not so, it supposes that in the time of Domitian pains had been spent on genealogic research respecting the family of Jesus, and that the partisans or the spies of the imperial power had taken offense. The nature of Domitian's suspicions favors the view that it was the royal genealogy in Matthew which was preferred in the home of these last representatives of the family of Joseph and Mary. It is under Domitian, then, (81-95), toward the end rather than at the beginning of his reign, that we think the date of the composition of our three synoptics must be placed. They reproduced earlier documents, among which figured the two genealogies of Matthew and Luke. But it appears to us demonstrated that both the one and the other are purely hypothetical, and consequently have no historical value. Jesus has other titles to greatness than a royal descent.

IV. THE BIRTH AT BETHLEHEM. — The same kind of considerations are suggested by the fact, declared by the gospels of Mat-

threw and Luke, that Jesus was born at Bethlehem in Judah, the "city" where the family of David originated. The two claims, "Jesus is the son of David" and "He was born at Bethlehem," are closely connected. There was a passage in the prophet Micah, v. 1, which was interpreted very arbitrarily (Matt. ii. 6) to indicate the city from which the Messiah should come.¹ It seemed natural that the "son of David" who was to reëstablish the glory of Israel should spring from the same place as his illustrious ancestor, and this opinion, shared by Luke and Matthew, was early adopted in the Christian communities.

Yet we are to observe that not the least allusion has been made to this birth at Bethlehem in all the rest of the gospel history. Neither Mark nor John shows the least acquaintance with it. Doubtless, there is nothing impossible in the fact itself. Children were born at Bethlehem as elsewhere. But it is very strange that in the first discussions relative to the Messiahship of Jesus no one thinks of drawing an argument from this circumstance which, under the ideas of the time and the country, would have had great weight.

The first gospel (Matt. ii. 1) announces the fact without commentary. It is one of the elements of the legend of the Magi peculiar to Matthew. The fact is supported (ii. 6) by the passage in Micah of which we have just spoken, and as, according to Matthew, it is only in consequence of events which embraced a period of three years, at least, that Joseph and Mary take up their residence at Nazareth, he seeks (ii. 23) in a doubtful connection of the epithet "Nazarean," or "Nazorean," and the "nazirate" or "nazir" (*surculus*, cf. Isaiah xi. 1) the explanation of the fact that Jesus was always called the Nazarene, never the Bethlehemite.

In fact, among the Christians and among the Jews, Jesus was never called anything else than Jesus of Nazareth. When he comes into his own country (*εἰς τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῦ*. Mark vi. 1), where he is not well received, the remarks of the people of Nazareth leave no room for the supposition that he is a stranger to them by birth.

A circumstance but little remarked is that Bethlehem in Judah was not the only city bearing this name in ancient Israel. There was, very near Nazareth, another such place, which in ancient times made part of the tribe of Zebulun, and is mentioned in Joshua

¹ In the Hebrew text Micah says that Bethlehem is "too little" to be counted among the "thousands" (subdivisions) of Judah. The evangelist boldly translates it, "nowise least among the princes of Judah."

xix. 15; it always remained insignificant. May there have been some connection between the Nazarene family of Joseph and this neighboring place? Did it perhaps originate there? May Mary, by chance, have become a mother in this Bethlehem, though living usually at Nazareth? It is impossible to establish any of these suppositions. But if such were the case, we could better comprehend the point of departure of the tradition which makes Jesus born in Bethlehem of Judah. However little the name of Bethlehem may have been associated with his birth in any manner, it was beyond a doubt that people would think of the city of David, and not of the other.

Luke, who makes it plain that Joseph and Mary were established at Nazareth before Mary gave birth to Jesus at Bethlehem of Judah, finds it necessary to explain this change of place. He believes he has found the cause in the imperial census of Judæa ordained by the governor of Syria, Quirinius, which would oblige Joseph to go to be registered in the city of his ancestor David. This seems at first sight like a very precise date, and a very historical indication of an event which marked the Jewish annals of this period. Unfortunately, in examining the matter closely, we perceive that this attempt to make the census of Quirinius coincide with the birth of Jesus is absolutely unhistorical.

In the first place, when was it ever known that in a great empire, where, for a long time, the various peoples had scattered far and wide from their native countries, a census was taken which obliged the inhabitants of one place in order to be registered, to go to the locality, often very remote, in which their families originated? It would have been necessary in such a case that the Jews established in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, Greece, and even Italy should return to Judæa, that the Roman colonists dispersed over the whole face of the Roman world should make the voyage to Italy, and, reciprocally, that the numerous strangers who had come to Rome from the conquered countries should go back to their native lands. Can any one imagine the unspeakable perturbation which the decree of the Emperor Augustus (Luke ii. 1-3) would have caused in all the affairs and relations of men? It would have been one of the most noted events of his reign. Besides, a little reflection will convince us that a census would absolutely fail of its end if the enumerators registered the people elsewhere than in the country of their residence. The supposition from which the narrative of the third gospel sets out could have been imagined only by people who had but a very vague and

inexact idea of the manner in which the imperial administration proceeded in this work. It was not for such a cause that Joseph and his betrothed were constrained to make the quite long journey from Nazareth to Bethlehem of Judah, a journey which the situation of Mary, approaching the time of her confinement, rendered particularly difficult.

The fact of this census of Quirinius is itself historic. Josephus speaks of it in several places.¹ But the census was one limited to Judæa and Samaria. The Emperor Augustus ordered a census three times, but not for all the provinces: it was to register the whole number of Roman citizens (*census populi*). That which he ordered for Judæa had a particular cause. After the death of Herod the Great, his kingdom had been divided between Archelaus, Herod Antipas and Philip. Archelaus the Ethnarch had received, as his portion, Judæa and Samaria. But he reigned only ten years. Herod his father having died four years before our era, he ascended his throne, which was contested for some time, only in the year 3 before our era; but he was deposed in the year 6 A. D. and his kingdom, or ethnarchy, was reduced to be a portion of a Roman province, while Herod Antipas and Philip continued to reign as sovereign *socii* over their respective domains. The former subjects of Archelaus were annexed to the province of Syria, with a Roman procurator for governor, under the superior authority of the legate of Syria. It was at this time, very naturally, that the emperor, in order to take account of the population, the resources, and the taxable wealth of the annexed country, ordered the governor of Syria, P. Sulpicius Quirinius, to proceed to a census. Now this institution had always been, even under its own kings, very distasteful to the people of Israel: the opposition which the census decreed by King David excited will be remembered (2 Sam. xxiv.; 1 Chron. xxi.). Much more would this be the case when the measure was prescribed by a foreign power. It was the concrete and humiliating sign of subjection. The census of Quirinius provoked the rising of Judas the Gaulonite, or Galilean, of which Acts v. 37 speaks. Such a census ordered by the imperial power could not have taken place in Judæa under the reign of Herod the Great or even under Archelaus. They were politically dependent on Rome, but officially they were independent princes, allied and protected, but not *subjects* of the empire. The fact of the census after the deposition of Archelaus and the annexation of Judæa to Syria is, then, historical, and it is very well explained by the circumstances.

¹ *Antiq.* xvii. 13, 5; xviii. 1, 1; 2, 1; xx. 5, 2; *Bell. Jud.* ii. 8, 1.

But chronology raises invincible obstacles to the combination made by Luke. The census of Quirinius took place in the year 6 or 7 of our era, — ten years, at least, after the death of Herod the Great, under whom, according to Matthew and Luke, Jesus was born (Matt. ii. 1; Luke i. 5). Every kind of hypothesis has been imagined to explain this contradiction of history. Commentators have spoken of a census which Quirinius made previous to the deposition of Archelaus; but nothing goes to show that there was one. Luke, on the contrary, says that the census “was the first” (ii. 2), and it is not explained how this direct governmental measure was possible as long as Judæa preserved the form of national independence.

There are, then, very grave reasons for thinking that the cause assigned by Luke to explain the movement of Joseph and Mary in leaving Nazareth and repairing to Bethlehem where Mary brought forth her first-born son, is based upon a very false conception of the method and the requirements of the imperial census, and upon a recollection still more inexact as to the time at which the census of Quirinius took place in Judæa. Despite his efforts to fix the chronology of his history, Luke is not exempt from palpable chronological errors. Thus in the Book of Acts (v. 36, 37), he makes the insurrection of Theudas precede that of Judas the Galilean, “in the days of the enrolment,” while, in fact, the rising of which Theudas was the head is well known to have been posterior to that of Judas.

It is thus more than probable that the birth of Jesus in Bethlehem of Judah was, like the descent from David, the result, and not one of the causes, of the belief in his Messiahship. According to all appearances, Nazareth was the native city, the *πατρις* of Jesus, as, indeed, the passage Mark vi. 1 declares.

V. THE MIRACULOUS CONCEPTION. — This subject belongs to the dogmatic, rather than to the historic order. The belief in it marks the first step in that powerful tendency which impelled Christianity to elevate its head ever higher and higher above the ordinary conditions of humanity. The Son of Man thus became something else than the son of a man. There is, so far, no question of preëxistence. The being miraculously formed in the womb of a virgin, by a unique action of the Holy Spirit, has not been *incarnated*, like the Son coeternal with the Father in the Athanasian Trinity. As for the miracle itself, Paul ignores it and never says anything of it, for the very reason that his Christ, “the Man from Heaven” (1 Cor. xv. 47), the head of the spiritual human-

ity, preëxisted, before his earthly appearance in the person of Jesus. In the Judæo-Christian communities, where this entire legend took form, the miraculous conception was the mythical expression of the exalted feeling entertained of the perfect sanctity and the incomparable superiority of the Messiah. The idea was already entertained, that, from the time of his baptism in Jordan, the Holy Spirit made of Jesus a chosen vessel and that he became, from that time, the Messiah, clothed with the most extensive powers and possessing spotless sanctity. The same need of pushing even to the absolute the perfection of Jesus led to the reference to his earlier life of the entire penetration of his being by the Spirit of God, and its full satisfaction was found only in this formula: *He was conceived by the Holy Spirit in the womb of his mother.* It is to be presumed that the controversies, of which only a few scattered traces remain, between the first Christians in Palestine and Syria and the disciples of John the Baptist¹ were not unaffected by this current of ideas. John the Baptist, to whom the Christians had no intention of giving an inferior place, except in comparison with Jesus himself, had been recognized as "filled with the Holy Spirit *from* his mother's womb" (Luke i. 15). In order to establish the superiority of Jesus, it remained only to regard the Holy Spirit as the factor and generating principle of his existence. This view has determined many of the particulars in the narratives concerning his birth.

In the Gospel of the Hebrews, of which Origen and Jerome speak, the Holy Spirit is not the *father* but the *mother* of Jesus, a change which was facilitated by the prevailing use of *rouach* in Hebrew as feminine (Orig. in *Joh.* iv. p. 63; Jerome in *Mich.* vii. 6; in *Ezek.* xvi. 13; in *Isaiam* xl. 9). This manner of representing the Holy Spirit as "the mother" of Jesus is evidently to be referred to the same tendencies which led to the reference to his origin of the prerogatives which were at first attributed only to his maturity.

VI. THE WISE MEN FROM THE EAST. — This episode, related by the first gospel only, is one of those which in every time have thoroughly captivated the popular imagination. It has been the point of departure for a whole series of legends which continued through the Middle Ages, and which finally found a home and definite resting-place under the grandiose vaults of the Cathedral of Cologne. The Magi were turned into kings, according to some passages which were applied to them.² These kings became the

¹ Cf. Acts xviii. 25; xix. 2, 3; possibly, John i. 19-27; iii. 25-31.

² Isaiah lx. 3; Ps. lxxviii. 31; Rev. xxi. 24.

sovereigns of the three parts of the world then known (this is the reason why they were three in number, and one was black); after having migrated from Constantinople to Milan, and from Milan to Cologne, they concluded by receiving in baptism the German names of Melchior, Gaspard, and Balthazar; having reached this point, the legend fell into absurdity.

When one returns to the naïve simplicity of the gospel narrative, he cannot question its original and suggestive beauty. The idea which it seeks to inculcate is that the most eminent representatives of heathen knowledge have come to pay homage to the new-born Christ. This is the reason why the Magi come from the East; they are truly genuine wise men, who have come from their countries where such have always flourished; they are not those ready-made Magi, — sorcerers and enchanters — who at that time were traveling over the Græco-Roman world in every direction, and whose impostures, extravagances, and evil habits were a scandal to all good people. The Magi have beheld a star appearing in the East, and their astrological science has enabled them to see in it the sure token of the birth of the “King of the Jews;” (this feature plainly indicates the Judæo-Christian origin of the legend). Their unexpected arrival at Jerusalem agitates the whole city, and particularly King Herod, who is ever in fear of losing the throne which he has usurped. For this reason, he assembles the priests and the scribes, in order to learn from them where the Christ should be born. They answer without hesitation, “At Bethlehem in Judah,” and they rest their assertion upon Micah v. 1. Herod, still more disturbed, secretly interrogates the Magi, to learn when they had seen the star appear, and sends them to Bethlehem, requesting them to return, in order that he also may hasten to pay homage to the infant King. This is a very childish ruse for a remarkably astute sovereign; he shows himself here very maladroit. It is evident that the star had announced the birth of the King of the Jews to the Wise Men of the East, but had not indicated the place where they might find him. So their joy is great when they see the star reappear; it goes before them and guides them, and stops only above the place where the marvelous child reposes. They enter, behold him in the arms of his mother, Mary, and prostrate themselves before him in oriental fashion (*προσκυνησες*). They open their treasures and offer him gold, frankincense and myrrh, — the most highly prized products of the East.

Beyond a doubt, if one puts out of sight the impossibility of

this narrative, it possesses great charm. This star which comes to the end of the world to reveal to the princes of human knowledge the birth of the future King of Humanity; this caravan which, crossing the desert, comes to fill Jerusalem with astonishment; these fears of the cruel tyrant, Herod, whose monstrous crimes could not prevail against the designs of God; this contrast between rich and powerful personages and the humble child whose high destiny they are the first to declare; — all this forms a most highly colored and attractive picture, and it is not surprising that it has always been a delight to artists and poets.

The idea that the first homage offered to the infant Jesus was paid by foreigners and heathen is entirely in conformity with the spirit of the first gospel, and the special kind of Judæo-Christian universalism which characterizes it. It is, indeed, an error to believe that universalism was, in the beginning, absolutely Pauline. It would take us too long to justify this assertion here. It was one of the exaggerations of the Tübingen school, otherwise so meritorious, that it saw in the Judæo-Christians of the first two centuries narrow and bigoted Judaizers only. It is true that Paul alone had the glory of proclaiming complete and logical universalism by founding it upon a theory which no longer leaves room for the privileges claimed by the Jews. But the principle according to which all men, on certain conditions, would be called to enter the Kingdom of God saw the light at the outset in the bosom of the Judæo-Christian communities. The incident of the conversion of Cornelius and his household by the Apostle Peter (Acts x.), and the decision of the apostolic *conventus* at Jerusalem (Acts xv.) enlighten us sufficiently as to the progress of the ideas which directed, in the line of universalism and of the principles laid down by Jesus himself, the religious practice of the Judæo-Christians. What remained, as the débris of their former exclusiveness in regard to the heathen, was the claim that, every concession being made to universalism, there remained always a certain prerogative, a primacy of rank and advantage, assured to the converted Jewish people. They had the right to be evangelized first (cf. Matt. x. 5, 6), and this right seems to have been recognized by Paul himself (Romans i. 16: ii. 9: cf. Acts xiii. 46). This people was to have the first rank in the New Jerusalem. This aristocratic sentiment of religious and social primacy in the kingdom of the Messiah remained, to the end, the distinctive feature of Judæo-Christianity. Its concessions to the heathen in regard to the observation of the Law set out from the same idea. One could not demand of them,

without danger of absolutely closing before them the doors of the kingdom, the observance of the whole Law. Let us then reduce to a minimum the required observances. But this minimum is indispensable; the principle of the Law remains untouched, and, naturally, the sons of Abraham who observe it in its entirety will be the first in the Kingdom of God.

Such is the point of view occupied by the first evangelist. The Magi personify the adhesion of the Pagan world to the King of the Jews, the Saviour who has just been born. They prostrate themselves before the King of the Jews; they recognize implicitly the sovereignty of this King over the whole world, but this King is, and remains, above all, the King of the Jews, and his people, consequently, will reign under him but with him. The converted heathen will esteem themselves happy to take the second place, instead of being, like the unconverted, objects of the wrath to come. Moreover, the episode of the Magi is closely related to the characteristic feature of this gospel. Its redactor, certainly a Jew by birth, seeks throughout to show that if the Jewish people, as a whole, has rejected the Messiah whom God sent to it, the fault is chiefly with the political and religious authorities, — the kings, the princes, the scribes, and the dominant sects of Pharisees and Sadducees. Left to itself, the poor people would certainly have proclaimed its celestial king. But the governing class have done all the evil. This may be seen from the first days of his life on earth. The heathen come from afar to offer him homage, while the reigning king prepares an ambush to take his life, and the religious authorities, the priests and the scribes, although informed, like all Jerusalem, of the birth of the Christ, remain indifferent and unmoved; they leave the Magi to repair unattended to Bethlehem, and thus show, from the outset, their distrust, if not their antipathy, for him who brings salvation.

The legend, then, is formed upon this primitive nucleus. The select Heathen have been more quick to recognize the Messiahship of Jesus than his blinded compatriots. They have come from afar to pay homage to him whom the chiefs of the nation were already threatening with murderous plans. The argument implied in this entirely oriental narrative of the mission of the Wise Men of the East looked, in the first place, to the Jews who obstinately refused the preaching of the gospel. Some notable conversions of learned and eloquent heathen like Apollos, and others of whom we are ignorant, may have suggested the first idea to the imagination of the pious narrators.

Of those who may reproach us for reckoning as a legend an event held to be very real for so many centuries, we ask how they can consider as historic facts the details of such a narrative. Do they, then, believe in astrology? Do they believe that there is a science which allows us to read in the stars the announcement of earthly events? Do they figure to themselves travelers who recognize in a city the house which they seek by this circumstance that a star which went before them, has stopped above it? Do they find the conduct of Herod comprehensible, and do they suppose that the old skeptic did not shrug his shoulders at the report which came to his ears? Is there nothing in the revealing dream of the Magi to shock their modern temper?

Grave minds, indeed, have sought to find positive confirmation of this legend, so poetical when taken as a legend and so impossible when taken as history. Men have wished to find in the annals of astronomy the star, the appearance of which determined the Magi to repair to Judæa, which reappeared when they approached Bethlehem, and which became stationary when they had arrived there. As well, indeed, might one seek the fragments of the ladder which the patriarch saw in his dream! Kepler, for example, pointed out a conjunction of Mars, Saturn and Jupiter which is reported to have taken place in the year 7 or 6 before our era. But a conjunction is not a star, and it does not move in order to guide travelers. In our days, Wieseler has disinterred from the Chinese monuments the mention of a star of exceptional brilliancy which is said to have shone in the heavens in the year 4 before our era. But what does this prove? We must always distrust many of these astronomical calculations, very exact in themselves perhaps, but setting out from vague and indemonstrable premises found in documents without scientific value. Even if we grant the alleged facts, how could the astrologists of the East conclude from this phenomenon that a King of the Jews had just been born?

The idea of the poetic symbol of the star of the Magi was probably suggested to the authors, or the author, of the legend by the passage in Numbers xxiv. 17 concerning a "star to come out of Jacob." It is to be presumed that apocalyptic teaching of the same kind was given in one or more of the Rabbinical schools where they sought to define the signs which should announce the coming of the Messiah. Otherwise, we cannot understand why the head of the Jewish revolt under Hadrian was anxious to call himself *Barcochba*, "the son of the star." It is beyond question that

analogous legends circulated in the Jewish schools; only they were applied to Abraham.¹ Nimrod had read in the stars that a man was to be born who should destroy his empire and his false religion. In order to prevent this, he caused all the little children to be massacred. But, forewarned in time, the mother of Abraham escaped, and brought forth her son in a cave.

It is probably this legend, or one analogous, which furnished the essential framework, *mutatis mutandis*, of our narrative. In fact the massacre of the children at Bethlehem commanded by Herod is the counterpart of that which Nimrod is said to have ordered. Herod had been sufficiently guilty of political crimes and was obnoxious enough to the Jews for them to believe him capable of anything. One monstrosity, more or less, could make no great difference in the memory he left. But it remains very surprising that the historian Josephus, who had little love for Herod and relates all his cruel acts, says not one word concerning this atrocious deed. It is not less strange that we find in the other books of the New Testament no trace of it whatever, and that Luke, in particular, has not the least knowledge of it. Some have wished to find confirmation of it in a saying which Macrobius, an author of the fourth century, puts in the mouth of the Emperor Augustus; having read of this massacre, he is reported to have said, "It is better to be Herod's swine than his son."² This humorous remark is visibly complicated with a play on Greek words. But if the saying of Augustus is authentic, Macrobius has confused the event at Bethlehem, for a long time hallowed by Christian tradition, and the execution of the son of Herod Antipas, the victim of the suspicions of his father, which Josephus relates (*Ant.* xvii. 7). It is solely to this family drama that the remark of Augustus is to be referred. Moreover, one may find here a significant example of the manner in which passages of the Prophets were turned aside from their historic sense in order to find in them a confirmation of real or supposed events in the gospel history. The passage in Jeremiah xxxi. 15, where the venerable figure of the aged Rachel is introduced, weeping for her children and refusing to be comforted, refers to the departure of the Jews who have gone into captivity; in no respect does it concern the massacre at Bethlehem.

It is the same with the journey into Egypt, which is completely

¹ Cf. Michel Nicolas, *Etudes sur les Evangiles Apocryphes*, p. 55.

² *Sat.* ii. 4, 11. Quum audivisset inter pueros quos in Syria Herodes rex Judæorum intra biennium jussit interfici, filium quoque ejus occisum sit, "melius est," ait, "Herodis porcum (*br*) esse quam filium (*vbr*)."

ignored by Luke and of which no trace has anywhere been found. Where did the evangelist get this? We do not know. I am inclined to think that it made a part in the beginning of the legend of the Magi. If, as is probable, the story of Nimrod and Abraham served as a suggestive model for the inventors of the journey of the Magi, the latter were held, beyond a doubt, to have come from Chaldea, although the offerings which they bring would rather point to Arabia. It consorted well with the spirit of the legend that the two countries which had held the highest place in the history of the relations of Israel with the heathen world, Chaldea and Egypt, should likewise be originally related to the new-born Christ. There is reason to believe that a Christian community was very early formed at Alexandria. With the intellectual tendency of mind which we must suppose in the inventors of legends, this fact, which we should thus express: "Christianity was very early carried into Egypt," might well be translated in this form, "The Christ, in his earliest years, was carried into Egypt." The quotation from Hosea ii. 1, refers historically to the Exodus, and not to the very improbable event with which it is connected by the first evangelist.

VII. THE SHEPHERDS OF BETHLEHEM. — The episode of the shepherds of Bethlehem in the third gospel is the counterpart of the visit of the Magi in the first, and it indicates perfectly the entirely different spirit which has presided over the whole composition. The tradition recorded by Luke is not less Judæo-Christian than that of Matthew, but it is entirely Ebionite. I mean by this that it represents exactly the feelings and ideas of those *Ebionines* or "poor ones" whom we distinguish from the militant Ebionites; these were the irreconcilable adversaries of Paulinism and constituted a very notable and very respectable portion of primitive Christianity. The former were representatives of a type of Jewish poverty, the characteristic feature of which was detachment from the world and contempt for earthly riches and grandeur. They were simple-minded, gentle, pacific men, who concentrated all their hopes of the future on the kingdom of God which was to come, and placed their confidence in its coming in the will of God alone, who should found it when and as He pleased. There was united with their mysticism a distrust of the great ones of the world, whether the secular princes, or the masters of Jewish science, the Pharisees and the scribes. Poverty such as it is in the East — not absolute pauperism, but the reduction to strict necessity of material needs, which a little honest labor serves to satisfy — was,

in their eyes, a sign of election, and the condition of salvation, as it were. From this to the idea that wealth in itself is an evil, a sin, or a fatal source of daily transgression was but a slight remove, and several passages in the gospel of Luke, — above all, if one compares them with the parallel narratives in the other synoptics, clearly set before us this somewhat narrow point of view. In consequence there was among them a natural inclination also to asceticism. The systematic reduction of life to the satisfaction of the desires most necessary to its simple preservation leads easily to the idea that the more one reduces it, the nearer one is approaching the ideal. Anna, the prophetess, had passed her long widowhood in fasting and prayer (Luke ii. 37). John the Baptist in the desert led a rigorously ascetic life, and Essenism had made asceticism the rule of the perfect life.

While the first gospel brings about the cradle of Jesus the king, the pontiffs, and the princes of science from foreign lands, the third shows us only humble and simple people. The higher classes of society are completely absent. Luke's narrative of the birth and infancy seems to be dominated from beginning to end by the desire to justify the word of Jesus: "Thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes" (Luke x. 21; cf. Matt. xi. 25). It is poor shepherds who are honored by the angelic vision which informs them of the birth of a Saviour wrapped in swaddling clothes, and laid in a manger. This mark of extreme simplicity will be the sign by which they shall recognize him. The great ones of earth are ignorant of this event which is to change the face of the world, but the host of blessed spirits celebrates it in a song of joy which fills the heavens. When Joseph and Mary come to present their child at Jerusalem, no one pays attention to it except Simeon and Anna, the humble representatives of those who piously await "the consolation of Israel." They are not scribes or savants, but they have the spirit of prophecy, and they predict the glorious destiny of the child in whom they discern the traits of the future Saviour.

Have we any more reason for admitting the historic reality of these peaceful scenes than we had for admitting that of the dramatic events related by the first gospel? Evidently, they excite far less objection. Yet we shall remark that they are attached to premises the legendary character of which we believe we have demonstrated, — the birth at Bethlehem in Judah and its coincidence with the census of Quirinius. Moreover, we recall the fact that they are in continuous contradiction with the narrative of

Matthew. This proves that, in default of positive information concerning the birth and earliest years of Jesus, poetic imagination delighted to fill up the gap, and was inspired to do this by very different tendencies. If the narrative of Matthew is historic, that of Luke cannot be so. If the narrative of Luke is composed of authentic and exact reminiscences, why was it not the constant theme of primitive tradition, and how was it possible that in another Christian circle they should have imagined what the first evangelist relates without taking the least account of Luke's story?

Finally, let us observe that the Ebionite Christians whose spirit, pacific and enamoured of social humility, has so marked with its impress the narrative of the birth and the events immediately following in the gospel of Luke, none the less maintained the aristocratic pretensions of Judaism. It is the entire Jewish people which is to rejoice at the birth of the Christ (Luke ii. 10, 11). The author of the narrative takes particular care to show us that all the prescriptions of the Law were scrupulously fulfilled by his parents (ii. 21, 22-24, 27, 39). He seems to believe that all Jewish children were to be presented in the Temple at Jerusalem. It is the redemption of Jerusalem which is expected by all those to whom the prophetess Anna speaks of the child (ii. 38). If he is to be the light of the nations he is also to be "the glory of the people of Israel."

VIII. DATE OF THE BIRTH OF JESUS. — Thus far we have said nothing of a matter which has not ceased to occupy historians of the Church, and which is not yet settled to general satisfaction. This is the date of the birth of Jesus.

It is commonly supposed that our era, fixed according to the somewhat arbitrary computation of Dionysius Exiguus in the sixth century, sets out with the actual year of the birth of Jesus. More precise researches have shown that Dionysius was mistaken in his calculation, by three to four years; but the attempt to substitute a chronology free from all objection has not yet succeeded.

The principal difficulty is that Matthew and Luke make Jesus to have been born under Herod the Great, and that, according to Luke, when John the Baptist began to preach in the desert of the Jordan and Jesus, on the eve of beginning his own preaching, came to be baptized by him, it was the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius (Luke iii. 1), Pontius Pilate being procurator of Judæa, and Jesus being "about thirty years of age" (iii. 23).

Now Herod the Great died at the beginning of the year 750 of the foundation of Rome, four years before our era, which begins in

the year of Rome 753. The fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius coincides with the year 29–30 of our era (781–782 of Rome). This would make Jesus thirty-four years of age, at least, at the time of his coming to the Jordan to be baptized by John. We say thirty-four years *at least*, because we do not know exactly how long John the Baptist preached before Jesus came to join the multitude of those baptized by him. According to the first gospel, as the events which succeeded the birth of Jesus suppose a lapse of time at least three to four years in length before the death of Herod, it would be necessary to add these to the thirty-four years, and this would render decidedly misleading the statement of Luke, “about thirty years of age.” We have seen what confusion was brought into this reckoning by the statement of Luke, according to which the birth of Jesus coincided with the census of Quirinius, which could only have taken place in the year 6–7 of our era.

It seems to me idle to plunge into combinations, each more difficult than the other, in order to fix a date which can only be established by conjecture, since the data upon which one might rest are contradictory. The laborious attempts made by distinguished scholars involuntarily recall the skill with which political orators manipulate the figures of a budget. The only indication which seems positive is that which fixes at “about thirty years” the age of Jesus at the time when he came to John the Baptist in the desert; this would be the twenty-ninth or thirtieth year of our era. This is a kind of reminiscence the relative exactness of which might well have been maintained in the midst of the fluctuations of tradition in the first century. Pontius Pilate, whose procuratorship extended from the year 26 to the year 36 of our era, was probably then the governor of Judæa, and Herod Antipas the tetrarch of Galilee. All this harmonizes, and Dionysius Exiguus, even while mistaken in his reckoning, may have come very near the truth.

But Jesus, then, could not have been born under Herod the Great, who died about four years before our era. Let us allow that John the Baptist had been preaching for a year when Jesus came to him; it would then be the sixteenth year of Tiberius, the year 782–783 of Rome, the year 31–32 of our era, and Jesus would have been born in the year 752 of Rome, one or two years before the era of Dionysius, and two to three years after the death of Herod the Great.

Jesus, born in Galilee, would then have been a subject of Herod Antipas, who succeeded his father in this part of Palestine. Thus

we could explain why, in the legends which surround the cradle of Christ, it was believed that Herod the Great was intended. It is we who, in order to distinguish him from his father, habitually call this second Herod "Antipas." He reigned, in fact, under the dynastic name of "Herod," and the New Testament invariably calls him "Herod."¹ But it was as with Bethlehem. Men thought only of the city of David bearing this name. In the same way, Jesus having been born in the reign of a Herod, men thought only of Herod the Great, whose sombre renown filled the imaginations of men for a long time after his death.

IX. THE CHILD JESUS IN THE MIDST OF THE DOCTORS. — In Luke ii. 41–52 we find the only reminiscence of the childhood, or rather the youth, of Jesus. Although only twelve years are attributed to him, the precocity of southern-oriental races causes a child twelve years of age to present, with them, a physical development comparable to that of a youth of fifteen or sixteen with us. The narrative appears to proceed from the same source which previously related the presentation in the temple and the pious utterances of Simeon and Anna. It emphasizes the fact that the parents of Jesus repaired each year to Jerusalem to celebrate the Passover; this fact proves their scrupulous fidelity to the law. Verse fifty, which testifies to the complete lack of understanding of Joseph and Mary, hearing the response of their son, only accentuates their astonishment in verse thirty-three, which, in its turn, brings into higher relief the sentiment attributed to the maternal heart of Mary in verse nineteen. We are thus led more than ever to believe that Luke has used two sources, one of which related the incidents of the miraculous conception, while the other, which said nothing of this, marked the gradual revelation of the superior and divine character of the predestined child.

In itself, this episode of the encounter of Jesus, still very young, and the doctors of Jerusalem, assembled in one of the halls attached to the Temple, does not excite the same objections as the preceding narratives, and it might well have had a basis of historic reality. Nothing is more admissible than the marvelous precocity of which Jesus might have given proof from the very earliest time, in matters of religion; even in his young soul he might have already conceived, or rather felt, God as his "father." It is the fundamental notion of God in all his later teaching. No more is it contrary to probability that, in his youthful candor, he should

¹ Luke iii. 1, 19; ix. 7; xiii. 31; xxiii. 7, 8; Acts iv. 27; Mark vi. 20; viii. 15; Matt. xiv. 1, etc.

have been powerfully attracted by these assemblies of grave men where teaching and discussion continuously referred to religious questions. Jesus was not a savant in the rabbinical and Talmudic sense, but in his lively controversies with the Pharisees and the Scribes and their scholastic, we observe very exact acquaintance with their style of mind and with several of their favorite doctrines. He had, then, in all probability, attended more or less often on their lessons. The mention, in verse forty-six, of the questions which he did not fear to address, despite his extreme youth, to renowned teachers, is in accord with the usage of the rabbinical schools, and there is certainly nothing strange in the fact that he should have more than once astonished those present by the originality and the justness of his remarks. He could not yet comprehend all the artificiality, factitiousness and emptiness of the science of the Scribes. May there not be found in the violent reproaches which he afterward addressed to them the tokens of a painful undeception, of a disenchantment, which increased with age and reflection?

It may be indeed that this superiority which impressed even the doctors of Jerusalem is also legendary. But there is infinitely more psychological probability in favor of the substance, at least, of this incident, than in the case of the miraculous events which we have discussed. The child Jesus was already so attracted by religious subjects that he forgot all, his parents even and the necessities of daily life, in abandoning himself, without reserve, to his great desire. He astonished serious men by the spontaneity and freshness of his reflections and he was himself astonished that all should not be absorbed, like him, by the predominant interest of religious questions. His parents and probably his compatriots at Nazareth understood nothing of this, and reproached him for isolating himself from vulgar cares and interests. This must have led the youth to turn back upon himself, to preserve habitual silence before those who did not understand him and to indemnify himself by the wealth of his thought in habits of solitary prayer, either in some corner of the modest house of his father or in the solitude of the mountain (cf. Matt. vi. 6; Mark vi. 46). Thus we might very well explain the narrative of Luke and the unfavorable reception which Jesus received when he came to preach the kingdom of God in the city where he had grown up (Mark vi. 6 ff.).

X. CONCLUSION. — It will be seen that the results of the preceding criticism are, in very large part, negative. The canonical narratives of the birth and childhood of the Christ are legendary

and without historic value, with the exception of the last which has just occupied us and of which we shall do well to accept the substance, rather than the form. Jesus of Nazareth was not descended from David; at least nothing goes to prove this. He was not born at Bethlehem of Judah, and he was not, from his cradle, the object of murderous persecution by King Herod. He was not born at the time when this King was still reigning at Jerusalem. His brief sojourn in Egypt forms a part, with the visit of the Magi, of a legend dictated by the desire to invest his entrance into life with the colors of universalism as Judæo-Christianity conceived it. It is Ebionism, on the other hand, which inspired the other legend, less brilliant, less dramatic, but more sweet and impressive, and at times charmingly poetical, which the gospel of Luke has preserved. The two legends are irreconcilable with each other.

The historic result that remains for us is that Jesus was born at Nazareth itself, or in the very near neighborhood of Bethlehem of the north. Herod Antipas had been reigning for two or three years over Galilee. Jesus was the oldest son of Joseph and Mary. His parents were very far from foreseeing the glorious and tragical destiny of their son. His childhood was passed under the humble conditions of his father's home, but those who were capable of understanding them already admired the wonderful utterances of this young Nazarene who spoke in the most natural manner of God as his "father," and who subordinated everything else to the happiness of communion with the Universal Spirit.

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THE MONISTIC THEORY OF THE SOUL.

IN the progress of thought during the last twenty years there is no department where advance has been more rapid and more radical than in psychology. In the subtle and suggestive treatises of Wundt, Ribot, Höffding, Sully, and James, a new world has been opened to the student. Not only have fresh questions of revolutionary import been brought forward for discussion, but equally novel methods of dealing with them have been put in practice. Physiology, anatomy, anthropology, hypnotism, comparative religion, and the most delicate measurements of the sensory and cognitive processes, all have lent their aid toward solving the problems which the psychologist has found confronting him.

Foremost in interest among these problems is that of the nature of the soul and its fundamental relation to the body. Of the many enigmas that perplex humanity, there is none more ancient, more profound, more fascinating, or coming more closely home to mankind. It is not a question of speculative interest merely; it has important practical bearings. For whatever answer we give to this psychologic problem, it will color and determine our æsthetic, political, moral, and religious convictions.

If we look back over the course psychology has followed, the problem of the nature of the soul appears no less obscure and no less debatable than it did twenty years ago. The controversy is now carried on, however, with much more caution, and the line of battle has shifted to positions quite new. On the one hand, among the advocates of a permanent spiritual reality as the ground of consciousness, we find no such positive assurance and dogmatic condemnation of their opponents as was formerly current. They freely grant to the organism and cerebral processes and conditions very great influence. The ingenious and multifarious experiments of Fechner, Hitzig, Wundt, Ferrier, Meynert, Münsterberg, and a throng of less celebrated collaborators, have shown, beyond dispute, how wonderfully and minutely mind and body are correlated. Every day it is more widely admitted that the "psychological asceticism," as Professor Sully well calls it, which would disown the body altogether and elaborate its theory of mind-action from pure introspection is hopelessly sterile and belated; and that the intelligent psychologist must constantly employ physiological experimentation and research, supplementing the knowledge of the mind, that he can gain *ab intra*, by the most

careful study of the determining and modifying conditions of the nervous system, and even of the whole corporeal frame.

On the other hand, among psychologists of distinction, the old-time materialism has become almost extinct. Such a dictum as Karl Vogt's, in his "Physiological Letters," that "as the kidneys secrete urine, so, in the same way, does the brain generate thoughts, movements and feelings," would to-day be unanimously repudiated as a monstrous crudity. Comte reduced psychology to a department of physiology; but to-day the foremost expositors of mental phenomena claim for this domain characteristic functions and qualities not to be confounded with any lower realm or merged in it. If we turn, for example, to the very latest textbook of psychology that the press has given to us, Professor James Sully's "Human Mind," we find this very positive statement: "The modern scientific psychologist follows the tradition of philosophic spiritualism so far as to insist on the radical disparity of the psychical and the physical. A sensation is something intrinsically dissimilar to any form of physical movement, such as presumably takes place in the nervous system. Consequently psychical processes cannot be included in, and studied as, a part of the functional activities of the bodily organism. However closely connected with these last, they form a group of phenomena of a quite special kind." In taking this position Professor Sully does not stand alone, but on the same platform with the chief modern authorities, Wundt, Lewes, Bain, Höffding and Ladd.

This certainly indicates a decided ebbing of the materialistic tide. It is curious to notice that the agent to which it is due is the very power commonly reckoned the chief foe of the spiritual philosophy—Modern Science, with its precise measurements and its inexorable laws. When the laws of the correlation and transformation of the various modes of force were first discovered, the materialists were jubilant. Feeling and conceiving would soon be shown to be physical forces, with the same conclusiveness as heat and light and electricity. If thought appeared to be different from the other forces of nature, it was because it had been transformed from the physical to the psychical phase. It was really, Moleschott hastened to assert, "a mere mode of motion."

When this great discovery, however, was brought to precise scientific tests, unexpected difficulties were met with. If mental phenomena are physical forces transformed, they must be subject to the established laws of the conversion and correlation of energy. It was soon found that this was not the case; that serious disproportion

tions existed and a common measure was lacking. Indeed, unless they were willing to have the laws of inertia and mechanical causation upset, it was better for the materialists not to consider the mental phenomena as a link in the chain of physical events.

The transformation theory soon gave way, therefore, to the view that physical and mental phenomena move together, side by side, but that neither passes over into the other, or has any causal connection with it.

This is the position which cautious students of psychology occupy to-day. Nevertheless, to many it appears unsatisfactory. The thinker tending toward materialism objects that it leaves an impassable gulf between matter and mind. If there can be no transition from the physical circuit to the conscious circuit, nor from the conscious to the physical, and the two have no common bond, the theory is as dualistic as that of Descartes. If the two sets of phenomena unfold in exact correspondence and move onward simultaneously, what accounts for this concord? Both the parallelism and the proportion, it is argued, point to some inner connection, some fundamental identity. It would be amazing if nothing of the kind existed; and we should have to resort for explanation of the coincidence to some preëstablished harmony ordained by the creative power from which both proceeded.

Again, if consciousness be but a parallel circuit, a passive attendant on the series of nervous processes which, beginning in a sensory impression on a terminal nerve, pass up through the cerebrum and out again in the appropriate motor action, the highest and most characteristic trait of humanity becomes a superfluous thing, — a by-product, as Professor Tyndall has called it. But to suppose that the highest evolution of human nature is a mere useless appendage seems to conflict directly with the Darwinian doctrine that it is mainly by their utility to the creature in the struggle for existence that the chief powers and faculties of animal and human life have been developed.

A more rational theory, more in harmony with philosophic insight, seemed desirable. It has been found, it is claimed, in the monistic theory of the soul. According to this view, the nervous and the mental circuits are not independent series, but dual forms of one and the same event. A mental process, George Henry Lewes declares, "is only another aspect of a physical process." There is no more difference between a nerve vibration and the accompanying sensation, Lewes maintains, than between the concavity and the convexity of one and the same arc.

The honor of having first propounded this theory, which would reconcile in a very plausible and subtle way the controversies of materialism and spiritualism, undoubtedly belongs to Spinoza. Anticipating the victorious march of the mechanical conception of nature, he essayed to put mental activity in a position where it could safely allow to the physical series all that uninterrupted causal connection which he foresaw that it would insist upon for itself; thus the objective and the subjective could each retain its own dignity, neither being engulfed by the other.

For many years Spinoza's solution of the ancient controversy failed to receive adequate appreciation. In Kant, Schelling, Hegel and Beneke we find more or less definite hints of it. But Fechner must be mentioned as the one who first based a theory of the relation between the mental and the material on this conception of their fundamental identity. In pointing out the amicable relations that should exist between physiology and psychology he used, in 1860, the very comparison of the concave and the convex side that one and the same curve may show to two observers, by which Lewes, seventeen years later, illustrated his monistic view of the soul. Since then, this conception has come rapidly to the front. Among the thinkers of prominence who have more or less definitely adopted it, the names of Bain, Lewes, Wundt, Taine, Dr. Morton Prince, and Professor W. K. Clifford may be enumerated; Herbert Spencer and Professor Höffding seem, on the whole, to incline to the same point of view. Professor Clifford regarded it as "not merely a speculation but a result to which all the greatest minds that have studied this question in the right way have gradually been approximating for a long time."

Dr. Paul Carus is an equally enthusiastic advocate of monism. His recent book, "*The Soul of Man*," takes this Monistic Positivism as its philosophic basis, and the volume gives the clearest and fullest exposition of it yet made. As an introduction to a critical estimation of the theory, we cannot do better than avail ourselves of Dr. Carus' frank and forcible account, as an authoritative statement of the theory.

Dr. Carus starts with a consideration of feeling and motion. They are radically different, and never transformable one into the other. But, on the other hand, feelings cannot exist by themselves. They are states that accompany motions. Every natural process is animated with the elementary germs of psychic life. There is not merely a "parallelism of feeling and motion," but something more,—an identity. Feeling and motion are abstrac.

tions of thought. The reality from which they are abstracted is one inseparable whole, which from the subjective side appears as feeling, from the objective as motion. Their doubleness is due to our two different modes of apprehension; but in fact there is but one and the same reality. Every atom has therefore its sentient side or element of feeling. It is only, however, when it is combined and organized with a group of its fellows into a fitting structure that these dim elements of feeling are combined into full feeling, and these simple feelings concentrated into what deserves the name of mind. Feelings grow into mind by being interpreted, by becoming representative. By repetition, and the possession of memory (one of the fundamental characteristics of feeling substance) they become significant of the presence of certain objective facts. By a natural law the subjective sensation is projected into the outside world and consciousness is more and more attached to the interpretation of the sensation alone. The growth of mind is, therefore, spontaneous, a necessary outcome of a combination of feelings. From these perceptions ideas develop, and finally the sense of self. The subject does not produce the states of consciousness, but the reverse. Consciousness is a growth out of and upon feelings — the sum of many feelings in a state of connection and unification.

If it be asked why coal and stone and atoms of oxygen in the air are not sentient beings in the same sense as animals, the answer is, that it is due to the lack of the requisite organization to preserve forms. The preservation of form in feeling substance explains memory, the universal property of organized substance which renders possible a comparison of present with past experiences and creates mental life. The definition of soul is therefore "the form of an organism." Consciousness is no motor power. It is not the cause of either muscular activity or will; it is an indicator of a certain condition of nerve activity, accompanying the nervous change as a shadow accompanies a moving body, or the ticking of a clock the swing of the pendulum. The ego is not a constant and immutable centre, it shifts about and brings into play now this, now that concept or wish. The subject, or self, is not a mysterious agent distinct from the different ideas, but it is the very idea itself. Man's mind is a society of ideas of which now one and now another constitutes his ego. We go too far when we say "I think." We should rather say, as Lichtenberg proposes, "it thinks," just as we say "it lightens," or "it rains."

Such are the essential features of the monistic theory. There

is certainly great attraction and suggestiveness in it. The student who comes across it for the first time is apt to be captivated by it. It explains, as no other theory does, the constant connection and correspondence of mind and body; they are not exceptional but universal in their copartnership. It removes the barrier between the objective and the subjective world, showing their contrariety to be only apparent. Neither is absorbed by the other, but reality is granted to both series. By extending feeling, at least in a rudimentary form, to all matter, the theory gives a unity and harmony to the universe which no other theory furnishes. It supplies also a rational source for the origin of consciousness, the production of which, as usually presented, is an impenetrable mystery, if not a magical effect. The development of consciousness becomes not an incongruous production of the sentient out of the utterly disparate non-sentient, but a natural evolution out of the simple and germinal into the complex and mature forms of the psychical order. Physical investigation in its recent studies of the micro-organisms finds in the smallest animated specks all the essential attributes of mental life, choice, purpose, memory, discrimination, associated action, adaptation to varying circumstances. Scientific theory favors the extension of the rudiments of sensation to every molecule of matter.

It is not strange, therefore, that the monistic theory has spread with great celerity and been received with high favor by the advanced thinkers of to-day. It meets exactly that desire for complete unity and simplification which is the master impulse of modern thought. When, however, we examine this much-praised solution with care, we shall find that its explanations are more verbal than real, and that it only brings us into deeper difficulties and confronts us with darker mysteries than ever.

Pure matter, the monists see, can never explain the origin of thought and feeling. So they remodel the idea of matter, and add to it, as original and universal qualities, the elements of sentience and a subjective side. They fancy that by the supposition of this hybrid substance we can account both for the mechanical pressure of a man's body on the scales and the loftiest metaphysical reflections of which he is capable. By an act of philosophical violence, attributes in utter contrast are forced together and called correlative sides of one thing. The great enigma of the ages is supposed to be thus solved. While the bewilderment of the mind due to this audacious *tour de force* lasts, the ruse may succeed; but as soon as the dry light of reflection falls upon these incom-

mensurable and disparate properties, the glue of theory will no longer hold them together and they fall apart again.

The monists reject the older philosophic dualism, because of the difficulty of supposing unextended, imponderable and intangible mind to dwell and work together with extended, ponderable and tangible matter. In order to solve the difficulty, they put these same two things side by side in every molecule of water, air, flesh and nerve. As independent existences they are too incongruous to interact or coöperate. But when called "sides," or "aspects," they can live and work in the greatest intimacy and harmony. The knot of difficulty that the problem of the soul presents is the coexistence in the thinking man of sentience and materiality. The monistic theory simply takes the two attributes whose coexistence in the whole body is so difficult to understand, and roundly asserts that they coexist in every fibre, bone, molecule and cell, and then calmly assumes that the enigma is made clear. But it seems to me that this is not an explanation of the difficulty, but only a restatement of it in other terms. Whatever real difficulty there is in the copartnership and interaction of the psychical and the physical series is not lessened, but rather increased, when the body is presented as a whole colony of double-sided units, in each of which the same inconsistent attributes coexist and coöperate. It may be a hard task for the mind to imagine two such distinct agents as matter and mind coöperating, mutually impressing one another, or independently moving upon parallel lines simultaneously. But it is certainly quite as hard to conceive a motion as identical with a feeling, or a thought as simply the other side of a chemical change.

Now if the nervous change and the mental change be but different aspects of one and the same thing, then the correlation of the two should be most exact; the two processes should move forward, step by step, and the laws exhibited by the two series should be substantially the same. Fechner, Lewes, and Carus assure us that they are but the concave and the convex aspects of one and the same curve. Then, as the laws and formula of change of the two sides are substantially the same, so should the laws of the physical and the psychical world be substantially the same. Such is the demand of the theory, and Mr. Romanes accordingly lays down the postulate, which Dr. Carus quotes with approbation, that "there is a constant ratio between the amount of agitation produced in a sensory nerve and the intensity of the corresponding sensation."

But, as we have already seen in treating the transformation theory, experience finds that there are between the incident force and the corresponding sensation numerous discrepancies. The increase of the stimulus, its repetition, or the contrasting of diverse stimuli occasions a notable disproportion between the two. Experience does not show that the laws of consciousness and the laws of matter are either the same or possess the similarity to be expected in two things which are but two aspects of one and the same thing. The laws of the objective side relate to form, extension, motion in space and quantity of substance. The laws of what is called the subjective side of the same processes relate to none of these things, but to unextended qualities; intensity or weakness; clearness or obscurity; slowness or quickness; logical coherence or incoherence, and the various proportions in them of the feeling, knowing and willing elements. In the material world, changes occur along the line of least resistance, according to laws of quantitative preponderance of energy. In the mental world, we have instead of this, laws of selection and discrimination according to pleasure and pain, conformity to ideals, adherence to purpose, intelligent choice and rational harmony; the direction of preponderant physical pressure is overruled by intelligent resolution, and made to fall in and follow in the train of previously adopted and prescient plans.

In the material world a motion or energy, once started, proceeds on to infinity in uninterrupted sequence, the law of the conservation of energy everywhere holding true. The mental world, on the contrary, is a fragmentary circuit, accompanying it only part way, continually rising afresh out of unconsciousness and returning into unconsciousness. Material energies pass one into the other, preserving in the new form the energy which ceases in the old. But mental existence, as Höffding points out, has, for its fundamental form, memory and synthesis; and synthesis (that combination of elements into unity which lies at the threshold of consciousness) presupposes individuality. The material world, however, as Höffding says, "shows us no real individualities. These are first known at the psychological standpoint, from which inner centres of memory, action and endurance are discovered."

Especially noticeable is the inapplicability to thought and sensation of some of the most fundamental and general of all physical laws. Two similar and equal forces, acting on the same line, double the energy of motion; two different forces acting upon one point, or two different motions incident upon one body, have,

as a resultant, a mean intermediate between the two. As far as these motions are contrasted they tend to neutralize one another. If the monistic theory be true, feelings and thoughts ought to be found obeying the same laws. The monists assume that they do. They tell us how elements of feeling or faint psychic shocks add themselves together to produce sensation ; how sensations blend and mix and are concentrated at length into consciousness ; and how the various kinds of consciousness are produced by the compounding of the primordial elements of feeling with themselves, and the recompounding of the compounds with one another in higher and higher complexities and concentrations (Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*, § 60).

When, however, we seek to verify this supposed blending and addition of the elements of feeling into higher compounds, we do not find the facts desired. The so-called elements of feeling are unobservable by either introspection or outward observation. They are pure suppositions. The physiological facts supposed to prove them are reduced, on careful examination, to simply this : that small or obscure nerve vibrations or impressions on the organs of sense, so weak or brief that they fail, as a distinct impression, to reach consciousness, may blend and thus give rise to sensations which no one of the nerve vibrations alone would produce. The integration is one, not of feelings or elements of feelings, but of the nerve vibrations, outside of, and anterior to, the crossing of the threshold of consciousness. Sensations that are once felt as distinct remain distinct, and when recalled they reappear as distinct, without any blending into a sum or a mean resultant. The sensations of a bass and a tenor sound do not melt into an intermediate note, but rather emphasize and intensify one another. The recollections of a green and of a red color do not fuse into a single neutral tint, nor do the remembrances of a pleasure and a pain coalesce into the equilibrium of an indifferent feeling ; but they always remain distinct, emphasizing one another. All our mental life depends on this retention of variations and contrasts, in their original difference, yet united in thought, through the unity of the subject to which they belong. Otherwise that comparison of the dissimilar, on which all judgment, reasoning, deduction, induction, classification, and even clear and intelligent perception depend, would be impossible. We thus see how all the higher activities of the mind are conditioned upon the reversal in consciousness of the laws that govern the composition of the physical forces. Is it to be believed, then, that the two are but opposite faces of one and the same process ?

Again, on the monistic theory, there should be a constant and exact ratio between the size and elaboration of the brain and the manifestation of mental power. A general correspondence is admitted by all. Nevertheless, one of the striking results of modern psychological research is, that the correlation is not at all what it ought to be, according to the monistic theory. In the first weeks of infancy, *e. g.*, we find the young babe possessing a wonderfully elaborate nervous mechanism, far surpassing in its grade of evolution the nervous system of the most intelligent adult animals. Yet in respect to the number and quality of its perceptions and volitions, the young babe is far behind the dog or the horse. During the first months of infancy, the intelligence of the child unfolds more and more rapidly. The brain also continues to develop in substance and structure, but each month more and more slowly. The mental development is enormously greater than the increase in the quantity and arrangement of the brain cells. At length, somewhere between twenty and thirty years, the physical development of the brain structure, as far as careful observation can detect it, ceases. The mind does not cease to develop, but having at length caught up with that cerebral development, behind which it had lagged so long, it now shoots ahead. It is precisely this period of middle life, when the nervous matter undergoes scarcely any development, and the weight of the brain actually decreases, that witnesses the greatest intellectual progress in the mind. "Nothing that microscope or electrometer can detect distinguishes the brain of the man of twenty-five from that of the man of fifty" (Ladd). Yet how much more mature and wide-reaching does the judgment of a diligent thinker become in this period, how much broader his grasp, and more profound his insight. Even to extreme old age, the mind often continues to broaden and ripen, or at least holds its own, in spite of the marked decay of the physical powers.

A table made by Dr. Boyd, from 1,607 post-mortem examinations, shows that the human brain reaches its *maximum of weight*, in proportion to the rest of the body, between the ages of seven and fourteen; it then begins to decrease through life. While intelligence is rapidly increasing from twenty to sixty, the brain is actually *diminishing*, both relatively and absolutely. The time when a man knows most is from seventy to eighty, but the brain is then much lighter and *smaller* than when he was a boy between seven and fourteen. The tables of Paul Broca, and Dr. Glendenning show similar results, the weight of the brain falling off five

ounces in the forty years between twenty and sixty. Now these noticeable inequalities between the rate and periods of development of the brain, on the one side, and the reason on the other, are quite inconsistent with the theory which looks upon brain changes and mental states as simply different *aspects* of one and the same process.

Such are some of the striking differences in the laws of the physical side of those double-units, and the laws of their mental side. That which constitutes the essence of mind,—its capacity to judge and discriminate; to adjust itself to an unforeseen contingency; to learn by experience; to associate conceptions on rational grounds; to subordinate physical energies to moral considerations; to adopt an intelligent plan and bend hostile circumstances, by force of wit and will, to its advance,—all these lie in a realm of law of which physical force knows nothing. Mr. Lewes himself admits (*Physical Basis of Mind*, p. 352) that we cannot translate all psychological phenomena into mechanical terms,—“Nay, we cannot even translate them all into physiological terms, nor can the laws of mind be deduced from physiological processes.”

However happy a thought, then, it may at first seem, to unite the peculiarities of materiality and of consciousness in the unity of the mind-stuff, we find them remaining as much contrasted and incomparable as ever, and in the changes of the one we fail to find the law of the changes of the other. The union, therefore, is only outward and artificial; the one series, while conditioned, indeed, by the other, to a very noticeable extent, is no self-evident consequent of the other. There is no evidence of *identity* or anything inconsistent with the separateness and actuality of the two factors, as equally real and distinct existences.

Such are some of the obvious difficulties in the monistic theory. Let us now come to closer quarters with it. Is it, in fact, an explanation to say that the objective and the subjective effects are two sides of one and the same process? Professor Tyndall well asks, “Why should the phenomenon have two sides?” This is “the real core of the difficulty.” On the one hand, if carbonic acid and water and ammonia do not think and feel when in the chemist’s retorts, why do they when united in the cells of the brain? Or if the atoms are conscious, wherever they are, why do they manifest their mental properties in man and not equally in earth or water; in the brain and not in the hair or the finger-nails?

In answer, the monists refer us to the effect of organization. All material atoms and physical motions, they tell us, have a certain measure of sentiency. When the atoms are combined into a crude organism like a polyp or jellyfish, the elements of sentiency which accompany them are so combined as to form a low grade of feeling. When the atoms combine in a human brain, the corresponding mind-sides combine and concentrate into a consciousness. But why and how can organization effect this wonderful change? Are the atoms in the beginning conscious, and do they simply need liberation through some more propitious arrangement? If so, then each atom is a little soul, and Science must fundamentally alter its laws of nature. Attraction would really be, as poets have fancied, the loves of molecules, and repulsion their hate; chemic unions would be conscious choices, and physics must be written over in the terms of psychology. But no monist, to my knowledge, admits this. The tendency of the monists is precisely in the other direction. Dr. Maudsley ridicules, as outgrown, the idea that the relations of bodies are influenced by sympathies and antipathies, or that positive and negative electricities consciously attract or repel, or that one acid chooses the corresponding base.

But if the atoms are not originally and individually conscious, then their mental side must be potential and embryonic merely. They have the raw material of mind, but it is not yet wrought up to a fineness allowing it to exhibit its characteristic traits. This is the view that the monists generally adopt. "We arrive at the conclusion," says Dr. Carus, that "the not-feeling elements of feeling develop into feeling and the not-rational monad develops into rational man" (*The Soul of Man*, p. 15). Similarly Professor Clifford presents the mind-stuff in the inorganic atom as a simple sensitive element or possibility, of the lowest grade, measurably inferior even to such dull sentience as is exhibited by a jellyfish.

Now we come to the problem which the older materialism never could solve. I fail to see how the new monism solves it any better. How can the mere aggregation and connection of atoms change, in a flash, these stupid rudiments of sentiency in each atom into full-blown consciousness? A drop of water enters a brain-cell from the blood of a learned professor and becomes a part of its protoplasmic structure. The moment before, it had only the dullest possibility of feeling. Now, presto! it engages with its neighbors in solving a profound mathematical or philosophic problem. That

the mere aggregation and rearrangement of mind-stuff particles which a little while before possessed only the rudiment of sensation can produce such a transformation, seems to me as incredible as that, by crowding together a colony of plant-lice into a skull, we can obtain from them at once the wisdom of a Newton.

Dr. Carus is mildly sarcastic about those psychologists who talk as if there were a psychic fluid floating about somewhere. But he and his fellow monists treat the mind as if it were a material fluid, and as if the same composition and aggregation of forces that occur in the physical realm occurred also in the realm of thought and feeling. They talk of not-feeling elements combining into feeling; and of feeling concentrating into consciousness. The theory, indeed, rests upon, and cannot get along without, some such assumption that rudimentary sentiences are added together and blended into totals of complete consciousness, just as the many small motions or electricities of a number of material bodies are mixed or accumulated into a single larger and different force.

But, as we have seen, no such mixing of true feelings into composite feelings takes place. The peculiarity of sensations and thoughts is that, when combined, they *retain their distinctness* and do not fuse together, either into an average or into the sum of their components. On the monistic theory itself, we must remember, mentality is not a separable ingredient, like the juice in a mass of grapes which is forced out in the vat, and from which a great quantity of liquid, with a high degree of force, is produced by the mutual pressure of the grape-juice thus collected. Mentality, on the monistic theory, is an inseparable aspect or quality of *each respective atom*, — the subjective side of each double-unit. It can no more be drawn out and away from its respective unit and condensed into some more intense extract, than the consciousness of a dozen men can be drawn away from them when they are assembled together, and condensed into something else. The assemblage and interaction of a multitude of physiological units may, of course, so stimulate each unit as to lead each to manifest more fully its own mind side; so the assemblage of a swarm of locusts brings out more fully the locust intelligence and character. But if the mind in each is only rudimentary, the mind in the whole must be of substantially the same grade. Dr. Carus tells us that, psychologically, our mind is an empire of innumerable psychic existences, framed by the memories of organized substance. But how do these atomic psychic individuals communicate, so as to add their respective knowledges and feelings one to another? In hu-

man empires, speech, newspaper, railroad and telegraph put mind *en rapport* with mind. But how shall these speechless atoms, without newspapers, railroads or telegraphs, blend sensation with sensation or add thought to thought? The anatomists tell us of the connecting fibres and commissural bands that connect the more distant parts of the brain together. But the greater, the insuperable difficulty lies in the hiatus that still remains between the most neighborly atoms. They can exert on one another their respective mechanical pressures, but how shall one more sentient atom extend its sensibility to the neighbor that has only a rudiment of feeling? How shall two atoms, that have evolved to the lower grades of sensation, concentrate that, in some magic molecular retort, into a true self-consciousness. This mode of evolving consciousness is quite as open to the charge of "bringing it out of fairyland" as the spiritualist theory. Certainly, to think that by merely assembling together the rudimentary sentiences of the brain atoms and putting them in communication in the skull, we get as a result the intelligence of a Shakespeare, is as irrational as to suppose that the squeezing together in a bowl, of several thousand members of a coral-polyp colony, would produce "Hamlet."

The consciousness exhibited by mind is not only infinitely higher in order and quality than any of the rudimentary mind-sides of the mind-stuff; it has also two marked peculiarities which are not only inexplicable by the monistic theory, but are directly contrary to it. According to this theory, we have in the brain an assemblage of a multitude of double units, each with its respective mind-side. The mind, as Taine has described it without hesitation, in his work on "Intelligence" (one of the earliest, and still, perhaps, the most elaborate of all monistic theories of the mind), is "a continuous flux, an aggregate of sensations and impulses, which, looked at in another aspect, are but a flux or aggregate of nervous vibrations, — this is the mind. This pyrotechnic show, prodigiously multiform and complex, is built and forever being rebuilt by a million of sky-rockets. . . . There is nothing *real* in the Ego save the thread of its events."

This statement is in strict accord with the monistic theory. But our consciousness is not of this kind; it is not a consciousness of prodigiously numerous selves, but of a unity, — a single self. This conscious self is indivisible. It cannot conceive of itself as separable into parts or smaller selves. It is not divisible even where, if anywhere, it would seem likely to be, — in the case of parentage. Traits and tendencies may be transmitted. But con-

sciousness never is. We speak, indeed, of various faculties of the mind. These are not, however, separable parts of the self, but the one self, acting in various ways, thinking, feeling, willing, or remembering.

This unity of the self is a necessary condition of intelligence, even of consciousness itself. As Kant showed a century ago, "Without the undecomposable unity of consciousness, nothing can be thought or known, because they could not be connected in a consciousness." The process of comprehending is, as its derivation indicates, always a synthesis, a grasping of two or more things together. By comparison and classification and mental relating, the many qualities of the object are united in a single perception or judgment. Now for the simplest act of comprehension, absolute unity of consciousness in the knowing subject is necessary. For two colors like red and green to be compared, and judged to be different, they must come before some single consciousness, by which the diverse phenomena shall be simultaneously observed and judged. If there be two observers, one of whom is color-blind in such a way that he can see no red, but only green, and the other can see no green, but only red, it would be impossible for these two observers, by any mediate transference of their impressions one to another, to arrive at any knowledge of the difference of the two colors. Any two sensations, in order to be compared and comprehended, must enter into and be judged by *one* consciousness. If the mind were but an aggregate of parts, it could not do its work.

Here, then, is the Gordian knot for the monist to untie, if he can. Here is an objection, weightier than all its predecessors. If the mind, as the monists tell us, is merely an aggregation of the numerous mind-sides of this multitude of double-units, how can we get out of this host of separate atomic individuals such a self-conscious unity as that of our consciousness?

There are just four possible cases here. Let us see if either of them supplies a satisfactory explanation of the unity of consciousness.

I. May we suppose that each one of the double-units of the brain has a separate consciousness, and when thinking takes place, entertains the whole of a feeling or thought? This, I suppose, is what not a few would say. Professor Maudsley, for example, distributes consciousness amongst the six hundred millions of nerve cells which form the cortical layer of the brain, and each particular cell, according to him, is the centre of its own particular idea.

But, as Du Bois Reymond asks, if *each* atom thinks and feels, what are the organs of the senses and the brain for? If we confine this full consciousness simply to the atoms of the cortex or some central region, still, as these are thousands, or probably millions in number, as Maudsley estimates, there would be in this case a multitude of minds, a multitude of distinct *selves*, in each person. There would be as many separate thinking individualities and as many distinct feeling consciousnesses at each instant, in the brain, as there are atoms, and in place of the present unity of consciousness and action there would be an endless anarchy and confusion of thought. However close might be the outward aggregation, the consciousness of each double-unit must still remain as distinct as that of the individuals in a crowd. This theory can never explain that single consciousness in itself and to itself, which is the fundamental characteristic of the mind. We cannot, then, suppose a multitude of selves, or thinkers, in the brain, each double-unit thinking the whole of a thought, or feeling the whole of a sensation.

II. Shall we suppose, then, that each double-unit has only a fraction of a thought or a part of a feeling? But such language is applicable only to material and divisible things, — not to consciousness, which is essentially indivisible.

It is, however, somewhat in this way, that most of the monists would undoubtedly explain the origin of consciousness. Their statement would be something like this: To give rise to consciousness there must be not merely the aggregation and organization of the mind-stuff particles, but also their *associated action*. In the brain, as out of it, a *single* mind-stuff atom, at rest, would have only the rudiment of sensation, or the elements of feeling, as Dr. Carus says. Full consciousness arises only when the current flows from one cell or nerve-centre to another. Just as the carbon filament glows under the electric current, so does the gray matter of the brain wake from its latent state to full consciousness whenever the nerve-current runs through it. The thought or feeling experienced belongs not to the nerve-cells separately, but to their joint action, of which it is the subjective side.

Now, if the brain or nerves were one continuous substance, this explanation might do. But science estimates the brain-cells by the million. It puts gaps, relatively immense, between the atoms of the densest substances. We are dealing not with one continuous substance, but with an organ composed on its physical side of thousands of parts, and each part again composed of thousands of

separate atoms. According to the monists, consciousness is simply the mind-side of this host of double-units. But if, when the current passes, all the mind-stuff particles awake to consciousness and each thinks the whole of the thought, we have again the same difficulty we have just found insuperable, — the impossibility of this host of separate consciousnesses blending into that unity of the single self, which is characteristic of the mind.

On the contrary, if, when the nerve-vibration passes along, each double-unit remains for itself unconscious (only rudimentally sentient), and does not think any complete thought, it is manifestly impossible that any consciousness should be reached, or any complete thought conceived. No passing along of a vibration or interaction of any kind among unconscious atoms can produce consciousness. It has been well compared to setting twelve men in a row and whispering to each of them a word; then bidding each of them think of his word to himself, and expecting in this way to get a knowledge in each or any of them of the whole sentence. But even this does not represent the whole difficulty of the proceeding. The mind-sides of the atoms are only dimly sentient. Let us then get a group of snails together; put in the mouth of one a bit of apple; let the next snail smell it; the third, touch it; the fourth see the red rind; and then conclude that this group of snails have the full concept of the apple. The combination of the elements of feeling in a group of atoms into a complete thought, by virtue of simply assembling themselves together, is equally sensible. The fact is that feelings and thoughts belong only to the individual subject that experiences them, and cannot be agglomerated into a higher compound mind. If a company of separate, conscious atoms cannot be conceived as able to have that unity of consciousness by which they can feel themselves as one being, still less can an aggregate of unconscious particles. For such interior self-knowledge and felt oneness of being, beneath all our varied sensations, binding them together as all known by, and belonging to, one and the same being, there must be a real continuous unitary subject; and human reason can never find any reasonable explanation of the mind in any theory which explains the origin of our conscious single selfhood through the mere interaction of a multitude of discrete, separate particles, external to one another, such as these double-units of the monists, are, on the objective side, with their material atomic form and separateness.

III. It is impossible, then, to get unity of consciousness out of a multiplicity of parts. To escape this difficulty there is only one

refuge, to limit consciousness and thought to a single central particle, so small as to be indivisible. It may be supposed that only one of the mind-stuff units becomes conscious. The others only pass along the message to it, and pass back again the various motor impulses or orders of this atomic monarch.

Not a few philosophers and anatomists of former times believed in and searched for some such indivisible atom or point without magnitude, as the material seat of the soul. Descartes, for example, placed it in the pineal gland; others in the cerebellum, or the sensory centres. Leibnitz and Herbart are among the distinguished names of the past that may be cited as holding to this view of a single indivisible arch-monad as the seat of consciousness; and not many years ago Mrs. Antoinette Brown Blackwell, in her work on the "Physical Basis of Immortality," presented this form of the monistic theory, with great learning and ingenuity. Philosophically, it is more satisfactory than any other view; and from the theological standpoint it has the advantage of supplying a surer basis for the persistence of the personal soul after death than any other form of the monistic theory. But when we bring it before the bar of scientific fact, it is no more sufficient than the others.

In the first place, we must remember that science shows that the material constituents of the body, especially of the nerves and brain, are constantly passing in and out. Nine tenths of the body changes every six months. But our consciousness, our sense of self-identity remains the same. This one royal atom, the king of the brain, which is the seat of our consciousness, must then be a permanent denizen and ruler of the brain. In these late years, the anatomical examinations of the brain, tracing the connection between various injuries to it and the corresponding mental states, and between the most numerous cuttings and mutilations in its various parts, and the consequent effect upon the mental condition, have been very careful and thorough. If consciousness be a function of some one atom, and seated in some single point, it would long ago have been discovered. On the contrary, the result of the most careful recent experiments has been against any such precise and definite localization of consciousness as this theory requires. The most recent and thorough investigations into the seat of consciousness unite to show that it is not limited to any one point or circumscribed region, even, but rather that all parts of the gray matter of the brain are indifferently and interchangeably the instrument of consciousness. "Each mental state," says George H. Lewes in his

"Physical Basis of Mind," "is a state of the whole Sensorium. One stroke sets the whole vibrating." Lewes even goes so far as to say (and in this he is backed by many of the more progressive psychologists), "The Sensorium is the *whole* living organism. The brain is only one organ in a complex of organs whose *united* activities are necessary for the phenomena called thinking." Brown-Sequard similarly says: "All parts of the brain act as one. When portions of the brain are lost or removed, it only reduces the *general strength* of mind."

Professor William James, in discussing this very question, states it as a well-known psychological fact that "there is no cell or group of cells in the brain of such anatomical or functional preëminence as to appear to be the keystone or centre of gravity of the whole system." Anatomy and microscopic science, then, do not lend any countenance to this theory of the location of consciousness in any one fixed atom of the brain.

IV. But, it may be said, "Why need we suppose the one conscious atom a fixed one? If we suppose, instead, that the one atom that is conscious is now this, now that, it will not be strange that the cuttings and slashings of the anatomists have not located it." In reply, I urge, first, that the researches of the physiologists tend to make them believe in the supreme importance and even necessity of multiplicity and complexity in the organ of the mind. Professor Ladd says (p. 685): "The study of physiological psychology compels us to affirm that such a unity in variety as is the human mind cannot be conceived of in dependence upon the movements in space of a single perfectly rigid and unchanging atom." To this the monists themselves bear testimony. M. Taine, for example, in his work on "Intelligence" (p. 176 of the English translation), says: "The more elements the brain has capable of setting one another in motion, the more delicate an instrument of repetition it is. The brain, then, is a repeater of the sensitive centres, and it will the better fulfill this office, the *more numerous* the repeating elements of which it is itself composed."

Moreover, to suppose that consciousness thus shifts about from one atom to another, which successively become its seat, brings us into diametrical contradiction with one of the chief characteristics of the mind — its identity. However numerous are our sensations and the successive states of mind of which we are conscious, we never refer these to *successive* selves; but the testimony of our consciousness is that all belong to one and the same self, which remains as they roll by, — one possessor, observer and

judge of them all, the same personal being, however varied the feelings and thoughts it experiences may be.

This personal identity is the general declaration of consciousness. But it is something that the monistic theory, whether it locate consciousness in many atoms or in one, whether it regard the mind-sides as fully conscious or only rudimentarily conscious, can never explain.

Instead, therefore, of obtaining a solution of our difficulties, we are conducted by our search to a further and most weighty objection to the monistic theory. Let us consider it a moment. For this *personal identity* possesses an importance in our mental life of the first moment. If consciousness be but the mind-side of the double-faced atoms, it must be fluctuating, as the stream of these atoms is. In seven years, as the men of science tell us, every part is renewed; in a single month most of the softer parts of the body are exchanged. If consciousness, then, be but the mind-side of these shifting atoms, and there is no permanent spiritual being remaining through all these changes, how can these successive mind-sides have a common and abiding consciousness? Rising as they do, one after another, into the state where they glow for a moment with self-consciousness, as the drops of sea-spray are tossed aloft for a second into the white wave-caps, and then plunge down again into the general level of unconscious matter, possessed merely of the rudiment of sentiency, — how can they remember what their predecessors felt and thought, or hand down to their own successors the memory of their brief experience?

This is the difficulty which that essential quality of mind, memory, presents to the monistic theory. Dr. Carus tells us that memory is simply the result of organization, the preservation of form in living substance; and that it is this that lifts the unconscious elements of feeling into feeling properly so called; and in illustration of the preservation of brain impressions and their accompanying thoughts, he adduces the preservation by a scar of its form, through change after change of the constituent cells and atoms. But this is putting the cart before the horse. It is not memory that explains feeling, but feeling that explains memory. The analogy of the scar is only a partial and deceptive one. Grant that in a brain cell or nervous group, as in a scar, each new atom that comes in takes up the same position as the atom that departs, and thus preserves the cerebral structure just as before. This might, to be sure, explain the external identity;

but it avails nothing to explain the inward identity, a man's consciousness to *himself*, namely, that he who did a certain act yesterday and he who remembers it to-day are one and the same self. Though by such physical renewal certain records of past feeling may be kept, or the material conditions for their renewal be preserved, there is still needed an intelligent agent to read off these records. There is needed still a continuing spiritual unity to bind together into a felt oneness this succession of separate conscious states. What possible explanation can monism supply? The best answer that Professor Clifford can give is to say that at the instant a given feeling does *not* exist as *my* feeling, but in and for itself. "By subsequent reflection we have a faint reproduction of the feeling, and connected with it a whole set of connections with the general stream of consciousness, and then remember it as *my* feeling." Our feelings would thus be distinct states, following one another in a stream, and the reference of them to a single subject, the Self, is a mistaken inference.

But if there is no such single subject, why should we invest the general stream of consciousness with such a personality? How can I remember anything as *my* feeling in the absence of such a persistent ground of relation? Our states of consciousness change. But the very knowledge of this change — that a quarter of an hour ago, for instance, I felt hot and now I feel cold — implies an unchanged permanent element, an abiding self, which notes the change and is its subject. Otherwise it would be no change of state, but the annihilation of one mind and the substitution of another. On the monistic theory no one knows that he, *i. e.*, his conscious self, has had any past life. His present self was really born this morning when he awoke from sleep.

This is the logical conclusion of the double unit theory. M. Taine has not hesitated to follow out his premises to this conclusion. He unequivocally declares that "when the series of our mental state ceases to exist, nothing remains of the mind or Ego." After profound slumber, then, the awakening to consciousness would actually be a new mental birth or creation, as much as a new rainbow in the sky. "What makes us imagine," says Taine, "that it is one and the same soul that still endures through the variations or interruptions of our mental states is the constant repetition of a similar mental quality or qualities, owing to the constant renewal of the same physical conditions." Such an assertion flatly contradicts the clearest testimony of consciousness that knows itself as a permanent unity.

But may not this testimony of consciousness be an illusion, the monist will urge. On the contrary, the more we examine our mental operations the more do we find it a necessary implication of them all. In the first place it is implied by *memory*. Without it, memory would be impossible. For a man can remember only of himself, of what he himself has done and been. Were not the self which remembered the same self whose previous states were remembered, recollection would be impossible. To remember directly and actually what *another* has experienced and told no one, would be to remember that one were *not himself* but somebody else; this would be to affirm and deny his identity, — a plain absurdity.

As personal identity and persistence are implied by memory, so is it by our perceptions, our judgments, our inferences and our reasoning; for in them all, one object or term must be held in memory, while that with which it is compared is observed. All our scientific knowledge, for example, is a knowledge gained by comparison of relations and generalization of those relations. In the whole process, one sensation, one perception, must be held clearly in mind while we put side by side that which is more or less similar, and so form the general ideas of species and genera, and the traits or laws common to them. Unless the same conscious self grasps both the past and the present sensation at once, no comparison can be made. If the mind-side of some last year's atom felt the one, and the mind-side of to-day's atom feels the other, no judgment is possible. Our personal identity, then, is a necessary condition of our mental life, and in the impossibility of reconciling this with any such monistic theory as its leading expositors give us, we have a still further and more serious objection to the hypothesis.

The more one studies the monistic theory and the expositions made of it by its advocates, the more plainly do we see that it is a theory standing in unstable equilibrium. As the old proverb says, it finds itself between the devil and the deep sea. As long as the scales are held exactly even, the problem of the coexistence of the mental and the material is simply shoved further back and made a universal mystery, and its insolubility seems to be tacitly admitted. As soon as it essays to explain things more clearly, it slips off either into monistic idealism or a more or less blank materialism. Besides the rocks we have already mentioned, another is found in the question, have feelings causal

efficacy? Do the mind-sides influence positively and actively the matter-sides of the double-units? Do they communicate with one another, and originate or cause motions and chemic changes? If so, monism is just as dangerous to the invariability of mechanic laws and physical sequences as the transformation theory or the traditional soul-view which it would supersede. The monists, therefore, deny causal efficiency to thought and feeling. Consciousness, says Dr. Carus, "is destitute of motor power," and he quotes with approval the words of Du Bois Reymond: "To Monism the world is a mechanism." "The brain molecules can move only in the determined way; and if one of them should wander from its place or path without an adequate mechanical cause, it would be as great a wonder as if Jupiter should break out from its orbit and throw the planetary system into confusion."

But when all causal efficiency is denied to thought and feeling, monism drops down into a helpless automatism. Consciousness is a mere shadow or echo, a passive satellite. The very objection on account of which the parallel theory was rejected, that it makes consciousness a superfluity, and puts all causal power not in the inner realm, in which it was experienced, but in the outer realm where it was only mediately inferred and imaginatively projected, is brought straight back to the monistic door. Dr. Carus, while admitting that consciousness is but a passive accompaniment of the material change, still tries to escape the necessary conclusion that it is redundant. He compares it to a light, and tries to show how useful, therefore, its illumination may be. "Consciousness," he says, "affords in novel and difficult situations the possibility of circumspection. The light in a machine-room will enable the attendant engineer properly to regulate the motions of the engine; but the rays of the lantern have no locomotive power. . . . The consciousness of mental states is an indispensable condition of the proper direction of will; but it does not possess motor power" (p. 84).

Such an illustration is a veritable boomerang to the view it is meant to support. According to this, the light of consciousness enables the will to be properly directed, and otherwise than it might be if there were no consciousness. But who or what, in accordance with the monistic view, is the engineer? Who regulates the motions of the cerebral engine? Consciousness cannot do it, for this, according to Dr. Carus, is not a cause of a man's will, or any motion of a muscle, but only an indicator of a cer-

tain condition of our nerve activity. The nerve-activity cannot do it, for its changes and effects are mechanically determined by preceding material conditions and invariable physical laws. If the will be improperly directed, and the motions of the cerebral engine be all awry, the nerve-vibration cannot see it or alter its incident force. The nervous mechanism has no option. Who and what, then, is this engineer? Monism has none, and whatever illumination consciousness may supply cannot swerve the direction of the muscular contractions or the path of the nerve circuits a hair's breadth. Either the monist must grant to the mind sufficient causal efficiency to regulate the motions of its engine, or he must admit the superfluity of consciousness, and that in his system, man is only an automaton.

Dr. Carus objects to having monism characterized as "a psychology without a soul." He clings not only to the word soul, but also to the similar terms spiritual, volitional and discriminative. But he uses them in such opposite senses from the customary ones that they are no longer consistent with honesty. If it be true that there is nothing in what men have thought the soul than "the form of feeling substance," it is time the word be dropped altogether, for it can only mislead the reader. At the outset of their expositions, the monists assure us that for the first time in the history of philosophy the scales are to be kept even, and that both the mental and the material are equally real and to be respected. But as soon as they get well into their exposition, all the causative energy is assigned to the material side, and the psychic side is practically ignored or reduced to a shadow of its active mate. Thus to contradict our intuitions of volitional efficiency and conscious power, to ignore the most certain and direct elements of our knowledge, and to look upon those elements which are only hypothetically and inferentially known as the real energies, causes and directors of our mental life, is as illogical as it is mischievous.

In considering this problem we ought constantly to bear in mind these elementary truths of philosophy: that all our ideas of matter are inferential; that our knowledge of atoms is thoroughly hypothetic; and that likewise our knowledge of nerves, cells, physical motions and chemic energies is all ideal and subjective, coming indirectly to us through the avenues of perception, judgment and consciousness, and it is not competent, therefore, to discredit those faculties on whose authority they must themselves lean.

We know, indeed, how strong the tendency of the philosophic spirit is to bring together all phenomena in a single centre and relate them to one supreme reality. But the true unity should not be one that erases fundamental differences. It is not an identity of contrasting phenomena such as the monist proposes, but an identity of source, the one creative Reality beneath all phenomena. This one Reality undoubtedly underlies and embraces both body and mind. But this does not mean or require that the motion in the brain and the thought in the mind be one and the same process. Forceful as is the mental instinct pointing toward unity, why should the human organism be thought more strictly homogeneous than a piece of glass? If the scientists affirm in this the existence, beside and among the material atoms, of a luminiferous ether of very different qualities, continuous, imponderable and frictionless, why is it not allowable to suppose in man, beside and among the material atoms of the brain, a cogitiferous ether, a thought-bearing, spiritual substance as the necessary substratum of consciousness? The savants infer such a luminiferous ether because the phenomena of light are so different from those of molecular motion, and occur as if there were such a substratum. Are not the phenomena of consciousness even more diverse, and do they not also occur as if there were such a spiritual substratum, a continuous, permanent, unitary soul-substance, correlated and interacting with the physical organism, but distinct from and superior to it? The unity and identity of the mind, its initiative and directing power, its faculties of choice and intelligent adaptation to new circumstances, especially its power of repairing its bodily mechanism, when not too greatly injured, all are explained by this assumption, and by this alone, with any clearness.

No doubt there are many difficulties that beset such a conception of the soul. But the objections to the monistic theory are equally weighty, and if, speculatively, the tendency to submerge this dualism in a higher unity is at times overpowering, nevertheless at the bar of *science*, of what we actually *know*, matter and mind must always stand not as two sides of one and the same process, but as two separate kinds of existence. Even the monists themselves admit this, when sober second thought resumes its sway.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

La Fin du Paganisme ; Etude sur les dernières Luites Religieuses en Occident au Quatrième Siècle. Par GASTON BOISSIER. 2 vols. Paris : Librairie Hachette et Cie.

A more agreeable or better informed guide through the earlier and the later scenes of the Roman Empire could hardly be found than M. Gaston Boissier ; and one who does not care to hold him too strictly to the point can ramble with him very charmingly through the pages of these two volumes. When he speaks of the "End of Paganism," he has in view chiefly the intellectual and social changes introduced into the Pagan world by the fall of the Empire and the coming of Christianity. The fourth century saw the triumph of Christianity under Constantine, and the complete banishment of Pagan worship under Theodosius. What effect was this to have on the ancient civilization of which the old worship was so vital a part? Was Christianity to have a civilization and literature of its own, or would it make terms with classic learning, and so save to the world all that Greece and Rome had bequeathed to it? This is the exact question which our author sets himself to answer ; classic literature being quite as dear to his heart as Christianity itself, and the part it has contributed to the life of humanity seeming to him quite as important. "The world has known as yet," he says, "but one literature capable of satisfying all intellectual demands, — the literature of Greece." . . . "When we ask ourselves what are the essential elements of our civilization, we find two legacies from the past without which the present would be inexplicable : classic letters and Christianity." This being his attitude, we are sure of abundant sympathy for the dying cause, and are made to share his gratification at seeing the old literature triumph in the victory of its mortal foe. Before Christianity was aware, it had cast its new thought in the old mould, and given Homer, Plato and Virgil almost equal place with its own Prophets. M. Boissier's way of telling his story is to bring forward the prominent Pagan and Christian writers of the age, and make them interpret for us the course of events. It should be said that while he is so warm a lover of classic learning, he is by no means hostile or indifferent towards Christianity ; on the contrary, he takes great pains to disclaim the condescending attitude which he thinks characterizes most men of letters in these days. He cannot agree with them, that Christianity has done more harm to civilization than good to religion.

The volumes open, as if to give a historical air to what is virtually a literary treatise, with brief sketches of the emperors Constantine and Julian, in which the two men are put before us, with no very masterly characterization, yet with description enough to show the author's estimate of them. Constantine, he considers, accepted Christianity, not of course

through any deep spiritual conviction, yet sincerely; sincerely, that is, from the point of view of superstition. He really believed that the Christian God could be of service to him, and so admitted him to his Pantheon; and he was not disappointed. To the end of his life he was fond of recurring to the blessings and victories which had come to him from this source, as contrasted with the disasters which had overwhelmed those who remained enemies of the church. The same motive prompted him, according to our author, in issuing the Edict of Milan, that splendid proclamation of tolerance, published in the year 313, which granted "to Christians and to all others the liberty of practicing the religion which they prefer." A noble attitude, certainly, for Christianity to take at the very moment of becoming a public religion; yet it showed, not so much a high religious or philosophical ideal on Constantine's part, as that he hoped by this large generosity to secure the favor of all the gods equally. His purpose was, in the language of the Edict, "that whatever celestial power there is may be propitious to us and to all who live under our government." But the special motive which led to the proclamation is after all a matter of little account, as the Edict itself became a dead letter the moment the Christian church was in a position to assert its power. Before the time of Julian the Edict of Milan was forgotten.

M. Boissier's account of Julian is fairly sympathetic, though he makes the singular point that, so far from opposing Christianity through scholarly tastes alone, or as a freethinker, Julian was in reality somewhat of a religious devotee, and did not find Christianity supernatural enough for him. While maintaining an attitude of lofty tolerance and protecting the "Galileans" from all violence, he could not resist the temptation of making sarcastic citations from their sacred writings in which he had himself been so carefully instructed; and he took pleasure in forbidding them to teach Homer and Hesiod, whom as Christians they could not believe, and advising them to keep to their own Matthew and Luke. In his religious ideas it is interesting to notice singular analogies with the metaphysics of the doctrine of the Trinity, showing that Platonic influences were working in quite the same direction in Pagan as in Christian theology; though M. Boissier chooses, strangely enough, to regard these analogies as reminiscences of Julian's Christian studies. But Julian made little impression either on Christianity or on Paganism. Not only was his career short, but he also took the ancient faith too seriously. In trying to bring out its deeper principles, while showing at the same time little interest in the Games which were so dear to the Roman heart, he lost for his new "Hellenism" the support of Paganism itself. All that he attempted, according to M. Boissier, Christianity was afterwards able to accomplish in another and better way.

But whether under Pagan emperors or under Christian, the new faith could not disengage itself from the dominion of classic thought. Had Christianity fully understood the situation, and undertaken to make itself

wholly independent of the Paganism it was to supplant, it should have begun its work in the second and third centuries by establishing schools of its own where its youth might receive a purely Christian culture. But it did no such thing. On the contrary, it found an established system of private and public instruction, which could not easily be uprooted, and it was forced to see its children getting their education under Pagan instructors, with Pagan text-books, and through the medium of Pagan poetry, oratory, rhetoric and mythology. Now and then a spasmodic effort was made to remedy the evil, as when Apollinaris the Elder converted the Old Testament into a series of epic poems, tragedies, comedies and odes, to take the place of Euripides, Menander and Pindar; or when Apollinaris the Younger issued the Gospels and Epistles in the form of Platonic dialogues; or when St. Augustine analyzed the prophecy of Amos, and the Epistles of Paul, to show that their phrases and periods were absolutely classic in form and worthy of the best exemplars of classic rhetoric; or when the poet Juvenecus took in hand the Gospel of Matthew and turned it into Virgilian verse, using so far as possible the very language of the *Æneid* itself. For the most part, however, no resistance was made. Christianity had to steep itself in the spirit, and array itself in the garb, of its rival, or else appear to the lettered world as a provincial and illiterate faith. Even Tertullian, while showing great indignation that Christian children should have to listen to "the scandalous history of Olympus," and to witness Pagan rites in their schoolrooms in honor of Minerva, yet confesses that a classic training is essential, and has no advice to offer but that they should continue to attend Pagan schools. M. Boissier's account of these schools, and of the entire system of Roman education, is full of interest; and as this is the field in which he is most at home, it forms the most valuable part of the work. When we read that in the time of Augustus, teachers sometimes received \$16,000 a year, or that in the time of Theodosius the School of Constantinople had thirty-one professors, we see that education was well cared for in those days, and it is evident why Christianity stood little chance of setting up a system of its own.

The effect of this enforced classic training upon the early Christian writers is very striking. Tertullian, for instance, that redoubtable defender of the church in the second century, wrote a certain treatise called "*De Pallio*,"—so extraordinary in its style, so startling in its metaphors, so crowded with erudition, and so flaming in its rhetoric, as to have been the despair of all the commentators. M. Boissier, who takes the pains to describe it at great length, pronounces it an attempt on Tertullian's part to prove to the world that in becoming a Christian he had not lost his literary spirit, but could be as splendid a rhetorician as ever. Christianity, he felt, was too much looked down upon by the lettered classes, and nothing short of such a *tour de force* would be sufficient to reestablish its prestige. Still more remarkable is the case of

Augustine, who, in his retreat from the world after his conversion, to prepare himself for baptism, instead of devoting himself to solitude and penitence, or even confining himself to the study of the Christian Scriptures, called a little company of friends old and young around him, and discussed classic and sacred writers on equal terms. "In the morning, after prayers, Virgil was taken up and explained; Matthew and Plato were cited in conversation together; the Psalms of David were chanted with the woes of Pyramus and Thisbe; St. Paul was searched for arguments for devoting one's self to the study of philosophy." St. Jerome struggled much more fiercely than St. Augustine against the Pagan devil that was in him, but to as little purpose. Carried in a dream before the heavenly Judge, and cruelly scourged by angels, he defended himself by claiming that he was a Christian. "No," said the angels, "thou art a Ciceronian." St. Jerome then pledged himself from that time to have nothing to do with profane literature. But his old love proved too much for him; his writings were still filled with quotations from his favorite authors. Finally he gave up the struggle entirely, comforting himself with the pious resolve that "he would make of ancient Wisdom an Israelite." St. Ambrose, on the contrary, made no struggle whatever, but held fast by his classic masters without demur, quoted Virgil and Pliny in his sermons quite as freely as the Bible, cited the old philosophers in his letters of consolation, and satisfied his conscience by claiming that the Greeks and Latins borrowed from Moses and Job.

It was this mingling of things sacred and profane which gave to the Christian literature of the first four centuries whatever vogue it had in the cultivated world. As this service, according to M. Boissier, was rendered chiefly by the poets, he devotes a considerable part of his second volume to Latin Christian Poetry. Interesting though this sketch may be, however, to the historian of Christian literature, its bearing upon the topic of the book is too slight to detain us here, and we must refer the reader who would know something more about Commodianus, Juvenius, Paulinus, bishop of Nola, or Prudentius, to these pages.

Paganism died with éclat and M. Boissier gives a picturesque account of its closing scenes, choosing as the decisive moment the removal of the altar of Victory from the Senate chamber by the emperor Gratian, in the year 382. Up to that time, though the emperors had long avowed themselves Christian, Rome had remained largely Pagan, the temples were for the most part undisturbed, and the Senate offered a rallying point for Paganism which existed nowhere else in the Empire. Already the altar of Victory, before which each Pagan senator as he entered was accustomed to offer incense, had been removed by Constantine; but it had been replaced by Julian and retained its old-time honors. Now again its destruction is decreed. Symmachus, the most eloquent orator of his time, utters the last plea for the ancient faith to which Rome owed all its grandeur and its prosperity; asks at what altar henceforth they can

swear fidelity to the laws; declares that the Supreme Being is the same for all, but must be approached by many paths; and prays that all religions may combine their forces in sustaining the imperial power. But all is vain. The moment has arrived, and Paganism meets its final doom.

By far the most interesting point which this sketch suggests is the entire unconsciousness on the part of Roman society of its approaching fate. Attention has more than once been called to the fact that in Paris, down to the very outbreak of the French Revolution, no one, whether of the populace or of the more thoughtful classes, seems to have had a suspicion that any unusual events were about to occur. Even more striking is the case of Rome. The Empire is in its last throes; the Goths have already inundated Italy and just been driven back from the gates of Rome; the army already has had to be recruited by enrolling the slaves; the treasury is empty and the revenues have almost ceased; yet to judge from the letters of Symmachus, here quoted, neither private citizens nor public officials who know most of the affairs of state cherish any serious anxieties. Men buy and sell, repair ancient monuments and erect massive mansions; the schools are fuller, education is more widely spread, and science more honored, than at any hour before. "We live truly," wrote Symmachus, "in an age friendly to virtue, when men of talent have only themselves to blame, if they do not find employment altogether worthy of them." Augustine also, viewing affairs from the Christian standpoint, far from echoing the sentiment of earlier generations, as shown in the Book of Revelation, has the same faith as the Pagans themselves in the perennial vigor of Rome, and the power of the eternal city to bid defiance to its barbaric foes. Christian and Pagan poets alike sing of Rome as still wreathing its brows with the laurels of victory.

Still more strange is the silence of the Pagan writers of this same period regarding the growing triumphs of Christianity. They seem to consider these unworthy of mention. Such a thing as anti-Christian literature is hardly to be found. Macrobius, a writer of the end of the fourth century or beginning of the fifth, describes an imaginary gathering of distinguished people at Rome, to celebrate the festival of Saturn. They are together for three days, discussing philosophy, literature, religion, and all the questions which interested the cultivated society of the day. It is just at the time when the sacrifices of the gods are about being abolished, when the festivals of Saturn and of all the gods are immediately to be prohibited, and the temples of the ancient deities to be forever closed. Yet throughout the entire conversation the name of Christianity is not once mentioned. The same fact is true, if we are to trust M. Boissier, of all Pagan writers of the time, whether grammarians, orators, poets or even historians. Events which seem to us now so ominous of change, and so decisive of the religion of the future, find no mention in these writings, and no place apparently in men's thoughts. M. Boissier finds no explanation for this phenomenon, but to ascribe it to a con-

spiracy of silence, — a deliberate attempt on the part of the élite to de-grade the new religion by ignoring it. We must think, however, that his own pages suggest a simpler and more natural reason. Great historic events, even those as momentous as the triumph of Christianity, show their historic character only after they have occurred. To our thought the world at that hour was awaiting the final triumph of Christianity; to those then living it was simply a new and foreign religion fighting against the old. Constantine, it is true, had accepted Christianity more than half a century before; but Julian had gone back to the ancient faith, and Julian's reign to men of mature age was a thing but of yesterday. Why might not the next occupant of the throne follow his example? Throughout the fourth century, Rome itself continued in great measure Pagan; the etiquette language and usages of the court retained their Pagan tone; the emperor allowed himself to be addressed as a god, and did not forbid lamps to be burned before his statues; the old faith had all the culture of the day and the prestige of the past on its side. Moreover, even supposing it to have been clear in the fourth century that Christianity had come to stay, what did that mean? Not necessarily a new religion superseding the old; but rather one additional worship to be added to the many which already existed; or rather one additional way of approaching the Supreme Being who was high above all local worships. That Pagan thinkers had already learned to regard their many gods only as representatives of one absolute Deity is well known. According to M. Boissier, a favorite term among the writers of the time to designate God was *Divinitas*. On the Arch of Constantine, erected by the Senate in honor of that great victory which Christian legend has associated with the vision of the cross, Constantine is said to have acted "*instinctu divinitatis*," — "at the instigation of the Divinity." The Edict of Milan, as we have seen, Constantine's great proclamation of religious liberty, speaks of the "Celestial Power" or "Divinity in celestial places." A Pagan correspondent of St. Augustine, here quoted, claims that every intelligent man believes in "one Supreme God;" he ends by invoking for the Christian bishop the care of "those subordinate deities by whose intervention we are enabled to approach the common Father of gods and men, whom all nations honor with rites at once different and the same." Such being the prevailing conceptions of the hour, it is hardly necessary to suppose a "conspiracy of silence" to explain the indifference of Roman society towards Christianity on the very eve of its triumph. It is easy to be wise after the event; before the event, it would seem, the educated Roman saw nothing in Christianity to mark it as the coming religion; or in the Goths or Huns to stamp them as the future masters of the Roman empire.

We have said enough, we trust, to show what valuable material these volumes contain. One has often to sift many pages, it is true, and work through much padding, to reach his results. M. Boissier takes ample

time, and travels with leisurely steps. If he wishes to cite the "Letters of Symmachus," he must first give an extensive excursus on letter writing, beginning with Cicero and Pliny, to show what the qualities of the classic letter writer were, and to prove that Symmachus did *not* possess them. To defend Christianity from the charge of having corrupted ancient letters, he carries us back to the writings of Livy, to show the changes which came over the Latin tongue between Livy and Tacitus, and then between Tacitus and Augustine. But we can forgive much to an author who draws from such abundant resources to give us this vivid picture of the last days of Paganism.

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Christian Doctrines and Modern Thought. The Boyle Lectures for 1891. By T. G. BONNEY, LL. D., Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. London and New York : Longmans, Green & Co. \$1.50.

The specialty of this book would seem to be an endeavor to illustrate Christian doctrine by certain results of modern scientific investigation. The purpose is exceedingly attractive; and this makes all the greater the disappointment that one cannot help feeling in the result. The reader must not expect to find interesting and inspiring comparisons like those given in Professor Drummond's "Natural Law in the Spiritual World." Dr. Bonney's illustrations are petty and often both degrading and inapt. The doctrine of the Trinity, for example, is illustrated by the separability of individuality in the organic world. Many plants may "be divided into parts, which will then become separate individuals" (49). The same thing happens in certain forms of animal life: "A single polybite gradually separates into two or more, which ultimately become perfectly complete in themselves" (51). The idea seems to be that all these individuals continue to be manifestations of the same essence. They illustrate the "three eternal aspects (*Υποστάσεις*) of the Divine, facing inward on each other, as well as outward on the world" (48 and 51). A better illustration is found in those groups of organisms, each member of which has a certain individuality, while all retain some sort of vital connection with one another. "A Hydrozoan, . . . consists of a number of polybites connected by a common tissue. . . . The life of the whole colony is a common one, yet it is individualized in each polybite" (50). One cannot help wondering that the Siamese twins have no place in this discussion, and the two-headed boy who has been on exhibition in some of our cities during the past season would seem to be a better illustration than all Dr. Bonney's put together.

A still wilder notion of essential unity preserving itself amid different manifestations is found in the phenomena of allotropy: "Graphite and the diamond are chemically identical, though their properties are so different" (55). Here the resemblance expressed by the words "chemi-

cally identical" passes into absolute identity under different forms, and furnishes another illustration of the Trinity.

It should be added that Dr. Bonney insists upon the imperfection of these illustrations.

We must seriously protest against this degradation of the venerable doctrines of the church, which have been and still are the source of inspiration to so many. If illustrations of the Trinity are wanted, one has not far to seek. Hegel has taught us that the world is Trinitarian to its core. The symbol of human personality, which Dorner in recent years has taken so literally, St. Augustine used in such a manner as to keep his results well within the lines of orthodoxy. These writers employed the greatest tact in their experience to illustrate the loftiest object of their thought.

In Dr. Bonney's discussion of the doctrine of the Incarnation great stress is laid upon the miraculous birth of Jesus. Here the contribution of modern science is to show how little of a miracle this would be after all, and to furnish parallels in the development of life upon the earth. We are told that "some animals divide themselves again and again; one individual becomes a host by subdivision, not by generation in the ordinary sense" (70). It will be noticed that one of the illustrations of the Trinity here does duty as an illustration of the miraculous birth. According to the first application of the figure, Jesus and his mother would continue to be manifestations of the same essence.

The only attempt at an original statement or modification of any doctrine of the church that occurs in the volume is found in the chapter that treats of the Holy Spirit. In this, also, science makes its only real contribution to the thought. Our attention is first called to the relation that science insists upon between spiritual energy, vital energy, and the energy that is active in the physical world; the second principle is the fact of the dissipation of energy, "Speaking figuratively, the universe is like a man living on his capital and this process must end in destitution." The final result is that "the work . . . of infusing a new energy or counteracting the natural tendency to dissipation . . . is the work of the Holy Spirit" (37 *b*). While this statement is original it cannot be regarded as a very important contribution to theologic thought. By it the Holy Spirit is represented merely as the great conserver. Its power to uplift, to advance and to re-create is not recognized.

The last two chapters of the book are the best. They treat of "The Sacraments" and "The Church." They are clear and manly. The author throws himself into the strife that is waged in the English Church in regard to these great matters. There is no possibility of mistaking his position in the contest. He insists that the sacraments have no magical influence, and that the church has no right to claim despotic power. In reading these chapters one feels for the first time the real strength of the man.

CHARLES C. EVERETT.

Essays and Criticisms. By ST. GEORGE MIVART, F. R. S. Two volumes. Boston : Little, Brown & Co. \$8.00.

These two volumes of the collected essays and criticisms of Professor Mivart are announced as "a new and important work" of this distinguished scholar, who adorns the field of science as an authority in comparative zoölogy, and at the same time acts as the champion of religion, as enshrined in the Roman Catholic Church. The work is new only in the sense that the essays are newly collected from the Reviews where for the most part they first appeared; yet perhaps the word "new" may be properly applied to them because of that cumulative force which their unity of purpose bestows in their collective presentation. That the work is "important" cannot be doubted. Mr. Mivart is the only considerable antagonist of Mr. Darwin and Mr. Spencer who is at once a "defender of the faith" and an evolutionist of the highest repute. He has labored consistently at a double task the past quarter of a century: he has steadily maintained that natural selection does not furnish a sufficient explanation of "the genesis of species" and the "descent of man," on the one hand, and that evolution pure and simple, as Herbert Spencer maintains its cause, is insufficient to provide for the rise of human intelligence and to establish a basis of moral life. Mr. Mivart is an evolutionist — with a difference. He sets a "limit to evolution;" he does not ask for a suspension of judgment, or the entertainment of a working-theory in science, but is dogmatically certain that the conclusions of his learned associates, whom most he antagonizes, are false as philosophy, and degrading and perilous as ethics.

These volumes cover a wide range of subjects, from "Jacobinism" to "Heredity," from "State Organization" to "The Meaning of Life." But, whether published twenty years ago or now first issued, they have one purpose, — to demonstrate the hospitality of the Roman Catholic Church to all rational thought, and to counteract the immoral and anarchical tendencies of the school of thought represented chiefly by the names of Darwin and Spencer.

Religion has its ablest advocate in Mr. Mivart among all those who "carry contradictory opinions in different pockets of their brain" (to quote Professor Huxley). The timid believers who desire "a limit to evolution" will find great assurance in the scientific learning which undertakes to show that "natural selection is not *the* origin of species," and that "evolution is perfectly compatible with the strictest Christian orthodoxy" (Specific Genesis, ii. 126).

There are many who do not need this stay put under their faith, who still do not think that either Mr. Darwin or Mr. Spencer has said the last word on the meaning of life or the responsibility for human conduct. But they do not share the alarm of Mr. Mivart, nor are they willing to say that the conclusions of Herbert Spencer are "absolutely fatal to

every germ of morality" and "entirely negative every form of religion." The theological drift and tendency of Mr. Mivart in these essays crops out in such references as this: "The Franciscan most interesting to the lovers of the critical and experimental sciences of our own day is Friar Roger Bacon. His love for physical science is widely known, but the breadth of his views concerning Holy Scripture is much less so. Aided by him, Robert Elsmere would have had but little to fear from his neighbor the Squire, who would have been met by principles capable of discounting beforehand his whole contention" (The Grayfriars, i. 291). It is very significant to have Robert Elsmere and Roger Bacon constitute in this sentence complementary names in the history of religious thought, and to find that neither needs a word of introduction. Something has happened when a name in fiction takes its place thus in the history of philosophy.

The attitude taken by Mr. Mivart in all these matters is not assumed or forced; it is *temperamental*. Just as all that he has to say on government and society is cast in the mould of scientific phraseology, so all that he has to say upon nature and man is penetrated by the zeal of one who believes he has made a great discovery in the realm of faith. This mental tone is seen throughout in both phrase and thought. Mr. Mivart has faith in "estates" (politically considered), rather than in "numbers;" in "representations of class and interest," rather than in "universal suffrage." He demands "some compensating check" upon "widely diffused suffrage," to the end that "justice may be done to well deserving minorities," — English Catholics for instance. He has faith, not in "the number of heads" in any count, but in "their contents." All this, with infinite variation, is most interestingly and forcibly expressed, but it all tends one way: "Instead of dreading, according to vulgar prejudice, the existence of an *imperium in imperio*, the thing which would seem to be desirable is the greatest possible numbers and diversities of *imperia*, hierarchically and harmoniously coexisting within one vast and majestic *summum imperium*. In this way the parallelism between the social and animal organism will be complete" (State Organization, i. 167).

This tendency, temperamental, and consistently so, is most evident in the very interesting historical papers which occupy a third of the first volume. They deal with Jacobinism (reviewing works of Taine and Mallet-du-Pan), Sorel's "Europe and the French Revolution," and "The Memoirs of a Royalist" (Le Comte de Falloux). Considered as historical studies, penetrated by a not very modern philosophy of society, and showing throughout a sharp distrust of all radicalism, these essays are brilliant and strong. Mr. Mivart has a lucid style, and a habit of exact and direct expression. But whether he is discussing the history of liberty in France or the claims of secularism in England, or the conclusions of undogmatic philosophy in science, his attitude is unmistakably antagonistic to all these,

and his mental affront provokes either a jeremiad or a challenge. If he had more faith in natural selection he might reassure himself with its postulate, that *in the breeding of wild creatures there is always a tendency to variation of the original type*. But he cannot so console himself. He feels that with "every extension of the suffrage we have fewer and fewer guaranties for the competency and discretion of our rulers. . . . Surely now, all men of equitable minds, whatever may be their religious views, should protest in favor of freedom (as understood in the United States and England and by such men as M. Jules Simon) against the passionate and sectarian Jacobinism which has managed so widely to usurp the fair name of 'liberal' on the Continent of Europe, and threatens to ruin civilization by an invasion of barbarism and brutality, not as in the days of the breakdown of the Roman Empire, by incursions from without, but from beneath" (Notes on Spain, i. 241).

This fear of sudden disaster to the established and traditional appears in Mr. Mivart's treatment of ethics, religion and science. He arraigns the system of Mr. Spencer for the same reason that he condemns the secularist and the radical; the Spencerian philosophy involves to him "the denial of all truth," and "radically and necessarily opposes all sound principles of morals." This seems to him a legitimate consequence of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, leading up, as it does, to the declaration that "we can know only phenomena." In justification of his dissent from this position, he uses again the too much trusted turn of logic, — that the statement that we can know nothing absolutely is self-contradictory; since it affirms, as certainly known, that we can certainly know nothing. The use of this most inconclusive retort marks always the mind in which the scientific method has been crossed by metaphysic; the boasted philosophico-scientific product is a hybrid. It certainly cannot be difficult to see the difference between saying that experience is the horizon of human knowledge, and saying that an intellectual postulate may have axiomatic certainty. The confusion between "feelings" and "ideas," charged upon "the extreme left" of evolution, has in this matter infected the method of their antagonist. We cannot, indeed, know matter, either as matter or the thing-in-itself, but we may be perfectly certain as to the validity of statements concerning it.

We feel in reading Mr. Mivart that he sometimes misunderstands or underestimates his antagonist, — for instance, when he says that Mr. Spencer's theory of the evolution of morality is not only "objectionable as a speculative theory, but has the gravest social consequences;" that it teaches that "every action whatever is a mode of the unknowable; and the stab of the assassin and the traffic of the courtesan are as much the necessary result and outcome of that ultimate principle as are the charity of a Howard or the self-devotion of Marseilles' good Bishop." There is but one answer to this: Mr. Mivart has misrepresented Mr. Spencer. Mr. Spencer has not solved the problem of evil; but neither has any

one else. So far as the Unknowable Power which appears in phenomena is substituted for a personal oriental Sovereign, and so far as the immutable order of the world has appeared where the eternal decrees used to be inscribed, there are many profoundly religious minds who feel that an inestimable gain has been made. The situation may not be so far advanced as to make new formularies of dogmatism possible, but at least we are not asked to misrepresent as beneficence an irresponsible Omnipotence, which has to many seemed the denial of love and the despair of helplessness. But Mr. Mivart fears that the motive for the acceptance of the doctrine of evolution, after the manner of Darwin and Spencer, is to be found in "a passionate hatred of religion, which, however discreetly and astutely veiled, lies at the bottom of much of the popular metaphysical teaching now in vogue. No system is to be tolerated which will lead men to accept a Personal God, moral responsibility, and a future state of rewards and punishments; . . . that system which excludes them the most efficaciously becomes the most acceptable." This is an uncharitable judgment delivered from a cloistered mind. There is in it no sufficient knowledge of the way in which the men and women of his own age feel upon the most vital themes. They are not to be charged with moral cowardice because they are no longer satisfied with a little cabinet world, and go out to find God in a universe where a hundred million worlds utter speech concerning Him in terms not derived from mediæval and pre-scientific times. Mr. Mivart is not certain that he "can find any unprejudiced Christian metaphysician;" so he appeals to Aristotle. But it is vain to conjure with "the voice" of Aristotle while "the hands are the hands" of Augustine. Greek thought has a method nearer to the great doctrine of the immanence of God than any inference, here set forth as Christian, can justify.

The dependence in all scientific inquiry conducted by Mr. Mivart is well grounded on "the appeal to consciousness;" but the dependence here is too complete. It is not the whole story. He says: "The great difference between man and the lower animals consists, not in his body, but in his mind. We must begin by looking a little carefully into our own minds, and examining our own acts and mental natures." He then places the fulcrum for his lever in "the fundamental difference between feelings and ideas:" in this difference he finds "the limit of evolution;" here a gulf yawns "between man and the highest of the lower animals." He can imagine "a mere irrational ape" so endowed "with nervous ganglia and nerve fibres" "as to solve the problems of Euclid and turn out quadratic equations. But such a creature would of course have no rational knowledge of the action he performs, — no intellectual apprehension of his own psychical processes, or of problems and equations as problems and equations." We do not really know whether such a being, if created by Mr. Mivart's order, would be still "irrational;" but we feel quite sure that such "a mere irrational ape," if created by the pro-

cesses now present in nature, would be a mathematician, with all that that implies. To Mr. Mivart, however, the distinction thus imperfectly illustrated marks "a difference *not of degree, but of kind*, which divides man from all, even the highest brutes; there is a limit to evolution between human and merely animal natures; and something altogether new, a capacity for apprehending abstract ideas, first appeared on the planet with the coming of man" (Vol. ii. p. 312).

If we understand this statement, it would make an end of all unity by introducing a break in an ordered world; the phrase, "a difference of kind," has a bad sound when used in connection with the other phrase, "processes carried on according to definite natural laws to fulfill a precise and determined end." Unless, indeed, these natural laws are of the old statutory kind, imposed from without, and dictated by an independent Will, not immanent in all, but superior to all, — in this case we would be back in the old dualism and contradictory anthropomorphism from which, for all these years, the scientific method has sought to deliver both religion and philosophy. We suspect this is the goal of such a course of thought as these essays contain. Man, the final unit, we are told, "knows that he is a unity with two sets of faculties, material and mechanical in one aspect, immaterial and non-mechanical in the other aspect. No certainty we can attain to about any other object can be nearly so certain as this certainty which we know about our own being: first, its active, immaterial aspect; and secondly, its material and mechanical aspect. That each man is a substantial, definitely organized substance in one unity, with a dynamic immaterial principle which is revealed in consciousness, is the first truth of physical science." We must enter an exception, as the lawyers say; so far from this being the first truth of physical science, it seems to us a very lame conclusion in philosophy, not scientific in its certainty nor in its terms. "In one aspect" it is a first truth in theology, and "in another aspect" it is the very thing still to be proved in physical science. Even if it be taken over into the adjoining field of psychology, the inquiry will at once be started, Is it to be treated by theoretical or experimental psychology? If by the latter, you must not insist on the "immaterial principle;" this is not a final term of the laboratory.

The prime difficulty which attends upon the work of Mr. Mivart, as related to that of Darwin and Spencer, is implied in the declaration that "the question of man's origin is a philosophical, not a scientific question, and men may be very distinguished for scientific knowledge and yet be the victims of a very defective philosophy. Such is conspicuously the case in the present instance. The Darwinian view is supported by men, and only by men, who confound 'ideas' with 'faint revivals of past feelings.' It is on this account that not one of them has grappled with the essence of the question." There can, then, be no agreement between explorers of the realm of nature *who start so far apart*,

though they enter the field from the same side. They are not one in purpose, nor are the instruments of their search the same; their tempers are antagonistic, and their loyalties are not similarly controlled. The one serves the cause of a tendency and a tradition; the other knows no sanctuary but the universe, and no basis of authority but the facts of nature.

THOMAS R. SLICER.

BUFFALO, N. Y.

Essays Scientific, Political and Speculative. By HERBERT SPENCER. Library Edition. Three volumes. New York: D. Appleton & Co. \$6.00. **Social Statics, Abridged and Revised; together with Man versus the State.** By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: D. Appleton & Co. \$2.00.

The various essays in which Mr. Herbert Spencer has covered so many of the special fields which he afterward embraced in his all-comprehending "Synthetic Philosophy" have heretofore been published in different collections, in England and America. This Library Edition, thoroughly rearranged, and including seven essays written since 1882, has now been brought out by his American publishers, who will doubtless receive the thanks of all students of the philosophy of evolution. Many of the essays have been changed in the way of omission and addition: that on the Nebular Hypothesis has been largely recast. (The short essay on the Constitution of the Sun is included in Volume I., but is not mentioned in the table of contents.)

A general rearrangement of the essays being desirable, Mr. Spencer has compromised between the order of time and the order of subjects; in each volume the essays have been arranged in an order substantially chronological; the first volume is devoted to evolution, general and special; the second to questions of philosophy — abstract and concrete — science, and æsthetics; the third volume is made up of ethical, political and social essays. Mr. Spencer mentions several papers which he has not thought it well to include, one class being ruled out "because of their personal character." Not a few of his readers will regret that he did not reject, under this last heading, the sharp and bitter essay entitled "Professor Green's Explanations," in which "unscrupulous" is one of the politest adjectives he applies to Thomas Hill Green. "Cold controversy" of this unfortunate order in no wise reflects credit upon the author who includes it in the definitive edition of his works. Mr. Spencer, indeed, betrays in more than one of his articles the heat of the controversialist rather than the calm of the philosopher and savant. Not a few of his sentences are better classified as scolding, rather than argument. His long struggle in his early career to obtain recognition for his philosophy seems to have left evil effects, in a polemic tone, the traces of which should have been carefully removed from this edition of his minor

works. In later years, the large measure of indiscriminate laudation which Mr. Spencer has received, especially from this country, has probably served to confirm him in some of his least admirable habits as a writer and thinker, such as extreme dogmatism, unwillingness to qualify, and the disposition, highly unbecoming in a scientific student, to square the facts with his theories at all hazards. In no respect is Mr. Spencer, as an observer and thinker, more deficient than when he treats subjects in any way bearing on this country. His paper on "The Americans," which closes this Library Edition of his essays, is extremely unequal to its subject. The introduction to the volume entitled "A Plea for Liberty," reproduced here under the heading "From Freedom to Bondage," especially exemplifies Mr. Spencer's unwillingness to study facts such as those which are offered in great abundance by our country; they would necessitate a large reconstruction of his social theories, which an American or Frenchman would say are, in a large degree, merely prejudices.

The new edition of "Social Statics," with the connected reprint of "Man versus the State," shows with great plainness numerous limitations of Mr. Spencer as a writer on political and social subjects. Making every reasonable allowance for the reaction from Mr. Spencer's type of individualism which carries many younger thinkers into the ranks of socialism, the criticism seems just that Mr. Spencer has an idea of the State from which his fundamental conception of evolution has been unwarrantably severed; the Spencerian State is, in truth, a case of arrested development, and Mr. Spencer himself, as a social philosopher, has apparently learned little in the last forty years.

These words are those of one who was an early admirer of Mr. Spencer, and has never wavered, from first to last, in thorough acceptance of the doctrine of evolution. It is one thing, however, to receive a doctrine as true, and quite another to venerate its leading apostle as infallible on all subjects. American thinkers of the present day stand in need of nothing more than of a judicial and searching criticism of Mr. Spencer. As supplying material for this, the definitive edition of his essays is welcome. It is more welcome for giving, at last, in a well-arranged form the many admirable papers in which one of the great minds of the century has set forth, often with more force and persuasion than in his system of philosophy, his leading ideas on evolution in the world of matter and world of mind. It would not be strange, indeed, if coming generations should value these volumes more highly than the "Synthetic System of Philosophy" itself.

Professor Huxley has disclaimed any scheme for a philosophy of evolution, and Mr. Frederic Harrison finds many who will agree with him when he says: "Mr. Herbert Spencer has attempted this with extraordinary powers and attainments, and has signally failed." The "Synthetic Philosophy" is undeniably the popular philosophy of the day, but more than one day before this has had its philosophy fully as popular.

The gradual subsidence of the Synthetic Philosophy into its proper place in the history of philosophy is now going on, and it is highly desirable that neither eulogy nor detraction of Mr. Spencer himself should interfere with a just settlement.

NICHOLAS P. GILMAN.

WEST NEWTON, MASS.

Short Sermons. By the Rev. STOFFORD A. BROOKE. London and New York : Macmillan & Co.

This volume contains thirty-nine discourses which the writer has intended not only for private reading, but also for use in home services on Sunday evenings. They are said to be five or ten minutes in length ; in fact, all must be over five and many are certainly over ten. But all are short, and must win for that reason the popularity which followed Dr. Charles Lowell's fifteen-minute sermons in the old West Church of Boston.

The sermons are directed almost exclusively to the formation of personal character on its finer and gentler sides, and very largely to the nourishing of the spiritual life of the home. The problems of theology are ignored. One would never suspect the existence of Biblical criticism, and the noise of the battle over miracles and inspiration does not penetrate the sanctuary of these holy thoughts. Those who know the preacher understand well that this is not because he is ignorant of the battle or does not care for it. They know, on the contrary, that he has fought a good fight in it, and has come out from it covered with scars and with honor. Few liberal preachers have sacrificed so much to doctrinal truthfulness as he. But for this very reason he has a special right to retire into the centre of the Christian faith, and to live there in the truths which concern the life of the soul. He says of the sermons in his preface : " I have removed from them everything controversial, and spoken in them only of those moral and spiritual things on which all sects and Churches may agree."

There is a quiet and simple beauty in these sermons which grows upon the reader. They are in line with the most spiritual thoughts of the Christian Church. They are not so much striking as pervasive and persuasive. There is as little reference to social as to theological problems, and no echo from the great conflicts between classes of society disturbs the contemplation of the central truths. Indeed, one accustomed to marching in the ranks of sturdy fighters for liberty or equality might well find these discourses somewhat tame, as modern taste, accustomed to the sensuous colors and strenuous action of modern paintings, might find Botticelli or Fra Angelico uninteresting. But he who worships God as a "lover of souls" and who is himself a seeker after inward purity and holiness will linger over these sermons as over delicate flowers and ferns. Space here allows but a single extract, from the sermon on "The Unused Talent : " —

It is not death to die, but it is death to live without using one's self, without usefulness to the world. The wages of self, like the wages of sin, are death ; and they are paid not only in the other world, but now, day by day, hour by hour. There is not a day of idleness for which the skeleton king we serve does not give unto our bosom something of himself, and he gives good measure. No paymaster can be more generous or more certain. As we go on serving him, he doubles and trebles his wage, until, one by one, all our powers, graces, gifts, faculties, affections, intellect, capacities for work and help and loving kindness are filled with death. We move among men and seem alive. But we are a living death. In the home of the soul, on its solitary plains, there are nothing but dead bones. And we hear a voice saying : "Son of Man, can these bones live?" And the answer is : "Lord God, Thou knowest." Yes, only He can know. And if, in the midst of our dead, there be one faint desire living (which moves like a searcher for some loved one over a battlefield, among the corpses of all that sloth has slain within us, mourning bitterly), let it cry aloud to God — "Come from the four winds, O Love, and breathe upon these slain, that they may live." And if that prayer be strong, then, in a rushing wind, which brings the pain of life upon its wings, God comes to make us alive.

WILLIAM H. LYON.

ALL SOULS' CHURCH, ROXBURY.

Henry Boynton Smith. By LEWIS F. STEARNS, D. D. Pp. vi, 368. Boston and New York : Houghton, Mifflin & Co. \$1.25.

This latest volume in the series of "American Religious Leaders" comes to us with a pathetic interest: it was finished for the press, but never seen in print by its author. Professor Stearns, to whom the work was a labor of love, died just as his task was completed. He was peculiarly qualified for it by his genuine but discriminating admiration for Dr. Smith, by his wide knowledge of the religious history of our country for the past fifty years and more, and by the similarity of his theological position. Endeavoring to be thoroughly orthodox and yet a modern man like his friend, serving as a mediator between old and new in days of unrest and transition, he was admirably well fitted to write with sympathy and precision of one whose greatness came before the public in no dramatic fashion, and whose finer elements of character were known only to the few. Many will perhaps feel that he deals in superlatives in calling Dr. Smith "one of the choice and master spirits of his age," and yet the language reveals that true hero-worship which every biographer needs.

Professor Stearns has given a well-arranged, clearly written, and nobly tempered portraiture and exposition. He makes us see and appreciate Dr. Smith both as a man and as a scholar, while he clearly outlines the system of theology for which his subject labored for about thirty years at Amherst, Andover, and Union Theological Seminary. Professor Stearns was chiefly interested in Dr. Smith as a theologian, but "in his hands theology was not a scholastic system, but a living power." This much had probably been deeply impressed upon him by his five years' pastorate of

a rural church in West Amesbury, Mass., from 1842 to 1847. But Professor Stearns, while making the theological services of his friend most prominent, — they were his distinctive services, — also describes his varied and valuable contributions to American periodical literature, both as translator and as author; and his words of wisdom as a citizen and a patriot are duly cited.

The biographer has given few grounds for criticism, and no occasion for censure. There are only a few blemishes, to which a passing allusion may be made. Professor Stearns did not wholly free himself from a phraseology which at times borders upon cant. Conventional familiarity in alluding to God and his purposes, and an assumption of intimate acquaintance with the plans of Providence mar, here and there, pages that otherwise are delightful reading. A rather hasty statement is sometimes made, as when on page 104 it is asserted that the school of Ritschl has gone so far as "the rejection of all philosophy." Unitarians, to whom Professor Stearns frequently refers, will often be somewhat amused, without being inclined to indulge in criticism. Yet one statement in this connection shows how easily we take things for granted, provided they happen to favor our side. The biographer asserts that Dr. Smith was always the more earnest in his evangelical faith, because he had tried Liberal Christianity and "found it insufficient to satisfy his spiritual needs." In view of the fact that Dr. Smith *was converted when he was about eighteen years old*, it is a little hard to see how a boy at that age could have had the opportunity to give any form of religion a fair trial and decide that it was insufficient to satisfy his spiritual needs! But Professor Stearns makes a good deal of this all through his book: Dr. Smith had tried Unitarianism and found it insufficient. As a matter of fact, his family was thoroughly Orthodox, and at the age of fifteen he entered Bowdoin College, where his surroundings were decidedly evangelical. His trial of Liberal Christianity consisted in hearing the sermons of Rev. Dr. Nichols, of Portland, before he was fifteen years old. Few of us would think our boys at that age, and under those circumstances, capable of passing judgment upon a system of theology and deciding that it was insufficient to satisfy one's spiritual needs.

Henry B. Smith was well born, and inherited from both father and mother large intellectual capacities and noble moral sentiments. His boyhood in Portland was spent in a stimulating and refining environment. His college course at Bowdoin brought him into contact with earnest and capable men. He was early drawn to the study of divinity and philosophy. He went abroad to study theology, when it was rare for orthodox divinity students to take such a course. There were then but few American students going to Germany for higher scholarship. Young Smith went, and came back a deeper scholar and a broader man, but free from German rationalism. It enriched him, but it did not convert him. Probably no other theological teacher in America,

during the period of his activity, was so well equipped, or came so widely into contact with theological students, or exerted so deep and broadening an influence upon American religious thought. He did not have the learning or the style of Hedge, or the genius of Parker, or the spiritual insight of Bushnell, but these were not professors in theological seminaries. Dr. Smith was for a short time a teacher of Hebrew at Andover, and for three years professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Amherst; for twenty-two years he was connected, first as professor of Church History, and then as professor of Theology, with Union Theological Seminary, New York, to which he gave success and celebrity by the solidity of his learning and the vitalizing power of his instruction. His spirit lingers there to-day in a teaching, the broad and progressive temper of which is the dread of conservatives and the joy of liberals. He was a widely read and thorough ecclesiastical historian, as his "History of the Christian Church" shows; he was a forcible and luminous critic, as his contributions to our periodical literature prove; he was an irenic churchman, as his work for union among Presbyterians illustrates. Whatever may be our opinion of his theology, we may all rejoice in the memory of him as a man who did much to establish higher scholarship in this land, and to foster a broad and progressive spirit in our conservative churches.

Dr. Smith left behind him no adequate expression of his theological system, — the work of instruction left little time for careful elaboration. He wrote much, but it was for the pressing needs of periodical literature. Ill health burdened his last years, and indeed all his days; his too short life closed in 1877. His most original and vigorous production was his address at Andover in 1849, on "Faith and Philosophy," a very clear account of which is given by Professor Stearns in his fourth chapter. His plea for the legitimacy of each power in its own sphere, and the union of both in one system is irenic and catholic. His words made a profound impression, and did good in the regions which they penetrated. But his claims for faith represent a view which is passing away. The harmony of religion and philosophy will be worked out on other and broader lines.

The most characteristic element in Dr. Smith's theology, not original with him, but new in the America of his day, was his contention that Christ be put at the centre, that theology be *Christologized*. He was to a certain extent the father of those among us to-day who advocate what they call a "Christocentric theology." A Calvinist, yet moderate, and with his eye fixed on Christ rather than the decrees; a Trinitarian, but holding the doctrine, not as a theological formula, but as a religious conviction leading on to Christ, Dr. Smith represented a broad interpretation of traditional dogma rather than a definite effort to revise them. As we read Professor Stearns's description of his theological system, in the sixth and longest chapter, — an admirable exposition, — we feel that

even his "Christological" creed has no room for the real universe known to science, and the real humanity known to historians, educators, and philanthropists. A theology which includes all the facts will not be *Christo-centric*, but *theo-centric* in its upward reaches, and *homocentric* in its outward efforts. This implies no forgetfulness of Jesus of Nazareth, who, as a realization of human possibilities, inspires an ever-deepening love, and serves mankind in a more and more spiritual ministry. Not deity emptied of Godhood, but man ascending to divinity; not a mediator coming between, but humanity perfected, he stands at the head to lift up hope and create enthusiasm, because what was actual in him is possible for us; otherwise, how unreasonable the command, Follow me! Such a theology will be something more than a broadened dogma, more than a revised creed; it will be a religious philosophy created by a fresh study and a deeper appreciation of all the facts of human life.

JOSEPH H. CROOKER.

HELENA, MONT.

The Anglican Career of Cardinal Newman. By EDWIN A. ABBOTT. Two volumes. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. \$10.00.

A less hostile temper towards Newman than that of Dr. Abbott would have been satisfied with his "Philomythus," which, as an exposure of Newman's intellectual method, was a remorseless and effective piece of work. But it did not satisfy Dr. Abbott. It was only the sharpening of his sword for a more terrible encounter, and we have this in the 907 pages of a book which is outwardly so beautiful that the wonder grows whether Dr. Abbott did not have a grave suspicion that his matter would sometimes require every advantage that the art of book-making could secure.

By "the Anglican Career of Cardinal Newman," we are to understand his life up to October, 1845, when he joined the Roman Church, and this was almost exactly half of its entire length. Not till chapter xiv. do we come upon the time — July 14, 1833 — from which Newman dated the Oxford Movement, — with its memories of the Bas-tille, a good day, he thought, for the beginning of a counter-revolution. That to a remarkable degree the boy was father of the man, is brought out in the early chapters. In those covering the years from 1824 to 1829 it is made evident that, even at the time when Newman was considered evangelical or liberal, his liberalism never went further than a partial sympathy with Whateley and the Noëtic school, and that the beginnings of his Roman tendency must be looked for all the way along the decade that preceded the first publication of the Tracts. By far the more interesting of these chapters are those which deal successively with Pusey, and Keble, and Hurrell Froude, distinguishing their characters and the nature and degrees of their influence upon Newman, which was very great. The characterizations of Pusey and Keble are sympathetic. While it was Pusey who first gave weight and afterward perma-

nence to the movement, his influence on Newman was much less than that of Keble and Froude, and their mutual understanding and sympathy was never quite complete. Pusey "had no idea of economy," in Newman's sense of keeping back the less agreeable things until the disciple had been logically committed to their acceptance. Pusey's happy marriage was a bar to Newman's perfect intimacy with him, marriage being to Newman a concession to "the world" against which the church must arm herself.

It was Newman's habit, in taking anything from another, to transmute it into something quite different from its original meaning. He did this with Keble's doctrine of the living power of faith and love to make more cordial our assent to religious truth, transmuting faith and love into degrees of probability, and finally into excuses for believing without evidence. Keble's feeling for Nature was much that of Wordsworth. She was a friend and guide. For Newman she had a convenient stock of illustrations, but for the rest she was a temptation to forbidden joy, as, to his mind, was all the pleasant side of life. Newman's retroactive influence on Keble was strongly marked. In Newman's last Anglican days he made Keble his confessor, partly because the burden of responsibility was greater than he could bear, and he must shuffle it off upon some one; and partly because he hoped to get the advice he wanted, and for which he angled in the most ingenious manner.

To Hurrell Froude Dr. Abbott gives much more attention than to Pusey and Keble. The analysis of his character is very searching and very damaging. The results do not differ from those heretofore made known, which were, indeed, too obvious to be escaped; but they are emphasized with severity, yet not more severely than they deserve. We see plainly enough why Newman should call him "sillyish," and not in the least why he should call him "deep." We find him rash, noisy, harsh, insolent, most confident where he was most ignorant, as in the matter of Laud, whom both he and Newman vaunted mightily as a model churchman, when in truth, apart from the divine right of bishops, his thinking was an anticipation of that of Whately, Arnold, and Stanley, — a fact well brought out by Sir James Fitz James Stephen in his recent "*Horæ Sabbaticæ*." Froude inoculated Newman with his hatred of Protestants and his love of almost everything Roman; in one of the last letters that he wrote, crying on him to "stop cursing and swearing at" his glorious Mother, and yet in one respect Newman's influence upon Froude was strongly marked. He accepted Newman's "economy," but unwillingly. Here Dr. Abbott makes an important point, and one that honors Froude and reflects injuriously on Newman in the same degree. Froude called Newman's economy "the undermining system" and "poisoning," while practicing it most grossly, and these expressions have generally been regarded as fresh instances of his pleasure in offensive terms. But Dr. Abbott shows that these expressions were, so to speak,

in quotation marks. He dipped his pen in the blackest ink, because, while following Newman's lead, he had done it with a certain self-content. In the last letter that he wrote to Newman, he wondered how he could, "even in the extremity of his economy," be a party to a certain Tract. This letter Newman garbled shamefully in his own "Letters," and one must go to Froude's "Remains" for the correct version. Newman was much given to garbling his own letters, when what he had written was not helpful to the purpose of a later time. The Tract that was generally regarded as teaching the principle of "economy" most unblushingly was Isaac Williams's "Reserve in Religious Teaching." But Dr. Abbott has so written as to imply that this Tract was Newman's, saying that after it Newman was accused of Jesuitism and Popery. Williams himself is of the opinion that Newman used it to justify his teaching Romanism in the Anglican Church. Bishop Thirlwall, a man of sturdy honesty, did not think the Tract justified what Froude called "something attractive and poisonous," baiting a trap with palatable morsels. Here was another instance of Newman's touch, converting something into an artifice which was not in the originator's mind.

A very interesting feature of Dr. Abbott's book is its tracing of Newman's development through his sermons at St. Mary's and Littlemore. Heretofore his progress has been traced, for the most part, through his more elaborate works, where the reviewer has not been content to take the "Apologia" as his only guide. Dr. Abbott shows in scores of places the folly of doing this, so treacherous was Newman's memory, so different did things appear to him as he looked upon them from the security of his Birmingham retreat. Even the differences between the first and second editions of the "Apologia" are full of interest, showing the workings of a subtle ingenuity in subjecting facts to theories or personal ends. Nothing is more interesting in Newman's development, as apparent in the sermons, than the original form of that doctrine of certainty through probability, and probability through credulity, which was afterward wrought out elaborately in the "Grammar of Assent." There was a doctrine worked out little by little, with much shifting and halting, much backing and filling, to justify Newman in doing this or that which for the time being he desired especially to do. But, however valuable this analysis of the sermons, it does not tend to the making of a thoroughly interesting or impressive book. It tends to make it what an artist would call "spotty," and to obscure the general effect by the multitude of details, so that we cannot, as an invaluable saying goes, see the forest for the trees. Then, too, the Cardinal is taken far too seriously, and the phrases of a poet and a rhetorician are put upon the rack as if they were the phrases of a profound logician. Too often it is a butterfly that is broken on the wheel. There is possibly a justification for all this in the reputation for great logical power which has attended Newman's fame. If Dr. Abbott has shown anything, he has shown that he had no such power; that,

whatever he might have had, — if he had been willing to be logical, — to manage somehow to escape from logical conclusions was generally the thing he most of all desired. He was a brilliant dialectician and a more brilliant rhetorician, and as a rhetorician he was always following the example of Pygmalion, and falling in love with his own work. Describing himself as “nearly hollow,” he was nowhere more nearly so than in his show of logical procedure to which sincere reality was generally denied. The one impression left on us by Dr. Abbott’s book, and justified by the things which Newman wrote and the facts of his career, is the unreality of the whole business of his life. Surely, of “walking in a vain show” he did his part as literally as ever did a mortal man.

Dr. Abbott’s story gathers head and stream in describing the few years from the beginning of the Movement to the first check which it encountered. After that came the new allies, Ward and Oakeley, and the like, who from following Newman soon began to lead him, or, without ceasing to follow him, to push him vigorously from behind. Dr. Abbott’s account of Ward is very interesting, and he puts Newman in a bad light as representing Oakeley as the head of the new party, when he was certainly not so. It was Ward who forced Newman into the writing of Tract 90, Dr. Abbott’s criticism of which is the least satisfactory part of his book. The morals of subscription, as developed in his own book, “*The Kernel and the Husk*,” disqualified his pot for calling Newman’s kettle black in any unequivocal manner. A curious bit of Newman’s unreality is where he calls a poor fellow who goes over to Rome a monkey who has cut off his tail, and the next Sunday solemnly arraigns the Anglicans for not “acknowledging that our brother has left us because we have left God.” Newman was in no hurry to cut off his own tail. Its prehensile vigor was immense, and Dr. Abbott spares us nothing of his fear and agony as fibre after fibre cracked before he fell at last. Sometimes we are tempted to believe that Newman’s sufferings, at least his longing for the end, could not have been greater than ours. Months after he had arrived at the certitude that the Church of Rome was the one only Church of God, he waited for “a sign,” and acted finally on one which showed an ounce of superstition to be more with him than a pound of reason.

How to attain certitude without rational conviction, and how to convert such certitude into action — these were the ruling motives of Newman’s Anglican career. The last words he wrote as an Anglican expressed his conviction of the incompatibility of reason and faith. His first sacrifice upon the altar of the Roman Church was the sacrifice of his understanding. Father Dominic, who “took him in,” would have omitted from the lesson of the day the story of St. Denis, — how after his martyrdom he put his head under his arm and walked about. But Newman would not have it omitted. He had come to the conclusion of Sir Thomas Browne, that “there are not impossibilities enough in religion for the exercise

of an active faith." If these pages represent him fairly, and they evidently do, he was preëminently the skeptic of his generation. He not only doubted, but he went on to doubt his doubt, entangled in a hopeless coil. When he had seen a ghost, the buried majesty of Rome, he thought "the spirit he had seen might be the Devil;" he thought, perhaps, he "did it wrong, being so majestic." He thought so many things, and they were so inconclusive, that he got tired of thinking and fell back on signs and omens. But Dr. Abbott treats Newman's procrastination as too exclusively an intellectual matter. Procrastination was the habit of his mind; but then, too, he had a great affection for the English Church, none for the Church of Rome, though she had for him a hateful fascination. This book, though stern, is true, and still there is another side of Newman which is hardly mentioned here, but which also is somewhat.

JOHN W. CHADWICK.

BROOKLYN, N. Y.

Le Problème de l'Immortalité. Par E. PETAVEL-OLLIFF. Etude précédée d'une lettre de Professeur CHARLES Secrétan. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. Deux volumes, 12 francs.

Life in Christ. A Study of the Scriptural Doctrine on the Nature of Man, the Object of the Divine Incarnation, and the Conditions of Human Immortality. By EDWARD WHITE. Third Edition, revised and enlarged. New York: Thomas Whittaker.

Rev. Edward White is well known as the standard English authority in favor of conditional immortality. His volume, in its revised form, and the larger work by Dr. Petavel cover all the ground one needs to go over to gain a full understanding of an interesting heresy which bids fair to become a leading tenet of orthodoxy. The phrase "Conditional Immortality" is intended to express the idea that immortality is not a natural gift made to all men, but a prize and reward of virtue. It is supposed to be revealed and imparted by Christ. In these two books, the arguments for this notable doctrine are presented with great fullness and ability. True or false, it is probably destined to play a large part in the religious history of the future. The inducements it offers are many. For instance, to the agnostic, its advocate cheerfully says: "You do right to doubt. There is no proof of natural immortality. It is not revealed in the Bible; neither is it taught by modern science." To the orthodox believer who is troubled by the doctrine of everlasting punishment, but who does not dare to dispute what he believes to be the teaching of the Bible, he says: "You may indulge your generous doubts; the Bible does *not* teach eternal punishment. The doctrine is abhorrent to the tender conscience and it is opposed to the plain teaching of the Gospel." To one who insists that sin and penalty must be commensurate and are invariably united, he says: "So they are. Life is for the right-

eous; death is for the sinner. The dictates of natural justice are reinforced by the divine revelation. Immortality is not a gift to every one, but the reward of the righteous."

To one who has not been long familiar with the arguments by which the doctrine is supported, there must be something perplexing in the air of eager and almost joyous animation with which the writers above named proceed to abolish the arguments for natural and universal immortality. When one remembers with what painstaking solicitude the supports and defenses of immortality have been provided, and how sensitive the religious mind commonly is to any attack upon the doctrine, he wonders how they can so gladly destroy the common hope. Usually those who argue against the doctrine of immortality are counted among "materialists," "atheists," and "destructive critics." This curious phenomenon, however, is explained when we see what the advocates of "conditional immortality" hold in reserve. They believe in immortality for all who *ought* to be immortal. They get rid of questions concerning the freedom of the will which go with the doctrine of universal salvation, and, above all, they rid themselves of the idea that eternal punishment must be the fate of some upon whom immortality has been forced. At the same time they attack no other doctrine of orthodoxy which devout believers in the infallible Bible and the atoning Christ would care to maintain.

The whole ground of controversy has been carefully covered in these three volumes. If one would know what the agnostic or the unbeliever has to say against the doctrine of immortality, he will find all the doubts of the generation well arrayed here. Every objection, also, to the doctrine of eternal punishment is presented. The difficulties in the way of accepting universal salvation as the certain end of human experience are summed up. A careful examination is then made of the Old Testament, the Apocrypha and the New Testament. It is clearly shown that the doctrine of natural immortality for all men is never taught clearly, explicitly and beyond a doubt. It is shown by ample citation of passages that the doctrine of conditional immortality, quite as well as any other, if not better, expresses, in modern terms, the meaning of the writers of the New Testament.

A disinterested critic, then, must see that this doctrine is admirably adapted to take a place in the front rank as a tenet of orthodoxy. It requires no renunciation of belief in anything known as orthodoxy except the doctrine of eternal punishment, which is already a burden, and the doctrine of natural immortality, for which compensation is offered in the idea of a revealed and attainable immortality. As a well-wisher to his fellow-men, one may rejoice at the probable wide acceptance of such a belief, although one may see that it belongs among those great half-truths by which the world swings itself from one point of progress to another. It would not be strange, if, from the side of agnosticism or the scientific doctrine of evolution, there should be an eager acceptance of a proposi-

tion which is certainly not absurd in itself, and which, representing immortality as a prize to be won, fulfills some of the conditions of the doctrine of evolution, and might easily become the basis of a scientific religion.

GEORGE BATCHELOR.

LOWELL, MASS.

The World as the Subject of Redemption. By the Hon. and Rev. W. H. FREMANTLE, M. A. Longmans, Green & Co.

The Bampton Lectures for 1883 by Canon Fremantle were animated by a spirit not usual in lecturers on this venerable foundation. His object was to show the virtual identity of the church while in the world *with* the world, so far as this means the effort to make politics, science, art, literature and all other human functions Christian. The construction put upon this last word by the lecturer is not such as to restrict any of these functions to the office of saving men *out* of the world. He conceives the Nation as a Christian Church, and Christianity "as a life, not as the holding of a series of propositions." "The notion that religion is primarily a cult is not a Christian but a heathen idea." Canon Fremantle is indeed a consistent follower of the great Dr. Arnold of Rugby, in his opposition to merely clerical conceptions of the church and its attitude toward the so-called "world." To him the church is in the world and a part of it, with a divine commission to penetrate the whole of the world, not with Christian bigotries, but with the moral and spiritual life that issued abundantly from Jesus Christ, and still flows forth from the loving heart of humanity to-day. Clericalism he abhors as a great enemy of Christianity, and all his impulses are toward a broadly human conception of religion.

That the world, transfigured by the spirit of Christ, is to be the Christian Community of the future, Canon Fremantle undertakes to show by a survey first of the Hebrew theocracy which is in harmony with the later criticism of the Old Testament; of the New Testament Church, where he is in accord with Dr. Edwin Hatch; of the imperial and mediæval church, the Churches of the Reformation and the English Church and Commonwealth. Seeking "the Christian basis of human societies," he then finds seven circles of human life within the great circle of Universal Humanity: the organization for public worship, not itself the church, though usually so called; the family; the search for knowledge; art; social intercourse; trade and professional life, and the nation. All these are capable of inspiration and redemption.

It is a pleasure to know that a Christian apologetic so broadly based and built up in so generous a temper is now accessible to American readers in a new and less expensive edition, with an introduction by Professor R. T. Ely. Professor Ely inclines more than I find myself inclining to accept Canon Fremantle's union of church and state for our own coun-

try, but this is not a matter that should interfere with a cordial welcome to the work, nor will it hinder the great measure of quickening to be derived from its earnest and thoughtful pages.

NICHOLAS P. GILMAN.

WEST NEWTON, MASS.

Die Ritschl'sche Theologie kritisch beleuchtet. Von OTTO PFLEIDERER. Pp. viii, 139. Braunschweig : C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn.

The eminent Professor of Theology at Berlin, the author of "Der Paulinismus" and "Das Urchristenthum," undertakes in this little book, which is composed of three articles reprinted from the "*Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*," a critical examination of the theology of Ritschl, whose school has attained prominence in Germany, and exerted no little influence upon a certain class of theologians in this country. The first essay is devoted to an examination of Ritschl's theory of knowledge, and the conclusion is reached that he can appeal neither to Kant nor to Lotze, but is rather in accord with the popular Positivism of the present day, particularly in his confusion of subjective Idealism and a naïve Realism, by which the reality of the religious objects and the possibility of a scientific theology are seriously jeopardized. In the second essay Dr. Pfeiderer discusses the Biblical basis of Ritschl's theology with special reference to its central points, atonement and justification, together with the divine holiness and human sin. It is shown that the pretended agreement of the Ritschlian theology with the Scriptures is only an appearance, which rests upon the skillful dialectic by means of which the opinions of the dogmatist are foisted upon various passages with a perversion of the meaning of words and no little prejudice to the ethical character of the Biblical doctrine. Here the Ritschlian rationalism is exposed which, assuming that Paul must have taught regarding the atonement such doctrines as are acceptable to the reason of a nineteenth-century Christian philosopher, resorted to exegetical subtleties in order to make it appear that he did so teach. In this connection Dr. Pfeiderer lays down the following propositions regarding the Pauline doctrine of atonement: 1. The atonement according to Paul is a completed act of God in reference to the whole world, and accordingly it is not a progressive ethical self-activity of men in changing the direction of their will. 2. The divine act of world-atonement is mediated through Christ in so far as God made him the bearer of the guilt of sin, and so destroyed it in his representative death; accordingly it consists not in an ethical change of the direction of the human will, but in the divine compensation and setting aside of the guilt which separates man from God. 3. Therefore, the non-imputation of transgressions or the forgiveness of sin is the consequence of the atonement, and the latter is not, inversely, the consequence of the former. The discussion of these and related points gives to the essay great exegetical importance.

Since the school of Ritschl enjoys the reputation of compensating for its poorly-concealed dogmatic heresies by emphasizing the ethical side of Christianity, Dr. Pfeiderer thinks it important to examine the relation which morality and religion hold to each other in this theological system. Upon this inquiry, then, he enters in his third essay, which is entitled, "The Religio-philosophical Basis of the Ritschlian Theology." He finds supported by the representatives of the school the doctrine that there exists between morals and religion no inner and necessary connection, but only an external relation so far as the one sometimes supplements the other, without being radically grounded upon it. He is of the opinion that this denial of the inner essential connection of morals and religion corresponds neither to the spirit of the Bible, nor to that of the Reformation, nor to the needs of Christianity at the present time. Rothe, he thinks, was undoubtedly right in maintaining that the whole development of the Christian and, in particular, of the Protestant Church and theology has this for its object, that the religious and the moral come ever into more intimate reciprocal relations, religion being filled with morality and morality grounded upon religion, — a result which presupposes the principle that both have their ground in the essential union of God and man. The separation of the two has the result that religion is regarded only as an institution for securing salvation without any effect upon the ethical life, and morality as a worldly-eudemonistic culture without any religious binding of the conscience. We regret that our limits do not allow us to discuss more fully this great little book.

ORELLO CONE.

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The Origin and Growth of the Conception of God as Illustrated by Anthropology and History. By Count GOBLET D'ALVIELLA, Professor of the History of Religions at the University of Brussels. Pp. xvi., 296. London : Williams & Norgate. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons.

The eleven courses of Hibbert Lectures delivered previous to 1891 have severally dealt with some particular phase or section of the history of religion. Count Goblet d'Alviella takes the whole of this history for his province; for nothing less is implied in an attempt to trace the idea of God from its earliest origins to its present stage of evolution. The work has been done as well as was possible in so brief a compass, and if the author shows little originality, he deserves the praise of having presented the most important results of modern research in an eminently readable, compact and trustworthy form. In discussing the origin of religion M. Goblet d'Alviella discards the fancies of some contemporary mythologers and resumes the sound tradition of eighteenth century philosophy. The first gods were personified natural phenomena. To those who argue that primitive men could not possibly have confounded inanimate with animated objects the one sufficient answer is that unfor-

unately for theory they *did* confound them, as the savages who represent them still do to the present day.

In idle moments we may see
A noble spirit in a hill,
A human strength about a tree,

and but for civilization we should see them, not without concern, in our busy moments, too. It remains true, indeed, that the worship of ancestral spirits, though credited with far too great importance by Herbert Spencer, has done much to vitalize and consolidate the belief in nature-gods.

The rise of the great polytheisms can only be understood as a process by which the celestial hierarchy was organized on the model of human society. The same method explains the progressive moralization of theology. "At first," as the author truly observes, "ethics and religion were absolutely independent of each other" (p. 177). But when the gods were constantly called on to act as referees in agreements or in quarrels between men, their will became first associated, and finally identified, with the idea of absolute justice. According to our author the spectacle of the cosmic order powerfully contributed to the notion of an equally inviolable moral order. But has he not inverted the true order of antecedence? Unless I am much mistaken, the idea of a cosmic order as such was inspired by reflection on the moral order of society. Metaphysical speculation, working on the materials supplied by physical religion, leads to monotheism, which in Egypt was developed by the aggregation of unlike deities into a composite whole, and among the Semites by the final identification of various deities who had always been almost indistinguishable. The ethical import of monotheism is incidentally and briefly treated under the head of "Sacrifice" (p. 255). In one way the idea of divine rectitude must rise with the idea of divine power, since the Lord of the whole earth cannot well be bribed to favor sinners by offerings of which he has no need — a point of view well brought out by the Hebrew prophets. Thus man's voluntary obedience and self-surrender becomes the only acceptable sacrifice. Unfortunately, self-renunciation may take the form of offering one's first-born as a holocaust to the god, as in Moloch-worship, or of senseless asceticism as in monastic Christianity and some Oriental religions. Among ourselves coöperation with "the Power that makes for righteousness" is coming to be considered as the worthiest form of worship. As to the future of religion, Count d'Alviella's views seem substantially identical with those set forth by Mrs. Humphry Ward in the June number of the "New World."

The lectures, originally composed in French, have been translated into English by Mr. Wicksteed, not only, as their author tells us, "with patience and accuracy," but also with admirable spirit and elegance. It is regrettable that the valuable series of which they form a part should be issued at what many persons must find a prohibitive price.

ALFRED W. BENN,

FLORENCE, ITALY.

VOL. I. — NO. 4.

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Hand-Commentar zum neuen Testament. Bearbeitet von Professor Dr. J. H. HOLTZMANN in Strassburg, Geh. Kirchenrath Professor Dr. R. A. LIPSIVS in Jena, Professor Lic. P. W. SCHMIDEL in Jena, Prediger Dr. H. v. SODEN in Berlin. 4 Bände. Freiburg i. B.; J. C. B. Mohr.

The name of Holtzmann at the head of the list of the writers of this commentary on the New Testament may be understood as indicating his general direction of the work, and is a guaranty of its high character for accuracy and learning. In the department of New Testament criticism and exegesis he is one of the foremost scholars in Germany, and is the author of important works, among which may be mentioned "Die Synoptischen Evangelien," 1863, "Epheser und Kolosserbriefe," 1872, "Die Pastoralbriefe," 1880, and "Einleitung in das N. T.," third edition, 1892. His contribution to the commentary comprises two volumes, or about half the entire work, dealing with the first three Gospels and the Acts, and the so-called Johannine writings — the fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse. Dr. Lipsius furnishes the commentary on Galatians, Romans and Philippians, Schmiedel that on Thessalonians and Corinthians, and Dr. Von Soden treats of the remaining Epistles.

The Hand-Commentar proceeds upon the historico-critical method, according to which the New Testament writings are regarded and treated as literary productions of their age, dealing with the central theme, the gospel of Jesus, from the points of view of the several writers, whose antecedents, education and intellectual environment determined to a considerable degree the character and contents of their works. The treatment accordingly aims to be scientific, and may be regarded as such, so far as the conclusions reached are not in general determined by dogmatic prepossessions and a harmonizing interest by which many similar works are impaired. The character of the commentary must be judged with reference to the object proposed, and this being to present "the results of scientific work in the investigation of the New Testament in a continuous, precise, readable, and manageable" form, the performance must be pronounced eminently successful. Compactness and brevity are an advantage in such a work only when difficulties are not lightly passed over, and important matters inadequately discussed. For the sake of brevity the synoptics are not treated separately but together, and this portion of the commentary is condensed into some three hundred pages, inclusive of an elaborate discussion of the Synoptic Problem. To Schürer's criticism that in treating the introduction to the synoptic question some details might have been omitted in order to present the matter in a form which would facilitate the comprehension of it for a beginner, it may be answered that the work is not intended for beginners, and that the understanding and advantageous use of it are possible only to one who is considerably advanced in exegetical study.

Holtzmann's conclusions regarding the composition of the synoptics are substantially those stated in detail in his "Einleitung." The begin-

ning of the Gospel-literature was the Aramaic logia-collection of Matthew. After Mark had composed the first connected historical account of the life of Jesus, an attempt to combine the two resulted in our Greek first Gospel, which is properly designated "according to Matthew," since it is the addition of the material of Matthew's logia which distinguishes it from the common synoptic narrative. Finally, in the interest of adapting the biography of Jesus to gentile Christians, our third Gospel was written with the use of all the available literature. Since the author of this demonstrably employed a journal of Luke, a companion and disciple of Paul, in the composition of his second work, the Acts, and since it is possible that the same Luke is responsible for much that is peculiar in the former writing, the designation "according to Luke" does not appear to be groundless, particularly in view of its conceded Pauline character. This view in its general features is in accord with the prevailing tendency of the criticism of the synoptics in Germany, and perhaps no one has contributed more than Holtzmann to establish it. Its present ascendancy is conceded by Hilgenfeld, who has always opposed it, in a recent elaborate critique of it in his "*Zeitschrift*," although he thinks it is no more likely ultimately to prevail than bi-metalism to take the place of a gold standard.¹

The modifications of Baur's tendency-theory effected in the present critical school of Germany are perhaps nowhere more apparent than in its conclusions regarding the book of Acts. The doctrine of the author's mediating attitude between the Pauline and Jewish-Christian parties is now generally abandoned, and he is regarded as a representative of the later gentile Christianity to which the oppositions of the apostolic age were of small importance. According to Holtzmann "the critical school maintains in principle nothing else than that the point of view of post-apostolic gentile Christianity was decisive for the picture of original Christianity sketched in the Acts," or as Wendt says, that it must have been, in the thought of the author of the book, "the original apostles who undertook the universal extension of the Christian gospel" (*Zeitschr. für Theol. u. Kirche*, 1891, p. 184). It is gratifying to read Holtzmann's judgment that "more than in the case of any other of the contested books of the New Testament an agreement in reference to Acts appears possible and near at hand."

In his discussion of the fourth Gospel, Holtzmann ranges himself, as in his "Einleitung," unreservedly on the side of those critics who deny its Johannine authorship. The elaborate introduction to the Gospel, which embraces all the contested points, scarcely omitting the minutest detail, shows his conclusion to be grounded rather on the internal character of the writing than on the external evidences. This remarkable work, which is characterized by Pfeiderer as "a didactic writing in the

¹ Die synoptische zwei-Quellen Theorie in neuester Fassung, *Zeitschrift für wiss. Theol.*, Jahrg. 36, i.

form of a Gospel," is regarded as showing not only in its historical deviations from the synoptics, but in almost its entire contents, the impress of second-century ideas and environment. "The history of Jesus as here related becomes a type in the sense that it is throughout brought into relation to the succeeding history of Christianity, in particular to that of the time of the evangelist himself, transported, so to speak, from the past into the present." "In general, the entire world of thought represented in the Gospel corresponds to an advanced development of the Church and its theology." This corresponds with Weizsäcker's judgment that "the Johannine Christ has no attitude toward the law, which does not exist for him, since it no longer existed for the writer, as in the earlier times" (Apost. Zeitalter, p. 540). The Johannine Epistles are regarded, with Pfeiderer, as the productions of the age of the Gnostic controversies, and the Apocalypse, which is discussed in an admirable introduction, as not the work of the apostle, while the question of its composite character is left undecided.

The commentary of Lipsius on Galatians, Romans and Philippians is in vigor, clearness and learning worthy of his reputation. In the introduction, which is remarkable for its compactness and comprehensiveness, the conclusion is reached that the church at Rome was composed of Jews and Gentiles, and that while the latter may have been in the majority, the Epistle was mainly addressed to the former. He maintains the genuineness of Philippians along with such representatives of the critical school as Pfeiderer, Hilgenfeld, Holtzmann, Weizsäcker and others, against Baur, Schweigler, Planck, Köstlin, Holsten, Hitzig and the Dutch scholars, Hoekstra and Straatman. In his exegesis he shows the highest judicial qualities, and his work is not prejudiced by any tendency toward the Ritschlian rationalizing of the thought of the apostle in order to bring it into accord with the tenets of the modern New Theology. On Gal. iii. 13, "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us," he remarks that the *ἐξαγοράζειν* occurs through payment of a ransom [λύτρον]. This ransom is Christ's death, suffered on the cross, by which he became a curse for us, that is, took upon himself representatively the curse with which we were burdened. Thus the law is satisfied on the one hand, and on the other is annulled for believers, who are crucified with Christ (Rom. ii. 19, cf. vi. 14), for the law has dominion over a man only so long as he lives (Rom. vii. 1). In Rom. ix. 5, the words, *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς εὐλογητός*, are not referred to Christ.

Schmiedel, in his commentary on the Epistles to the Corinthians and the Thessalonians, maintains the high standard established by his collaborators. Points of great importance are treated in dissertations [*Excurses*], short and long, in which are discussed such themes as *σάρξ*, *σῶμα*, charisms, speaking with tongues, Christology, etc. The first Epistle to the Thessalonians is regarded as genuine, the second as spurious.

Opposing the majority of the critical school, including Holtzmann, and retracting some of his own earlier opinions, Von Soden undertakes to defend the Pauline authorship of the entire Epistle to the Colossians. Ephesians he ascribes to a liberal Jewish Christian of the Dispersion, who wrote it toward the end of the first century. He decides that the Pastoral Epistles were written at the earliest in the first decade of the second century, and does not find in them traces of the controversy with Gnosticism. Both as to the date and the object of these Epistles, he is in disagreement with the older Tübingen critics, and with many of the most prominent representatives of the critical school of the present day, such as Hilgenfeld, Hausrath, Weizsäcker, Harnack, Holtzmann and Pfeiderer. In dating 1 Peter so early as 92-96, and ascribing it to Sylvanus, Von Soden assumes a position which Schürer characterizes as "more than hazardous," and takes issue with two of his collaborators, Holtzmann and Schmiedel, besides many other critical authorities, who date it at the beginning of the second century amid the persecutions under Trajan. The Epistle of James is not regarded as representing the Jewish-Christian point of view, and is dated in the early years of the second century, perhaps as late as 130.

The New Testament text adopted here is that of Tischendorf in Von Gebhardt's edition. Looking through this extensive work of about 1800 closely printed lexicon-octavo pages, one cannot but admire the industry and learning which have accumulated and marshaled so great a mass of isagogical and exegetical material. The publication of such a work, together with the fact that a second edition of some of the volumes has been speedily demanded, indicates that the interest in the historical and critical study of the New Testament, to which the Tübingen school gave a powerful impulse more than fifty years ago, is not by any means declining.

ORELLO CONE.

BUCKETT COLLEGE.

Aids to the Devout Study of Criticism. By the Rev. T. K. CHEYNE, M. A., D. D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture in the University of Oxford; Canon of Rochester. New York: Thomas Whitaker. 1892. Pp. viii, 397. \$2.50.

This book consists of two parts, devoted to the "David-Narratives" and the "Book of Psalms." Both of these headings are, however, too comprehensive. Only selections from either class are treated. The whole presents the substance of sundry courses of cathedral sermons, somewhat recast in form and enlarged by "the addition of much interwoven illustrative matter." "All the Psalm studies," the author states in a note on page vi., "except those on Ps. li., were originally published in 'The Expositor.' The critical matter, however, and the introductory notes, etc., are new." From these statements it will readily be inferred

that we have before us a production of somewhat heterogeneous character. This fact on the one hand, and the respect due to an author of well-merited fame on the other, make it difficult to express in few words a definite opinion of his performance that shall be just both to him and to the readers of this periodical. With regard to the contents of the book, it is enough to say that so far as critical material is concerned, while there is much that is valuable, especially in the notes and their references, there is little that cannot be found in works not likely to be wanting on the shelves of any one moderately interested in the more recent phases of Old Testament criticism and exegesis, except Kautzsch's analysis of the books of Samuel and Dr. Cheyne's comments upon it in Chapter I. What may be called the homiletical contents of the volume, that is, its directly religious and ethical thought, — its application to modern life of old-time events, relations and experiences, — is always devout, but seldom very fresh or striking. The book, however, must be judged mainly with reference to its purpose. This is somewhat inaccurately set forth in its title, and a little more clearly in the short preface. It appears to be to point out, both to private students and to "those who take part in the 'higher religious education,'" how religious nourishment and stimulus are to be derived from the Scriptures, especially those of the Old Testament, when studied in the light of the higher criticism. This aim is not merely good and laudable, but presupposes a need which actually exists and must somehow be met. The question is whether this book indicates the true way of meeting it. I cannot think that it does. Dr. Cheyne, adherent though he be of the orthodox faith of the Church of England, and thoroughly imbued with its best reformed, Bible-loving spirit, seems not to see, or rather does not put or imply, the practical problem as it really lies. From his mode of solving it, one would infer that it might be formulated thus: If this narrative is not historically true, or if this psalm be not the product of infallible inspiration, how can it serve for edification? By way of answer he takes some of the David-narratives and shows that after criticism has done its best (or its worst, as you please), the David that remains still commands our affection and reverence. But this may be said, with at least equal truth, concerning Alfred of England, after criticism has destroyed many attractive stories once believed about him. In two chapters devoted to "David and Goliath," our author, after showing that the whole story is historically untenable, proceeds to treat it as poetry, — "that poetry which is idealized history," — and unfolds its wealth of spiritual truth and life. But might not many parts of the story of Odysseus, as sung by the Homeric muse, be turned to edification in the same way? As to the psalms, whatever the nature of the inspiration that produced them, who will doubt their value that has felt the power of his hymn-book? The real problem is not concerned about the homiletical availability of the Old Testament, but with the ultimate basis for a reasonable religious

faith. We all know what allegorizing interpretation can do; what we wish to learn is the bearing of the higher criticism on religious certitude. It is the profoundly disquieting apprehension, felt by thousands in every Christian communion, that criticism is tending to destroy the foundations of life and hope in God, that needs to be met, and which the title of this book seems to promise to meet. Now, no doubt, Dr. Cheyne's chapters may relieve the fears of predominantly impulsive, sympathetic minds, but people who *think*, clearly and connectedly, who can rest in no conclusion which they cannot trace to firmly-held, reasonable premises, will find little help in them. The needed principles are there, indeed, but in undeveloped, incidental form, not to be seized and combined by one not already familiar with the subject. Take it all in all, the volume contains more that was worth preaching than it offers to justify printing.

P. H. STEENSTRA.

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Old Testament Theology; or, The History of Hebrew Religion from the year 800 B. C. By ARCHIBALD DUFF, M. A., LL.D., Professor of Old Testament Theology in the Yorkshire United Independent College, Bradford. From 800 B. C. to Josiah, 640 B. C. Pp. xvi, 343. London and Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black. 10s. 6d.

In his preface Professor Duff expresses the hope that this volume may be followed by the exposition of the periods following the seventh century, and in this connection he says it is the aim of the work "to give the story of the Faith of the Hebrews; but this is to be watched as it appears in the course of the Biblical and other Hebrew religious records. The whole work will thus be at once a History of Hebrew Religion, and a Guide for the Christian teacher in the use of the Bible." His conception of his task, and to some extent his point of view are stated by the author in the opening pages: "We are to study something more precious than the history of documents and scribes, or of wars and kings, for we have to ask, 'What is God?' . . . 'What was the ever-living Word of God before He became flesh in Bethlehem?'"

Book I. of this volume is entitled "Introductory Studies — The Pentateuch and the Student." The problem the author takes to be a theological one: "What was the preëxistent Christ in Israel?" The Pentateuch, however, discovers such "remarkable art in its construction," that "the criticism of it is no task for beginners . . . and the wondrous old fabric, pricelessly precious, forbids in venerable solemnity the rude touch of the ignorant. . . . Study of the Pentateuch demands preliminary knowledge independently gained of the main course of the history of the Hebrew people's religious life. . . . We can learn thus whether it must be placed as a whole before the beginning of the story already gained from independent sources, or whether it falls in as a whole at any one point in the course of that story." Dr. Duff does not mean to give anything critically

exhaustive in this discussion of the Pentateuch, but he says some helpful words respecting the way to determine a place for the Pentateuch in the field of Hebrew history. The historical method is highly commended. The "unhistoric method has closed the Bible, and must keep it closed. . . . The mind of Christ confirms the historical method, demands the historical method, and condemns the unhistorical as wrong." Some readers will question, however, whether the author might not have been more helpful in his discussion of the Pentateuch, both to students and to the general reader, if he had presented a little more fully this historical side of the question instead of expressing himself in the following vein: we learn "the opinion of the present Christ on every question now from the thoughtful voice of his present Body, wherein He is made flesh to-day. . . . The mind of our Lord Jesus Christ, concerning especially the Pentateuch, is to be learned in the thoughtful mind of Christians now."

After this brief preliminary study of the Pentateuch Professor Duff begins his history with the eighth century, taking as "the earliest of the virtually uncontroverted monuments of Hebrew religion" the book of Amos. The general method is to present first an analysis of the book studied, and the personal characteristics of the prophet himself; then to give the religious background of the prophecy, so as to study, finally, the prophet's thoughts on the various concerns of God and man, noting what there may be of advance and the problems left unsolved.

The religious antecedent of the age of Amos the author finds in the "David-revelation" to the effect that "Jehovah is supreme Lord over all other gods, powers and nations." The growth of this idea is traced from the wide empire Dr. Duff accords to David, "the first forerunner of the imperial Cæsar; he may also be called the first world-monarch of later well-known history." The revelation which the prophets "saw in David gave them life for their own times, just as the revelation which we see in Jesus gives us life amid the needs of to-day." The next stage of insight into the character of God the author calls the "Amos-revelation." "It comes amid wrestlings, thoroughly human, in company with God, wrestling with God, wrestling with man, wrestling in argument;" it is "breadth and keenness of conscience." The characteristic of Amos's oracles "is demand for larger righteousness; and to this task Amos rose through his sense of the overlordship of Israel's God." The final gospel of this prophet is, "If ye would find God and live, seek good, for there is his abode"; but just what this good is, Amos left unsaid. He did not tell whether God could or would do anything to convert the sinner into a seeker after the good, but left standing the oracle, "All who sin shall die." He disturbed the unconscious sleep of the individual without waking him to a clear vision of personal religion.

Turning to Hosea, Professor Duff says, "In technical phrase we begin the system of his theology by the scheme of his anthropology." "Righteousness will always be if men have only, first a clear mind, and secondly,

true instruction." This, then, is an advance upon Amos in its suggesting a method for changing men from bad to good ; and if it is still hard to know how God can dwell with evil, the answer is, "He is God and not man ;" thus "the story of faith in atonement has begun." But Hosea has himself left questions unsolved. Men are not regenerated by affliction. It is not the rod, it is the Saviour they learn to love. "And ignorance is not the cause of all sin. Rather to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." So "Hosea's lines of advance from the faiths of Amos" are "eager hopes rather than clear possessions." In the chapters on Isaiah, after a presentation of the course of the development of the prophet's thought, as manifested in his relation to Zion, and an analysis of his oracles in chronological order followed by a systematic sketch of the genesis of his faiths, Dr. Duff comes to a consideration of the prophet's place in Hebrew religious history. "Isaiah rose from the despair of Amos, above the despairing hope of Hosea, to faith in Jehovah's cleansing of his own unclean lips and life, and then to like faith that this God could love the worst men in Zion and would save them. . . . He can regenerate souls. . . . He can forgive. . . . Isaiah denies entirely Amos's theory that evil men are worthless, but he denies also Hosea's theory that they are naturally good." With respect to the new world of life that was looked for, the way of its attainment with Amos was death, with Hosea, slavery, "with Isaiah it was creation." Isaiah "stands in his place in history casting a flood of light around him, backwards from him on the past, and forwards on the seers who were to see still more than he."

This claim of progress, development from one prophet to another in the thought of God and of man, is a very prominent feature of this book, and it adds a great charm to the religious story. Despite, however, the interest of the reader, increasing from page to page, he will find himself asking whether there was really the great progress which the author sympathetically portrays. Some readers will hesitate, too, about the significance attached to "Torath-Mosheh" taken to mean "the divine instruction concerning deliverance," and to "Elohim," meaning "far-reaching" ones. But whatever may be said of some such debatable points and of the author's general view of religious phenomena, the book is written with a profoundly sympathetic touch ; it is full of incentive to the reader ; and, in its acceptance of the results of modern criticism, will help to make a new era in the treatment of Old Testament theology by English writers. Dr. Duff says that perhaps he preaches too much here. This is probably the case, and the work would be more available as a text-book if a good deal of this element had been omitted. Nevertheless, the preacher who feels that historical criticism has robbed him of Old Testament texts will find abundant comfort in these pages of Dr. Duff, with their historical background.

GEORGE R. FREEMAN.

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL.

The Canon of the Old Testament. An Essay on the Gradual Growth and Formation of the Hebrew Canon of Scripture. By HERBERT EDWARD RYLE, B. D., Hulsean Professor of Divinity, Professorial Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and Examining Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of Ripon. Pp. xx, 304. London and New York : Macmillan & Co.

Professor Ryle in his preface, after saying that he has used the results of modern criticism, adds : " There is no need, in the present day, to 'apologize' for such use of Biblical criticism. There are, no doubt, some who would still include all Biblical critics under the same sweeping charge of repudiating Revelation and denying the Inspiration of Scripture. But they thus show so plainly either their want of acquaintance with the literature of Christian criticism or their disinclination to distinguish between the work of Christian scholars and that of avowed antagonists to religion, that the complete misapprehension under which they labor is not likely to be widely shared, and only calls for the sincere expression of a charitable regret. The Church is demanding a courageous restatement of those facts upon which modern historical criticism has thrown new light. . . . But we shall at least, I trust, endeavor to make use of the gift with which God has enriched our age, the gift of historical criticism, to the very utmost of our power, so that the Church may be found worthy of the responsibility which the possession of such a gift entails." I quote these words because they not only indicate the author's point of view, but also illustrate the struggle now going on in the English Church, — a struggle in which Professor Ryle is taking an active part.

The present work recognizes the fact that the growth, not merely of the existing canon, but also of the conception of a canon, was a gradual one, and the first chapter, on the preparation for a canon, which gives a brief sketch of the development of the old Hebrew literature, is one of the most important parts of the book. It is a clear statement of the progress of the thought, and it also explains the method by which ancient Hebrew books were preserved and transmitted to succeeding generations. Two or three statements in this chapter appear doubtful : the Septuagint's omission of David's name in Amos vi. 5 may make one hesitate to cite this verse (p. 22) as proof that David was then regarded as a musician ; the difference between the two versions of the decalogue in Ex. xx. and Dent. v. can hardly be said to be of " quite inconsiderable importance " (p. 23), since it involves a difference in the conception of the ground of Sabbath-observance that points to widely separated periods ; and there is great critical difficulty in the view that, at the call of Abraham, the ceremonial system " received the quickening impulse of a new spiritual life " (p. 27). But these points affect very slightly the value of the historical sketch.

Professor Ryle properly represents the canonical movement as beginning in the seventh century, when the book of Deuteronomy was pro-

duced, and gathering force during and after the exile, till it took distinct shape in the canonization of the Pentateuch under Ezra and Nehemiah. Why the final step was delayed till then seems clear: the people had not reached that stage of thought in which it felt the need of a written religious constitution. The prophets were still active down to the fifth century. When the prophetic impulse had gained its end and expended itself, the nation settled into an organized life of reflection, and demanded a tangible and permanent guide which might be known to and consulted by all. Such a guide must be a divinely given book, and this constituted a canon.

The testimony respecting the collection of the Prophetic canon (third century) and the Hagiographa (second century) is carefully examined by the author, as well as the content of the Alexandrian canon (Septuagint), and the history and work of the Synod of Jamnia, which, about the close of the first century of our era, undertook to make a final settlement of the canon, and especially to decide on the claims of the disputed books. The work closes with chapters on the Hebrew canon in the Christian church, and the arrangement of the Old Testament books. In the excursus, citations are made from original Jewish sources bearing on the history of the canon. Professor Ryle is satisfactorily cautious and judicious. On certain points, as, for example, the estimation in which the Jewish apocryphal books were held by the writers of the New Testament and by the Jews generally, his statements might be modified; and in such a discussion it is desirable to give in full the history of those books that never secured a place in the Palestinian canon. But the presentation, as a whole, is a valuable addition to the literature of the subject; Professor Ryle has given us, what we did not have before, a good manual of the Old Testament Canon.

C. H. TOY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A Concordance to the Septuagint and the other Greek versions of the Old Testament (including the Apocryphal books). By the late EDWIN HATCH, M. A., D. D., and HENRY A. REDPATH, M. A., assisted by other scholars. Part I. Α-ΩΠΙΘ. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press; New York, Macmillan & Co.; 1892. Folio, pp. vi, 232.

This first instalment of a new critical Septuagint-Concordance is a welcome indication and product of the increasing interest in the Greek text of the Old Testament. The Concordance of Trommius is a notable monument of learning and industry, surpassing Kircher, as far as concerns consulting the Septuagint, as light surpasses darkness. But since the time of Trommius (nearly two centuries ago) many additions have been made to our resources for fixing and explaining the Greek text. New manuscripts have been brought to light, an accurate copy of the Vatican manuscript has been obtained, and, above all, a more systematic

study of the text has been entered on. The investigations of Lagarde and others have begun to accomplish for the Old Testament what has been done for the New Testament by Lachmann, Tregelles, Hort and their coadjutors. The Apocryphal books have been worked up more thoroughly, and Field's edition of the Hexapla has superseded that of Montfaucon which Trommius used. Cornill's recent study of the Hebrew text of Ezekiel shows the enlargement of the Greek critical material; there we find something like a scientific grouping of the manuscripts, and an attempt to introduce the reign of law into the estimation of various readings; the book shows in this respect a great advance on its predecessors. Septuagint-criticism has itself become a science covering a wide field. It is more distinctly recognized that the Septuagint does not always follow our present Hebrew text, and that therefore the Hebrew equivalent of a given Septuagint word is not necessarily the corresponding word in the Masoretic text. All this makes it possible to construct a better concordance now than was possible two hundred years ago; but it also makes the task harder, since it calls for more research, and requires greater nicety of judgment.

Dr. Hatch's long years of study eminently fitted him for such an undertaking. He did not live to complete it or to publish any part of it; the first fasciculus is brought out by Mr. Redpath, who is now charged with the conduct of the enterprise. "The design and plan of the present work," we learn from the preface, "are wholly due to Dr. Hatch. For some few years before his lamented death he had gathered round him a small band of scholars, of whom the present editor was one, to prepare material for it under his direction. At the time of his death nearly half was in manuscript, though to a great extent unrevised. A few sheets were actually in print, and at the request of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press the present editor undertook the revision of what actually existed, and the completion of the work." The competency of the editor is evident from this first fasciculus, which is admirably full and exact; the *addenda et corrigenda* (hardly to be avoided in a work of such minute detail) fill one page; the excellence of the mechanical execution is what was to be expected from the Clarendon Press. This first part, containing two hundred and thirty-two pages of three columns each, makes about one sixth or one seventh of the whole work.

Dr. Hatch probably followed Trommius in a general way, though of course with many modifications and additions. If we compare the two works, we find that, in the arrangement of the material, while Trommius prints the head-words in the same sort of type with the citations, and divides the articles by horizontal lines, Hatch's head-words are in bolder letters and heavily underscored, the articles not being otherwise divided; the deep black and the underscore are improvements, but it would perhaps have been better to use the dividing line also. A great advantage in this work is that it gives all the occurrences of one word in one article,

while Trommius sometimes scatters the material over various articles, to the reader's great loss of time. Hatch has a number of words (though rarely an important word) not found in the older Concordance, and his citations are more numerous, especially in particles, and from the Apocrypha and the Hexapla; these last are often of value for the Hebrew text, and bear also on the history of the Septuagint. In the present work we have also a greater number of various readings, the number of accessible manuscripts being now so much larger than it was a couple of centuries ago. As far as regards the Hebrew words to which Septuagint readings are held to correspond, the numbers of such Hebrew correspondents seem not to differ materially in the two works; but Hatch has here and there corrected inaccuracies in Trommius. There is a difference in the mode of denoting the Hebrew text-word: Trommius arranges under each Hebrew form (in each article) the passages in which it is supposed to be rendered by the Greek; Hatch prints at the head of each article all the Hebrew equivalents, numbered in order, and adds to each citation its appropriate number; this is done to save space, but it diminishes very little the convenience of reference—the eye easily glances from any passage to the head of the article, and this method has the additional advantage that it makes possible a continuous arrangement of passages in the order of the books throughout the article, whereas the other plan requires a separate arrangement of passages under each Hebrew equivalent; it is convenient to have all the citations from one book together, especially in order to study the phraseology of a given book. An illustration of this is found in Ezek. xxxvii. 23, where, answering to the impossible Hebrew *mosheba*, “dwelling-place,” we have the Greek *anomia*, “lawlessness”; most recent editors correct the Hebrew into *meshuba*, “backsliding,” which has the recommendation of requiring an insignificant change (or perhaps no change at all) in the Hebrew consonants; but when we observe that *meshuba* does not occur elsewhere in Ezekiel, while the Concordance exhibits a long line of occurrences of *toiba*, “abomination” as the equivalent of *anomia*, we may reasonably be led to prefer this word in spite of the fact that its resemblance to the Masoretic text-word is not so great as that of *meshuba*. Here Hatch marks the passage with an obelisk to indicate that the Hebrew equivalent is uncertain.

There is often, in fact, great difficulty in deciding what Hebrew words the Greek translators had before them. Here I find, in the brief comparison that I have been able to make between the two books, that Hatch has in some cases clearly improved on Trommius: in Dan. ix. 16, where the latter says there is nothing in the Hebrew for the Greek “we have sinned,” the former gives the noun “sin” in the Theodotion text (though here the verb should have been given). In Ezek. xxxvi. 5 Trommius gives the noun *migrash*, and Hatch the verb-stem *garash*, which is better; but both are probably wrong. In Ezek. xxxv. 6 we

have a case in which the Greek ("thou hast sinned") is a rendering of no word in the Masoretic text; it certainly does not represent "make" (*ásah*) which both Trommius and Hatch give; it stands in the place of the unintelligible "hast hated" of the Hebrew, which must be changed to some word meaning "to sin" (*asham* or *hata*, preferably the latter, according to Ezekiel's usage).

The hearty thanks of all Biblical students are due to Dr. Hatch for his organization of this great undertaking, and to Mr. Redpath for the care with which he is carrying on the work, the labor of which is enormous. The editor says that he will be grateful for notices of omissions or errata, so that they may be set right, if possible, in the future.

C. H. TOY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

Les Bibles, et les Initiateurs Religieux de l'Humanité. Par LOUIS LEBLOIS (de Strasbourg). Paris, Librairie Abel Pilon : H. Le Vasseur et Cie., Editeurs. 1883-1888. Seven volumes, large octavo.

As the title indicates, this work covers a very large area; it is a sort of encyclopædia of the great religions of the world, and especially of the history of Christianity. It has, however, the special aim of exhibiting the natural course of development of religious thought in the world. The author, brought up in the traditional views respecting the Bible, came through his study and experience to hold other ideas, and his object is to disseminate the information and to put within reach of all the enlightenment which have come to him. Traversing so vast a field, the work cannot be expected to go into minute detail, nor does the author claim to be himself an authority in the matters of which he treats; he draws, however, on accredited specialists in all the departments of his subject. He has produced a useful book, attractive in style, provided with numerous illustrations, and full of information which it is desirable to have in compact form. Though he has not in all cases consulted the latest authorities, he has given a fairly good résumé of modern researches on the great religions of the world. The value of the book is increased by supplements and notes at the end of each part, in which there are numerous citations from ancient and modern authors, and a very full indication of the sources of the facts. It is impossible here to give more than a general outline of the work.

The First Book is devoted to the History of the Christian Church. It describes the traditional method of moral and religious education, and the principal phases through which the Church has passed up to the present time, particularly the harmony between the Church and science in the Middle Age, and the conflict between the Church-tradition and experimental science after the time of Columbus and Copernicus. The Second Book gives an account of the discovery of the Sacred Books of the East, — Chinese, Persian, Egyptian, Phœnician, Babylonian, Brahmanic and

Buddhist. In the Third Book we have extracts from the various Sacred Writings, and in the Fourth Book an account of the origin of these pagan writings. The Fifth Book deals with the Koran, the Hebrew Bible, and the Talmud; and the Sixth Book with the New Testament.

The industry of the author is enormous; there are few points in the history of the great religions he does not touch on. Such a general view, here presented with French lucidity, may be of service even to the specialist. To the non-specialist the caution must be given that many conclusions here stated are still under discussion, and that, especially in regard to the date of Biblical Books, one should always be careful to consult standard authorities.

C. H. TOY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

Geschiedenis van den Godsdienst in de Oudheid tot op Alexander den Groote. Door C. P. TIELE. 1ste Deel, 1ste Helft. (The history of Religion in Antiquity to the time of Alexander the Great.) Amsterdam: P. N. Van Kampen & Zoon. 1891.

Dr. Tiele's well-known work on comparative theology, the "Outline of the History of Religion to the Spread of the Universal Religions," which was presented to English readers in a translation by Professor J. Estlin Carpenter, is now being entirely rewritten and greatly enlarged by its author. His plan is to preserve, as far as possible, the chronological order; therefore a first Part is to contain a study of the ancient Egyptian, Babylonian and West Asian Semitic religions. A second Part is to treat of the religions of Ancient India and Persia, and a third of the religions of Asia Minor, Greece and Rome. Since the aim of the author is to trace the course of the development of religion in antiquity, he excludes those national religions, the influence of which was, from any concurrence of causes, confined to their own territory, and formed no determining factor in the evolution of ancient religion. He thus passes by the East Asiatic religions, such as those of China and Japan; he also omits the cults of the barbarous and semi-barbarous races of Armenia, Polynesia, Northern Europe and Asia, as having no real history, and belonging, therefore, within the proper domain of universal hieroglyphy.

The present volume is the first half of the first Part, and treats only of the religions of Egypt and Mesopotamia. It is virtually a condensed reproduction of the author's former work, "Comparative History of the Egyptian and Mesopotamian Religions," made accessible to English readers by a translation published by Trübner & Co. in 1882. Dr. Tiele's merits are well known; complete mastery of material, rigorous method, precision and compactness of statement mark this book, as they have distinguished his other productions. The treatment of Egyptian religion begins with a survey of the sources, a description of the land, and a history, so far as this affects the religious problems. After describing the

Old or Memphitic Empire, the middle or first Thebaic Empire, the new or second Thebaic Empire, and the Sahidic period, Professor Tiele divides the Mesopotamian period into four sections, which treat of the time before the domination of Ur; religion in the empire of Ur and the Old-Babylonian Empire; religion in the Assyrian period; and religion in the New-Babylonian Empire. The concluding portions contain general characterizations and estimates of each religion. These are especially valuable, since the author takes the true scientific standpoint, that each religion is to be judged according to the place it occupied and the part it played in the development of ancient religion, rather than by comparing it with our own standards of the true or absolute religion.

Our Dutch neighbors have long been justly famous for their contributions to comparative philology; they are fast achieving a like success in the new science of comparative theology.

H. P. FORBES.

ST. LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY, CANTON, N. Y.

Levensbericht van Abraham Kuenen. Door C. P. TIELE. Amsterdam : Johannes Muller. 1892.

The readers of "The New World" have had, in its first number, a full and discriminating account of the life, chief writings and critical conclusions of the lamented Dr. Kuenen. Only brief notice will be needed of this sketch by his friend and collaborer, Dr. Tiele, as reprinted from the Yearbook of the Royal Academy of Sciences, of which Dr. Kuenen was the president. There is little contribution of new biographical material, but long years of friendship qualified Dr. Tiele to pass behind the disguises which attend casual intercourse, and portray the innermost personality of his friend. The tone of the memorial is therefore warm and tender, but there is no lavish panegyric. Dr. Kuenen's qualities as a preacher are duly praised; his sermons were thoroughly thought out, rich in ideas, and careful in expression; but we are told that he was too quiet in manner and too formally logical in statement to be a popular orator, that his sermons cost him much effort, and that, after the members of the theological faculty were released in 1877 from the obligation of serving as university preachers, Dr. Kuenen ascended the pulpit but once, as a kindness to his friend Dr. Tiele.

Dr. Kuenen's lectures on Ethics, entirely overlooked by some biographers, receive adequate mention. It was a favorite topic, on which he continued to lecture at his own request, after he was assigned in 1877 to the department of Old Testament literature. His ethical courses were fully attended and were more popular than those on the Old Testament, where the problems involved were of less general human interest and demanded more linguistic preparation as well as critical acumen.

But in this department, despite repeated solicitation, Kuenen published

nothing, and left no material suitable in form and adequate in amount for publication. It is interesting to learn that, after he had written his work on "Prophecy and Prophecy in Israel" as a special favor to his friend, Dr. John Muir, of Edinburgh, the work was, as far as possible, withdrawn from circulation by Dr. William Muir. Though himself a thorough student of Israel, the latter wished to save the memory of his brother from the ill-repute which, in his opinion, resulted from the connection of his name with a work advocating the positions maintained by Dr. Kuenen. Of Dr. Kuenen's chief contributions to Old Testament study, "De Godsdiens van Israël" and the "Historisch-kritisch Onderzoek," Dr. Tiele speaks with the same appreciation as do Professor Toy and Mr. Weirwood. Here, indeed, his mastery is universally recognised, and the world of specialists is nearly unanimous in the opinion that Dr. Kuenen was the first to write a really critical history of Old Testament religion. His "Vader Godsdiens en Wereldgodsdiens" is not, in Dr. Tiele's opinion, of such high value throughout, as in some parts he was obliged to depend too largely on the investigations of others. But even here Kuenen is well informed and exact, and his book is a valuable contribution to theological science.

Dr. Kuenen was not by temperament a prophet, in touch with the masses, zealous for reform, and burning with holy fire against established error, like the aid whom he so thoroughly studied: he was not one of the great discoverers who open to the world new realms of knowledge, — he was a scholar, versatile yet painstaking, of wide learning, yet remarkable for mastery of details, — a prince of critics, as Canon Cheyne calls him, humane in character, and wise in counsel, who moved as a natural master among men, — a veritable sage.

H. P. FORBES.

ST. LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY, LANTON, N. Y.

Canon and Text of the Old Testament. By Dr. FRANK BUEHL, Ordinary Professor of Theology at Leipzig. Translated by Rev. JAMES MACFARLANE, M. A. Edinburgh. I & II. Clark. 1892. 7s. 6d.

Dr. Buehl left in 1889 his professorship of Theology and Oriental Languages in the University of Copenhagen to occupy in the University of Leipzig the place made vacant by the death of Dr. Franz Delitzsch. This translation is from the German of 1885, which is now a somewhat enlarged edition of a manual first appeared in Leipzig in 1867. For the English edition Professor Buehl has himself supplied some references in recent literature not found in the German text, the translation was at the author's request, with some contributions in the subject by British scholars.

Within less than one hundred pages the author treats in a critical and helpful way the history of the Old Testament canon to which the first vol. — 2s. 6d. — is devoted.

part of the manual is devoted. In the very brief Introduction we read: "The history of the Old Testament Canon has generally been given in the form of an account of the style and manner in which the Jews established the number and extent of the sacred writings. . . . It must, however, be now quite evident that the task lying before us consists in tracking out the historical process itself, which, within the limits of Judaism, gave authority to the writings of the Old Testament revelation as canonical and distinguished from them the writings that did not belong to revelation." The task thus defined the author works out under the two divisions, "The Old Testament Canon among the Jews," and "The Old Testament Canon in the Christian church."

After discussing briefly the three canonical divisions of the sacred writings, Professor Buhl goes on to notice what he considers the initial stage in this historical development. "As the beginning of the construction of the canon properly so called among the Jews, . . . we take that particular period when Ezra, at whose side Nehemiah stood during the latter half of the fifth century before Christ, introduced among the Jews 'the Book of the Law,' . . . as 'canonical' Scripture, and made it the ruling standard for their religious and social life. The solution of the much contested, and as yet by no means solved, questions regarding the existence and enforcement of this law during the pre-exilian period, is a matter to be determined by the special science of Pentateuch criticism."

Of the discovery and publication of the Book of the Law in the time of Josiah, 621 B. C., the author does not say anything in this connection; nor does he here consider how much of the present Pentateuch Ezra read, or whether there may be in it elements later than the time of this reading. These questions of detailed criticism, however, do not come within the sphere of a manual on the canon.

Turning now to the second collection, that of the prophetic books, Professor Buhl accepts witnesses such as 1 Macc. iv. 46, ix. 27, xiv. 41; and The Song of the Three Children, v. 14, as proof that "the Jews of the Greek age acknowledged that they were a people without prophets. . . . And as they became more and more convinced of this fact, after the silencing of the loud voices of the prophets, they must have felt impelled to bring together in one complete whole the prophetic writings transmitted to them, the historical books, comprising utterances of the old prophets as well as the properly prophetic books, and to attach this collection, as a second group of sacred and inspired writings, to the Law." That the historical works Joshua-Kings were received into this second collection because they were supposed to have been composed by prophets properly so called, the author says is by no means certain. He holds it very probable that they were received into this collection "merely because they contained occasional utterances of the old prophets, such as Samuel, Nathan, Ahijah, etc., by means of which the entire historical narrative was, so to speak, sanctioned."

The date at which this collection of prophetic writings was made canonical, Wildeboer conjectures to have been about 200 B. C.¹ Professor Buhl thinks that in the passage 2 Macc. ii. 13, referring to a library founded by Nehemiah, there may be a "reminiscence of the historical preparations for the canonization of the Prophets and the Hagiographa." But the date 200 B. C. he considers too late for the canonization, "if these writings were not only recognized as canonical by Ben Sirach, writing about B. C. 170, but were also circulated in a Greek translation as early as B. C. 140. . . . But how far one will have to go back it is impossible with the means at our disposal to determine. We might ask whether the allusions of the chronicler, living about B. C. 300, to a prophetic-historical work different from our books of Samuel and Kings, do not imply the assumption that 'the Prophets' were not then as yet regarded as canonical, in which case we would obtain the year B. C. 300 as the *terminus a quo*."

With respect to the third division of the canon, the author, after discussing the date and nature of references to its various books, reaches the conclusion "that even the third part of the Old Testament writings, which in the time of Ben Sirach was as yet without firmly determined limits, had its canon finally closed, even before the time of Christ, although we know nothing as to how or by whom this was accomplished; enough that the canon and the clear idea of the canon were there, and formed the basis of a definite dogmatic theory of the sacred writings. But just this dogmatic theory called forth various doubts and objections with reference to particular books, which made a revision of the canon necessary. This revision was made at Jamnia, and was afterwards confirmed in the Mishna. Its result was the establishment of all previously canonized books." That this revision of Jamnia should occur in the later years of the first century of the Christian era the author finds quite in keeping with the social-religious condition of the Jews at this period. They felt the need of a firm and unassailable Scripture for comfort and for defense. Closely related, too, with this same condition of things were the efforts of the time to secure for these Scriptures a definite and standard text.

To the history of this text, external and internal, editions, versions, etc., Professor Buhl devotes the second and larger part of his book. The presentation is clear, critical, and brief, yet affording all necessary information on this intricate subject. In this entire work Dr. Buhl has made an exceedingly helpful contribution to this department of Old Testament study.

Mr. Macpherson, himself a scholar in these things, will receive the thanks of many an English reader for making this book accessible not

¹ G. Wildeboer, *Het ontstaan van den kanon des O. V.* Pp. vi. 166. Groeningen: Wolters. 1889. A translation into German, *Die Entstehung des Alten Testamentslichen Kanons*, appeared in 1891. Gotha: F. A. Perthes.

only, but as well for the way in which he has done his work. There are occasional sentences, however, in which one does not quite get the author's meaning. For example, on page 24, line 10 of the translation, Chananiah should be made contemporary with Hillel and the elder Gamaliel; the sentence beginning "Hence it cannot be supposed," page 35, should mean that, when correctly understood, the formation of the prophetic canon cannot be considered as the work of the Great Synagogue; the last line on page 82 should not associate Hahn and Theile, since each had his own edition; the Hebrew words of the substitution mentioned at the top of page 100 are interchanged. The references to Bleek on pages 23 and 28 should be to the fourth edition. In some instances the translator's own ease in following the thought of a long and somewhat involved German sentence made him apparently unmindful that to his readers a sentence of the same length and order in English words might not be so clear.

G. R. FREEMAN.

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL.

Vedische Mythologie. Von ALFRED HILLEBRANDT. Erster Band. Soma und verwandte Götter. Breslau: Wilhelm Koebner.

The widely celebrated plant which in India goes by the name of Soma, and in Persia by the name of Haoma, is the subject of an exhaustive study by the learned professor of Sanskrit in the University of Breslau. In the Veda and in the Avesta alike, the earliest religious practices are permeated strongly with the cult of this plant. The earliest religious heroes of the Avesta are represented in Yasna ix. of the Avesta as having successively pressed the Haoma for their own good and for the happiness of their subjects. The Haoma is the plant, and its juice the drink of the golden age of Zoroastrian antiquities. The late French savant, Abel Bergaigne, in a posthumous essay, published in Volume XIII. of the "Journal Asiatique" (1888), pointed out certain very significant circumstances which seem to tend to show that the so-called "family-books" of the Rig-Veda (books ii.-viii.) are essentially Soma-books, that is, that they were composed to accompany a Soma sacrifice, which is the prototype of the *gyotis Soma* of the later formal ritual, as described in the Sūtras. The Soma is the expressed or implied centre of Vedic religious life, to an extent which cannot easily be paralleled from the religious history of any other people; every part and characteristic of the plant, every act which accompanies the pressure of the intoxicating and inspiring liquid are noticed with sedulous care, and made the basis of religious speculation. The precise extent to which Soma engages sacerdotal activity in the Veda does not as yet, even after Professor Hillebrandt's careful analysis, appear with sufficient clearness. I venture to say that the adjustment in correct perspective of the Soma-cult will ultimately show more than anything else what the Rig-Veda really is. Even now, one may

venture to state that the great mass of the hymns of that collection were composed as a part of the Soma-ritual, that the Rig-Veda is essentially a Soma-book.

The body of Professor Hillebrandt's book is divided, very naturally, into two parts. The first deals with the plant and the liquor which is pressed from it. Every descriptive detail which concerns the branches, the stems, the color, the places where the plant grows, and the modes by which it is procured, is discussed with great care, in order to establish the biological character of the plant. Every circumstance connected with the pressure, the instruments with which the juice is extracted, the vessels into which it is gathered, the times and occasions on which it is drunk, the admixtures with which it is enriched and modified, — all these are stated in order on the basis of the documents. This part of the investigation may be regarded as approximately final, in spite of the essentially negative final result. For Professor Hillebrandt concludes that the plant which was considered as the most excellent by the Indo-Iranians, the remoter ancestors of the Vedic people, was not necessarily the one whose praises they sing, and the plant described in the Veda needs not be the *sarcostemma* of the later tradition. One statement only occurs with unflinching persistence: the fluid is extracted from bright-colored shoots and branches, and this, according to the author, is necessarily so, since the Soma is a "moon-plant" (p. 13). The bright shoots of the plant are the rays of the moon.

This brings us to the second part, the mythological interpretation of Soma, which Professor Hillebrandt advocates with great warmth and exhaustive philological learning. Vedic scholars in general had noticed the positive identification of the moon with Soma, which is, indeed, commonplace in the "second period" of Vedic literature, the Brāhmanas, and continues from that time on through Sanskrit literature. It had been admitted also that this identification is expressed in parts of the Rig-Veda itself, which are supposed to be of somewhat later date than the body of that collection. Here and there a voice had been raised, more or less clearly and confidently, calling for a complete identification throughout the literature (Professors De Gubernatis and Fischel). Professor Hillebrandt undertakes to clarify and establish this view. The moon, in the view of the Vedic Hindu, is not only the still ruler of night. That is only one side of his being and by no means the most important. Incomparably more momentous is the following: The moon contains the drink of the gods. As the stems of the Soma swell in order to yield the juice, so does the moon swell for their nourishment. He is a drop, or a wave, or a well, or a sea in heaven full of sweet nourishment for the gods. In this sense the name Soma later came to be the most common designation of the moon among the Hindus. The Rig-Veda says: "The moon moves along in the (heavenly) waters." This simple physical conception is attributed to Soma as well, and with much

fantastic modulation. Thus Soma is spoken of as the friend and husband of the waters. Since the clouds are constantly spoken of as cows, Soma, the moon, is compared with a bull who stands in the midst of the cows, or he is the young calf of the cloud cows. So frequent are these Somic ideas that the centre of gravity in the mass of Vedic conception, must be moved from solar mythology to lunar mythology. The sun recedes, and in his place the moon rules Vedic religious thought.

I confess that I am not altogether convinced in the sense which the author desires to convince. I have, for my part, no objection to offer to most of the concrete results of Professor Hillebrandt's investigation. I have no hesitation in helping to remove the artificial barrier which the earlier investigators of the Veda have built about certain parts of the Vedic hymnal literature to the exclusion of other parts. The analogies in the life and environment of the moon, which have led to his identification with the Soma-plant in its sacrificial treatment, are likely, nay, most likely, to have suggested themselves in the time of the Rig-Veda, the Somic time *par excellence*, as much as, or more than in later times. But the question arises, How much of this is sacrificial symbolism, and how much is genuine identification? Professor Hillebrandt believes that Haoma in the Avesta is also to be identified with the moon, but the proofs which he adduces are few and inconclusive. The treatment of the Haoma-plant in the Avesta is not reported in sufficient detail to justify the belief that the same *rapprochement* to the moon took place. The conception of the equivalence of Soma and the moon is impossible if we eliminate the sacerdotal ritual of a highly developed type, such as we find indicated in the songs of the Rig-Veda. In any case it seems difficult to conceive of the identification of the moon with Soma upon a basis of free popular thought. It is speculative; it is Talmudical; it savors of the priestly imagination. Even if it does permeate the Rig-Veda, the fact would only tend, along with many others, to show how far advanced the Rig-Veda is in this direction. The Rig-Veda is inconceivable without a background of a highly speculative and ritualistic religion, and as a part of this we may properly consider the identification of Soma and the moon.

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Lectures on the Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages.

From the papers of the late WILLIAM WRIGHT, LL. D., Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1890. Pp. xi., 280.

It is fitting that the first attempt at a comparative grammar of the Semitic Languages should come from the veteran professor at Cambridge. In such studies Semitic science is behind Indo-European, partly because

Semitic scholars have, of late, been so largely occupied in working up details, and partly because the Semitic languages do not offer the variety which in its sister-family stimulates students to the examination of the general laws of morphology. Renan's vast undertaking, which included a history of the Semitic languages on all sides, never advanced beyond his introductory volume ; it has been reserved for the English professor to make a beginning in Comparative Semitic Grammar. Professor Wright began to lecture on this subject as long ago as 1877, and continued to revise his manuscript up to his death ; the present volume was printed after his death, under the editorial care of Professor W. Robertson Smith.

After a general survey of the Semitic peoples, and their languages and dialects, the author treats of the origin of Semitic writing and the permutations of letters ; and then of the pronoun, noun and verb. These discussions are characterized by his well-known learning and judiciousness ; his book is an admirable compend of the subject, and an excellent starting-point for investigation. I say "starting-point," because it seems to have been Professor Wright's design "not to produce a complete system of Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages, or to give a complete account of all recent researches and discussions, but to do through the press for a wider circle of students what he had done by the oral delivery of lectures for his Cambridge pupils." He does not treat of the forms of the noun, and devotes only a few words to broken plurals. He bases his results mainly on Aramaic, Hebrew, Arabic and Ethiopic, making few references to Assyrian. He has thus deliberately excluded from the book a certain quantity of material. But, within the limits which he imposes on himself, his treatment of the facts is admirable. Much connected with the origins of Semitic forms is obscure, and no large mass of results in any such book will meet with universal acceptance ; but this compact statement will prove very useful in the furtherance of the study of Semitic Grammar.

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
Har-Moad, or the Mountain of Assembly. A Series of Archæological Studies, chiefly from the Standpoint of the Cuneiform Inscriptions. By Rev. O. D. MILLER, D. D., North Adams, Mass. 1892. 8vo. pp. xxi., 445.

This book is a melancholy example of much industry and enthusiasm expended to no purpose. The exemplary character and devotion of the author made him many friends in his life-time, and it can only be a matter of regret that the present work has been published since his death. It is stated by the publisher that the spirit and intent of the book is "to teach a primitive revelation written in the heavens : first, inscribed astronomically and zodiacally on the eastern sky ; then historically on the northern heavens which overlook the mountain of the Assembly, the Har-

Moad of Isaiah, the Olympus of all Asia. Out from the Gan-Eden of Genesis — to the East, to the West, to the South — the author has traced the earliest traditions of mankind; then, from the widely separated countries to which the cultured races of antiquity had migrated, he has retraced the same traditions to their common origin, on the high tablelands of Central Asia." In carrying out this plan, the author has proceeded without regard to the laws of philological and historical criticism, and his book so far as regards its main purpose, is absolutely without value. This is the more noteworthy, as he seems to be acquainted with good books, on the subjects of which he writes, though it must be added that he mingles good and bad without much discrimination. A fair example of his mode of procedure is found in the following sentence (p. 73): "I think the most rigid linguistic criticism ought to admit an original and direct relationship between the Aryan radicals *Ak* and *Tak* and the Accadian terms *Ak* and *Tak*, together with the derived forms respectively appertaining to them." The great undigested mass of statements in the book may easily lead unwary readers to suppose that it reaches some result.

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